Soviet Defence Spending Estimations.pdf

8172019 Soviet Defence Spending Estimationspdf

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Nick Blackbourn 1

Introduction

Late American scholar Aaron Levenstein is said to have remarked that ldquoStatistics are like a bikini

What they reveal is suggestive but what they conceal is vitalrdquo The impact of Soviet defence

spending estimations in the late 1980rsquos was no different to Levensteinrsquos bikini analogy On the

surface the statistics appeared to unveil proof that the Soviet Union could be deemed an lsquoEvil

Empirersquo but further examination complicates matters considerably These calculations are regarded

as having had ldquohellipan important impact on US defence policyhelliprdquo and the extent to which this is true

in both America and the former Soviet Union is at the centre of this thesis

1

Current research regarding Soviet defence spending in the mid-1980rsquos is heavily focused on

the mechanics of their calculation The value of this focus is limited in that it offers little to the

understanding of how these statistics actually influenced the politics of Cold War governance in

both the United States and the Soviet Union In the post-Cold War climate the focus of study can

now shift with actual influence rather than degree of accuracy driving research Todayrsquos historians

are therefore able to address how these estimates however accurate affected Cold War governance

How did Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan use this information Did they in fact use it at all

How much influence did the authors of such information hold In considering the final chapter of

the Cold War in the 1985 to 1989 period it is now apt to consider the relevance and importance of

statistical information such as Soviet defence spending rather than exclusively looking at how this

information was compiled

Comprehensive studies both advocating and dissimulating the Central Intelligence Agencyrsquos

(CIArsquos) Direct Costing effort to evaluate its accuracy exist and these studies are useful for this

1 Firth N amp Noren J ldquoSoviet Defence Spending A History of CIA Estimates 1950 ndash 1990rdquo (College Station TexasAampM University Press 1998) pxii



Nick Blackbourn 2

particular purpose and will be drawn upon during the course of this particular study2 The general

function of these studies the majority conducted pre-Soviet collapse was to offer an appraisal of

methodology in the hope of improving accuracy What is now needed however is a link between

the statistical analysis of Soviet defence spending and the way this information was then used by the

two Superpower administrations To achieve this objective two sections will address firstly the

leaderships of Reagan and Gorbachev and the relative importance of the defence sector within

them and secondly how useful these Soviet defence spending estimations were to these

administrations in driving policy

The first section will examine how the ideological drive of the individual leaders can be

interpreted which will enable the rationale behind decision-making to be examined Their

objectives for the military sector will also be discussed to show how intelligence estimations may

have subsequently been used to justify such actions Finally the influence of the military sphere on

the leadership will be considered this will scrutinise the extent to which proponents within the

military establishment were able to influence policy In addressing these aspects of Ronald

Reaganrsquos and Mikhail Gorbachevrsquos leaderships I hope to demonstrate how they approached defence

spending estimations and the relative importance within each administration they held3

The second section will address how useful the calculation of Soviet defence spending was

in assisting policy formation and the determination of Soviet aims The dearth of Soviet-created

defence spending statistics will be considered as well as the costing estimation efforts of the CIA

2 See Firth N amp Noren J ldquoSoviet Defence Spending A History of CIA Estimates 1950 ndash 1990rdquo (College StationTexas AampM University Press 1998) and Rosefielde S ldquoFalse Science Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup An Appraisal of the CIArsquos Direct Costing Effort 1960 - 1985rdquo (Oxford Transaction 1987)3 For a study of Reaganrsquos and Gorbachevrsquos impact on the Cold War as individuals see Matlock J ldquo Reagan and

Gorbachev How the Cold War Endedrdquo (New York Random House 2004) and also Gaddis J ldquoThe Cold Warrdquo(London Allen Lane 2007) especially Chapter Six ldquoActorsrdquo



Nick Blackbourn 3

This section will reveal the actual importance and relevance of Soviet defence estimates within the

two Cold War rivals

This thesis will conclude that the premise of calculating a monetary figure for Soviet

defence spending was flawed At best such a figure was a general and very vague guide to the

trend of Soviet defence spending for American decision makers In reality the lack of a market

system to set prices meant valuations of defence procurement were essentially meaningless to the

Soviet government Many have scathingly remarked Gorbachev himself included that the

inefficient government and economically predatory Soviet Defence Council failed to produce useful

price valuations of defence spending and that this limited the scope of Politburo governance But

then why should they have created such figures Prices were meaningless to the government they

set them Of more concern and of greater practical use was to gauge the opportunity cost of

approving certain procurement programmes

In this context it is clear how defence spending in monetary terms was unimportant to the

Soviet leadership Gorbachev whose premiership began in March 1985 distrusted the military and

sought to reduce its influence in the political and economic sphere His Perestroika programme to

reform the Russian economy included reducing the heavy economic burden of defence the purpose

of which Kotkin has argued was ldquohellipreclaiming the ideals of the October revolutionrdquo4

Reagan on the other hand openly sought to increase the power of the American military

and was consequently increasingly open to its influence The estimates of Soviet defence spending

were used by Reagan in ldquohellipone of the biggest and most enduring political battles in Washington

the annual struggle over the size of the US defence budgethelliprdquo5 However it will be shown that such

calculations were beset with inaccuracies pure guesswork and were cherry picked by an

4 Kotkin S ldquoArmageddon Averted The Soviet Collapse 1970 ndash 2000rdquo (Oxford Oxford University Press 2001) p1745 Firth amp Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo pxii



Nick Blackbourn 4

administration determined to spend heavily on defence Reagan chose to use the aspects of CIA

estimations that demonstrated what he wanted to see communist militarism against which he could

lead a lsquocrusadersquo6

This study will conclude the work of the evaluations regarding CIA estimates of Soviet

Defence spending and assess the importance of these estimates on the Superpowersrsquo leadership In

America such estimations were crude and often hopelessly inaccurate throughout the Cold War

particularly in its closing stages These studies were unhelpful and misleading as the true costs of

maintaining Soviet military capabilities were revealed under lsquoglasnostrsquo In the Soviet Union such

statistics for the most part did not exist The impact of Soviet Defence estimations on the decision-

making process was limited The actions of Reagan and Gorbachev are better explained by their

own preconceptions as a staunch anti-Communist and a faithful Communist respectively

Chapter I ndash The Administrations of Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan

To understand how defence-spending estimates were used the ambitions of the two Superpower

leaders for their relevant countries are an important area to consider The statistics themselves were

simply numbers on paper but it is how they were subsequently acted upon that makes them

significant In this section I will demonstrate what Reagan and Gorbachev saw as the purpose and

direction of their time in power particularly within the defence sector To achieve this I will

examine their worldview (ie how they viewed their perspective positions within the Cold War and

how this would change over time) their objectives for the military and the influence held by the

defence sector within each administration

6 Kengor P ldquoThe Crusader Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communismrdquo (New York Regan 2006)



Nick Blackbourn 5

There is a clear contrast between the dynamics of leadership in the US and USSR between

1985 and 1989 Reagan led his country towards militarism and thus the sector may be presumed to

have held significant influence over the president but in the Soviet Union the opposite was true as

Gorbachev sought to demilitarise his country and reduce its influence within government7 By

examining the interactions between the military and the decision-making processes of the Reagan

and Gorbachev leaderships we can scrutinise the military-politico relationship in both the US and

the Soviet Union

The Worldviews of President Reagan and Premier Gorbachev

In the Soviet Union Reagan saw a powerful adversary and a sworn enemy of the United States of

America He was passionately anti-communist so much so that after his January 20th

1981

inauguration as President he actively sought to end deacutetente and take the offensive and bring about

the end of communism This was outlined in his National Security Decision Directive seventy-five8

ldquoReagan wanted to take the strategic initiative and not be forced into a reactive positionrdquo 9 These

views were fermented in Reaganrsquos Hollywood years during his time as a lsquoone man battalionrsquo facing

communists during their alleged lsquotakeover of Hollywoodrsquo in the 1950rsquos 10

Reagan had lsquolearnt what

communists were capable ofrsquo and henceforth despised them

ldquoNow I knew from firsthand experience how communists used lies deceit violence or

any other tactic that suited them to advance the cause of Soviet expansionism I knew

7 For details on Reaganrsquos Military build up see Wirls D ldquo Build Up The Politics of Defence in the Reagan Erardquo(Ithaca Cornell University Press 1992)8 See Bailey N ldquoThe Strategy That Won the Cold Warrdquo (Virginia The Potomac Foundation 1998)9 Schweizer P ldquoVictoryrdquo (New York Atlantic Monthly Press 1994) p13010 Reagan R ldquo An American Liferdquo (London 1991) p114



Nick Blackbourn 6

from the experience of hand-to-hand combat that America faced no other more insidious

or evil threat than that of communismrdquo11

Reagan was keen to instigate the downfall of the Soviet Union How much credit he can

individually command for the fall of communism is a topic beyond the scope of this study however

there is no doubt that the president actively sought to end the rule of the Communist Party in the

Eastern Bloc It was an individually driven ambition within his administration ldquoAt the time no one

in the administration (with the exception of Ronald Reagan) ever articulated a vision of a collapsing

Soviet edificerdquo12 This is not to suggest that Reagan was indeed a lsquoone man battalionrsquo in the fight

against communism but with his clear distain for the communist system any decision that would

weaken the USSR would be looked upon kindly by the president A classic case in point is

Reaganrsquos own brainchild the Strategic Defence Initiative and his rationale behind undertaking such

a project is ably outlined by Schweizer

ldquoWhile the presidentrsquos interest in SDI was largely based on his vision of a world no

longer facing nuclear peril the system was also pursued because of the strain it would

place on the Soviet economyrdquo13

The policies and spending initiatives undertaken during the Reagan presidency wherever possible

included aspects that could undermine the Soviet system Another example is Reaganrsquos relationship

with Saudi Arabia which ultimately lowered world oil prices and devastated Soviet foreign

currency earnings as a result These anti-Soviet initiatives undoubtedly represent the tone of

Reaganrsquos years in the White House The release of National Security Decision Directive seventy-

five on January 17th 1983 signed by Reagan clearly summed this subversive attitude towards the

Soviet Union which highlighted the key objectives of policy to be

11 Ibid p11512 Schweizer ldquoVictoryrdquo p28213 Ibid p135



Nick Blackbourn 7

ldquohellipexternal resistance to Soviet imperialism internal pressure on the USSR to weaken

the sources of Soviet imperialismhellipthe US must convey clearly to Moscow that

unacceptable costs will incur costs that would outweigh any gainhelliprdquo14

Although Garthoff has questioned the true significance of NSDD seventy-five (ldquohellipthe ambiguity in

the presidentrsquos directive reflected Reaganrsquos ambivalencerdquo15

) there is no doubt that President

Reagan did believe that the Cold War could be won and the policy choices he made reflected this

attitude Five thousand miles away in Moscow Gorbachev viewed the future of Cold War tensions

in very different terms

Mikhail Gorbachev appointed General Secretary of the Communist Party on 11

th

March

1985 was a faithful communist and according to Kotkin a ldquohelliptrue believerhelliprdquo16

