JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUESVOLUME XXV, NUMBER I, 1969

For a Sociology of Evil*

Kurt H. WolffBrandeis University

Certainly in some, probably in most, very likely in all of his activities asa social scientist, the social scientist by what he does inevitably intervenes in,interferes with, meddles in the social process.

If this "social science is social action theorem" (Seeley, 1963,56) is true, it follows that social-science neglect, too, makes itselffelt in society. Such neglect exists in regard to evil: to my knowl-edge, no social scientist, as a social scientist, has asked whatevil is.

"What is evil"? is a question that has rather been raised(both in the West and in the East) by philosophers and theolo-gians, as well as by uncounted, unclassified, unrecorded peoplesince time immemorial. Here, most social scientists, however, willnot feel negligent but virtuous and self-evidently so: "Of course",they might put it, "the exploration of the nature or essence ormeaning of evil obviously is not our concern; it is a concern for the

•Talks with Ruth Meyer and with Juan E. Corradi, Roger Pritchard, AliceStewart, and Barrie Thorne, friends and students; responses to a first version ofthis paper in French (see Note 1) by Carroll Bourg, S.J., Mihailo Markovic,Barrington Moore, Jr., Paul Ricoeur, John R. Seeley, Hans Weil, Walter A.Weisskopf; comments on an earlier draft in English by members of a seminar onthe topic at Brandeis University, Fall 1967-68, especially Stephen D. Berkowitz,Y. Michael Bodemann, but particularly Mario Mantano and Andrew Strick-land, as well as by Milton Rokeach and Ralph K. White; finally critical readingsof this essay itself by Montano and Strickland have influenced and helped me.I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to all these persons.

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philosopher and the theologian! All we do and legitimately can dois ascertain (as well as possible) what men, what certain menconsider evil. We study beliefs about evil, conceptions of it, attitudestoward it, the moral code of a given society or other group, andso on; in short, we explore what is called evil; but as social scien-tists, we do not and cannot commit ourselves to a conception ofevil, because if we did, we would by definition no longer be socialscientists but, precisely, become philosophers or theologians". Or,as they might not put it, in their nominalism and the practiceattendant on it, social scientists commit themselves to a sciencewhich claims not to know what evil is, not to be responsible forknowing it or seeking to know it, and which, they are convinced,would indeed lose its character of science if it founded its investi-gations of evil on its own conception of it.

Social Science Neglects to Raise Thisand Other Questions

This social science is characterized not only by the neglectto raise the question at issue—as well as many other questionswhich it considers equally non-scientific—but also by certainrelated, typically unacknowledged, theoretical consequencesof conceptions of truth, particularly scientific truth, and of the re-lations between student and subject matter. Is and Ought, theoryand practice, knowledge and its application, and science andhistory, society, politics and ethics. This is not the place to enterinto any of the problems connected with this^—for they affect thetreatment or nontreatment of many topics—evil is only one ofthem.

Even more conspicuous than studies of people's conceptionsof evil are two other relations between social science, especiallysociology, and the investigation of evil. On the one hand, there isthe "classical tradition" which puts sociology at the service ofimproving the society studied, whether we think of Marx, Comte,Spencer, Durkheim, Max Weber, or others among its representa-tives. On the other hand, there is the plethora of research into"social problems", that is, into evib, which are, however, con-ceived as such characteristically not by specified groups, but bysome sort of anonymous "middle-of-the-road" (American) soci-ety, with which their student, probably in contradiction to theconception of sociology he would profess if he were pressed, mightwell agree. (For an attempt at specification, cf. Mills, 1963.)

For an analysis of some of them, see an earlier version of this paper(Wolff, 1967, esp. 197-205).

