Socrates as Citizen and Social Critic

7/29/2019 Socrates as Citizen and Social Critic

1/37

osiah Ober, Gady on Trial: Socrates as Citizen and Social Critic, in A. Lanni, ed., Athenian Law in its Democratic Context

Center for Hellenic Studies On-Line Discussion Series). Republished with permission in C. Blackwell, ed., Dmos: Classical

Athenian Dem ocracy(A. Mahoney and R. Scaife, edd., e Stoa: a consortium for electronic publication in the humanities

[www.stoa.org], . , J. Ober.

is is a version of an electronic document, part of the series, Dmos: Clas-sical Athenian Democracy, a publication ofe Stoa: a consortium for electronic

publication in the humanities [www.stoa.org]. e electronic version of thisarticle oers contextual information intended to make the study of Atheniandemocracy more accessible to a wide audience. Please visit the site at http://www.stoa.org/projects/demos/home .

Gady on Trial: Socrates asCitizen and Social Critic

Iis artic e was origina y written or t e on ine iscus-

sion series Athenian Law in its Democratic Context,organized by Adriaan Lanni and sponsored by HarvardUniversitys Center for Hellenic Studies. (Suggested Read-ing: Plato,Apology; Plato, rito.)

Socrates of Athens is an enduring presence in the west-ern imagination, in part because he presents us with amass o contra ictions: Most e oquent o men, yet e neverwrote a wor ; ug iest yet most pro oun y attractive; ig-

norant yet wise; wrong u y convicte , yet unwi ing toavoid his unjust execution. Behind these conundrums isa contradiction less oen explored: Socrates is at once themost Athenian, most local, citizenly, patriotic, and other-regarding of philosophers and yet the most cosmopoli-tan, critical, and self-regarding of Athenians. Exploringthat contradiction, between Socrates the loyal Athenian


2/37





citizen and Socrates the philosophical critic of Athenian

society, will help to situate Platos Socrates in an Athenianlegal and historical context; it allows us to reunite Socratesthe literary character and Athens the democratic city thattried and executed him. And this will in turn go a ways inhelping us to understand Platos presentation of the strangelegal and ethical drama of the last days of Socrates andt us Socrates remar a e impact on su sequent genera-tions, in antiquity an mo ernity a i e.

S, C, E

e setting of Platos Apology of Socrates is the publictria o , in w ic Me etus supporte y ot erprominent At enians , serving as a vo untary prosecutor,c arge Socrates wit impiety inc u ing corruption othe youth). A jury of citizens heard the case, presentedas a timed speech of accusation by the prosecutor, fol-lowed by a defense speech of equal length by the accused.e jurors then voted by secret ballot and the votes werecounted. Because a majority ( to ) judged Socratesguilty, each side delivered another speech, advocating a

punis ment. In t ese particu ars, t e tria o owe esta -is e At enian ega proce ure. P atosApo ogypurports

to e Socrates initia speec o e ense, is secon speecresponding to the prosecutors call for his execution, andan informal post-sentencing address to those jurors whohad voted in his favor. Socrates rst speech conforms


3/37





quite closely in form and style to other surviving examples

of Athenian courtroom oratory, but its content is distinc-tive. While it is not possible to determine how accurate the

Apologyis as record of how the historical Socrates actuallydefended himself on that day in ; it is, I think, safeto claim that Platos text is an accurate record of Platosown rst take on the problem of Socrates and Athens:P ato s Socrates, t e iterary c aracter, s etc es out t ecase against imse an i enti es is own a reputationamong the Athenian citizenry as the real issue in the case.He locates the ultimate source of this widespread and ulti-

mately deadly resentment and distrust of himself in deeplyingrained Athenian assumptions and practices.e jurors who heard Socrates case were ordinary

Athenian men, over age , who represented a reasonablecross section of citizen society. Most would have had towor or a iving, a ew mig t e genuine y estitute, a ewot ers per aps were o t e eisure c ass. None was a ega

professional, but most of them were very experiencedconsumers of public rhetoric, they were knowledgeablein the ways that Athenian public speakers attempted to

persuade mass audiences through speech in courtroomand Assembly. When he entered the courtroom, the typi-cal Athenian juror already knew the elaborate unwrittenrules of the game and expected the litigants to play byt ose ru es.

ere were we esta is e r etorica conventions to eo serve ; many jurors must ave sett e more com orta y


4/37





into their seats when Socrates opened his defense with the

standard gambit of claiming to be just a quiet private citi-zen, one who was unfamiliar with the courts, innocent ofrhetorical training, and who now found himself confront-ed with skilled and experienced opponents (ad). iscommonplace (topos), like others employed by Athenianitigants, serve to esta is t e spea ers oya a erence

to a genera y accepte an speci ca y emocratic co e oe ie an e avior. A ong wit exp icit c aims to aving

performed services for thepolis appropriate to ones socialstation, rhetorical topoi sought to integrate the interests of

the litigant-speaker and the audience of jurors.e establishment of the speakers credentials as a usefulcitizen who conformed to standard democratic norms ofbelief and behavior would be interwoven with the substan-tive case establishing a defendants technical innocence.W at t e At enian jury expecte , t en, was or t e e-en ant, Socrates, to try to s ow t roug is r etoric t at

the specic charges were without factual basis, and fur-thermore that they were incredible given his standing asa loyal citizen of the democratic polity. He should, more-

over, explain how the baseless charges came to be lodgedagainst him, in the process exposing his accusers as scoun-drels who were corruptly willing, even viciously eager, toundermine democratic practices. Finally, he might try tos ow t at is own e avior consistent y con orme to amo e o citizen ignity, w i e is opponents t reatene


5/37





the security of each citizen by brazenly violating public

standards.