He still thought

that the Party ldquohellipwas a force capable of uniting societyhelliprdquo17 The Premier was also a realist

stemming from his days as a student at Moscow State Universityrsquos law faculty His pragmatic

approach meant he

ldquohellipwanted to see a world bound by sensible codes of conduct He was also a deal-

maker by nature and preferred to create a world in which he could haggle and persuade

rather than be locked in military confrontationrdquo 18

In order to achieve his goals for the political and economic restructuring under lsquoPerestroikarsquo he felt

the Soviet Union was obligated ldquohellipto change our relationship with the West particularly the US

and bring the costly and dangerous arms race to an endrdquo19 A Cold War de-escalation was necessary

14 National Security Council January 17 1981 ldquoNational Security Directive Decision 75rdquo ldquoFederation of American

Scientists Intelligence Resource Programrdquo lthttpwwwfasorgirpoffdocsnsddnsdd-075htmgt [accessed 190407]see also Bailey N ldquoThe Strategy That Won the Cold Warrdquo p2915 Garthoff R ldquoThe Great Transition American ndash Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold Warrdquo (Washington DCThe Brookings Institute 1994) p3316 Kotkin ldquo Armageddon Averted rdquo p3117 Gorbachev M ldquo Memoirsrdquo (London Bantam 1996) p16818 Galeotti M ldquoGorbachev and His Revolutionrdquo (Basingstoke Macmillan 1997) p6019 Gorbachev ldquo Memoirsrdquo p171



Nick Blackbourn 8

to give the Soviet economy breathing space to lower its defence commitments and re-orientate itself

away from economic militarism

ldquoYes wersquove achieved strategic military parity with the Unites States And no-one

counted how much it cost ushellipLetrsquos make a thorough analysis of what a strong modern

army is what ensuring security means what the quality of security consists of And

when we know how much all this costs we can cut out the restrdquo20

To ideologically justify these cuts in military spending to the Politburo and Defence Council who

remained convinced of western hostility towards them Gorbachev attempted to lower the external

threat presented by the US

21

This was not an uncommon practice according to Meyer ldquohellipSoviet

military doctrine can be changed to fit economic assumptions In essence if you canrsquot afford the

requirements change the threatrdquo22

Much of Gorbachevrsquos rhetoric emanated from his professed distain for conflict and nuclear

proliferation ldquoThe arms race like nuclear war itself cannot be wonhellipSecurity is a political

problem and it can be solved only by political meansrdquo23 Gorbachev was too young to remember

the horrors of the Second World War that dominated the decisions made by the older members of

the Politburo He rejected the policy of continued military build-up to prevent a repeat of the

surprise Nazi invasion in June 1941 and instead highlighted the importance of farsighted diplomacy

to ensure Soviet security24 On April 26th 1986 the ldquoChernobyl disasterrdquo furthered his anti-military

disposition which was regarded by Gorbachev as ldquohellipa lsquofinal warningrsquohellipChernobyl has left a strong

20 Gorbachev M in Cherniaev A ldquo My Six Years With Gorbachevrdquo (University Park Pennsylvania State UniversityPress 2000) p19221 See Gorbachev M ldquoPerestroika New Thinking for Our Country and the World rdquo (London Collins 1987)22 Meyer S ldquoEconomic Constraints in Soviet Military Decision-Makingrdquo in Rowen R amp Wolf C (Eds) ldquoThe

Impoverished Superpower Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burdenrdquo (San Francisco 1997) p21723 Gorbachev ldquoMemoirsrdquo p18524 Gorbachev ldquoIzbrannye Rechi i Statirdquo (Moscow 1987) cited in Colton T amp Gustafson T ldquoSoldiers and the Soviet

State Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachevrdquo (Princeton Princeton University Press 1990) p78



Nick Blackbourn 9

anti-nuclear streak in Gorbachevrsquos thinkingrdquo25 The Soviet Premier was forced into demilitarisation

by the economic straitjacket the Soviet Union found itself in but it was a measure he was more than

happy to pursue in his attempts to attain a lsquohuman facersquo for Socialism26

Aside from a shared distain for nuclear weapons we can see a marked contrast in how the

two leaders viewed the world and their position within it Reagan wanted a final victory whereas

Gorbachev hoped to back down and alleviate Cold War tension to provide breathing space for

structural reforms to take effect We now turn to how these views were manifested in the two

leadersrsquo military objectives and outcomes

The Military Objectives of President Reagan and Premier Gorbachev

Reagan wanted to escalate and lsquowinrsquo the Cold War and thus proceeded to practise confrontation in

foreign policy backed by increased arms spending Reagan stated as late as 1986 that

ldquohellipthe threat from Soviet forces conventional and strategic from the Soviet drive for

domination from the increase in espionage and state terror remains great This is reality

Closing our eyes will not make reality disappearrdquo27

In a tongue-in-cheek address on August 11 1984 he quipped ldquoIrsquom pleased to tell you today

thathellipbombing [of Russia] begins in five minutesrdquo28 Albeit a joke the address shows the hostile

mentality of the president To defeat the Soviet Union even without a lsquohotrsquo war military strength

was vital Building military strength was a signal of intent It provided an increased capability of

25 Reagan ldquoAn American Liferdquo p71026 Kotkin ldquo Armageddon Averted rdquo p5727 Reagan R ldquoAddress Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union February 4 1986rdquo ldquoThe Ronald

Reagan Presidential Libraryrdquo lthttpwwwreaganutexaseduarchivesspeeches198620486ahtmgt [accessed130407]28 Reagan R ldquoBegin Bombingrdquo ldquoThe National Public Radio Archiverdquolthttpwwwnprorgnewsspecialsobitsreaganaudio_archivehtmlgt [accessed 130407]



Nick Blackbourn 10

military action and also presented an economic challenge to Soviet Union to maintain parity (and

later as doctrine altered sufficiency) Creating strong Armed Forces was obviously a military

decision but the impact on the USSR was perhaps most importantly economic and Reagan was

well aware William Clark Reaganrsquos National Security Advisor between 1982 and 1983 explains

that

ldquoRonald Reagan wanted a complementary relationship between the US military

builduphellipand economic security policies directed at MoscowhellipFrankly our intention

was to divert priority Soviet resources to meeting future US capabilities beyond their

grasp and to persuade Moscow that they would not prevail in a toe-to-toe technological

competitionrdquo29

These may well be the words of a man attempting to cement his own contribution to the downfall of

the Soviet Union but his summary of the intentions of the Reagan build-up are corroborated by

Soviet Marshal Ogarkov is his book lsquoAlways in Readiness to Defend the Fatherlandrsquo in which he

highlights his own concerns over the pace of American technology30

Aside from his desire for freedom to ldquohelliptranscend communismhelliprdquo Reaganrsquos goal was to

restore American national pride following the negative reaction to the Vietnam years and the

apparent successes of communism in the 1970rsquos such as the recognition of Soviet dominated

Eastern Europe after the Helsinki Accords on August 1st 1975 and the advancement of

Communism in Latin America throughout the decade 31 One way Reagan sought to achieve this

29 Schweizer ldquoVictoryrdquo p13230 Ogarkov N ldquo Always In Readiness to Defend the Fatherlandrdquo (Moscow 1982) see also Weickhardt G ldquoTheWorld According To Ogarkovrdquo in ldquo International Security 8rdquo (Spring 1984) pp182-531 Reagan R ldquoAddress at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame May 17 1981rdquo ldquoThe Ronald

Reagan Presidential Libraryrdquo lthttpwwwreaganutexaseduarchivesspeeches198151781ahtmgt [accessed130407]



Nick Blackbourn 11

goal was to shake-up the American military and restore its prestige in society in addition to

strengthening its physical power

ldquohellipthere were many problems facing our nation the tragic neglect of our military

establishment high unemployment and an ailing economy the continuing expansion of

communism abroadhellipBut to me none was more serious than the fact America had lost

faith in itselfrdquo32 ldquoI told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that I wanted to make our men and

women proud to wear their uniforms againrdquo33

For Reagan the military held an important position within American society and as such he actively

sought to improve the power and standing of the Armed Forces In his opinion a military revival

would spearhead a spiritual revival34

The strengthening of the defence sector was in many ways

independent of the confrontational foreign policy that was outlined in NSDD seventy-five in its

own right the president wanted America to be lsquoproudrsquo once again Thus the build-up of US armed

forces was a keystone of domestic policy as well as being a vital component of foreign policy

The same was not true in the Soviet Union Gorbachev was not as sympathetic to military

concerns as previous Soviet leaders his priorities clearly lay away from the defence sector and he

sought to remove this hitherto ubiquitous bias within the Soviet system Gorbachev referred to a

meeting where

ldquoDmitry Fedorovich [Soviet Defence Minister 1976 - 1984] remarked casually that

he was fully aware that lsquodefence and breadrsquo were the key issues I corrected this

statement to me lsquobread and defencersquo was the right order of prioritiesrdquo35

32 Reagan ldquoAn American Liferdquo p21933 Ibid p23534 Ibid p21935 Gorbachev ldquoMemoirsrdquo p136



Nick Blackbourn 12

Though we can question the reliability of his memoirs which may well be presented in a

self-promoting manner Gorbachevrsquos actions in this period lend credence to his claim For example

the easy removal of military figures from power ldquohellipclearly show[s] that Soviet political leaders

[did] not instinctively agree with the priorities of the military establishmenthelliprdquo36

The Soviet

Premier was committed to reducing the grip of militarism over Soviet society and this was achieved

by delivering ldquohellipa series of deliberate symbolic slights of high commandrdquo37

Behind his desire to thaw the Cold War lay Gorbachevrsquos goal to demilitarise the Soviet Union

both economically and politically As Anatoly Chernayaev personal advisor on foreign affairs to

Gorbachev recalls

ldquo[It was] an imperative for Gorbachev that we had to put an end to the Cold War that

we had to reduce our military budget significantly that we had to limit our military

industrial complex in some way For him it was absolutely clear that would have to

negotiate with President Reaganhelliprdquo38

The rationale for bias in Chernayaevrsquos testimony is limited His statement reveals the emphasis of

policy rather than any of his own potential prejudice for or against Gorbachev as a person or as a

leader Furthermore the removal of the uncooperative military leader Soviet Defence Minister

Sokolov in 1987 demonstrates this trend Thus Gorbachev in his attempts to reform the Soviet

Union sought to instigate a decline in the power of the military first politically and then physically

in order to reduce the economic burden that such a large force placed on the Soviet economy

Evidently there was a clear contrast in geopolitical aspirations between the two

Superpowers Reagan harboured ambitions to increase Americarsquos military power in order that she

36 Meyer S ldquoEconomic Constraints in Soviet Military Decision-Makingrdquo in Rowen R amp Wolf C (Eds) ldquoThe

Impoverished Superpowerrdquo p21737 Colton amp Gustafson ldquoSoldiers and the Staterdquo p3238 Schweizer ldquoVictoryrdquo p238



