South Korea Aff Novice Packet

8/8/2019 South Korea Aff Novice Packet

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South Korea Aff Georgia Novice Packet 20101/23 Your Team Name

Index

The plan removes troops from South Korea. Two Advantages:

Overstretch keeping our troops theres undermines our ability to project power and keep leadership high globally.

Leadership stops nuclear conflicts.

North Korea they are motivated to aggression because we harass them, they dont like us, and China would be muchmore peaceful. Leaving decreasing the risk of the coming conflict that North Korea will start if we remain.

There are more specific answers to possible negative positions at the end of the file.

Index.........................................................................................................................................................................11ac - Inherency.........................................................................................................................................................21ac Overstretch.....................................................................................................................................................31ac - Overstretch......................................................................................................................................................41ac - Overstretch......................................................................................................................................................51ac North Korea....................................................................................................................................................61ac North Korea....................................................................................................................................................71ac North Korea....................................................................................................................................................81ac - Solvency...........................................................................................................................................................91ac Solvency........................................................................................................................................................10Overstretch ext Collapsing now...........................................................................................................................11Overstretch ext Presence not key........................................................................................................................12Heg Solves Prolif....................................................................................................................................................13Heg solves Aggression............................................................................................................................................14NK ext Conflict coming.......................................................................................................................................15NK ext US will get drawn in................................................................................................................................16NK ext A2 attacking solves..................................................................................................................................17Solvency Withdrawal Solves NK aggression.......................................................................................................18Solvency Withdrawal Solves NK nukes..............................................................................................................19

Solvency US causes NK aggression....................................................................................................................20 Answers To: Chinese Aggression...........................................................................................................................2Answers To: hurts Credibility................................................................................................................................22Answers To: hurts readiness..................................................................................................................................23

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2/23


1ac - Inherency

Observation One Inherency

South Korea is increasingly dependent on the US military that will only increase.

BANDOW 2010 (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of

Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled

Relations with North and South Korea, Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas, Huffington Post, May 21,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/let-the-koreans-take-care_b_542141.html) Calum

This is a ludicrous position for both the U.S. and South Korea, six decades after Washington saved a far weaker ROK from a North Korean invasion in the midst of the

Cold War. Neither country is well-served by Seoul's continuing defense dependency on America.

Unfortunately, the policy incongruities only are likely to worsen. The ROK desires to wield increasing influence beyond its own

shores. While relying on American military forces to defend its homeland, the South Korean government is crafting its navy for more

distant contingencies and deploying ground personnel in the Middle East and Central Asia. Yet Seoul found that when the enemy

struck at home, assuming the Cheonan was sunk by the North, the South Korean military was ill-prepared to defend its own personnel

PLAN The United States federal government should substantially eliminate its military presence in South Korea.

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1ac Overstretch

Advantage One is is Military Overstretch.

US military overstretched now Haiti put us on the brink

Wood 2010 (David, Chief military correspondent, Haiti disaster opens new front for overstretched military, Politics Daily News

Service, January 2010, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/01/19/haiti-disaster-opens-new-front-for-overstretched-u-s-military/) SLV

As the United States was rushing troops, warships and rescue supplies to earthquake-ravaged Haiti Monday, gunmen and suicide

bombers half a world away mounted coordinated attacks on Afghanistan's government in Kabul. Suicide bombersattacked ministry buildings and gun battles blazed for four hours as U.S.-backed President Hamid Karzai gamely swore in

new cabinet members at the nearby presidential palace. The twin crises -- a long-term humanitarian disaster nearby and a

distant war seemingly spinning out of control -- bookend the immense security challenges facing the United States as the

Obama administration completes its first year in office. It was just six weeks ago, as Obama announced his decision tosend 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, that the president acknowledged his struggle to respond to the multiple crises

that seem to press in from all sides. "As president, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or

our interests,'' Obama declared in a speech at West Point. But, he added pointedly, "I must weigh all of the challenges that our

nation faces. I don't have the luxury of committing to just one. '' That was before Haiti. U.S. officials now anticipate a

large and long-term U.S. intervention in Haiti, including a major security role that will demand a commitment of troops

and resources from an already stretched military. The U.S. Army currently has 95,000 soldiers in Iraq, 43,000 inAfghanistan (along with 35,000 U.S. Marines, sailors and airmen), 18,000 in Korea and 132,000 deployed elsewhere,

from Kosovo and Kuwait to Qatar. Tens of thousands more troops are headed to Afghanistan this spring and summer.

Altogether, before Haiti's earthquake struck Jan. 12, more than half the Army's 556,680 active-duty soldiers are already deployed or forward-stationed overseas.Now

3,500 soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division have been sent to Haiti, along with 1,700 Marines of the 22nd Marine

Expeditionary Unit who embarked on the helicopter assault carrierUSS Bataan and two amphibious ships for an uncertain

duration. The 22nd MEU had just returned last month from a seven-month deployment. It is one of six similar units in the Marine Corps. On Monday, a C-17transport plane flying out of Pope Air Force Base, N.C., air-dropped 14,000 individual prepackaged meals and 14,000 quarts of water into a secured area in Port-au-

Prince. Dropping cargo by parachute is a quick way to avoid congestion at the airport, but has not been done in Haiti until now because of the difficulty in identifying

and securing drop zones. At this point, at least, U.S. officials are struggling to handle the immense demands of the crisis in Haiti

and cannot say how long the military intervention will last. "We're going to be here as long as needed,'' Lt. Gen. Ken

Keen, the top U.S. military commander in Haiti, said on Sunday. That followed Obama's promise to the Haitian people Friday that "we will do

what it takes to save lives and to help them get back on their feet.'' Meantime, other crises simmer: -- In Iraq, sectarian violence and political

turbulence are rising with the approach of parliamentary elections set for March 7. Last week, Iraqi police intercepted suicide bombers on their way to bomb

several government buildings, attacks that were meant to be followed by waves of political assassinations. -- A counterterrorism struggle is heading up

in Yemen, where a resurgent al-Qaeda group armed and dispatched suspected suicide bomberUmar Farouk Abdulmutallab on a

Northwest Airlines flight into Detroit on Christmas Day. Obama has promised not to send U.S. troops, but U.S. militaryadvisers are helping in training and operations of Yemen's security forces. On Friday, Yemen claimed an attack had killed six al-Qaeda

operatives in an air strike, including Qassim al-Raimi, one of the most wanted militants. Al-Qaeda denied the claim on Monday. -- An ugly series of suicide

bombings in Afghanistan centered on crowded marketplaces have killed dozens of civilians in Garedez, where a police headquarterswas also overrun, and in Musa Qaleh and Garmsir in southern Afghanistan. Garmsir is a river town that U.S. forces have been attempting to secure for almost two

years. The United Nations reported last week that almost 6,000 Afghan civilians were killed in 2009, two thirds of them by Taliban insurgents using suicide bombers,

IEDs, assassinations or executions. -- In the ongoing war with insurgents in Pakistan, a suspected U.S. drone attack is said to have

killed 15 people in South Waziristan, the extremist stronghold along the border with Afghanistan. The use of unmanned attackaircraft has been highly successful against the extremist leadership, U.S. officials say, but the attacks also have generated rising anti-American anger among Pakistani

politicians and public. In Haiti, meanwhile, U.S. and international officials were still struggling to comprehend the size and scope ofthe disaster and the tasks of treating the injured, clearing rubble and providing security and other essential services in the

months ahead. "We will be here, obviously, for the long haul,'' Tim Callaghan, the point man for U.S. aid efforts in Haiti,

said Monday.