P A

P atos Apo ogypresents a Socrates w o is very we awareo t ese r etorica conventions an au ience expectationshe had oen been present at trials of others: a) and

more than willing to confound them. Socrates speech isa rhetorical masterpiece. But by its end he has not alignedhimself with the democratic norms embraced by his fel-low citizens. Instead, he has proved that his own political

convictions are drastically at odds with popular views,an t at is irritating, i iosyncratic every ay practice oexamining is e ow At enians an n ing t em pain-u y wanting in wis om , o owe necessari y rom is

convictions. He has demonstrated that he is, by his ownlights, a patriotic citizen who cares deeply about the goodof hispolis and one who consistently acts in what he sees ashis citys best interests; but he has also shown also that, inlight of his own denition of patriotism, Socrates must beregarded as a uniquely patriotic Athenian. Moreover, given

t e pro ematic current con ition o t epo is, or Socratesoing goo means acting as a socia critic: questioning

un amenta At enian e ie s in conversations e inpublic and private spaces of the city.

By the end of the Apology, Socrates has shown (to hisown satisfaction at least) that his accusers are fools, but


6/37





fools appropriate to business as usual in the democratic

state. He has established that he himself is a digniedprivate citizen rather than a pandering politician. But inthe process he has also revealed that an active political life,one that included speaking out in the citizen Assembly, isimpossible for a just man. Finally he has shown that true

ignity was not a socia matter at a , ut rat er an a air ot e in ivi ua sou .

In sum, Socrates position initia y appears quite ana o-gous to the position claimed by the standard Athenianpolitician: both Socrates and politicians claimed to be

civic-minded activists who sought to improve the polis.Yet Socratic politics rejects trying to persuade mass audi-ences and Socratic ethics is a matter of private consciencerather than social control. ese points will have been se-curely established for a sympathetic reader; but they would

e regar e as arrogant an potentia y su versive asser-tions y unsympat etic jurors w o regar e persuasivepublic speeches and social control as essential bulwarks ofthe democratic order.

e defense speech centers on Socrates distinction be-

tween new and old accusers. is structuring tech-nique can be read as a variation on the standard Athenianlegal tactic of dealing with both the facts of the matter (thenew) and with the defendants reputation among the citi-zens t e o . e stan ar approac was to s ow t at t ecurrent c arges against me are at variance wit my repu-tation: e prosecutor says I ave one somet ing wrong,


7/37





but my fellow citizens knowledge about me renders it

impossible to believe that I did what he says. us youjurors must weigh my opponents lying words against myreputation and you should judge me accordingly. If thereare nasty rumors about me oating around, these are theproduct of my opponents slanders. Now Socrates at rstseems to e p aying y t e usua ru es. W en respon ingto t e o c arges t at e investigate t ings eneat t eeart an in t e s y, ma e t e wea er argument e eat t estronger, and taught others to do likewise, Socrates deniesthem and appeals to general public knowledge regarding

his activities:I oer the majority ( oi polloi) of you as witnesses, andI ask you to teach and advise (didaskein kai phrazein)one another; those among you who have heard me inconversation t ere are many o oi) o you in ormeac ot er, p ease, w et er any o you ever ear me

iscussing anyt ing o t at sort .

is call upon the jurymen-citizens to act as character wit-nesses for a defendant sounds pretty standard, but Socrates

immediately introduces a strange note: From that [askingeach other] you will come to know the status of the otherthings that the multitude (hoi polloi) says about me (d).Rather than taking the expected line (by consulting publicopinion you wi earn t at my current accusers are spea -ing a se y , Socrates as s t e jurors to earn y in ivi uainvestigation t at t e genera opinion o t e mass o citi-


8/37





zens (hoi polloi) was false. He seeks, in eect, to establish

a conversational, dialectical relationship among the jurorswhich privileges individual knowledge and rejects the gen-eral knowledge of the many en masse. e key shi is inthe status of the highly charged term oi polloi: many ofyou have heard Socrates and should inform your fellowcitizens o w at you now o im in or er to a si y t es an erous c aims o t e many genera y. In t is s ortpassage Socrates rings t e positive, emocratic mar ingof the term oi polloi into competition with a negative,critical marking of the same term.

Socrates explicitly accepts the priority in time and inimportance to his case of deep-set public opinion (old ac-cusers over new: ac), but he turns the standard rhetori-cal tactic on its head by pointing out the general congruitybetween the current charges and the opinion of himselft at t e citizenry as orme over time: e points out t att e o accusation t at Socrates is an at eistic scienti cinvestigator and a sophistical teacher is the basis of thecurrent charges of impiety and corruption of the youth.e new accusers (the prosecutor and his associates) form

the tip of a much larger iceberg: the prejudice that hadbeen building against Socrates for a very long time.Socrates professes to believe that he is not seriously en-

dangered by the visible new accusers, who, despite theirr etorica s i , , cou e re ute y simp e ogic.

roug cross examination Socrates s ows, or examp e,t at t e ea prosecutor, Me etus, e ieves t at t e At e-


9/37





nian Assemblymen, Councilmen, and jurors all educate

and improve the youth, while only Socrates corruptsthem. is is shown to be illogical by an analogy withhorse training: it is of course true that only one or a fewmen know how to improve horses through training whilehoi polloi, when they try to train horses, actually corruptt em an t e same is true o a ot er anima s a .

e act t at Me etus wi not ac now e ge t e orce ot is argument or t e training o t e At enian yout istaken to show that he has never given any thought to thesubject of education (ec). e problem with this line

of reasoning, from the point of view of persuading the jury,is that most Athenian jurymen would be likely to agreewith Meletus that the Assemblymen and so on did edu-cate the youth through their decisions. us, according toSocrates implied horses=youths analogy, most Atheniansare convicte a ong wit Me etus o giving no care to t ee ucation o t e yout . Rat er t an iso ating is oppo-nent, Socrates reveals that his opponents views are indeedin harmony with those of most Athenians. e juror whois persuaded by Socrates will also set himself against the

ordinary wisdom of the mass of citizens.Socrates has thus set himself a staggering rhetorical chal-lenge: in order to be acquitted he must bring at least in-dividual jurors over to his side, aer having reminded themin no uncertain terms t at it is is opponent w ose posi-tion is in con ormity wit popu ar opinion. Socrates must,in a very s ort time, persua e eac juror to ac now e ge