Nick Blackbourn 13

may take the initiative and end the Cold War Schweizer a contemporary political journalist in

Washington believes ldquoReagan had deeper ideological commitments and a strategic agenda that

went beyond real-politikhellipReagan not only spoke of the lsquoevil empirersquo and Marxism-Leninismrsquos

ending up on the lsquoash heap of historyrsquo he believed itrdquo39

The situation was quite the opposite in the

Soviet Union Gorbachev a pragmatist wanted hostilities to subside in order to allow the economic

and indeed political restructuring to permit the reduction of the military burden in the Soviet

Union His unilateral demobilisation of five hundred thousand Soviet troops announced at the UN

in 1988 shows his commitment to this direction in policy

The contrasting trends of militarization in America and demilitarization in the Soviet Union

would suggest a similar contrast in the influence of the military within each regime and this will

now be considered

Influence of the Defence Sectors in the USA and the USSR under Reagan and Gorbachev

The question of the influence of the military sector in Reaganrsquos and Gorbachevrsquos administrations

was an important one Reagan was much more open to the information presented to him from

within the military sphere than was Gorbachev Immediately following his inauguration Reagan had

authorised a thirty-three billion dollar increase in defence spending without even consulting the

military for their needs40 With this level of fiscal commitment to the American defence sector

Reagan was likely to utilise the information provided by his intelligence services Reaganrsquos

appointment of Bill Casey to head the CIA offers an insight as to the role of the Pentagon in the

Reagan administration

39 Ibid p17140 Garthoff ldquoThe Great Transitionrdquo p33



Nick Blackbourn 14

Prior to his acceptance of position Casey demanded an office in the White House and his

inclusion in policy discussion Reagan accepted

ldquoCasey demanded an office in the White House complex He wanted easy access to

White House personal and the president not exile in Langley In politics as in

commercial real estate location is everything He could drop by the Oval Office and

informally influence policyrdquo41

The CIA chief now had direct access to the president He presented raw data on the Soviet

economy and defence-spending patterns were regularly passed onto the president Reagan was

guided towards lsquoshockingrsquo statistics on Soviet military spending which required urgent US

attention These reports Reagan said led him to muse that ldquohellipsomeone in the Kremlin had to

realize [sic] that in arming themselves to the teeth they were aggravating the desperate economic

problems in the Soviet Unionhelliprdquo42

However one must question whether these reports actually lead

to this conclusion or whether they simply corroborated the presidentrsquos own view Did the CIA

provide information that helped determine Americarsquos spending policies under Reagan or did it

simply justify policies Reagan had already chosen prior to Office It appears that rather than

assisting the formulation of policy directly information from the intelligence community was used

because it ldquohellipproved useful in supporting the US defence builduphelliprdquo43

Ronald Reaganrsquos

lsquocrusadingrsquo attitude towards ending communism meant that he leant much credence to CIA findings

when it supported his anti-Soviet Union view His intelligence budget increase of thirteen percent in

1981 perhaps ensured Americarsquos defence analyst community to follow Reaganrsquos own hard-line

view of the Soviet Union lest they politically weaken the hand that had increased their funding 44

41 Schweizer ldquoVictoryrdquo p242 Reagan ldquo An American Liferdquo p26843 Firth amp Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo p8744 Schweizer ldquoVictoryrdquo p62



Nick Blackbourn 15

Firth and Noren dispute this accusation contending that Soviet defence spending estimations were

ldquohellipnever cooked for political purposesrdquo45

However Firth and Noren were themselves part of the

CIA team that created such data and as such are unlikely to slight their own professional integrity

As Freedman recognises it is important to consider that Estimators do not work in ivory towers

but in a community with its own political structure They find themselves amongst colleagues who

share a particular adversary image and come perhaps subconsciously to adopt this image as their

own46

Intelligence integrity aside Reagan selectively utilised the information provided by his

military advisors Facts and figures presented to him particularly by the CIA were an important

tool in policy justification Schweizer argues that ldquo[Casey] was a key figure in the emerging United

States foreign policyhelliphis effect on policy is hard to underestimaterdquo47 However when CIA

information did not lend credence to Reaganrsquos own worldview it was disregarded The influence of

the military over Reagan is questionable its importance in the justification of policy rather than its

determination is not The stature if not the influence of the military in American politics grew

during the 1980rsquos

There could be no greater contrast to this trend of the increasing importance of the military

in politics than Gorbachevrsquos Premiership in the Soviet Union from 1985 Gorbachev was the first

Premier to have achieved his position without association with the military sector in his political

career For the first time in the history of the Soviet Union no serving military official sat in the

Politburo The reason for historian Galeotti was that ldquo[Gorbachev]helliplacked patience with his

generals and soon realized [sic] that he would have to rely on outmanoeuvring rather than

45 Firth amp Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo p746 Freedman L ldquoUS Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat rdquo (London Macmillan 1977) p18547 Schweizer ldquoVictoryrdquo p14



Nick Blackbourn 16

persuading themrdquo48 The military under Gorbachev clearly were losing capacity to influence

decision-making in the Soviet Union Defence spending was cut by fourteen point two per cent and

weapons production declined nineteen point five per cent49

This move was part of Perestroika which sought to restructure the Soviet economy away

from the military50

Gorbachev made conscious efforts to scale down the problems emanating from

the military industrial complex51 Not only were military appointments by the Soviet Premier

lacking outspoken military commanders were removed from office Sergi Sokolov Minister of

Defence was relieved of duties in 198752

Gorbachev did not simply remove military influence from the Politburo in the form of

physical representation he also questioned the paper information and statistics that emanated from

the defence sector He had little faith in the relevance and accuracy of the data and recognised that

the climate of fear that had surrounded defence concerns had removed any form of accountability

from the defence procurement and spending procedure

ldquohellipnew policy undermined the psychology of confrontation that had developed during

the Cold War years and affected the interest of those who fed on it Proposed

reductions in military production meant a reduction in allocations subsidies and jobsrdquo53

Gorbachev was well aware he was operating against long established Soviet party line The

military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union had benefited a great number of people and as such

these beneficiaries had a vested interested in maintaining the status quo Gorbachev felt he could

48 Galeotti ldquoGorbachev and His Revolutionrdquo p6249 Rowen amp Wolf ldquoThe Impoverished Superpowerrdquo p650 See MccGwire M ldquoPerestroika and Soviet National Securityrdquo (Washington DC Brookings Institute 1991)51 See Checinski M ldquoThe Soviet War-Economy and the Conversion of the Arms Industryrdquo in Blank S amp Kipp J(Eds) ldquoThe Soviet Military and the Futurerdquo (London Greenwood Press 1992) pp89-11452 For more on Gorbachevrsquos relations with the Soviet High Command see Herspring D ldquoThe Soviet High Command

1967 ndash 1989rdquo (Princeton Princeton University Press 1990) pp265-96 and also Green W amp Karasik T (Eds)ldquoGorbachev and His Generals The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrinerdquo (Boulder Westview Press1990)53 Gorbachev ldquoMemoirsrdquo p238



Nick Blackbourn 17

not trust the statistics presented to him from this sphere He noted the inherent biases of the defence

sector ldquohellipalthough the defence ministry was well aware of the price the arms race exacted from the

country in all the years of my work in Moscow they never made any suggestions for cuts in

defence spendingrdquo54

It is clear that under Gorbachev the military in the Soviet Union witnessed a sharp decline in

influence and importance within the political and economic decision-making process Military

personnel were removed from the Politburo and conscious efforts were made to introduce

accountability and transparency in defence spending as part of lsquoglasnostrsquo Gorbachev implied that

he had little confidence in the reliability of the defence spending figures the secretive Defence

Council presented him that this was unacceptable and would be changed

Unsurprisingly given the differing aspirations for the military and the progression of the

Cold War the trend of military importance within government contrasted between the two

superpowers In America the military establishment had been neglected since McNamararsquos lsquosystem

analysisrsquo cost reduction methods in the 1960rsquos and even more so following the Vietnam withdrawal

in 197255 American armed forces would experience a revival in funding and consequently strength

from 1981 after Reaganrsquos election victory In the USSR the opposite was true as a vastly influential

defence sector had its importance in the political arena curbed by Gorbachev as he sought to

lsquoacceleratersquo and then lsquorestructurersquo the communist statersquos economy whose ailing condition was

becoming increasingly apparent

Summary

54 Ibid p40555 For details on McNamararsquos defence spending policies see Enthoven A amp Smith K ldquoHow Much is Enough

Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969rdquo (New York Harper Row 1971)



Nick Blackbourn 18

Reaganrsquos military build-up resulted in the increasing importance of the defence sector in politics if

not for informing decision-making for justifying it to Congress This focus meant more funds for

intelligence services and this financial incentive coupled with a subconscious alignment with the

prevailing view of the administration meant that Reagan could use such information to justify his

anti-Soviet policies Gorbachev on the other hand was much less receptive to the military sector as

Soviet Premier He was aware of the unwarranted importance of the military in Soviet social

political and economic life and made a conscious effort to reverse this trend As a result the

importance of the military in Soviet governance markedly declined after Gorbachevrsquos ascension to

power

In turning towards the examination of the figures that the CIA and Soviet Defence Council

actually presented to their prospective leaders it is possible to further justify this conclusion

Chapter II ndash Soviet Defence Estimations Problems Impact and Relevance

So far this thesis has shown how the US administration and the government of the USSR in

the 1980s viewed the prospects of the Cold War the objectives they held for their own military

forces and consequently what importance the respective military and intelligence hierarchies held

over the leaderships of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev

In this chapter the focus of study turns to the information each leader received with regard to

Soviet military expenditure and how it influenced policy Firstly the lack of accurate data received

in the Kremlin from the Defence Council will be considered Why was there such a dearth of useful

information and why was the information that was presented to the Politburo and even the General

Secretary himself so unhelpful Secondly the CIArsquos own effort to estimate Soviet defence costs



Nick Blackbourn 19

will be considered How they were compiled will be briefly discussed (such analysis has been

completed in detail elsewhere in work by Firth and Noren) and then the value of these estimates to

the policymaking process in Washington will be deliberated Scrutiny of these factors will reveal

that in the final analysis the importance of Soviet defence estimations was limited Gorbachev could

not trust the figures that he was presented with but in many cases relevant information did not exist

anyway ldquoIt is probably true that Soviet leaders never had in their policy deliberations an articulated

set of defence spending figures in constant pricesrdquo56

Reagan had already formed his views on the

Soviet Union independent from the information presented to him He used CIA estimates to back up

his policy but not to formulate it in the first instance

In considering the Soviet case the simple reason why internal lsquowestern stylersquo Soviet

defence-spending statistics were so scarce in Moscow was that they were fundamentally of little use

to decision-makers Soviet economic decision-making was not made on a basis of real cost prices

were not the value indicators they represent in a free market economy and instead procurement was

decided on the basis of input output tables used for economic planning

As shown in studies elsewhere the Direct Costing effort of the CIA was flawed 57 This

thesis does not challenge this conclusion but focuses instead on the impact that CIA figures had on

