Sosa - The Unity of Action, Perception and Knowledge (Ch. 1)

7/24/2019 Sosa - The Unity of Action, Perception and Knowledge (Ch. 1)

1/14

The

Unity

ofAction,

Perception,

and

Knowledge

Introduction: On Metaphysical Analysis

r.

Three

sorts

of

analysis can be

distinguished:

the linguistic, the

concep-

tual,

the netaphysicai.

Take the

familiar

example of a cat's

lying

on

a mat.

Consider

first

the

pragmatics and

semantics

of

the

corresponding

sentence.

For

exanrple,

rvhen exactly nrust

the cat

be

on the nrat in

order for

an

utterance

of that

sentence,

which takes

tinre,

to be true?

Consider next

the analysis of the sentence's

conceptual

content.

One

sort of conceptual analysis

would involve

a bi-conditional claim

of

neces-

sity,

with

the

target

content

on orle

side

and

the

explaining content on the

other. On pain

of vicious

circularity,

the explanation cannot

contain

the

content

to

be

explained.

Grasp

(untlerstanding)

ofthe target content

would

be

explained through

(prior)

grasp

of thc. explaining content.

The

nretaphysical

analysis

of the

mt's lying

on

the

mat is

distinct

from such

linguistic

or conceptual

analysis. A rnetaphysical

analysis,

with

respect

to

that

cat

and

that

rnat,

of the

fornler's

lying

on the latter, would involve

the

cat, the

ma, and a

certain

binary

relation, that of

lying

on. But

what is this

relation?

We

nright

try this:

it

is

a relation

of being adjacent

to

and

above.

llut

that

is problcnratic:. Strppose

the cat lies

on a ntat that is glued

on

the

inside

ancl bottortr

of

a large wheel. Ancl suppose

the wheel

starts

to rotate

with high

at'cclcrti()n

s() that thc cet

stays

on

the

nrat

throughout the

rota-

tiort, rhrc

to

tlrc firrccs involvcd.

-['hc

ct

c:ontinucs

to

lic

cln

the rnat all

tlrrouglr

tlrc

rot:rtiorr,

l'rrrt lt tltc top is

lu'lou,

tllc

nlt.

()rtc'rc,tt'tion

to tltt'cx;rrtrplt'r,voultl lrc

to try tl-l,i.q

rll

is.r nr()r'(','ottrplt'x

t't'l.rtiorr tlr,rrr

rrrirllrt lr,rvt',r1r1lt':rrt'tl.

In tloinu


2/14

THE

UNITY

()F

A(l

I

()N,

l)lllt(

lil)

I

l()N,

ANI) KN()WLEDGE

this one nright appeal to

resultant

firrt'cs,

so tlrrt tlrc actual

relation

involves

previously

unsrlspected

f;ctors.

Witllout tllc

c'oncept

of

fbrce,

one

woulcl

not

be abler to

entertrin that prorosal. Yct

onc:

cotlcl still gain a partial

account

ofthe

relevant relation as

firllows:

ir

is

r

rcltion ofbeing adjacent in

a

certain

way,

n

the

right wrty. Whilc

unsurc of what

that

way is, one rrright

at

least

know that it is

sorue way ey

of

"pcrsor)s"

ancl

the

c-onceptual

analysis

of

a

concept of

a

person, and

how

thcsc cliffbr

fronr

nretaphysical

inqr:iry

into

the

nature

of

persons,

such as

the

living

hurnan beings

amollfl us.

2.

Metaphysical

analysis

goes

beyoncl conc:eptual

or

sernantic:

inquiry,

ancl

also beyoncl

necessary

bi-conditionals, which

can

fail to

provide

the

rneta-

physical

explanation

of special interest

to

the

philosopher.

Consider for example the

nret

rphysics

of

persons.

In

the

broad

dornain

of

personso

we

find

our

threefold

divide

alnon{:

(a)

words,

suclr

as

the

word

"person," (b)

concepts, such as

the concept

of a

person,

and

(.)

extra-linguistic,

extra-conceptual

entities,

the

living

persons.'

(loncerning

the

latter, wc find nretaphysical options such

as substance

dr-ralisrn,

aninralisnr, rrncl so olr.

According to an Aristotelian view, a persoll

is

never identiml

tuith,bvt only cttnstittfted

by, abody,

which

needs

to be alive,

r.

Objectiort'.

"lu

dditiott

to tltt lit,itt.{

p('rsotts nKutq

tts,

tulticlt dft'pdrti.tildrs, tltt'rc'is

thc utiut'rsal o.l'

pcrsonhood,

tilticlt is

lst:

distitttt.liom

tht'(0tt(('pt

of

d

p('rsott. Ivt't

it

rt:ttlly

l1'

ttttit,t'rsl

tltdt int(rcsts

thc metaphysicitut, ttot

prtirtar

liuiryq

pcrsttttt,

l.r

lr)

artd carlit'r.fitntttil,tliotts.rttqqc.tf2" Reply: We

can wonder

horv

auy arbitrary

living person

nright be collstitutecl otrtoloqically.

And

this

is

of course

diflbrent fronl

h


3/14

IO

THE

UNI'rY

()F

ACTI()N,

PERCEP'II()N, AND

KNOWLEDCIE

A

serious

problem

aft^ects the

nretaphysics

and icleology of

perception

and

action,

however,

and similarly affects the

nretaphysics

and ideology of

knowledge.

This

is the problenr

of deuant causatitttt.

We

shall consider

a solution for

the problenr in its three varieties. To

begin

we exanline Davidson on action, Grice on perception,

and

the, account of

knowledge

as

apt belief,

as

belief that

gets

it right

through

conlpetence

rather

tharr luck.

We

take

up

the

opposition between sucir

traditional

accounts and

"disjunctivist"

alternatives. And we explore how

the

point

and

substancc of

nretaphysical

analysis bears on the

problenr

and on conlpeting reactions to it.

What

follows divides intc

four

parts.

ln

a.first part, the

main

lines of the

view are laid out,

and

it is shown how it

applies

with

thc sanre

basic

stnlc-

ture

in

all three donrains. A

sccontlpart

then

develops

these icleas

with

finer

grairr and more detail.

In a third

part we consider how

our accouut

goes

beyond

Davidson

and

Grice. A

final,.fwrth

part,

then presents a rrrethodol-

ogy that fits

our

approach.

First

Part

Action,

Perception, and Knowledge

A. Action

What

is it

to act

intentionally?

As

a first approxirnation, you

might

think,

to act

intentionally

is to succeed in

a certain

intentional

ainr,

where the suc-

cess is owed to

the

agent's

intention.

But that

has

counterexanrples, such as thc fbllowing.

A waiter

intends to startle

his

boss

by krrocking over

a

stack

of

dishes

right

now,

which

rnakes

hinr

so

nervous that

he

involulrtarily staggers into

the stack

and

knocks

it

over, thus

startling thc

boss.

lJut

this is not sollrcthin

ire- ckrcs

intentionally,

cvcn tlrotrglr thc

succcss lrcrc is

owccl to tllc ugcrrt's

irrtcntir>n.'

also Irty

lr.rvirrgbottght ouc

c:rt'l

icr:rtrrl

kt'1lt rt

rrr rn1'l)()\s('\\i()r). ((ltlrrrp:rtiblv

rvitlr tllrrt.;r strt-

fL'icnt crpl:r ttrtt

iort

rrr

iglrt

st

ill

l,c itr

tplovcrl s() .1\ t

()

llc

uot or

r

ly

rrrf/ir ir'lf

brrt

;r lso lrt'l/r'r

tllrr

n

thc

c;rrl it'r'

srr llir'ir'r

rt orrt'.)

1.

I lcrc is.r lt't ntttolorlt,rl(,r\'(',1( n()l

lll\t

lor

lllrs

l).r\\.rl{('ltut

,rls,,lot

tllt't't'rtt.r

intlt'l ol

tlris

lrook.

'I

lrt'ol

tzttt',.rlt,

)ul

.r(

I r(

)n

(

.ur

()\'('rl,

t,

rk

.ut

Inrl)()t t.ntl

,ltrl

n,

Iolt llt'ltvt't'rr rvl.tl

,trt'tl.

rt's

itttt'-

lrolr,tlll',rttl

u'll,rl

()tt('(l(t1".