10/37





that what he has learned since childhood about Socrates

is fundamentally in error. is acknowledgment carriesthe burden of accepting that the way the citizens currentlygain their knowledge about the aairs of thepolis is faulty.Moreover, because of faulty knowledge, it is the citizens enmasse who corrupt the youth of thepolis and only a truly

now e gea e man mig t e a e to improve t em.Having starte o on t is ris y course, Socrates mig te expecte to s ow t at t e o accusations s ou prop-

erly be discounted because they were circulated by tenden-tious enemies and are incongruent with the core beliefs

of democratic ideology. But Socrates makes exactly theopposite point: he admits that he cannot name his oldaccusers or identify the source of the long-circulatingrumors which accuse him (cd). us the jury is le tosuppose that the rumors had arisen spontaneously amongt e citizens as a resu t o is pu ic e avior. is is t esort o spontaneous popu ar rumor t at t e pu ic oratorAeschines (.), for example, would later claim had an al-most divine status and completely legitimate role to play inthe democratic city. Far from attempting to refute that sort

of assumption, Socrates embraces the fact that in the opin-ion of most citizens he was an enemy to the ideals of thedemocracy and he states forthrightly that those who fellinto popular suspicion were likely to be dealt with harshly:But as I said before, a great deal of enmity has risen againstme among many peop e ros po ous), an you now verywe t at t is is true. An t at is w at wi convict me, i I


11/37





am convicted not Meletus, not Anytus, but the grudging

slander and envy of oi polloi. It has convicted many othergood and decent men ollous kai allous kai agathous); Ithink it will convict me; nor will it be surprising if it failsto stop with me (ab).

e Athenian litigant, especially one accused of a crimeagainst t e pu ic i e impiety , was expecte to emon-strate is recor o pu ic uty an , pre era y, to s owt at e not on y per orme t e o cia y man ate servic-es to the state but that he was an avid and voluntary publicbenefactor. Once again, Socrates seems at rst glance to be

playing along. He refers with obvious pride to his recordof military service and underlines that it was service tothe democracy: When the commanders that you ( umeis)elected to command me stationed me at Potidaea and Am-phipolis and Delion, I remained there like anyone else, andran t e ris o eat e . is appea to one s ster ingmi itary recor is a ami iar r etorica topos c . Aesc ines.). But Socrates statement is embedded not in astandard list of state services, but in an explanation of whySocrates would refuse to obey a hypothetical legal order

forbidding him to pursue philosophy.Like other Athenian litigants, Socrates claims to be aseless benefactor of thepolis in that he had exhausted hisprivate resources in the pursuit of the public good (bc,a, ac . Because e oes w at is goo or is e ow citi-zens astoi) or w om e ee s regar , rien s ip umasaspazomai men ai p i o: an a specia c oseness ue


12/37





to kinship (mou engutero este genei: a) despite the danger

to which this exposes him, Socrates claims to be a benefac-tor of the Athenians. But the standard rhetorical claim wasbased on the transfer of material goods from the private es-tate of the litigant to thepolis. By contrast, Socrates claimsthat he should be rewarded for inicting therapeutic painupon is e ows. He amous y exp ains is ene action tot epo is as ana ogous to t e goo one y a ga y to aarge an we re orse, a orse grown s uggis ecause

of its size and in need of being roused I rouse you. I per-suade you. I upbraid you. I never stop lighting on each one

of you, everywhere, all day long. Such a one will not easilycome to you again, gentlemen Perhaps you will swat me,persuaded by Anytus that you may lightly kill. en youwill continue to sleep out your lives, unless the god sendssomeone else to look aer you. (ea)

Socrates equine metap or is tongue-in-c ee e -oioteron eipein: e , ut reca s t e point o is ear ierhorse-training analogy when refuting Meletus: the mass ofAthenian citizens, like their children, can best be regardedas a lazy beast in need of being disciplined by the rare in-

dividual who understands what is in fact good for them.On this reading, popular ideology is no better than a stateof sleep, popular opinions are mere dreams. e peopleonly come awake, and then momentarily, when stung bySocrates. Le to t eir own evices, reamers ave no opeo proper y running t e a airs o t e po is, muc ess o


13/37





improving it. Once again, this is a hard pill for many jurors

to swallow.e peroration of his rst speech gave Socrates one last

chance to confound the expectations of his judges. AnAthenian defendant would oen wind up his plea to thejury with a family tableau; the display in court of youngsons, re atives, an rien s was an expression o so i aritywit t e citizenry as a ins ip group an remin e t ejury o t e consequences to t epo is o removing t e eaof a family. Socrates pointedly refuses to engage in thistouching ritual (ce).Moreover, instead of simply saying

I wont be bringing on my three sons, Socrates pointedlyreminds the members of the jury that they themselves, aslitigants, may have used the tableau tactic (c). He thenclaims that such behavior in his case would be shamefulaischron) and oensive to his personal reputation (doxa)an t at o t epo is. W y? Because e is regar e as a su-perior sort o person an istinct rom oi po oi ea .Furthermore, it would be impious, since attempting toinvoke pity might seem to be a way of urging the jurorsto foreswear their oath to judge according to the evidence

bd). Here, Socrates overtly sets himself up as morallysuperior to hoi polloi, the ordinary men who made up thejury: cowardly behavior in which you indulge is shamefulfor a distinguished man like me. He establishes a separatestan ar o igni e e avior or imse t at is ar re-move rom t e emocratic notion o citizen ignity as