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1ac - Overstretch

Korea is the lynchpin of US overstretch withdrawal provides needed resources

CUMMINGS 2004 (Colonel John Cummings, US Army War College, Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South

Korea? May 3, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Calum

Neither Richard Hallorans diplomatic options nor the blatantly militant pre-emption options should be entertained. There is a more viable option: a unilaterawithdraw of United States ground forces from South Korea. The current administrations commitment to the global war on terrorism,

with subsequent military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, has caused considerable strain on the United States Militarys finiteresources. Service components, scrambling to meet the increased operational tempo of the current environment, have yet to realize the

implications on retention and sustaining a quality force. Withdrawal of forces from South Korea would enable the United States to

realize an infrastructure cost savings while continuing to meet the guidance in the National Security Strategy and regional policy objectives

that are inherent in forward basing of troops. It will also make available more forces for the administrations global war on terrorism. Additionally, the removal

of American forces from South Korea would alleviate political unrest associated with the increasing anti-American sentiment among

South Koreans. Moving the headquarters from Seoul to the south will do little to stem the tide of growing anti-American sentiment. The source of anti-Americanfeelings resides with the large amount of ground forces that operate and train on Korean soil, not the location of the headquarters. Since South Korea has a large

standing ground force, the presence of United States ground forces in South Korea is militarily inconsequential. The real threat from NorthKorea is their policy to develop nuclear weapons. U.S. ground forces are unnecessary to deter or defend against nuclear weapons. Additionally, the presence of US

forces on South Korean soil is a major source of anti-American sentiment among the Korean population. This hostility cause political unrest on the peninsula. United

States diplomatic efforts to end the North Korean nuclear weapon crisis are at odds with the South Korean diplomatic policy. The divergent views of the North Korean

threat and diplomatic policies to alleviate it are causing friction between South Korea and the United States. To maintain our influence in South Korea, theU.S. needs to narrow the gap between our divergent perceptions.

Overstretch cripples American military power

PERRY AND FLOURNOY 2006 (William, professor of management science and engineering at Stanford University, was U.S.

secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997, Michele, senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was principal

deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction, National Defense, May)

As a global power with global interests, the United States must be able to deal with challenges in multiple regions of the world

simultaneously. If the Army were ordered to send significant forces to another crisis today, its only option would be to deploy units at

readiness levels far below what operational plans would require.

As stated rather blandly in one Defense Department presentation, the Army "continues to accept risk" in its ability to respond to criseson the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere. The absence of a credible, sizable strategic reserve increases the risk that potential adversaries

will be tempted to challenge the United States. Although the United States can still deploy air, naval, and other more specialized assets

to deter or respond to aggression, the visible overextension of our ground forces could weaken our ability to deter aggression.

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1ac - Overstretch

Decline in readiness cripples American hegemony

Spencer00 (Jack, policy analyst for Defense and National security, Heritage foundation, The facts about military readiness,

Readiness, Backgrounder #1394, 9/15/00, http://heritage.org/research/missiledefense/bg1394.cfm) SLV

America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war.America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in

defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any singlenation has little saliency.

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover,

regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy,

the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the U nited States "must have the capability to deter and, if

deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4 According to some of

the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General JamesJones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about theirrespective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the

U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6

Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not

prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and

interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostilenations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

This causes great power nuclear conflict

Gray, 05 Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies, and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, at the University

of Reading (Spring 2005, Colin S., Parameters, How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War? http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/05spring/gray.htm)

6. Interstate War, Down but Far from Out

Logically, the reverse side of the coin which proclaims a trend favoring political violence internal to states is the claim that interstate

warfare is becoming, or has become, a historical curiosity. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen assure us that most armed conflicts in

coming decades are likely to be internal ones.21 That is probably a safe prediction, though one might choose to be troubled by their

prudent hedging with the qualifier most. Their plausible claim would look a little different in hindsight were it to prove true exceptfor a mere one or two interstate nuclear conflicts, say between India and Pakistan, or North Korea and the United States and itsallies. The same authors also offer the comforting judgment that decisive war between major states is rapidly moving toward

historys dustbin.22 It is an attractive claim; it is a shame that it is wrong.

War, let alone decisive war, between major states currently is enjoying an off-season for one main reason: So extreme is the

imbalance of military power in favor of the United States that potential rivals rule out policies that might lead to hostilities with the

superpower. It is fashionable to argue that major interstate war is yesterdays problemrecall that the yesterday in question is barely

15 years in the pastbecause now there is nothing to fight about and nothing to be gained by armed conflict. Would that those points

were true; unfortunately they are not. The menace of major, if not necessarily decisive, interstate war will return to frighten us

when great-power rivals feel able to challenge American hegemony. If you read Thucydides, or Donald Kagan, you will bereminded of the deadly and eternal influence of the triad of motives for war: fear, honor, and interest.23

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1ac North Korea

Scenario Two is North Korea

North Korea wont be aggressive. But, the pressure for a US preventive strike on North Korea is growing. This

strike would cause mass casualties and kill US credibility. Troops withdrawal would encourage a regional non

strike solutionBANDOW 2009 (Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. He is a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan and the author of several books, including ForeignFollies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon) and Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, Starting the Second Korean War? Restraint is almost certainly the better

part of valor, Reason.com, Feb 26,http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/starting-the-second-korean-war) Calum

The government in Seoul responded with a yawn and Secretary Clinton indicated her desire for continued negotiations. But

the latest emanations from Pyongyang have caused some policymakers to advocate confrontation. Philip Zelikow, late of the Bush

State Department, suggests war. This isn't the first time that U.S. officials have proposed sending in the bombers . The Clintonadministration apparently came close to ordering military strikes before former President Jimmy Carter's dramatic flight to Pyongyang. And Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) has spent years

pondering the possibility of preventive war against the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was never a good idea, but the pressure for military

action may grow. Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy recently traveled to the DPRK, where he was told that existing

supplies of plutonium had been "weaponized." He argues that the U.S. "can tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea that

may or may not actually have the weapons arsenal it claims," but others would put the military option back on the table.

Zelikow goes even further. He says: "whatever the merits of Harrison's suggestion when it comes to North Korea's nuclear

weapons, the United States should not accept Pyongyang's development of long-range missiles systems, which can be

paired with an admitted nuclear weapons arsenal, as still another fait accompli." In his view, Washington should warn theNorth to stand down; if the DPRK failed to comply, the U.S. should take out the missile on its launch pad. Why? Zelikow

contends that "the North Korean perfection of a long-range missile capability against the United States, Japan, or the

Republic of Korea would pose an imminent threat to the vital interests of our country." To rely on deterrence, he adds,

would be a "gamble." Obviously no one wants the North to possess nuclear weapons or missiles of any kind. However, North Korean threats against the ROK and Japan are not

threats against America's vital interests. Japan is the world's second ranking economic power and the South has roughly 40 times the

GDP and twice the population of the North. Sooner rather than later they should be expected to defend themselves.

