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Soviet signals intelligence:Vehicular systems andoperationsDesmond Ball aa Head of the Strategic and Defence StudiesCentre, Australian National University,CanberraPublished online: 02 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Desmond Ball (1989) Soviet signals intelligence: Vehicularsystems and operations, Intelligence and National Security, 4:1, 5-27, DOI:10.1080/02684528908431982

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Soviet Signals Intelligence: VehicularSystems and Operations

DESMOND BALL

The Soviet Union employs an extraordinary range of facilities andplatforms for signals intelligence (Sigint) collection. Many of theseare essentially similar to those used by the US National SecurityAgency (NSA), the British Government Communications Headquarters(GCHO) and other Western Sigint agencies. However, the Soviet Sigintestablishment is several times larger than all its Western counterpartscombined, and maintains many more facilities and a greater variety ofsystems. For example, the Soviet Union maintains more than 500 Sigintground stations (nearly double the number of those maintained by theUS and UK combined); Sigint collection activities are conducted frommore than 100 Soviet diplomatic establishments in some 62 countries(compared with similar US operations in some three dozen diplomaticestablishments); the Soviet Union currently maintains three distinctSigint satellite programmes; and some 20" Soviet aircraft types, withseveral additional variants, are involved in Sigint activities.1

In other cases, however, the Soviet Union employs certain Sigintplatforms for which there are really no Western equivalents. Forexample, whereas the Soviets maintain some 60 dedicated Sigint vessels(and numerous other ships with significant Sigint collection capabilities),the US decommissioned its Sigint ships in 1969, following the Israeliattack on the Liberty on 8 June 1967 and the North Korean capture ofthe Pueblo on 23 January 1968. And whereas the Soviet Union andits Warsaw Pact allies operate a variety of vehicles equipped withSigint systems in many Western countries, there are of course noequivalent Western vehicular Sigint operations inside the USSR orEastern Europe.

Vehicles are commonly used for a wide variety of civil and militaryradio monitoring purposes. For example, vans with intercept and direc-tion finding (DF) systems are used for detecting and locating transmis-sions in unauthorized civil radio frequency bands, which interfere withair and marine navigation signals, or which are otherwise illegal. Andwith respect to tactical or battlefield support Sigint systems, for example,the US Army operates the AN/MSQ-103 Teampack, AN/TSQ-109

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6 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

AGTELIS, AN/TSQ-112 TACELIS and AN/TSQ-114 Trailblazermobile Sigint systems.

Similarly, the Soviet Union maintains an extensive variety of land-transportable systems. The most advanced of these arc the Fix SixA and Fix Eight HF-DF systems, which are Adcock arrays consist-ing respectively of six and eight vertically polarized dipole antennaelements deployed around a transporter/control and processing truck.A second type of Soviet mobile Sigint system is represented by theRing Two and Loop Three HF-DF arrays, which consist respectivelyof two DF loops and three DF loops mounted on towed vans. Inaddition, the Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground forces maintain numeroussorts of tactical VHF radio and radar DF systems (such as the PoleDish) mounted on trucks. In 1981, the Chairman of the US JointChiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, reported that the Sovietground forces were deploying 'a new series of improved SIGINTvehicles'.2

However, the Soviet and allied vehicular Sigint operations which areessentially unique and which are most interesting arc those which involvecovert activities within Western countries.

Soviet and allied use of vehicles for Sigint purposes is particular-ly widespread in Europe and North America. Operations have beenspecifically identified in France, Turkey, West Germany, Belgium, theNetherlands, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Aus-tria, Canada, Mexico and the United Slates; they have involved mobileSigint units of both the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB),or Committee for State Security, and the Glavnoye RazvedyvatelnoyeUpravleniye (GRU) or Chief Intelligence Directorate of the SovietGeneral Staff. In addition to Soviet vehicular Sigint activities, Sigint-equipped vehicles are also used by Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary,Poland, Czechoslovakia, and, to a lesser extent, Romania. The types ofvehicles used include vans and lorries, long-distance transport trucks,Winnebagos or mobile homes, and ordinary cars. The activities includecounter-espionage and counter-intelligence operations as well as themonitoring of governmental and military communications centres, mili-tary exercises, weapons research and development facilities, and testranges.

Vehicles have a number of important attractions as Sigint platforms.They are very cheap compared with other systems. They can be parkedclose to emission sources and hence monitor signals which would other-wise be inaccessible. They can be operated clandestinely to avoid directcounter-action. And if detected by counter-intelligence authorities, theycan frequently claim diplomatic or other immunity from inspection orphysical obstruction.

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SOVIET SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 7

COUNTER-ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

The Soviet use of Sigint vehicles outside the USSR itself beganon a large-scale in the mid-1950s in connection with various counter-espionage and counter-intelligence operations. The most important -and successful - of these involved the use of vans equipped with inter-ception and DF systems for locating the sources of clandestine radiotransmissions; the use of cars and vans to monitor the radio commu-nications of the security and counter-intelligence services in situationswhere those services are conducting surveillance of Soviet intelligenceoperations; and the use of vans designed to detect the operation of radioreceivers by suspected agents or the presence of receivers and othersignal monitoring equipment in buildings occupied by agencies of othergovernments (such as US or British Embassies in Eastern Europe).

The capabilities of intercept and DF vans operated by the GRU weredemonstrated in Syria in 1964-65, when GRU mobile radio direction-finding (DF) units assisted the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate(GID) or the Syrian State Security Organization in a major counter-espionage operation.

In mid-1964, the GID became aware that unauthorized radio signalswere being transmitted from somewhere near the headquarters of theSyrian General Staff in the Abu-Rummanah district in Damascus.However, the Counter-intelligence and1 Communications Branch of theGID was unable to locate the source of the transmissions, and inDecember 1964 requested assistance from the Soviet 'advisers' who hadarrived in Syria in 1962.3

The source of the transmissions was Eli Cohen, one of Israel's mostsuccessful espionage agents, who arrived in Damascus in January 1962and whose apartment in Abu-Rummanah contained a radio transceiverfor communication with Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv.

