Sofia Vasilopoulou (University of York)
Theofanis Exadaktylos (LSE/University of Surrey)
Daphne Halikiopoulou (London School of Economics)
Workshop on social Change: Theory and Applications, the case of Greek society
Hellenic Observatory/ LSE
Dept. of Sociology, University of Manchester
Friday March 9th, 2012
Research Questions� How do countries respond during times of severe
crises and the prospect of austerity?
� Why is Greece—a highly likely case of Europeanization—responding with non-substantive policies to meet European demands?
� There is initiation of policy but why is there not instigation of reform?
� Tax evasion
� Public procurement / public sector reform
� Welfare state reform
The EU Effect
� EU context conducive to high adaptation pressures
� We start with a classic definition of Europeanization from a top-down approach (set policy areas vsflexibility of implementation)
� High adaptation pressures = transformation
� Transformation –major adjustment (e.g. change of party system, revised macroeconomic policies, and new belief systems by groups or individuals – paradigmatic change)
� Inertia of process versus inertia of outcome
The Argument
� CATCH 22� Political accountability problem hinders the solution of the
economic problem
� Corruption + lack of cleavages + two party system ����Cartelisation
� Corruption � Widespread and institutionally embedded� Tension between providing successful economic solutions
and retaining political accountability.
� Political will to introduce and implement substantive policies is constrained by party cartelisation
� Cartelisation: tacit consensus against substantive measures because they could result in impeding the two main parties’ political and electoral opportunities.
PASOK and New Democracy
election results since 1977
Lack of opposition to the cartel E le ctio n y ea r To ta l co m b ine d sea ts
19 77 2 64
19 81 2 87
19 85 2 87
198 9 Ju ne 2 70
1 989 N o v 2 76
19 90 2 73
19 93 2 81
19 96 2 70
20 00 2 83
20 04 2 82
20 07 2 54
20 09 2 51
Corruption
The Greek Outcome� Cartelisation causally linked to inertia of outcome
� Political actors: both unwilling and unable
� They do recognize high economic pressures and threats and the misfit but
� Prefer not to instigate change (established party interests);
� Cannot impose change (e.g. riots, strikes and civil disobedience)
� Cannot agree on common discourse (external and internal opposition)
� Lack of discursive tools to convince the public of the necessity for and the appropriateness of change.
Populism as a frame of party
system dynamics � Cartelisation is beyond party positions and party
alignments and is expressed and justified through a populist blame-shifting agenda on behalf of all parties in the system
� The dynamics of the party system in Greece are characterised by a competition between cartel and non-cartel parties
� Populism frames this dynamic � Two main political camps carry out an agenda of blame-
shifting � Mainstream cartel parties (ND – PASOK): soft populism
� Who are engaged in a rhetoric of blaming each other
� Fringe parties (KKE – LAOS – SYRIZA): hard populism� Whose rhetoric merges internal and external blame-shifting
Argument flow
EU Pressure
for reforms
Parties Blame-shifting
Populism
CORRUPTION INERTIA
of outcome
Voters
ReinforcesCartelization
Method and data� Sophisticated qualitative content analysis
� Frames
� Time frame: elections 2009 – cooperation government 2011
� Unit of analysis: 35 speeches
� Thessaloniki International Fair 2010, 2011
� Memorandum of Understanding 2010
� Mid Term Financial Strategy 2011
� Budget 2010, 2011, 2012
Populist framesFrame Mainstream (soft) Radical (hard)
Rationale
Holistic
Specific
On behalf of all the people
On behalf of the ‘people’ (as equated with a
particular social group, e.g. class)
System ontology
Pro-establishment
Anti-establishment
Catch-all parties
Left-wing
(class based)
Right-wing
(ethnically based)
Tactic/Rhetoric
Blame-shifting
Exclusion
(across party lines)
- Onto main opposition party
- Onto specific domestic groups
- Onto specific media outlets
- Of elites (vertical);
� External elites (US, IMF, EU…)
� Domestic elite as collaborators of
the external elites
- Of specific social groups (horizontal):
� Tax evaders
� Public servants
� Closed-off professions
Soft populism: Cartel parties � Pro-establishment: system; rule of law; democratic procedures, EU,
support of the middle class. � Holistic: language of togetherness
� ‘we’ will make it ‘together’� ‘Greece is us’; ‘our’ country� we identify ourselves with the Greek people and their efforts� we stand by the people’s side� we serve the Greek citizen
� ND more nationalistic: reference to symbols (e.g. Acropolis) � Blame-shifting:
� The main opposition is ‘responsible’ for the situation� They ‘have committed crimes’� They have been concealing the truth � Greece has taken ‘steps back’ as a result of ND/PASOK � The main opposition has encouraged lack of transparency, political
clientelism and corruption.
Hard populism: fringe parties
� Anti-establishment: anti-system & Eurosceptic but in varying degrees
� Specific: equate the people with a specific social group (class versus the Greek ethnie)
� Exclusion:
� Politics of blame onto PASOK & ND
� Both leaders responsible for the current crisis – they are both ‘afraid’ to govern
� Criticism of other small parties
� Criticism of external elites
‘Capital’ versus ‘Ethnie’KKE LAOS
� Crisis is the cause of the international capitalist system which is supported by the two main parties
� Distinguishes between patriotism of the capital and patriotism of the people
� Emphasis on nationalistic frames
� Immigration, history, Alexander the Great (Macedonia), Turkey, Smyrna etc.
� ‘the 1922 crisis is greater than the current crisis’
Conclusions
� What do we find:
� Initiation of change, YES – Reform/Outcome NO
� Where can we locate the explanatory variables?
� Party-political discourse, cartelization, and populist frameworks
� Potential for change: increasing fragmentation/ polls indicate de-alignment
� But: cartelisation, patronage, and corruption dominate Greek politics hindering reform/ change needs to be political, systemic and generational
