South Texas Project, Unit 2, Supplement to Seismic Walkdown … · South Texas Project Unit 2...

Nuclear Operating Company

South Texas Pro/ect Eleatric GeneratIn$ Station PO Sow 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

February 27, 2014NOC-AE-1 300306710 CFR 50.54(f)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAttention: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001

South Texas ProjectUnit 2

Docket Nos. STN 50-499Supplement to STPNOC Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Summary Report

Walkdown of Items Classified as Inaccessible

References:1. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, "Request for Information

Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) RegardingRecommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review ofInsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," March 12, 2012(ML1 2056A046)

2. Letter from D.W. Rencurrel, STPNOC, to NRC Document Control Desk,"Final Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"November 27, 2012 (ML13003A275)

3. Letter from D.W. Rencurrel, STPNOC, to NRC Document Control Desk,"Revision to Commitment for Final Response to NRC Request for InformationPursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects ofRecommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights fromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," June 19, 2013 (ML13191A910)

The purpose of this letter is to supplement the seismic walkdown report for STP Unit 2 toinclude the walkdown results for these inaccessible items. On March 12, 2012, the NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 requesting information pursuant to Title 10of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f). Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 contains specificrequested actions, requested information, and required responses associated withRecommendation 2.3, Seismic. South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC)submitted the final seismic walkdown response including a list of areas that were unable to beinspected due to inaccessibility and a schedule for when the seismic walkdown would becompleted (Reference 3).

STI: 33801032

NOC-AE-1 3003067Page 2 of 3

The commitment due date provided in Reference 3 for reporting the seismic walkdown resultsfor the inaccessible items was based on the Unit 2 refueling outage that was originallyscheduled for completion in May 2013. Emergent station issues caused the Unit 2 refuelingoutage to be rescheduled and the commitment to provide walkdown results was changedaccordingly from July 2013 to February 2014 in Reference 4.

The results of the inaccessible walkdown features are provided in the enclosure. Per therequirements of 10 CFR 2.390, the enclosed information is no longer considered proprietary.

There are no commitments in this letter.

If there are any questions regarding this letter, please contact Wendy Brost at (361) 972-8516or me at (361) 972-7566.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on a •7, zMic)

G.T. PowellSite Vice President

web

Enclosure: Supplement to Seismic Walkdown Summary Report for STPEGS Unit 2

NOC-AE-13003067Page 3 of 3

cc:(paper copy) (electronic copy)

Regional Administrator, Region IVU. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission1600 East Lamar BoulevardArlington, TX 76011-4511

Balwant K. SingalSenior Project ManagerU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionOne White Flint North (MS 8 B1)11555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852

NRC Resident InspectorU. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionP. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MN116Wadsworth, TX 77483

Jim CollinsCity of AustinElectric Utility Department721 Barton Springs RoadAustin, TX 78704

Eric LeedsDirector, Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionOne White Flint North (MS 13 H16M)11555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852

A. H. Gutterman, EsquireMorgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

Balwant K. SingalU. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

John RaganChris O'HaraJim von SuskilNRG South Texas LP

Kevin PolioRichard PefiaL.D. BlaylockCity Public Service

Peter NemethCrain Caton & James, P.C.

C. MeleCity of Austin

Richard A. RatliffRobert FreeTexas Department of State Health Services

EnclosureNOC-AE-13003067

Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3: Seismic

Supplement to Seismic Walkdown Summary Report For

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Unit 2

STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC)

Revision 1

EnclosureNOC-AE- 13003067

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Executive Summary

On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued requests forinformation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) related to the Near Term Task Force (NTTF)recommendations. Enclosure 3 of the NRCs 50.54(f) letter requested utilities to provide informationrelated to NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, as amended by the SRMs associated with SECY-1 1-0124 and SECY-1 1-0137 (Reference 1). The nuclear power industry and the NRC cooperativelydeveloped guidelines and procedures to perform the seismic walkdowns. The resulting EPRI ReportNo. 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Termn Task ForceRecommendation 2.3: Seismic (EPRI 1025286) provides guidance and procedures for performing theseismic walkdowns (Reference 2).

South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) incorporated the guidance in EPRI1025286 during development of the site-specific procedure that governs identifying the scope of theseismic walkdowns, performing the seismic walkdowns, and developing the summary report. The initialseismic walkdowns were conducted at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) UnitsI and Unit 2 in September and October 2012, in part during a Unit 1 outage. The results of these initialseismic walkdowns were documented the Final STPNOC Seismic Walkdown Summary Report(Reference 5), hereafter referred to as Revision 0.

Since Unit 2 was not in an outage during the initial walkdowns, some items included in the Unit 2Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) were inaccessible at that time. The initial STP Unit 2Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (Reference 5) committed to completing the walkdowns of theseinaccessible items during the next Unit 2 refueling outage.

This revision of the Unit 2 report, hereafter referred to as Revision 1, provides the results of the finalUnit 2 seismic walkdowns and area walk-by which were performed during the November 2013 Unit 2refueling outage (2RE16). The walkdowns and walk-by were performed by two experienced, qualifiedseismic walkdown engineers, who also participated in the original walkdowns. With the submittal ofthis information, all of the information required by the 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Letter(Reference 1) regarding seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys for STP Units I and 2 is complete.

The format and content of Revision I is based on the NEI agreement with the NRC that licensees onlyneed to submit the body of their report, updated to include the results of the final walkdowns, and onlythose attachments or appendices which provide new or revised walkdown results. The attachments orappendices which did not change are not included in Revision 1.

This summary report contains the following:

* Section 1.0 of this report summarizes the seismic licensing basis for STPEGS Unit 2, includingdefinition the seismicity of the site, the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), and the applicable codesand standards used in the design of Seismic Category I structures, systems, and components (SSCs).

* Section 2.0 of this report describes the qualifications of the personnel involved in developing thescope of the walkdowns, performing the walkdowns, performing peer reviews, and providinglicensing basis evaluations.

• Section 3.0 of the report describes the process by which the scope of the walkdowns was identified.


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" Sections 4.0 and 5.0 summarize the results of the scoping process, the results of the seismicwalkdowns and walk-bys, and the results of any licensing basis evaluations that were performed.Potentially adverse conditions identified during the seismic walkdowns were entered in theCorrective Action Program (CAP) for resolution and are listed in Table 4-1 of the report.

* Section 6.0 is a summary of seismic vulnerabilities identified during the Individual PlantExamination for External Events (IPEEE) program, as well as, a description of the actions taken toeliminate or reduce these seismic vulnerabilities.

* Section 7.0 provides a description of the results of peer reviews performed for scoping, walkdownpackages, and the summary report.

" Section 8.0 provides a list of documents referenced in this revision of the seismic report, includingthe original report (Revision 0).

As previously stated, the appendices include specific personnel qualifications; the intermediateequipment lists used for developing and the resulting seismic walkdown equipment list (SWEL); andcopies of the completed walkdown and walk-by checklists. The appendices have not been provided inRevision 1 unless they are new or have been changed to provide new or revised information.

In summary, the walkdowns and walk-bys identified some minor seismic and housekeeping items,documented in Appendices C and D, which were entered into the site CAP for resolution, asdocumented in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. However, the walkdowns and walk-bys indicate that, generally, thecondition and configuration of equipment were such that it was determined to be capable of performingits intended safety function.


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Table of ContentsSECTION PAGE

Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................................... iii1.0 Seism ic Licensing Basis Summary ................................................................................................ 1-1

1.1 Seismic Licensing Basis ............................................................................................................. 1-11.2 Codes and Standards Used to Design Seism ic Category I SSCs ............................................... 1-4

2.0 Personnel Qualifications Summ ary ................................................................................................ 2-12.1 Equipment Selection .................................................................................................................. 2-12.2 Seismic W alkdowns ................................................................................................................... 2-12.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations ...................................................................................................... 2-12.4 IPEEE Review ........................................................................................................................... 2-12.5 Peer Review ............................................................................................................................... 2-1

3.0 SSC Selection ................................................................................................................................. 3-13.1 M ethodology .............................................................................................................................. 3-13 .2 R e su lts ........................................................................................................................................ 3 -23.3 Inaccessible Items ...................................................................................................................... 3-9

4.0 Seism ic W alkdowns and Area W alk-Bys ...................................................................................... 4-15.0 Licensing Basis Evaluation ............................................................................................................ 5-1

5.1 Summary of Evaluations ........................................................................................................ 5-15.2 Plant M odifications .................................................................................................................... 5-1

6.0 IPEEE Vulnerabilities .................................................................................................................... 6-17.0 Peer Team Review Summary ................................................................................................... 7-18.0 References ...................................................................................................................................... 8-1

Appendix A Personnel Qualifications (Not included in Revision 1)Appendix B Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWEL) and Area Walk-By Lists

Table B-i: Unit 2 Base List 1 (Not included in Revision 1)Table B-2: Unit 2 SWEL 1 (Not included in Revision 1)Table B-3: Unit 2 Base List 2 (Not included in Revision 1)Table B-4: Unit 2 SWEL 2 (Not included in Revision 1)Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Revised version included in Revision 1)Table B-6: Unit 2 Area Walk-By List (Revised version included in Revision 1)

Appendix C Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Only new Checklists included in Revision 1)Appendix D Area Walk-by Checklists (Only new Checklists included in Revision 1)


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Introduction

Following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11,2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)established the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction. The NTTF wastasked with conducting a review of NRC regulations and processes, and determining if the NRC shouldmake additional improvements.

A set of recommendations made by the task force was included in a report provided to the Commission.Although the NRC concluded that continued plant operation did not pose an imminent risk to publichealth and safety, the Commission directed the NRC staff (in the Staff Requirements Memorandum(SRM) to SECY-1 1-0093) to determine those recommendations that should be implemented withoutunnecessary delay. In SECY- 11-0124, the NRC staff identified the NTTF recommendations thatshould be implemented without delay, including the development of information requests to be madeunder 10 CFR 50.54(f).

The NRC issued the requests for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) on March 12, 2012 related tothe following NTTF recommendations (Reference 1):

* Recommendation 2.1: Seismic* Recommendation 2.1: Flooding" Recommendation 2.3: Seismic* Recommendation 2.3: Flooding" Recommendation 9.3: Emergency Preparedness

Enclosure 3 of the NRC's 50.54(f) letter addressed providing information related to NTTFRecommendation 2.3: Seismic, as amended by the SRMs associated with SECY-11-0124 andSECY- 11-0 137. Enclosure 3 requested that licensees:

1. Develop a methodology and acceptance criteria for seismic walkdowns to be endorsed by the NRCstaff,

2. Perform seismic walkdowns using the NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology,3. Identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through a corrective

action program, and4. Verify the adequacy of licensee monitoring and maintenance procedures.

The nuclear power industry and the NRC agreed to cooperate in the development of guidelines andprocedures to perform the seismic walkdowns. The resulting EPRI Report No. 1025286, SeismicWalkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3:Seismic (EPRI 1025286) (Reference 2) provides guidance and procedures for performing the seismicwalkdowns. The guidance addresses selection of personnel, selection of a sample of structures, systems,and components (SSCs) that represent a diversity of component types and ensures inclusion ofcomponents from critical systems and functions as described in the NRCs 50.54(f) letter, conduct of thewalkdowns, evaluations against the plant seismic licensing basis, and reporting requirements. EPRI1025286 also includes checklists to be used by the seismic walkdown engineers for seismic evaluations.

The guidance contained in EPRI 1025286 was developed to meet NRCs objectives, and in a letter datedMay 31, 2012 (Reference 3), the NRC confirmed that the EPRI 1025286 guidance directs licensees toperform walkdowns in a manner that will address Requested Information Items l.a through 1.g in the50.54(f) letter. The NRC staff also confirmed that Section 8, "Submittal Report," of the EPRI 1025286


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guidance outlines the appropriate information to be submitted in response to Requested InformationItems 2.a through 2.f. of Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.

South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) used the EPRI 1025286 guidance indeveloping and performing the seismic walkdowns at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station(STPEGS) in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter. In addition, STPNOC followed the EPRI 1025286Section 8 guidance for the development of this report.

As explained in Section 3.3, the content of Revision I of the report is based on the agreement betweenNEI and the NRC regarding the content and format for report updates, which is to only update the bodyof the report to provide final walkdown information and only submit those attachments and appendiceswhich contain updated information for items inaccessible during the initial walkdowns.


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1.0 Seismic Licensing Basis Summary

1.1 Seismic Licensing Basis

Texas consists of two major regions separated by a relatively narrow transitional zone of foothills andescarpments. The Texas Gulf Plain occupies the southeastern one-third of the state; a stable interiorregion covers the northwestern two-thirds of the state, within which are the Edwards Plateau and the HighPlains. The STPEGS site is located in the Gulf Coast portion of the Texas Gulf Plain. It is a low-lying,flat, featureless terrain composed primarily of river floodplain and littoral and deltaic sediments.Compared with that of many areas of North America, the geologic history of the Texas region has notbeen particularly complex, but the significant factors follow:

I. Numerous transgressions and regressions of seas from the Cambrian period into the Cenozoic.2. Major uplift and erosion at the end of the Precambrian, Permian, Jurassic, Early Cretaceous, Late

Cretaceous, Tertiary, and Pleistocene.3. Geosynclinal developments from Cambrian to Pennsylvanian creating the Ouachita Geosyncline, and

from Triassic to the present creating the Gulf Coast Geosyncline.4. Ouachita orogeny from mid-Pennsylvanian to the end of Permian, with major compressive forces

destroying the Ouachita Geosyncline and creating the Ouachita Tectonic Belt.5. Post-Ouachita orogeny relaxation of compressional stresses and change to tensional stresses with

development of normal faulting in a peripheral graben system.6. An arid climate and widespread salt and gypsum deposition during Jurassic time.7. Pleistocene interglacial deposition along the Gulf Coast laying down alluvial sediments in the site

vicinity.8. A post-Mesozoic environment of little or no seismic activity in the Texas Gulf Plain region.

The most important stratigraphic feature of the site region is the degree of consolidation and induration ofthe subsurface formations rather than their petrologic descriptions or formational names. The formationscan be separated into those that are hard and consolidated enough to accumulate sufficient shear strain toallow the possible occurrence of an earthquake of engineering significance, and those that are too weakand plastic to store significant strain energy. In the site region, a separation on this basis can be made nearthe top of the Mesozoic era. Most Mesozoic and older rocks are hard and consolidated and are consideredto represent the upper basement beneath the site. Clayey sediments that were deposited at the end of theMesozoic and during the Cenozoic have generally not fully consolidated and are characterized by massiveshales containing highpore fluid pressures. These relatively soft materials are primarily deltaic and littoralin origin and were deposited gradually gulfward into the Gulf Coast Geosyncline by transgressing andregressing seas and meandering surface streams.