The GRU DF units were reportedly equipped with the 'very latestradio detection vans',4 which they may have already had stationed inSyria or which may have been 'specially sent from Moscow'.5 Theseunits quickly detected the unauthorized signals, and on 21 January 1965Cohen was arrested in the course of a transmission to Tel Aviv. Cohen'stransmitter operated on both electricity and battery-power. In orderto locate the transmitter precisely, the GRU units directed that theelectricity in Damascus be turned off. Because electrical power failureswere relatively frequent in Damascus, Cohen accorded it no attentionand simply used battery-power instead. Hence:

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Locating him was easy: his transmitter was virtually the only radiostill in operation.

Having positive identification of Eli's building as the sourceof the transmissions, the Russians advised the Syrian counter-intelligence men to search the rooftop. It was then that theystumbled on the radio aerial leading to Eli Cohen's apartment.6

Cohen was executed by public hanging in the main square of Damascuson 19 May l%5.7

Similar GRU radio detection vans were used to locate another Israeliespionage agent, Wolfgang Lotz, who operated in Cairo from December1960 until his arrest on 22 February 1965 - a month after the arrestof Cohen in Damascus." (Lotz was tried in Cairo in July 1965 andsentenced to life imprisonment; he was released in 1968 as part ofthe Israeli-Egyptian exchange of prisoners captured during the June1967 War.)

The use of cars and vans for monitoring the radio communicationsof Western security services during espionage operations first becameapparent in Canada in the mid-1960s, when the Royal Canadian Mount-ed Police (RCMP) Security Service concluded that this provided the onlypossible explanation for a recent succession of unsuccessful counter-espionage operations. The RCMP Security Service had determinednot only that both the KGB and GRU'maintained local electronicsurveillance posts within the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa to monitorand record the radio communications of the Service, but also thatboth 'had portable monitoring equipment for the times the embassywas out of reach'.''

On 13 February 1966, for example, the Surveillance Section (alsoknown as the Watcher Service or I Ops) had observed a meetingbetween a Canadian government employee and Eugeni Kourianov,a GRU agent-running officer, and instituted Operation Gold Dust,designed to catch the agent in the process of passing classified materialto Kourianov. However, the GRU had evidently realized that themeeting had been observed and Kourianov failed to appear at a sub-sequent meeting with the agent scheduled for 27 March.10 At thistime, the Watchers used only a single frequency each day and hadnot yet acquired scrambling equipment. It seems that before meetingan agent,

[the GRU would) park an empty car near the meet with a radiotuned to the Watcher Service frequency and a tape machinerecording any transmissions. The Soviets would recover the carafter the meet and replay the tape with the watcher's chatter onit."

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SOVIET SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 9

Kourianov would have known from the tape of the February meetingthat he and his agent were under surveillance, and hence he decidedagainst any further meeting; he soon returned to Moscow, with less thanhalf his normal term in Ottawa completed.12

Finally, it seems that the Soviets began using vans for the detection ofcovert radio receiving systems in 1960-61. According to Peter Wright, aformer assistant director of M15, he had in 1957-58 conceived of a meansof determining whether covert reception equipment was being operatedby transmitting on the presumed frequency and monitoring emissionsfrom the local oscillator in the receiver.11 The CIA was informed of thetechnique, now instituted as Operation Rafter, in 1961. At aboutthe same time, Wright also informed the CIA that he was sure thatthe KGB had developed a similar technique and were using it to locateCIA agents in Poland who used HF radio receivers for communicationsfrom the CIA. According to Wright. MI6 had a source inside the PolishIntelligence Service who had described to MI6 a joint Polish-Sovietinvestigation of a suspected agent:

Toward the end. when they were closing in on the suspect agent,the KGB brought a van up to the apartment building where thespy lived. The UB [Polish Intelligence Service), according to theMI6 source, were never allowed to see inside the van, but he knewenough to guess that it had something to do with radio detection.14

The CIA concluded that Soviet Rafter-type operations must have com-promised many of its agents in Poland (and presumably elsewhere inEastern Europe).15

EUROPEAN OPERATIONS

Soviet and other Eastern European Sigint-equipped vehicles have virtu-ally unconstrained access throughout most of Western Europe. Indeed,this is essentially guaranteed by a number of inter-governmentaland commercial agreements and conventions. In West Germany, forexample. East Germans arc not considered foreigners and hence are ableto 'stay as long as they want' and to 'roam at will ' ."1 Cars equippedwith electronic monitoring systems have been parked by East Germansoutside the research and development laboratories of certain WestGerman Sigint companies and left for several days to monitor and recordemissions from the laboratories.

The GRU is allowed relatively free movement throughout WestGermany under a 1947 agreement between the United States, theSoviet Union, France and Britain which permits the Soviets to maintainthree Soviet Military Liaison Missions (SMLMs) - in Frankfurt, Baden

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Baden, and Bunde - and to observe military activities within the FederalRepublic.17 In 1984, the SMLMs made 2,477 intelligence collectionsorties within West Germany.18 Although some areas with particularconcentrations of military and intelligence installations are declaredoff-limits to the Missions, the restrictions are frequently ignored bythem. In 1984, for example, there were 98 cases in which members of theMissions were caught in restricted areas. '*' The SMLMs evince particularinterest in military bases, US missile sites, communications stations andsignal centres, and training areas when being used for exercises andmanoeuvres. The cars used by the Missions arc reportedly 'heavily laden'with electronic surveillance devices and tape recorders.20