Washington is busy enough dealing with its own geopolitical problems in the midst of an economic crisis. Moreover, nothing in theNorth Korean regime's behavior suggests that Dear Leader Kim Jong Il is any less amenable to deterrence than were Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong. Kim may be many things, but there is no

indication that he is suicidal. Rather, he likes his virgins in the here and now. Of course, it would be better not to have to rely on deterrence. But a

preventive strike would be no cakewalk. If there is insanity at work on the Korean peninsula, it is the assumption that Kim

would do nothing if his nation was attacked by the U.S. He might choose inaction, but more likely would see such a strike

as the prelude to regime change. In that case the results of the Iraq war would impel him to act first rather than awaitinvasion. America and South Korea would win any war, but the costs would be horrendous. Moreover, the DPRK could easilyinitiate a more limited tit-for-tat retaliation. The South's capital of Seoul lies within easy range of Scud missiles and massed artillery. Even the "optimists" who believethat Seoul could be protected by massive military strikes along the Demilitarized Zone talk about holding casualties to under 100,000. Imagine Pyongyang announcing a limited bombardment

in response to the U.S. action, combined with the promise of a ceasefire if the ROK blocked any further American response. Washington's Asian policy would be wrecked along with Seoul.

Despite the vagaries of dealing with the North, it is not the first bizarrely brutal and secretive regime with which the U.S.

has dealt. Forty-some years ago there was China. The unstable Mao regime, atop a country convulsed by the bloody

Cultural Revolution, was developing nuclear weapons. National Review editor William F. Buckley and New York Sen.

James Buckley both pressed for a preventive attack on Beijing's nascent nuclear program. The Johnson administration considered proposals

for such an assault. The arguments were similar as those made today regarding North Korea: An unpredictable regime, theuncertainty of deterrence, and the relative ease of attack. It's impossible to know what the world would have looked like

had Washington struck, but China likely would have moved closer to the Soviet Union and become more resolutely hostile to

the U.S. Restraint almost certainly was the better part of valor. So, too, with North Korea today. Of course, Washington still should work with the DPRK's

neighbors in an attempt to persuade Pyongyang to abandon both its missile and nuclear ambitions. Even more important, though, wouldbe to turn the problem of North Korea over to the surrounding states. To the extent that the North threatens anyone, it is

South Korea and Japan. China and Russia are unlikely direct targets, but still have good reason to prefer a stable and peaceful

Korean peninsula. Thus, the U.S. should withdraw its 29,000 troops from the ROK, where they are vulnerable to military

action by Pyongyang. Then North Korea would be primarily a problem for the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia. And the U.S. need not worry about the latest North Korean gambit.

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1ac North Korea

North Korean aggression is increasing an attack is imminent

McCurry 10 (Justin, writer for the Guardian, North Korea ratchets up tension as South marks 60th anniversary of war,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/25/north-korea-tension-war-anniversary) ZParks

North Korea today marked the 60th anniversary of the Korean war by announcing a shipping ban off its west coast, while the South

urged the regime to end the "thoughtless provocations" that have raised tensions on the peninsula to their highest in years. Analystssaid the ban could be part of routine military drills or preparations for the test-launch of short-range missiles in the Yellow Sea, near

the border between the two countries. The moves came exactly six decades after North Korean troops swept across the border into

South Korea, triggering three years of bloody conflict in which an estimated three million people died. The shipping ban may also be a

show of defiance as the UN security council discusses possible action against Pyongyang over its alleged sinking in March of the

Cheonan, a South Korean naval vessel, in which 46 sailors died. An international investigation concluded that the ship had been sunk

by a North Korean missile, a claim the regime has denounced as a US-led conspiracy. It has threatened "all-out war" if the UN issues a

reprimand or adds to the punitive measures imposed after it conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. South Korea's Yonhap news

agency reported that the no-sail zone had been set for 19-27 June, north of the port of Nanpo, 50 miles from the maritime border

between the two Koreas. The area was the scene of deadly naval battles in 1999, 2002 and last year. The South Korean defence

ministry said: "This appears to be part of training exercises and we have no indications of unusual activities by the North Koreanmilitary." But South Korea's JoongAng Ilbo newspaper quoted a government official as saying that the ban may indicate the North is

preparing to test-fire short-range missiles. South of the demilitarised zone the heavily fortified border that has divided the two

Koreas since the war ended in a ceasefire in July 1953 ageing war veterans from South Korea and other countries attended amemorial service in Seoul. Flags were displayed from a UN contingent of 21 countries which sent troops or medical units to assist the

South in its war against the North and its ally China. Among the allied contingent were 63,000 British troops more than 1,100 of

them died. The fighting ended with an armistice, not a permanent peace treaty, meaning the countries are technically still at war.

Today, 28,500 US soldiers and 655,000 from the South are still engaged in a nervous standoff with the North's army of 1.2 million.

"South Korean and UN soldiers, you were not only courageous and genuine soldiers but also a cornerstone of South Korea's history,"said president Lee Myung-bak. "We will remember your sacrifice and dedication forever." Lee demanded an apology for the Cheonan

sinking and warned the North to avoid further provocation. "North Korea must halt reckless military provocations and join the road to

co-existence among the 70 million Korean nation. Our ultimate goal is not military confrontation but peaceful unification." Decades

after the guns fell silent, the two sides continue to offer contrasting accounts of the causes of the conflict. Lee recalled the morning

"communists opened fire on all fronts when all people were sleeping peacefully". Victorious US and Soviet forces had divided the

Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel in 1945 following Japan's defeat in the second world war. But in North Korea, where the

conflict is referred to as the fatherland liberation war, the official version insists that its forces had invaded the South to repel an attack

by the US. "All the historical facts show that it is the US imperialists who unleashed the war in Korea and that the United States cannever escape from that responsibility," said the official Korean Central News Agency.

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1ac North Korea

An American attack on North Korea would spark a conflict that ends in planetary extinctionCHOL 2002 (Director Center for Korean American Peace, 10-24,http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html) Calum

Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed

North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will

certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "NorthKorea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing

missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim

Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according toone Pentagon study) kill up to a million people." U.S. Perception Counts Most What counts most is not so much North nuclear and missile capability as the American

perception that North Korea may have such capability. No matter how true North Korean nuclear capability may, such capability does not serve the political purposes o

Kim Jong Il and his policy planners in dealing with the U.S., unless Washington policy planners perceive North Korean nuclear threat as real. Their view is of the

Americans being hoaxed into suspecting that the North Koreans have already nuclear capability. The Americans are the most skeptical people in the world. Due to the

historic al background of their nation building, they are least ready to trust what others say. What they trust most is guns and money. This is the reason why theAmericans show a strong preference for lie detectors, which are ubiquitous in the U.S. If the North Koreans say that they have nuclear capability, the immediate

American response is to doubt the statement. If the North Koreans deny, the Americans have a typical propensity to suspect that they have. Most interestingly,