Reaganrsquos perceptions of trends in Russian defence procurement The range of estimations and sheer

guesswork used severely limited the usefulness of the statistics In the last hectic years of the Cold

War these inaccuracies become obvious as Soviet published figures began to reflect reality The

premise of cost estimations of Soviet defence-spending will be critically evaluated on the basis of

these conclusions

56 Firth amp Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo p14257 See Rosefielde S ldquoFalse Science Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup An Appraisal of the CIArsquos Direct

Costing Effort 1960 - 1985rdquo (Oxford Transaction 1987)



Nick Blackbourn 20

The Lack of Official Soviet Spending Statistics

There was a distinct lack of western style accounting in the Soviet Unionrsquos defence sector

throughout the existence of the communist state Many historians and politicians viewed this gap in

sinister terms the lack of information supposedly representing the totalitarian nature of the system

that embodied a complete lack of transparency and accountability58 This interpretation of Soviet

statistical practice may well be warranted There is little doubt that statistics were manipulated to

serve a political purpose however we should be wary of other mitigating circumstances behind the

lack of comparable Soviet data

Common practice in the West has been to release statistics pertaining to the physical cost of

spending and procurement and subsequently the percentage of national income that this expenditure

represented Gross National Product or total national output is a familiar term to western

economists but to Soviet economists the term and concept would have been much less useful

Calculation of national output requires the price level of each individual production item to be

added to create a total However such information was meaningless in the Soviet planned economy

price levels of individual items were designated by the state Price did not reflect the value of a

given commodity and consequently GNP was an arbitrary figure within the Soviet command

economy The Politburo would not want nor need to see spending statistics because it was they who

set prices National accounts simply reflected what prices had been set and the quantity of produce

that had been created an essentially meaningless figure for decision making purposes Much more

useful would have been the calculation of the opportunity cost of certain procurement decisions

58 Aslund A ldquoHow Small Is Soviet National Incomerdquo in Rowen R amp Wolf C (Eds) ldquoThe Impoverished

Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

Politburo members would then have been able to make better procurement decisions if they could

determine if x tanks were produced the production of x tractors would be foregone

In reality the Soviet hierarchy had access neither to western style spending calculations nor

even detailed breakdowns of the productive impact of defence procurement and expenditure to the

economy as a whole The military held exalted status in the Soviet Union and attempts to instil

notions of accountability into the defence sector were met with fierce resistance and suspicion59

Gorbachev has revealed the attitude towards appraising the military even at the highest echelons of

Soviet government was extremely hostile

ldquoTaboo areas included everything to do with actual military expenditure the situation in

the army in general the state of scientific research in the military-industrial complex

and data on how efficiently financial and material resources for defence were being

used Not even the politburo members knew the full picture They often authorised

decisions on top secret matters without the right to question or discuss themrdquo60

Though seemingly conclusive in its scathing view of the Soviet military-industrial complex we

should be wary of Gorbachevrsquos testimony as he could have been using the defence sector as a

scapegoat for his own economic mismanagement which some later suggested hastened the fall of

Soviet Union61

Despite these concerns Gorbachevrsquos remarks have been verified elsewhere by both

Politburo advisor Chernyaev (who recalls ldquoNo one had even had a remote idea nor had they any

right to know [military spending affairshellip]rdquo62) and also political-historian Galeotti63

59 ldquohellipit seems quite clear that Marxist-Leninist systems generally show a marked tendency to accord their systemsmilitary establishments relatively high priority and favoured treatment in comparison with that granted by other politicalsystemsrdquo In Rowen amp Wolf ldquoThe Impoverished Superpowerrdquo p660 Gorbachev ldquoMemoirsrdquo p20361 See Keeran R amp Kenny T ldquoSocialism Betrayed Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Unionrdquo (New YorkInternational Publishers 2004) and also Garthoff R ldquoThe Great Transition American-Soviet Relations and the End of

the Cold Warrdquo (Washington DC Brookings Institute 1994)62 Chernyaev ldquoMy Six Years with Gorbachevrdquo p118 63 Galeotti ldquoGorbachev and His Revolutionrdquo p61



Nick Blackbourn 22

Mark Harrison in his recent research has uncovered the so-called lsquoKonoplev Reportrsquo64

Though the authenticity of the report is in doubt it outlines expenditures for defence for the Central

Committee of the USSR in the early 1980s But as already noted this information was regarded as

top secret leading Harrison to ponder ldquoIf the information in the Konoplev Report was so sensitive

it is not clear why a joint commission of the parliament and ruling party was appointed to compile

itrdquo65 He suggests that perhaps the report was either propaganda to confuse Western analysts or a

genuine attempt by the Central Committee to find out was really being spent on defence Either

way the report demonstrates the problems Gorbachev encountered in his premiership

In considering the notion of Soviet statistical inaccuracy it maybe more useful to look at what

the Soviet leadership felt constituted the lsquodefencersquo sector Statistical manipulation in most cases did

not simply involve plucking numbers from thin air it evolved from shifting certain figures from one

accounting headline to another Wiles in his study of the economics of Soviet arms notes of Soviet

accountants ldquoTheir extreme reluctance to falsify totals and strong preference for distributing the

item they wish to conceal all over the place in penny packetshelliprdquo 66 Furthermore a number of

defence activities were considered lsquoproductiversquo and not simply a sunk cost for national defence

developing nuclear technologies for example Such activities were not classed as defence

expenditure because they supposedly contributed to the economy rather than extracting from it

Accounting for defence expenditure in the Soviet Union is therefore an extremely complex matter

not only must we consider the presence of deliberate and calculated statistical manipulations but

also the nature of what actually constitutes lsquodefencersquo within the budget Even the composition of

lsquodefencersquo accounting amongst Western states differs Wiles observes

64 ldquoThe Konoplev Reportrdquo ldquoWarwick Economic Research Papersrdquolthttpwwwwarwickacukfacsoceconomicsstafffacultyharrisonpaperskonoplevpdfgt [accessed 130407]65 Harrison M ldquoHow Much Did the Soviets Really Spend On Defence New Evidence From the Close of the BrezhnevErardquo ldquoWarwick Economic Research Papers No 662rdquo (Warwick 2003) p1566 Wiles P ldquoThe Economics of Soviet Armsrdquo (London London School of Politics 1985) p6



Nick Blackbourn 23

ldquoThere is a fundamental lack of concern in the west with capital accountancy in the non-

market public sectorhellipIn the USSR depreciationhellipis a large issuehellipBy contrast British

official statisticians have been since 1948 extremely reticent about depreciation

anywherehelliprdquo67

In the US all expenditure within the defence sector was regarded as defence spending irrespective

of whether it contributed to the economy In the Soviet Union however classification was far less

transparent Was this was an accounting decision or a propaganda initiative Military research had

positive externalities on the general scientific knowledge of the Soviet Union as a whole and

therefore despite its primary military purpose can be seen to be a contributor to the value of the

Soviet economy and not listed simply as a lsquodefencersquo expenditure Similarly was the Baikal-Amur

Railway primarily a military endeavour with civilian capabilities or vice versa Should this be a

military or civilian expense The simple charge of continued gross malpractice is not clear-cut

It would appear that the authorities entertained a statistical balancing act Simultaneously

they had to convince the West of the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union thus stating lower

defence spending figures but also to reveal such levels of expenditure so as to justify to the Soviet

population their relatively low standard of living in return for a strong national defence force At

other stages the Soviet would publish high spending figures to exude strength as they did before the

Reykjavik arms limitation talks in 1985 to create a position of strength from which to bargain with

the West Clearly there was a propaganda nature to spending statistics military and otherwise

within the USSR Maddock goes as far as to suggest ldquoThe official data designed to confuse as

much as clarify must be largely symbolic having a mainly propaganda functionrdquo68

67 Ibid p11468 Maddock P ldquoThe Political Economy of Soviet Defence Spendingrdquo (Basingstoke Macmillan 1985) p1



Nick Blackbourn 24

The lack of detailed Soviet information on defence statistics was not simply a result of the

government withholding accurate spending figures It is imperative to remember that defence

statistics in the form of monetary output were not the most useful indicator to the leadership of a

command economy Released statistics were thus not of great significance to the leadership due to

the fact that ldquohellipinformation for top officials was handled with an appalling lack of

professionalismhelliprdquo69 The statisticsrsquo ineffective contributions to policy decision-making meant that

figures were often tweaked and released primarily for propaganda purposes so as to be of at least

some worth to officials

In the late 1980rsquos statistics were re-examined and corrected under lsquoGlasnostrsquo and an

apparent albeit artificial increase in spending resulted This sparked both alarm and confusion in

the West The Soviets were by now claiming a commitment to peace and disarmament but the

released official statistics did not appear to support this claim because they seemed to show a

twelve per cent increase in defence spending70 In real terms it is important to consider how these

statistics were compiled ndash it is not only rearmament and the purchase of munitions that costs

money but demobilisation too Weapon decommission troop reduction and altered manufacturing

processes any from the military all impose additional costs before a long-term savings can be made

As a result of these measures the 198586 fiscal year saw a rise in the defence budget but after this

year in real terms the Soviet defence budget dropped significantly This initial rise in defence

spending though actually used to dent military power gave Gorbachev substantial goodwill from

military circles The secrecy of actual spending destinations became a blessing For a time

Gorbachev hid his demobilisation objectives and thus avoided a backlash from the military

hierarchy at a time he was still manoeuvring to secure unrivalled power in the Kremlin With no

69 Gorbachev ldquoMemoirsrdquo p40970 Michaud N ldquoThe Paradox of Current Soviet Spendingrdquo in Rowen R amp Wolf C (Eds) ldquoThe Impoverished

Superpowerrdquo p114



Nick Blackbourn 25

accurate base year to work from now that past costs were revealed as false this actual trend of

defence cost reduction was impossible for western analysts to appreciate The confusion was

compounded as the new Soviet statistics were wildly different to the CIArsquos own calculations which

had been regarded by former CIA director Robert Gates as having ldquohellipperformed admirably in

meeting the challenges of assessing Soviet strengths and weaknessesrdquo71

This significant

discrepancy between actual Soviet spending as published under glasnost and the statistics

produced by the CIArsquos Direct Costing effort will now be considered

Direct Costing Methodology and Reliability

Direct Costing as a statistical process has been assessed elsewhere notably by Firth and

Noren and is not the focus of my study72

As they highlight ldquoCIA estimates often had an important

impact on US defence policyhelliprdquo the analysis of this however they ldquohellipgladly leave to othersrdquo73 I

intend to take up the mantle and investigate the consequences of how the Direct Costing effort may

have been inherently flawed in providing the Reagan administration with information about trends

in Soviet defence-spending This of course will include a limited examination of Direct Costing

methodology but also how the process as a whole managed to significantly misinform the US