More generally, since the Soviet Union and its Eastern Europeanallies joined the Geneva-based International Road Transport Union(IRTU) in the mid-1970s, the number and scope of espionage opera-tions involving trucks and lorries in Western Europe has increasedenormously. Members of the IRTU are entitled to send trucks bearing'TIR' (Transports International Routiers) licence plates on internationalroutes with a minimum of customs formalities.21 (Customs authoritiesdo have the right to inspect vehicles travelling under the TIR carnet.but 'only if there is a clear cause for suspicion').22 The number of tripsis limited by bilateral accords. In the case of Belgium, for example, theallowances arc 2,200 per year from Czechoslovakia, 1,800 from theSoviet Union, 900 from Poland, 650 from Hungary, 500 from Romania,and 300 from Bulgaria.21

The number of Soviet and Eastern European trucks entering WesternEurope in recent years has reached some 350,000 a year.24

Western European security and intelligence officials are disinclinedto publish their specific estimates of the number of these trucks typicallyengaged in intelligence collection, but it is generally agreed to be of theorder of 1-2 per cent, or 3,500-7,000 a year. These vehicular intelligencecollection operations involve a wide range of activities:

• systematic reconnaissance of road networks and other trans-portation systems. A Soviet truck checked by police in Austria,for example, contained equipment for measuring the widthsand strengths of road surfaces as well as for measuring theweight-carrying capacities of bridges;25

• reconnaissance of areas which are off-limits to accredited mili-tary attaches (and the SMLMs in West Germany);

• photographic observation of major strategic installations, suchas military headquarters, ammunition and fuel depots, com-munication centres, etc.;

• monitoring of exercises and troop movements;

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SOVIET SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 11

• familiarization tours by Spetsnaz personnel;• transport of people and goods to Soviet agents, clandestine

movement of people and material, and general support forillegal operations;

• locating and registering key political and military personnel forelimination at the outset of a major war in Europe;

• locating precisely particular military and infrastructure facilitiesfor purposes of targeting and/or calibration of electronic andother monitoring systems. For example, since 1982, a series ofSoviet and East German brightly coloured trucks has beenobserved in Sweden which are equipped with l-square metremetallic reflectors designed to contrast sharply with the colour ofthe canopy. Swedish security intelligence authorities concludedin 1987 that these trucks were used by Soviet photograhicintelligence (Photint) and Sigint analysts to calibrate imageryand signals recorded by Soviet photographic and Elint satellitesmonitoring Swedish military bases and radar and communi-cations sites.2'1

• Sigint collection.

It is not possible to determine precisely the number of Soviet andEastern European trucks operating in Western Europe which are dedi-cated to Sigint collection as their primary intelligence mission. A largeproportion of these trucks is equipped with some sort of electronicmonitoring equipment. Usually, however, this consists of little morethan radar detectors and frequency scanners designed to avoid detec-tion of any illegal or suspicious behaviour or otherwise to supportthe primary espionage missions. The proportion of espionage trucksdedicated primarily to Sigint collection is probably around l(>-20 percent - some 7(K) a year. Given that these vehicles stay in WesternEurope for some two weeks or more, this means that on average thereare about two trucks collecting Sigint in each country in Western Europeat any given time.

In practice, of course, not all the countries in Western Europe aresubject to equal attention. West Germany is the single most importanttarget country. Special attention is accorded to recording airfield trafficcontrol radar emissions; to monitoring communications to and frommilitary bases, weapons storage sites, and early-warning and intelligencefacilities; and to monitoring major strategic communications centres(such as Frankfurt, Augsburg and Pirmasens) and relay towers in thepublic telephone and telegraph (PTT) system.

In addition to the Soviet and East German Sigint trucks, the EastGerman cars and the SMLM vehicles. West German authorities have

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also found Soviet trucks with diplomatic licence plates to be engaged inSigint collection.

The most celebrated incident of this sort occurred in July 1984, andinvolved a major diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Unionand both West Germany and Switzerland. On 11 July 1984 a nine-tontruck with a two-man crew and bearing the 'Sovtransauto' emblem ofthe Soviet state transport company crossed into West Germany fromEast Germany. The Soviets claimed that the truck carried diplomaticbaggage destined for the Soviet Mission to the United Nations inGeneva, and after an overnight stop at the Soviet Embassy in Bonn,the truck crossed into Switzerland on 13 July. According to WestGerman authorities, however, instead of proceeding directly to Geneva,the truck 'made an unexplained detour' to a Swiss military air baseat Duebendorf, near Zurich. When it arrived in Geneva, the Swissauthorities refused to allow it to unload without inspection by them onthe grounds that a truck with nine tons of cargo could not be regardedas 'diplomatic pouch'.27

The truck returned unopened to West Germany, via Basel, on 18 July,and was detained at the West German border checkpoint at Helmstedton 19 July. The West German authorities demanded that the truck beopened for inspection before proceeding back into East Germany, butthe Soviets insisted on claiming diplomatic immunity. According to anofficial Soviet description of the cargo given to the West Germanauthorities, the cargo consisted of 207 packages containing radio trans-mitting and receiving equipment, parts for a cipher machine, 'standardelectrical and technical equipment', and other goods for furnishing a newbuilding at the Geneva mission. The impasse was resolved on 22 Julyunder a compromise arrangement whereby the truck was opened withinthe grounds of the Soviet Embassy, and West German customs officialscounted and photographed the packages, but were not allowed to openthem. The truck returned to East Germany on 23 July.28 According toWest German counter-intelligence officials, the primary Sigint missionof the truck had been to monitor and record signal characteristics andspectral patterns at Swiss and West German airports and signal sites forsubsequent Sigint collection operations.

