SOMALILAND ANIMAL

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SOMALILAND ANIMAL DISEASE

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN

March 2009


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. IACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................ III

1. INTRODUCTION

......................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Information on Somaliland....................................................................................... 11.2 Animal Disease Emergencies: Their Nature and Potential Consequences ............ 2

1.3 The Benefits of Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Planning....................... 3

1.4 The Principles of Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Planning .................... 5

2. A COORDINATED NATIONAL APPROACH TO ANIMAL DISEASE

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING IN SOMALILAND ......................... 72.1 Animal Disease Emergency Task Force ................................................................... 7

2.2 Animal Disease as a component of the National Disaster Plan ................................ 72.3 Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Livestock in Somaliland...................... 8

2.4 Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning Committee ................................. 8

2.5 Organizational Structure of the Department of Animal Health & Production ......... 92.6 Animal Disease Control Centre for Somaliland..................................................... 10

2.7 Local Animal Disease Control Centres................................................................... 112.8 Difficult or Marginalized Areas.............................................................................. 12

3. RISK ANALYSIS OF INTRODUCTION AND SUSTENANCE OF

TRANSBOUNDARY ANIMAL DISEASES IN SOMALILAND .............................. 133.1 Rinderpest ............................................................................................................... 13

3.2 Peste des Petits Ruminants (PPR)........................................................................... 14

3.3 Rift Valley Fever (RVF) ......................................................................................... 143.4 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)........................................................... 14

3.5 Risk Mitigation of Animal Disease Emergency in Somaliland.............................. 14

4. EARLY WARNING CONTINGENCY PLANNING .............................................. 164.1 Disease Surveillance ............................................................................................... 164.2 Emergency Disease Reporting and Response in Somaliland................................. 16

4.3 Emergency Disease Information System ................................................................ 17

4.4 Training of Veterinarians and other Animal Health Staff in Early Recognition ofEmergency Animal Diseases and Collection and Dispatch of Diagnostic Specimens . 17

4.5 Laboratory Diagnostic Capability........................................................................... 18

4.6 International Reference Laboratories and Collaborating Centres ........................... 184.7 International Disease Reporting.............................................................................. 19

4.8 Regional Organizations........................................................................................... 19

5. EARLY REACTION CONTINGENCY PLAN ....................................................... 215.1 Preventing the Entry of Exotic Diseases................................................................. 215.2 General Principles of Emergency Livestock Disease Control in Somaliland......... 21

6. CONTINGENCY PLANS .......................................................................................... 256.1 Nature of the Disease .............................................................................................. 256.2 Risk Assessment (Including Potential Consequences) ........................................... 25

6.3 Diagnosis and Surveillance..................................................................................... 25

6.4 Principles of Control and Eradication ..................................................................... 256.5 Policy and Rationale ............................................................................................... 26

6.6 Action Plan.............................................................................................................. 26

6.7 Appendices.............................................................................................................. 26


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6.8 Standard Operating Procedures............................................................................... 26

6.9 Enterprise Manuals ................................................................................................. 27

7. SUPPORT PLANS ...................................................................................................... 287.1 Financial plans ........................................................................................................ 28

7.2 Resource Plans ........................................................................................................ 28

7.3 Legislation............................................................................................................... 288. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION ............................................................... 29

8.1 FAO Reference Laboratories .................................................................................. 29

8.2 FAO Collaborating Centres .................................................................................... 32


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ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONSAPHCA: Regional Animal Production and Health Commission for Asia and

the Pacific.

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASF: African swine fever

AU/IBAR: African Union/inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources

BSE: Bovine spongiform encephalopathy

CBPP: Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia

CVO: Chief Veterinary Officer (or the Director of Veterinary Services orother Equivalent position).

ELISA: Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay.

EMPRES: Emergency Prevention system for Transboundary Animal and Plantpests and Diseases.

EUFMD: European Commission for the control of Foot-and Mouth Disease

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

FMD: Foot-and-mouth disease.

GIS: Geographic Information System

GREP: Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency.

IATA: International Air Transport Authority

MOL: Ministry Of Livestock

NERAD: National Disaster Management Authority of Somaliland.

NGO: Non-governmental Organization

OIE: International Office of Epizootics/Office international des epizootics

PAHO: Pan-African Rinderpest Campaign


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PPR: Pest des petits ruminants

RADISCON: Regional Animal Disease Surveillance and Control Network.

RVF: Rift Valley Fever.

SADC: Southern African Development Community

SPC: South Pacific Community

TAD: Transboundary Animal Disease

TADINFO: Transboundary Animal Disease Information System.

VAI: Virulent avian influenza

WHO: World Health Organization

WWW. World-Wide Web.


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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Information on Somaliland

Somaliland is located at the horn of Africa between latitudes 80

and 110

30 north andlongitudes 430 and 49030 east. It borders the Gulf of Aden to the north, Somalia to theeast, Ethiopia to the south, and Djibouti to the North West. It has an estimated area of137,600KM2

with a coastline of 850 KM. The country is divided into 6 regions namelyTogdheer, Sahil, Awdal, Hargeisa, Sanag and Sool. The average amount of rainfallranges between 100 300mm per annum. The rains are unpredictable both spatially andtemporally. Long-term disruption of water sources and rangeland management are majorcontributors to poverty and lower the peoples overall quality of life.

Somaliland was colonized by Britain, and was called Somaliland Protectorate andachieved its independence on 26th J une 1960. Soon after independence, Somaliland

united with the rest of Somalia on 1st

J uly 1960, under the name of the Republic ofSomalia. Before the union, the rest of Somalia was colonized by Italy, and had achievedits independence on 1st J uly 1960. For the first 9 years, there was a democraticallyelected government in Somalia with a president, a prime minister, and a parliament.During that period, participation of the private sector in national development was strong,and Somalia economy was growing rapidly. However, a military revolution took place on21st

October 1969 and the military regime took control of the country. The new militaryregime declared Somalia to be a socialist state and all sectors of development weremonopolized by the government. The military system of administration lasted for 21years. During this period the national development continued to deteriorate and, togetherwith occurrence of many civil conflicts, led to the collapse of the military Government in

early 1991, followed by destruction of all vital infrastructures.

1.1.1 Somaliland Livestock Sector

The livestock sector is the backbone of the Somaliland economy since it producesemployment opportunities 70%, foreign currency earnings 85% and Gross DomesticProducts 60%. However, the decay of key private and public sector institutions followingthe collapse of the military regime in 1991 resulted in the poor delivery of animal healthservices to support Somali livestock production and trade. Suspicions of the presence ofmajor epizootic diseases of livestock led to the imposition of livestock bans by majorimporting countries. Therefore the need for the rehabilitation and strengthening of

institutions to improve animal genetic resources and the delivery and regulation of animalhealth services that conform to international standards for trade in livestock and livestockproducts became absolutely desirable.


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1.2 Animal Disease Emergencies: Their Nature and PotentialConsequences

Animal disease emergencies may occur when there are unexpected outbreaks ofepidemic diseases or other animal health-related events which have the potential tocause serious socio-economic consequences for a country.These emergencies are frequently caused by outbreaks of transboundary animaldiseases (TADs), which are of significant economic, trade and/or food security importancefor many countries. Such diseases can spread easily and reach epidemic proportions;control/management, including exclusion, requires cooperation among several countries.

The occurrence of one of these diseases may have disastrous consequences for acountry when they:

compromise food security through serious loss of animal protein and/or loss ofdraught animal power for cropping;

cause major production losses for livestock products such as meat, milk and otherdairy products, wool and other fibres and skins and hides;

cause losses of valuable livestock of high genetic potential. They may also restrictopportunities for upgrading the production potential of local livestock industries bymaking it difficult to import exotic high-producing breeds that are extremelysusceptible to TADs;

add significantly to the cost of livestock production since costly disease controlmeasures need to be applied; seriously disrupt or inhibit trade in livestock, germplasm and livestock products,

either within a country or internationally. Their occurrence may thus cause majorlosses in national export income in significant livestock-producing countries;

inhibit sustained investment in livestock production, thus trapping livestockproducers in uneconomic, peasant-type agriculture;

cause public health consequences where diseases can be transmitted to humans(i.e. zoonoses);

cause environmental consequences when wildlife populations die out; and

MAP OF SOMALILAND


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cause unnecessary pain and suffering to many animals.