There are three major regional tectonic provinces within a 200-mile radius of the plant site: the Foreland,a stable interior region; the Ouachita Tectonic Belt; and the Gulf Coast Geosyncline. The principalstructural elements of the region are the Ouachita Tectonic Belt and the Gulf Coast Geosyncline. TheOuachita Tectonic Belt extends generally westward from the Mississippi River in a belt or sinuous trendto the Rio Grande and then southward into Mexico. A zone of regional normal faults, known as theperipheral graben system, is located south of and subparallel to the Ouachita Tectonic Belt and isgenerally regarded as the northern margin of the Gulf Coast Geosyncline. The axis of the geosyncline,where an estimated 40,000 feet of Cenozoic sediments were deposited, is about 70 miles southeast of thepresent Gulf of Mexico shoreline. Within the sediments are numerous gravity-related salt and shalediapirs as well as gravity-included slip surfaces known as coastal growth "faults."


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Three principal classes of faults have been identified in the 200-mile radius of the plant site: the thrustfaults of the Ouachita Tectonic Belt, the nonnal faults of the peripheral graben system at the inner ornorthern and northwestern periphery of the Texas Gulf Plain, and the growth "faults" of the Texas GulfPlain. The thrust faults of the Ouachita Tectonic Belt originated in the period from mid Pennsylvanianinto Permian and accompanied the uplift and destruction of the previously developed OuachitaGeosyncline. The thrust faults are buried beneath Mesozoic sediments, except in West Texas. The normalfaults of the peripheral graben system, collectively ternmed the "older" faults of the region, are related toadjustments to conditions set up in the wake of the thrust faulting of the Ouachita orogeny. Thenontectonic growth "faults" of the Texas Gulf Plain are gravity-related features formed by slumping,creep, and consolidation of thick sections of geosynclinal sediments. They are confined entirely tosediments of Cenozoic age within the Gulf Coast Geosyncline. The closest mapped faults of theperipheral graben system are approximately 85 miles northwest of the plant site. At this point, the grabensystem is 65 miles wide. The Ouachita Tectonic Belt lies just beyond the graben system away from theplant site. The thrust faults of the Ouachita Tectonic Belt and the normal faults of the peripheral grabensystem are of tectonic origin because they involve rupture of the hard, well-consolidated pre-Cenozoicformations. On the other hand, the growth "faults" are nontectonic in origin because they are not relatedto tectonic forces originating in basement rocks and involve only the unconsolidated Cenozoic sediments.Since growth "faults" are found in the Cenozoic sediments in the vicinity of the site, their characteristicsand mode of occurrence are important to the evaluation of differential ground displacement due tosubsidence. Because of their significance to the petroleum industry, growth "faults" have been extensivelyinvestigated for many years.

The following are some of their characteristics:

* All growth "faults" in the Texas Gulf Coast are of the normal type and nontectonic. For the mostpart they are downthrown on the Gulf side.

* The growth "faults" tend to flatten at depth.* Stratigraphic units on the downthrown side are thicker than correlative units on the upthrown

side.* Separation of correlative stratigraphic units tends to increase with depth to some maximum and

then, as the slip plane flattens, to decrease with further depth." Growth "faults" tend to die out upward over relatively short distances in a given section; whereas

tectonic normal faults have greater vertical continuity. The youngest displaced sediments markthe time at which slippage along a growth "fault" ceased.

" Over long distances, horizontal traces of growth "faults" tend to be broadly arcuate and roughlyparallel to regional stratigraphic strike.

* The zones of active growth "faults" tend to conform to depocenters, where the sediments of thethickest part of a given stratigraphic unit are deposited.

There are no known tectonic faults in the site vicinity, nor were any detected by this investigation.Furthermore, the absence of historic seismicity supports the conclusion that there are no active tectonicstructures in the site area. Surface displacements have occurred in the region, but without perceptibleground-shaking or other evidence that the displacements are the result of movement along tectonic faultsor other faults capable of significant seismic activity. Differential surface displacements, such as those inthe vicinity of Houston, Texas, are apparently related to man-induced aseismic creep on preexistinggrowth "faults." Growth "faults" are found to exist in the site vicinity, but extensive study revealed noevidence of significant seismic activity on growth "faults" at any time. This almost aseismic character isin keeping with the conclusion that growth "faults" are nontectonic in that they are confined to Cenozoicformations, and Cenozoic formations are not sufficiently consolidated and indurated to enable them tostore strain energy to the point where sudden rupture can produce an energy release in the form of an


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earthquake. This negligible seismicity is also in keeping with the gravitational mechanism of growth"faults" involving gradual, almost plastic, creep-like slippage along the growth "fault" surfaces as theydevelop.

Seismic records dating back to 1699 for the region within a radius of 600 miles of the plant site wereexamined to evaluate the potential earthquake activity that might affect the site. Only 23 tectonicearthquakes have been reported within 200 miles of the plant site and none within 80 miles. The onlydocumented earthquake effects at or in the vicinity of the site were minor disturbances to bodies of watercaused by low-amplitude low-frequency surface waves generated by the Alaska earthquake in March1964. Although the 1811 and 1812 New Madrid, Missouri earthquakes were felt in New Orleans, there isno historical documentation to indicate they were felt in the site vicinity.

Based on review of post-construction permit (post-CP) catalogues of seismic history, the maximumintensity reported within 200 miles of the site is intensity V (modified Mercalli) reached in three events:the 1887 Paige event (112 miles from the site), the 1902 Creedmore earthquake (130 miles from the site),and the 1983 Fashing event (130 miles from the site). The nearest intensity VI event is the 1932 Mexia-Wortham earthquake (201 miles from the site). The nearest intensity VII earthquake is the 1952 El Reno,Oklahoma event (467 miles from the site) and the nearest intensity VIII event is the 1931 Valentine,Texas, earthquake (500 miles from the site).

Differential ground displacement in the site vicinity due to vibratory motion is considered remote.Differential ground displacement from other than vibratory causes has been classified as due to naturalcauses or induced by man's activities. Natural causes include growth "fault" displacement, regionalsubsidence related to continued development of the Gulf Coast Geosyncline, tectonic depression

.associated with the peripheral graben system, landslides, piercement of sediments by rising salt domes,and collapse of solution cavities. The sources of potential ground displacement from man's activities aremineral and fluid extraction from or fluid injection into the subsurface geologic section.

No growth "faults" were found at the ground surface in the area of the site; geophysical investigations andanalysis of oil and gas well logs show that growth "faults" do occur at depth in the vicinity of the site. TheMiocene and younger geologic strata to a depth of at least 5,000 feet beneath the plant site are notdisplaced by growth "faulting". It is concluded that growth "faulting" does not affect plant safety ordesign.

The distance to the closest faults of the peripheral graben system (85 miles) is sufficiently great toeliminate the possibility of differential surface movement at the site due to displacement on these faults.In addition, uplift or subsidence in this system is not known to have occurred since the middle of theCenozoic era. Cavernous conditions and karst terrains are the result of differential erosion of solublerocks, usually limestone, gypsum, or salt. None of these rocks is present in the upper 16,000 feet ofsediments in the site area; therefore, no differential surface displacement related to such rock types canoccur at the site.

The SSE producing the maximum vibratory ground acceleration at the site is conservatively assigned anintensity of VI modified Mercalli. This earthquake is based on two potential sources: an intensity VIImodified Mercalli earthquake at least 70 miles from the site in the Ouachita Seismotectonic Province,which is conservatively attenuated to an intensity VI modified Mercalli earthquake at the site; and anintensity VI modified Mercalli earthquake in pre-Cenozoic rocks at a depth of at least 34,000 feet belowthe site. Acceleration/intensity correlations indicate an acceleration of 0.07g for an earthquake of intensityVI modified Mercalli. However, the minimum ground acceleration in Appendix A to 1OCFR100, is 0.1Og,and accordingly is adopted for the SSE. Because only three intensity V modified Mercalli earthquakeshave been reported within 200 miles of the site in the last 100 years and no earthquakes have been


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reported within 80 miles, the maximum earthquake reasonably expected within the site vicinity, based onhistorical records and geology, is an earthquake of Intensity IV to V modified Mercalli.Acceleration/intensity correlations show the maximum acceleration of an intensity V modified Mercalliearthquake to be 0.035g which would represent a reasonable operating basis earthquake (OBE). However,to comply with Appendix A to 1OCFRI0O, a minimum acceleration of 0.05g (1/2 of the SSE) is adoptedfor OBE.

1.2 Codes and Standards Used to Design Seismic Category I SSCs

The peak accelerations associated with SSE and OBE have been established based on the seismicityevaluation described in UFSAR Section 2.5, as summarized above. As noted, the expected peakhorizontal acceleration at this site is less than 0.10g. The peak horizontal accelerations of 0.10g and0. 0 5g incorporated in the design response spectra for the SSE and OBE, respectively, comply withAppendix A, "Reactor Site Criteria," to 1OCFR100. The ground acceleration as represented by thespectral acceleration at 33 Hz is 0.1g for both the horizontal and the vertical directions. At 50 Hz thevertical spectral acceleration is reduced to two-thirds of the horizontal acceleration.

Horizontal design response spectra for 1-percent, 2-percent, 4-percent, 7-percent, and 10-percentspectral damping values are presented on UFSAR Figures 3.7-1 and 3.7-2 for the SSE and OBE,respectively. Vertical design response spectra for the SSE and OBE for the same damping values arepresented on UFSAR Figures 3.7-3 and 3.7-4. The design response spectra are developed in accordancewith Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.60, Revision 1. The percentages of critical damping values applicablefor structural components and systems of Category I structures are those listed in RG 1.61, October1973, and included in UFSAR Table 3.7-1.

As discussed in UFSAR Section 3.2,. safety-related SSCs are designed to withstand the effects of anSSE (described above) and remain functional if they are necessary to assure:

* The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary* The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition" The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in

potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 1OCFRI00

Plant structures, systems, and components, including their foundations and supports, which aredesigned to remain functional in the event of an SSE, are designated as seismic Category I and areindicated in UFSAR Table 3.2.A-1. These classifications meet the requirements of RG 1.29.

SCCs, including their foundations and supports, that are designed to remain functional in the event ofan SSE are designated as seismic Category I. Information regarding the loading conditions for theseseismic Category I SSCs and the methods used for their seismic qualification are provided in variousUFSAR sections as follows:

* Mechanical-UFSAR Sections 3.7 and 3.9* Electrical-UFSAR Section 3.10* Structures-UFSAR Sections 3.7 and 3.8* Instrumentation and Controls-UJFSAR Section 3.10


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The seismic qualification and documentation procedures used for safety-related equipment and theirsupports meet the intent of Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 344-1975and RG 1.100. The project compliance to RG 1.48 is noted in UFSAR Section 3.12 and UFSAR Table3.9-2.5. Seismic qualification of equipment by analysis and!or tests demonstrates that the equipment isable to withstand seismic loads as a result of the SSE preceded by five OBEs without loss of function inthe operating mode.

Codes and standards for Seismic Category I balance of plant SSCs are provided in UFSAR Table3.2.A-1. Codes and standards for the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) are provided in UFSARTable 3.2.B-1.


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2.0 Personnel Qualifications Summary

A summary of the requirements, as outlined in EPRI 1025286 (Reference 2), for different seismicactivities is provided as follows. Appendix A provides the qualifications of the personnel involved inperforming the seismic walkdown activities at STP.

2.1 Equipment SelectionPersonnel responsible for equipment selection should have knowledge of plant operations, plantdocumentation, and associated SSCs. They should have the capability to select a broad distribution ofSSCs for the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). The Equipment Selection Personnel shouldalso have knowledge of the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program.

Equipment Selection Personnel: Steve Sieben (STPNOC), Sanjay Dankar (Bechtel), ElenaPapadopoulos (Bechtel), Rattan Tawney (Bechtel) and Surinder (S.P.) Singla (Bechtel).

2.2 Seismic Walkdowns

The seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs) should have a degree in mechanical or civil/structuralengineering, or equivalent; and experience in seismic engineering as it applies to nuclear power plants.In addition, the SWEs must successfully complete one of the following two training courses: NTTF 2.3Seismic Walkdown Training Course or SQUG Walkdown Training Course.SWEs: Javier Burgoa (Bechtel), Ken Clough (Bechtel), David Dujka (STPNOC), Xuan Hoang

(Bechtel), Tammy Jacobs (STPNOC), Ali Nikaeen (Bechtel), Surinder (S.P.) Singla (Bechtel).

2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations

All potentially adverse seismic conditions were documented and evaluated using the Corrective ActionProgram (CAP).

2.4 IPEEE Review

Reviewers should have adequate engineering experience to review and understand the results of theIPEEE program. Because of the limited scope of the IPEEE, due to the low seismic hazard at STPEGS,no specific IPEEE reviews were performed.

2.5 Peer ReviewThe peer review team should consist of a minimum of two individuals, one of whom has seismicengineering experienceas it applies to nuclear power plants.

Peer Reviewers: Leo Nadeau (Bechtel) and Roger Smith (Bechtel).


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3.0 SSC Selection

This section describes the process used to select the SSCs that were included in the SWEL anddocuments the resulting SWEL and Area Walk-by lists for STPEGS, in response to NRC's 10 CFR50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012 (Reference 1).

3.1 Methodology

The SWEL was developed using the guidance provided in EPRI Technical Report 1025286 (Reference2). This guidance describes the process to be used to identify items to be included on a SWEL. Ingeneral, the SWEL is comprised of two groups of items. The first is a sample of components used tosafely shut down the reactor and to maintain containment integrity. The second is a sample of spent fuelpool (SFP) related items. These lists are designated as SWEL 1 and SWEL 2, respectively. SWEL 1and SWEL 2 are combined to form the SWEL for use in conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and AreaWalk-Bys.

The following steps, consistent with the guidance in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, were taken indeveloping SWEL 1, SWEL 2, and the SWEL. A more detailed discussion of these steps, theirimplementation, and the results are provided in Section 3.2.

Development of SWEL 1 (SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and to maintain containmentinteerity):

For development of SWEL 1, the following screens were applied to the Master Equipment Database(MED):

Screen #1: Identify seismic Category 1 equipment list

Screen #2: Screen out structures, piping, and penetrations

Screen #3: Screen out SSCs that do not support the five safety functions described in Section3.2, Screen #3 or are major pieces of the NSSS, located inside containment.