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The representatives of the "classical tradition", no matterhow different from one another, share a more or less explicit con-ception of history. Both features, but particularly the latter, areabsent from the "social pathologists". The one characteristicthat the two groups have in common is a desire to ameliorateextant society—though the former consciously and more or lessas an admitted task of their activity, the latter blushingly, giventheir vaunted "freedom from value judgments". The latter, andsociologists typically, in this country probably more than else-where, do not judge what they study, or judge it unwittingly—butif they do at all, it is more likely to be on the basis of their privateviews which, according to their conception of social science, oughtnot to "contaminate" it. They do not tell us, or do not tell usfrankly, what they consider evil or, for that matter, evils: theirconception of social science cannot tell them. Instead of having aconception of evil, they take over the conceptions of others andmake their studies of evils (among other things) in accord withthese conceptions, if not by contract or on order. Their position,role and professional type approach those of the "organizationman".

Evil: the Western Tradition and TodayWhy is this so? Perhaps we can try for an answer by glimps-

ing at the history of the Western conception of evil and at con-temporary society.

This conception is marked, above all, by the Judaeo-Christian tradition, particularly its Christian component, whetherOriginal Sin or Glad Tidings be considered the core of Christian-ity. The Western conception of evil would thus have dissipatedwith the dissipation of that tradition, especially of Christianityitself. Owing perhaps to the personal and particular loyalties thatcharacterize it—to Jesus, to saints and priests, to the Protestant'sindividual conscience—owing to this "particularism", Christian-ity seems difficult to reconcile with the "universalism" (bothterms in Talcott Parsons' sense) that characterizes industrial,technological, bureaucratic society, whether capitalist or socialist(despite the fact that there is a line connecting certain features of"universalism" with certain features of Protestantism). Thisdifficulty obviously accounts for much of the controversy andmovement that has for some time agitated many churches—theCatholic Church notably since John XXIII. The heritage of theChristian conception of evil, at any rate, even though modified,diluted, deformed, is rooted in us, and the combination of thisheritage with the historical development that is hard to reconcile

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with it goes some way toward accounting for the incapacity ofpresumably a great many individuals today to form a viable con-ception of evil, one for which they—we—could truly answer.

God Has Been Replaced by Other AbsolutesTo put it differently: God has been replaced by other

absolutes—State, Race, the Future of a given People, if not ofMankind, to which the present generation must be sacrificed (cf.Camus, 1958, esp. 282). Millions of men have been victimized bythese absolutes and in their riame have victimized others. Thebad conscience or unease hovering about this remains to be ascer-tained. When infidels or witches were persecuted and killed, badconscience and unease are likely to have been covered up by theconviction of acting in the name of God^although the persecuteddied as irrevocably as if they had fallen prey to Hitler, Stalin, atraffic crash or napalm. Recognition of mishandling the nameof God played, however, its role in the Reformation, which,among other things, was a secularization of Catholicism in thesense that it questioned previously unquestioned aspects of Godand their abusive institutionalization on earth.

Yet the suffering inflicted in the name of more recent abso-lutes is much less limited than that perpetrated in the name ofGod: the numbers and the categories of people that punishment,misery and death can attain have grown enormously with demo-cratization and with technology, especially that of communica-tion, transportation and destruction. Modern social control thusis far more total and cruel, as well as efficient, than ever before,when "crimes against mankind" had not yet begun to be recog-nized as such. They were first named and punished at Nurembergbut have also been perpetuated for years in Vietnam by American"fire power", "especially air power (Harvey estimates . . . [itspjeponderance over the Vietnamese] at about 1000 to 1)":"crimes against mankind" have not yet entered the consciousnessand conscience of mankind, so that "American Huey troops atVinh Long" (soldiers hovering in a Huey Hog, "a convertedtransport helicopter which has been remade into a floating firingplatoon with the fire power of a World War II infantry battalioncrammed aboard")

didn't hurl impersonal thunderbolts from the heights in supersonic jets.They came muttering down to the paddies and hootch lines ["rows ofhouses along a road or canal"], fired at close range and saw their oppo-nents disintegrate to bloody rags 40 feet away (Harvey, 1967, quoted byCrichton, 1968).