President about the levels of Soviet defence-spending

The Direct Costing programme was a yearly statistical study in which the CIA attempted to

value Soviet Defence spending The premise was to be able to provide the president with lsquoa view

from Moscowrsquo an insight into Soviet strategic decision-making Soviet figures were regarded by

71 Gates R ldquoPrefacerdquo in Haines G amp Leggett R (Eds) ldquoCIArsquos Analysis of the Soviet Union 1947 ndash 1991 A

Documentary Collectionrdquo (Washington DC Government Reprints Press 2001) p vii72 Firth amp Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo73 Ibid p xiii



Nick Blackbourn 26

the US as bearing little resemblance to actual military expenditure and so were implicitly rejected

by the CIA and played no part in its own calculations It is interesting to note that despite this

rejection Swain chief of economic issues at the CIA felt it was a sign of accuracy ldquohellipthat our

spending estimates are consistent with Soviet datahelliprdquo74

But perhaps the Soviets deliberately

manipulated their own figures to give the CIA false assurances to their incorrect estimates The

theoretical procedure used by the CIA to achieve a figure for Soviet defence expenditure was to

estimate the physical quantity of Soviet military procurement and then attribute a production cost

to each item In this way the programme could build up a balance sheet for the Soviet military and

calculate the level of expenditure within it year on year

In theory the Direct Costing programme appears to be a sound measurement of expenditure

if you know what military hardware is being produced and how much it costs an accurate picture of

defence spending can be compiled with the greatest accuracy In reality however the CIA did not

know exactly what was being produced (though spy Colonel Oleg Penkovsky did provide detailed

order of battle information75) nor was it aware of production costs of Soviet hardware constructed in

Soviet factories Lee has observed that ldquoConceptually all is in order but empirically there are many

problemsrdquo76

There was no open international arms trade that allowed the CIA to calculate the cost of any

particular Soviet weapon To price each piece of hardware the CIA would break down the

equipment in question and then get an American manufacturer to quote its cost This is a major

shortfall in the Direct Costing method American factories we know were much more efficient

than their Soviet counterparts Pravdarsquos economic editor Parfenov demonstrated how a Soviet

74 Swain D ldquoThe Soviet Military Sector How It Is Defined and Measuredrdquo in Rowen R amp Wolf C (Eds) ldquoThe

Impoverished Superpowerrdquo p10975 Haines amp Leggett ldquoCIArsquos Analysis of the Soviet Unionrdquo p776 Lee W ldquoThe Estimation of Soviet Defence Expenditures 1955 ndash 75 An Unconventional Approachrdquo (New YorkPraeger 1977) p7



Nick Blackbourn 27

engine factory in Mogilev employed three thousand five hundred workers whereas the same factory

in Italy hired just nine hundred77

If we consider this example to be endemic in the Soviet Union the

larger labour force would obviously result in significantly higher overhead costs in the Soviet plant

which would logically lead to a higher lsquopricersquo of the final product Thus the Direct Costing method

of price creation is as a method of true calculation inherently flawed Obviously not all production

factories would require a labour force that was almost four times larger than their western

equivalents but it is an important point to note Whilst most Soviet consumer industries operated

within monopoly conditions and faced no competition and thus no incentives for efficient

production the Soviet military sector was in actual fact subject to competition a global

competition with America that we call the Cold War This competition contributed to the defence

bias within the Soviet economy and perhaps made the sector more internationally competitive than

consumer industries in the Soviet Union Quite clearly though regardless of what relative

inefficiencies both between sectors within the USSR and between the Superpowers themselves

were the CIA figures provided to Reagan using the Direct Costing method had severe limitations

Costing Soviet weapons in American factories could not possibly have accurately reflected the costs

associated with production in the Soviet Union

Additional inaccuracies arose where the CIA had no detailed information on a particular

item of Soviet hardware In these cases it lsquoSovietisedrsquo the technologically nearest piece of

equipment within Americarsquos own armoury lsquoSovietisationrsquo meant American hardware was

substituted for Soviet hardware for the purpose of Soviet procurement estimations In effect

Reagan received statistics that included estimated production costs for estimated technology

produced in estimated quantities This cannot be regarded as an accurate representation of the

77 Parfenov in ldquoPravdardquo January 31 1987 (Moscow) in Rowen R amp Wolf C ldquoThe Impoverished Superpowerrdquop22



Nick Blackbourn 28

defence procurement costs of the Soviet Union Whilst standard issue hardware such as planes

tanks guns and ordinance could be counted with relative accuracy the cost of production was

unlikely to be exact More sensitive weaponry such as biological warfare technology nuclear

technology missile technology military satellites and electronic weapon systems would have been

much harder to calculate both in number and cost Satellite imagery could not peer into

underground bunkers and quantity weaponry nor could the number of paid man-hours required to

crack a missile technology be calculated for example Even if numbers of individual missiles could

be counted accurately to build a complete picture of expenditure the quantity and costs of spare

parts and components would need to be gathered and this was nigh on impossible to compile

Operations and maintenance costing is another source of error within the CIA figures

Analysts attempted to calculate what it would cost for the Soviet armed forces to maintain its

hardware and conduct lsquonormalrsquo operations This expenditure was unknown and to quantity it the

costs incurred by US armed forces to maintain and service a force of similar size doing similar

things was calculated and then attributed to Soviet armed forces Soldiersrsquo wages fuel costs and

operational procedures involving them are all likely to be significantly different in the Soviet

Union Once again a troubling source of inaccuracy is evident in Soviet defence spending

estimations

ldquoThere are many data gaps and uncertainties inherent in the CIArsquos Direct Costing approach

to estimating USSR national security expenditures past and presentrdquo78With so many assumptions

and estimations used to compile the CIA figures for defence spending ndash what the head of research at

the CIA called the lsquoInventory of Ignorancersquo - this method in estimating defence expenditure in the

Soviet Union cannot be regarded as being an accurate representation of defence costs incurred by

78 Lee ldquoThe Estimation of Soviet Defence Expendituresrdquo p1



Nick Blackbourn 29

the USSR79 Having highlighted the many flaws and inaccuracies to the CIA estimations we now

turn to the implications for the Reagan administration What did the estimates reveal and how

relevant was this information for the purposes of policy formation under Reagan

Direct Costing Use and Relevance to the Policy-making of President Reagan

In revealing the limitations of the CIA Direct Costing effort it would be useful to revisit the

actual purpose of these estimates ndash in other words what were they supposed to reveal to President

Reagan Earlier we explored the relationship of the CIA to Reagan and determined that he lsquocherry-

pickedrsquo the information that matched his own expectations of Soviet actions and objectives in the

defence sector In this final section I will show that the premise behind these CIA estimates used by

Reagan to justify his worldview and policy formation was flawed A direct defence spending price

comparison between the US and USSR was not particularly useful for a number of reasons Firstly

spending statistics do not show military capabilities For example the Soviet Union could have

been spending billions of roubles on a missile research programme without any success The

accounting balance sheet of defence-spending would have subsequently revealed large defence

expenditure but the actual threat to the US would have remained unchanged Secondly as hinted at

elsewhere the Soviet government did not know what their current defence spending in price terms

actually was - as Aslund suggests ldquohellipthe Soviets themselves may not have an accurate or full

accounting of their national security expenditureshelliprdquo80

CIA figures were supposed to give lsquoa view

from the Kremlinrsquo they did not defence estimates were at best educated guesswork Maddock

believes that the CIA was ldquohellipunable to provide acceptable rouble estimates of American defence-

79 Firth and Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo p1380 Michaud N ldquoThe Paradox of Current Soviet Military Spendingrdquo in Rowen amp Wolf (Eds) ldquoThe Impoverished




Nick Blackbourn 30

spending since it lacks sufficient data on Soviet production and costsrdquo81 Thirdly the Direct

Costing method required extensive lsquoSovietisationrsquo with US factory costs which disregarded

production factor valuations labour was expensive in the US with hi-technology relatively cheap

In the USSR the opposite was true By pricing production costs accordingly CIA estimates would

overestimate the cost of weapons requiring labour-intensive production an area in which the USSR

enjoyed a comparative advantage over the US The reverse is true of high-technology production

costs Finally the CIA assumes a clear and distinct separation between the civilian and defence

sector But the heavily militarised Soviet economy often blurred the boundaries between them

Many civilian projects for example included military aspects to them the BAM railway has

already been mentioned civilian factories were built partially underground to preserve defence

production in a potential war commercial ships were a lsquoroll-on-roll-offrsquo design which was less

commercially viable than a container design but better suited to military needs82

General Odom

goes as for to suggest that the Soviet military was a sector ldquohelliparound which all the economic

activity is done and plannedrdquo83 This is a vital point and will be expanded upon later

Spending statistics do not reveal military capability The main benefits of such analysis are

politico-economic They show the economic burden of the military and allow for a spending

comparison between two countries But on both these counts the CIA figures are lacking Over the

course of the Direct Costing effort the military burden of the Soviet Union was stated as being

between six and thirteen percent84 The true burden was nearly three times this upper limit at forty

percent As for providing a spending comparison not only did the figures represent a large

undervaluation of Soviet spending but the authors even acknowledged a ten percent inaccuracy

81 Maddock ldquoThe Political Economy of Soviet Defence Spendingrdquo p1882 Swain D ldquoThe Soviet Military Sector How It Is Defined and Measuredrdquo in Rowen amp Wolf (Eds) ldquoThe

Impoverished Superpowerrdquo pp130-13483 Firth and Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo p14784 Maddock ldquoThe Political Economy of Soviet Defence Spendingrdquo p15



Nick Blackbourn 31

range85 which considering the amount guesswork involved in its calculation seems extremely

optimistic Ten percent is no small sum especially when the statistics would be used in part to

calculate Americarsquos own defence budget Whether Cold War defence strategy was to seek either

lsquosuperiorityrsquo or lsquoparityrsquo these strategies were based on Soviet spending estimates and it seems

astonishing that a major indicator informing policy had such a large margin of error Because of

this somewhat ironically the CIA figures which underestimated Soviet defence expenditure may

have severed to temper the intensity of the Cold War arms race Firth and Noren suggest that

without the understated Direct Costing figures US views on the USSR ldquohellipwould be been more

alarmist and US defence spending during the Cold War would have been much higherrdquo

86

This

would appear to be an admission of Direct Costing inaccuracy inconsistent with the view

throughout the rest of their study that stresses the lsquousefulnessrsquo of Direct Costing If Reagan had

been informed that the Soviet defence burden was forty per cent of GDP rather than the eighteen

per cent that the CIA had informed him of his rhetoric foreign policy and military build up would

have been much more severe and intense to match this high level of militarisation The fallibility of

CIA estimation may have done the world a favour

The Direct Costing effort was at best a crude guide to the general trends of Soviet defence

spending CIA analysts themselves conceded this point ldquowe generally have more confidence in

data that represent trends than in data for absolute levels especially the levels for individual

yearsrdquo87 For the period on which this thesis is focused this had important implications An

assumption that the main use of CIA Soviet defence estimates for Reagan was to reveal the general

trends in expenditure is fair as this was the area in which the authors themselves considered their