Screen #4: Select a representative sample of SSCs based upon including:

* A variety of types of systems" Major new and replacement equipment / recently modified/upgraded* A variety of types of equipment* A variety of environments* Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program

* Equipment access considerations* Repeat maintenance considerations

Development of SWEL 2 (Spent Fuel Pool Related Items):

Similarly for development of SWEL 2, the following screens were applied to the MED:

Screen #1: Identify seismic Category 1 equipment list

Enclosure

NOC-AE- 13003067Page 3-2

Screen #2: Screen out all SSCs not appropriate for the walkdown process

Screen #3: Select SWEL 2 items considering the following:

* A variety of types of systems* Major new and replacement equipment / Recently modified/upgraded* A variety of types of equipment* A variety of environments• Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program* Potentially risk-significant SSC considerations

Screen #4: Perform rapid drain-down assessment. For STPEGS there are no components orpenetrations that could drain the SFP down to below 10 feet above the fuel.

Development of SWEL

The SWEL was developed by combining SWEL 1 and SWEL 2.

3.2 Results

The methodology outlined above was implemented. A detailed description of that implementationalong with the results is provided in the following subsections.

3.2.1 Results of Screening Process for the Development of SWEL 1

The following section describes how the screening processes were applied to meet the objectives ofSection 3 of the EPRI guidance, particularly as it relates to incorporating the appropriate variety ofclasses of equipment, environments, systems, new and replacement equipment, and other elements. Perthe guidance, the four screening processes were accomplished as follows:

Screen #1 -Seismic Category I:

The purpose of Screen #1 is to restrict the scope of SSCs in the SWEL to those that are classified asSeismic Category I and thus have a defined seismic licensing basis, against which to evaluate the as-installed configuration.

The MED was screened to obtain a list of all seismic Category I SSCs. This resulted in theidentification of 9967 seismic Category I SSCs.

Screen #2 -Equipment or Systems:

The purpose of Screen #2 is to narrow the scope of SSCs by selecting only those which do not regularlyundergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the establishedplant licensing basis. The types of SSCs that were screened out include seismic Category I structures,containment penetrations, and safety-related piping systems. In addition, manual valves, check valves,flow orifices, flow elements, fire dampers, relief valves, snubbers, spent fuel racks/cells, andthermowells were excluded in keeping with the intent of the guidance.

Out of 9967 items resulting from Screen #1, 5559 items were retained by Screen #2 and subsequentlypassed on to Screen #3.


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Screen #3 -Support for the 5 Safety Functions:

The purpose of Screen #3 is to narrow the scope of items to be included in SWEL 1 to focus on thoseSSCs associated with providing or maintaining the following five safety functions:

1. Reactor reactivity control2. Reactor coolant pressure control3. Reactor coolant inventory control4. Decay heat removal5. Containment Function

A list of STPEGS systems was reviewed by a previously-licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) atSTPEGS to determine which systems support the five safety functions described above (Table 3-1 liststhe systems supporting the five safety functions). The systems identified were consistent with thoseprovided in Tables B-1 and B-3 of the EPRI guidance. Components of systems not included in this listwere then screened out. Note that the specific safety functions supported by each component weredetermined with assistance from a previously-licensed SRO at STPEGS, during completion of the finalsampling of components for the SWEL 1 list.

Of the 5559 items from Screen #2, 4799 items were retained by Screen #3. These 4799 items areidentified as Base List 1 in Appendix B, Table B-1.

Screen #4 -Sample Considerations:

Screen #4 represents a process intended to reduce Base List 1 to a list (SWEL 1) that sufficientlyrepresents a broad population of Seismic Category 1 SSCs considering the following:

1. A variety of types of systems2. Major new and replacement equipment / Recently modified/upgraded3. A variety of types of equipment4. A variety of environments5. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program6. Repeat maintenance considerations

SWEL 1, containing 105 representative items, was generated using the required sampling selectionattributes, as further described below. The SWEL 1 list is provided as Table B-2, in Appendix B.

1. A variety of types of systems:

SWEL I items were selected from the Base List 1 after sorting it by the system typesdetermined to support the 5 safety functions as shown in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1: Unit 2 Base List 1 and Selected SWEL 1 Items Based on "System Type"


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System Type Definition # of Items in # of Items in

Base List 1 SWEL 1BS 7300 Process System 7 0

DO Standby DG Fuel Oil 141 1

HG Standby DG HVAC 54 0

JW Standby DG Jacket Water 54 0

LU Standby DG lube oil 63 1SD Standby DG starting air 42 1

AF Auxiliary Feedwater 111 7

AM Qualified Display Processing System 26 3

CC Component Cooling Water 393 12CH Essential Chilled Water 247 4

CS Containment Spray 12 2

CV Chemical Volume Control 246 4

DG ESF Diesel Generator 205 11DJ Class 125 VDC 75 5

EH Electro-Hydraulic Control 7 1EW Essential Cooling Water 117 5

FW Feedwater System 196 0

HC Containment HVAC 137 1

HE Control Room & Electrical Aux. 484 4

HM Mechanical Auxiliary Building HVAC 122 1II Reactor Vessel Water Level 65 1

MS Main Steam 243 2

PM Class IE 480 Motor Control Centers 496 8

PK Class IE 4160 Power 65 1PL Class 1E 480 Load Centers 83 3

RC Reactor Coolant 235 3

RH Residual Heat Removal 76 2

RS Rod Control 6 2

IA Instrument Air 7 1

SF Engineered Safety Features Actuation 3 2

SI Safety Injection 263 7

SP Solid State Protection 296 3


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Table 3-1: Unit 2 Base List 1 and Selected SWEL 1 Items Based on "System Type" Cont.

System Type Definition # of Items in # of Items inBase List 1 SWEL 1

VA Class IE 120 VAC 18 4

RA Radiation Monitoring 117 2

XC Contaimnent 87 1Total 4799 105

2. Major New and Replacement Equipment

A list of all major modifications listed in STPEGS database as complete/implemented/workingstatus within the last 15 years was reviewed by a previously licensed SRO at STPEGS toidentify major new or replacement equipment appropriate for inclusion in the SWEL. Thisreview resulted in the following items being included in SWEL 1.

Table 3-2 Equipment Selected for SWEL I Based on the "Major New or ReplacementEquipment"

New/Replacement orItem Equipment ID Description Equipment Modification

7 3EI72EMCEICI MCC E2CI Equipment Modification19 A2MSFSV7444 Steam Generator 2D Main Steam ORC Isolation Valve Equipment Modification

67 3E242EIV002 25 KVA Single Phase Class IE Inverter/Rectifier Channel Equipment ModificationIV (Train C)

78 C2CCMOV0197 RCFC Train C CCW Supply ORC Isolation MOV Equipment ModificationOperator

83 3E242EIV 1204 10 KVA Single Phase Class IE Inverter/Rectifier Channel Equipment ModificationIV (Train C)

86 D2MSPV7441 S/G 2D Main Steam Outlet Power Operated Relief Valve Equipment ModificationORC

91 2C262XXC0 19 Personnel Airlock Outer Door Open/Close Equalizing Equipment Modification91___ 222X01 Valve113 3QI52MDG0500 Diesel Generator #21 Speed Governor Equipment Modification

115 C2CCMOVO2IO RCFC Train C CCW Return ORC Isolation MOV Equipment ModificationOperator

3. A variety of types of equipment:

SWEL items from Base List 1 were extracted to meet the 22 classes of equipment listed inAppendix B of the EPRI Guidance. Note that two classes, compressors and motor generators,are not represented because there is no seismic Category I equipment in those categories.


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Table 3-3: Selection of SWEL 1 Items Based on "Classes of Equipment"

# of ItemsClass Description in SWEL 1

0 Miscellaneous 81 Motor Control Centers 42 Low Voltage Switchgear 33 Medium Voltage Switchgear 24 Transfonners 75 Horizontal Pumps 106 Vertical Pumps 77 Fluid Operated Valves 48 Motor Operated Valves, Solenoid Operated Valves 139 Fans 210 Air Handlers 4tI Chillers 112 Air Compressors 013 Motor Generators 014 Distribution Panels 215 Batteries on Racks 216 Battery Chargers and Inverters 417 Engine Generators 118 Instruments on Racks 419 Temperature Sensors 120 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 1321 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 13

Total 105

4. A variety of environments:

Items located in the following buildings were included on the SWEL I list: Diesel GeneratorBuilding, Electrical Auxiliary Building, Mechanical Auxiliary Building, Isolation ValveCubicle, Fuel Handling Building, Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure, ReactorContainment Building, and the Turbine Generator Building. The installed location of the SWEL1 items, which provides an indication of the operating environment for the item, is indicated bythe associated walk-by area number included in Appendix B, Table B-2. The Base list did notinclude any items located outside, and therefore, no outside components were included on theSWEL 1 list.

5. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program

In the STPEGS IPEEE, a limited scope, conservative and bounding analysis was performed.This was included as a seismic PRA. The basis for the limited scope was that the fact that theseismic hazard at STP is extremely low. No seismic vulnerabilities were identified.


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6. Repeat Maintenance Considerations

No components were selected for inclusion into the SWEL in this category.

3.2.2 Results of Screening Process for the Development of SWEL 2

SWEL 2 was developed based on a review of systems associated with the SFP that are seismicCategory I or SSCs whose failure could result in a rapid drain-down of the SFP water level to less thanten feet above the fuel. The review was supported by a previously licensed senior reactor operator atSTPEGS.

The following demonstrates how the screening processes used meet the objectives of Section 3 of theEPRI guidance. Per the guidance, the four screening processes for SWEL 2 were accomplished asfollows:

Screen #1 -Seismic Category I:

Similar to Screen #1 for SWEL 1, the list of Seismic Category 1 SSCs were considered for SWEL 2.

Screen #2 -Equipment or Systems:

Screen #2 considers only those SSCs associated with the SFP that are appropriate for an equipmentwalkdown process. Similar to Screen #2 for SWEL 1, SSCs that regularly undergo inspections toconfirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the established plant licensing basiswere removed. The same types of SSCs that were screened out during Screen #2 of SWEL 1 were alsoscreened out here.

Also, the following seismic Category 1 systems associated with the SFP screened:

* Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System* Component Cooling Water System

Eight items were retained by Screen #2 and constitute Base List 2 (Appendix B, Table B-3). All ofthese items are in included in system type FC (Spent Fuel Pool Cooling).

Screen #3 -Sample Considerations:

Screen #3 included the following five sample selection attributes to be represented in SWEL 2:

1. A variety of types of systems2. Major new and replacement equipment / Recently modified/upgraded3. A variety of types of equipment4. A variety of environments5. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program

From the eight items from Screen #3, two items were selected for SWEL 2. These two items constitutethe final select for SWEL 2, because no rapid drain down items are present, see Screen #4 below. SeeAppendix B, Table B-4 for SWEL 2 items.


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Screen #4 -Rapid Drain-Down:

Screen #4 identifies items that could allow the SFP to drain rapidly. The SSCs considered are not limitto seismic Category I items but are any that could allow rapid drain-down of the SFP. Rapid drain-downis defined as lowering the water level to the top of the fuel assemblies within 72 hours after anearthquake.

Systems interfacing with the SFP were reviewed to identify any components that could, upon failure,result in rapid drain-down of the SFP water level to below ten feet above the fuel. As stated in UFSARSection 9.1.3.1.2 (Reference 4), system piping and the pool itself are arranged so that failure cannotdrain the spent fuel pool or the in-Containment temporary storage area below a depth of approximately23 feet of water over the top of the stored spent fuel assemblies. Therefore, no rapid drain-down itemswere added to the SWEL 2 list (Appendix B, Table B-4).

Table 3-4: Selection of SWEL 2 Items Based on "Classes of Equipment"

Equipment Description # of ItemsClass Number inSWEL25 Horizontal Pumps 1

21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 1Total 2

3.2.3 SWEL

The SWEL was developed by combining the items on SWEL 1 and SWEL 2. The SWEL is providedin Appendix B, Table B-5. Items on the list are indicated as being included as a part of SWEL 1 orSWEL 2.

The items on the SWEL were reviewed to identify those that included anchorage (i.e., items that werenot line-mounted equipment such as valves). Eighty-six (86) items were identified with anchorage andapproximately 56 percent (48 items) were selected for confirmation that the as-installed equipmentanchorage is consistent with plant documentation of the anchorage design. The items selected foranchorage verification are indicated on the SWEL.

The SWEL is what was used for the seismic walkdowns in accordance with a site-specific procedure.Walk-by areas were identified to include all of the items on the SWEL and are listed in Appendix B,Table B-6.


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3.3 Inaccessible Items

In the process of selecting SSCs to be included on the SWEL, items that are accessible and have visibleanchorage were selected wherever possible. However, because Unit 2 was in operation during the timeof the initial walkdowns. there were 15 walkdown items included in the SWEL and one area walk-by,which were not sufficiently accessible to complete the walkdown and walk-by during normal plantoperations. Revision 0 of this report committed to completing the remaining walkdowns during thenext Unit 2 outage when these items would be accessible. These items are listed in Table 3-5 and areidentified by a footnote on the SWEL (Appendix B, Table B-5).

The walkdowns and walk-bys were completed during the recent Unit 2 (2RE16) refueling outage andthe results are documented in this revision of the report.

Revision 1 of the report is based on the following agreements between NEI and the NRC regarding thecontent and format for report updates submitted to provide information for items which wereunavailable during the initial walkdowns:

* The complete body of the initial report (Reference 5) is to be resubmitted, but it only needs to berevised to the extent necessary to provide the results of the final walkdowns and walk-bys.

" Only those attachments or appendices which require revision to provide the results of the finalwalkdowns of inaccessible items need to be included in the updated report. Thus, resubmittal of theattachments or appendices which have not changed is not required by the NRC.

* General updates to the remainder of the report are not required.

The contents of Appendix A and some contents of Appendix B (Tables B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4), whichhave not been revised, are not included in Revision 1. However, title pages for each of theseappendices are included and are annotated to indicate the content has not been provided but is availablein Revision 0 of the report (Reference 5).


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Table 3-5Unit 2 Walkdown Items and Area Walk-Bys completed during November 2013

Seismic Walkdown Items Completed During November 2013

Item # Equipment ID Equipment Description Completion Date

5 3EI52ESGOE1C 4160 VAC SWGR E2C 11/25/13

6 3E162ESGOEIC 480V CLASS IE Load Center E2C 11/25/13

7 3EI72EMCE1CI MCC E2C1 11/25/13

35 3E172EMCE1C2 MCC E2C2 11/25/13

37 4Z552ZLP661A Isolation Relay Cabinet Train C ZLP661A 11/23/13

38 3E232EBC047G Battery Charger E2CI 1-1 11/25/13

42 4Z172ESGOO1B Reactor Trip Switchgear Train B 11/24/13

64 3EI72EMCE1C4 MCC E2C4 11/25/13

65 3E132ESGOE1C2 Load Center Transformer E2C2 11/25/13

66 3E232EBC047H E2C 11-2 Battery Charger 11/23/13

67 3E242EIV002 25KVA Inverter EIV 002 (Channel 4, TRAIN C) 11/24/13

69 3EI32ESGOE1C1 Load Center Transformer E2C 1 11/25/13

83 3E242EIV1204 10 KVA Inverter EIV 1204 (C Train, Channel IV) 11/25/13

87 3E152ESGOOIA RCP 2A 15KV Class 1E Cubicle 2A 11/23/13

116 3Q352EDG0334 & Diesel Generator #23, Generator & Motor 11/24/133Q 152MDG0334

Area Walk-By Completed During November 2013

Area Walk-By STP2-WB-002E 11/25/13


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4.0 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys

The seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were performed consistent with the guidance provided inEPRI 1025286 (Reference 2).