1,1 ,1t",t,,tt(ott

rttl)()\(.ttl(',ttttttl-',

1tlrrt/slrt'rlr,,rllt').

lllt st'tlst',tl

"trl('nlt,rtr.tll1'"

n u

lt.rl

l,tll,trr'. r', r('\lrr(

l('(l

lo lll.rl

r,l

"l'1'

,lt".t'r,".rltll,'up.'.lr

rt

,tl,lrn,tt

V

l.u

liu.rll('rl

',lr( 1,lrr". l.rr

lrr'llrrrl

I

lrrr',,,rrr'rrrrl'lrt \\r'.rrlo\\

n

on(".',n,.r[.,

r',

url(

nlr,'n.tll\'.t\

()lr('

THE UNITY

OF

ACTION,

PERC]EP'TION, AND

KNOWLEDGE

So, we

shouid

require

that the

agent's

intention

nrust

bring

about

the success

in the right

way,

with

"the

right kind of

causation."

Or

so

Davidson

advises

repeatedly

in his long

struggle

with the

problem,

and in

his

parting

thoughts on

the nratter.

F{ere

is how

he

puts

it (with

nrinor variations):

\Vhat is

it

for

an agent to

F intentionally

on a par-

ticular

occasion? There

must

be sonre G such

that

the agent's intend-

ing to

G must

cause

o'.

.

ill

the

right

w1',

the

agent's

particular

act

of

Fitrg."5

The waiter's krrocking

over of

the

dishes is

not caused in

the

right

way

by any

such intention.

IJut

no

account

of

"the

right

way"

has

won consensus.

B.

Perception

I.

What

is

it to

perceive

an entity?

The ac:count

of perception defended

in

Paul

Grice's

"Causal

Theory of Perception"r'is

an early,

influential

answer.T

Clrice begins

with

a

view

drawn fronr

H. H.

Price's

Percepton:

X perceives

M iffX has

a sense experience

that is

causally dependent on

some

state

of affairs

involving

M.

runs

a

marathon,

without

doing

so

by

design

(on purpose).

ln ordinary

language,

intentionally

is

conrpatible

lvith urere knorvledge

alorethoueht,

r.vhereas

b,

rt,fn goes r,r'ith nralice afbre-

thotrght

(or,

urore

broadly,

purpose

albrethoueht). The issues

that arise with this restricrion

are

itrrportant

fcr

ttnderstanding the ontologv

of action, even ifwe

do not tackle the

broader sub-

ject

of

what one does

"intelrtiourlly,"

whether it is

clone

by design or not.

(C)ornpare

Michael

Brattrrau,

lntctttitttts, Pttuts, dild

Practical

Rcrr.rol (Stanforcl,

CA: CSLI Publications,

1999),

espe-

cially

"Two

Faces

of Intentiolt"

and

"Acting

with

an

Intention.")

-5.

See

p.

22L

of his

"Reply

to

Vermazerl,"

in

B.

Vernrazen

and

M.

Hintikka,

ecls, E,rsay-s

on

Dntidsott: Actiotts

rutd Evutts

(Canrbriclge,

MA:MIT Press,

t98-5). Davidson's

thought evolved

frotrr "Acticlns,

Reasorts, and

Clatrses,"

-lottntnl

o.f

Philosttph'1,

$g6il,

through

"Intendine"

in

his

Ii.r.iay.i

ttn Attitttts

utd

Evtttts

(Oxfbrd:

Oxlirrcl

University Press, r98o),

and then

to

his replies

in

the

Vernrazen ancl Hintikk

collection.

.

H. P.

(irice,

"The

Clattsal

Theory

of Perception," Procccdings

of

thc

Aristotelut

Society

Sttpplctrrt'ttt,t,

l,'ttltrtrrc

(t

9fi

r):

t

I I-5J.

7.

(lrii:c

tlocs

ttot

rlistinetrisll clclrly

nlonq

our

rhree

sorts ofenalysis. Much

ofhis

discussion is

clcurly nlcilnt

s

littuuistic;rrtalysis,

rs is his lone

discussion

ola

theory

of implication.

But he

of tcn nrovcs swiftly fj-onr noti


4/14

THE

UNTTY

()F

ACTI()N, PERCftP'tI()N,

AND

KNOWLEDGE

This, he

argues,

is

subject

to

counterexanrples. C)ur visual sense

experi-

ences while

in

the sunlight,

for

exanrple, are causally dependent on

the

sun even when

we look away from it. Nor

do we

nornrally

perceive

our

eyes even when

our

visual experiences are

highly dependent

on

the state

ofour eyes.

2.

The

account

is

then revised

to

say

that

an

object

is

perceived

if

and

only

if

some condition involving it is

a

differential condition that

afIects

some

but not all of the

perceiver's relevant

sense experience at the

tinre

of per-

ception.

The

sun

is

not seen

rvhen we look

away

from it; on

the

revised

account, this

is

because no condition of it affects only sonle and not all

of

orle's

visual sense experience.

However, the revised

account too

has counterexanrples.

Torches can

shine

respectively

on statues viewed

concurrently,

each torch thus

affecting

the perceiver's

visual

inrpressions

differentially,

though only the statues

are

seen, with the

torches

blocked

fronr view.

3.

Grice eventually arrives at approximately

the fbllowing view:

X perceives

M if,

and only if,

X

hosts a sensory experience

for r,vhic:h M

is

causally

responsible in

the

right way.

This is what

Grice's

view

cotnes

to,

g'iven

how

he

thinks the

"right"

way is

grasped,

to

be considered

in

section

E.8

C.

Knowledge

As a

first

approximation,

propositional knowleclge can

be understood

as

belief that

attains its

ainr

(truth)

and

does

so

not merely

by

luck

but

through

competence.

Such

knowledge

is

tlien a

special

case of

perfornrance

that

is

not

just

lucky but apt:

i.e., perfornlance whose

sLlccess

is owed suffrciently

to the

performer's

relevarlt

conrpetence.

The

aptness of a

perforrnance

is

thus

supposed

to block an

important

sort of

luck,

the sort that

precludes

Gcttiered subjects

fronr knowing what they

believe

both

c:orrcc:tly ancl

Irr

rrilposirrq

tlris

vicw,

(ilrt'c

lrolrt's

to

rlr':l

ll()t

()nlv

u'rtll lris t'x,rrttrlt's t

rtt'tl rn

otn'tcxt,

brtt

;rlso

rvitl

t lcltr t.rscs of

t

,tus,tl tlt'r'r,tn, t',

su, ll .tr

lltost'lourt,l

,tn

l)

t.l

-r

,rl

lrrs

r,t1rt'r.

tt.

THE UNITY

()F

ACTI()N, PTiRCEPTI()N,

AND

KNOWLEDGE

i3

conlpetently.

A belief

falls

short of knowiedge

when

its truth

is

owed

too

much to iuck and

not

sufliciently

to

the believer's competence.e

In

a Gettier

case,

the

believer's

cornpetence

in oue way

rnakes sonte

con*

tribution

to their

getting it right in believing

that p.

We

might

conceive

of

"their

getting it

right"

as

a conjunctive

state

of affairs

containing as

con-

juncts

both

P and the believer's believing

P. The believer's

exercise

of

epis-

temic

competencc docs

certainiy

nrake a

contribution

to

their

believing

P,

so

it follows

that it makes

a

contribution

to the holding of

the

conjunc-

tive

state by

rnaking a contribution

to

the holding

of

one of

its conjuncts.

Flowever, what

is required for

aptness

of

belief

is not

rnerely

the

holding

of the conjunctive

state

that

is

sourced

through

those two

separate

chan-

nels: one

for

the

holding

of the belief,

and the

other

for

the truth

of

the

proposition

believed.

This

would leave

it

open

that the combination

of

belief-plus-truth

be entirely

coincidental.

Even if

the

believer's compe-

tence

contributes

heavily to their

beleuirtg as

they

do,

it

nray still contribute

nrtt nt

all

to

that

coincidence's being

rlore than

a

merc

coincidence.