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If ever these men conceive of their actions as evil, they don'tact in accord with their conception. Thus: if "no poetry afterAuschwitz", what social science in the face of such bestiality?Will there be a Nuremberg for the American military and theirWashington directors, or will it be impossible to distinguish theEichmanns among all of us? Yet to

be silent about that which we cannot grasp is the only adequate mode ofbeing; the only adequate mode of being before that which we cannot graspis not to be silent about it. Between these contradictory truths lies ourdilemma, for we can neither be silent nor speak; we must speak, but wecannot speak (Wolff, 1961, 14).

The Paralyzing Suspension . . .This dilemma has taken historical body in our paralyzing

suspension between two impossible worlds: one in which we canno longer believe, a world ordered by religious directives andmoderations; and one which we cannot bear, a world withoutthese directives and moderations. We are alienated from bothof them, which nevertheless alone seem the worlds at our disposal.This, perhaps, is the reason why we have not succeeded in articu-lating a conception of evil that would be adequate to the secular-ized world in which we in fact live, but which has left evil itself, incontrast to space, cancer, the Greeland Icecap, and innumerableother phenomena and problems, comparatively unexplored, om-inously sacred and threatening. Evil is no longer committed inthe name of God, is less than ever "legitimated" by religious oreven moral motives, and is covered over by political, economicand technological reasons, and on a larger scale than ever—butthe cover can also be seen through, and is seen through, by morepeople than ever. And there is evil, such as the suffering and deathcaused by famine and epidemics, that the technology and eco-nomy we have developed could eliminate if we applied them tothis end, instead of submitting to other orders we also have devel-oped, notably the relations and the distribution of power, and thedistribution and, especially, nondistribution of economic products.

Max Weber's DiagnosisThe decisive difference between the two worlds is that the

first is done with, while the second is there for us to work on soit may become one we can affirm. Here Max Weber's work (Mar-cuse, 1968) can be of much help, not only in its analytic powerbut also in its symptomatic character. The Protestant Ethic and theSpirit of Capitalism, in particular, has a significance at once morevast and specific than tends to be recognized. For it deals not only

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with the two phenomena indicated in its title but conjures up,for Weber as well as for us, a much larger complex, which pro-foundly troubled Weber himself, and which is made up, beyondthe remnants of ascetic Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism,by the associated elements of bureaucracy, functional (technical,instrumental) rationality, secularization, impersonality and con-trol. In other words, it represents the second of the two worldsmentioned, modern industrialized society. It is this complex andthose and related elements that make us feel frustrated, alienated,powerless, vicarious, anonymous, etc., as we so often say. Beyondanalyses, discussions, laments, however, there also are more activeand practical responses, suffering, and political action. MaxWeber's intent was to account for the rise of the spirit of capital-ism; but what this account can mean for us was probably asunintended by him as was, from the point of view of Galvinism,capitalism itself.̂

Let us recall these features of the Protestant-capitalist com-plex: labor, work, making, producing, discipline, asceticism,control, specialization, bureaucracy, profit. Being parts of awhole, they are related, as are our responses to them. In terms ofthis list, capitalism and the reaction to it, socialism, which hasbecome the other variant of modern industrialized society, aremuch more alike than unlike.

This society goes back far beyond the present generation,and so does its critique—it is enough to recall Marx himself,Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Utopian communities, communistand socialist movements; and there are many other indicationsin the arts, philosophy and theology. What is new is the extra-ordinarily accelerated development of this society during the lastdecades. Some of its results are Stalinism, Nazism, and fascism,more generally, the A- and H-bomb, electronics, the explorationof space. Perhaps the most general reaction to them is a feeling ofpuzzlement, foreboding and ignorance and, more recently, the

^Capitalism as what Robert K. Merton might call "an unintended conse-quence of purposeful social action" is suggested by Talcott Parsons: "Onecannot say that the Calvinistic ethic or any of its legitimate derivatives everapproved money-making for its own sake or as a means to self-indulgence, whichwas, indeed, one of the cardinal sins. What it did approve was rational, system-atic labor in a useful calling which could be interpreted as acceptable to God.Money was, certainly in the beginning, regarded as a by-product and one by nomeans without its dangers. The attitude was, that is, an ascetic one. But eventhis served capitalistic interests since, on the one hand, work in economic callingswould serve to increase earnings but, on the other, the fear of self-indulgencewould prevent their full expenditure for consumption" (Parsons, 1937, 526-527).Thus it looks like a double surprise: first, capitalism, then the meaning for usof Weber's analysis of it.