A site-specific procedure was developed to implement the EPRI 1025286 seismic walkdown guidancefor conducting and documenting the seismic walkdowns. A walkdown package was prepared for eachcomponent listed on the SWEL and for each area walk-by to be performed. Each package included aseismic walkdown checklist (SWC) or an area walk-by checklist (AWC), and the drawing(s) showingequipment location, plant documentation showing the anchorage details for each SWEL item requiringanchorage configuration verification, and documents from prior seismic walkdowns, as applicable. Ahardcopy of the package was available for the SWEs during performance of the equipment walkdownor area walk-by.

The seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were performed by walkdown teams, which consisted of atleast two (2) qualified SWEs.

For the seismic walkdowns, the SWEs focused on the following adverse seismic conditions associatedwith each item of equipment as described in the EPRI 1025286 guidance:

* adverse anchorage conditions,* adverse seismic spatial interactions, and* other adverse seismic conditions.

The purpose of the area walk-bys was to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions associated withother SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL items. For the area walk-bys, SWEs focused on thefollowing potentially adverse seismic conditions as described in the EPRI 1025286 guidance:

* anchorage conditions (if visible without opening equipment)," significantly degraded equipment in the area* condition of cable/conduit raceways, including condition of supports or fill conditions, and

HVAC ducting," potential adverse seismic interactions including those that could cause flooding, spray, or a fire

in the area, and" housekeeping items that could cause adverse seismic interactions.

During the walkdown or walk-by, the walkdown teams discussed conditions and/or any findings in thefield, reached agreement on the results of the walkdown, and documented results of the seismicwalkdowns and area walk-bys on the checklists. The results of the completed seismic walkdowns aredocumented on SWCs, which are included as Appendix C. The results of the completed area walk-bysare documented on AWCs, which are included as Appendix D.

For Unit 2, the SWEL includes 107 items to be walked down and 58 area walk-bys to be completed. Ofthese, 92 walkdowns and 57 area walk-bys were completed during the initial walkdowns, and theresults documented in Revision 0 of this report. The remaining 15 walkdowns and I area walk-by


Page 4-2

were completed during the outage in November 2013 and are documented Revision 1. Note that all ofthe electrical cabinets included on the SWEL were accessible and were opened and inspected.

A low threshold was used to identify and document potential adverse conditions observed during thewalkdowns and walk-bys. Table 4-1 lists these potential adverse conditions, which have been submittedas Condition Reports (CRs) and included in the station CAP. The items listed in Table 4-1 include non-seismic issues, such as various housekeeping and material condition items, as well as seismic issues.Table 4-1 summarizes the issue, describes how the issue has been or is being addressed and providesthe current status of the resolution.

Table 4-1 provides the status of the CRs for the initial walkdown and walk-by items as of November27, 2012, just prior to the issue date for Revision 0. Table 4-2, added in Revision 1, provides the statusof the two additional CRs (13-14021 and 13-14022), identified during the November 2013 walkdownsand walk-by. The status of these CRs is as of February 5, 2014.

In some cases, immediate operability determinations (IODs) were performed by the senior reactoroperators on shift. In all cases where an IOD was performed, the equipment was determined to beoperable and no additional evaluation was needed. Thus, no significant issues that challenged theSTPEGS seismic licensing or design basis were identified as a result of the walkdowns.


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Table 4-1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During the September and October, 2012 Walkdowns

The Potentially Adverse Conditions listed in this table are those conditions which were identified during the initial walkdownsperformed during September and October 2012. This table provides the status of these CRs as of November 27, 2012. It has not beenupdated in Revision 1.

CR# DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUSRELATED? (See Note 1)

12-27023 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE NOTED AT 24 AFW PUMPS N OPENTHAT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT BY: 1. THE OIL LINE THAT RUNS BETWEEN BEARINGSHAS A PERFORATED PLATE ATTACHED TO THE TOP OF IT THAT APPEARS TOSOMEWHAT PROTECT FROM SOMEONE STEPPING ON THE OIL LINE. HOWEVER, THEPLATE IS ONLY ATTACHED TO THE LINE & PRESSURE ON THE PLATE DIRECTLY PULLSTHE OIL LINE. THE PLATE SHOULD BE FIXED TO THE FOUNDATION & NOT THE OILLINE. OR, AT LEAST, PUT A SIGN UP THAT SAYS DON'T STEP ON THE PLATE. THISCONDITION EXISTS IN BOTH UNITS. 2. THE COUPLING COVER IS MADE OF VERYLIGHT WEIGHT SHEET METAL & MOVES CONSIDERABLY WITH PRESSURE. THEENGINEERS BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISER TO BE MADE OF A STRONGER MATERIAL. 3.THERE IS MINOR CORROSION IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS ALL OVER THE TURBINE, PUMP& AUXILIARIES THAT SHOULD BE CLEANED UP & REPAINTED THE NEXT TIME THEPUMP IS DOWN FOR ENOUGH TIME. EVALUATE AFW PUMP 24 COUPLING GUARD ASWELL

NONE OF THESE ISSUES AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALITIES OF THE PUMP OR TURBINE.


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CR# DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUSRELATED? (See oeI

12-27096 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS- IN ROOM 010 IN ELEVATION 10', EAB, A ROD HANGER SUPPORT Y OPENHAS BEEN OBERVED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH CONDUIT A2XEIGRS099. SEE THECOMMENTS FOR PERSPECTIVE ON NON-ADVERSE NATURE OF CONTACT.

REWORK ROD HANGER SUCH THAT A SEPARATION OF 3" 1S ACHIEVED WITH CONDUITA2XEIGRS099, PER SEISMIC SEPARATION CONTROL DRAWING UNIT I&2, 3A010S10003.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION - THE SEISMIC WALK DOWN ENGINEERSTHAT PERFORMED THE WALK DOWN NOTED THAT THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDEREDNOT ADVERSE. -DESIGN ENGINEERING HAS PROVIDED A SECOND PARTY PEER REVIEW,AND CONFIRMS WITH THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS CONCLUSION OF ACCEPTABLE (SEEFOLLOWING JUSTIFICATION): THE DIAMETER OF THE CONDUIT IS MANY TIMES LARGERTHAN THE HANGER ROD DIAMETER. THE ROD HANGER WILL READILY FLEX WITHOUTADVERSE INTERACTION TO THE CONDUIT. NOTE THAT THE ROD HANGERS EXHIBITSUBSTANTIAL FLEXIBILITY AS THEY GO TO THE CEILING, THUS NOT ADVERSELYAFFECTING THE CONDUIT. BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE ISREASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS CONDITION IS OPERABLE BASED ON THE ABOVEINFORMATION AND EVALUATION BY ENGINEERING.

12-27097 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - TRANSFORMER EDT02J2 IN ROOM 001 OF 10 FT ELEV EAB HAS 2 Y OPENLOOSE ANCHORS (SUPPORT BOLTS) UNDER THE TRANSFORMER. THERE IS ENOUGHTHREAD ENGAGEMENT TO PREVENT A I1/I CONCERN PER THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS.REPAIR AS NECESSARY.

*IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION

AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECTOPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULDREMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THE ANCHORS SHOULD BESCHEDULED TO BE REPLACED OR TIGHTENED AS THE NEXT AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY.

12-27099 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THE BASE ANCHORS HAVE MINOR CORROSION FROM N OPENCONDENSATION & THE INLET & OUTLET CHILLED WATER FLANGES HAVE CORROSIONON THE BOLTS.

REPAIR AS NECESSARY.


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CR# DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUSRELATED? (See Note I)

12-27102 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - A SMALL LIGHTWEIGHT CART WAS FOUND IN THE RELAY Y CLOSEDROOM THAT WAS NOT SECURED PER ZA-98, ADDENDUM 7. ONLY 1.LEG OF THE CARTWAS SECURED SO THE CART WAS ABLE TO COME INTO WITH A SAFETY RELATEDCABINET. THE WHEELS OF THE CART WERE NOT PREVENTED FROM ROLLING ALSO.OPERATIONS TOOK PROMPT ACTION TO SECURE THE CART PROPERLY & REMOVE THEWHEELS. THE CART IS SO LIGHT THAT IS WOULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE SEISMICQUALIFICATIONS OF THE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IN THE ROOM PER THESEISMIC ENGINEERS.

BASED ON ENGINEERING INPUT, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS LIGHTWEIGHT CART WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THISROOM. THE CART HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THE ROOM.

12-27103 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ESSEN CHILLED WATER FLOW INDICATOR IS MISSING 2 BOLTS Y OPENAT THE BOTTOM OF THE ANCHORAGE PANEL. 4 ARE INSTALLED, 2 ARE MISSING.THERE IS ADEQUATE SECURING FOR SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS.

REPLACE MISSING BOLTS.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITIONAND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECTOPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULDREMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EQ OR SEISMICCONCERNS. THE BOLTS SHOULD BE INSTALLED DURING NEXT FEG TO SUPPORT GOODOPERATING/MAINTENANCE PRACTICE.

12-27104 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - CCP 2B LUBE OIL COOLER CCW RETURN FLOW INDICATOR IS Y OPENMISSING ONE BOLT ON TOP. THERE ARE 5 BOLTS THAT SECURE THE INDICATORADEQUATELY.

REPLACE BOLT.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITIONAND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECTOPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULDREMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EQ OR SEISMICCONCERNS. THE BOLT SHOULD BE INSTALLED DURING NEXT FEG TO SUPPORT GOODOPERATING/MAINTENANCE PRACTICE.


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CR# DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUSRELATED? (See Note I)

12-27111 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS- IN ROOM 013, ELEVATION 10', OF THE EAB IT WAS IDENTIFIED Y OPENON TRAIN 'A' CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING UNIT ONE NUT WAS FOUND LOOSE, ANDONE ANCHOR BOLT WAS SUSPECT OF NOT BEING COMPLETLY SEATED ON THEFOUNDATION. PER THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS, T

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITIONAND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECTOPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULDREMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EQ OR SEISMICCONCERNS.

12-27140 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - A HANGER ON THE FIRE PROTECTION PIPE IN ESF DG 21 BAY Y OPENALONG THE SOUTH WALL (VERTICAL) IS TWISTED. PIPE HANGER SHOULD BE ROTATED90 DEGREES & ADJUSTED TO CARRY LOAD.

PER DISCUSSION WITH ORIGINATOR, SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS DISCUSSED THISCR AND CONCLUDED THAT THE TWISTED HANGER IS STILL CARRYING SOMEVERTICAL LOAD BUT, BEING TWISTED, THIS WOULD NOT BE ITS FULL DESIGNED LOAD.THE SECOND HANGER AT THE TOP OF THE VERTICAL PIPE RISER ON THE HORIZONTALPORTION JUST A FEW INCHES FROM THE ELBOW AT THE TOP OF THE RISER, ISCARRYING THE VERTICAL LOAD SUFFICIENTLY FOR ANY SEISMIC CONCERNS. FP PIPESUPPORT IS CONSIDERED FUNCTIONAL BUT DEGRADED IN THIS CONDITION.

12-27158 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT BOLTS & WELDS IN MAB N OPENCHILLED WATER IN THE FHB HAVE ENOUGH RUST TO WARRANT CLEAN & RECOAT:1.CH04632. CH04623. CH04644. CH04655. CH04666. CH0413THESE ARE IN ROOM 002 IN FHB4' ELEV.

12-27165 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - INSULATION IS TORN/DEGRADED IN A COUPLE LOCATIONS N OPENAROUND CH-FE-9320 ON 4 FT ELEV OF FHB.

REPAIR AS NECESSARY12-27167 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ED-PI-8101 FHB CASK POOL PUMP DISCHARGE PI HAS A BORIC N OPEN

ACID LEAK JUST BELOW THE GAUGE.

I&C REPAIR NEEDED.


Page 4-7

ICR # DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUS

RELATED? (See Note 1)

12-27174 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ECW PUMP 2A HAS CORROSION AT THE BASEPLATE THAT N OPENSHOULD BE CLEANED UP & RECOATED.

12-27176 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - HCMOV0007 HAS SOME CORROSION & SLIGHT OIL LEAK THAT N OPENWARRANT REPAIR.

THIS SLIGHT AMOUNT OF CORROSION AND OIL SEEPING IS NOT AT THE QUANTITYTHAT WOULD IMPACT THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE VALVE WHICH IS TO STAYCLOSED AS IT CURRNRTLY IS. NOT AN OPERABILITY CONCERN.

12-27188 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ESSEN CHILLED WATER PUMP 21A HAS A COUPLING GUARD Y CLOSEDTHAT IS BOLTED TO THE FLOOR WITH 4 BOLTS. 3 OF THESE BOLTS HAVE A SLIGHT GAPBETWEEN THE BOLT HEAD & THE LEG OF THE GUARD. THE COVER IS STILL STURDY &DOESN'T FLEX IN ANY DIRECTION.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION: THIS SLIGHT GAPS ON THE MOUNTINGFASTENERS FOR THE COUPLING GUARD DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO THE CONTINUEDOPERABILITY OF THIS PUMP AS DESCRIBED. ENGINEERS AGREE THAT THIS IS NOT ANOPERABILITY CHALLENGE. PUMP CONTINUES TO BE OPERABLE

12-27484 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - EAB ROOM 212 HAS AN EMERGENCY LIGHT THAT IS MISSING A N CLOSEDNUT. REPAIR AS NECESSARY. THERE IS NOT A II/1 ISSUE, IT IS ADEQUATELY SECUREDFOR SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS.

12-27485 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ROOM 76 & ROOM 106 NEED RELAMPED N CLOSED

12-27492 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ONE OF THE ESSEN CHILLED WATER LINES IN ROOM 206 HAS A N OPENCLAMP NEAR THE FLOOR PENETRATION THAT IS CORRODED & WARRANTSRECOATING. THIS IS FOR C TRAIN ESSEN CHILLED WATER.

12-27499 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THERE IS LOOSE INSULATION ON 10' MAB MEZZININE LEVEL N OPENNEAR CC-137.