The International Office of Epizootics (OIE) recognizes a list of diseases, most of whichcould also be regarded as being TADs. These include Foot-and-Mouth Disease(FMD),Rinderpest, Peste des Petits Ruminants (PPR), Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia

(CBPP), Rift Valley Fever (RVF), Lumpy Skin Disease, Vesicular Stomatitis, SwineVesicular Disease, Bluetongue, Sheep and Goat Pox, African Horsesickness, AfricanSwine Fever, Hog Cholera (classical swine fever), Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza andNewcastle Disease. Other viral, bacterial, rickettsial and mycoplasmal diseases may alsobe regarded as having the potential to cause animal disease emergencies under somecircumstances. Indeed, they may not necessarily be infectious diseases. For example,animal pests such as the New World and Old World screwworm flies may fit into thiscategory.

Most people tend to equate emergency animal diseases with exotic or foreign animaldiseases, although this is not necessarily so. Unusual outbreaks of endemic diseases

may also cause an emergency when there is, for instance, the appearance of a newantigenic type such as a significantly different FMD virus subtype in an endemic countryor when there is a significant change in the epidemiological pattern of the disease such asan unusually severe outbreak of anthrax. The emergence of previously unknown diseasesmay also cause an emergency, as in the case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy(BSE) in the United Kingdom in 1986, equine paramyxovirus disease (Hendra virus) inAustralia in 1994 and Nipah virus disease of pigs and humans in peninsular Malaysia in1999. There are other animal health emergencies that may be caused by non-diseaseevents, for example a major chemical residue problem in livestock or a food safetyproblem such as haemorrhagic uraemic syndrome in humans caused by verotoxic strainsof E. coli contaminating animal products.

In Somaliland, the most important transboundary animal diseases include Rinderpest,Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia, Rift Valley Fever, PPR and Contagious CaprinePleuro-Pneumonia, while Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza cannot be ignored given itspresent global evolution and geographical spread.

1.3 The Benefits of Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Planning

An animal disease emergency such as an outbreak of a transboundary animal diseasecan have serious socio-economic consequences which, in extreme cases, may affect thewhole national economy. For example, in Somaliland livestock production has been themainstay for the people. Livestock production is predominantly pastoral and agro pastoralemploying over 70% of the population. Livestock production contributes 60% of GDP andabout 85% of foreign export earnings. Livestock is the source of pastoral livelihoods,contributes to government revenues and provides employment to a wide range ofprofessionals and other service providers. Somaliland has had a long history of liveanimals export to the Arabian Gulf states through the Berbera port. These exports haveexperienced a series of trade embargos due to suspicions of diseases like Rift ValleyFever, Peste des Petits Ruminants (PPR) and suspected presence of rinderpest. Thebans have adversely affected the income and livelihoods of pastoralist families and thenational economy in general.


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It is extremely important that a new disease be recognized quickly while it is still localizedand prompt action taken to contain and then progressively eliminate it since thisenhances the chances of eradication of the disease. Conversely, eradication may beextremely difficult, costly and even impossible if the disease is not recognized andappropriate control action taken before it becomes widespread or established in wildlife.

The target should always be to eliminate progressively and finally eradicate atransboundary animal disease (and prove that national or zonal freedom has beenregained) if epidemiological and other circumstances are favourable. The alternativeapproach of simply living with the disease through the institution of routine vaccinationcampaigns and/or other disease control measures will in the end prove far more costlyand will be a permanent constraint to efficient livestock production systems. Furthermore,the continuing presence of a TAD in a country, even if losses are minimized by effectivedisease control programmes, will inhibit the opening of export trade opportunities forlivestock and livestock products. Eradication of the disease and provision of scientificproof of freedom from the disease to a level of international acceptability will remove thisconstraint to international trade.

In Somaliland, the animal health services recognizes that contingency planning and otherpreparedness programmes for animal disease emergencies provide the key to mountingearly effective action in the face of an emergency. It is worthy of note that Somaliland hasdeclared vision, mission and policy for the livestock sector. The vision envisages that bythe year 2016, there should be a livestock sector, which to a large extent shall be healthy,productive and sustainable to ensure food security, increased household incomes andimproved national economy while conserving the environment. The mission is to ensurethat the livestock resources are developed and managed sustainably throughcollaboration with stakeholders, for the purpose of improving food security, improvinglivelihoods and contributing to the national economy. The ministrys strategies are

designed to: Co-ordinate development inputs and, monitor and regulate the livestock sector inthe country

Implement realistic, comprehensive and dynamic livestock policies that take intoaccount other related policies.

Develop competent sector professionals of high integrity to promote investments inthe livestock industry.

In addition, the Somaliland National Livestock Policy strives to provide guidelines,coordination and regulation of the livestock sector in order to increase its efficiency interms of production and productivity for the betterment of the livelihoods of livestock

producers and improvement of the Somaliland economy, through focused use ofresources. Specific objectives are stated to promote national food security to meetnutritional requirements, promote animal health assurance and human health protection.Others include to increase the quantity and quality of livestock and livestock products asraw materials for local industries and export and to promote integrated use of naturalresources related to livestock production while protecting the environment. The policyalso provides for the adoption and application of new technologies relevant for livestockproduction to improve human resources and strengthen technical support requirements inthe livestock sector and the .production of safe food to safeguard consumers.


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1.4 The Principles of Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Planning

The two fundamental components of animal disease emergency preparedness planningare the development of capabilities for:

early warning, and early reaction to disease epidemics and other animal health

emergencies.This is the basis of the present effort at the preparation of this generic written plan to befollowed by disease specific contingency plans and operating procedures. This would beaccompanied by the testing of the plans, training of staff; the development of capabilitiesat national, provincial and local veterinary headquarters, including field and laboratoryservices; development of mechanisms to involve other necessary government and privatesector services and livestock farming communities in the emergency response;development of the capacity to apply all the necessary resources to countertransboundary animal diseases or other animal health emergency in the most efficientway. Efforts at securing necessary equipment, personnel and finances as well asadvance establishment of the appropriate legal and administrative structures to deal with

an emergency are also described and discussed.

1.4.1 Early warning of diseasesThe Government of Somaliland is aware that early warning enables rapid detection of theintroduction of, or sudden increase in, the incidence of any disease of livestock which hasthe potential of developing to epidemic proportions and/or causing serious socio-economic consequences or public health concerns. It embraces all initiatives, mainlybased on disease surveillance, reporting and epidemiological analysis that would lead toimproved awareness and knowledge of the distribution and behaviour of diseaseoutbreaks (and of infection) and which allow forecasting of the source and evolution of thedisease outbreaks and the monitoring of the effectiveness of disease control campaigns.

The Government therefore first developed a national livestock policy andstrategies designed to address constraints in the livestock sector and incompliance with local, regional and international obligations in matters related toanimal health and livestock trade. The strategies proposed in this policydocument take the following into consideration:

National Veterinary Code and other laws of Somaliland OIE terrestrial animal health code. AU/IBAR recommendations for disease control policies and strategies for

East African countries. WTO/SPS requirements/agreements in livestock and agricultural products

trade.

FAO/IAEA recommendations on accreditation for the purpose of sanitarymeasures of inspection and certification protocols and procedures ofimplementation for the export and import of livestock and livestockproducts.

The J oint Needs Assessment (WB/UN/GOSL/J NA) (2006) report. Thereport has described the livestock sector development needs (not all thepriorities were emphasised in the report) towards attainment of theMillennium Development Goals (MDG) by the year 2015.


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The process for this policy development involved consultative, participatory, interactiveand consensus building approaches and was thus inclusive and transparent. At the end, astakeholders workshop was held where the findings of the study were discussed. Theworkshop participants proposed to the Ministry of Livestock to engage a task force toformulate the national livestock policies. The members of the task force represented all

the major livestock sector institutions within Somaliland. A complete draft of the policydocument was circulated to a total of 15 different institutions in Somaliland where it wassubjected to review and critique. This was followed by a stakeholders workshop whereconsensus was reached on all the issues on this policy.

The National Livestock Policy emphasized The improvement of animal health delivery and diagnostic services to

protect the national herd. Improvement of veterinary public health services to protect and safeguard

consumers locally and internationally. Maximization and commercialization of animal production where possible

to meet income demands of the producers and the national nutritionalrequirements.