Americans readily accept as true acknowledgement after repeated denial. It is easy to imagine how stunned James Kelly and American officials were at the reported

post-denial acknowledgement by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju that the North Koreans have a uranium enrichment centrifuge. As expected, American

officials have been ordered into globe-hopping tours, rallying international support for their campaign to apply pressure to bear upon the North Koreans to dissuadethem from their alleged nuclear weapons program. Bush, Rice, Rumsfeld and other tough guys took special care to paint North Korea as different from Iraq, offering the

North Koreans the striped-pants treatment. It is too obvious that indirect diplomacy is not effective now matter how hard the Americans may consult their allies and the

allies of North Korea. The past consultation with Russia and China failed to produce any positive results, because they have little leverage with North Korea. The four-

way talks are a case in point, where the Americans ended up talking with the North Koreans. Three Options Available Then the question arises of how to interpret the

reported North Korean admission of the possession of a uranium enrichment device. One most likely explanation is that it is more of an invitation to diplomaticnegotiations than refusal to talk. There are a few months to go before the target year of 2003 strikes. In other words, the Kang Sok Ju statement means that the North

Koreans still keep the nuclear trump card, namely, that the Bush Administration has no choice but to pick up where the Clinton Administration left off. The Bush

Administration is left with three choices: The first is just to ignore North Korea and let the regime of Kim Jong Il emerge a nuclear

power with atomic and thermonuclear weapons in their arsenal with a fleet of ICBMs locked on to American targets. This option is

most likely to set into motion the domino phenomenon, inducing Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arms, making unnecessary

the American military presence on their soil with anti-Americanism rising to new heights. The second choice is for the Americans to

initiate military action to knock out the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Without precise knowledge of the location of those target

facilities, the American policy planners face the real risk of North Korea launching a full-scale war against South Korea, Japan and theU.S. The North Korean retaliation will most likely leave South Korea and Japan totally devastated with the Metropolitan U.S. being

consumed in nuclear conflagration. Looking down on the demolished American homeland, American policy planners aboard a special Boeing jets will have

good cause to claim, "We are winners, although our homeland is in ashes. We are safely alive on this jet." The third and last option is to agree to a shotgun

wedding with the North Koreans. It means entering into package solution negotiations with the North Koreans, offering to sign a peace treaty toterminate the relations of hostility, establish full diplomatic relations between the two enemy states, withdraw the American forces from South Korea, remove North

Korea from the list of axis of evil states and terrorist-sponsoring states, and give North Korea most favored nation treatment. The first two options should be soberingnightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in

no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their

resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of [hu]mankind. A nuclear-armedNorth Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up findingthemselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power.

8
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9/23


1ac - Solvency

Only withdrawal solves overstretch and allows the US to prevent confrontation with great powers



Relations with North and South Korea, South Korea Needs Better Defense, Forbes, March 26,

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11628) Calum

It also is in America's interest to shift responsibility for the South's defense back where it belongs. The U.S. spends almost as much as

the rest of the world on the military, yet America's armed forces have been badly stretched by lengthy occupation duties in Iraq and

continuing combat in Afghanistan. Washington should focus on potential threats from major powers, not more peripheral dangers that

can be handled by allied and friendly states.

The Korean War ended in 1953, but the potential for conflict never fully disappeared, as evident from the latest events in the Yellow Sea. Before the government

in Seoul attempts to save the world, it needs to protect the people of South Korea.

The US will provoke North Korea into warSouth Korea alone will not



Relations with North and South Korea, Cutting the Tripwire: It's time to get out of Korea, Reason Magazine, July 2003,http://reason.com/archives/2003/07/01/cutting-the-tripwire/1) Calum

Placing even greater pressure on this unequal arrangement is disagreement about proper policy toward North Korea. Some 24 millionpeople, roughly half of South Korea's population, live in the Seoul-Inchon metropolitan region. Yet Seoul sits barely 25 miles from the

border, vulnerable to artillery and Scud missile attack. Thus, the costs of mishandling the North would be horrific for the South. As

President Roh has said, war "is such a catastrophic result that I cannot even imagine. We have to handle the North-South relations in

such a way that we do not have to face such a situation."

Washington, by contrast, has almost casually considered plunging the peninsula into war. Former President Bill Clinton admits that

his administration prepared for a military strike against the North during the first nuclear crisis, without consulting the South.

President Roh understandably complained. "We almost went to the brink of war in 1993 with North Korea," he later said, "and at the

time we didn't even know it."Upon what can Seoul rely to avoid a new conflict? There are reports that President Bush rejected a military course after then-President

Kim Dae-jung personally described the carnage of the Korean War. Yet Bush explicitly refuses to rule out any option. SecretaryRumsfeld has called the Kim Jong-il government a "terrorist regime," offering an obvious justification for action. And it is hard to find

anyone who speaks with administration officials off the record who believes their publicly pacific intentions.

Indeed, some hawks flaunt their lack of concern for Seoul's views. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) opines that "while they may risk their

populations, the United States will do whatever it must to guarantee the security of the American people. And spare us the usual

lectures about American unilateralism. We would prefer the company of North Korea's neighbors, but we will make do without it if

we must." Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy hits a similar note: "The desire of dangerous nations' neighbors to

accommodate, rather than confront, them is understandable. But it should not be determinative of U.S. policy. Such pleading today

from South Korea and Japan is reminiscent of the Cold War advocacy for dtente by leftists in the West German government."Apparently, America's allies should gaily commit suicide at Washington's command.

9
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10/23


1ac Solvency

Finally the US is the reason a war would start without US presence a war will never occur in KoreaBANDOW 2009 (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of


Relations with North and South Korea, North Korea: Paper Tiger, Campaign for Liberty, June 4,http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100) Calum

Yet the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an impoverished wreck. One American carrier group has more firepower

than the entire North Korean military. It is the U.S. which threatens Pyongyang, not the other way around.

U.S. entanglement with Korea began with the Japanese surrender in 1945. Washington and Moscow divided the peninsula at the 49th

parallel and occupied the southern and northern sections, respectively. As the Cold War enveloped U.S.-Soviet relations, the Republic

of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea emerged as hostile independent states.

In the early years the DPRK was the more fearsome player. The U.S. refused to arm the ROK with heavy weapons to discourage

authoritarian President Syngman Rhee from fulfilling his threat to march north. The Soviets were not so scrupulous in dealing with the

North's Kim Il-sung, who almost conquered the entire peninsula after invading in June 1950 before U.S. forces turned the tide. Afterthree years of see-saw warfare, an armistice was agreed near the initial boundary.

But no permanent peace was arranged, so American troops remained. Over the last half century, however, Chinese forces went home,

South Korea raced past the North in economic development, Moscow and Beijing recognized Seoul, and the DPRK suffered economic

collapse and famine. The balance of power of 1950 long ago disappeared.

Pyongyang retains a quantitative military edge, but its equipment is antiquated; North Korean troops are malnourished and get littletraining. The North is effectively bankrupt and without allies. With about 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North,

Seoul could outmatch the Kim regime in any way it chose. With large military reserves, a strong industrial base, abundant allies, and

generous access to international credit markets, South Korea is well-positioned to triumph in any conflict.It is obvious, then, that the DPRK doesn't pose much of a conventional threat to the South. The Kim regime could invade the ROK,

but doing so would be far more likely to end in the destruction of the North than the South. And nothing suggests that Kim Jong-il isseeking martyrdom: he wants his virgins in this life, not the next.