14/37





protection against verbal or physical insult by the power-

ful.Democratic dignity was regarded by the Athenians as a

collective possession of the citizenry, guaranteed by thecollective political will of the people as expressed espe-cially in judicial decisions. It is the will of the many exer-cise in e ense o t e onor o t e in ivi ua citizen w omig t e incapa e o o ing is own against a power uan arrogant man. Socratic ignity y contrast is a er-ence to a personal standard of virtue: the self-willed deter-mination of the one good man to avoid shaming himself

and, by extension, his polis by refusing to stage thesepathetic dramas (b). Moreover, Socrates denies thecentral, if uno cial, role of the court as an agent of socialcontrol. Socrates claims that the only legitimate approachfor a juror who would not impiously foreswear himselfwas to ju ge t e matter at an against a xe stan aro justice. W i e most jurors no ou t regar e justiceas a paramount concern, they dened justice as the goodof the democratic polis. at good demanded that judgestake into account a litigants standing as a citizen. And that

standing was demonstrated, in part, by his integration intoa network of kin and friends.hen viewed through the historical prism of an Athe-

nian jurymans expectations, Socrates speech (as reportedy P ato is revea e as a rea s oc er an Socrates pro-

esse amazement at t e re ative y ig num er o positivevotes some , as against some or conviction: a


15/37





seems warranted. e Apology is a demonstration of an

alternative and openly critical use of the ordinarily demo-cratic genre of courtroom rhetoric. Rather than employingspeech to demonstrate conformity with and submission toa democratic ethos that emphasized equality among citi-zens and their collective wisdom, Platos Socrates employsit as a orm o provocation an cu tura criticism:

Per aps you t in , At enians, t at I ave een convict-e or ac o wor s aporia ogon) to persua e you, t at Ithought it right to do and say anything to be acquitted. Notso. It is true I have been convicted for a lack; not a lack of

words, but lack of bold shamelessness, unwillingness to saythe things that you would nd it most pleasant ( edista)to hear lamenting and wailing, saying and doing manythings I claim to be unworthy of me, but things of the sortyou are accustomed to hear from others. I did not thent in it necessary to o anyt ing unwort y o a ree manane eut eron ecause o anger; I o not now regret so

having conducted my defense; and I would far rather diewith that defense than live with the other. (de)

Socrates follows this overt rejection of conformity with a

prophesy: e Athenians are killing him in a vain attemptto free themselves from his stubborn insistence that theyexamine their own beliefs, but following Socrates deaththey will be pursued by younger, ercer, more numerouscritics. us, e suggests, t e pru ent response to Socraticcriticism is not to i t e one gent e critic t ey now ave,

ut to ta e care to ma e t emse ves into etter peop e


16/37





cd). at is, each Athenian must abandon his illogical,

ideological, democratic convictions and seek to nd better,more logically consistent alternatives.

is section, and the text as a whole, make it clear thatSocrates saw his own erce, biting criticism of the statusquo, both before and during the trial, as doing good: be-ing a socia critic is is uty to is go , imse , an ispo is. Socrates e ieve imse assigne to t e country o

is irt as a ene cia ga y an t e speec in is e-fense can be regarded as his last, best sting. Socrates, asdepicted in PlatosApology, never sought out a mass audi-

ence but he chose to employ his trial in a nal attempt toeducate his fellow citizens. Although Socrates doubted hisown ability to persuade his judges, we must suppose thatbecause he did address the jury (rather than keeping a dig-nied silence) he kept open the possibility that he mightsuccee in e ucating some or a o t em. Socrates use ot e tria as an e ucationa opportunity is in ine wit isself-description as a good citizen and public benefactor. IfSocrates had been convinced that his fellow citizens wereineducable, if he had been concerned only with improving

his own soul, he would have had nothing to say at a publictrial. e fact that Socrates did oer a defense proves thathe sought to improve hispolis: proves that Socrates was, inshort, both a philosophical social critic and a citizen.

e Apo ogypresents Socrates as a ig y patriotic citi-zen w o attempte to improve is e ows t roug ene -cia provocation an criticism o popu ar i eas. Socrates


17/37





avoided addressing the Assembly, but he carried out his

critical obligations in public places as well as in privatehouses. e trial speech itself represents a sincere attemptto employ public rhetoric for the purposes of mass educa-tion. Socrates speech also projected the likely outcome ofopenly engaging in social criticism: the death of the dissi-

ent at t e an s o t ose e attempte to improve. P ato sia ogue rito, w ic continues t e story o t e ast ays

o Socrates, reiterates t e centra t emes t at emocraticknowledge was tantamount to ignorance, that it was aphilosopher-citizens duty to criticize ignorance, and that

fatal consequences could attend the public practice of dis-sent. e setting of the Crito is the public prison of Athens;Socrates is awaiting his execution and rito is attemptingto persuade him to cooperate in a prison escape that hasbeen planned by Socrates friends. But, in stark contrastto w at we mo erns ave come to accept as t e stan arprison-escape p ot, Socrates re uses to move un ess ritocan prove that escaping prison would be a just thing todo.

P e rito opens wit an e a oration o t e expert argu-

ment t at Socrates a use to emonstrate t at Me etushad no concern for the education of the young. Crito hasurged Socrates to escape from prison, on the grounds thatif Socrates were executed oi polloi, who dont really know


18/37





you or me will think (b) that Crito had failed in his

duty to save Socrates, given that saving him was withinhis power. Socrates notes that surely we should notbe concerned with what oi polloi think of us, and that

reasonable men ( oi epieikestatoi) the only ones worthconsidering would understand the course of events (c).But Crito rep ies t at t e outcome o t e tria a ma e atoo c ear ow necessary it rea y is to care a out w at oipo oi t in , since t ey can accomp is near y t e greatestof evils when a man has been slandered among them (d).Socrates demolishes Critos position by the analogical ar-

gument for technical expertise: just as in the case of physi-cal training, he who hopes for self-improvement must payattention to the knowledgeable few and ignore the adviceof the ignorant many (bb). Socrates scornfully com-ments that the considerations Crito has raised Socratessupporters nancia oss, t e ate o Socrates own c i -

ren, w at peop e t in are rea y t topics or peop ewho kill lightly and would raise to life again without athought if they could: hoi polloi themselves. In contrast,for us the choice of how to act is determined by justice,

and justice is to be discovered only through logical argu-ment (cd).e escape urged by Crito is then shown to be unjust on

the basis of Socrates remarkable premise that, contraryto popu ar e ie , it is never rig t to commit injusticea i ein)/ o arm a on poiein), even in response to in-

jury aa . Since escape wou constitute a arm, it is


19/37





unjust, and so the substantive question has been settled

just a few minutes into the dialogue. But Socrates then setsout to show, by an imaginary conversation with the reiedLaws (nomoi) of Athens that a fortiori it is wrong to harmones ownpolis which had done one not harm but good.