Fostering Trade in livestock and livestock products, Promotion of research, continuous professional development and

strengthening of institutional capacity (public and Private) for effectiveservice delivery.

In addition guidelines on privatization of veterinary services were developed forSomaliland defining the roles of public and private veterinary services in areas of clinicalveterinary services, Brucella diagnosis for livestock export trade, Veterinary drugsimportation and distribution, Preventive veterinary medicine and Public health service

Master plan for Ministry of LivestockThe master plan for the Ministry of Livestock (MoL) was developed in 2001 with the

support of Terra Nuova, the Somali PACE project, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute(KARI), VetAid, and the Ministry of Livestock. The Master plan is a key policy instrumentwhich guides the functioning of MoL and its departments. The master plan focuses onoperating an efficient and effective organizational structure of the ministry which has thefollowing components:

Clear chain of command and division of labour (job description) and Accountabilityat central, regional and district levels.

Participatory decision making. In built motivational factors such as upward progression (proper schemes of

service), remuneration of both collective and individual efforts, provision of workingtools, equipment and facilities, smooth and quick flow, dissemination, storage andretrieval of information (including feed back mechanisms)

Emergency preparedness (rapid responses)


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2. A COORDINATED NATIONAL APPROACH TO ANIMAL DISEASEEMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING IN SOMALILAND

The responsibility for dealing with animal disease emergencies resides with the Ministerof Livestock under the direct technical and professional supervision Director-General ofthe Ministry of Livestock. The Director of Animal Health has overall technical responsibilitywith regard to preparedness for and management of animal health emergencies. Theappropriate government minister would of course be ultimately responsible. Where suchanimal disease emergencies have a significant public health component, such as RiftValley Fever or Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza negotiations would be carried out

between the Ministry of Livestock and the Ministry of Health on a joint framework forpreparing contingency plans and for other complementary preparedness programmes.This would include decisions on the most efficient mechanisms for coordinatingemergency responses, for implementing disease control and eradication programmes andfor sharing responsibilities. Appropriate opportunities for sharing resources between thetwo Ministries should also be explored so as to avoid unnecessary duplication.

2.1 Animal Disease Emergency Task Force

In Somaliland an Animal Disease Emergency Task force has been appointed to facilitate

and coordinate emergency planning. This Task Force which is directly accountable to theMinister of Livestock and is charged with the responsibility of preparation, monitoring andapproval of contingency plans for high priority animal diseases and liaison with relevantpersons and organizations such as the national veterinary association, livestock industrygroups, the national disaster management authority and departments of finance, healthand wildlife for appropriate response to animal disease emergencies. The Task Force isexpected to assist the Ministry of Livestock in the development of active diseasesurveillance and epidemiological analysis capabilities and of emergency reportingsystems and overall monitoring of the national state of preparedness for animal healthemergencies.

2.2 Animal Disease as a component of the National Disaster PlanIn Somaliland, Animal Disease Emergencies are not yet integrated into the NationalDisaster Plan. There is currently an awareness to effect this as is provided for in othercountries in the Horn of Africa Region and to make provisions for the establishment of aNational Livestock Disease Emergency Commission. This Commission would comprise ofrepresentatives of the ministerial disease control task force acting as the technical arm ofthe commission, Office of the President/ Cabinet office for high level political coordinationand support, the Ministry of health for Zoonosis Control, Ministry of Finance for financialcoordination, Ministry of Interior for prompt engagement of local authorities/ Municipalities


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and Police forces as well as the Ministry of Planning for logistic support and solicitinginternational assistance. The national disease emergency commission would be expectedto ensure that finance, human resources, enforcement units, international assistance andother resources are forth coming during a national emergency response declared by theMoL Minister as well as ensure that all logistical support and other stakeholders are

informed and involved in the national emergencies declared by the MoL Minister.

Fighting a disease epidemic or combating other animal health emergencies is in manyrespects like fighting a war and requires the same level of discipline. It requires the sameability to make rapid decisions based on analysis of the best information that can bemade available from all sources, to convert those decisions into clear orders which can beconveyed down the chain to those who are charged with the responsibility of carryingthem out and to know that orders have been carried out and with what results. Theremust therefore be efficient mechanisms in place for the transmission of information andinstructions from the national veterinary services headquarters to the front line of the

disease eradication campaign in the field and laboratory and for feedback of informationto headquarters.It is clear that for these things to happen quickly and efficiently in an emergency, theveterinary services of Somaliland must be placed in a command structure or line-management system at least for the duration of the emergency response.

2.3 Organizational Structure of the Ministry of L ivestock in Somaliland

The organizational structure of the Ministry of Livestock has a strong veterinary authoritywith a clear chain of command for effective and reliable delivery of veterinary services .

The structure has at the top H. E the Minister of Livestock, next H.E, the State Minister ofLivestock followed by the Director-General. Reporting to the Director-General are threeDirectors in-charge of:

Department of Animal Health and Production. Department of Extension, Training and Research. Director of Administration, Personnel and Finance.

The Department of Animal Health and Production has six technical sections, namelyAnimal Health , Public Health , Animal Production , Epidemiology , Pharmaceuticals, andBiological and Marketing . The Planning Department has three sections that includes ,

Extension, Training and Research while the Support, Finance and AdministrationDepartment has two sections namely Finance , Accounting and Personnel.

2.4 Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning Committee

In J une 2008 an Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan Committee forSomaliland was formed and consisted of:

The Director of Veterinary services. Officer in charge of the Epidemiology and data Management Unit (EDMU).


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Representative of the Somaliland National veterinary Association (SOLNAVA). Representative of the United Livestock Professional Association.(ULPA) Representative of the National Environmental Research and Disaster

Preparedness (NERAD). Representative of the Local Government.

Ministry of Health VetAid Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Somali Animal Health Services Project (SAHSP) Pastoral Environment Network in the Horn of Africa (PENHA).

2.5 Organizational Structure of the Department of Animal Health & Product ion

For Animal Disease Emergency Response, the chain of command and reporting route isas shown below:

Public Health DivisionDisease Control andLaboratory Services

Division

Meat

Inspection

Food HygienSection

ZoonosisSection

Qualitycontrol andlegislation

LaboratoryServicessection

Vector andpredator

controlsection

Diseasecontrolsection

Department Of AnimalHealth &

Production


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Central Level (Headquarters)

Local Level Region, District

Field

Field

Field

Field Field FieldField

2.6 Animal Disease Control Centre for Somaliland

The central Animal Disease Control Centre would reside in the office of the Director ofAnimal Health who should assign responsibility to a senior veterinary officer in charge ofthe Disease Surveillance and Emergency Response Unit of his department. In the eventof an outbreak of an emergency animal disease, the centre should be responsible to theDirector of Livestock for coordinating all emergency disease control measures inSomaliland. The epidemiology unit should either be attached to the centre or should work

Minister of Livestock

RVCOs

Public&Private field operators SVPssMeat Inspector,sCBAHW,etc

DVO

State Minister of MoL

Director General Of MOL

Director of Animal Health

Diseases Surveillance&Emergency response Unit


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in close collaboration with it. The responsibilities of the animal disease control centre inthe emergency response would include:

implementing the disease control policies decided by the Director of Livestock andthe Animal Disease Emergency Task Force.

directing and monitoring the operations of local animal disease control centres. maintenance of up-to-date lists of available personnel and other resources, and

details of where further resources may be obtained. deployment of staff and other resources to the local centres; ordering and dispersing vaccines and other essential supplies; monitoring the progress of the campaign and providing technical advice to the

Director of Animal Health. advising on the definition and proclamation of the various disease control zones. liaison with other groups involved in the emergency response, including those that

may be activated as part of the national disaster plan. preparation of international disease reports and, at the appropriate times, cases for

recognition of zonal or national freedom from the disease. management of farmer awareness and general publicity programmes, including

press releases.

The animal disease control centre should be fully equipped with a range of maps coveringall parts of Somaliland (preferably at 1:50,000), and all suitable communication equipmentfor liaison with local animal disease control centres, veterinary laboratories, etc., bytelephone, radio, e-mail and facsimile, as appropriate.