Scandinavia is also a major target for vehicular Sigint operations,with missions being undertaken in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Den-mark, and involving Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian and Roma-nian trucks. In Sweden, vehicular espionage operations have become amajor national issue, and numerous instances of vehicular Sigint activ-ities have been cited in the Parliament (Riksdag) and the media29 - ofwhich the following are intended to illustrate the scope and characterof these activities:

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SOVIET SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 13

• Covert Swedish examinations of Warsaw Pact trucks used forSigint purposes have found broad-band antennae mounted onthe sides of the trailers, and receivers and tape recorders insidethe trailers. The equipment is particularly sensitive, and isdesigned to scan the HF, VHF and UHF bands, to recordradio signals and radar emissions, and to monitor telecommuni-cations.30

• The meanderings around the Swedish countryside of EasternEuropean trucks 'fully equipped with signal equipment' takesthem 'suspiciously close to restricted military zones' and has 'ap-parently coincided with the testing of the latest radio equipmentby the army'.31

• In an incident near Kristianstad, in southern Sweden, a Sovietsemi-trailer was observed parked on a minor road, and localSwedish truck drivers concocted a ruse to 'accidentally' pull offthe tarpaulin covering the trailer. Inside the trailer were fivemen and extensive electronic equipment. The site was well-suited for monitoring signals from various defence installationsand army units in the area, as well as the navy base at Karlskronaand navy vessels operating in the area between the islands ofOland and Bornholm.32

• On 25 November 1986, a Soviet semi-trailer was observed ran-domly driving on minor roads near'Bergslagen, before parkingnext to a military training and live-firing range. Tests were underway involving remote-controlled robots. The Soviet semi-trailerwas 'within easy radio monitoring distance'.33

In Denmark, in addition to the use of the TIR trucks, the KGBand GRU have made particular use of Lada cars. In the early 1970s,the Soviets began to promote sales of Ladas in Denmark to provide acover for intelligence activities. Soviet 'test drivers' and 'specialists* areused to test the roadworthiness of successive models of the cars underDanish conditions - an exercise which leads to numerous 'breakdowns'throughout the Danish countryside. According to a report on the use ofthe Lada cars for intelligence collection in Denmark in 1978:

By a curious coincidence, the breakdowns nearly always seemedto take place on the outskirts of Nato installations or Danishdefence sites. The Lada cars seemed particularly unable to copewith the terrain around the Nato base at Frederikshavn, andthe bases at Skrydswtrup and Karup, and the military airfieldat Alborg.

Only a Soviet 'specialist' could get the cars going again. Theexact nature of the tools used by these specialists is not known.

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but the Danish authorities observed that they lugged around withthem large quantities of sophisticated electronic equipment ofa kind more likely to be used for radio monitoring than fortuning cars.34

In Norway, Soviet trucks/ have conducted electronic surveillanceof military bases, early-warning and communications stations, andUS-Norwegian Sigint sites. Particular attention is accorded to facilitiesin northern Norway, such as the air and naval bases at Bodo, Narvik andTromso, and the Sigint station near Fauske on the main northernhighway. In 1984, for example. General Ulf Berg, the military com-mander in northern Norway reported that 'two Soviet tractor-trailersremained parked for 48 hours at nearby Olavsvern after delivering asmall supply of capelin (a North Sea fish) at Tromso, one of Norway'smost important naval bases.'35 As General Berg noted, commercialconsiderations could not have justified such as a long drive. The mostlikely explanation for the exercise was that the vehicle was monitoringradio activity associated with the operation of the Tromso base.

Bulgarian vehicles evidently have a particular responsibility for tech-nical collection operations in France, Austria, Greece and Turkey. (It isnoteworthy that Soviet fixed Sigint stations in Bulgaria are also primarilydirected toward signals emanating from Greece and Turkey.) Turkishintelligence officers, for example, established in 1987 that 'Bulgarianagents were using sealed international transport trucks from their state-owned trucking company in many operations, [including] gatheringelectronic intelligence'.36

In Austria, the Special Branch of the State Police (Staatspolizei)observed in 1983-84 that Soviet and Bulgarian trucks, described as'mobile spy centres' in the Austrian press, were typically taking atleast 5-6 days to cross the country. Surveillance of these trucks led theSpecial Branch to conclude that they were equipped with 'sophisticatedelectronic equipment for recording radio signals and radar pulses as wellas for listening in to telephone conversations'.37

In France, counter-intelligence officials have confirmed the use ofboth Soviet and Bulgarian trucks for Sigint collection. In 1985-86, forexample, French counter-intelligence officers became aware of 'Soviet-registered long-distance delivery trucks driving around in the extremenorthwest corner of the country with instructions to pick up non-existentcargo in Brest and Saint-Nazaire'.3K There are numerous strategic instal-lations in the Brest area, including the Headquarters of the NavalCommander-in-Chief Atlantic Region, the primary radio station fortransmission of submarine and fleet communications to the northeastAtlantic, a major air defence control and reporting centre, and the

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SOVIET SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 15

home base for the French Force Oceanique Strategique (FOST, strategicballistic missile submarine force). French authorities have concluded thatat least some of the Soviet trucks operating in the Brest/Saint-Nazairearea have been involved in Sigint activities.