Japan worries about threats from Pyongyang, but the former is more than capable of defending itself. Japan possesses the world's

second largest economy, noted for its technological sophistication. There is little that Tokyo could not build or buy. More than 60

years after the end of World War II, it is time for Japan to take over responsibility for its own defense.

The DPRK has neither the interest nor the ability to challenge other nations in the region -- Indonesia, Australia, Philippines, et al. The

North possesses an antiquated army and little else, not a globe-spanning military like that of the U.S.

It is even more obvious that Pyongyang poses no meaningful danger to America. The North has no ability to project military power. If

it attempted to do so, U.S. air and naval power would make quick work of North Korea's forces.The only Americans currently within range of the DPRK are the 28,000 troops stationed in the South. Their deployment, while

unnecessary to protect the ROK, actually endangers the U.S. Disengagement would be the most effective means of reducing the threat

to America.

What of the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs? They are primarily a problem for the North's neighbors and thus give other

countries a good reason to consider augmenting both defensive and deterrence capabilities. However, North Korea apparently has

neither weaponized nor miniaturized actual nuclear warheads. Pyongyang possesses no long-range missiles capable of accurately

hitting American territory. The North's capabilities do not match its bluster.

That could eventually change, of course, but the DPRK obviously poses no present danger. There is no cause for precipitous action. Infact, Pyongyang is never likely to pose a genuine threat to America. The U.S. has the world's most sophisticated nuclear arsenal: any

North Korean attack would be suicidal. Just one American missile with multiple warheads could destroy everything worth destroying

in the North. If Washington could deter Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, two of the greatest mass murderers in human history, it can

deter Kim Jong-il.

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11/23


Overstretch ext Collapsing now

The U.S. is not using cost effective measures to win the wars its fighting now, cutting commitments key to ease the

fall of American Primacy

Bandow 09

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of

Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, Kims Atom Project ,12/11/09http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11044]

In short, Washington spends what it spends not to defend America but to maintain the ability to attack and overpower other

nations that's what "primacy," as Donnelly put it, really means. This perspective is reflected in oft-voiced concerns over Beijing's ongoing

military expansion. As Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments observes: "China's

People's Liberation Army is aggressively developing capabilities and strategies to degrade the U.S. military's ability to

project power into the region." He did not express fear that China is planning aggression against America. Rather, he believed

Beijing is hoping to prevent intervention by America. Addressing the first is a vital U.S. interest. Avoiding the second is not. Moreover, it will

be far less expensive for countries like China to deter an American attack than for America to preserve the ability to attack

countries like China.The cost of the latter will only grow over time. Terrorism remains a pressing security threat.

However, terrorist attacks, such as 9/11, though horrid, do not pose an existential danger. Al-Qaeda is no replacement for

Nazism and Communism, nuclear-topped ICBMs, and armored divisions. Nor is traditional military force the best way to

combat terrorism.International cooperation, improved intelligence, judicious use of Special Forces abroad, and smarter

use of police forces at home will work far better in far more cases. Indeed, foreign intervention often promotes terrorism,

rather like swatting a hornet's nest. The Reagan administration's misguided intervention in the Lebanese civil war is one of many examples. America's

military spending is determined by its foreign policy. The Wall Street Journaleditorialized that "We learned on 9/11 that

three percent [of GDP] isn't nearly enough to maintain our commitments and fight a war on terror." That's true, but

irrelevant. America's commitments are a matter of choice, and the question is whether they make sense. They don't. The second issue iswhether more money on the military would better prevent terrorism.It wouldn't. In its 2010 budget justification the Department ofDefense announced: "It is not enough to possess military forces capable of deterring or responding to aggression. Rather it is vital that the United States be a force for

good by engaging with and helping to positively shape the world." Shaping the world might prove helpful, but that does not mean it is

"vital"; engagement is good, but military force is not the only form of engagement.Any international involvement must

balance costs and benefits. Adjusting commitments would allow a vastly different, and less expensive, force structure.The

U.S. could make significant cuts and still maintain the globe's strongest and most sophisticated military and one well able todefend America and Americans. Cutting commitments is an imperative for anyone committed to limited government. War is the ultimate big government

program, the "health of the state," as social critic Randolph Bourne put it. The world is a dangerous place, but not all dangers are created equal and

not all dangers must be confronted by America. The U.S. has global interests, but most are not worth going to war over.

When the Constitution authorizes the federal government to "provide for the common defense ," it means America's defense, not that of

well-heeled allies and failed Third World states. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledges that "resources are scarce"at a time of massive deficits. Washington must reconsider its priorities. That means cutting back on the U.S. government's

role abroad as well as at home. American primacy is bound to diminish. Deciding in what way and at what rate should be

made by Washington, not forced by events.

11


12/23


Overstretch ext Presence not key

Our presence isnt key to power projection or regional stability South Korea can fill-in and deter any aggression

Bandow '96 Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and a Senior Fellow at the Cato

Institute (Doug, TRIPWIRE; Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, pg. 63-4)

In fact, the ROK doesn't even come up to the standard of an important interest--one that would materially affect America but not threaten its survival as an

independent republic. Examples of that sort of interest include the maintenance of open sea lanes and Western Europe's independence, for instance. In contrast, thepreser vation of a midsized trading partner surrounded by competing great powers in a distant region is not strategically impsortant.22(Obviously, for the South Koreans their survival is not only important but vital; the fact that it is vital to them does not automatically make it vital or even important to

us, however.) Rather, the ROK is what Cato's Ted Galen Carpenter calls a peripheral interest, one of many "assets that marginally enhance America's security but

whose loss would constitute more of an annoyance than a serious setback."23 U.S. officials obviously reject such an assessment; they often por tray

South Korea as an advanced base for America, allowing the projection of U.S. power into East Asia. But traditional arguments about

how deployments in Korea constrained the Soviet Union obvi ously no longer apply.24Creative policymakers have had to lookelsewhere for justification; for example, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke went so far as to contend that the loss of Korea "would

be the end of our position in the entire Pacific."25 William Gleysteen, former U.S. ambassador to the ROK, said the alliance contributes

"importantly to the regional balance of power."26 Similarly, Heritage Foundation president Edwin Feulner once called the Mutual Defense Treaty "a linchpinfor stability in the entire Northeast Asian region."27 In 1990 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney warned that a U.S. withdrawal would be followed by a power vac-

uum. As a result, "there almost surely would be a series of destabilizing regional arms races, an increase in regional tensions, and possibly conflict."28 In early 1995 the