2.7 Local Animal Disease Control Centres

During an emergency, one or more local animal disease control centres should be set uppreferably at the District levels and preferably within easy reach of the infected zones ofthe disease outbreak. Ideally they would be sited so that teams are able to travel to andfrom any site for surveillance or any other disease control activities on the same day. Thelocal animal disease control centre should be fully equipped with offices, maps,communication equipment to contact both field personnel and the National AnimalDisease Control Centre, vehicles and fully stocked central stores. Central cold-storagefacilities for vaccines should also be located at or within easy access of the centre. Thecentre should have simple equipment that will allow it to process and dispatch diagnosticspecimens, including serum samples.

Each local animal disease control centre should be under the control of an experiencedsenior field veterinary officer. This officer should be given the responsibility for directingthe emergency disease control and eradication programme within the area, under thegeneral supervision of the central animal disease control centre and the Director ofAnimal Health. The officer in charge of the centre should be given the authority to:

designate a farm, herd or community as an infected premises, when necessary,after consultation with, and with the agreement of, the central animal diseasecentre.


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quarantine infected and dangerous contact premises. send surveillance teams to all places where there are susceptible livestock. deploy the necessary staff to infected premises to arrange valuation, slaughter and

safe disposal of animals, cleaning and disinfection. advise on the delineation of infected, surveillance and control zones, and on the

measures to be taken in them. impose livestock movement restrictions. organize and implement vaccination programmes where applicable. carry out insect vector control programmes, if necessary; liaise with police and other authorities over the maintenance of disease control

restrictions. carry out publicity and public awareness campaigns.

Depending on the type of disease control strategy chosen, there will be a need fordisease surveillance teams, vaccination teams, quarantine and livestock movementcontrol staff, valuers, infected premises teams (livestock slaughter, disposal, cleaning and

disinfection), administrative staff (stores and general administration) and a publicrelations/education officer.

2.8 Difficult or Marginalized Areas

Where Somaliland is faced with the situation where they have to deal with an outbreak ofan epidemic livestock disease in areas that are difficult for geographical reasons orbecause they are relatively inaccessible owing to civil unrest or because they practisenomadism or transhumance, special arrangements would be made using CommunityAnimal Health Workers, NGOs and livestock associations.


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3. RISK ANALYSIS OF INTRODUCTION AND SUSTENANCE OF TRANSBOUNDARYANIMAL DISEASES IN SOMALILAND

Risk analysis comprises three components: risk assessment, risk management and risk

communication. Risk assessment of a transboundary animal disease emergency involvesestimation of the risks and likelihood of such a disease occurring and evaluation of itspotential consequences. Risk management is the process of identifying, documentingand implementing measures to reduce risks and their consequences while riskcommunication is the process of exchange of information and opinions on risk betweenrisk analysts and stakeholders which consist of all those who could be affected by theconsequences of risks, that is, everyone from livestock farmers to politicians.

In Somaliland the major transboundary animal diseases that are regarded as prioritydisease based on their socio-economic and food security consequences as well as theirpotential public health impact are Rinderpest (RP), Peste des Petits Ruminants (PPR),

Rift Valley Fever (RVF) and possibly Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). OtherTADs include Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia (CBPP), Contagious Caprine Pleuro-Pneumonia (CCPP) and Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD).

3.1 Rinderpest

With respect to Rinderpest, there is no scientific evidence to suggest that thedisease/infection still exists in Somaliland. There has not been any confirmed clinicaldisease for over twenty years and results of sero-surveillance that was carried out underthe Somali PACE project in 2004 showed that all the cattle herds tested were

serologically negative and the last rinderpest vaccinations in Somaliland were carried outin 1993. In the larger Somali ecosystem, the last rinderpest vaccinations were carried outin Southern Somalia and Northern Kenya in November-December 2003. In addition, thereis no evidence of the continued presence of rinderpest in the the Horn of Africa Region.Djibouti declared Provisional freedom from Rinderpest in October 2003 and is consideredto be most likely free from the disease (OIE 2007; FAO, 1997). Ethiopia was recognizedas Free from Rinderpest Infection in May 2008 (OIE, 2008). In 2007, Kenya wasrecognized as free from rinderpest on a zonal basis with zonal freedom from disease inmost areas outside the Somali ecosystem while the Somali ecosystem and itsneighbouring areas in Kenya were declared Provisionally Free from Rinderpest. Given thetraditional nomadism and transhumance, if rinderpest still exists in the Somali ecosystem.it would have re-appeared in Somaliland given the situation that with cessation ofvaccination since 1993, most of the cattle in the area were fully susceptible to rinderpest..Despite inter border and intra-country uncontrolled movement of livestock between socio-culturally related communities, the small size of the livestock population in Somaliland,which according to 1988 records was estimated at less than 6,000,000 would make itunlikely that rinderpest, if re-introduced, would be sustained with our present contingencyresponse plans


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3.2 Peste des Petits Ruminants (PPR)

In recent years, the geographical distribution of PPR has dramatically expanded toinvolve both Eastern Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East apart from Asia and

West and Central Africa. The disease has been confirmed in Somaliland and an overallbaseline serological prevalence of 6.2% was established by testing 4,217 sera collectedfrom all regions of Somaliland in 2001. The highest PPR antibody prevalences wererecorded in sheep and goat flocks in Sool region while the flocks sampled in Sahil regionwere sero-negative at the that time. Clinical disease with laboratory confirmation of PPRoutbreaks have since been recorded in Awdal region in 2006 and in Maroodijeh region in2008. The overall antibody prevalences in sheep and goat flocks sampled duringoutbreak investigations in 2008 in Awdal, Maroodijeh and Sahil regions was 26%, 23%and 30% respectively. The surveillance results thus indicate that the disease is nowendemic in all the regions of Somaliland.3.3 Rif t Valley Fever (RVF)

Although there does not seem to exist any documented confirmed evidence of clinicalRVF in Somaliland, results of baseline sero-surveillance conducted by the Somali PACEProject indicated baseline seroprevalences of 17% in camels, 0.3 % in goats and 2% insheep flocks with an overall prevalence of 1.9%.in Somaliland. The highest antibodyprevalences were recorded in the Sool and Sanaag regions indicating that these were theareas most at risk to RVF outbreaks if favourable climatic conditions prevailed. Thedisease, together with Brucellosis constitutes a big threat to export trade in livestock withthe Gulf States. The disease is insect-borne and outbreaks are modulated by climaticfactors such as un-usual rainfalls and flooding. Although the climatic conditions inSomaliland are not very suitable for outbreaks of RVF to occur commonly, the possibility

of outbreaks resulting from unusual heavy rainfalls and flooding in specific potentially highrisk localities (e.g Nugaal Valley) should be borne in mind.

3.4 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

There is no report of HPAI in Somaliland and the adjoining Puntland, Central andSouthern Somalia. No sero-surveillance has been carried out so far. Nevertheless, HPAIis known to occur in Egypt and one outbreak was confirmed in Djibouti in 2006. Althoughthe poultry population in Somaliland is considered low and village scavenging type localpoultry are not considered significant, importation of poultry products consisting mainly ofeggs and meat from the Middle East, Ethiopia and Yemen is known to occur. Some trans-continental migratory wild birds also visit Somaliland at some seasons of the year. Therecent unpredictable global spread of HPAI makes it desirable for attention to be given toa potential risk of HPAI emergency in Somaliland, the risk albeit low at present.

3.5 Risk Mitigation of Animal Disease Emergency in Somaliland.Although specific risk mitigation for individual diseases may vary in details, broadmeasures adopted in Somaliland include development of a generic national emergencies


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disease preparedness and contingency plan as well as for identified high-risk diseaseslike Rinderpest, PPR and RVF for a start. A national animal disease emergency task forcecharged with the responsibility of implementing national disease emergency plans hasbeen put in place. Ban on importation of livestock and livestock products from countrieswhere a relevant disease is known to exist supported by an effective animal disease

surveillance, establishment of livestock inspection points between Somaliland andadjoining areas and targeted community based training of rural livestock farmers andpastoralists in various aspects of transboundary animal disease recognition and controlincluding biosecurity procedures. Other mitigation measures include development of acommunity based, participatory rural livestock disease surveillance system andintegrating it into the existing epidemio-surveillance network, training of veterinarians,auxiliaries, other categories of farmers on TAD prevention and control strategies andeffective public enlightenment and awareness programmes on animal diseaseemergencies. Study tours for animal disease emergency preparedness is envisaged tosee how the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Botswana and Sudan are dealingwith animal disease emergencies.