In 1983, French counter-intelligence authorities became so concernedabout Bulgarian truck activities that a major operation was planned tostop and check all Bulgarian trucks present in France on 26 October1983. Under the IRTU arrangements negotiated between Bulgaria andFrance in 1977, Bulgaria is permitted 4,5(M) TIR return journeys intoFrance each year. It seems that Bulgarian trucks began extensive Sigintoperations in France after April 1983, when 47 Soviet diplomats andcommercial staff were expelled from France for espionage. As theEconomist Intelligence Unit reported in May 1984:

Bulgaria is playing a role in gathering information for the Sovietblock in France. Some Bulgarian long-distance trucks are special-ly equipped with cameras and detection systems for use whentheir routes take them past sensitive French military and civilianinstallations.1''

Bulgarian trucks were soon noticed parked outside a variety of sensitivemilitary and intelligence installations, including the naval facilities atBrest; the naval base and communications.ccntre at Toulon; the S-3intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) silos, command posts andcommunications centres on the Plateau d'Albion; the headquarters ofthe Armee de I'Air (French Air Force) in Paris; and the offices ofthe Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieurc (DGSE. the Frenchexternal intelligence service), in Boulevard Mortier, some 6.5 km eastof the centre of Paris. Despite the concerns of the DGSE and the will-ingness of the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST, Frenchsecurity intelligence service), police and Customs Service to co-operatein the operation planned for 26 October 1983, it was cancelled by thegovernment on 25 October after it had decided not to risk diplomaticand commercial confrontation with Bulgaria.4"

AMERICAN OPERATIONS

In the Western hemisphere, Soviet and Eastern European vehiclesinvolved in Sigint operations have been reported in Canada, Mexicoand the United States, as well as in Nicaragua, where they are used insupport of Nicaraguan military planning and operations. For example, acomplex of intercept vans is located at the Sigint facility at Santa Maria,just south of Managua.41

In Mexico, which is used by both the KGB and GRU as a major

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base for espionage operations against the United States, Winnebagosor self-contained mobile homes belonging to personnel from the SovietEmbassy in Mexico City are a fairly common sight at various placesalong the US-Mexico border, such as Ciudad Juarez, Naco, San LuisRio Colorado, and Tijuana.

Ciudad Juarez is about eight miles south-west of Fort Bliss andabout 40 miles south of Holloman Air Force Base and the WhiteSands Missile Range in New Mexico. Holloman Air Force Base isthe site of the Armament Division of the 6585th Test Group of theUS Air Force Systems Command, which is responsible for test andevaluation of navigational and guidance systems for missile re-entryvehicles (RVs); and of the 1025th Satellite Communications Squad-ron (Mobile) of 1 Space Wing of Headquarters US Air Force SpaceCommand, which maintains and operates six Mobile Ground Terminals(MGTs) as part of the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite early-warning system.42

The White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) is the 'largest overlandmissile test centre in North America'.4-1 The Range has been involved inthe development of every Army nuclear missile, including the PershingIRBM, the Sprint anti-ballistic missile (ABM), the Patriot air defencemissile, and tactical and anti-tactical missiles. It is equipped with morethan 3,000 precisely surveyed instrumentation sites, 11 microwave relaystations, three telemetry reception sites, 14 tracking telescope sites, 20video camera sites, and 18 radars.44 According to a report on NBCNightly News on 19 August 1986, 'Army sources say commands fromcontrollers at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico have occasion-ally been the target of Soviet mobile spy units, large vans clandestinelyoperated just across the Mexican border'.45

In fact, officials at WSMR have stated that the appearance of theseSoviet vans is more than 'occasional'. According to Major General J.M.Bunyard, Patriot Project Director, '[It is] a regular occurrence. Everytime there is a missile test at White Sands, the vans with telemetry-intercept equipment roll right up to the border'.40

The Soviet vans which operate near Naco are concerned with signalsfrom Fort Huachuca, Arizona, some 30 miles to the north-west. FortHuachuca is the location of the Headquarters Army CommunicationsCommand, which is responsible for all US Army non-tactical communi-cations worldwide, including communications concerning nuclear weap-ons command and control;47 the US Army's Electronic Proving Ground,which is responsible for test and evaluation of US Army electronicequipment; the US Army's Directorate of Combat Developments; andthe US Army Intelligence Center and School (USA1CS).

San Luis Rio Colorado and Tijuana are also well-placed for vehicular

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Sigint activities. The former is just 20 miles south-west of the YumaMarine Corps Air Station and 50 miles south of the Yuma ProvingGround, used for development and testing of artillery and air-deliveredweapons and of the Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation satellitesystem. Tijuana is about eight miles south-east of the Imperial BeachRadio Station and some 16-26 miles south-east of numerous defencefacilities in the San Diego area - including the Naval Air Stations atNorth Island and Miramar, the submarine base and carrier homeport,the Naval Amphibious Base, the Naval Electronics Systems EngineeringCenter, the Naval Ocean Systems Center, and the Naval Communica-tions Station (NAVCOMSTA).

With regard to vehicular Sigint operations within the United Statesitself, NBC Nightly News reported on 19 August 1986 that 'Intelligenceofficials believe such vans are operating in the United States as well'.48

For example, it was reported in May 1978 that the Soviet Consulate inSan Francisco possessed vans equipped with portable, 3-4 foot diameter,highly directional microwave dishes for monitoring telecommunicationswithin the Bay Area. According to these reports, the vans operatednear the American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) Long Linesmicrowave tower at Bcrnal Heights, as well as within line-of-sight oftransmissions from Grizzley Peak behind Berkeley, and Sierra Marina,near Woodside, south of Bcrnal Heights.41' More recently, it has beennoted that vans from the Consulate have evidently been parked outsideaerospace plants in Silicon Valley.50 There is also evidence that KGBofficers based in New York have used Sigint-equipped vehicles tomonitor the downlinks to the RCA (now General Electric) Americom,Western Union Westar, and Contcl American Satellite Corporationcommercial satellite ground stations in Vernon Valley, New Jersey,as well as the microwave links between these stations and New YorkCity.5'

Perhaps the most extraordinary recent incident involved a Czecho-slovak Tatra truck which toured the United States from 17 July to 2December 1987. The truck, which was in the course of a round-the-worldtour to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the manufacture of the firstTatra automobile in Czechoslovakia, was manned by a crew of five,including a driver, a military pilot and two Czech Communist Partyofficials. It carried an ultra-light aircraft and was equipped with extensiveelectronic equipment.52

The truck arrived in the United States at Niagara Falls on 17 July1987, and was trailed by a large contingent of FBI and NSA agents asit toured through some 17 states, parking near numerous military bases,communications stations and defence industries on the way. Accordingto NBC Nightly News, for example:

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Agents assigned to the case say when the Czechs came to SanDiego, they parked [tjhere for days, just a few hundred feet froma key naval communications center for the Pacific fleet, and justacross the water from the big North Island Naval Air Station.53

The FBI and NSA agents were even more disturbed by the fact that onat least two occasions the ultra-light aircraft was flown by the Czech pilotin the vicinity of two major US strategic military complexes - Omaha,Nebraska, location of Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters andnumerous ancillary installations; and Durango, Colorado, some 180miles south-west of the US Air Force Space Command and North Ameri-can Air Defense (NORAD) complex in the Colorado Springs area.54

On 1 December 1987, the evening before the truck crossed theborder from the United States into Mexico, it was thoroughly searchedby US Customs agents at Nogales, According to the Customs authorities,acting on information provided by the FBI/NSA contingent, they 'werelooking for some electronic spy equipment that could lead to espionagecharges against the Czechs'.55 However, although the ultra-light aircraftwas found stowed under the truck, the vehicle contained no electronicequipment'that could be used as evidence in court'.56 US intelligenceauthorities have since concluded that the Czechs had become aware ofthe FBI/NSA surveillance, and had unloaded all incriminating elec-tronic intelligence equipment at the Soviet Consulate in San Franciscoduring a two-day stay at the Consulate. In any event, a month afterthe Czech Tatra left the US, a Czech van 'loaded with electronic gear'but manned by Czech diplomats and accorded diplomatic immunity alsocrossed the border into Mexico, evidently to re-equip the Tatra with itsmonitoring systems for use as it continued its sojourn through Mexicoand thence Central and South America.57

According to US State Department officials, the Tatra exercise was'an eavesdropping venture' specifically arranged as part of a new effortdesigned to circumvent recent restrictions imposed by the State Depart-ment on Eastern bloc diplomatic travel within the United States.Although travel restrictions had been applied against Soviet diploma-tic, consular, trade and other official personnel since the mid-1940s,officials from other Eastern bloc missions were allowed essentiallyunconstrained movement throughout the United States. However, inDecember 1985, the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) of the StateDepartment

. . . imposed . . . travel service requirements on East German,Polish, Czech, and Bulgarian officers assigned to their diplomatic,consular, commercial, [and] U.N. missions, as well as on thoseassigned to other governmental offices. Travel for all these foreign

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missions is confined to a 25-mile radius of their headquarters cityabsent prior approval . . . .

All travel requests are now subject to prior review by nationalsecurity agencies. This provides, for the first time, an opportunityfor the Department of Defense to have prior knowledge of alltravel and to make an informed assessment of the security threat

Normally 48 hours is required for either notice or approval;however, such a time period could be of any reasonable length.In the case of the Soviet Union, 18 hours advance notification is[required under reciprocal agreement].58

Some State Department officials believe that before these restrictionswere imposed in December 1985, 'Czech diplomats would spend theirsummer vacations in the western US, travelling in rented Winnebagosbelieved to have been rigged for eavesdropping missions'.59 Theseofficials believe that since the new restrictions were imposed, theseoperations have been conducted by 'Czech tourists'/1"

CONCLUSIONS

The ability to conduct clandestine and sustained vehicular-based Sigintoperations on an extensive scale in the West provides the Soviet andEastern European Sigint community with unparalleled access to a widerange of interesting communications and other signals. At any giventime, there are likely to be about 30 vehicles specifically equippedfor Sigint collection operating within Western Europe, and perhapsanother half a dozen or so in Mexico, Canada and the United States.Together with the use of embassies and other diplomatic establishments(consulates, trade missions, residences, etc) throughout the West, theypermit a comprehensive coverage of signals that would otherwise beinaccessible from outside national borders.

Despite the extensive scale of these activities, and, indeed, the impu-dent and contemptuous nature of the practice. Western authorities havemade little serious attempt to stop them. The fact that such operationsare frequently planned in close conjunction with the facilities providedby diplomatic establishments greatly complicates Western efforts tocounter them. Trucks equipped with Sigint systems are able to operatewith diplomatic immunity under the pretext of delivering 'diplomaticbaggage' to missions in Western Europe. Truck crews engaged inSigint activities are able to use diplomatic establishments for rest andrecuperation; for transferring tape recordings of interesting signals fordispatch back to Moscow or other processing and analysis centres;

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and sometimes even for depositing incriminating equipment where itis thought that a particular Sigint operation may have been detected byWestern counter-intelligence authorities. In some cases, of course, theuse of Sigint-equipped cars and vans is an integral element of espionageoperations conducted by the KGB and GRU from Soviet diplomaticmissions - as evinced by the Soviet espionage activities in Ottawa inthe mid-1960s.

However, the involvement of diplomatic facilities with vehicular Sigintactivities need not prevent counteraction. The identification of largetrucks as 'diplomatic pouches' should be quite unacceptable. As a WestGerman official stated in July 1984, when Swiss and West Germanauthorities had refused to accept a nine-ton Sovtransauto truck as'diplomatic baggage', 'We think that an entire truck is not diplomaticpost. The rules are that diplomatic baggage and mail cannot be violated.But we cannot accept that an entire truck constitutes a mail bag'.61

As noted above, this incident was resolved by a compromise arrange-ment whereby the truck was opened within the grounds of the SovietEmbassy in Bonn, and its freight of 207 packages photographed, butthe packages themselves remained inviolate. Although the West Ger-man Foreign Ministry was quite satisfied with this compromise, it wasreached over the protests of some West German security officials, whoargued for the right to open and inspect the contents of the packagesthemselves - both to expose the Sigint operations publicly and to assessthe characteristics and capabilities of the equipment itself.