U.S. Department of Defense made much the same pitch, promising to maintain the alliance "even after the North Korean threat passes . . . in the interest of regional

security."29None of those arguments suggests that any vital American inter ests are at stake. Thus, the most obvious reason to threaten to go to war

does not apply to Korea. Rather, America's second most impor tant and costly commitment (after Europe) is rooted in the more nebulous concepof regional "stability." But the "stability" argu ment fails to distinguish between U.S. influence in East Asia and a defense commitmentto the ROK. The latter is not necessary for the former. First, the Mutual Defense Treaty yields America little benefit. As noted earlier, while a commitmen

to defend Seoul from North Korea helps stabilize the peninsula, the benefits of doing so accrue mostly to the ROK and to a lesser degree to neighboring nations. The

advan tages to America, based on proximity, if nothing else, are much more modest. Second, a militarily stronger South Korea, the

probable consequence of a U.S. withdrawal, would promote regional stability almost as much as could the U.S. presence, by deterring

aggression by not only Pyongyang but also by China, Japan, or Russia. (Those nations will always be able to outdo even a united Korea militarily, butthe latter could make the prospect of war too expensive for any of them to seriously contemplate.) At the same time, it is hard to imagine even a more powerful Korea

being in a position to threaten any of its major neighbors. Useless Troop Presence The U.S. troop presence in the ROK offers America little advantage. One infantry

division in Korea would play no useful role in any conflict with, say, China. Nevertheless, Joseph Nye, assistant secretary of defense for international security, argues

that pre-posi-tioning equipment "is a terrific force multiplier" allowing one to "add tremendous additional capability in a very short time."30 U.S. access to South Korean

basestwhich actually would not require a permanent troop presencemight be useful in a full-scale war in the region, but it is hard to imagine what interests would

warrant U.S. participation in such a conflict. An attack on Manchuria in retaliation for China's sinking of a Filipino warship off the Spratly Islands? An expedition tohelp Japan forcibly wrest the Kuril Islands from Russia? Further, that kind of U.S.-ROK cooperation would depend, not on past American support, but on shared

interests at the time the conflict erupted. Seoul might be reluctant to join in a military crusade against a neighboring power or powers, however much it currently enjoys

being defended by Washington. After all, South Korea has to live with China, Japan, and Russia while Washington can leave whenever it chooses. Moreover, it wouldbe hard to preserve an isolated forward outpost like the ROK in any serious conflict; in 1950 Pentagon planners worried that the United States could maintain military

superiority on the peninsula only by using atomic weapons on Siberia if the USSR entered the Korean War.31 In short, using Korea as an advance military outpost couldprove to be more costly and less beneficial than currently assumed. Moreover, neither an infantry division nor bases in the ROK are likely to do much to suppress

nationalistic sentiments and conflicts throughout the region. If Vietnam, the Philippines, and China slide toward war over the Spratly Islands, only an American threat to

intervene, not the mere U.S. presence in Korea, is likely to deter them. Yet there is precious little evidence either that America is better able to solve

regional problems than are the parties involved or that the United States has sufficient interests to warrant military action in response

to the few problems that might spin out of control. The United States might have been the key to regional stability 40, 30, and even 20

years ago. That it was even 10 years ago is doubtful, and that it is today is very unlikely indeed.

12


13/23


Heg Solves Prolif

Heg solves prolif

Brookes 08 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. He is also a member of the

congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

(Peter, Heritage, Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might, November 24, 2008

The United States military has alsobeen a central player in the attempts to halt weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missileproliferation .In

2003, President Bush created theProliferation Security Initiative (PSI),an initiative to counter the spread of WMD and theirdelivery systems throughout the world.The U.S.

military's capabili ties help put teeth in the PSI, a voluntary, multilateral organization of 90-plus nations which uses national laws and joint military operations to fightproliferation. While many of the PSI's efforts aren't made pub lic due to the potential for revealing sensitive intelligence sources and methods, some

operations do make their way to the media. For instance, according to the U.S. State Department, the PSI stopped exports to Iran's missile

program and heavy water- related equipment to Tehran's nuclear program, which many believe is actually a nuclear weapons program. In the same vein, the United States isalso developing the world's most prodigious-ever ballistic missile defense system to protect the American homeland, its deployed troops, allies, and friends, including Europe. While missile

defense has its critics, it may provide the best answer to the spread of ballistic missiles and the unconventional payloads, includingtheWMD, they may carry. Unfortunately, the missileand WMD proliferation trend is not positive. For instance, 10 years ago, there were only six nuclear weapons states. Today there are nine members of the once-exclusive nuclear

weapons club, with Iran perhaps knocking at the door. Twenty-five years ago, nine countries had ballistic missiles. Today, there are 28 countries with ballistic missile arsenals of

varying degrees. This defensive system will not only provide deter rence to the use of these weapons, but also provide policymakers with a

greater range of options in pre venting or responding to such attacks, whether from a state or non-state actor .Perhaps General Trey Obering, theDirector of the Missile Defense Agency, said it best when describing the value of missile defense in countering the growing threat of WMD and delivery system proliferation: "I believe that

one of the reasons we've seen the proliferation of these missiles in the past is that there has historically been no defense against them."

13


14/23


Heg solves Aggression

Hegemony is key to contain Chinese aggression

Swaine 98 et al Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment For International

Peace

(Michael, Sources of Conflict in the Twentieth Century, p54-55)

The second vital interest is toprevent the rise of a hegemonic state in Asia. Any hegemonic state capable of dominating the Asian land mass and

the lines of communication, both internal and external, represents an unacceptable challenge to the safety, prosperity, and power position of the UnitedStates. For reasons well understood by geopoliticians since Sir Halford Mackinder, Asias great wealth and resources would serve its possessors well in the struggles

endemic to international politics. If the regions wealth and resources were secured by any single state (or some combination of states acting in

unison), it would enable this entity to threaten American assets in Asia and, more problematically, in other areas such as the Middle East, and finallyperhaps to challenge the United States itself at a global level. This entity, using the continents vast resources and economic capabilities, could then effectively interdict

the links presently connecting the United States with Asia and the rest of the world and, in the limiting case, menace the CONUS itself through a combination of both

WMD and conventional instruments. Besides being a threat to American safety, a hegemonic domination of Asia by one of the regions powers would threaten

American prosperityif the consequence of such domination included denying the United States access to the continents markets, goods, capital, and technology. Incombination, this threat to American safety and prosperity would have the inevitable effect of threatening the relative power position of the United States in

international politics. For these reasons,preventing the rise of a hegemonic center of power in Asiaespecially one disposed to impeding American

economic, political, and military accesswould rank as a vital interest second only to preserving the physical security of the United States and its extended

possessions. This interest inevitably involves paying close attention to the possible power transitions in the region, especially those relating

to China in the near-to-medium term and to Japan, Russia, and possibly India over the long term. In any event, it requires developing an appropriate set ofpolicy responses which may range from containment at one end all the way to appeasement at the otherdesigned to prevent the rise of any

hegemony that obstructs continued American connectivity with Asia.

Hegemony key to preventing mideast conflict

Lesser 98 Senior Political Analyst, RANd

(Ian, Sources of conflict in the 20th century, p 214)

Finally, the most important extraregional variable for the future of regional security will be the United States itself. Our analysis highlights the enduring

nature of U.S. interests in the Middle East. The level and character of our engagement and presence, and ourcapacity for power projection in times of crisis,

will be dominant elements in the regional security equation for the foreseeable future. The influence of the United States on the strategicenvironment across the region under current conditions cannot be overemphasized. American withdrawalthe end of Americas role as preeminent security

guarantorcould transform the security picture in profound terms and could affect the propensity for conflict and cooperation far beyond

the region, as other extraregional actors move to fill the strategic vacuum. One of the many potentially disastrous consequences of U.S.

withdrawal might be the much more rapid spread ofweapons of mass destruction as regional powers strive to substitute for American deterrence or capitalize on theirnewfound freedom of action.