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4. EARLY WARNING CONTINGENCY PLANNING

4.1 Disease Surveillance

Disease surveillance in Somaliland is both passive and active. Apart from reports to theanimal health department by livestock owners, pastoralists and nomads traditionally helpto spread news of strange diseases and unexplained mortalities to fellow farmers andlivestock owners and eventually to the livestock officers as a way to avert their herdsbeing infected or affected. Under normal conditions, the epidemiology unit of the livestockdepartment carries out active surveillance of high priority. In the last four yearssurveillance efforts to ascertain the status of TAD like RVF,FMD,PPR,CBPP with supportfrom Terra-Nuova, PACE, SAHSP and others International organizations in co-operationwith the public and private professionals have been made. With the assistance of theFAO and implementation actions of the SAHSP Phase 11, efforts have been made tostrengthen the capacity of Somali institutions for animal disease diagnosis and

surveillance, reactivate the monthly animal disease reporting. And enhance the capacityof Somali communities and institutions for preparedness and response to transboundaryanimal diseases as well as relevant key livestock/veterinary policies designed to involveconsultative and participatory processes with stakeholders.

During active disease surveillance exercises samples collected for RVF and CBPPdiagnosis were sent to Internationally accredited laboratories in Kenya and the resultswere negative. In addition, recently collected sheep and goat samples tested positive forPPR and PPR emergency interventions programmes funded and implemented by FAO,VETAID,OCHA and Terra Nuova/SAHSP II were organized in which the Ministry ofLivestock and Private Veterinary Associations jointly participated and the disease was

brought under control.

4.2 Emergency Disease Reporting and Response in Somaliland

In Somaliland emergency reporting is carried out by the public animal health workers, theprivate professional associations, Community Animal Health Workers, Community eldersand other stakeholders. It is envisaged that an individual seeing a disease outbreakreports to the village police station who by phone will pass on such information to theDistrict Veterinary Officer (DVO). The DVO then reports to the Director of Animal Healthfor necessary advise and instructions. To ensure the effectiveness of the emergencydisease reporting, the Ministry of Livestock has at the national level, linkages with:

Livestock traders. International organizations Non-governmental organizations. Governmental Authorities such as NERAD, MoA, MoRD, MoF, MoI, MoH AND

MoNP&C. Drug importers Chamber of commerce.


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Within the Regions, the Regional Governors and Regional Disaster ManagementCommittees play significant roles at this level. At the local level, the local authority is thefocal point for epidemic diseases (disasters) management issues at the District level andprovides the main link between the community, and the regional and national levels,where decisions, policies and funding emanate from. In principle, recognizing and

working through community level structures, ensures the community's capacity and theirown coping mechanisms are supported rather than undermined. The multi-dimensionalproblems associated with animal disease epidemics necessitate collaboration from a widerange of stakeholders within Somaliland. These include various stakeholders such as therelevant organizations and other focal points (line Ministries, NERAD, Livestockprofessional associations, and UN Agencies, NGOs, and community Animal HealthWorkers, MoFNP&C, MoA SAHSP, FAO AND UN-OCHA.)

The basic information that would be required during a disease emergency includes:

the disease or diseases suspected;

the exact geographical location of the disease outbreak(s); the names and contacts of affected farms or villages; livestock species affected; approximate numbers of sick and dead animals; brief description of clinical signs and lesions observed; date(s) when the disease was first noticed at the initial outbreak site and any

subsequent sites; details of any recent movements of susceptible animals to or from the outbreak

farm or village; any other key epidemiological information, such as disease in wild or feral animals

and abnormal insect activity; initial disease control actions taken.

4.3 Emergency Disease Information System

A functioning animal disease information system does not truly exist in Somaliland andthis is one important area that needs strengthening through support from the internationaldonors. The development of a disease information system is an essential part of nationalanimal disease emergency preparedness planning. It is desirable but by no meansessential that this be computerized. Efforts are being made to reactivate monthly diseasereporting to AU-IBAR using a standard format. Shapefiles are also available for the

customization of TADInfo by FAO Rome.

4.4 Training of Veterinarians and other Animal Health Staff in Early Recognition ofEmergency Animal Diseases and Collection and Dispatch of Diagnostic Specimens

In Somaliland, many veterinarians or other animal health workers in either the public orprivate sector have not had first-hand experience with transboundary or other emergencyanimal diseases, such as PPR or RVF as these diseases may never have occurred in thecountry or may have been exotic for a considerable period. The Ministry of Livestock


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therefore considers it desirable that training of veterinarians and animal health auxiliarystaff including Community Animal Health Workers in transboundary animal diseasesrecognition, diagnosis and control is carried out. Some training has been carried outunder the Somali PACE and SAHSP projects. Other areas of priority training includeepidemiology, disease investigation procedures, reporting and risk analysis of disease

occurrence and sustenance.

Opportunities exist for training of laboratory staff in Nairobi, Kenya and in South Africa.There is also the possibility of training for laboratory staff at world or regional referencelaboratories or through programmes organized by the J oint FAO/IAEA Division. Trainingprogrammes may also be arranged occasionally by other international organizations.

National emergency disease training workshops should be organized as the mainstay oftraining and should be targeted at government field and laboratory veterinary officers,veterinary practitioners, industry veterinarians and public health and quarantineveterinarians including those stationed at abattoirs, markets, border posts and air-and

seaports. Formal presentations and discussion sessions on the major emergencydiseases should be supplemented as much as possible by audio-visual teaching aids,including colour slides and videos on the diseases. At the same time, instruction shouldbe provided on disease reporting responsibilities and procedures, disease surveillanceand other field epidemiology methods and immediate disease control actions at theoutbreak site(s). Similar but simpler training workshops should be organized for auxiliaryveterinary staff.

4.5 Laboratory Diagnostic Capabilit y

Three potential diagnostic laboratories for animal diseases exist in Somaliland, namelythe Veterinary Laboratory in Hargeisa, the laboratory at the Sheik Technical VeterinarySchool (STVS) and the Berbera port quarantine laboratory. The Hargeisa laboratory with8 members of staff can only carry out limited serological tests and haematology andparasitology. It would need a lot of equipment and staff training to be able to cope withTransboundary Animal Disease diagnosis. The Berbera Port laboratory is mainly involvedwith Brucellosis diagnosis for export trade mainly while the STVS laboratory is currently atraining facility and has not started providing testing services to the public.

4.6 International Reference Laboratories and Collaborating Centres

Somaliland through support from AU-IBAR, SERECU, FAO and Terra Nouva has linkswith Kabete and Muguga Veterinary laboratories in Kenya. In addition, there is a networkof FAO and OIE reference laboratories and collaborating centres around the world whichare available to provide advice and assistance to countries. They are designated forspecific diseases or for broader subjects such as emergency preparedness for


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transboundary animal diseases, vaccine quality assurance and biological standardizationand veterinary epidemiology and economics.

4.7 International Disease Reporting

OIE has obligatory disease reporting requirements for member countries which should befactored into emergency disease preparedness plans. The head of the epidemiology unitwould be expected to prepare draft international disease reports, for OIE and elsewhere,to be approved by the Director of Animal Health. The OIE provides that countries shouldnotify it within 24 hours of any of the following events:

for OIE listed diseases: the first occurrence a listed disease and/or infection in acountry, zone or a compartment.

re-ocurrence of a listed disease and/or infection in a country,, a zone or acompartment after a report had declared the outbreak ended.

First occurrence of a new strain of a pathogen of an OIE listed disease in acountry, a zone or a compartment. A sudden and unexpected increase in the distribution, incidence, morbidity or

mortality of a listed disease prevalent within a country, a zone or a compartment. An emerging disease with significant morbidity or mortality or zoonotic potential. Evidence of change in the epidemiology of a listed disease (including host range,

pathogenicity, strain) in particular if there is a zoonotic impact.

Thereafter, weekly reports should be sent to OIE to provide further information on theevolution of the disease incidence which justified urgent notification. These reportsshould continue until it has been eradicated or the situation stabilized. A final report of

the incident should also be submitted to OIE.