85 Swain D ldquoThe Soviet Military Sector How It Is Defined and Measuredrdquo in Rowen amp Wolf (Eds) ldquoThe

Impoverished Superpowerrdquo p10886 Firth and Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo p20287 Swain D ldquoThe Soviet Military Sector How It Is Defined and Measuredrdquo in Rowen amp Wolf (Eds) ldquoThe

Impoverished Superpowerrdquo p108



Nick Blackbourn 32

study to be most accurate Following Gorbachevrsquos drive for lsquoopennessrsquo official Soviet data began

to represent reality and were no longer falsified propaganda instruments Therefore in 1985

ldquohellipthere was an announced increase of 12 per centhelliprdquo88 in the defence budget despite in reality the

actual budget having been reduced by some fourteen per cent89

The inaccuracies of the Direct

Costing effort had been exposed Their estimates were and had been greatly understated when

Reagan saw official Soviet defence expenditure figures well in excess of the CIA figures he could

conclude either that Gorbachev had suddenly enacted a massive defence procurement programme

or that his own intelligence was and had been for many years flawed With no observed physical

build up of military forces it was clear that the estimations were wrong

The CIA valuation through its lsquoSovietisationrsquo practices significantly altered the perceived

spending pattern of Soviet military procurement Leaving aside the aforementioned costing

inaccuracies these practices created from a military-strategic standpoint the Direct Costing effort

completely distorted the distribution of Soviet spending in the defence sector If the CIA attempted

to calculate the production costs of a rifle in an American factory the costing structure for such a

plant would be wildly different to the Soviet factory that in reality produced the weapon The

American factory would most likely attempt to automate the production line Robotic machines

would perform the monotonous tasks and operate at a great intensity and for longer hours than an

American worker could achieve either physically or legally The prevalence of such robotic

technology in the United States relative to the Soviet Union in the 1980s coupled with the relative

expense of labour would make an automated factory economically efficient to run The fixed cost-

base of such a plant and the purchase of robotic technology may have been high but the variable

costs including labour costs would have been very low To further consider that such robotic

88 Michaud N ldquoThe Paradox of Current Soviet Military Spendingrdquo in Rowen amp Wolf (Eds) ldquoThe Impoverished

Superpowerrdquo p11489 Rowen amp Wolf ldquoThe Impoverished Superpowerrdquo p6



Nick Blackbourn 33

technology was likely to be adaptable to various different production lines the fixed cost base of

the factory over the long term falls further The cost structure of an American factory to reproduce

Soviet arms is vastly different to the cost structure in the Soviet Union The CIA figures as a result

ldquohellipundervalue that aspect of American defence spending where it has the greatest comparative

advantagerdquo90

There was no attempt to equate the cost-base between the two countries and from an

end-user in the American governmentrsquos point of view the composition of Soviet defence spending

was simply incorrect

Cost overheads we have seen were different between the two Superpowers The use of high

technology in production was relatively more expensive in Russia However the lack of a clear

divide between the civilian and defence sectors further complicated any attempt to calculate actual

Soviet defence spending There is no doubt that the civilian sector subsidised the defence sector In

a factory producing both tanks and tractors for example the overhead costs of machinery would be

disproportionately borne by tractor production and thus the cost of each tank would be lowered 91

An attempt to resolve this dilemma is fraught with difficulty Was wear and tear on machinery used

to produce a tank more than for a tractor Were tractors built in more months of the year and thus

used the equipment more A CIA analyst could not possibly know and they had to estimate which

lead to further inaccuracy Even contemporary CIA director Gates suggested ldquohellipthat the Soviet

economy was about 15 ndash 20 [percent] purely military and 20 [percent] purely civilian and the

remainder could not be broken down into civilian or military componentsrdquo92 This is by no means

an accurate breakdown of the Soviet economy but it does demonstrate how even the head of

foreign intelligence in the US recognised the problems posed in establishing what actually

constituted the Soviet defence sector

90 Holzman in Maddock ldquoThe Political Economy of Soviet Defence Spendingrdquo p2191 Firth and Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo p8992 Ibid p89



Nick Blackbourn 34

Rowen has noted that many civilian sector items incurred greater costs to make them ready

for military use Planes for example were given strengthened undercarriages at increased cost to

allow military use in wartime Civilian truck production favoured the military also Worldwide the

average four-ton truck constituted three percent of total production in the Soviet Union the figure

was eighty percent93

This was simply because a four-ton truck was the most useful from a military

standpoint Therefore it was the civilian sector that bore the initial expenses but the military

obviously benefited These costs werenrsquot included in the Direct Costing effort but Soviet military

capability would benefit greatly from such spending The militarization of the Soviet economy

along these lines contributed to the gross underestimation of Soviet defence spending

Conversion from dollars to roubles and vice-versa presented further problems for the purpose

of spending comparisons for US government to review in order to judge their own spending

requirements The Kremlin did not procurement military hardware in dollars and nor did

Washington set its budget in roubles As Aslund has recognised ldquoA mole in the Kremlin could

never reveal the dollar cost of Soviet defence activities becausehellipthe Soviets donrsquot spend dollarsrdquo94

The roubledollar conversion rate was thus key and an acknowledged source of significant error

Hidden inflation in the Soviet economy meant the CIA was in a constant battle to set a realistic

conversion rate indeed each year it attempted to better estimations of previous years

ldquoThe r$ ratios represent the weakest link in the procurement estimating equation Since

Soviet rouble prices for weapons systems generally are not available the r$ ratios

93 Epstein D ldquoThe Economic Cost of Soviet Security and Empirerdquo in Rowen amp Wolf ldquoThe Impoverished

Superpowerrdquo p13094 Swain D ldquoThe Soviet Military Sector How It Is Defined and Measuredrdquo in Rowen amp Wolf ldquoThe Impoverished




Nick Blackbourn 35

represent a set of estimates generated in order to assign a rouble price itself unknown

to both the identified and the estimated components of each Soviet systemrdquo95

Thus the CIA figures underestimated the level of Soviet defence expenditure96 This led Direct

Costing end users which included Reagan to the conclusion that the Soviet defence sector was a

well-tuned arms manufacturer It seems strange to suggest that by underestimating arms expenditure

the CIA overestimated the threat of the USSR but that was indeed the result By understating

procurement spending but achieving better accuracy in assessing the actual Soviet order of battle

through utilisation of its spy network and satellite surveillance it appeared that the Soviets were

able to support their military on a smaller proportion of national income than was actually the case

Reagan remembers ldquoI had been given a briefing on the astonishing Soviet arms build-up which left

me amazed at its scale cost and breadth and the danger it posed to our countryrdquo97 But at the same

time he ldquohelliplearned that the Soviet economy was in even worse shape than Irsquod realized [sic]rdquo98

This

apparent contradiction gave the somewhat distorted view of Soviet Union as a military powerhouse

but at the same time a system teetering on the brink of collapse Indeed Rowen has commented that

ldquoIf the CIA assessments had been reasonably accurate the Soviet economy would be a maturing

industrialised economyhellipThere would be little need for a radical economic reform Gorbachevrsquos

urgency would be incomprehensiblerdquo99

Paradoxically the understatement of Soviet defence expenditure by the CIA meant Reagan

was reacting to an exaggerated threat but this fitted with his own perceptions of communist Soviet

Union being an ldquoEvil Empirerdquo100

In reality Reaganrsquos own views on the fragility of the Soviet

95 Lee ldquoThe Estimation of Soviet Defence Expenditurerdquo p996 Rosefielde ldquoFalse Sciencerdquo p5997 Reagan ldquo An American Liferdquo p55198 Ibid p23799 Rowen amp Wolf ldquoThe Impoverished Super Powerrdquo p15100 Reagan R lsquoEvil Empire Speech June 8 1982rsquo ldquo Modern History Sourcebookrdquo lthttpwwwfordhameduhalsallmod1982reagan1htmlgt [accessed on 130407]



Nick Blackbourn 36

economy as a whole was matched in the defence sector it too was costly inefficient and backward

Garthoff has highlighted ldquoPresident Reaganrsquos notorious disregard for concrete factshelliprdquo101

which

seems to raise questions over whether Reagan was influenced by wayward statistical analysis by the

CIA But he surely had to trust the information the professional national intelligence agency

provided even more so if it matched Reaganrsquos own worldview To do otherwise would question the

professionalism of its authors His own beliefs concerning communism and the Soviet Union meant

he envisaged a militaristic and hostile adversary and the CIA Direct Costing statistics presented a

statistical model to support this albeit by methodological errors

Concluding Remarks

This thesis has shown is that cost estimations of Soviet defence expenditure had little influence in

dictating policy in the 1985 ndash 1989 period despite their apparent importance in government rhetoric

on policy justification102

In the Soviet Union Gorbachev was struggling to remove the unwarranted influence of the

military from the higher echelons of the Communist Party and the subsequent burden placed on the

Soviet economy and its people The available statistical information upon his rise to power in

March 1985 was both lacking in substance and accuracy Gorbachev was battling against the

military tradition of the USSR to restructure the economy He adopted lsquoGlasnostrsquo policies in an

attempt to secure his position as Premier by allying himself with the Soviet people and actively

distancing himself from the military hierarchy Glasnost forced the defence sector into greater

101 Garthoff ldquoThe Great Transitionrdquo p9102 See Reagan R ldquoAddress to the Nation on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence Nov 22 1982rdquo inldquoPublic Papers of the Presidents Ronald Reagan 1982rdquo (Washington DC United States Government Printing Office1983) pp1506-7



Nick Blackbourn 37

transparency over its procurement costs and this meant greater reliability of spending statistics as

Gorbachevrsquos tenancy as Premier progressed More detailed spending statistics did not clarify to any

greater extent the fact that military expenditure was overly excessive and had to be cut His policies

both before and after more accurate breakdowns of Soviet military spending centred around

slashing its budget and burden on the economy Therefore the influence of spending estimates on

Gorbachev was extremely limited

In America Reagan had formed his objectives for his presidency without consulting any CIA

figures He attempted to revive US military strength and pursued a confrontational foreign policy

against the Soviet Union even before he had set foot in the White House and reviewed any

intelligence documentation Reagan is not the only American President who has been charged of

selecting intelligence to justify a predetermined policy For example accusations that President

Bush carefully selected intelligence to justify an already envisioned invasion of Iraq surround the

2003 lsquoOperation Iraqi Freedomrsquo103 Reaganrsquos own preconceived goal in 1981 was to lsquotranscendrsquo

communism and witness the end of a ldquohellipbizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even

now are being writtenhelliprdquo Reaganrsquos personal hatred of communism meant that statistical

confirmation of the threat of communism though welcome were not at the base of his policies104