So,

in

order

for

a

belief to

be apt, the coincidence

of belief and

truth must derive

sufficiently through

competence,

so that

it

is

not merely coinciclental.

And,

nlore

generally, in order

for

a

perfornlance to

be apt, it nlust

be

suiciently

an exercise

of conrpetence

that

yields the

coincidence of

(a)

the atternpt and

(b)

the

realzation of

the

attenr.pt's

coutent.'o

But this too

has ostensible counterexanrples.

Take an archer's

competent

shot that

(a)

would hit the

target

absent

intervening

wind, and

(b)

does

hit the

target because,

although

a

first gust diverts it, a

second gust

puts it

back on track.

Here

the

agent's conrpetence

yields

the

early orientation

;rnd

speed of

the arrow,

and

this

conrbined orientation

and

speed,

together

with

the

two conr.pensating

gusts,

results

in

the

buli's-eye.

So, why is this

shot

not

apt

after

all?

A

performance

is

apt

when

it

succeeds because

of the

;rgent's conlpetence.

But our

archer's wind-aided shot

r/oes seenr

to

succeed

bcc:ause of

his

cornpetence

If

the

agent's competence

had

not resulted in

,t.

"Wc

hvc rechcd

the vicw th:rt

kllorvleclge is

true

belief orlt of intellectual

virttte,

belief

tlrt

trrrns

otrt right by rcusorr

of'the

virtrre ancl not

jrrst

by coincidence"

(E.

Sosa, Knouladgt:

itt

l\rsttctiut'(()lrrrbridgc:(lnrbritlgc

Utriversity

Press, rggt),z77).

ro. A rccitrricnt

of'tcstirlorry rrriglrt contrillutc

throrth llis cxcrcise of epistetrric colltpetence

to

tlrc r'.r'is/r'rrr'of'llis lrclicl'rvitllorrt

t'orrtribrttirtg

to

its vrrtt'rs, to its hittirrg the lltark of trtlth.

Arrtl tllc,llrtncss

of'lris

bt'lrcl

rt'.rrirt's tll;rt

llc'nt;rkc;r

r'oltlilltltirlt.

rvltir'h

rrrlty

bc qtritc

lirrr-

ttcrl,tlttl

srlr,ll, t() lls lrc.'llt'f'\ rrrtlr'rf,/r'\\,

ll(tt

lll\l

(()

tlr

t'xtrlt'lltc.


5/14

r4

THE

UNITY

()F

ACTI()N,

PBRCEPTION, AND

KN()Wt.liDGE

the

right

orientation atrd

speed

uporl

release

fronr

the borv, then

the

arrow

would not have

hit

the

target.

Taking

a

ieaffrorn

I)avidson and

Grice,

we rnightjudge

success

to be

apt

oniy if it

derives causally

frorn

conlpeter"tce

in the right

u)ay. Soccess essen-

tially

aided

by

lucky gusts

of

wind would

not derive in

the

right

way

frorn

the archer's

competence.

D.

Assessing

the

Three

Accounts

L

A11

three accotlnts

nray

be

rejected

as unsatisfactory

rlntil

wc

are

told

what it

is

for succress

to

derive

"in

the

right

way"

fronr

thc

relcvant

cansal

2.

'We

are

considerring

accounts

of

phenornena

that

are broadly

oofactive,"

such

as perceiving

x, killing

x, perceiving

that p,

intentionally

oing,

and

knowing

that p. These

involve

relations spanning rnincl

ancl

world,

relations

between

the

subject/agetrt's

nrind and her

environing world. Philosophical

analyses

proposed

for

these

various relations

then repeatediy

appeal

to

sonle

essential

causal relation.

And thus we reach the

nub

of

the

problenr.

The problenr

is

often posed

by

de'u'rant

causation,

wayward causation

that

gives

rise

to

counterexamples,

whether the analysis

targets

action, percrep*

tiott,

or

knowledge.

Time

after

tirue, a

kincl

of

"luck"

or

"mere

coincidence

"

derives

from the deviant

character

ofthe

causation,

inconrp:rtibly

rvith appro-

priate

success and relevantly

creditable perception,

acticln,

or

knowledge.

3.

For all

sttch

"factive"

phenonrena,

tltcre

is

a

cood

case

ancl a lrad

c]lst:.

In

the good

case

the

agent

fully succeecls."

[n

the bacl

case she f?rils

in

some

way or other.

Traditionalists

take the

good

casc

to

bc constituted

in part try

what con-

stitutes

the bacl

c:ase,

plus

sonrething else

that is

rnissing

in thc

bacl case.

rr.

My

"succeeding"

is telativc

to

the ainr

constitutive of'the perforrnancc

t.llat srrcccecls.

It

llreans

strictly

just

that

the constitutive

ainl is lttrrincrl

by thirt

rerfitrrrrrrncc.

()lljcrtiotr:

It

tokttott,

lltdt

l)otttltt'h,tsisol'ttr'lt'cltt,i,lLtt,t.l(t'1r11':

Ycs.tluc. llutinnlys(.1)scy()u(';lnsritcctl

firlly

cvcrr if

'yotr

rnigltl lt,rvc srr,

t t't'tlt',1

('\'('r

luol'('f

ullr'.

(

()ln[).u(.

Moott..ut(l

l)('s( ill.tcs

()n

lit,t(lc5()l

(('ll,trrrll.(()ttlrn,tt\'\l)('('(lrrst,rt'rr

totlrrs,,rrrvllt'll

l,..rt

"Mr,\utt(,t\(.rslirll

lrrt

I t.u

sltll

r,rr


6/14

I6 THE

UNITY OF AC'IION, PER(]EPTION, AND

KNOWI-EDGB

In response it

should be granted that there is no analysis

of the

good case

in terms

of

indepeudent factors

conjoined

in

the analysis. This seenls cor-

rect for all three phenornena: for perception, for

action, and

for knowledge.

So

"disjunctivism"

is then right to

claim that there

is no

anaiysis of the

good

case into independent

conjunctive

factors. From this it

would

follow,

nloreover,

that there is no highest

conlnlon

factor, if this

just

nreans

that

no

highest independent factor figures

in

an analysis

of

each

case,

the good

and

the

bad, into indepenclent

conjunctive

factors.

Flowever,

that

leaves

it open that the good case

adrnit

nretaphysical

anal-

ysis,

if such analysis need

not be afactortzing analysis that conjoins

inde-

pendent factors.

All three accounts-of

action,

of perception,

and of

knowledge-are

analyses

of the good

case

into factors,

and

in

all three there would be a

highest common factor shared

by

the good case and the bad case. But in

none

of them

would

this highest conrmon factor

figure

as a conjunct

in

a

conjunctive analysis of the good

case

into

independent conjuncts. Why

is

there

no

such analysis? The reason is

unifornl across the three cases,

as

they all involve

a causal

connection

saicl

to

be present

in

the good

case

and

absent in

the bad

case.

Iu no case is

the

causal

conrection

releuantly

detachable frorn other

factors conrbired with it, and with each other, in

the analysis.

No state

of

affairs that

conrprises

relata related

by causation will

have

a metaphysical

analysis

such

that

no

two factors constitutive of the whole

are necessariiy related

by

logical

or metaphysical

necessity.

X'-c

causing

Y

thus

comprises X

and

Y as

relata related

by

causation, but

the

whole causal

state of affairs is

not fully

resolvable

by analysis into

logically

and

nreta-

physically independent

factors. Even if factors X

and

Y

are

logically and

7.

That

has

implications not

only lbr

concepttral

analysis but also

fbr

nretaphysical

analysis.

Suppose,

for

exarnple, that we grant that the concept

Anorr,.r

is

distinct

fronr the concept

beliattts truly. And suppose that, in spite of

that,

we insist that the nretaphysical

states

of

knor'vledge

and true belief are iclentical, sitrce kuowlerlge

,

the state,

just

is

true belief.

8.

This

would

imply

that the c:orlcepts rre necessal-ily coextensive despite

the dlversitv ol

the corresponding

states. Ancl

th;rt

worrlcl

bc a bizarrc

(and ptesuurabiy

ini:reclilrle) rncta-

physical

coincidence

.