Six monthly reports should be sent regarding the absence or presence and evolution ofdiseases listed by the OIE and information of epidemiological significance to othercountries. Annual reports should be sent on any other information of significance toother countries.

The Ministry of Livestock in Somaliland will compile disease reports to facilitatereporting in compliance with the obligations to OIE.

4.8 Regional Organizations

There are several regional organizations that have been established, inter alia, tocoordinate livestock disease control programmes at a regional level, foster internationalcooperation on animal health issues and facilitate safe international trade in livestockand livestock products. Somaliland at present has contacts with;

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations African Union-Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) Muguga Laboratory


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Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute (OVI).


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5. EARLY REACTION CONTINGENCY PLAN

5.1 Preventing the Entry of Exotic Diseases

In Somaliland, there are holding grounds or quarantine stations in Dhamel and Qool-Aday for Hargeisa region, Aroori holding ground for Togdheer region, Wagade holdingground for Gabel region and Barbera quarantine for Sahel region. Animals for export areretained for 15-20 days during which the animals are examined and vaccinated ifindicated before export mainly to the Middle East. Animals coming into Somaliland aresimilarly expected to be handled in similar manner in the quarantines stations or holdinggrounds.

5.2 General Principles of Emergency Livestock Disease Control in Somaliland

In Somaliland, universally accepted general principles of epidemic disease control anderadication to be adopted include:

5.2.1 Denial of Access of the Disease Agent to Susceptible AnimalsThis may be achieved by:Applying good hygiene and sanitary practices when handling livestock includingdisinfection of all personnel and equipment. This helps to prevent transfer of diseaseagents from one location to another. This should be accompanied by removingpotentially contaminated materials from the environment, by disinfection, destructionand/or safe disposal including cleaning and disinfection of premises that have housed

infected animals, destruction of contaminated feedstuffs and other materials and burialor burning of the carcasses of infected animals.

5.2.2 Avoiding Contact Between Infected and Susceptib le AnimalsThis may be achieved by quarantining of infected or potentially infected areas andrestrictions on the movement of people, potentially contaminated animal products andother materials and imposing livestock movement controls.

5.2.3 Removing Infected and Potentially Infected AnimalsThis is basically an eradication policy and can be achieved by slaughter of infected andexposed susceptible animals, safe disposal of carcasses combined with cleaning anddisinfection of the infected premises.

5.2.4 Reducing the Number of Susceptible AnimalsIn emergency disease control this is usually achieved by vaccination of susceptibleanimals. Vaccination may be done selectively (for example as ring vaccination aroundinfected areas) or as blanket vaccination programmes in susceptible animalpopulations. More usually vaccination is used to reduce the level of infection in animalpopulations to an acceptably low level where other disease elimination policies are morefeasible. Efforts will be made to avoid protracted mass vaccination which often leads tostate of living with the disease.


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5.2.5 Reducing Access of Vectors to Susceptible AnimalsFor insect-borne diseases such as Rift Valley Fever, control may be achieved byreducing vector numbers in an area by treatment and/or elimination of potentialbreeding sites. Large-scale insecticide spraying is generally too costly, ineffective in the

long term, and/or environmentally unacceptable. Other approaches might be to treatsusceptible animals with long acting insecticides during critical periods or removeanimals from high-activity insect vector areas either continuously or during times of theday or year when insect vectors are most active.

5.3 Strategies for Epidemic Livestock Disease Control and Eradication inSomaliland

In the event of a transboundary animal disease emergency in Somaliland, the firstresponse steps would involve containment and zoning followed by one of the control

options described below. Containment which essentially is designed to stabilize thesituation before eradication would involve immediate active disease surveillanceprocedures that include trace forwards and backwards. Zoning is essentially theproclamation of geographic areas in which specific disease control strategies are to becarried out. Zoning will take place in the form of concentric circles around known orsuspected foci of infection, with the most intensive disease control activities in the innerzones. The actual size and shape of the zones will be determined by administrativeboundaries or geographic barriers or be driven by epidemiological or resourceimperatives. The nature of the disease control zones and the activities carried out ineach zone will depend on the particular disease control/eradication strategy selected.

5.3.1 Control Options

5.3.1.1 Stamping out by Slaughter of Affected Herds or FlocksThis is usually the most efficient and cost effective method for the rapid elimination of anintroduced exotic or other emergency disease. In an eradication campaign, activities tobe carried out in the infected zone are described below. An immediate quarantine of theinfected premises would be imposed and all susceptible livestock species in the infectedpremises would be slaughtered, whether clinically ill or not. The carcasses would bedisposed of by burying or burning. Fair compensation is expected to be paid as soon aspossible, preferably at the time of slaughter.

Depopulated premises, equipment, clothing and other protective outfits in dairy animalhousing and feedlots would be cleaned with detergents/soaps and then decontaminatedwith suitable disinfecting agents depending on what disease agent is being dealt with asspecified in individual disease specific contingency plans. Faeces and effluents wouldbe similarly treated before burial or burning.

Dangerous contact premises, which are premises in the area immediately surroundingthe infected premises/herds/villages in which epidemiological investigations show a highlikelihood that infection may have been introduced, although no overt disease has yet


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been seen would be placed under strict quarantine and subjected to intense activesurveillance. If any infected animal is detected, the area would be automaticallyconsidered to be infected premises. Animals in such holdings, premises, villages orsettlements with susceptible species of livestock would be subjected to dailyexamination to detect clinical disease. This must continue for at least 21 days after the

last clinical case has been slaughtered in the infected premises. This would be thepreferred option in the case of Rinderpest.

5.3.1.2 Modified Stamping out with Ring VaccinationDepending on which transboundary animal disease is under consideration and existingcircumstances, Somaliland may consider modified stamping out with ring vaccination toprovide rapid control of an outbreak. This consists of the immediate imposition of strictmovement controls, slaughter of clinically affected animals in the infected herd(s),premises, villages or settlements, combined with ring vaccination of in-contact as well

as other susceptible livestock in the infected zone. This option is designed to reduce thenumber of infected animals shedding virus and the number of susceptible animals. Itcreates, in the area surrounding the infected herds, a ring of immune animals protectedfrom the risk of developing disease after exposure from the known infected herds orfrom an undetected source. These aims can be achieved relatively quickly.

5.3.1.3 VaccinationWell-planned, comprehensive vaccination programmes, supplemented by other diseasecontrol measures, can go a long way towards eliminating many epidemic livestockdiseases. This may be the strategy of choice in areas where large-scale eradication isunacceptable for one reason or another. Depending on which disease is being

controlled and prevailing circumstances, Somaliland may adopt either ring or blanketvaccination.

Ring vaccination is the rapid creation of an immune belt around an infected area andmay be carried out to contain a rapidly spreading epidemic disease outbreak or insituations where the effectiveness of other methods to prevent the spread of the diseasein and around infected zones, e.g. quarantine and livestock movement controls, cannotbe guaranteed, or where these areas may be relatively inaccessible.

Blanket vaccination involves the comprehensive vaccination of all susceptible species ofanimals over a larger area. It may be the preferred option when the disease outbreakhas become well established and there are multiple foci of infection, or when otherdisease control methods are impractical for one reason or another. The vaccination areashould cover known and suspected infected areas together with those areas consideredto be at high risk for spread of the disease.

Whichever vaccination programme would be selected, the purposes of the vaccinationprogramme would be carefully defined and the programme targeted to meet the desiredobjectives. If the goal is eradication in Somaliland, vaccination would not be allowed tobecome merely a routine activity of government veterinary services. The vaccinationwould be carried out as comprehensively as possible, with the target close to 100


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percent vaccination cover as practicable and different vaccination teams would be usedfor herds/flocks that are known or thought to be infected and those that are thought tobe free. This is to minimize the possibility of spread of the disease. Attempts would bemade to permanently identify vaccinated animals by such methods as ear-notching.