14


15/23


NK ext Conflict coming

Korean conflict is coming now nuclear deterrence fails

Chung 6/1 Visiting Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations (RSIS), Nanayang Technological

University (Chong Wook, 2010, The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident,

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us_policy_toward_the_korean_peninsula.html)

After a month-long investigation, the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a NorthKorean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. President Lee

Myung-bak, demanding the North's apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the

humanitarian area.North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of

communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed itsarmed forces on special alert. The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation. Another factor

that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North. Pyongyan is believed to have fissionable materials

enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. Its two nuclear tests so far reinforced the possibility of all-out military flare-up involving

nuclear weapons. The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but North Korea has proven that the rational

logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinkmanship tactics often defy the strategiccalculus of its neighbors. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments,however, premature pessimism is not advisable.

15


16/23


NK ext US will get drawn in

Expanding North Korean provocations will draw the US into nuclear conflict

Hayes, 06 - Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne; and Director, Nautilus Institute, San

Francisco (Peter, The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony 10/4,

http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0682Hayes.html)

If as I have suggested, the DPRK has become a nuclear stalker state that seeks to redress past wrongs and use nuclear leverage to force the United States to treat it in a

less hostile and more respectful manner, then the United States will have to ask itself whether continued isolation and pressure on the regime is more likely, or less so,

to ameliorate stalking behaviours in time of crisis, when the risk of nuclear next-use becomes urgent. Like a repeat offender, the DPRK is likely to continue

to use nuclear threat to stalk the United States until it achieves what it perceives to be a genuine shift in Washingtons

attitude. Unlike an individual who stalks, there is no simple way to lock up a state that stalks another with nuclear threat. Currently, the United States has no commonlanguage for discussing nuclear weapons with the North Korean military in the context of the insecurities that bind the two sides together at the Demilitarized Zone.

Continued rebuffing of Pyongyangs overtures may lead to more nuclear stalking that is, the development of creative

and unanticipated ways of using nuclear threats, deployments, and actual use in times of crisis or war. There are no

grounds to believe that the DPRK will employ a US or Western conceptual framework of nuclear deterrence and crisis

management in developing its own nuclear doctrine and use options. Indeed, US efforts to use clear and classical deterrent

threats to communicate to North Koreans that if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any

attempt to use them will bring national obliteration as Condoleezza Rice put it in her Foreign Affairs essay in 2000 serve to incite theDPRK to exploit this very threat as a way to engage the United States, with terrible risks of miscalculation and first-use on

both sides.

16


17/23


NK ext A2 attacking solves

Attacking North Korea doesnt solve-it will result in Global Nuclear War

Bandow 03


Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, N. Korea Is No Place to Apply Iraq 'Lessons' , 4/22/03

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6020]

When Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton said North Korea should "draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq," the

meaning was clear: The United States might send in the Marines. The administration apparently believes that its hard-line

stance led to the three-way talks among North Korea, China and the U.S. planned for later this week. And if the talks bog

down or blow up, Bolton's statement implies that war again will be an option. But we should know clearly what we mayprovoke, and it isn't a limited, quick, low-casualty Iraqi-style conflict. Where North Korea is concerned, even a limited

military strike almost certainly means full-scale war on the Korean peninsula, with massive casualties and widespread

devastation. The North is thought to possess one or two nuclear weapons or at least has reprocessed enough plutonium to

make them. More important, it has cheated on the 1994 Agreed Framework, which froze its nuclear program, and it also

has taken a series of increasingly provocative steps. North Korea probably chose the current path for a mixture of

reasons. Its putative nuclear capability is the only reason other nations pay any attention to an otherwise bankrupt,

irrelevant state. So far the nuclear option also has been useful in eliciting bribes, such as fuel oil shipments and financial

aid. Moreover, developing a nuclear arsenal may be the surest route to ensuring that the U.S. does not attack. A decade

ago, many American policymakers and pundits blithely talked about military options for destroying the Yongbyon reactor

and other North Korean nuclear facilities. Many people, apparently including President Bush, seem to be making the same

calculations again. It is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within easy reach of North Korean artillery and Scud

missiles, have a different perspective. Officials in Beijing, Moscow and Tokyo also worry about radioactive fallout,

missile attacks, refugee flows, economic turmoil and regional chaos. Even among the countries in the region most

vulnerable to a North Korea with nuclear weapons, there is no constituency for war. South Korea is particularly adamant.As President Roh Moo Hyun said, "For Washington, their prime interest lies in getting rid of weapons of mass destruction

to restore the world order, but for us it's a matter of survival." Some advocates of military action predict that Pyongyang

would not retaliate against a blow to its nuclear facilities. Others propose coupling such a military strike with the use or

threat of tactical nuclear weapons against the North's conventional forces. But to attack and assume the North would not

respond would be a wild gamble. A military strike might not get all of Pyongyang's nuclear assets, and hitting the

reprocessing facility and spent fuel rods could create radioactive fallout over China, Japan, Russia or South Korea.

Moreover, given the official U.S. policy of preemption, designation of the North as a member of the "axis of evil" and the

Iraq war, Pyongyang might decide that even a limited military strike was the opening of a war for regime change. In that

case, it would make sense to roll the tanks. An account by a high-ranking defector, Cho Myung Chul, is particularly

sobering. In analyzing Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, North Korean military officials concluded that Baghdad was too

defensive. Cho related the North Korean view as: "If we're in a war, we'll use everything. And if there's a war, we should

attack first, to take the initiative." He estimates the chances of general war at 80% in response to even a limited strike on

Yongbyon. Unfortunately, "everything" is a daunting force: In addition to a large army, the North possesses long-range

artillery and rocket launchers, up to 600 Scud missiles and additional longer-range No Dong missiles. And it has

developed a significant number and range of chemical and perhaps biological weapons. Estimates as to the number of

casualties run to more than 1 million. Also possible would be a limited retaliatory strike against the United States'

Yongsan base in the center of Seoul. The Seoul-Inchon metropolis includes roughly half of South Korea's population,

about 24 million people, and is the nation's industrial heartland. Pyongyang is thought to be able to fire up to 500,000shells an hour into Seoul. Washington could hardly afford not to respond to an attack on Yongsan, yet retaliation would

probably lead to general war. Such a scenario might threaten civilian control of the military in Seoul; the perception that

South Koreans died because the U.S. acted against the wishes of the Roh administration might create a decisive split

between Seoul and Washington. Dealing with North Korea could prove to be one of the most vexing challenges for this

administration. Military action does not offer a simple solution but rather portends a real war of horrific destructiveness.