However, that

linc

of-rcst'rninr

rrprl ics orrly

to u

srct'ial

sct of'traditional

;rnal1,5c5.

It

clocs

tri>t irrply to lrrlrlyscs

tlrrrt tlo n


7/14

tl{

llllr

l)Nll\'

()l'

\( ll(lN. I'lrll( 11l'll()N.

ANI) KN()Wl11l)(;l

E.

An

Approach

through

Performance

Theory

I.

What

follows

ainrs

to turrl the tables on

objections to

traditionalist

cattsal analyses.

The

use ofa concept of

"nranifbstation"

will

enable causal

analyses

ir

all

three cascls. Appeal

to

nraniibstation

helps

to develop

a better

solution

to

those

problems. The

notion

of

aptness

(success

that

nranifests

cornpe

tence) prornises

to be helpftrl

not only

in the

theory

of

knowledge,

but

also

in the theory

of

action, and

in

the

philosophy of perception.

BothDavidson

and

Grice

nrake

a

cruc:ial

nlove in

defending their

respec-

tive

accounts. Even

though

their fornrulations

are different, the

rnove

is

essentially

the satne.

They

both

in effect recluire

a

partiuilar

sttrt

af causation,

while

ostensibly

assuruittg

that

no

verbal fbrrnr.rla can noll-trivially

define it.

Davidson

then

says

that

rto

sudt.fornrula s ncedcd,

and Gricc

adds

that

a grasp of

the

right

sort

ttf

cattsatott cmt

lte

attancd througlt exanrytks.

Let

us have

a closcr look.

2.

Recall the rvaiter who intends

to

knock

over

a

stack

of

dishes rrgllr

now,bLrtdoes

so

only through a n attack ofirerves

caused

by the

nervy

inten-

tirrtt.

Why is

this

not a way in which

a

doing can relate

to

an intention

so

;ts

to cotrstitute intentional

acticln?

What

is

the requirecl

causal

rela-

tiolr?

(lan

it

trc

clefirecl so

as

to

reveal why

the waiter's

doing cloes not

tltrrrlify?

I)aviclson

clainrs

that

we

r-rced ntr

armchair analysis

ttf this mat-

/r'r'.

ln

his vicw

intcntiotral

actiorls

are analyzable

as doings

caused

by

irtt'rrtiorts

tt

tltc ri.glrt utny,

ancl no further

analysis

of

tlrc

riaht way

is pos-

srltl.',)r'r'('(luircri.

Wc

trrieht

ask:

"No

further

analysis is requiredfor

tt,lt,tt?"

Antl,

in

tlrc light

of our

c:at-or1-n1at

exarnple,

here is

one

plau-

srlrlr'

t('\l)()nsr'.

Wc ncctl

n()t pr()vide

a

furthcr

explication

(of

what

that

"rrilrl

u'.t"'

it) in orclcr

t lrc

able:

to

nrake further prosrcss,

by going

lrr'\,,r.1

tlrtrs invokirrq

"tllc

right way."

I

t'l

us

tl'v

ill) .r('('()r.ult

in tcrllls ct'

contltr'l('tt((s

ttd lrcir tnonifi'stttiotts.

(

lr

tnsitlt't':

l(

rr,ru'lt'rlqt'

is ,11tl lu'liy'1.

l)t't't t'pttott (rt'orlrsitoll;r

l

lt,'t'.','lttiorr.

Pt't't't'l)tron

tlr:lt su('ll

lrrrtl

strclr)

is

,r|f

ltt'ttt'lltt,tl

r'.\lt''i',r', t'xtt't'icttr't' rt'ltr)\('\u(

(

('\\

In,uuli'st\

(

(rnrl)('t('lr(

('.

A

lrr.'t

(

('f

)l

tt,tl

t'rtt't

t('tt(

('rttt

t

t't'tlr

',r'lt.'lt

t( t\

r'r't ,li,,tl

t)r

,t(

(

ut,ttt'.

Alr .rl)t

('\l)('t

t('lt(

('

THE

UNITY

()F

A(lTI()N,

Pl,tt(ltjP'rlON,

AND

KNOWLEDGE

19

is one

whose

accuracry

manifbsts

rhe

relevant

contpetence

ofthe

subject's

per-

ceptual

systenrs.

Action

is apf

intention.':

lrr ail

three

cases,

the

foliowing

f,ic:tors

cronle to

the

fore:

Success,

the attainnrent

of the

aitn'

The

competence of the perforrlrance.

The aptness

of that

perfonnance:

whether

the success

nranifests

c:onlpetence.

Ancl it

is no accident

that

aptness-success

that

manifests

conrpetence-is

tlre

key

to

"the

right

wAy."

Again,

all

three

hurnan

phenomena

involve

aint-

ig-c,

perforluanc--es

with

an airn.

Perception

involves functional,

teleological

ainrings,

through

the teleology

of

our

perceptual systenrs.

Intentional

action

ivolves

aimings

that are

full-fledged

intentious.

Knowledge

divides into

two

sides:

a functional

perception-like

side,

and

ajudgrnetrtal

action-like

side.

The

sorf

of causation

esserltially

involveci

in

all

three

phenornena

is

hence

the

causation

of

aptness.

lt

is

not

enough that

the success

tlcrivc causally

from

conlpetence,

for

it

nray so

derive

deviarttly,

by

luck.

Rather,

the

success

must

be

apt.It

must mailifcsf

sufficient

conrpetence

on

the

part of

the

perfortner.

Second

Part

The

Approach

through

Manifestation

Developed

A.

Objectual

PercePtion

I

Iow

slrotrld

we

unclerstancl olrjectualperception specifically? Factive

propo-

sitioal

perception

cloes

sccnr

analogotts

to

actiori

and

knowledge

in the

ways

spccifie'cl,

sinc-c

all thrce

irrvolve

an ainriug

with

propositional

con-

tcllt, rv|crc

it is clc.ar

how airlrings

lcnd

thetnselves

to

AAA

rnetaphysical

:rrr;rlysis: in

tcrnts

oisrt'c'css,

c()lrtpclcttc:c,

attd

stlcccss

through

conlpetence.

llrrt [


8/14

20 THE

UNITY

0F

AC IoN,

PERCEPTION, AND

KNOWLEDGE

I.

Grice on

objectualperception.

a. Grice defends

his

"causal

theory of perception" with

an essential

appeal

to

ex;rnrples, as follows:

X

perceives

M if, and only if, sonre

present-tense

sense-datunr statenlent

is

true

ofX

which

reports

a

state

of afrairs for

which

M,

n

d LU(1y to be indicated by

ex ample, is causally

responsible.'"

b.

Unfortunately,

(]rice's

account is

little

lnore

than a

gesture

at how

an

account

nright be

obtained. Can we do better,

even

within the spirit

of Grice's thought? Here follows an attempt

to

do so.

z. Perception

as aptness

of objectual image.

Our approach requires a finer grain thanjust the propositionai

content of

experience. We

mttst

take

note

of

the fact

that experience is

finer

grained

in

containing inr,ages as weli. We begin rvith visual

inrages,

airrring

to

provide

an account

of

seeing things, individual things such as physical

objects or

events,

or other objective

individual entities.'7

Some

perfbrrnances

are

not

free

or intentional

and

yet

have

aims

none-

theless, such

as the teleological or

functional aims

of a biological organisnr

or

its

subsystenrs. Salient anlong the

aims

of our visual

systenl

is represent-

ing

our

environrrlent

appropriately. This our

vision nright

do

by

represent-

ing

proxirnate

facts

through

the propositional

content

of experience,

visuai

or otherwise. Inrages

too

can

represent,

however, through appropriate

correspoltdence to

individual worldly

entities. In aiming to represent,

an

irnage

will

airn

to

correspond in

sonre

way.'t

Since an irnage can represent

t.

Grice,

"The

Causal

Theory

ofPerception,"

r-5r.