In adopting the vaccination option, attention would be made to vaccine type, vaccinequality, vaccine storage and application, vaccine cover and degree and duration ofvaccine protection. Different types of vaccine are available and their comparativeadvantages and disadvantages would be evaluated. Live attenuated vaccines generallyprovide a more durable immunity and require fewer doses and vaccines would beobtained from reputable sources that are credited with OIE accepted quality assuranceprocedures and codes of good manufacturing practice. The target will be to obtain atleast 70% herd/flock immunity levels. It is envisaged that vaccines would be stored atthe correct refrigeration temperatures at all times and used before their expiry dates.This means that cold chains will be maintained as necessary for vaccines up to the timeof their injection. Too often, injection of vaccines in the field becomes a hit-or-miss affair

because animals are inadequately restrained. Vaccination teams must be trained inproper techniques and equipped to restrain animals properly.

Because vaccination campaigns may result in a mixture of immunized and un-immunized animals in the population, thus making clinical surveillance difficult and maycomplicate the interpretation of results of serological surveillance activities, it isimportant that a permanent identification system for vaccinated animals would beadopted.

5.3.2 Strategies for Dealing with Special Circumstances

5.3.2.1 Nomadism and TranshumanceThe presence of an epidemic disease in highly mobile cattle herds and sheep and goatflocks in Somaliland complicates disease eradication processes. Nomadic andtranshumant pastoralists are among the most knowledgeable of livestock farmers andthey are amenable to cooperation with veterinary authorities if their confidence has beengained and they are given the opportunity to participate actively in decision-making.Many are amenable to quarantine procedures as a part of their traditional diseasemanagement practices, providing they are carried out sympathetically with fullconsultation. This is important because changes in climate and weather, which haveprofound implications for the seasonal availability of feed and water, may affect theirwillingness to conform to quarantine regulations. Virtually all pastoralists are nowfamiliar with the value of vaccines in controlling major epidemic diseases. Confidencebuilding achieved largely through communication and improvements in the veterinarian-farmer interface must start well in advance of any disease emergency.

5.3.2.2 Insecure or Otherwise Inaccessible AreasRelative inaccessibility of areas as a result of natural causes (climate or topography) orinsecurity resulting from civil unrest present a major challenge to the successful controland elimination of epidemic diseases. Approaches that use local community-basedparticipation would be adopted under the supervision of the Ministry of Livestock.


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6. CONTINGENCY PLANS

The process of preparation of specified disease contingency plans has started with theplan for rinderpest. This will be followed by plans for PPR and RVF. There is also a plan

to develop a time-bound strategy for the control of Brucellosis which has serious tradeimplications for Somaliland. Similarly, standard operating procedures for activities andprogrammes that may be common to several or all emergency disease campaigns aswell as enterprise manuals that set out zoosanitary guidelines for enterprises that maybe involved in an emergency animal disease outbreak are also planned.With regard to the specific disease contingency plans, the format and contents would betailored to meet the requirements and circumstances of Somaliland. The followingmodel format, which is based on FAO Manual for national disease contingency planswould serve as a guide.

6.1 Nature of the Disease

aetiology susceptible domestic and wildlife animal species world distribution and present status of the disease in Somaliland. epidemiology including likely pathways for spread within Somaliland. clinical signs and pathology.

6.2 Risk Assessment (Including Potential Consequences)

risk profile of the disease for Somaliland. likely methods of introduction and geographical areas at high risk potential consequences for food security and poverty alleviation, production

losses, trade losses and public health .

6.3 Diagnosis and Surveillance early warning mechanisms for disease introductions/outbreaks disease reporting procedures in Somaliland field and laboratory diagnostic strategies linkages with international reference laboratories surveillance strategies during different phases of eradication

6.4 Principles of Control and Eradication

methods to prevent spread of infection and to eliminate the pathogen factors that may affect control and eradication: agricultural production systems,

epidemiological, social and economic


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feasibility of control and eradication in Somaliland.

6.5 Policy and Rationale

overall policy zoning policy disease control and eradication strategies and procedures in each zone alternate disease control and eradication strategies and the general

circumstances in which these other options would be used. strategies for dealing with special circumstances: disease in wildlife or feral

animals, areas with nomadism or transhumance and difficult or relativelyinaccessible areas

criteria for proof of freedom.

6.6 Action Plan

Is a set of instructions covering various aspects of the controls to beimplemented and actions to be taken during transboundary animal diseaseemergency in Somaliland from when the disease is first suspected up to its finalcontrol.

It would identify lines of communication between livestock owners and field andgovernment veterinary services

Tries to ensure a short command chain with regard to reactions during thedisease emergency.

6.7 Appendices

criteria for defining infected areas and disease control zones summary of disease control actions in infected areas and other zones quarantine livestock movement controls stamping out, vaccination or other disease control procedures OIE International Animal Health Code for the disease.

6.8 Standard Operating Procedures

These are detailed sets of instructions for key programmes and activities thattend to be generic rather than disease specific. They should be cross-referencedto the specific disease contingency plans. Standard operating procedures may beprepared for:

organization and operation of the national disease control centre; organization and operation of local disease control centres; emergency disease reporting and information systems;


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laboratory diagnosis and surveillance; field diagnosis and surveillance; zoning; quarantine and livestock movement controls; livestock destruction and disposal of carcasses;

cleaning and disinfection; planning and performance of vaccination programmes; valuation and compensation; extension and public awareness campaigns.

6.9 Enterprise Manuals

These are codes of zoosanitary practice and instructions for action in what could bedeemed as risk enterprises in a disease emergency. They should cover acceptableand unacceptable zoosanitary practices when these enterprises find themselves

located in infected areas, disease control zones, or disease-free areas. They may beprepared for:

livestock markets abattoirs and knackeries feedlots egg hatcheries artificial breeding centres animal quarantine stations livestock traders and transporters zoos, wildlife parks and commercial aviaries

veterinary practices


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7. SUPPORT PLANS

7.1 Financial p lans

The need for a livestock emergency fund has been brought to the attention of theMinistry of Livestock. The importance of Government commitment and provision offunds in the Somaliland budget has been emphasized. It is being proposed that part ofthe revenue from livestock export should be ploughed back as emergency livestockfunds. Donor support would also be solicited as necessary.

7.2 Resource Plans

A resource inventory, listing all the resources that would be needed to respond to amoderate sized outbreak of each of the high-priority emergency diseases is being done.

7.3 Legislation

Somaliland enacted its Veterinary Code in 2008 which makes provisions for high priorityanimal diseases to be compulsorily notifiable. The code specifies the authority of theMinister, the director general and the Director of Livestock on issues relating toimportation of livestock and livestock products, declaration of disease control zones inthe event of a disease emergency, quarantine and application of zoo-sanitary measuresfor disease control. Provisions are made to allow the entry of officials (or otherdesignated persons) on to a farm or other livestock enterprise for disease surveillancepurposes and for the collection of diagnostic specimens and defines channels ofcommunication with international organizations such as the FAO, WHO, OIE, WTO, AU-

IBAR etc.


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8. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

8.1 FAO Reference Laborator ies

FAO Reference Laboratories provide consultations, assist in making diagnoses anddevelop diagnostic capability, maintain a reference collection of disease agents,produce and standardize reagents and assist in characterization of causative agentsand in training activities.

Institute Disease Laboratory

Institute for Animal Health (IAH) PirbrightLaboratory

Ash RoadPirbright, WokingSurrey GU24 ONFUK

Tel.: +44 1483 232 441Fax: +44 1483 232 448E-mail: [email protected]

Foot-and-mouthdisease

Other vesiculardiseases

Rinderpest

Peste des petitsruminants

Lumpy skindisease

Sheep pox

Goat pox

WorldReferenceLaboratory

World

ReferenceLaboratory



Reference

Laboratory

ReferenceLaboratory

ReferenceLaboratory

Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI)Muguga Laboratory

PO Box 32Kikuyu

KenyaTel.: +254 20 2700640email: [email protected]

Rinderpest

Peste des petits

ruminants

RegionalReferenceLaboratory


Institut sngalais de recherche agricole (ISRA)Laboratoire national de l'levage et derecherches vtrinaires (LNERV)

BP 2057 De HannDakarSenegal

Rinderpest

Rift Valley fever





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Tel.: +221 832 2762Fax: +221 832 2118E-mail:www.aupelf-uref.org/sngal_ct/rec/isra/isra.htm


Pan-American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Center

(PAHO/PANAFTOSA)

CP 58920001-970Rio de J aneiroBrazil

Tel.: +55 21 671 3128 through 33Fax: +55 21 671 2387



Foreign animaldisease

Regional

ReferenceLaboratory


DiagnosticLaboratory

Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Laboratory ChiefUSDA-APHIS, Box 848GreenportNew York