e Laws as imagined by Socrates initially posit thatescape constitutes injury ecause it meant rea ing t eaw an t e po is cannot continue to exist i t e aws are

wit out orce a . Socrates as s Crito: ow we are toanswer that one? and he points out that a good deal mightbe said, especially by a political orator on behalf of that

law (nomos), now to be broken [by the proposed escape],which requires judgments judicially rendered (dikai) tobe authoritative ( uriai: b). e mention of the politi-cal orator is interesting. It signals that while Socrates anddemocratic politicians both believe that laws and judg-ments must e aut oritative, t ey approac t e matterquite i erent y. W at t en mig t an At enian oratorhave said in favor of the democratic approach? In hisspeechAgainst Meidias, written in , a half-centuryaer the trial of Socrates, Demosthenes presents a detailed

brief for why the laws must remain authoritative if thedignity of ordinary citizens is to be protected from attacksby powerful, wealthy, clever men. Demosthenes assumesthat powerful men will always desire to demonstrate theirpower y arming t e wea , an e oes not consi er t epossi i ity t at t ey wou e restraine y any internaconcern or a stract justice. Nor are t e aws t emse ves,


20/37





mere inscribed letters, capable of guaranteeing compli-

ance. Rather, the appropriate insurance of legal authorityis the collective action of the citizenry: the legal judgmentand its consequences. Vigorous public punishment of out-rageous behavior will serve to intimidate the powerful andwill force them into compliance with the will of the many.In Demost enes argument, it is t us t e mass o citizens,acting as jurors on t e initiative o a vo untary prosecutor,t at is t e co ective agent t at ensures t e aut ority o aw.It is only when the people are unwilling to use their collec-tive power to restrain the powerful that the law will lose its

authority. Although Demosthenes was not yet born in , Socrates seems to be pointing to this sort of claim inhis reference to the many things that an orator might sayabout the authority of law and judgment.

Socrates position on the basis of legal authority is radi-ca y i erent rom Demost enes in t at it ases t e sur-

viva o ega aut ority on t e in ivi ua s private ecisionto behave ethically, rather than on the public exertion ofpower by the people acting collectively, as a citizenry. us,maintaining the rule of law is (for Socrates) an issue of eth-

ics not politics, and it depends upon the behavior of theindividual not upon that of the collectivity. e basis of theSocratic legal order is a just contract between the Laws andthe individual citizen. According to the terms of that con-tract, Socrates a agree to a i e y t e proce ura ormso At enian aw an to o ey t e ega ju gments ren ereaccor ing to t e proce ura ru es, even t oug t ose ju g-


21/37





ments might be substantively incorrect. His obedience

was given in exchange for having received from the Lawsspecic goods: his birth (because of the laws regardingmarriage), his nurture (trophe), and his education paid-eia) Moreover, the Laws claim that because Socrates is the

son and slave of the Laws, the parties to the contract arenot on an equal footing, We bore you, reared you, ande ucate you egenou te ai exetrap es ai epai eut es) Can you t en say, rst o a , t at you are not our o springand our slave you and your ancestors before you? And ifthats true, do you think that justice is on an equal basis

between you and us that it is right for you to do in returnwhat we may undertake to do to you? (e).Socrates has already explained that he cannot ethically

do anything substantively harmful to any entity. In thispassage the Laws demonstrate that for any citizen to breakt e aw is mani est y to o arm to an entity t at eservesspecia respect an gratitu e. ere ore arming t e Lawseven in response to an injury) is seen to be unjust even

from the perspective of a traditional Greek help-your-friends/harm-your-enemies ethics. And thus, by escaping,

Socrates who, in theApology, had publicly announced hismoral superiority, would sink beneath the ethical standarddemanded of oi polloi.

e demonstration that it is unjust for any citizen toiso ey ega ju gments t at were proce ura y correct

w et er or not t ey are su stantia y correct is now com-p ete, ut t e Laws go on to ma e an a ortiori argumen


22/37





regarding Socrates himself, which slides into an overtly

rhetorical appeal. Socrates, say the Laws, a rmed thecontract more than anyone else, since he absented him-self from the polis less than anyone, and thus he shouldfeel particular shame (aischune) in breaking it. He did noteven desire to gain rst-hand knowledge of other poleisan t eir aws , a t oug e o en asserte t at Spartaan Crete were we governe e . Moreover Socrateswi e an o ject o moc ery atage astos) i e escapesa) and the whole Socrates aair will appear utterly

indecent (c). He will degrade himself by sneaking out

of town dressed like a runaway slave and will live a slavishexistence in foreign parts where he will amuse his audi-ences with the absurd tale of his clandestine ight in peas-ant costume. Moreover, if he ever oends his new hosts,Socrates can expect to hear many a contemptuous thingsai o you e . I e rings is c i ren wit im,t ey wi e raise an e ucate as non-At enians a .e Laws peroration returns to the nurture theme: bepersuaded by us, for we nurtured you (b). ey assurehim that if he obeys the Laws, Socrates will die the victim

of injustice at the hands of fallible men (i.e. the jurors whowere misled into dening Socrates behavior as constitut-ing impiety), not at the hands of the law (which prescribedonly the procedure for prosecution of impiety, not its

e nition . Fina y, t ey t reaten im wit post umouspunis ment y t eir rot ers, t e Laws in t e P ace ot e Dea i e iso eys c . e ia ogue conc u es


23/37





with Socrates statement that I seem to hear these things

as the Corybants seem to hear the pipes, and the droningmurmur of the words sounds within me and makes meincapable of hearing anything else. Be assured that if youspeak against the things that now seem to me to be so ( anun emoi dokounta), you will speak in vain. Still, if yousuppose you can accomp is anyt ing, p ease o spea .Not surprising y, Crito as no rep y an so t e Laws

carry the day.