The extraordinary scale of these vehicular Sigint operations has alsoinduced resignation. Western authorities generally lack the resources tomonitor the enormous volume of Soviet and Eastern European vehiclemovements. An average of about I ,(XK) trucks with TIR registrations cur-rently enter Western Europe each day, and the number of other vehiclesis much greater again. It is simply impracticable for Western Europeancustoms and security authorities to inspect all incoming vehicles. Asan official of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior has stated, whendiscussing the use of vehicles for espionage operations in Austria:

We do know of their existence but we are not in a position to checkeach and every semi-trailer truck from the East in order to establishwhether it carries suspicious technical equipment on board. Thiswould cause tremendous traffic chaos as a consequence, let alonethe fact that we would not possess the personnel that would berequired to carry out such checks/'2

In other cases. West European officials have conceded that, given theenormity of the problem, constraints placed on particular types of vehiclemovements would simply lead to the use of other types of vehicles. As

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Colonel Einar Lyth, Commander-in-Chief of the Orebro military regionwest of Stockholm, noted in March 1987, 'We cannot have special rulesfor the T1R lorry drivers from the Eastern bloc . . . . Even if we succeedin curbing the espionage from the T1R trucks they will soon start usingSwedish registered cars'.63

Moreover, even where vehicles are reasonably suspected of beinginvolved in Sigint activities, the resources required to monitor them areprohibitive. In the case of the Czech Tatra truck in the United Statesin July-December 1987, for example, the joint FBI/NSA surveillanceeffort required 'more than 100' personnel and some 20 'chase cars andvans'.64 It is obvious that any comprehensive surveillance effort wouldbe infeasible.

Commercial considerations, too, at least in Western Europe, militatestrongly against any serious attempts to counter East bloc vehicularespionage activities. The IRTU regulations governing intra-Europeantruck movements are specifically designed to minimize customs for-malities. As a Swedish government spokesman stated in March 1987,'Our customs authorities do have the right to investigate vehicles travel-ling under the TIR carnet, but only if there is a clear cause for sus-picion'/'5

And as the chief of Customs at the major West German border postat Hclmstedt stated in an interview with S(em magazine published inJanuary 1986, 'We carry out checks only on compelling suspicion ofcustoms violations'/16

In practice, 'compelling suspicions' arise only very infrequently, andborder controls are essentially limited to checking documents and theroadworthiness of the Eastern bloc vehicles. According to the January1986 Stern report, Soviet and Eastern European trucks entering WestGermany at Helmstedt had not had their cargoes inspected since 1982,when time-consuming checks had brought strong protests, because theWest German government 'does not want to endanger East bloc tradeand fears political retaliation'.67 According to Stern, the West GermanEconomics Ministry had ordered that 'on no grounds should overlandtrade be disrupted'.6"

It is possible, however, to institute far more rigorous control mecha-nisms and procedures which would not interfere with genuine commerce.For example, the Swedish Ministry of Defence has proposed that strictrouting systems be established that would limit Eastern bloc vehiculartraffic to specifically designated routes, arranged to keep them well awayfrom sensitive military and strategic sites. It has also proposed that atime limit be imposed on the period for which a vehicle can stay in thecountry.6*' It should not be necessary for Soviet trucks to take 'up to fourdays' to travel the 100-150 km between the West German border and

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the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands;70 or for Soviet and Bulgariantrucks to take 5-6 days to cross through Austria.71 The Swedish DefenceMinistry has reportedly ulso proposed the establishment of a 'specialcomputerized data network that would track the East bloc trucks, theirdrivers and cargo once they enter Sweden'.72 It would be worthwhileto consider the implementation of such a system throughout the wholeof Western Europe. Indeed, the efficiency and effectiveness of anysuch scheme would be dependent upon the extent of participation andco-operation of the West European countries.

In the United States, the imposition of stringent travel restrictionson East German, Polish, Czech and Bulgarian official personnel inDecember 1985, in conjunction with the erstwhile restrictions on Sovietmovements in the Washington, New York and San Francisco areas, hasproved to be a significant impediment to Eastern bloc long-distancevehicular espionage operations. In particular, procedures are now ineffect to alert the FBI, CIA and the Department of Defense (includingthe NSA) to forthcoming travel by Eastern bloc personnel. It should berecognized, however, that these restrictions remain deficient in severalimportant respects.

To begin with, there is still essential freedom of movement within 25miles of each particular mission. The OFM regulations cannot prohibita van from the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco parking within comfort-able monitoring range of San Francisco's central microwave station atBernal Heights; or a Soviet van in transit between the Soviet residentialcomplex in Riverdale in the Bronx and the 'recreational facilities' at GlenCove and Oyster Bay in Long Island Parking en route near the majorAmerican Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) microwave relay tower atRoslyn Harbor some five miles south of Glen Cove.

Second, the current restrictions do not apply to Hungarian and Roma-nian personnel. The rationale for these exemptions was explained inan exchange between the Chairman of the Permanent Subcommitteeon Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,Senator William V. Roth, and the Director of the OFM, James E. Nolan,on 5 December 1985:

Chairman Roth: Why were these restrictions not applied toHungary and Romania?Mr Nolan: We, in co-ordination with the intelligence community,made assessments of where we thought the priority concerns were.We have put both Romania and Hungary, for example on noticethat if there is evidence of intelligence activity, they will jointhe other group in the restraints. But our assessment was thatwe should begin putting these on in a gradual way, and give

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some incentives, perhaps, for less terrible performance and someincentives to behave.Chairman Roth: Arc you at all concerned, that by leaving themout, that these two countries will be put under tremendous pressureby the Soviet Union to use their personnel and facilities forespionage? It almost invites that possibility, doesn't it?Mr Nolan: I think it certainly is possible, Mr. Chairman, I am surethey arc probably under such pressures in any case. I think that itwill be one test of the degree to which our controls are effectivehow much pressure they are under.7-1

It is noteworthy that in Scandinavia there has been a significant increasein the number of Hungarian and Romanian vehicles engaged in Sigintoperations since 1986.74

Third, the current restrictions apply only to movements by personnelfrom certain designated official 'headquarters' of Soviet, East German,Polish, Czech and Bulgarian missions. As Senator William Cohenobserved during Hearings before the Senate Committee on Governmen-tal Affairs on 5 December 1985, various Eastern bloc countries haveestablished their commercial headquarters in 'the very center' of SiliconValley and in other high-technology regions of the United States:

They tend to be clustered in the Silicon Valley, those areas wherewe have our defense industries. They have commercial head-quarters set up in those regions. It is quite clear that they are forthe purpose of gathering information . . ..7S

There are no restrictions on vehicles operating in connection with thesecommercial establishments.