The CIA Direct Costing effort was inaccurate but managed to portray the USSR as a dangerous

adversary who posed a threat to the American way of life Political-scientist Freedman questioned

in 1986 ldquohellipto what extent is the produce of the intelligence community influenced by the political

requirements of policymakersrdquo105

The answer during the Reagan era may never be revealed but

103 Hooker G ldquoShaping the Plan For Operation Iraqi Freedom The Role of Military Intelligence Assessmentsrdquo(Washington DC Washington Institute For Near East Policy 2005)104 Reagan R ldquoRemarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando FloridaMarch 8 1983rdquo ldquoThe Reagan Presidential Libraryrdquo lthttpwwwreaganutexaseduarchivesspeeches198330883bhtmgt [accessed on 13042007]105 Freedman ldquoUS Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threatrdquo p184



Nick Blackbourn 38

Reaganrsquos own - very public - views on communism and of the Soviet Union itself no doubt

influenced the information with which he was presented Freedman considers that estimators

ldquohellipin a hierarchical intelligence organisation may come to feel that their lives will be

easier and their careers will prosper if they close their minds to those hieratical notions

that contradict the images held by their superiorshellipEstimators may feel forced to adopt

adversary images which have been made official not by senior professionals but by

senior policymakersrdquo106

The inaccurate defence estimations that were compiled by the Direct Costing estimators at the CIA

thoroughly understated Soviet expenditure yet the information was still presented in the most

alarmist terms for the President Access to the President was severely limited foreign policy

concerns are a limited aspect of the presidential remit Rather than attempt to fully understand the

findings of the CIA including all issues of accuracy and relevancy the political leadership simply

wanted ldquohellipa shorthand yardstick to compare US and Soviet military spendinghelliprdquo107 The CIA to

secure funding maximised its limited exposure by stating the worse-case scenario pandering to the

political lsquorequirementsrsquo of the administration In the footnotes to a draft report on the Soviet threat

an anonymous author writes to CIA Director Robert Gates ldquoI hope it at least captures the flavour

you were looking forrdquo108

This is not reflective of the impartial reports one might expect of the CIA

Furthermore James Locher staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee highlighted

that many politicians ldquohellipbelieve [that] this analysis is intentionally misleading that it somehow

comes out to exactly what it is that the Administration would like to argue on Capital Hillhelliprdquo109

106 Ibid p185107 Berkowitz et al (1993) ldquoReport of the Working Group Report of the Methodology Panel of the Working Group onMilitary Economic Analysisrdquo ldquo An Evaluation of the CIArsquos Analysis of Soviet Economic Performance 1970 ndash 1990rdquoComparative Economic Studies 35 (Summer) pp 33 - 48108 CIA SOVA Report ldquoThe State of the Soviet Economyrdquo ldquo Memorandum for the Director for Intelligence April 22

1987 rdquo in Firth amp Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo p244109 Firth amp Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo p87



Nick Blackbourn 39

This accusation perhaps goes a little far as in reality the administration simply disregarded the

aspects of the CIA estimates they did not like rather than enforce all analyses to meet one particular

conclusion

To give estimations of Soviet defence the scholarly attention they deserve this thesis has

neglected the other Sovietological studies that were conducted by the CIA Whilst Direct Costing

seemed to highlight the danger of Soviet militarism other CIA reports were predicting even as

early as 1981 that ldquo[A] possibility is that the Soviets will reduce the level of military expenditure

absolutely (rather than reducing the rate of increase)hellipreductions cannot be excluded as a long run

possibilityrdquo

110

Putting the Direct Costing effort in this context explains the implications of

Reaganrsquos thirteen per cent intelligence budget increase in 1981 With the amount of money that was

allocated to American intelligence agencies as a result of the defence build-up not just to the

Central Intelligence Agency but to the Defence Intelligence Agency and also to the National

Security Agency the President could find somewhere a report that suited his aims CIA Direct

Costing estimates of Soviet defence expenditure thus only added fuel to Reaganrsquos own ideological

fire it did not start it in the first instance Reaganrsquos hatred of communism formed decades before he

even entered politics in his Hollywood years111 CIA estimates in the 1981 ndash 1989 period

contributed little to the direction of policy during Reaganrsquos presidency it was used merely to justify

it Even the Director of the CIA recommended against using Direct Costing in policy-formation

ldquo[Gates]hellipplanned to urge DoD [Department of Defence] to rely on physical comparisons rather

than dollar comparisons of the defence programsrdquo112

Communism was destined for consignment to

Reaganrsquos ldquohellipash-heap of historyhelliprdquo but the contribution of the Direct Costing effort which offered

110 April 1981 Intelligence Assessment ldquoThe Development of Soviet Military Power Trends Since 1965 and Prospectsfor the 1980srdquo in Haines amp Leggett (Eds) ldquoCIArsquos Analysis of the Soviet Unionrdquo p308111 See Vaughn S ldquo Ronald Reagan in Hollywood Movies and Politicsrdquo (Cambridge Cambridge University Press1994)112 Firth amp Noren ldquoSoviet Defence Spendingrdquo p88



Nick Blackbourn 40

often a hopelessly inaccurate representation of Soviet defence expenditure was negligible113

Levensteinrsquos proverbial lsquobikinirsquo of Soviet defence estimations has been laid bare and the discovery

is less than appealing

113 Reagan R lsquoEvil Empire Speech June 8 1982rsquo ldquo Modern History Sourcebookrdquo lthttpwwwfordhameduhalsallmod1982reagan1htmlgt [accessed on 130407]



Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

Primary

Berkowitz et Al ldquoReport of the Working Group Report of the Methodology Panel of the WorkingGroup on Military Economic Analysisrdquo ldquo An Evaluation of the CIArsquos Analysis of Soviet Economic

Performance 1970 ndash 1990rdquo Comparative Economic Studies 35 (Summer 1993)

CIA SOVA Report ldquoThe State of the Soviet Economyrdquo ldquo Memorandum for the Director for

Intelligence April 22 1987 rdquo in Haines G amp Leggett R (Eds) ldquoCIArsquos Analysis of the Soviet

Union 1947 ndash 1991 A Documentary Collectionrdquo (Washington DC 2001)

CIA Report April 1981 Intelligence Assessment ldquoThe Development of Soviet Military PowerTrends Since 1965 and Prospects for the 1980srdquo in Haines G amp Leggett R (Eds) ldquoCIArsquos

Analysis of the Soviet Union 1947 ndash 1991 A Documentary Collectionrdquo (Washington DC 2001)

Gorbachev M in Cherniaev A ldquo My Six Years With Gorbachevrdquo (University Park PennsylvaniaState University Press 2000)

Gorbachev ldquoIzbrannye Rechi i Statirdquo (Moscow 1987) cited in Colton T amp Gustafson TldquoSoldiers and the Soviet State Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachevrdquo (PrincetonPrinceton University Press 1990)

Gorbachev M ldquo Memoirsrdquo (London Bantams 1996)

Gorbachev M ldquoPerestroika New Thinking for Our Country and the World rdquo (London Collins1987)

ldquoThe Konoplev Reportrdquo ldquoWarwick Economic Research Papersrdquolthttpwwwwarwickacukfacsoceconomicsstafffacultyharrisonpaperskonoplevpdfgt[accessed 130407]

National Security Council January 17 1981 ldquoNational Security Directive Decision 75rdquoldquoFederation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Programrdquolthttpwwwfasorgirpoffdocsnsddnsdd-075htmgt [accessed 190407]

Ogarkov N ldquo Always In Readiness to Defend the Fatherlandrdquo (Moscow 1982)

Parfenov in ldquoPravdardquo January 31 1987 (Moscow) in Rowen R amp Wolf C ldquoThe Impoverished

Superpower Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burdenrdquo (San Francisco Institute forContemporary Studies 1997) p22

Reagan R ldquo An American Liferdquo (London 1991)



Nick Blackbourn 42

Reagan R ldquoAddress at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame May 171981rdquo ldquoThe Ronald Reagan Presidential Libraryrdquo lthttpwwwreaganutexaseduarchivesspeeches198151781ahtmgt [accessed 130407]

Reagan R ldquoAddress Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union February 4

1986rdquo ldquoThe Ronald Reagan Presidential Libraryrdquolthttpwwwreaganutexaseduarchivesspeeches198620486ahtmgt [accessed 130407]

Reagan R ldquoAddress to the Nation on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence Nov 221982rdquo in ldquoPublic Papers of the Presidents Ronald Reagan 1982rdquo (Washington DC United StatesGovernment Printing Office 1983)

Reagan R ldquoBegin Bombingrdquo ldquoThe National Public Radio Archiverdquolthttpwwwnprorgnewsspecialsobitsreaganaudio_archivehtmlgt [accessed 130407]

Reagan R lsquoEvil Empire Speech June 8 1982rsquo ldquo Modern History Sourcebookrdquo

lthttpwwwfordhameduhalsallmod1982reagan1htmlgt [accessed on 130407]

Reagan R ldquoRemarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals inOrlando Florida March 8 1983rdquo ldquoThe Reagan Presidential Libraryrdquo lthttpwwwreaganutexaseduarchivesspeeches198330883bhtmgt [accessed on 130407]

Secondary

Bailey N ldquoThe Strategy That Won the Cold Warrdquo (Virginia The Potomac Foundation 1998)

Becker A ldquoSitting On Bayonets The Soviet Defense Burden and Moscows Economic Dilemmardquo(Santa Monica UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior 1983)

Blank S amp Kipp J (Eds) ldquoThe Soviet Military and the Futurerdquo (London Greenwood Press1992)

Colton T amp Gustafson T ldquoSoldiers and the Soviet State Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev

to Gorbachevrdquo (Princeton Princeton University Press 1990)

Enthoven A amp Smith K ldquoHow Much is Enough Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969rdquo

(New York Harper Row 1971)

Firth N amp Noren J ldquoSoviet Defence Spending A History of CIA Estimates 1950 ndash 1990rdquo(College Station Texas AampM University Press 1998)

Freedman L ldquoUS Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat rdquo (London Macmillan 1986)

Gaddis J ldquoThe Cold Warrdquo (London Allen Lane 2007)



Nick Blackbourn 43

Galeotti M ldquoGorbachev and His Revolutionrdquo (Basingstoke Macmillan 1997)

Garthoff R ldquoThe Great Transition American ndash Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold Warrdquo(Washington DC Brookings Institution 1994)

Green W amp Karasik T (Eds) ldquoGorbachev and His Generals The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrinerdquo (Boulder Westview Press 1990)

Haines G amp Leggett R ldquoCIArsquos Analysis of the Soviet Union 1947 ndash 1991 A Documentary

Collectionrdquo (Washington DC Government Reprints Press 2001)

Harrison M ldquoHow Much Did the Soviets Really Spend On Defence New Evidence From theClose of the Brezhnev Erardquo ldquoWarwick Economic Research Papers No 662rdquo (Warwick 2003)

Herspring D ldquoThe Soviet High Command 1967 ndash 1989 Personalities and Politicsrdquo (PrincetonPrinceton University Press 1990)

Hooker G ldquoShaping the Plan For Operation Iraqi Freedom The Role of Military Intelligence

Assessmentsrdquo (Washington DC Washington Institute For Near East Policy 2005)