P A C: eApo ogyan Crito, ta en toget er, may e rea as es-

ta is ing an et ics o socia criticism. e Socratic co ere ects Socrates own way o i e, w ic a een ive ac-cording to unrefuted principles established in uncoercedconversations. ese principles were hypothetical, but theaspiring philosopher would be expected to follow themunless and until he refuted them by logical argument. Aswe have seen, Socrates life was spent in attempting to im-prove his fellows by philosophical conversations held in

pu ic an private p aces. Socrates attempts to o goo oris e ow citizens ecause e e ieves t at as ot a uty

an a capacity to o so. His uty is imp ie ot y isinterpretation of the Delphic oracles comment regardinghis unsurpassed wisdom as having the force of an order.It is further demonstrated by the contractual argument of


24/37





the Laws in the Crito. While Socrates duty is not put in

terms of a traditional obligation to return a favor for favorsreceived, that is what every Athenian reader would under-stand the Laws of the rito as driving at. e establish-ment of a duty to seek to do good (as well as to avoid doingharm) is the deafening music that Socrates hears as heistens avi y to t e r etorica arguments o t e Laws, ong

a er t e assertion o t e no- arm octrine as ma e isc oice c ear. Socrates capacity to o goo or is e owsis implied by the extended gady metaphor. He imaginesthat his critical sting really can awaken at least some Athe-

nians and he refuses to regard anyone as ineducable. Hisconviction that he had a duty and a capacity to improveothers was (or at least Plato supposed it was) why the real,historical Socrates chose to defend himself before the massaudience of Athenian jurors in .

P ato, owever, i not imitate Socrates own mannero i e. He i not a ow is private estate to a into ruinin the philanthropic pursuit of the betterment of Athens,nor did he haunt the public square seeking philosophicalconversations with passers-by. Instead, he withdrew to his

private think-tank, the Academy, where he conversed witha few carefully chosen students, most of them non-citizens.He was not perceived as a public gure, as Socrates hadbeen, and never had trouble with Athenian law. By choos-ing a quietist pat an avoi ing t e opportunities or p i -osop ica conversation in pu ic p aces t at a typi eSocrates i e, P ato seeming y iso eye certain aspects


25/37





of Socrates ethical code as sketched out in Apologyand

Crito. Assuming that Plato remained true to the injunc-tion that we should live our lives on the basis of unrefutedphilosophical arguments, we must ask: did he nd a way torefute Socrates ethics of criticism?

I would suggest that he did, and that the refutation is toe oun in t e great ia ogues orgias an t e Repu ic.

O course I o not ave t e space ere to wor t roug t eargument o t ose two massive texts, ut y way o conc u-sion, let me pick out just a couple of passages that bear onthe matter of Socrates role as a social critic.

P

e Gorgias centers on matters o et ics, po itica justice,an t e pro ematic ro e o persuasion in t e po itica i eof the polis. e bulk of the dialogue consists of a longinterchange between Socrates and Callicles a politi-cally ambitious Athenian citizen who is studying with therhetoric-teacher Gorgias. Callicles believes that mastery ofrhetoric will make him a powerful man and assure himpersonal security against any threats to his person or his

stan ing. Ca ic es scorns Socrates or ai ing to avai im-se o t e power u weapons a or e y t e art o pu icspea ing. He c aims t at Socrates wou e incapa e oprotecting himself if someone sought to do him harm. Inresponse, Socrates seeks to show Callicles that the powerand security associated with rhetorical skill is illusory, and


26/37





that in fact rhetorical skill ends in nothing other than the

enslavement of the speaker to the whims of his audience:For Socrates, anyone who seeks to persuade a mob endsup being nothing more than the unwitting tool of the pas-sions of the mob. By contrast, Socrates claims that his own,philosophical cra of politics is aimed specically at theimprovement o t e citizens e, Socrates, is i e a octor,a t oug t e t erapy e o ers is escri e in metap ors omi itary com at. Socrates at one point e nes is own ap-proach to doing good in the polis as going to battle withthe Athenians (diamachesthai Ath enaiois: ac).

ose who willingly engage in battle, rather than spend-ing their time in preparing the means of personal security,risk their lives. Callicles warns Socrates that he is overcon-dent about his chances of survival. But Socrates respondsthat he knows perfectly well that in this polisanythingcan appen an e u y expects t at i e is accuse ysome evi man e wi in act e i e . His ate is assureprecisely because he is one of the few Athenians, if notthe only one truly to undertake the political cra andto practice politics ( rattein ta politika: ce), that is to

say, the only one who tries to improve his fellow citizensthrough critical struggle, rather than seeking to gratifythem. Because he will not address his fellows in the at-tering way they desire, Socrates position in court will, hesays, e equiva ent to t at o a octor eing prosecute ya pastrycoo e ore a jury o c i ren. I t e octor c aimst at is nasty-tasting me icine is rea y goo or t e igno-


27/37





rant brats, wont they just make a great fuss (ea)?

e doctor in such a trial would be at an utter dead enden pas ei aporiai: ab) regarding what to say and so

will Socrates when accused of corrupting the youth andslandering their elders by saying harsh words in privateor public. He will be able to say neither the truth, thatJustly I say all those things and I do so acting in your in-terest o umeteron etouto), jurymen, nor anyt ing e seoute a o ou en). An so e wi su er w atever comes is

way (bc). Yet if he is convicted due to a lack of atter-ing rhetoric, he wont mind; it is only conviction on a true

charge of having done injustice that Socrates fears.is passage presents a problem, because it seems tocontradict the account of the Apology, in which Socrateshas a good deal to say to the Athenians, and specically onon the subject of the benets he has done them. Leavingasi e t e inso u e question o w at t e rea Socrates rea y sai on t at ay in , w at sort o comment on t e