REPAIR AS REQUIRED12-27552 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ECW 2B HAS RUSTED BASEPLATE BOLTS ON THE WEST SIDE. N OPEN

THIS IS MORE THAN MILD CORROSION.

REPAIR/RECOAT.


Page 4-8


12-27690 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - BAT 2A & 2B BOTH ARE BOLTED TO THE FLOOR BUT THE Y OPENHOLD-DOWN NUTS DO NOT HAVE WASHERS AS DETAILED IN THE DRAWINGS. INSTALLWASHERS. SEISMIC ENGINEERS & STP ENGINEERS AGREE THESE MISSING WASHERS DONOT AFFECT THE TANK'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED ON ENGINEERING INPUT, SEISMIC RESTRAINT IS ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT THEUSE OF WASHERS AND THE TANKS CAN WITHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT GIVEN THECURRENT CONDITION OF THE BOLTS AND NUTS INSTALLED.

12-27832 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - 2 NON-CLASS ELECTRICAL JUNCTION BOXES (COVERS) ARE Y OPENMISSING ONE BOLT EACH & ONE OF THE PANELS (BFZZ00I 1) ALSO HAS 2 LOOSE BOLTS.REPLACE/REPAIR AS NECESSARY. SEE PAGE 3 FOR MED COMMENTS. THESE PANELS'TPNS NUMBERS ARE NOT IN MED. THEY ARE PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN FHB-29' ROOM4.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION N2VMBFZZ003I IS THE TPNS OF ONE OFTHE PANELS (ACT # 496963); N2VMBFZZOO IIS THE TPNS FOR THE OTHER ONE (ACT #540620) THE JUNCTION BOX HAS A LIGHT WEIGHT METAL COVER. ONE OF THE BOXES ISMISSING I BOLT WITH 2 OTHERS LOOSE. THE 15 REMAINING BOLTS ARE CAPABLE OFSUPPORTING THE LIGHT WEIGHT COVER FROM A SEISMIC Il/I CONCERN. THE OTHERBOX IS MISSING I BOLT. THE REMAINING 7 BOLTS ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THECOVER FROM A SEISMIC 1I/I CONCERN. THESE CONDITIONS WOULD NOT THREATENTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION OR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTIONS, ANDTHEREFORE NO OPERABILITY CONCERNS EXIST PER ENGINEERING.


Page 4-9


12-27896 A NUMBER 9 (#9) GAGE WIRE IS ATTACHED TO ONE OF FIFTY EIGHT ANCHOR BOLTS ON SI Y OPENACCUMULATOR 2A. PLEASE REWORK BY REMOVING THE PIECE OF WIRE. THEBACKGROUND ON THIS WIRE IS THAT IT WAS USED DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THEPERMANENT SCAFFOLDING BUILT AROUND THE SI ACCUMULATORS. REVIEW OF THECONDITION, THE SCAFFOLD, THE DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE, AND THE PROCEDURE THATINSTALLED THE SCAFFOLD CONCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 1) THE WIRE TIE WOULD NOTHAVE AFFECTED THE ANCHOR BOLT OR ACCUMULATOR FUNCTION, AND 2) THE WIRE TIE ISUNNECESSARY TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE SCAFFOLD INSTALLATION.THE REASON FOR THESE TWO CONCLUSIONS IS THAT THE SCAFFOLD ASSEMBLY ALREADYUSES EMBEDDED HILTI BOLTS AND SEISMIC BRACES TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC STABILITY.FOUND DURING SEISMIC WALKDOWNS

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION - UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION ANDDISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTEDCOMPONENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS INTENDED SAFETYFUNCTION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: A NUMBER 9 (#9) GAGE WIRE IS ATTACHED TO ONEOF FIFTY EIGHT ANCHOR BOLTS ON SI ACCUMULATOR 2A. THE BACKGROUND ON THISWIRE IS THAT IT WAS USED DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE PERMANENT SCAFFOLDINGBUILT AROUND THE SI ACCUMULATORS. REVIEW OF THE CONDITION, THE SCAFFOLD, THEDESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE, AND THE PROCEDURE THAT INSTALLED THE SCAFFOLDCONCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 1) THE WIRE TIE WOULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE ANCHORBOLT OR ACCUMULATOR FUNCTION, AND 2) THE WIRE TIE IS UNNECESSARY TO MAINTAINSEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE SCAFFOLD INSTALLATION. THE REASON FOR THESE TWOCONCLUSIONS IS THAT THE SCAFFOLD ASSEMBLY ALREADY USES EMBEDDED HILTI BOLTSAND SEISMIC BRACES TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC STABILITY. FOUND DURING SEISMICWALKDOWNS. IT WAS NOT THE INTENT OF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN TO TIE OFF THESCAFFOLD FRAME TO THE FLANGE BOLT OF THE ACCUMULATOR TANK. THE SCAFFOLDFRAME IS ADEQUATELY TIED OFF IN THE HORIZONTAL DIRECTION BY 3 BRACES FORSEISMIC LOADS. THIS INSTALLATION HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY SEISMIC ENGINEER AND ASSUCH DOCUMENTED IN THE DCP 02-86-10 SUPP. I. THEREFORE, THE WIRE TIE-OFF TO THEACCUMULATOR ANCHOR BOLT (ONE OF FIFTY-EIGHT ANCHOR BOLTS) WOULD NOT HAVEPREVENTED THE ANCHOR BOLT, OR THE ACCUMULATOR, FROM PERFORMING ITSFUNCTION DURING A DESIGN BASES EVENT. LIKEWISE, THE WIRE TIE-OFF MAY BEREMOVED FROM THE ACCUMULATOR ANCHOR BOLT, SINCE ADEQUATE SCAFFOLDSUPPORT IS PROVIDED BY THE 3 SEISMIC BRACES. BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE ISREASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE ACCUMULATOR IS OPERABLE.


Page 4-10

SEISMIC STATUSCR# DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION RELATED? (See Note 1)

12-27897 DURING THE SEISMIC COMPONENT WALKDOWN OF E2CI 1-2 BATTERY CHARGER (TPNS Y OPEN3E232EBC047H) IT WAS NOTED THAT ONE OF THE FOUR (I OF 4) FASTENERS WHICHHOLD DOWN THE INDUCTOR IS FULLY ENGAGED, BUT IS NOT WRENCH TIGHT. PLEASEREWORK THIS CONDITION BY TIGHTENING THIS FASTENER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEAPPROPORATE INSTRUCTIONS. FOUND DURING SEISMIC WALKDOWNS.

FOR THIS ONE FASTENER THAT IS NOT WRENCH TIGHT, THE LOCK WASHER IS NOTFLAT, INDICATING THAT IT COULD BE TIGHTER. ON THE REMAINING THREE BOLTS THEWASHERS, LOCK WASHERS AND NUTS APPEAR TO BE TIGHTLY CONNECTED. BECAUSETHE THREE REMAINING BOLTS ARE TIGHTLY CONNECTED, AND THERE ISSUBSTANTIAL BOLT STRENGTH MARGIN, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THATTHE INDUCTOR WILL REMAIN IN PLACE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT, AND THEPERFORMANCE AND FUNCTION OF THE INDUCTOR AND THE BATTERY CHARGERASSEMBLY WILL NOT BE IMPACTED DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS EVENT

MMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION - UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITIONAND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THEAFFECTED COMPONENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS INTENDEDSAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE

FOLLOWING: FOR THIS ONE FASTENER THAT IS NOT WRENCH TIGHT, THE LOCKWASHER IS NOT FLAT, INDICATING THAT IT COULD BE TIGHTER. ON THE REMAININGTHREE BOLTS THE WASHERS, LOCK WASHERS AND NUTS APPEAR TO BE TIGHTLYCONNECTED. BECAUSE THE THREE REMAINING BOLTS ARE TIGHTLY CONNECTED,AND THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL BOLT STRENGTH MARGIN, THERE IS REASONABLEASSURANCE THAT THE INDUCTOR WILL REMAIN IN PLACE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT,AND THE PERFORMANCE AND FUNCTION OF THE INDUCTOR AND THE BATTERYCHARGER ASSEMBLY WILL NOT BE IMPACTED DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS EVENT.BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE BATTERYCHARGER IS OPERABLE


Page 4-11


12-27969 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 2C HAS I JAM NUT OUT OF 14 THAT IS NOT TIGHT Y OPENAGAINST THE FOUNDATION HOLD DOWN NUT.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION: THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THATTHE JAM NUT ON ONE OF 14 HOLD DOWN BOLTS IS NOT AN OPERABILITY ISSUE. PERENGINEERING, THIS JAM NUT IS TO KEEP THE HOLD DOWN NUT FROM COMMINGLOOSE. THE HOLD DOWN NUT IS NOT LOOSE. THE JAM NUT SHOULD BE TIGHTENEDTHROUGH THE NORMAL CAP PROCESS.

12-28083 DURING THE SEISMIC WALKDOWNS SEVERAL INSTANCES OF EQUIPMENT IMPROPERLY N CLOSEDSTAGED / SECURED IN SEISMIC I1/I AREAS WERE NOTED. DISCUSSIONS WITH WORKERSINDICATED SOME AREAS THAT ARE NOT UNDERSTOOD WELL REGARDING THIS ISSUE.

Note 1: This table provides the status of these CRs as of November 27, 2012, which has not been updated in Revision I of this Report.


Page 4-12

Table 4-2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During the November 2013 Walkdowns

The Potentially Adverse Conditions listed in this table are those conditions which were identified during the Unit 2 walkdownsperformed during November 2013. This table provides the status of these CRs as of February 5, 2014. This table was added inRevision 1 of this Report.

SEISMIC STATUSCR# DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION RELATED? (See Note I)

13-14021 SEISMIC WALKDOWN - LOOSE BOLT ON THE BACKSIDE OF LC 2L1 TRANSFORMER ON Y CLOSEDTHE MIDDLE TOP PLATE. TAG HUNG. TIGHTEN BOLT

ACTION WAS CLOSED USING WAN 473121 TO TIGHTEN THE BOLT

13-14022 SEISMIC WALKDOWN- TWO EXIT SIGNS IN ROOM 318 NEED RELAMPED N OPEN

Note I: This table provides the status of these CRs as of February 5, 2014. This table was added in Revision 1 of this Report.


Page 5-1

5.0 Licensing Basis Evaluation

The plant CAP system was used to document the evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditionsidentified in Section 4.

5.1 Summary of Evaluations

As indicated in Section 4.0, a low threshold was used to identify and document potential adverseconditions observed during the walkdowns and walk-bys (refer to the lists provided in Table 4-1 andTable 4-2). In some cases, IODs were performed by the senior reactor operators on shift. In all caseswhere an IOD was performed, the equipment was determined to be operable and no additionalevaluation was needed. Thus, no significant issues that challenged the STPEGS seismic licensing ordesign basis were identified as a result of the walkdowns.

Evaluations of Other Potentially Adverse Conditions

No other potentially adverse conditions were noted by the SWEs; therefore there are no licensing basisevaluations.

Evaluations of Potential Flooding/Spray Hazards

No potential flooding/spray hazards were noted by the SWEs; therefore there are no licensing basisevaluations.

Evaluations of Potentially Seismically Induced Fire Interactions

No potential seismically-induced fire interactions were noted by the SWEs; therefore there are nolicensing basis evaluations.

5.2 Plant Modifications

There are no planned or newly installed changes to the plant as a result of implementation of theseismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.

As identified in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, actions planned as a result of seismic walkdown findingsinclude documentation updates, maintenance items, and engineering evaluations to document as-foundconditions.


Page 6-1

6.0 IPEEE Vulnerabilities

In the STP IPEEE, a limited scope, conservative and bounding analysis was performed. This wasincluded as a seismic probabilistic risk assessment. The basis for the limited scope was the fact that theseismic hazard at STPEGS is extremely low. No seismic vulnerabilities were identified.

I


Page 7-1

7.0 Peer Team Review Summary

The Peer Review Team finction and required activities are delineated in EPRI 1025286, Section 6,Peer Review. The Peer Review Team provided an overview of the following seismic walkdownactivities, as defined in EPRI 1025286:

1. Selection of the SSCs included on the SWEL2. Checklists prepared for the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys3. Licensing basis evaluations4. Decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions into the CAP process5. Submittal report

Peer Review activities have been performed throughout the duration of the Seismic Walkdown portionof the STP 1& 2 Fukushima Response Project. The Peer Review Team members were Leo Nadeau,Bechtel Power (Lead) and Roger Smith, Bechtel Power.

A summary of the results of the Peer Review is provided below:

1. Selection of SSCs

The Peer Review Team performed a comprehensive review of the SWEL The SWEL wascompared to the requirements of EPRI 1025286, Section 3, Selection of SSC, utilizing Appendix F,Peer Review Checklist and was found to appropriately apply the EPRI 1025286 guidance including:

* Selection of SWEL 1 SSCs* Use of sample selection attributes (e.g., types of systems and environments)* Adequate representation of the five safety functions* Consideration of risk insights* Selection of spent fuel pool related items

2. Sample of SWCs and AWCs

The Peer Review Team reviewed a sample of walkdown results and concluded that the SWC andAWCs were completed in accordance with the EPRI 1025286 guidance.

a. Packages - The Peer Review Team reviewed seismic walkdown packages for 32 Unit 2 SWCs,before walkdowns were performed. This initial sampling of the SWC reviewed thedetermination of the equipment class and that related documentation was included (e.g.,location drawings, anchorage details, etc.). The initial issue of the walkdown packages sampledwas determined to be adequate to support the seismic walkdowns and in accordance with EPRIReport 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance.

b. SWC/AWC - There are a total of 107 SWCs and 58 AWCs for Unit 2. The Peer Review Teamsampled approximately 21% (34 of 165) of the completed Unit 2 SWC and AWC whichexceeds the EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance requirement of 10-15%. ThePeer Review Team concluded that SWC and AWC were completed in accordance with theEPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance.


Page 7-2

c. SWEs - SWEs were interviewed by the Peer Review Team to verify that they understood andfollowed the guidance in EPRI 1025286, Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.Results of the interviews indicated that each team understood and followed the EPRI 1025286guidance.

3. Review of Licensing Basis Evaluations/Review of CAP Decisions

Licensing Basis Evaluations, as defined in EPRI 1025286, were accomplished in accordance withthe STP Corrective Action Program (CAP). Potentially adverse seismic conditions identified duringthe walkdowns were entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) consistent with plantprocedures. The Peer Review Team sampled thirty condition reports (CRs) submitted betweenSeptember 20 and October 1, 2012 and determined that the threshold level at which a CR wasgenerated was low enough to ensure that any licensing basis issue would have been appropriatelydocumented. CRs were written for many items other than those related to seismic issues includingminor corrosion, housekeeping, fire suppression, damaged insulation, foreign material, missinghardware on non-seismic equipment and equipment interactions. STP Station Engineeringpersonnel took direct responsibility for the resolution of potentially adverse conditions andappropriate functional organizations (e.g., Operations, Design Engineering, MaintenanceEngineering, and Station Management) were routinely consulted as required by the CAP.Supporting documentation prepared (e.g., photographs) was appropriately included on theSWC/AWC prepared and CR submitted.