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protest against such particular features as the proliferation ofnuclear weapons and the war in Vietnam. But there are manymore indirect reactions, that nevertheless are equally, if not moreinstructive in regard to the society in which we live: the wide-spread feeling of alienation and the widespread concern withalienation; the resistance against control and manipulation on thepart of ever younger people, particularly students; the distrustof their elders; the civil-rights struggle; the ecumenical movement;the formation of various groups who protest or withdraw, fromBeats to Hippies and Diggers; developments in art—pop-art,happenings, art in the service of politics; certain governmentalprograms, especially the anti-poverty program; certain develop-ments in the social sciences, for instance, action anthropology(Wolff, 1958, 1959, 1964). A few words about some of these willshow their relevance in our context.

AlienationAlienation places a distance not only between the individual

and his society but also within himself, between him and whateverhe might believe reality to be (Keniston, 1967). Much of what thealienated encounters, including himself, is unreal, and he longsfor the real. He may try to find it in psychic states induced bydrugs; he may be tired of the centuries-old sermon on deferred,indefinitely deferred gratification, and seek it now; he may "turnon" (but notice the mechanical metaphor) by, for instance, lettingmusic, in turn turned on full-blast, invade him. He may be lesspervasively alienated and instead reject more definable and par-ticular aspects of his society, notably persons, especially hisparents and his elders generally, whom he believes to suffer fromthis world as he does but whom he may also hold responsible forits horror. Or he may rebel against certain of these features thathe resents as particularly objectionable, such as control andmanipulation—despite the official veneration of science, as ifscience were nothing but the highest expression of this control.Or he may do more than rebel, joining others in trying to leavethis society physically, socially, emotionally, perhaps founding acommunity. This may be no more than withdrawal or, as in thecase of the Diggers, may also entail action on concern andkindness.

^Despite this veneration, its more spontaneous distrust is shown, e.g., inscience fiction in the decreasing confidence in the scientist as the human typewho solves "social problems"—which are rather left to the native of otherplanets, suggesting that the faith in the magic of science had resurrected theolder magic of the deus ex machine (Hirsch, 1962, 267).

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FightOthers react to this society by attempting to improve it,

working, for instance, for civil rights or in the ecumenical move-ment. A few try to understand how certain children and adultsrisk their lives doing what strikes them in particular as right—howthey fight evil (Coles, 1967); or they attempt—as the late C. WrightMills, or Herbert Marcuse, Barrington Moore, or KennethKeniston-—to understand this society historically and critically;or they engage in political actions of many kinds.

Concerning our society, various forms of art, most obviouslycaricature and cartoon, but also certain mime and pantomimeplays, use irony and sarcasm; in other forms expectations arebroken—from the trompe-l'oeuil to the happening ("it isn't as youthink it is"), which may, like the social "no", pass into a "yes",into the effort to "feel real" to "have an experience", if only to beshocked out of numbness. This consideration points to antecedentdevelopments in art—surrealism, dadaism, expressionism, andin literature, from the contemporary "new novel", in whichthe object replaces or does for the subject, to Kafka, Joyce,Henry James, imagism, stream-of-consciousness writing. Mar-shall McLuhan too, finds his place here, with his insistence onovercoming controlled unilinearity and the eye's monopoly infavor of the appeal to all the senses or, in Norman O. Brown'swords, polymorphism.

International RelationsThe most obvious problem of modern industrial society lies

in international relations, though less, despite its magnitude, inthe precarious relation between the two variants of this society,capitalist and communist, than between both and those that areneither, the "developing nations", the "third world". The truthof Marx's adage that the root is not society, but man, showsitself when man comes to the fore and fights—most dramaticallyas a guerrilla—against the whole "military-industrial complex".The political outcome surely is uncertain; thus in Vietnam, anincreasing number even of observers who are members of thatcomplex admit that our machinery is not equal to guerrilla war-fare; in Latin America, the success of the guerrillas appears tohave been set back by Che Guevara's assassination; in the UnitedStates itself, the future seems impenetrable—but of more impor-tance than almost anywhere else.