Socratic ethics of criticism is implied by Socrates predic-tion here in Platos Gorgias of his own courtroom silence?Platos re-writing of his own earlier account of the trial in

the Apologyunderlines the new ethical position Socrateshas arrived at in the Gorgias. Socrates speech, the readernow realizes, cannot have positive public eects for tworeasons: First, because Socrates cannot and will not con-

verse wit a mo . But, more important y, ecause even inan uncoerce one-on-one conversation wit an inte igente ow citizen i e Ca ic es, Socrates r etoric is insu -


28/37





cient to reeducate an individual who has been thoroughly

ideologized by the democratic political culture. us Platohas shown that Socrates actually has no real capacity todo good in hispolis he cannot heal either the politicalcommunity as a group or the would-be political leader) by

rhetorical means and so there is no purpose served in de-ivering a passionate an wou - e pe agogica speec inis own e ense. Rea izing t is, P ato s c aracter Socrates

in t e Gorgias pre ers to e en is own ignity y eepingsilent before the childlike jurymen.

e orgias, I would suggest, by showing that Socrates

actually has no capacity to do good in the real worldpolis of democratic Athens, kicks out one of the two keyprops from under the Socratic code of critical ethics. In theRepublic Plato goes aer the second prop, by showing whyit is that Socrates actually has no duty to try to do goodeit er.

P

e Laws ofCrito, we remember, had claimed that Socratesmust either accept his own execution or break his just and

voluntary contract with them. e terms of that contracta speci e t e exc ange o o e ience to t e city s Laws

or Socrates aving receive an accepte speci c goo s:his birth, nurture (trophe), and education (paideia: Critoe). e Republic rings all of this (and therefore the fair-

ness of the contract) into question. In Book , when reiter-


29/37





ating the absolute responsibility of the philosopher-king of

the utopian state ofKallipolis to return to the cave andtake part in ruling thepolis, Socrates allows that the phi-losopher in otherpoleishas no responsibility to take partin public aairs:

Well say that when such men [philosophers] come toe in t e ot er po eis it is tting or t em not to partici-

pate metec ousi) in t e misera e a ors ponon) o t osep aces , or t ey t e p i osop ers grew t emse ves up otheir own will, and against the will of thepoliteia in eachcase (automatoi gar emphuontai akous es t es en hekast ei

politeias). So it is just that the nature which is self-madeo autophues) and owes its upbringing (trophe) to no onemedeni troph en opheilon) is less than eager to repay the

price of its upbringing ( ropheia) to anyone. ( epublicab)By contrast, i a p i osop er in Ka ipo is s ows re uc-

tance to eave o t e p easures o pure contemp ation anreturn to the cave, the other philosophers will say to him:

But you we have caused to be born (egenn esamen) foryour own sake and for the sake of the rest of the polis tei

te all ei polei), like the leaders and kings in beehives. Youhave been better and more fully educated epaideumenos)and are more able to participate (metechein) in both activi-ties [ruling and contemplating]. (b)

is is very c ose to t e contractua argument t at t eLaws a presse upon Socrates in rito: ecause we areresponsi e or your irt , up ringing, an e ucation you


30/37





owe us obedience in repayment for goods received, and be-

cause of the implied contract you must do that which maynot initially seem to you most desirable.

Aer completing the Republic long discussion of thespecial education required to make a philosopher-king,the reader knows what a genuinely benecial upbringingan e ucation or a person wit Socrates innate a i itiesan c aracter wou e i e. e up ringing an e uca-tion t at Socrates actua y receive rom t e orma awsand informal customary practices of the democratic polisnot at all similar to those prescribed for the future rulers

of Platos ideal state, Kallipolis. Socrates of the Republichas, in eect, explained that he owes nothing to Athens.e democratic polis had contributed nothing positive tohis upbringing, and worse, had been unwilling to havehim bring himself up as a philosopher. Moreover, Socrateso t e Repu ic as exp aine t at t e e ucation o ere y t e assem e masses consiste o raw in octrination anhe has stated bluntly that no private education could hopeto stand up to the ideological bombardment of democraticeducation (be).

If Socrates of the Republic is right about the absence ofappropriate upbringing and education oered the philoso-pher in the real city and the crude indoctrination enforcedby the mob, then the Laws of Athens in the Crito ares own to e iars. eir contractua argument is a si ew en it is viewe rom t e rari e eig ts o Ka ipo is.In ee , t e argument o t e Repu ic ea s us to suppose


31/37





that the Laws of Athens had sought to corrupt Socrates

soul by attempting to teach him to atter and mimic themasses. When viewed from Kallipolis, the Laws argu-ment that Socrates was their son and slave appears notonly false, but sinister. Had Socrates been educated as theLaws of Athens had wished, he (like the unhappy sophist

escri e e sew ere in t e Repu ic) wou in ee aveeen traine to e a s ave o t e great east t at is, o

t e emocratic assem y. But some ow Socrates a e u-cated himself (automatos) to be a true philosopher. Whatthen becomes of the Laws conclusion in the rito that

the fatherland, must always be revered and obeyed and toSocrates claim in theApologythat he was duty-bound totry to improve his native polis because of the demands offriendship and kinship?

Socrates of the Republic answers obliquely at the end ofRepu ic Boo , in t e course o a iscussion a out w enit is rig t to ta e an active ro e in po itics. e ing yman, he says, willingly undertakes political aairs (tapolitika prattein) in his own polis, but perhaps not inhis native land except by divine providence (a). His

friend Glaucon grasps his meaning: by his own polis yourefer our idealpolis of Kallipolis. Socrates a rms this: themodel (paradeigma) exists in heaven and by this modelthe philosopher-king establishes a political regime in hisown sou . us it oes not rea y matter i t e i ea po isever comes into eing or not: a per ect in ivi ua sou isenoug . Wit t is argument, we may suppose t at t e


32/37





argument of the Laws of the rito for the existence of a

binding contract is overthrown; not only is the contractfundamentally unfair (in that it demands that substantialharms be repaid by benets) but outside Kallipolis the phi-losophers truepolis (the entity he must seek to improve)is his own soul, not his native land and not even the soulso is e ow citizens.