My

italics.

r7. Eventually

rve

woulcl need

to generalize

beyond

that so as

to

cover

other sense modaiities, if

all goes

well

with orlr

approach

to

vision. Adnritteclly,

that rvould

be

no

trivial

exercise. We

would

neeci

to

do

jrrstice

to

the phenomenology

of

other

senses,

such

as

sound, snrell,

and

touch, This may reqtrire

appeal

not only to

direct

perception by the nkecl

eve,

but

also

to

indirect perception:

throrrgh

mirrors and television

screens, lbr exanrple, and even throtrgh

photographs

or filnrs

in

a kind of delayecl seeing. Similar ideas

would

then pertain

to snrell,

as when we smell

a

skunk

(with

no

conception that

there

is such an aninral, never

hlving

encounterecl nor heard of any) by snrelling

its

characteristic snlell

in

tire air. We mieht

thelr

snrell

a particular skunk

thus

indirectly.

Some

woulcl banish lny

notion

olclirectncss

fl'r>rlr

thc

phik>sophv of"pcrccption. trtrt

its proln-

inence in the

history of thc

srrbjcct lllrrkcs

thlt

unrvisc.

llcttcr

to try to ttttdt'rslutd thc r{ivcrsity

ofdirectness-cf

.

clr.

of'rrry

i\,1()llli,,1q

l:ull Ill'll(l)rirrcctorr: l)r'inr'cton Urrivcrsity [)rcss,:ol

l).

t8. Morestrictly,bylrostirrgthrrtirnrrgcitvisu;rlt'xpt'r'rortr'.:rn; rrinl;l'svisu:rlsystcnl,rrndin

I way

tltc

lrtrintlrl trro,,rirus

t() r'('[rr('\('nt, {lttorrrqlr

tlrt't,Pt'r,rlr()lr

()l'vision,;ntl

in

srr;

ijg

thcy.riril trl r'rlttt'sllrrrrtl.

Iltrt lrc|c I ,l,l n()l

(

()nililrl

l.'.r

lt'lcr)\('nr,ilrlrt tllt'tll

y.

t'spct i;rl11'rrot

t()()llctll:tl

lc\ttittrsr'lt'tlr()nlr)n.rtlll,rlst'lt'tlrrrnr)\'('r .rll('\'ollllt()il,il\'tiln('\l);ilt,il()l('\,('n

to.r lltstorr..tl .t,rrunl, ttltr'tllr't tt'l,tlttt'lr)\l){'(r{'\,}r l('rullurr'

(,rvt'rr

lr,trvrltllirrtlt.rrr,l

TIIE

UNITY

OF

ACTI()N, PERCEPTION,

AND KNOWLEDGE

clespite

nlassive illusion,

the

correspondence

might be mininral.

Macbeth

rnight

represent

a walking stick

as a sword,

for

example,

in which case there

will be

sorne

correct

corresponclence.

The image and the stick

wili

stili

share

the property of being a11

elongated object.'e

Thus we

reach the following account.

3.

An

account of objectual

visual

representation

a.

First,

two prelinrinaries:

Inr.age

Inr

corresponds

to

x IFF

(a)

Irn

aims

to correspond to

some

worldly

item: that

is,

ainrs

for

an outcorne in which it shares

content with

some

woridly

itenr

or other,

ancl

(b)

therc

is

scnrc:

content of

Im in

respect

ofwhich

it does

corresporld

to x in

particular, throuoh

sharing

rtf

properties

ttr

conditions,

i

n

cl u di ng rcl

a t i o n al p ro p c

r

t i e s or c() ndi

ti

()

tt

s,

)c'

Inrage lm aptly corresponds

to

x

IFF

(a)

Inr attains

its

airn

of thus corre-

sponding to

some

worldly

item or other,

in virtue of its corresponding to x

in

particular,

and

(b)

Inr's thus

corresponding to

x rnanifests

S's

perceptual

conlpetence.

b.

And now

the

account of objectual visual representation:

S visually represents

object x

IFF

a visual

inrage hosted by

S

aptly corresponds

to x.

According to

one basic form of

seeing, to see an

indiviclual

"object" (in

the

broadest sense)

is

to

visually

represent

that

object.''

controversial

these issues

have proved to be,

I

stay at a

liighlevel of

abstraction

thatleaves

open

just

how in ful1

philosophical detail we should understand these

fr"rnctional or tele-

ological airrrs, and

the

"proper

functions"

involved.

r9.

Sr,rch

sharins

is

of course

not

just

co-exenrplification.

An

itnaqe

ancl an object can

"share"

properties in

a clifferent

way, by the

imase's

cottttittittg

a

property

exurplified by the object.

Inrages are here

assunred

to

have

a status

like

that

offictional

characters.

The

character

Harrrlet lor exarnple corirts the

property

of owning a sword,

b::,t exenplific.s no such

prop-

erty, since

characters have

no legal

standing

to owll swords, Inrages

and characters are

ontologically

shallow,

like

shaclor,vs

ancl surces, and

are

presunlably

grounded

or

sttper-

venient on

tleepcr,

nrore strbstantial entities

or

plrenomena.

But one ueed

llot enter

these

llctaphvsical

issucs

in order to grallt ontological

stanclins

to

such

entities,

while

invoking

thcnl

to

clucirltc

otltcr phenorlrena.

.:.o. Hcrc wc

nly nccd

to bc

flcxible in allorvins

intlexical

conclitions,

as rvhen ury iuraee con-

trrins

tllc colltlitioll

w)

or evel]

(causes

l/ri.s

very

iuraee]. Even

ifwe

allow

t

lrc l:ttu'sclf

-r'cf

i'r'cnt il


9/14

TIIE UNI'rY

()F

ACf'I()N,

PERC;EPTION,

AND

KN()WLEDGE

4.

It cannot be clernonstrated

that our

account covers the

clefining

exam-

ples envisaged

by Grice,

since he displays very few, nor does he

take

himself

to

have

given

a conrplete

list,

or

even any list. He

just

issues the clainr that

exanrples

could

be

usecl to

convey

what

sort of causatiorl it

is

that enables a

causal

accollnt

of perception.

We

go

beyond that

by saying

nrore

about

what

sort

of

causation it is, even

if

in

the

end

we

too

rely on showing

rather

than

telling,

as

do Grice

ancl

Davidson. In order

to convey how

that is

so,

it helps

to cliscuss

an exaillple.

Suppose Macbeth had

suffered his dagger

hallucination while at

the same

time

there

wrs

a

dagger

at the

relevant

piace and

time, ancl

indeed

a

dagger

just

like

the

one in his hallucination

in every

perc:eptual

respect.

'We

can

surely

understand the

case

even described so

sparely. In

doing

so, I suggest,

we rely on Macbeth's getting it right by accident,

not

conrpetellce.

And

we

can now explain why

and

how

Macbeth

fails

visually

to

represent

the

real

dagger before him:

he lacks

the

representational relation to it defined

in terrns of conrpetent and apt

visual representing.

No

visual

image

hosted by

Macbeth aptly

represents

that

real

clagger, since

none aptly

shares

any

content

with

it.

Any

sharing of content

is

only

accidental and

not through

the

com-

petence ofMacbeth's

visuai

systenr as

it interacts with the real dagger.

Moreover, the

exairrples used

by

Gric-e to counter earlier theories,

such

as

Price's, are also arnenable

to our

dornpetence-theoretic account. When

we

do

not see the sun

despite

how

it aftbcts our visual

experiences,

it is

because

we

do

not

o'visually

represent" it. And

the

sanre goes for

our

eyes.

In neither case do we so rnuch as

host

any

relevant

visual

inrages, whereas

according to our account

we can

visually

represent

only

by

hosting a visual

irnage that aptly corresponds to the

itenr represerlted."

5.

As

we

shall

see presently, this approach also

helps

to

solve problems

faced

similarly

by

Davidson's account

of

intentional

action. 'What

is

"the

right way" in which

a

doing can be

caused

by an

intention? Here

again,

bc

itt t scttst'hiddut.frottt

tts.

lttt tt,t'tni.qlrt still

lu'ptrrtir'tt.q

tltcttt," l{cply: Wc ncccl to clistinsuish

the

property

of trerine,

srry,

bltrc, fl'onl thc

r)trrrc

of'that

pr()pcrty.

Thc propcrty

rrritl-rt

have

the

n:rttrrc ola sccontllrry

crr:rlitv.