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Max Weber's Diagnosis TodayMax Weber's methodological tenets, notably his misleading

and widely misread insistence on a value-free social science, butalso his dangerously elliptic formulation of the ethics of respon-sibility and of principle, suggest his position at the end of a periodduring which men took it for granted that the nation was thelargest unit of social organization. Characteristic of Weber's posi-tion was that he felt urged to diagnose his society and his timebut that he insisted on doing so outside sociology. "No oneknows"—to recall a famous passage at the end of The ProtestantEthic—"-who will live in this cage of the future" (the "iron cage"that the "light cloak" of the Puritans' "care for external goods"had become)

or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely newprophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals,or if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convul-sive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, itmight well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists withoutheart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization neverbefore achieved". But with this [Weber checks himself], we get into thefield of value judgments and judgments of faith, with which this purelyhistorical presentation shall not be burdened (Weber, 1958, 182; author'stranslation of the last sentence).

If we take Weber, the whole man, and not only that part ofhis that he himself admitted into his sociology, then by bringinghis diagnosis to bear on ourselves, we are acting on his intent.We placed Protestantism and capitalism into the complex ofwhich they are a part and from which Weber had isolated themfor scientific analysis, and we are trying to understand the wholeof this complex today. The reactions to it we have sketched, towhich many could be added, suggest that we are closer to the endof Weber's period than he was, or are already into the beginningof a new one, of which we know as little as Marx could know aboutthe reign of freedom that was to follow the reign of necessity.

On the basis of the diagnosis suggested, the task of the sociol-ogist is to analyze and interpret responses to our society such ashave been illustrated. To vary Marx's formula of the change fromnecessity to freedom, we can adopt Marcuse's {Eros and Civiliza-tion) of the change from life under the performance principle,which we all know, to life under the pleasure principle, of whichwe have only the most fleeting notions: under the guidance andcompulsion of the former, we have produced so many things andso much knowledge that we can afford the most radical changein man's history: to a society that would be acceptable to anunprecedented majority of men because they would consider it

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good on unprecedently mature reflection. Not only this change,but also its outcome is almost impossible to imagine. Still, it isquite possible, if it is not likely, that in the short run we shall bedead, but that the prospects for those who come after us, if weourselves attend to this change with everything at our command,are unimaginably better than is the world in which we live.

For a Sociology of Evil

This suggests what one sociologist, at least, might argue asgood: a necessary Utopian society, whose seed he recognizes inours. Evil, therefore, would be the failure to recognize and fightall that would choke this seed: injustice, misery, sham and theiristitutional arrangements that favor and facilitate these. Anhistorically adequate conception of evil cannot locate it in theindividual, as evil deed, sin or vice (which, of course, exist), norin myth, religion or philosophy (not that its mythical, religiousand philosophical dimensions are not relevant today, too), butmust locate it in society and in the individual's relations to society.

Hence, the tasks of a sociology of evil: to study the variousreactions to our society that have been mentioned, or other, simi-lar ones, in an effort to specify the corresponding characteristicsof this society, thus this society itself, and what of it needs change,and how.

It may be objected that such an undertaking is possible with-out reference to evil, in another perspective or, indeed, withoutan explicitly formulated one. It may also be objected that theundertaking, in whatever perspective, is superfluous because weknow enough already, and what is needed is not study but action.Both objections, if they are counter-suggestions, are nothing butwelcome. What recommends the proposal submitted here is this:(a) The proposal acknowledges and acts on sociology as moralityand praxis which has been neglected, thus helping to reconnectsociology with its historical task and thereby to reestablish, atleast in one area of our intellectual concerns, a believable, affirm-able continuity, (b) It reestablishes a continuity also with theuniversal human preoccupation with good and evil. This contin-uity is expressed and denied—expressed, e.g., in nightmares,neuroses, psychoses, anxiety, aggression, violence; denied, e.g., inthe widely observable reluctance to use the word "evil" and toprefer, instead, less "haunting" words. The enterprise proposedthus has a therapeutic function for those who would act on it, aswell as for persons who would in any way come in contact with it.(c) The neglect to study evil intervenes, and its study will inter-vene—if we recall Seeley's "social science is social action theorem"—"in the social process". On the most modest scale, those