C

us by the end of the Republic it is only by abandoningpolitics and history the project of working to achieve

justice in a real polis that Plato manages to solve thec a enge pose y Socrates et ica eman t at a truep i osop er must p ay t e ga y wit t e azy orseo is e ow citizens. Apparent y, neit er P ato nor anyother philosopher-Athenian owes anything substantial toreal-world Athens and thus he is in no way duty-bound toseek the improvement of thepolis or its residents. To theextent that the reader (ancient or modern) is dismayed byPlatos willingness to sunder philosophy from history andpolitics, to separate private self-improvement from public

responsi i ity or t e genera we are, e or s e must regrett e inva i ation o t e contract urge y t e Laws in t eCrito. Wit t e rejection o t e contract t at t e istoricaSocrates had willingly died to uphold, the Platonic philo-sophical project gains the capacity to change its entirenature, and some of us may feel that the change will not


33/37





be for the better. In light of these regrets, we might ask: is

here something missing from the epublic argument fortossing the contract aside?

hat seems notoriously le out of the contract that theLaws of the rito press upon Socrates is the positive ben-et he had received from the freedom of the democratic

po is an its unprece ente to erance even ce e ration oiversity among its citizens. Socrates o t e Apo ogyan

Crito a u es to t is on y o ique y, y suggesting t at ewould not have much success practicing his philosophy onthe relatively well governed Megarians or ebans ( rito

bc, cf. Apol. cd). e historical Socrates had beenregarded by many of his fellow citizens as a loudmouth,know-it-all, and potential troublemaker for at least twenty-ve years before the trial of as Aristophanescomedy, Clouds makes clear. us, while Athenian de-mocracy a ways a t e capacity to i Socrates, t at ca-pacity was or inari y counter- a ance y t e emocraticcommitment to freedom of action, to free speech, and toprivacy, and above all by the diverse culture of the demo-craticpolis itself. e multifaceted nature of the democracy

ensured that the majoritarian tendency of popular opinionordinarily remained fragmented and contingent. Athenswas ordinarily tolerant of eccentric citizens like Socrates.

In conclusion, I think Platos implicit argument thatAt ens inevita y i e Socrates an t at At ens was in-evita y osti e to t e practice o p i osop y was wrong.P ato s attempte re utation o t e origina Socratic et ics


34/37





of social criticism, on the grounds that philosophers had

neither the capacity nor the duty to do public good, mayhave authorized Plato to leave the walled city and with-draw to his Academy. But it is worth remembering thatthe Academy was still within Athenian territory; and thatPlato himself never chose to live for long in anypolis othert an At ens.

e gure o Socrates continue to aunt t e P atonicAca emy, as e continues to aunt t e mo ern Aca emytoday like Plato, we (teachers and students alike) maynd that the challenge of being both loyal citizens of our

country and severe critics of its tendencies to self-satisedcomplacency and self-serving injustice are overwhelm-ing and we may seek to nd excuses to give up criticizingor to give up being citizens. But, like Plato, when modernday Academics are tempted to give up either commit-ment to a an on socia criticism or citizens ip we arestung anew y t e examp e o t e ga y w o ie in , believing in his own duty and his capacity to do publicgood by living as a dissident citizen in a democratic state.

Josiah Ober


35/37





F R

e trial of Socrates, and Socrates relationship to Athens,have occasioned a great deal of scholarship. e primarysources in trans ation an some major areas o contro-

versy are presente in Bric ouse an Smit . estory o t e tria is we to y Co aiaco, w o gives an even-handed assessment of the issues and full bibliography. Myown understanding of the historical context of democraticAthens is laid out in Ober and ; my reading ofPlato on Socrates is presented in more detail than is pos-sible here in Ober . Hall is a lively attempt to

evoke the atmosphere of a typical Athenian trial, empha-sizing t e importance o per ormance an t e ana ogy o

rama. Hansen o ers a care u ana ysis o t e triarom t e point o view o At enian citizens. Reeve is

a ne philosophical analyis of PlatosApology; on the rito,see Kraut and Weiss . For a very thoughtful as-sessment of Socrates and his importance, one that is verydierent from the one I present here, see Nehamas .

Bric ouse, T. C. an N. D. Smit . e tria anexecution o Socrates: sources an controversies. NewYork, Oxford University Press.

Colaiaco, J. (). Socrates against Athens: Philosophy onrial. New York and London, Routledge.


36/37





Hansen, M. H. (). e trial of Sokrates from the

Athenian point of view. Copenhagen, KongeligeDanske Videnskabernes Selskab: CommissionerMunksgaard.

Ha , E. . Lawcourt ramas: e power oer ormance in Gree orensic oratory. Bu etin o t e

Institute of Classical Studies : .

Hansen, M. H. (). e Athenian democracy in the ageof Demosthenes: structure, principles, and ideology.Ox or , UK; Cam ri ge, USA, B. B ac we .

Kraut, R. (). Socrates and the state. Princeton, N.J.,Princeton University Press.

O er, J. .Mass an e ite in emocratic At ens:r etoric, i eo ogy, an t e power o t e peop e.Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

Ober, J. (). e Athenian revolution: essays on ancientGreek democracy and political theory. Princeton, N.J.,Princeton University Press.

Ober, J. (). Political dissent in democratic Athens:

ntellectual critics of popular rule. Princeton, N.J.,Princeton University Press.

Ne amas, A. . e art o iving: Socratic re ectionsfrom Plato to Foucault. Berkeley, University ofCalifornia Press.


37/37





Reeve, C. D. C. (). Socrates in the Apology: an essay on

Platos Apology of Socrates. Indianapolis, Hackett.Weiss, R. . Socrates dissatised: an analysis of Platos

Crito.New Yor , Ox or University Press.

Date post:	04-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	davo-lo-schiavo
View:	216 times
Download:	0 times

Socrates as Citizen and Social Critic

Documents