Arrtl

in

tl)rt

('sc

tllc

rclcv;rnt inlgc

wrrltl

"contain"

that

sccondury rrrlrlity, so

tll;rt thc irrrrrgc:rntl tltc sky t'otrltl

"sll:tt'c"

tlt.rt

1't'.rtcry,

irt Iny

scrtse

.

(tt'rlt,ttt //lir

ir, lt,n,l,lt'tirli, l lttt'ntl'ttlntttl ll,llt

t

llt'l(' llt(')'tttttltut( ,,

t1t'i111'lltt'.t,ttttr

si.gtt,tl

litt

t,r1'luttt'tlllt't

tltt tttiti,tl

l,t'ttt'ltln,tl

t,'iltttl) ,\ly

t'r'tt,tl

\)'\lt'ut

tttilti,

1t

lsl

tut

uitt.t|

lltttl ttttt.('

\/,t,,r/\

li illl't

l'(

\,

,uttl

tl

tlit

\ \tt

ut

t,nlilt

rtl

lt r,ttltr't

tttiltlt(

lt iltt

ls llt,tl r'ntt(lt

lit

ttltl ront

lttttttl(lttt'?

ll\ttttt\\lttutt'(l,'\,tlllt,tll,,ttt'ttlll,ttttt't r,,)')'\tt'ttttt'ltttt ,tttttt,,l,'1,,l,r,tl,'t',tlllttttt (lttlltt'

Tr{E

UNITY OF

ACT'ION, PERCEPTI()N' AND KN()WLEDGE

23

proper

causation

turns out to

be

causation through

conrpetence,

be

it

per-

ceptual

conlpetence or agential competence.:3

B. A Defense of

Manifestation

in

the

Theory

of

Action

I.

Recall

the waiter's

knocking

over

a

stack

of

glasses

(while

intending to

do so

right

then ancl there),

but

only

through

an attack of

nerves

caused by

the nervy

intention. l)avidson clainrs

that

no

arnrchair

analysis

of

this nrat-

ter

is

either

possible

or

requirecl. In his view intentional

actions are analyz-

ble

as

doings caused

by

intentions in the

right

way,

with

no

need

for any

further analysis

of

what

collstitutes

causation

in

the

rght

way.'1

z. Cornpare

a wine glass

that

shatters

upon

hitting a

hard floor,

but

only

because it is

zapped

at the

rnoment

of

inrpact

by a

hovering fiend

who

hates

tragility

nreeting

hardness,

r.vhere the

zapping ray would have shattered

an

iron

dumbbelljust

as

well."

Here

the

fragilityis

a

source

ofthe

shattering,

but

not

in

the

right

way.

C)nce agairr

we

appeal

to the

convenient

"right

way."

'We

now

say that in orclerfor an ostensible

"manifestation"

of a disposition to

be a real manifestation, it must derive from the disposition

in

the

right

way.

othcr hand,

if

it

s ttot

(tpt

corresp(,ttdcttct:,

tuh,

lot?"

Reply: I

am

encouraqecl

by

the fact

that we

continue to say that we see the stars at night, even once we understrncl what is really going

on. [n any case,

the

relevant col]lpetence lvould

not

be

just

the eariier colilpetence. It rrrust

be the

nlore encorrrpassine

conlperence

whose

exercise

extends

all

the way

to

the present

hosting

of the

relevarrt

image,

as lvith the

seeing

of

the

stars.

:i.

My earlier strggestiorr that

refbrence nright

also

yield

to analysis throtrgh conlpetence, l11an-

ifbstation,

and

aptness

derives

largely fronr

the

promise

of

a

lruitful

arralogy

between objec-

tral

perception

and

refbrence.

t.+. My

approirch

to

intentiol-al

actiotr

in

tcrlns

of rlranif-estation

of

conlpetence

is

so

farjust

a

sketclr. And

the

sketch

is basecl on

t\'vo

restrictions of

the subject

nratter.

Herc

ntuttior.s are

-jrrst.rrridirqq,,rirrr-t,;urd

intt'rrtiott'il|, oirqg

is

jtrst

oirr.g b),

,fusiltt,

My

hope

is thereby

to

skirt the

bro:rcler tcrl'itory

covercd

by the

"intcntionllly

oing"

of

orclinary languaae.

It is inrrortunt

t()

11()tc,

ilr()r'c()\'er', that an intention

becomes a11

attenpl rvhen

it

is tinre

firr :rctioll.

At

tllrt

point

the ttcnlpt

nrisht

succe ed or

filil,

ancl if it does succeed, it might do

so

.rptly

ol inlptly. So. rnorc strictly,

ac'tion

is

apt rrttetrrpt

(intention

that succeecls aptly

right

tllrorrglr tllc tinrc of-lrctiott).

A

lillcr

(r'crtnrcnt

tll.rrry'rrrolc rcstrir'tctl trlric woulil of'coursc nced

to engace

with

a

r.it lr

litt'r';tur't'irr .rt

trorr

tlrr',rr'1'.

lltt tlr.rt

is

l

projct't

firl

rrnotllcr tinlc.

We proceed here

at

.r

lrirllrt'r

lcvcl

ol',tlrstr'.tr'tiotr lty

t'otrsirlct

itrg

prorrrisirrg

',v;tys

itr

rvltit'lr

rr

vit"trrc-tllctlrctic

,rlrfrt

r

,1

1

rt

t.rY

ll.tr.'t' \( )n l('t lr

nr.r, t

o

t

ont

r

ilrtrl t'.

.tt. At,,rtlrrr,,toMt'r',.',,, Xtllt'lrrt(r,'l()/.rl)'l\.llr,ln\rlr\'('\'('rlr,rlt'lirt'tl

.rslollorvs:

",r:tot'tt'itl

ol,

tlcrtrir\',

()r

I'rllcslrt'r .rllt rvrllr

ot

.rs

rl

rlrtlr.,u.l,l,'lt l,rt.

t',Ir

to lul

n'rllt,,t

.r. rl

rvrllr.

su,l

,1,'t,,)n( ('nll.rl(.rl.rr1rlt(.rlt(lttoI loIr ('()t

(

il( ttl\


10/14

24 THE UNITY

()F

AC',rI()N, PERCIEPTION,

AND KN()WI-EDGE

3.

Competencres are a

special

case

of dispositions, that

in which the

host

is

disposed

to succeed

when

he

tries, or

that

in

which the

host

seats

a

relevant

skill,

and

is in

the

proper

shape

and situation,

such

that he

tries

in close

enough worlds,

and

in the

close enough worlds where

he

tries,

he

reliabiy

enough succeeds.

But this

nrust

be so

in the right

way.'n

C.

A Defense of

Manifestation

in

the Theory

of Knowledge

-We

considered

an accrount of

propositional

knowledge,

itr first

approxinr.a-

tion, as belief

that

attains

its airu

(truth)

ancl does so

not

just

by

luck

but

through

conlpetenc:e.

Such

knowleclge

is then a

special

case

ofperfornrance

that is

not

just

lucky

trut apt:

i.c.,

perfurnlance

whose success

is

relevantly

owed

to

the

perforrner's

conrpetence.

The aptness

of a

perfornrance is

thus

supposed to

block

an inrportarlt

sort

of

luck or

mere coincidence, the

sort

that

precludes

Clettiered

subjects

from knowing

something

even

when they

believe

it

both

correctly

and competently.

A

belief falls short

of

knowl-

edge

when

its truth

is owecl

too

nruch

to

such

luck

and not properly

to the

believer's conlpetence.

In

a

word,

the success of that belief,

its truth, must

be

apt, nlust

be

appropriately

due

to ronrpeterice.

And this

is

where deviant

causation impinges. Exactly how

is

it

that

success

rnust derive causally

from

corilpetence in

order

to be properly

apt,

in

order

to be apt ill such a way

that

it

does not derive

excessively from

(credit-denying)

luck? Renrember

the

archer's success r,vhen the

two

grlsts

intervene.

In that case, the success

is

still

owed causally

to

the arclrer's conrpeterrce.

Why

then

is

it

not

apt?

In

what

way is

it

due excessively to

luck

rather

than

cornpetence?

Here

again

success

must

do

nrore than derive causally

fronr sufficient conrpetence

in

sone

way or other.