Jacobsen C (Ed) ldquoThe Soviet Defence Enigmardquo (Oxford Oxford University Press 1987)

Keeran R amp Kenny T ldquoSocialism Betrayed Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Unionrdquo (NewYork International Publishers 2004)

Kengor P ldquoThe Crusader Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communismrdquo (New York Regan2006)

Kotkin S ldquoArmageddon Averted The Soviet Collapse 1970 ndash 2000rdquo (Oxford Oxford UniversityPress 2001)

Lee W ldquoThe Estimation of Soviet Defence Expenditures 1955 ndash 75 An Unconventional

Approachrdquo (New York Praeger 1977)

Maddock P ldquoThe Political Economy of Soviet Defence Spendingrdquo (Basingstoke Macmillan1985)

Matlock J ldquo Reagan and Gorbachev How the Cold War Endedrdquo (New York Random House2004)

MccGwire M ldquoPerestroika and Soviet National Securityrdquo (Washington DC BrookingsInstitution 1991)

Rosefielde S ldquoFalse Science Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup An Appraisal of the

CIArsquos Direct Costing Effort 1960 - 1985rdquo (Oxford Transaction 1987)



Nick Blackbourn 44

Rosefielde S (1990) ldquoSoviet Defence Spending The Contribution of the New Accountancyrdquo inldquoSoviet Studies 42rdquo pp59-80

Rowen R amp Wolf C ldquoThe Impoverished Superpower Perestroika and the Soviet Military

Burdenrdquo (San Francisco Institute for Contemporary Studies 1997)

Schweizer P ldquoVictoryrdquo (New York Atlantic Monthly Press 1994)

Vaughn S ldquo Ronald Reagan in Hollywood Movies and Politicsrdquo (Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press 1994)

Weickhardt G (1984) ldquoThe World According To Ogarkovrdquo in ldquo International Security 8rdquo pp182-5

Wiles P ldquoThe Economics of Soviet Armsrdquo (London London School of Political Science 1985)

Wirls D ldquo Build Up The Politics of Defence in the Reagan Erardquo (Ithaca Cornell University Press1992)



Nick Blackbourn 1

Introduction

Late American scholar Aaron Levenstein is said to have remarked that ldquoStatistics are like a bikini

What they reveal is suggestive but what they conceal is vitalrdquo The impact of Soviet defence

spending estimations in the late 1980rsquos was no different to Levensteinrsquos bikini analogy On the

surface the statistics appeared to unveil proof that the Soviet Union could be deemed an lsquoEvil

Empirersquo but further examination complicates matters considerably These calculations are regarded

as having had ldquohellipan important impact on US defence policyhelliprdquo and the extent to which this is true

in both America and the former Soviet Union is at the centre of this thesis

1

Current research regarding Soviet defence spending in the mid-1980rsquos is heavily focused on

the mechanics of their calculation The value of this focus is limited in that it offers little to the

understanding of how these statistics actually influenced the politics of Cold War governance in

both the United States and the Soviet Union In the post-Cold War climate the focus of study can

now shift with actual influence rather than degree of accuracy driving research Todayrsquos historians

are therefore able to address how these estimates however accurate affected Cold War governance

How did Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan use this information Did they in fact use it at all

How much influence did the authors of such information hold In considering the final chapter of

the Cold War in the 1985 to 1989 period it is now apt to consider the relevance and importance of

statistical information such as Soviet defence spending rather than exclusively looking at how this

information was compiled

Comprehensive studies both advocating and dissimulating the Central Intelligence Agencyrsquos

(CIArsquos) Direct Costing effort to evaluate its accuracy exist and these studies are useful for this

1 Firth N amp Noren J ldquoSoviet Defence Spending A History of CIA Estimates 1950 ndash 1990rdquo (College Station TexasAampM University Press 1998) pxii



Nick Blackbourn 2
























Nick Blackbourn 3


two Cold War rivals
























Nick Blackbourn 4
























Nick Blackbourn 5







the Soviet Union




1981













Nick Blackbourn 6


























Nick Blackbourn 7











th

March


He still thought



approach meant he











Nick Blackbourn 8










21

















Nick Blackbourn 9























Nick Blackbourn 10





that





competitionrdquo29














Nick Blackbourn 11


















meeting where







Nick Blackbourn 12





The Soviet





Gorbachev recalls

















Nick Blackbourn 13












now be considered













Nick Blackbourn 14



















Ronald Reaganrsquos








Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















Nick Blackbourn 32




























Nick Blackbourn 33





advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























Nick Blackbourn 35













This













Nick Blackbourn 36



which







Concluding Remarks














Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

Primary




















Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 2
























Nick Blackbourn 3


two Cold War rivals
























Nick Blackbourn 4
























Nick Blackbourn 5







the Soviet Union




1981













Nick Blackbourn 6


























Nick Blackbourn 7











th

March


He still thought



approach meant he











Nick Blackbourn 8










21

















Nick Blackbourn 9























Nick Blackbourn 10





that





competitionrdquo29














Nick Blackbourn 11


















meeting where







Nick Blackbourn 12





The Soviet





Gorbachev recalls

















Nick Blackbourn 13












now be considered













Nick Blackbourn 14



















Ronald Reaganrsquos








Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















Nick Blackbourn 32




























Nick Blackbourn 33





advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























Nick Blackbourn 35













This













Nick Blackbourn 36



which







Concluding Remarks














Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

Primary




















Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 3


two Cold War rivals
























Nick Blackbourn 4
























Nick Blackbourn 5







the Soviet Union




1981













Nick Blackbourn 6


























Nick Blackbourn 7











th

March


He still thought



approach meant he











Nick Blackbourn 8










21

















Nick Blackbourn 9























Nick Blackbourn 10





that





competitionrdquo29














Nick Blackbourn 11


















meeting where







Nick Blackbourn 12





The Soviet





Gorbachev recalls

















Nick Blackbourn 13












now be considered













Nick Blackbourn 14



















Ronald Reaganrsquos








Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















Nick Blackbourn 32




























Nick Blackbourn 33





advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























Nick Blackbourn 35













This













Nick Blackbourn 36



which







Concluding Remarks














Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

Primary




















Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 4
























Nick Blackbourn 5







the Soviet Union




1981













Nick Blackbourn 6


























Nick Blackbourn 7











th

March


He still thought



approach meant he











Nick Blackbourn 8










21

















Nick Blackbourn 9























Nick Blackbourn 10





that





competitionrdquo29














Nick Blackbourn 11


















meeting where







Nick Blackbourn 12





The Soviet





Gorbachev recalls

















Nick Blackbourn 13












now be considered













Nick Blackbourn 14



















Ronald Reaganrsquos








Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















Nick Blackbourn 32




























Nick Blackbourn 33





advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























Nick Blackbourn 35













This













Nick Blackbourn 36



which







Concluding Remarks














Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

Primary




















Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 5







the Soviet Union




1981













Nick Blackbourn 6


























Nick Blackbourn 7











th

March


He still thought



approach meant he











Nick Blackbourn 8










21

















Nick Blackbourn 9























Nick Blackbourn 10





that





competitionrdquo29














Nick Blackbourn 11


















meeting where







Nick Blackbourn 12





The Soviet





Gorbachev recalls

















Nick Blackbourn 13












now be considered













Nick Blackbourn 14



















Ronald Reaganrsquos








Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























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estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























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General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

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Nick Blackbourn 33





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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Nick Blackbourn 43























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Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






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problemsrdquo76










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estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























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Nick Blackbourn 31










86

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advantagerdquo90






















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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Bibliography

Primary




















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Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











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Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






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problemsrdquo76










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estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























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General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

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advantagerdquo90






















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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Bibliography

Primary




















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Nick Blackbourn 43























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now be considered













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Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






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Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










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estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























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Nick Blackbourn 31










86

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advantagerdquo90






















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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Bibliography

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Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











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that





competitionrdquo29














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now be considered













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Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















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problemsrdquo76










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estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















Nick Blackbourn 32




























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advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Bibliography

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Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























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now be considered













Nick Blackbourn 14



















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Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










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estimations









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86

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advantagerdquo90






















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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Bibliography

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Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























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meeting where







Nick Blackbourn 12





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Nick Blackbourn 13












now be considered













Nick Blackbourn 14



















Ronald Reaganrsquos








Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























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estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















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advantagerdquo90






















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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Bibliography

Primary




















Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 12





The Soviet





Gorbachev recalls

















Nick Blackbourn 13












now be considered













Nick Blackbourn 14



















Ronald Reaganrsquos








Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










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estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















Nick Blackbourn 32




























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advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























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Nick Blackbourn 36



which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

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Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 13












now be considered













Nick Blackbourn 14



















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Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















Nick Blackbourn 32




























Nick Blackbourn 33





advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























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This













Nick Blackbourn 36



which







Concluding Remarks














Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

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Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 14



















Ronald Reaganrsquos








Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















Nick Blackbourn 32




























Nick Blackbourn 33





advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























Nick Blackbourn 35













This













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which







Concluding Remarks














Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

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Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 15








own46


















Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















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Nick Blackbourn 33





advantagerdquo90






















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This













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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

Primary




















Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 16





from the military50




















Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















Nick Blackbourn 32




























Nick Blackbourn 33





advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























Nick Blackbourn 35













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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

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Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 17




















Summary





Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















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Nick Blackbourn 33





advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

Primary




















Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 18









power















Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















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advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

Primary




















Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 19






















these conclusions





Nick Blackbourn 20






















Superpowerrdquo p26



Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















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advantagerdquo90






















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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

Primary




















Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























Nick Blackbourn 44











Nick Blackbourn 20






















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Nick Blackbourn 21

















Soviet Union61








Nick Blackbourn 22

























Nick Blackbourn 23

























Nick Blackbourn 24



























Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























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estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























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General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

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advantagerdquo90






















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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Bibliography

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Secondary













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Nick Blackbourn 23

























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Nick Blackbourn 25






This significant




















Nick Blackbourn 26

















problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















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Nick Blackbourn 33





advantagerdquo90






















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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Bibliography

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Secondary













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problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























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estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

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advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






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110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

Primary




















Nick Blackbourn 42









Secondary













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problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









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General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

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advantagerdquo90






















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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






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110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Bibliography

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Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























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problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























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General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

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advantagerdquo90






















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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






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110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







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Bibliography

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Nick Blackbourn 43























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problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























Nick Blackbourn 28

















estimations









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Nick Blackbourn 30













General Odom














Nick Blackbourn 31










86

This


















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advantagerdquo90






















Nick Blackbourn 34


























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which







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Nick Blackbourn 37

























Nick Blackbourn 38


























Nick Blackbourn 39



conclusion






possibilityrdquo

110


















Nick Blackbourn 40







Nick Blackbourn 41

Bibliography

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Secondary













Nick Blackbourn 43























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problemsrdquo76










Nick Blackbourn 27



























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estimations









Nick Blackbourn 29


























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General Odom














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86

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advantagerdquo90






















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estimations









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estimations









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conclusion






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conclusion






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conclusion






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conclusion






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Soviet Defence Spending Estimations.pdf

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