4. Review of Submittal Report

A review of the submittal report was performed by members of the Peer Review Team and it wasdetermined that the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter were met.


Page 8-1

8.0 References

1. NRC Letter, Request for Infonrmation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review ofthe Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12056A046).

2. EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-TermTask Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated May 29, 2012 (ML 12164A75 1).

3. NRC letter, Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Draft Report 1025286,"Seismic Walkdown Guidance," dated May 31, 2012 (ML12145A529).

4. South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report,Revision 16.

5. Letter, D. W. Rencurrel to NRC Document Control Desk, "Final Response to NRC Request forInformation Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"dated November 27, 2012 (ML 13003A275).


Page A- I

Appendix AQualifications of Seismic Walkdown Personnel

The information in Appendix A was previously provided in Revision 0 of the

Seismic Walkdown Report and has not been revised.

The information in Appendix A is not included in Revision 1 of the Report.


Page B- 1

Appendix BSeismic Walkdown Equipment List

The information in the following Appendix B tables was previously provided in Revision 0 of the SeismicWalkdown Report and has not been revised:

Table B-i: Unit 2 Base List 1Table B-2: Unit 2 SWEL 1Table B-3: Unit 2 Base List 2Table B-4: Unit 2 SWEL 2

These tables are not included in Revision 1 of the Report.

The following Appendix B tables have been revised and are included in Revision 1 of the Report:Table B-5: Unit 2 SWELTable B-6: Unit 2 Area Walk-Bys


Page B-2

Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL

4t Z

E Equipment ID Equipment Description " -E z

-% -9

3ZI02ZRR00I SSPS LOGIC CAB R 20 SP HIGH I NA Y N Y 03A

(ZRRO01)

REACTOR CONTAINMENT

2 2V142ZHC0007 BUILDING NORMAL 10 HC MED 5 NA N N N 13APURGE SUPPLY (ORC)ISOLATION DAMPEREAB ELECTRICAL

3 3V1 12VAH004 PENETRATION SPACE 10 HE LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02AEMERGENCY AIR 5HANDLING UNIT 21A

SDISTRIBUTION PANEL 001 1,2,3,44 3E242EDP001 14 VA MED 123 NA Y N Y 02C

(CLASS I E) 5

57 3EI52ESGOEIC 4160 VAC SWGR E2C 3 PK MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02E'5

67 3EI62ESGOEIC 480V CLASS 1E LOAD PL MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02ECENTER E2C 25

77 3EI72EMCEICI MCC E2CI I PM MED 1,2,3,4 Mnt Y N Y 02E,5

8 3VI 12VAH007 CONTROL ROOM TRAIN 10 HE HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02FA AIR HANDLING UNIT ,5


Page B-3

Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

E r 1 5E g

9 3N092ZLP801 TRAIN A ESF LOAD 20 SF HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02HSEQUENCER CABINET 25

10 3Z102ZRR002 SSPS ACTUATION TRN A 20 SP HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 03ACAB ZRR02 5

11 4ZI02ZRR057 SSPS INTERPOSING ISOL 20 SP HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 03ARELAY CAB 5

12 A2SPRXTRPSG2 TRAIN R REACTOR TRIP 2 RS HIGH I NA Y N N 04CBYPASS BREAKER

13 3R282NSP201A ECW SELF CLEANING 0 EW MED 4 NA Y N Y 14A

STRAINER 2A

ECW SCREEN WASH14 A2EWFY6914 PUMP 2A FV-6914 8 EW LOW 4 NA N N N 14A

SOLENOID VALVE

LOW HEAD SAFETY15 2NI22NPA202A INJECI SUMETA 6 SI HIGH 1&3 NA Y N Y 12CINJECTION PUMP 2A

REFUELING WATERSTORAGE TANK SI

16 A2SIMOV0001A PUMPS TRAIN A SUCTION 8 SI MED 1&3 NA N N N 12CISOLATION MOVOPERATOR

17 2N 102NPA201A CONTAINMENT SPRAY 6 CS LOW 5 NA Y N Y 12CPUMP2A


Page B-4


Ea -Z'

18 3S142MPA0I AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 5 AF HIGH 2&4 NA Y N N 10B

PUMP 21

STEAM GENERATOR 2D19 A2MSFSV7444 MAIN STEAM ORC 7 MS MED 2&4 NA N N N 11A

ISOLATION VALVE

20 Not Used.

21 Not Used.

22 3E342EDTB170 DP XFMR DTB170 (FEEDS 4 PM LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 03DTHROUGH TO DPB 135) 5

CCW HEAT EXCHANGER23 A2CCFT4512 2A OUTLET FLOW 18 CC NRS 4 NA Y N N 07A

TRANSMITTERRCFC TRAIN C CHILLED

24 A2CCFY0864 WATER RETURN FV-0864 8 CC NRS 5 NA N N N 08ASOLENOID VALVECVCS CHARGING

25 A2CVFT0205 DISCHARGE HEADER 18 CV LOW 3 NA Y N N 06FFLOW TRANSMITTER

26 C2RHMOV0061B RHRPUMP2B SUCTION 8 RH HIGH 4 NA N N N 15DMOV OPERATOR

27 C2CCMOV0129 RHRcc LOW 4 NA N N N 16BRETURN HEADER IRC


Page B-5


C. <C<

ISOLATION MOVOPERATOR

RCFC TRAIN B CHILLED

28 C2CCMOV0147 WATER/CCW RETURN 8 CC LOW 4 NA N N N 16CIRC ISOLATION MOV

OPERATORMAIN TURBINE EHC NFLUID TO REACTOR TRIP

29 A2EHPSL6327 0 EH LOW 2 NA Y N 17ALOGIC INPUT LOWPRESSURE SWITCH

30 3E342EDTA370 DTA 370 TRANSFORMER 4 PM LOW 4 NA Y N 14A(FEEDS DPA 335)

FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK 1,2,3,4 N31 3Q152MTF0237 #22 21 DG MED ,5 NA Y Y 01B

32 3N092ZLP802 TRAIN B ESF LOAD 20 SF HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y Y 02GSEQUENCER CABINET 25

QDPS APC (AUXILIARY 1,2,3,4 N33 4Z552ZLP678 PROCESS CAINET) B I 20 AM HIGH 1, NA Y Y 02G

ZLP678 ,5

34 3V112VFN008 CONTROL ROOM HE LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 03CCLEANUP FAN 21B 95

N357 3EI72EMCEIC2 MCC E2C2 1 PM j MED NA Y Y 02E


Page B-6


-N: e' *%

E .z

EE

36 Not. Used

377 4Z552ZLP661A ISOLATION RELAY CAB 20 AM 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 03FTRAIN C ZLP66IA 25

387 3E232EBC047G BATTERY CHARGER 16 DJ LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 04BE2C 1-1 ,5

DISTRIBUTION PANEL 123439 3E242EDPI203 1203 (B TRAIN, CHANNEL 14 VA HIGH 5 NA Y N N 03E

111) ,5

40 B2DJPL037CI MAIN BATTERY DJ MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 03EBREAKER (B TRAIN) '5

41 3E232EBT045C CLASS IE BATTERY E2BI1 15 DJ MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 03E,5

427 4Z 172ESG001B REACTOR TRIP RS HIGH NA Y N N 04CSWITCHGEAR TR B

43 3R282NPA202B WASH 5 EW LOW 4 NA Y N Y 14BBOOSTER PUMP 2B

ECW PUMP 2B44 3R282TEW0137 DCH MO2 8 EW HIGH 4 NA N N N 14BDISCHARGE MOV

LOW HEAD SAFETY45 2N122NPA202B INJECI SUMP2B 6 SI HIGH 1&3 NA Y N Y 12BINJECTION PUMP 2BI


Page B-7


_ _ - . \0 z

LO HEAD SAFETY

46 B32SIMOV0018B3 IJCIN UP2 SI MED 1&3 NA N N N 12DDISCHARGE MOVOPERATOR (ORC)

47 3SI42MPA02 AXLAYFEWTR 5 AF HIGH 2&4 NA Y N Y 10APUMP 22

48 3E342EDTB370 FEED TO 120/208V DP 4 PM LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 14BDPB335 VIA XFMR DTB370 5

COMPONENT COOLING49 3R202NHX201 B WATER HEAT 21 cc LOW 4 NA Y N Y 07A

EXCHANGER 2B

TRAIN B ESSENTIAL 23450 3 V1I12VTS005 CHILLED WATER 21 CH MED 5,,, NA Y N Y 07AEXPANSION TANK ,

CCW HEAT EXCHANGER51 B2CCTE4515 2B OUTLET 19 cc NRS 4 NA N N N 07B

TEMPERATURE ELEMENTINSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY

LO R-EACTSFET

52 B2IAFV8565 TOJECTOR 7 IA LOW 5 NA N N N 06DCONTAINMENT BUILDINGORC ISOLATION VALVEROEACTOR COOLANT

53 B2RCPT0406 SYSTEM LOOP 2C 18 RC LOW NA Y N N 06DPRESSURE TRANSMITTER

54 3E342EDTA470 D VA XFMR 4 PM LOW 4 NA Y N Y 02K(FEEDS THROUGH TO DPAI


Page B-8


Cu co t

435)

RESIDUAL HEAT55 2RI62NHX201B REMOVAL HEAT 21 cc HIGH 4 NA Y N Y 16A

EXCHANGER 2B

RHR TRAIN A CCW56 A2CCMOV0012 SUPPLY ORC ISOLATION 8 cc LOW 4 NA N N N 08A

MOV OPERATOR57 3Q152MAB0334 STANDBY JACKET 5 DG LOW 1,23,4 NA Y N N 01A

WATER PUMP (DG 23) ,5

58 3QI52MHX0336 LUBE OIL COOLER (DG 23) DG HIGH 1,

435)

59 3Q152NPCO334 STANDBY LUBE OIL DG MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 01A

PUMP (DG 23) ,5

60 3Q152MTS0534 STARTING AIR RECEIVER 10 SD MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 01A

#25 ,5

58 3QI52Mi-10 L DG 23 GENERATOR ) 0 DG HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N OIACONTROL PANEL 1,5

INCORE

INSTRUMENTATION62 C211K008B HEATER JUNCTION T/C 20 11 LOW S NA Y N N 03A

CABINET HEATERCONTROLLER


Page B-9


-

2e U

STEAM GENERATOR 2C63 C2AFMOV0085 ORC AFW ISOLATION 8 AF HIGH 4 NA N N N 10D

MOV OPERATOR

64' 3E172EMCEIC4 MCC E2C4 1 PM MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02E'5

657 3EI32ESGOEIC2 LOAD CENTER E PL MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02ETRANSFORMER E2C2 ,5

667 3E232EBC047H E2CH 1-2 BATTERY 16 DJ LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 04BCHARGER ,5

67 7 3E242EIV002 25KVA INVERTER EIV 002 16 VA LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 04B(CHANNEL 4, TRAIN C) , 5

68 3V1 12VFN003 EAB MAIN AREA RETURN 9 HE HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 05AFAN 21C ,5

697 3E]32ESGOE1CI LOAD CENTER 4 PL MED 1,293,4 NA Y N Y 02ETRANSFORMER E2CI 45

70 2N102NPA201C CONTAINMENT SPRAY 6 CS LOW 5 NA Y N Y 12APUMP2C

HIGH HEAD SAFETY71 2NI22NPA201C INHECI PUMP2C 6 SI HIGH 1&3 NA Y N Y 12AINJECTION PUMP 2C

C AFW CROSSOVER72 C2AFFV7515 VALVE (AF-FV- 7 AF MED 4 NA N N N 10D

7515)


Page B- 10


E I~

z- =

CHEMICAL & VOLUME73 3R172NPA203A CONTROLCV LOW NA Y N Y 06A

BORIC ACID TRANSFERPUMP 2ACHEMICAL & VOLUME

74 2RI72NPA201A CONTROL SYSTEM 5 CV MED 1&3 NA Y N Y 06BCENTRIFUGALCHARGING PUMP 2ATRAIN C ESSENTIAL 11234

75 3VI12VCH006 CHILLED WATER II CH HIGH 1,2,3 NA Y N Y 06HCHILLER UNIT 22C ,5COMPONENT COOLINGWATER PUMP 2A

76 3VI02VAHOOI SUPPLEMETAR 21 HM HIGH 4 NA Y N N 06ESUPPLEM ENTARY

COOLER 21ADTB 470 TRANSFORMER

77 3E342EDTB470 (FEEDS THROUGH TO DPB 4 PM LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 03D435) ,5RCFC TRAIN C CCW

78 C2CCMOV0197 SUPPLY ORC ISOLATION 8 CC LOW 5 NA N N N 08AMOV OPERATOR

79 Not Used.

80 2R162NPA201B RESIDUALRH HIGH NA Y N N 15REMOVAL PUMP 2B


Page B- 1I


SAFETY INJECTION81 2NI122NRC201B SYSTEM ACCUMULATOR 21 SI MED 1&3 NA Y N Y 15A

21382 3E232EBT045B CLASS IE BATTERY E2DI 1 15 DJ MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02B

,5S0 KVA INVERTER EIV

83 3E242EIV1204 1204 (C TRAIN, CHANNEL 16 VA HIGH 1,,-, NA Y N Y 04BIV) LQDPS (QUALIFIEDDISPLAY PROCESSING 1234

84 4Z552ZLP680 SYSTEM) APC 20 AM HIGH 1,23, NA Y N Y 02J(AUXILIARY PROCESSCABINET) DI ZLP680

85 3SI42MTU01 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP 0 AF HIGH 2&4 NA Y N N 10C24 TERRY TURBINE

S/G 2D MAIN STEAMOUTLET POWER

86 D2MSPV7441 OPERTPER 8 MS HIGH 2&4 NA N N N 11AOPERATED RELIEF

VALVE (ORC)

877 3EI52ESG00IA RCP 2A 15KV CLASS IE RC --- I NA Y N N 02ACUB12A

SAFETY INJECTION88 2N I22NTF20IA SYSTEM REFUELING 21 SI HIGH 1&3 NA Y N Y 06C

WATER STORAGE TANK I II


Page B-12


u u

89 N2CHFI9502 ESSENTIAL CHILLER 22A 20o CH NRS 1,2,3,4 NA N N N 06EFLOWMETER ,5

90 3R202NTS201A 21 cc MED 4 NA Y N N 09AWATER SURGE TANK 2A

PERSONNEL AIRLOCK91 2C262XXCH009 STIER D2A xc LOW N NA N N N 091

OPEN/CLOSE EQUALIZINGVALVE

92 Not Used.

93 Not Used.

94 Not Used.

95 3V112VPA004 ESSENTIAL CHILLED 5 CH HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 06EWATERPUMP21A 5