USA 11944Tel.: +1 516 323 2500Fax: +1 516 323 2798E-mail: [email protected]


Classical swinefever

Viralhaemorrhagicdisease of rabbits

Malignantcatarrhal fever

Rinderpest


African horsesickness

African swinefever







ReferenceLaboratory

ReferenceLaboratory

Centro de Investigacin en Sanidad Animal(CISA)Instituto Nacional de Investigacin y TecnologaAgraria y Alimentaria (INIA)Valdeolmos28130 MadridSpain

Tel.: +34 91 620 2300


African horsesickness

African swinefever




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Fax: +34 91 620 2247E-mail: [email protected]


Center for Veterinary Biologics-Laboratory (CVB-L)

PO Box 844Ameslowa 50100USA

Tel.: +1 515 239 8266Fax: +1 515 239 8673E-mail: [email protected]/vs/cvb/lab/lab.htm

Classical swinefeverBluetongueEpizootichaemorrhagicdisease

RegionalReference

Laboratory



Institut fr Virologie Tierztliche Hochschule

Bnteweg 17

D-30599 HannoverGermany




Centre de coopration internationale enrecherche agronomique pour le dveloppement

Dpartement d'levage et de mdecinevtrinaire CIRAD-EMVTCampus international de BaillarguetBP 503534032 MontpellierCedex 1, France

Tel.: +33 (0)4 6761 5800Fax: +33 (0)4 6759 3795E-mail:[email protected]

Contagiousbovinepleuropneumonia

Contagious

caprinepleuropneumonia





Laboratrio Nacional de Investigao Veterinria

Estrada de Benfica 7011500 LisbonPortugal

Tel.: +351 1 716 0448Fax: +351 1 716 0039

Contagiousbovinepleuropneumonia


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC)

Division of Vector-Borne Infectious DiseasesRampart RoadColorado State University Foothills ResearchCampusPO Box 2087

Rift Valley fever

Arthropod-transmitted viraldiseases

ReferenceLaboratory

ReferenceLaboratory
http://www.cirad.fr/http://www.cirad.fr/http://www.cirad.fr/


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Fort CollinsColorado 80522USA

Tel.: +1 970 221 6400Fax: +1 970 221 6476www.cdc.gov/ncidod/ncid.htm

Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute (OVI)

Private Bag X5Onderstepoort0110 South Africa

Tel.: +27 12 529 9111Fax: +27 12 565 6573

E-mail: [email protected]


Bluetongue

Epizootichaemorrhagicdisease

African swine

fever

Arthropodtransmitted viraldiseases




ReferenceLaboratory

ReferenceLaboratory

National Institute for Virology Special PathogenUnit

Private Bag X4Sandringham 2131South Africa


Arthropodtransmitted viraldiseases

ReferenceLaboratory

Central Veterinary Laboratory

New HawAddlestoneSurrey KT15 3NBUK

Tel.: +44 (0)1932 357 466Fax: +44 (0)1932 357 856E-mail: [email protected]

Newcastledisease

Avian influenza

Transmissiblespongiformencephalopathies

Brucellosis

ReferenceLaboratory

ReferenceLaboratory

ReferenceLaboratory

ReferenceLaboratory

8.2 FAO Collaborating Centres
http://www.ovi.ac.za/http://www.ovi.ac.za/http://www.ovi.ac.za/


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FAO Collaborating Centres provide technical advice, expertise and consultations ondesignated subjects pertinent to FAO headquarters, field projects and membercountries; and assist in the organization and implementation of training activities.

InstituteGeographical

coverageTheme

Agriculture Research Council (ARC)Onderstepoort Complex

Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute (OVI)Private Bag X05Onderstepoort0110 South Africa


Africa

Emergencypreparednessfortransboundaryanimal diseases

Department of Veterinary Tropical Diseases

Faculty of Veterinary SciencePrivate Bag X04Onderstepoort0110 South Africa


Africa


National Veterinary Research Institute (VOM)

Fed. Min. of Agriculture and NaturalResourcesPlateau StateNigeria

Tel.: +234 73 80811/80 812Fax: +234 73 460 006/460 370

West andCentral Africa


Institut sngalais de recherche agricole(ISRA)Laboratoire national de l'levage et derecherchesvtrinaires (LNERV)

BP 2057 De HannDakarSenegal

Tel.: +221 832 5146/832 2762Fax: +221 832 2118E-mail:www.aupelf-uref.org/sngal_ct/rec/isra/isra.htm


Emergencypreparedness

fortransboundaryanimal diseases

Laboratoire central vtrinaire

BP 2295


Emergencypreparednessfor


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BamakoMali

Tel.: +223 243 344 / 246 653Fax: +223 249 809

transboundaryanimal diseases

Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI)

Muguga Laboratory

PO Box 32KikuyuKenya

Tel.: +254 20 2700640email: [email protected]

Eastern Africa


Central Veterinary Laboratory

18 Borrowdale RdPO Box CY551Causeway

HarareZimbabwe


Southern

Africa

Emergencypreparedness

fortransboundaryanimal diseases

Central Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory

PO Box 11365

1558 TeheranIran

Tel.: +98 261 72005 through 9Fax: +98 261 74658E-mail: [email protected]

Near East andMiddle Asia


Institut agronomique et vtrinaire Hassan II(IAV)Rabat-Instituts

BP 6202RabatMorocco

Tel.: +212 7 675 539Fax: +212 7 776 796

E-mail: [email protected]

North Africa


Kimron Veterinary Institute

PO Box 12Beit Dagan 50250Israel

Tel.: +972 3 968 1682 / 968 1711Fax: +972 3 968 1753 / 968 1641E-mail: [email protected]

Near East


Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) Asia and Emergency


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AP 10San J os de la LajasLa HabanaCuba

transboundaryanimal diseases

Institute for Animal Health (IAH) Pirbright

Laboratory

Ash RoadPirbright, WokingSurrey GU24 ONFUK


EuropeAfricaAsia


Centre de coopration internationale enrecherche agronomique pour ledveloppement (CIRAD-EMVT)

Dpartement d'levage et de mdecinevtrinaireCampus International de BaillarguetBP 503534032 Montpellier cedex 1France

Tel.: +33 4 6759 3724Fax: +33 4 6759 3798www.cirad.fr

Africa


FAO/IAEA Central Laboratory for ELISA andMolecular Techniques in Animal DiseaseDiagnosis/Animal Production Unit/FAO/IAEAAgriculture and BiotechnologyLaboratory/IAEA Laboratories

Wagramer Strasse 5, PO Box 100A-1400 ViennaAustria

Tel.: +43 1 2060 ext 28355 or 26053Fax: +43 1 2060 ext 28222E-mail: [email protected] orM.H.J [email protected]./programmes/rifa/d3/index.html

World

Standardization,validation andqualityassurance ofELISA andmoleculartechniques foranimal diseasediagnosis

CNEVA Ploufragan - Laboratoire central derecherche avicole et porcine

BP 53 Zoople22440 PloufraganFrance


WorldViral diseasesof swine
http://www.cirad.fr/http://www.cirad.fr/http://www.cirad.fr/


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Institute for Animal Science and Health,ID/IDLO

PO Box 658200 AB Lelystad

The NetherlandsTel.: +31 320 238 238Fax: +31 320 238 050E-mail: [email protected]

EuropeViral diseasesof swine

CNEVA Sophia Antipolis - Laboratoire depathologie des petits ruminants et des abeilles

105, route des ChappesBP 111F-06902 Sophia Antipolis cedexFrance

Tel.: +33 4 9294 3700

Fax: +33 4 9294 3701E-mail: [email protected]://perso.wanadoo.fr/apiservices/cneva.htm

Europe andNear East

Diseases ofsmall ruminants

Virology Department

New HawAddlestoneSurrey KT15 3NBUK

Tel.: +44 1932 341 111 / 334 115Fax: +44 1932 347 046

WorldViral diseasesof poultry

Poultry Health and Production

Danish Network for Poultry Production andHealth in Developing CountriesDepartment of Veterinary MicrobiologyRoyal Veterinary and Agricultural UniversityBulowsvej 132000 Frederiksberg CDenmark


WorldDiseases ofpoultry

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