It

nrust

do so by

maniJestingthat conrpetence.

Conclusion

of the

Second

Part

We fincl unity

across

action,

pcrccpti()rr, ancl

knowlcclge

.

All tltre:c

are cron-

stituted by aintirrgs,

by

pcrfirrrrnrtc'cs witll

u

constitutivc

inr. Ir)

pcrrcrcp-

tion thc airlr

is finrr'tion:rl,

tllrouglr

tlrc

tclcology

of'orrr'rcrt'cptttul

systcrtts.

'l'llc:riltr

of ;ln intcntit,rr:rl .rr'tiort

is olrvious

irt

ils,.'onstitutivr'intcnti


11/14

26 THE

uNtry

()F

ACTt()N,

pEItCEprt()N,

AND

KN()wl_EDct:

even

when

these

are not helpfully expressible

through

verbal irrmulas.

Nor

need

they be

thus

expressible even

when

widely shared

arnong

us.

Really? How

do we

understand

those oracular

clairns?

z.

Just

cotnpare

how we

manale to

srasp

what politeness

is,

r,vhat

it recluires.

No verbal fornrula

can

fully

convey

or determine

(by

explicit

convcntion)

',vhat

is

or

is

not polite conduct.

Polite face-to-face (:onversation

sets

lirrrits

to the proper

distance

between the partners,

ancl linlits

the volunrc

ofvoice

and the

tone. How

is any

of

this to

be captured non-trivially

thror-rgh

verbal

forrnulas?

It

seenrs

quite

hopeless.

Yet,

sonrehow,

antecedent conrnrunity

convention

sets

those linlits.

Such

convention

recluires

anter:eclent

agree-

ntent, at

least

inrplicit

agreenrent, which

in

turn

requires

colttent

that is

shared even

rvithout

explkit conventional

agreenle:11t.

Compare

the

"ntanifestations"

of a conrpetence.

A conlnrunity

rnight

sinrilarly agree (however

in

the end we understand

sr-rch inrplicit

"asree-

n1ent"

ancl

its

cotttetrt)

on

what are

crases

of "nraniestation"

of a given

cont-

petence, even

with

no helpful

verbal

{brnlula to

cover

all

such

cascs.

This

is

like

"politeness,"

in

both

general

ancl

specific

respects.

(lonsicler the

SSS

strttcture

(skill,

shape,

situation) of

cornplete colnpe

terlc:es, arrcl our

coll-

cepts

of

these, and

the

irrclucecl

SS and S correlates.

Take for

exanrple

our

conrplete driving

corlrpetence

on

a

certairr occasion,

including

(a)

our

basic

driving skill

(retained

even when

we

sleep),

along

with

(b)

the shape

we

are

in

at

the

tine

(arvake,

sober,

etc.),

and

@

our

situation

(scateci

at the

wheel,

on a

dry

road,

etc.).

l)rop

the situation and

you

still

havc

an

inner

SS

conlpetence. Drop

both shape ancl

situation

ancl you

still

havc, an inncrntost

S

competence:

that

is, the basic

clriving skill retainec{

even w}relr

asleep

(in

unfortunate shape)

in

bed

(inappropriatcly

situated).

Such

concepts

arc-- broadly

sharecl with

no

benefit of

linguistic fbnnulaton.

What

counts

as

nranifbstation

seellrs

also graspable

only in

inrplicit

ways,

as

with etiquette,

and

not

through

cxplicit

(antl

nontrivial)

verbal

funntrlation.

B.

Competences,

f)ispositions,

and Their

Manifestations

t. l)l'ivil)t{

('otttrt'l('n('('

('onrr's

in

tlrrt't' v,u'it'tics:

Skill

([r;rsit'

tllivinrf

('()nr-

pt'lt'lrt t'),

Skill

I

Slr,rrt'

(skill

lrlus

l,t'nul

.r\v,rk,',

s.rlrr'r',

t'rt'.), ,rntl Skill

1

f HE

UNITY OF

ACTION,

PERCEPTI()N,

AND

KNOWLEDGE

)n

Shape

*

Siturtion

(skill

plus

shape

plus being

at the wheel

ofan

operative

car

while

the

roacl is

relevantly

clry

enough, etc.).

Only

with the

relevant

SSS

conlpetence

are

we

fully colrrpetent to drive

on

a given

roacl.

What

deter-

nrines whether we have the

in nertnost

S conrpetellce?

It is presunrably

a

modal

nlatter: that

ifwe tried

to drive safely we would reliably enough succeed. But

tn any

conclitions? Surely not. It is not

at

ail likely

that

we would

drive

safely,

evcn

ifwc

triecl,

when

dead

drunk,

or on

an

oily

road.

But

this

nray

not

bear

on our

corupetence to

drive

safbly. There

is

an array of SSS

conditions that

wttuld

likely

enough

yield

sLlccess

for

our atternpts to drive safely.

This involves

certain

rarlges

of

the shape we

need

to

be in, and

certain

ran5les

of

how we

lxust

be

related

to

the

road,

including

the roacl

conditions. Communities that

rlse cars

and roads are interestecl

in

certairr particuiar combinations of

Shapes

and

Situations, and

wc

are

pretty r,vell

inrplic:itly

agreecl

on what those

are.

Innernrost

driving

Skill

is then

determinecl as

the

basis

for our likely enough

succeedingifwe tried

in thosc

Shape

*

Situation

combinations.

z.

It

is not

imrnediately

obvious that dispositorts

generally,

as opposed

to

conlpetences specificaily,

still

have

that

triple

structure.

Rut

r,vith

a

bit

of

stretcrhing

they

can be

rnade

to share

it. Thus, we nright

consider

coinplete

fragility

to require the

fragile

object

not only to

have

a certain inner struc-

tLlre, but

alscl

to be within certain bounds

of

tenrperature,

so that a

piece

of

glass loses its fragility

when

heating

makes

it

liquid

(molten,

flowingliquid).

And

one nright even countenance

that

it loses

its

fragility

once

suspended

in

outer space.

We

do

speak

of

our being utcightle ss

out

there.

Without rnuch of

a

stretch,

then,

dispositiorls

too

can be

viewed

as

corning

in three

varieties:

first, Seat

(or

inrrernrost

basi$; second,

Seat

*

Shape,

including tempera-

ture, etc.;

and,

third,

Seat

*

Shape

*

Situation.

Located

in

outer space we

are

weightiess in a SeShSi way,

while we nright

still

retain our same

exact

weight,

ancl

still

count

as

heav

in

a

SeSh

way, or

in

an

innerrnost

Se

way.

There is an array

of SSS conciitions

that

u'tttiltl

likely

enottgh result

in the

lrreaking

of n

object

whcn

subjectecl to a certain sort of

stress. This would

involve

ccrrtairl rangcs of,

the

shape

it neecls

to

be

in, and

certain

ranges

of lrow it nrrrst ber situutcd.

We

who use ot'rjects

of that

sort are

interested

in

t:crtairr

r:rrticul:rr

r'onlbinations c>f

Shapcs

ancl

Situations, and

we are

prctty

r,vcll

irrrplicitly

:rsrcctl

on

whrrt thosc

re .

Intrenlrost fragility-that

is,

Sc:rt is

tlrcn

dctcnninctl ls

tlrc

brsis firr

thc likcly cnonsh

breaking

of

tlrc

fl-lqilc

olr.jct't

if

it lvcrc strlr.jct'rcrl to tlrc rclcvnt triggcrs in

losc

Shapc

+

Sit

u,rt

ion

t'onrlri

r r,rtions.


12/14

28

THE

uNITy

()F

ACTIoN,

pERcEprI()N,

AND KNowLEDGE

'We

have

a

large

and

varie d array

of conlnronsense

dispositional

croncepts:

fragility,

flammability,

malleabilit

etc, These

can

perhaps

all

be understood

in terms

of

our

SSS structures,

along

with

relevant

triggers

and

outconres.

An object's

outcottte

behavior tnanifests

a

given

disposition,

then, provided

it

flou's

causally

from

that disposition's

triggering

event(s), when

the

object

has

the

relevant

Seat,

and

is

in

the relevant

Shape

and

Situation.