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engaged in the study will find it meaningful, hence feel less alien-ated for it; and this may also apply to some readers of theirfindings. Less modestly, the study may contribute to changing thedefinition of the situation of contemporary society, and thus per-haps to changing this situation and this society themselves.

A Few ExamplesI conclude with a few examples of study complexes that may

serve to make the proposal more concrete by conveying its openand comprehensive character.

First, an Example of One of the Investigations Envisaged by theGeneral Diagnosis That Has Been Suggested:. . . In probably all countries, there are people who recognize

certain aspects of our historical situation and act according-ly: resisting, protesting, rebelling, fighting, destroying,killing, building, planning, constructing, helping, writing,marching, analyzing, proclaiming, preaching. It is alwaysa "No" to aspects they have recognized and a "Yes" toothers whose seeds they discover and want to grow, whetherit is in a peasant revolt or a civil-rights struggle, whetherthe actors are colonials, ex-colonials or students. Is a newconception of evil—less Christian or religious in general,more secularized and more in line with our virtually Oneworld—in the process of developing? One could try to findout by studying both the leaders of many of these types ofactivities and participants at all levels; one would probablyarrive at a number of conceptions of evil. What are the socialsources of these conceptions, and what are their social andpolitical effects? Which are their common traits? Is it pos-sible to ascertain a rather limited number of types of con-ceptions of evil, or perhaps even one, which would bediffused everywhere? What aims might such studies serve,how could their utilization for these aims be justified, howcould they be used, what could be the consequences of theiruse?

An Example of Research into Sociology Itself that isSuggested by the Sociology of Evil Proposed:. . . The type of individual and sociologist who argues this

sociology of evil is himself somebody who acts in accordancewith his recognition of certain aspects of the world in whichhe lives. His own conception of evil finds expression, e.g.,in his insistence that evil be recognized as a topic of social-

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scientific, especially sociological, research. Which type ofsociologist is concerned with evil as a scientific topic; whichtype is not? What has happened in the world that wouldaccount for the change from the second to the first? Is there,in addition to the precarious role of Christianity in a societythat has been partly described, partly predicted by GeorgeOrwell twenty years ago in 1984, also the precarious situa-tion of the white man and of Western domination that hasbeen predicted fifty years ago by Oswald Spengler in TheDecline of the West? The social psychologist who studies so-cialization, aggression, resentment, prejudice; the psychi-atrist who studies neuroses and psychoses; the culturalanthropologist who studies the variety of cultures, includingthe variety of moral codes; the sociologist who studies slums,crimes, vice are probably more sensitive than others to theproblematic and dangerous aspects of our world. But manyof them separate their profession from their life, hold on toa "value-free" social science, and try to practice it. Whatis the origin, beyond Max Weber, of this social science?(Recall the change from the Hegelian conception to positiv-ism: Marcuse, 1960.) Its practitioners have probably spreadnot only their knowledge but also their personal sensitivityto social phenomena far beyond the social sciences them-selves. Is this, however, comparable to knowledge diffusedby the mass media in having contributed less to the enlight-enment than to the disorientation of the general social con-sciousness and to its increased disturbance?

A Few Examples of Sociological Analyses of MaterialsNot Originally Found in Sociology but Relevant to the Inquiry:. . . From sin to complex. Origin and development of the psy-

chological interpretation of the infraction of moral norms,including changes in attitude toward such infractions, espe-cially the shift from judgment and condemnation to under-standing and explanation. Development of efforts to correctand improve the behavior of those who breach norms.Changes in the significance attributed to the thought ofinfraction as against the act of infraction. All these aspectsto be investigated in relation to social situations and struc-tures and their changes. One of the lessons of the researchcould be the answer to the question that both the authorand his readers might ask: what is a justifiable attitudetoward his or their own behavior and that of others—criticalor understanding, moral or psychological?