CONTROL ROOM /EAB

96 A2RART8033 VENTILATION 20 RA NRS 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 05BRADIATION 5TRANSMITTERDIESEL GENERATOR #21

97 N2DOPT5475 FUEL OIL SUPPLY 18 DO NRS 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 01CHEADER PRESSURE 15

TRANSMITTER I I


Page B- 13


E z E

4 z

MAIN STEAM LINE A98 A2RART8046 RADIATION 20 RA LOW 1 NA Y N N 02A

TRANSMITTER

99 Not Used.

100 3R202NPA201C COMPONENT COOLING 5 CC HIGH 4 NA Y N Y 06HWATER PUMP 2C

CHEMICAL & VOLUME101 3R172NTF201B CONTROL SYSTEM BORIC 21 CV LOW 3 NA Y N Y 06G

ACID TANK 2B

102 3Q152MHX0334 JACKET WATER COOLER 21 DG LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N O0A(DG 23) ,5

JACKET WATER 1234103 3Q152MPX0334 CIRCULATION PUMP (DG 5 DG LOW 5'' NA Y N N OIA

23) ,5

104 3QI52MHT0335 JACKET WATER CIRC 21 DG LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N OIAHEATER (DG 23) 21 DG LOW ,5

105 3Q]52MFR346 LUBEOILFILTER (DG23) 0 LU LOW NA Y N N OA'5

DIESEL EXHAUST 1,2,3,4106 3Q]52MTS3334 SILENCER (DG 23) 0 DG LOW 5 NA Y N N OA

107 Not Used.


Page B-14


- = -"z _ r E

EE E.~

108 7RO92NTS20IA PRESSURIZER RELIEF 21 RC LOW 2 NA Y N N 15ETANK

109 Not Used.

TERRY TURBINE LUBE110 3SI42MHIX01 TERRYOTURBANE 21 AF HIGH 2&5 NA Y N N 10COIL COOLER (AFW 24)

111 3S142MSP0I TERRYTURBINELUBE 0 AF HIGH 2 & 4 NA N N N 10COIL FILTER (AFW 24)

112 Not Used.

113 3QI52MDG0500 DIESEL GENERATOR #21 DG HIGH 1,2,3,4SPEED GOVERNOR 05 Up. Y N N 01C

114 3R282NPA201A ECW PUMP 2A 6 EW HIGH 4 Rep. Y N Y 14A

RCFC TRAIN C CCW115 C2CCMOV0210 RETURN ORC ISOLATION 8 LU LOW 4 Rep. N N N 08A

MOV OPERATOR

3Q352EDG0334 DIESEL GENERATOR #23 1,2,3,4116' and GENERATOR and 17 DG HIGH 1 NA Y N N OIA

3Q152MDG0334 GENERATOR MOTOR ,5

201 3R212NHX201A SPENTFUELPOOL HEAT 21 FC MED NA Y N Y 13BEXCHANGER2A


Page B- 15


z z05 -0

4t E 10 E4 =

0. C 49-

SPENT FUEL POOL202 3R212NPA20IA SPENT PUE POO 5 FC MED NA Y N Y 13CI COOLING PUMP 2A

Notes:1 Class designations are provided in Table 3-3 Equipment Class Summary2 System designations are provided in Table 3-1 System Summary3 Safety functions are defined as follow (NA for SWEL 2 items):

1= Reactivity control2= RCS Pressure control3= RCS Inventory control4= Decay heat removal5= Containment

4 NA=Not applicable, "Rep" indicates a major modification replacement, and "Up" indicates upgraded items5 Y indicates that equipment includes anchorage.6 y indicates that equipment was subject to anchorage verification during walkdown.7 The walkdowns for items superscripted with Note 7, were completed in November, 2013.

I.


Page B- 16

Table B-6: Unit 2 Area Walk-By List

Walk-By ID Building Elevation Room I Walkdown Items

STP2-WB-001STP2-WB-00IA DGB 25'-0" 003 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106

STP2-WB-OO1B DGB 55'-0" 108 31

STP2-WB-00IC DGB 25'-0" 001 97, 113

STP2-WB-002

STP2-WB-002A EAB 10'-0" 001 3, 87, 98

STP2-VB-002B EAB 10'-0" 006 82

STP2-WB-002C EAB 10'-0" 007 4

STP2-VB-002D EAB 10'-0" 009 Not Used

STP2-VB-002E EAB 60'-0" 318 5, 6, 7, 35, 37, 64, 65, 69 (See Note 1)

STP2-WB-002F EAB 10'-0" 013 8

STP2-WB-002G EAB 10'-0" 015C 32, 33

STP2-WB-002H EAB 10'-0" 015D 9

STP2-VB-002J EAB 10'-0" 015 84

STP2-WB-002K EAB 10'-0" 010 54

STP2-WB-003STP2-VB-003A EAB 35'-0" 202 1,10,11,62

STP2-WB-003B EAB 35'-0" 214 Not Used

STP2-VB-003C EAB 35'-0" 206 34

STP2-WB-003D EAB 35'-0" 212 22, 77

STP2-VB-003E EAB 35'-0" 213 39,40

STP2-VB-003F EAB 35'-0" 214 41

STP2-WB-004

STP2-WB-004A EAB 60'-0" 318 Not Used

STP2-WB-004B EAB 60'-0" 319 66, 67, 38, 83

STP2-WB-004C EAB 60'-0" 323 12, 42


Page B- 17

Table B-6: Unit 2 Area Walk-By List (Cont.)

Walk-By ID Building Elevation Room Walkdown Items

STP2-WB-005STP2-WB-005A EAB 72'-0" 410 68

STP2-WB-005B EAB 86'-0" 510 / 96

STP2-WB-006STP2-WB-006A MAB 10'-0" 018A 20, 73

STP2-WB-006B MAB 10'-0" 039 74

STP2-WB-006C MAB 10'-0" 063 88

STP2-WB-006D MAB 10'-0" 064 52, 53

STP2-WB-006E MAB 10'-0" 067 76, 89, 95

STP2-WB-006F MAB 10'-0" 067B 25

STP2-WB-006G MAB 10'-0" 076 101

STP2-WB-006H MAB 10'-0" 067F 75, 100

STP2-WB-007STP2-WB-007A MAB 29'-0" 106 23, 49, 50

STP2-WB-007B MAB 26'-0" 106A 51

STP2-WB-008

STP2-WB-008A MAB 41'-0" 216 24,56,78,115

STP2-WB-009

STP2-WB-009A MAB 60'-0" 324B 90

STP2-WB-009B MAB 60'-0" 326 91

STP2-WB-010STP2-WB-OIOA IVC 10'-0" 006 47

STP2-WB-O1OB IVC 10'-0" 007 18

STP2-WB-01OC IVC 10'-0" 008 85, 110

STP2-WB-0IOD IVC 21'-2" 101 63, 72

STP2-WB-011

STP2-WrB-0 IIA IVC 58'-6" 504 19, 86


Page B- 18

Table B-6: Unit 2 Area Walk-By List (Cont.)

Walk-By ID Building Elevation Room Walkdown Items

STP2-WB-012STP2-WB-012A FHB -29'-0" 004 70, 71

STP2-WB-012B FHB -29'-0" 005 45

STP2-WB-012C FHB -29'-0" 006 15, 16, 17

STP2-WB-012D FHB -29'-0" 008 46STP2-WB-012E FHB Not Used

STP2-WB-013'STP2-WB-013A FHB 68'-0" 304 2

STP2-WB-013B FHB 36'-0" 207 201

STP2-WB-013C FHB 30-0" 107 202

STP2-WB-014

STP2-WB-014A ECW 32'-0" 101 13, 14, 30, 36, 114

STP2-WB-014B ECW 32'-0" 105 43, 44, 48

STP2-WB-014C ECW 32'-0" 106 Not Used

STP2-WB-015

STP2-WB-015A RCB -11-0" OIOB 81

STP2-WB-015B RCB -11-0" 010 Not Used

STP2-WB-015C RCB -2-0" 110 80

STP2WB-015D RCB -2-0" 111 26

STP2-WB-015E RCB -2-0" 103 108

STP2-WB-016

STP2-WB-016A RCB 37'-3" 306 55

STP2-WB-016B RCB 52'-0" 402C 27

STP2-WB-016C RCB 19'-0" 210C 28

STP2-WB-017

STP2-WB-0 7A 1GB 55-0" 204 29

Notes:

1. The walk-by of this area was completed during the walkdowns performed during the November2013 Unit 2 outage (2RE16).


Page C- I

Appendix C

Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs)

(210 pages in Revision 0)


The SWCs for all items included in the original walkdowns were provided inRevision 0 of this report.

The SWCs in Appendix C of Revision 1 of the report are only those whichare new or revised.


Page C-2

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEIO05

AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YZ NEI U[I

Equipment. ID No. 3E152ESGOElC Equip. I

Equipment Description 4160 VAC SWGR E2C

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 318

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)_

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist shall be used to document theresults of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on theSWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments andfindings. Additional space. is provided at the end. of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verifi cation required (iLe-, is the item oneof the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing Or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surfaceoxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% forwhich an anchorage configuration verification is required.)Ref Dwgs: 3M01-9-C-4040, Rev. 15

3M11-9-C-34003 Sh.-1, Rev. 12;3MI1-9-C-3 4019, Rev.. 6- Serial No. I14926-8121-01028-BGU

•6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free ofpotentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yo NO

YO NEI UI5 N/AUj

Y0 NEI u] N/AD

YO ND 13 N/A[I

YO ND U1I N/AD

Y0VZ NEI U1I

Endo sureNOC-AE-13003067

Page C-3


SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-005

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, Ceiling tiles and lighting,and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free.of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Yi NEI Ut] N/AO

Y[MNO Ut• N/AO

YO NEI U[] N/Al]

YZ NE] UE]

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YN N[O U]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None

Date: 11-25-2013

Date: 11-25-2013


Page C-4



AWO # STP2-NVB-002E Status Y0 NO UEiZ

Equipment ID No. 3E162ESGOElC Equip.

Equipment Description 480V CLASS 1E LOAD CENTER E2C

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60.'-0" Room, Area 318

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)


This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on theSWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments andfindings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item oneof the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?*

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface

oxidation?*


5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% forwhich an anchorage configuration verification is required.)Ref. Dwgs: 3M01-9-C-4040, Rev. 15

3M01-9-C-4118, Rev. 93Ml1-9-C-34003 SH.-I, Rev. 123M11-9-C-34019, Rev. 6-Serial No. 2714926-8114-01028-BWU

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free ofpotentially adverse seismic conditions?

Y0 NO

YZ* NEI U5 N/A[]

Y9* NO U[1 N/Al]

Y*I, NO UIF N/A[]

YZ* NE1I 31 N/A[]

Y0* NO Ul]

*See Comments on Page 2.


Page C-5

Seismic Walkdown .Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEA-006

Interaction Effects


8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting,

and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have-adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment freeof potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

YZ ND UI" N/AU]

YO NEI UV N/AO

YO NEI UO N/AD

YZNDC U


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YO N]D UE]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?


4 of 5 Sections inspected. One Section (Cabinet E2CI/4D) could not be opened for anchorageinspection as it was to remain energized for spent fuel pool cooling due to 2RE16 outage work goingon.

-n i

Evaluated by: Ken Clough .r

J

LIDate: 11/25/2013

Date: 11/25/2013Evaluated by: S. P. Singlaj U


Page C-6



AWC # STP2-WB-002E

Equipment ID No. 3E172EMCElC1.. Equip.

Status YN. NEI UlO

Equipment Description MCC E2CI

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 6'-0'"" Room, Area 318. TRAIN C ESF SWlTCHGEARROOM



This checklist shall be used to document the-results of the Seismic Walkdown of an.item of equipment on theSWEL.,The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments andfindings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is thle anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item oneof the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?



5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% forwhich an anchorage configuration, verification is required.)Ref Dwgs: 3M0i-9-C-4040, Rev. 15

3M01.-9-C-4118, Rev. 93Mli-9-C-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 123M11-9-C-34019, Rev. 6- Serial No. 518066-0 0270-CGB14926-8066-00038-BGB, including FCR# CE-05080

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of,potentially adverse seismic conditions?

YN N[

YN NO Ui N/AO

YO No UO N/AO

YN NO3 UE] N/AE]

YN NE] U-] NIAO]

YO NO U]

EnclosureNOC-AE-1 3003067

Page C-7



Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment orstmctures? YO NEI U1 N/AD

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ NEI. US N/AD.and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

•9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YZ, NEI UD N/AD

10, Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YO NEI U[1of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?


SI. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ No U[]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?


None.

Evaluated by: K N. Clough

Evaluated by: S. P. Singla

Date: i-25,-13

Date- 11-25-13Sa


Page C-8



AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YI NEI UOr

Equipment ID No. 3E172EMCElC2 Equip. Class

Equipment Description MCC E2C2

Location: Bldg. EAB FloorEl. 60-0" Room, Area 318, TRAINCESFSWITCHGEAR ROOM



This checklist shall be used to document.the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an-item of equipment on theSWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments andfindings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage




oxidation?


5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent .with plant documentation?(Note:. This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% .forwhich an anchorage configuration verification is required.)Ref Dwgs: 3M01-9-C-4040, Rev. 15

3M01-9-C-4118, Rev. 93M11-9-ýC-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 123M11-9-C-34019, Rev. 6- Serial No. 528066-00218-CGB8066-00219-CGB14926-8066-00038-BGB, including FCR# CE-05080

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchoragefree ofpotentially adverse seismic conditions?

YZ NO

YO ND UO] N/A!]

YO NO UO N/AD

YZ NOl UO N/AI

Y0 ND UE] N/ADI

YONOJ U[


Page C-9

.Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)


Interaction Effects


8. Are overhead. equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting,and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?



YR NEI UfO N/ACI

YO NO Ui N/AD3

YN NEI UC- N/AD

YNEI UI


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Y[ NEI UOladversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?


None.

-56ý 04C.,Evaluated by: K N. Clough

Evaluated by: S. P. Sinlla

Date: 11-25-13

Date: 11-25-13


Page C-I 0



AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YO NO UIll

Equipment ID No. 4Z552ZLP661A Equip..

Equipment Description ISOLATION RELAY CAB TRAIN C ZLP661A

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-O" Room, Area 318




Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item oneof the 50% of SWEL items'requiring such verification)?