What are

the

rel-

evant

shape,

situation,

trigger,

and

outcorne

associated

with

a

certain dispo-

sitional

concept?

This

rnay

simply not

be

formulable

in full

explicit

detail

by

humans

who

nonetheless

agree

sufiicientlr

in

their

grasp

and

deployment

of

the

concept.

A particular

disposition,

then, rvill

have a dstnctue

SSS

profiie,

with

restricted

Shape

and Situation.

Not

all dispositions

to

shatter alnoLlllr

ro

fragility.

Zapper-dependent

clispositiclns, firr

exanlple,

do not

count.

3.

But

why should

we

have

all this

iurplicit

agrecnlent

on

how

ro

catego-

rize

dispositions,

and

their

spec;ia1

cases,

such

as abilities, nd

in

turrl corrl-

petences?

Why do

we agree

so

extensively

on

whether all

entity's

output is

to be

attributed

to

a certaitr, recognized

disposition

hosted

by that

entity, as

its

manifestation,

and

by extension

attributed to

the

enrity

itself?

When

the

output

is

good,

it

is then generally

to the entity's

c:redit, r,vhen

bad

to its

discredit. The

entity might

be

an

agent who

nranifests

a

colnpetence,

or it

rnight

be

a

lifeless

patient

nranifesting

a

nlere

disposition.

Why

do we

agree

so

extetrsively

on

these

dispositions,

abilities,

conrpetences,

and on

the credit

ancl

discredit that they

deternrine

(whether

this

be

to

the

creclit ofa nroral

asent,

or

to the

credit ofa sharp

knife),

and

on the sortals

that they help

to

consritute?'e

Is

that not

all

just

part

of

the

instrumentally

determined

conrnron

sense

that

hurnans

live

by?

Such

conlmon

sense

helps

us

keep

track ofpotential

benefits

and

dangers

and

how the bearers

of

these are

to

be handled.

As

a

special

case of how to

handle

things

and

agents

that

rnanifest dispositions and

conrpetences,

we

have

propriety

of

encouraging

praise

or

approval,

or discouraging

blarne

ditttc

bettucttt thc,qttttd

tnd tlu'

,trl

c,l.rr'.t. ,4nd

il is irrtt'rcstirt.g

tlttt ottr itttttitiotts

,il


13/14

I

3o

THE

UNITY OF

ACTION,

PERCEPTION,

AND

KN0WLEDGE

When does the

relevant

belief,

experience,

or

intention yield

success

in

such a

way

that

it

is, respectively, knowledge, perception, or intentiorral

action? That requires an SSSloining of seated Skill,

Shape,

and Situation,

so

as to cause the

nranifestation

uporl the

onset

of the

trigger,

And this

rnust

occur appropriately. Consider for exanrple

what is required for

a trrie nrani-

festation of fragility

as a

fine wine glass

shatters

upon hitting the

hard

floor.

The shattering

of that

glass

does

not

nranifcst

its

fragility

ifit

shatters because

it

is

zapped

by sonr.eone

who

hates

fragility-meeting-hardness,

ifit

is

zapped

with

enough

power

to shatter an

iron

durnbbell.

This despite the

fact that,

through

the

zapper's knowledge

and

action,

he

drrcs

nranage

to

link

causally

the

fragile structure

of

the

glass

with the shattering upon inrpact.

The

exarnpie of fragility

zapped

suggests

that

a

disposition

can be

nrarrifbst

in a certain outcorne

only

if it accounts a7tproprately for that

outconle.r'This

requires

a

joining

of seated skill, shape,

and

situation, so as to cause

the nrani-

festation,

upon the onset

ofthe

trigger. And this must take

place

in

the

norrnrl

way,

which

by conrmon

corlsent

excludes the action of our zapper, even when

he

does deviantly

nlanaTe to link the

trigger with

the

ostensiblc

rnanifestation,

C.

How'We

Go

beyond

Appeal

to

"The

Right'W'ayo'

I. That is to

present

our account with a

certain nrode

sty, by

relying explic-

itly on

a

requirenlent

of

"appropriateness."

More

boldly we

nright claim

proper

cross-linsuistic

ideology,

since

the sanre

surely

goes lirrgtristically

lbr

other

nirtrlral

langtrages. Our

discussion

in

thc

nrain

tc:xt

suggests

reasolls

u'hy

it

rTrieht or nright rrot be

advisable to so extencl

our

language and

ideology. This'nvould probably

clepend on

how

likely

it

is lbr the relevant comnrunity to encoullter strch zappers. Thtrs, recall the

suggc'stiorr

in

the text:

"Strch

an

instrumentally

cleternrined

conurroll sellsc'rlr-lst

of

corrrse be

stnrctured

aEainst backsrorrncl

inrplicit

assurrrptiotrs rtrout

rvht

is

nornral

or stanclrrrrl, cither

in

gerteral

or with

respect to

the specific

clonlin o1'perfbrnrlnce

that

nray

be coutexttnlly

relevrnt."

Chapter

4

rvill

clevelop

firllcr

ccount

of'cornpetence,

ln

account

that recounizes

the

distinction

betrveen

ciistal

ucl

prc'rxitual

conrpctences.

Strictly,

a fi-agilc glss

('rrl

rrrlnifbst

its

fi:agility

by

shattcrins

un(lcr lvcak

crrorrgh zrrppirrg. Antl intlcctl

tirrgility

scclns rr

rloxi-

nral disposition inv


14/14

3z

TFIE

UNITy

OI'

ACTI()N,

PERCEPTION,

AND

KN()WLEDGE

view

a sunlit scene.

Our

account

would

explain that

faiiure

by noting

thar

we would

have

no

corresponding

inrages.

2. Some

ntay

well renlain

skeptical

of

the powers

alleged

for

our

prirnitive

concept

of

"manifestation."

To

such

skeptics

we

can

oft^er,

as

a

fallback,

a nlore

rtrodest

option

whereby, perhaps

through

exanrples,

we

can

still

explain

what is

required

for

proper

tnanifestaton.

And

we coulcl

even

dis-

own

any arrrbition

to

rely

exclusively

on explicit

verbal fornrulation (as

by

invoking "rnanifestation").:t

Even

on this

nlore modest

option, we

will

have made

progress.

We will

have

specified

more fully

the

sorl

of causation

involved.

And

we

will

have

seen

that it

is

the

sanxe sort

of causation

in

all

three of

our

cases: in percep-

tion, in action,

ancl

in knowledge.

Fourth

Part

Methodological Context

for

our

Inquiry

In

philosophy

we

often appeal

to

what we would

ordinarily

salr

or

think,

in

the

exercise

of generally

sharecl

roncepts.

But

our

nrain interest

is

not

restricted

to

sematltic

or

conceptrlal

analysis.

When we

wonder

about

per-

sonal

identity, freedorn

and respc>nsibility,

the

nrind and

its

states and

con-

tents,

justice,

rightness

of

action, happiness,

and

so

on, our

nrain focus

is

not,

or

not

just,

the

words

or

the

concepts.

There are

things beyond

words

and

cotcepts

whose nature

r,ve

rvish

to

understand.

The

ntetaphysics

of

persons

goes

beyond

the semantics

of the word "person"

and

its cogrlates,

and

even

beyond

the correlated

croncreptual

analysis.

The

sanre goes

for epistenric

concerns

such

as

the

nature

of

knowledge

and

other

epistemic

phenonrena.

Consicler

the

senrantics

of

epistenric

vocabu-

lary,

and even

the

conceptual

structure

of

epistenrology

ancl its

nornrativity.

It

seerns

an opelt

possibility

that

our wr>rcls

and

corr'cpts

rc

nclt

in

the

best

shape,

just

as they

starrcl,

firr graspins

ancl

unclc:rstancling

thc rclcvant

clonraiu

ttfobiectivc

pltcttott'lcn:1.

Wlry

not

lcrvc'opcn

thc

lossibility

oftcr-nlinological

1.1

.

Wc rrrrr',lrt

('\'('n

t.it,rnl

(ll,rt

\\'(.rr,ul{)l

rt.l1,r.x,

lrrsrvcl1,,rrr

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Sosa - The Unity of Action, Perception and Knowledge (Ch. 1)

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