17


18/23


Solvency Withdrawal Solves NK aggression

Removing U.S. troops is a prerequisite to genuine Chinese support for Korean reunification

Van Nguyen, 9 - freelance writer based in Sydney, Australia. His articles have been published in OpEdnews, Asia Times

Online and Foreign Policy Journal (Peter, U.S. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification, UPI Asia, 10/13,

http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us_bases_are_obstacle_to_korean_reunification/1193/)

The United Statesbelieves that if the North collapsed, China would have to back reunification to demonstrate that it is aresponsible player in regional cooperation. But in order to get the Chinese to endorse the plan, the United States would

have to give up its strategic military bases in South Korea and order a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the regionBoth Koreas have been constantly eyed by foreigners due to their geostrategic value in Northeast Asia. For China, Japan and the United States, the Koreas have

provided a buffer zone for more than half a century since the end of the Korean War. The Korean peninsula is also seen as a predetermined battlefield if war breaks out

between China, the United States and Japan. This would leave the warring states relatively untouched, as the three nations could avoid hitting each others territories,

which would escalate the conflict and make it difficult for all parties to disengage for fear of losing face. But both Koreas would have to face the brunt of a full-scale

war. For China, protecting North Korea means keeping the United States and its allies from encroaching on its border.

China would rather maintain the status quo than accept a reunified Korea under South Korean administration. Therefore, Chinawill do its best to stabilize North Korea and rebuild its political structure in line with Chinese interests. China might be forced to accept a reunified Korea if it wants to

maintain an international image as a peace-promoting country. However, unless it gets some kind of security guarantee without losing the strategic balance in the

region, there is little incentive for it to allow reunification to take place unchallenged. Since the end of the Korean War the United States has maintained a large militarycontingent in South Korea to deter an invasion attempt by the North. The U.S. military presence keeps Chinas ambitions in check and in the bargain offers Japan some

security, as the Japanese fear reprisals from the Chinese for atrocities committed during World War II. Besides, Chinas growing economic and military clout has

increased the necessity for a military presence in South Korea. However, U.S. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacleto a peaceful reunification of the Koreas. Even a unified Korea might not want the U.S. military, as reunification would make the objective of providing

deterrence against the North redundant. A U.S. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China, as it would be

difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Also, millions of North Koreans have adeeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region.Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. This would create a deep rift

within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. The complete withdrawal of all U.S. military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable

has been set, allowing the new Korea to handle its own security. The question is, will the United States pull out all its troops in order to allow the peaceful reunification of the Koreas? The

United States has been dreading a scenario in which its military bases in South Korea could come under threat. The United States may not withdraw its troops, as that would leave a strategic

vacuum. It would risk losing influence over Korea to China, whose economy is touted to race ahead of that of the United States. Although complete U.S. withdrawal would be ideal, analternative would be to allow China to set up bases in the northern part of Korea, similar to Kyrgyzstan allowing Russia and China to set up bases to ease their concerns over the U.S. military

presence. This would have its challenges, however, and might increase the chances of military confrontation. But regardless of the implications and consequences, the United States will

hesitate to remove its bases. China would probably ask for a U.S. troop withdrawal as a precondition to the reunification of the two

Koreas under a liberal and democratic government.

18
http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us_bases_are_obstacle_to_korean_reunification/1193/http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us_bases_are_obstacle_to_korean_reunification/1193/


19/23


Solvency Withdrawal Solves NK nukes

Troop withdrawal key to denuclearizing North Korea

Bandow 09


Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, Bipolar Pyongyang ,8/9/09http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10523]

Secretary Clinton should invite the DPRK to send an envoy to Washington. (Enough supplicants have gone to

Pyongyang.) The agenda would be to develop the parameters for any bilateral talks. The administration should indicate

that it is willing to discuss most any issue, but genuine negotiations could be conducted only in a multilateral contextifnot the six-party talks per se, then in an ongoing, parallel framework. The reason is simple: the North's nuclear program,

accentuated by Pyongyang's predictable brinkmanship, is the principal barrier to improvement of the DPRK's relations

with the United States, as well as North Korea's neighbors. In response, Washington should indicate that it is prepared to

work with the other parties to develop a comprehensive program to promote stability, security and prosperity for the

Korean peninsula. The solution must be both regional and consensual. Washington should indicate that it has no intention

of imposing a solution on other nations. During this period the administration should work with Seoul and the new

Japanese government to craft a package that includes: a peace treaty, a nonaggression pact, phased U.S.-troop withdrawal,

mutual diplomatic recognition, an end of sanctions, membership in international organizations, and bilateral and

multilateral aid. In return, the North would agree to forgo nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, fully dismantle its

existing nuclear facilities, relinquish all nuclear materials and accept intrusive inspections. The need for the latter is even

more evident after Pyongyang's claim to be in the final stages of uranium enrichment. If true, that gives the lie to the

regime's lengthy denial that it possessed such a capability. In return for bountiful benefits from engagement, the DPRK

must agree to a process that ensures no more unpleasant surprises for its neighbors and America. Washington, South

Korea and Tokyo should simultaneously work together to encourage more intensive Chinese involvement. Withincreasing pessimism in Beijing that North Korea will agree to give up its nuclear potential, the allies should suggest that

the People's Republic of China closely coordinate its policy with theirs for one last serious attempt to resolve the nuclear

crisis through negotiation. In essence, Pyongyang's three antagonists would provide the carrots while its ally would wield

the stick. If the DPRK chose to obstruct and obfuscate, it would demonstrate that it does not desire a diplomatic solution.

In that case, Beijing should supportand, more importantly, enforcean enhanced sanctions regime. China also should

consider using whatever influence it has within the North to encourage more responsible behavior and/or better

leadership. To ease the PRC's concerns over the prospect of inadvertently sparking a North Korean implosion, the United

States, South Korea and Japan should emphasize that the situation today is dangerously unstable, despite the fact that

Pyongyang is in its manic phase. Should the result of Chinese pressure be social collapse, the three allies would contribute

financially. Moreover, both Washington and Seoul should promise that there would be no American military presence in a

reunified Korea.

19


20/23


Solvency US causes NK aggression

The US will provoke North Korea into warSouth Korea will not



Relations with North and South Korea, Cutting the Tripwire: It's time to get out of Korea, Reason Magazine, July 2003,http://reason.com/archives/2003/07/01/cutting-the-tripwire/1) Calum

Placing even greater pressure on this unequal arrangement is disagreement about proper policy toward North Korea. Some 24 million

people, roughly half of South Korea's population, live in the Seoul-Inchon metropolitan region. Yet Seoul sits barely 25 miles from the

border, vulnerable to artillery and Scud missile attack. Thus, the costs of mishandling the North would be horrific for the South. As

President Roh has said, war "is such a catastrophic result that I cannot even imagine. We have to handle the North-South relations in

such a way that we do not have to face such a situation."

Washington, by contrast, has almost casually considered plunging the peninsula into war. Former President Bill Clinton admits that

his administration prepared for a military strike against the North during the first nuclear crisis, without consulting the South.

President Roh understandably complained. "We almost went to the brink of war in 1993 with North Korea," he later said, "and at the

time we didn't even know it."

Upon what can Seoul rely to avoid a new conflict? There are reports that President Bush rejected a military course after then-PresidentKim Dae-jung personally described the carnage of the Korean War. Yet Bush explicitly refuses to rule out any option. Secretary

Rumsfeld has called the Kim Jong-il government a "terrorist regime," offering an obvious justification for action. And it is hard to find

anyone who speaks with administration officials off the record who believes their publicly pacific intentions.Indeed, some hawks flaunt their lack of concern for Seoul's views. Sen

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