5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% forwhich an anchorage configuration verification is required.)Ref. Dwgs: 3M0!-9-C-4040, Rev. 15

3MO1-9-C-4141, Rev. 123M1l-9-C-34030, Rev. 11 - Se 'al No. 313M 1-9-C-34003 So-i, Rev. 123M01-9-C-34040, Rev. 73MOi-9-C-4031, Rev. 183MO1-9-C-34038, Rev. 23M11-9-C-34031, Rev. 414926-8331-00093-D2Y.14926-8331-00047-B2YFCN 2C-00588 to Dwg 3M]1-9-C-34003, Sh 1


YO NEI

YV ND UD N/A-

YO N[E]I N/AD

YM ND UD N/AD

Y0R NEI Uli N/A[]

YO NEI UD


Page C-II


SWC # STP2-WD-SWELQ$7

Interaction Effects


8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting,and masonry. block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?


10. Based on the above seismic, interaction evaluations, is equipment freeof potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Y0 NE UD N/AED

YZ NEI U[I N/AD

YO NE] UJ N/AD

YZ NEI U


11. Have.you looked. for and found no other seismic conditions that could. YZ NO] UDadversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be. added as necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: S. P. Sinwa

Evaluated by: Ken Clough

IDate: 11-23-2013

Date: 11-23-2013


Page C-12



AWC # STP2-WB-004B Status YN NOI UO

Equipment ID No. 3E232EBC047G Equip. Class 16

Equipment Deription E2CJ1-1 BATTERY CHARGER

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60"-0" Room, Area 319



This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on theSWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments andfindings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage


YONO




5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies'if the item is one of the 50% forwhich an anchorage configuration verification is required.)


Y0 NO UQ N/A]

YWNO UN] N/AD

YZ NOI UO N/AO

YO NO U[] N/AM

Y NO UIO


Page C- 13

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC).


Interaction Effects

7., Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YZ NEI UO N/AD

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ ND UlD N/ADand masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?


10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free.of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

YCK NDI U[I N/AD

YN NO UO]


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NI LUDadversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?:


None.

Evaluated by: S. P. Singla


JDate: 11-25-13

Date: 11-25-13

LI


Page C-14



AWC # STP2-VV]340C Status YN NO UOI

Equipment IDNo. 4Z172ESGOOB Equip. Class 3

Equipment Description REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR TR B

Location: Bldg. EAD Floor El. 60"-O" Room, Area 323, RX TRIP SWGR -TRIP BKRS SIDE

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) ...


This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on theSWEL. The space below each of the following questions maybe used to record the results ofjudgments andfindings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchoraae

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item oneof the 50% .of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

YEI NO




5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% forwhich an anchorage configuration verification is required.)


YZ NOE UD N/AC3

YO NEI] U N/A["

Y0 NEI U17 N/AD

YO NEI uEn NIAO

YN NCI U1"

EndosureNOC-AE- 13 003067

Page C- 15



Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y0 NEI Ur" N/A[.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YS N[O U0] N/AUl

and masomny block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YID NE] UD N/AE]

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YZ NE] U[]of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that couldadversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?-3/" gap observed to adjacent equipment (Rod Drive MG#2 OutputBreaker), Westinghouse Equipment 7Z1 72ERD0202. Gap betweencabinet bolt heads and the adjacent cabinet surface is small as -1/8".

No seismic concern -. 3/32" gap allowed, based on Dwg 5-E-02-9-E-1863, Rev. 9

Y.NEI U0


See Qi1 above.

Evaluated by: S. P. Singly

Evaluated by: K NX Clough

Date: 11-24-13

Date: 11-24-13


Page C-16



AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YO NE] Ui]

Equipment ID No. 3E172EMCE1C4 Equip. Class 1

Equipment Description MCC E2C4

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El.:60U0'' Room, Area 31.8, TRAIN C ESF SWITCHGPARROOM

Manufacturer,'Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)



Anchorage



3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion. that is more than mild surfaceoxidation?


5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% forwhich an anchorage configuration verification is required.)Ref Dwgs: 3MOI-9-C-4040, Rev. 15

3M01-9-C-4118, Rev. 93M11-9-C-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 123Mll-9-C-34032, Rev. 3- Serial No. 1614926-8337-00005-EOU8337-00107-BOU14926-8066-00038-BGB, in.cluding FCR# CE-05080

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is.the anchorage free ofpotentially adverse seismic conditions?

YO NEI

YZ NI] U[3 N/A[]

YZ NEI U] N/Al]

YZ NO UO N/AQ

YM NE UO1 N/AN

Z NI] UOi


Page C- 17



Interaction Effects

7. Are, soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment oristructures? Y0 NO U• N/AN

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yo NOand masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Uli] N/AD


10. Based. on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment freeof potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

YZ ND UD N/AD

YM NND UD


1. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Y0 NEI uoadversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added .as necessary).

None.

Evaluated by: K. N. Clough -

£

./Date: 11-25-13

Date: 11-25-13Evaluated by: S. P. Singla


Page C-I 8



AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YZ NEI UE],

Equipment..ID No. 3EI32ESGOEIC2 Equip.

Equipment :Description .LOAD CENTER TRANSFORMER E2C2




This checklist shall be used to document the results:of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on theSWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments andfindings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchoraae




oxidation?


5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% forwhich an anchorage configuration verification is required.)Ref. Dwgs: 3M01-9-C-4040, Rev. 15

3M01-9-C-4118, Rev. 93Mll-9-C-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 123M!1-9-C-34019, Rev. 6 - Serial No. 2914926-8454-00007-CKV

.6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free ofpotentially adverse seismic conditions?

YN NE

YZ NO UOZ N/AO

Y9 NOJ UF N/A[5

Y9 NO U[] N/Af-

YM NEI UU N/AO]

Y ZNO UO


Page C-19



Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YZ NO UEJ N/AfJ

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ NI LUEI N/AEland masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?


10. Based on the above-seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment freeof potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

YO NEI UD]N/AC"

YO NI UO


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that. could YO NEI UO]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?


None.

Date: 11-25-43

Date; 11-25-13


Page C-20



AWC # STP2-WB-004B Status YZ NEI U!]

Equipment ID No. 3E232EBC047H Equip.

Equipment Description E2Ci 1-2 BATTERY CHARGER




This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on theSWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjjudgments andfindings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments,

Anchoraze


Y0 NO




5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% forwhich an anchorage configuration verification is required.)Ref Dwg 3M01-9-C-4031, Rev. 18

3M01-9-C-4043, Rev. 93M11-9-C-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 123Ml1-9-C-34019, Rev. 6-Serial No. 4214926-8100-01016-EDO

MTD-P319-0001, Rev. 0, S7T # 30074607


YZ NI] U!] N/AD

YZ NEI U!] N/AD

Y NO U!] N/AO

Y0 N! U!] N/A

YS NO UO

EnclosuieNOC-AE- 13003067

Page C-21


SWC # STF2-WD-SWEL-066

Interaction Effects

7. Are. soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or. structures? YO NO U3 .N/AE-]

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YO N[3 U1 N/AUand masonry block wallsnot likely to collapse onto the equipment?



Y0 NEI U0 N/AU

YZ NE] US

Other Adverse COnditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YO NE] U[1]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages: may be added as necessary)

None

Evaluated by- S. P. Sin•ia Date: 11-23-13

Date: 11-23-13Evaluated by: K N. Clough


Page C-22

Seismic.Walkdown Checklist (SWC)


.AWC # ,STP2-WB-004B Status Y9NEI U[]

Equipment ID No. 3E242EIV002 Equip. Class 16

Equipment Description 25KVA INVERTER EIV 002 (CHANNEL 4. TRAIN C)

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 319, CH 4 DIST RM




Anchorage





5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% forwhich an anchorage configuration verification is required.)Ref. Dwgs:. 3M01-9-C-4031, Rev. 18

3M01-9-C-4043, Rev. 93Ml1-9-C-34003, Skt. 1. Rev. 123M01-9-C-34039, Rev. 2114992-00005H4DCN 1001943 to 3MI19C34032, Rev. 3DCN 1001941 to 3Ml19C34003, Sht. 2, Rev. 1


YZ NEI

YO NI UD N/AD

Y0 NEI uI N/AD1

Y NEI UD N/AED

YO NI UO N/A[

YO NEI UI

EnclosureNOC-AE-1300-3067

Page C-23



Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YO NEI UE N/AD

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YJZ NOl U[t N/ADand masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?



YO ND UE] N/AD

YZ NE UD


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NDl U]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?


None

Evaluated by: .S. P. Singla

Evaluated by::K N. Clownh

J e~c~U Date: 11-24-13

Date: 11-24-13

J


Page C-24



AWC #.STP2-WB-002E Status YZ N[ UE

Equipment ID No. 3E132ESGOE1C1 Equip.

Equipment Description LOAD CENITE TRANSFORMER E2C1.





Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item. oneof the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?



oxidation?



3MO1-9-C-4118, Rev. 93M11-9-C-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 123M1 1-9-C-34019, Rev. 6- Serial No. 2814926-8454-00006-DKV

6. Based on the above. anchorage evaluations, is the. ancho.,rage free ofpotentially adverse seismic conditions?

YZ NEI

YZ NEO U[1 N/AQI

YN NO U0 N/AO

•YCK NEIO U N/A]

YZ NE U3• N/AD

YZ NEI1 U


Page C-25



Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YR NEI UI N/AD

8. Are overhead equipment distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yg N[] U[] N/A[]and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?



YN NO U[i N/ADi

YZ NO UD


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Y0 N[3 UIDadversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?


None.

Evaluated by: K N . h

Evaluated by: S. P. Singia

6~Date: 11-25-13

Date: 11-25-13-. 1~~ -

i d

Enclo sureNOC-AE- 13003067

Page C-26



AWC # STP2-WB-004B :Status Y0 N[] UC]

Equipment ID No. 3E242EIV1204 Equip.

Equipment Descriptiona 10 KVA INVERTER EIV 1204 (C TRAIN, CHANNEL MV)

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 319. CHANNEL 4 DIST RM


Instructions .for Completing Checklist

This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on theSWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments andfindings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage






3M01-9-C-34039, Rev. 23MOI-9-C-4031, Rev. 183M11-9-C-34003 Sh.-1, Rev. 12BO3050-00009H4DCN 0500325 to Dwg 3MI1-9-C-34003DCN 0500327 to Dwg 3M11-9-C-340193A010SIO003, Sh. 1, Rev. 8.


YO NO

YO NO U] N/AE]

Y. NEI UtJ N/AtI

YO NI0 Ut- N/A[]

Y0 NC- Ut] N/AD

YZ NO UO

.rALIbUm IC

NOC-AE-13003067Page C-27



Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YO NEI UE[ N/A[l

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceilingtiles and lighting, YO NEI UFJ N/A[]and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?



YZ NEI UD NIAFJ

YMNEIhU11~

Other-Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YE N[] U[]adversely affect the safety functions of the 'equipment?


Light Fixture above the cabinet on backside is about 2" clear from top surface of the. cabinet. This isacceptable per Seismic Separation Control Drawing 3A01 0SI0003, Sh. 1, Rev. 8, which shows thatminimum separation between Group 6 (Light Fixtures) and Group 5 (Safety Related Panels) can beas little as I ".

Evaluated by: S.£P1 Singla

Evaluated by: Ken Clough

U:ýgLaýc

Date: 11-25-2013

Date: 11-25-2013


Page C-28

• Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)


AWC # STP2-WB-002A Status YZNEI UE

Equipment ID No. 3E152ESGO01A Equip.'

Equipment Description RCP 2A 15KV CLASS lE CUB 2A

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 10'-6" Room, Area 001, PENETRATION AREA


Instructions for Completing Checklist.


Anchorage

1. Is the anchdrage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item oneof the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

YONO






YS NO UD N/A-

YO NO UOZ N/All

YZ NO uD N/AD

'YO NE LIU N/AZ

YNDO U


Page C-29

.Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)


Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YZ NE UDI N/AD

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ NF] U[] N/ADand masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?



YZ NEI UD N/AD

YO NEUIj


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NEI ULIadversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?


None.

Evaluated by: S. P. Singda


I-;/

Date: 11-23-13

Date: 11-23-13

(I

EnclosureNOC-AE- 13 003067

Page C-30



AWC # STP2-WB-OO1A Status YZ NEI UQ]

Equipment ID No. 30352EDG0334 &30152MDG0334

Equip. Class 17

Equipment Description DIESEL GENERATOR #23 GENERATOR AND MOTOR

Location: Bldg. DGB Floor El. 25'-0" Room, Area 003,



This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment On theSWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments andfindings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage


Y[3 NE






YZ NO UC1 N/AO

YZ NEI U[C N/Al[

YOJ NEI U[] N/AN

YN WO UO


Page C-31


SWC # STF2,WD-SEL116

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y[ NDI UE N/AOl

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ NIO UV] N/ADand masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?



YO NO U! N/AD

YZ NEI U-]


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YO ND UOadversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be.added as necessary)

None

Evaluated by: S. P. Sin-gla

Evaluated by: K N Clouh

Date: 11-24-13

Date: 11-24-13

j


Page D- 1

Appendix D

Area Walk-by Checklists (AWCs)



The AWCs for the items included in the original walk-bys were provided inRevision 0 of the Report.

The area walk-by checklists in Appendix D of Revision 1 of the Report areonly those which are new or revised.


Page D-2

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

AWC #.STP2-WB-002E

Status YM NEI UO

Location: Bldg. :EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 318


This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items. Thespace below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appearto be free ofpotentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible withoutnecessarilyopening cabinets)?

YN NO U0 N/AD

2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant Y@ NO U"0 N/AOdegraded conditions?

3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduitraceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverseseismic. conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fillconditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatialinteractions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles andlighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismicinteractions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?

YS NEI UO N/ADl

'YON.O UL N/AD3

YZ NO U13 N/A[l


Page D-3


AWC # STP2-WD-002E

64 Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismicinteractions that could cause a fire in the area?

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismicinteractions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portableequipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, leadshielding)?

YO NEI U- N/A-

YO NO] UOJ N/A[l

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YO NI] UI]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?


Associated Seismic Walkdown Checklists:STP2-WD-SWEL-005, 006, 007,035,.037, 064, 065, 069

1. One bolt on the backside of LC 21, Transformer on the middle top plate was found notcompletely tightened. See Photo on Page 3 of 3. Judged to be not a seismic condition. CR 13-14021 was written. Bolt was fully tightened the same day and CR 13-14021 was closed.

2. Two exit signs in Room 318 need re-lamped. CR 13-14022 was written.

Evaluated

Evaluated

Date: 11-25-2013

Date: 11-25-2013


Page D-4


AWC # STP2-WB-002E

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