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Mythology and Practice of Ordeals. . . What conceptions of evil can be deduced from ordeals de-

scribed in myths; what conceptions of evil, from ordeals thathave in fact been practiced? What can we infer about thenature of ordeals and corresponding conceptions of evil froman analysis of the mythical as against the practical context(circumstances, explanations, frequency, consequences) ofordeals? What does the study of ordeals suggest if we com-pare them with investigations that suspected persons under-go in our own society (examinations and cross-examinations,lie-detector, brainwashing, punishments and humiliationsto discover the truth or obtain a statement, etc.)? To whatextent can such studies change our own attitudes towardsuch measures?

Evil in Dreams. . Dreams about particular evils, their imagery of evil, infer-

ences as to the dreamer's conception of evil, comparison ofthis conception with that of the awake person. Specialattention should be paid to relations between evil andanxiety, fear, and the mechanisms by which what is fearedbecomes an evil or evil. The importance of these mechan-isms for our understanding of the relations between anxiety,fear and mythical figures and symbols of evil, of the phenom-enon of the scapegoat and, more generally, prejudice—including the importance for our understanding of thesephenomena in ourselves.

When Does Who Think About Evil?. . One could begin by studying socialization, in the course

of which people acquire their ideas of evil. What ideas ofevil are taught during socialization, what importance forthe individual is given them? For which manifestations ofevil, which the researcher knows from other sources, does(a given case of) socialization not, or inadequately, preparethe (given) individual? A comparison of what the studentknows about conceptions of evil acquired in the course ofsocialization and what he knows about evil(s) that exist inthe world can furnish him with hypotheses concerningevil(s) for which socialization does not prepare, or insuffi-ciently prepares, the individual. These hypotheses can thenbe examined by studies of cases where the individual thinksabout evil or otherwise encounters it. Or one could beginwith such cases, wherever one finds them—in scientificliterature, in novels or short stories or by direct investigation

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—in order to try to find an answer to the question of thisinquiry.

What Does the History of Censorship Teach Us Aboutthe History of Conceptions of Evil.^

. . . The inquiry which tries to ascertain it should be accom-panied, as far as available sources allow, by an inquiry intothe diffusion of censored writings and of their readers. Cen-sorship, diffusion of censored books and types of readersshow perhaps more or less marked changes according tothe various contents of the writings. Thus, the history of"pornographic" books is possibly less variable, despite thevariations in the criteria of pornography, than the historyof books censored for theological or political reasons. Inany case, what can we learn from such studies about thenature of evil that expresses itself in this fashion in its moreor less variable relations with social institutions and humantraits—particularly in contemporary society?

The One QuestionObviously, these examples could be multiplied enormously.

In addition to conceptions of evil and their differences and con-vergences; the examination of sociology and sociologists in regardto notions of evil and attitudes toward these; interpretations ofbreaches of moral norms; ordeals; evil in dreams; occasions onwhich types of persons think about evil, and censorship—whatabout (for instance) studies in the etymology and semantics of"evil" and cognate and constrasting words, in one language andcomparatively; inquiries into the place of evil in the history ofphilosophy: into ideas of evil as counter-concepts to ideas of thegood society in works of sociologists and other thinkers; into theantecedents, if such there are, of evil in pre-human animals; orinto the vast relations between evil and technology (of variouskinds) or between evil and law—among many, many others? Nomatter how heterogeneous these areas of research may appear,drawing, as they do on the literatures of sociology, social, child,depth psychology and psychoanalysis, ethics and theology, cul-tural anthropology, law, linguistics, philosophy, history of ideas,social, economic, and intellectual history, animal sociology, ethol-ogy, and genetics, the histories of science and technology, litera-ture and the other arts, and journalism—what makes themcontributions to one central problem is the question that inspiresthem: the question concerning the seeds, in our society, of a better

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one than ours. Is there a more urgent and a more important taskfor sociology?

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