In addition to these commercial movements, there has evidentlyalso been an increase in the use of 'tourist' vehicles by Eastern blocagencies for Sigint collection since December 1985 - with the CzechTatra truck in July-December 1987 being only the most noteworthyrecent instance.

Fourth, whatever the efficacy of the restrictions on travel within theUnited States itself, a large area of the country, from south-westernTexas across to the Pacific coast, is still vulnerable to monitoring bySigint vehicles parked on the Mexican border. This area includes suchinteresting and important installations as Fort Bliss, Holloman AirForce Base, White Sands Missile Range, Fort Huachuca, Yuma, andthe numerous defence facilities in the San Diego area. Effective actionagainst these Sigint vehicles would obviously require the co-operation ofthe Mexican government.

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Finally, the present restrictions serve primarily to protect officialUS government signals, and most particularly those of Department ofDefense agencies and facilities, against Eastern bloc vehicular Sigintactivities. The prior knowledge of Eastern bloc official movementsnow available to the Department of Defense enables it 'to make aninformed assessment of the security threat'7'1 and presumably to instituteappropriate counter-measures to forthcoming movements. It is alsothe case that aerospace industries in the Washington, Long Island,and, most particularly, Silicon Valley areas have in the past severalyears increasingly constructed Secure Compartmented InformationFacilities (SCIFs), or buildings which the NSA has classified as being'impervious to electronic eavesdropping by the Soviets'.77 Accordingto one recent account concerning companies in the Moffctt IndustrialPark in Sunnyvale:

Some companies are so concerned they actually have a monitoringgroup that goes around through the park that tries to pick up anytransmission that could be coming from a secured area. It's anongoing program to check anything leaking, literally.78

It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that Soviet Sigint operations,including those involving vehicles, are directed against the whole gamutof accessible signals, and not just those involving official governmentor defence contractor communications. The protection of these lat-ter communications is necessary, but the vulnerability of commercialand personal communications also requires redress. It is imperative,therefore, that, while more rigorous mechanisms and procedures arcdeveloped to nullify or at least greatly reduce the scope and efficacyof vehicular Sigint operations, the general public is made more awareof the vulnerability of public telecommunications systems. Indeed, it islikely that the outrage generated by greater awareness of the increasingimpudence of the Eastern bloc practice would be a major force for thedevelopment of comprehensive and effective counter-measures.

NOTES

1. For more comprehensive discussion of Soviet ground-bused Sigint systems andthe use of Soviet diplomatic establishments for Sigint purposes, see DesmondBall, 'Soviet Signals Intelligence', in Bruce L. Gumblc (ed.), The InternationalCountermeasures Handbook (Palo Alto, California, 12th edition, 1987), pp.73-89;and Desmond Ball. 'Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): The Use of DiplomaticEstablishments', in Floyd C. Painter (ed.), The International CountermeasuresHandbook (Palo Alto. California. 13th Edition. 1988), pp.24-15.

2. General David C. Jones. United States Military Posture for FY 1982 (Washington.1981), p. 107.

3. Dennis Eisenberg, Uri Dan and Eli Landau. The Mossad: Israel's Secret Intelligence

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SOVIET SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 25

Service - Inside Stories (London, 1979), p. 141.4. Stewart Steven, The Spymasters of Israel (New York, 1980), p. 166.5. Eisenberg, Dan and Landau, The Mossad, p.141.6. Ibid., p. 142.7. Ibid., pp. 150-53.8. Steven, The Spymasters of Israel, pp. 165-6; and Wolfgang Lotz. The Champagne

Spy: Israel's Master Spy Tells His Story (London, 1972), p.136.9. John Sawatsky, For Services Rendered: Leslie James Bennett and the RCMP Security

Service (Garden City, New York, 1982), p.277.10. Ibid., pp. 194-6.11. Ibid., p. 201.12. Ibid., p. 196.13. Peter Wright. Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence

Officer (New York, 1987), pp.53, 91-3.14. Ibid., p.151.15. Ibid.,16. 'East Bloc Truckers Arc Accused of Spying', Philadelphia Inquirer, 10 January

1986.17. James M. Markham, 'Patrols in Germany: Postwar Vestige", New York Times, 29

March 1985.18. Alice Siegert, "Hundreds of Soviets Scout West Germany", Chicago Tribune, 29

March 1985.19. Ibid.,20. Ibid.; and Markham, 'Patrols in Germany: Postwar Vestige". New York Times, 29

March 1985.21. 'Soviet Truckers Suspected of Spying". Washington Times, 23 December 1982.22. Geoffrey Dodd, 'Russia Using Spy Lorries Inside Scandinavia", The Times (Lon-

don), 11 March 1978.23. 'Soviet Truckers Suspected of Spying", Washington Times, 23 December 1982.24. James M. Markham, 'Soviet Bloc Commandos said to Infiltrate West", New York

Times. 2 November 1986.25. "Ende der Affare Um Einen Sowjetischen Camion: Kontrolle des

"Diplomatengepacks" in Bonn", Neue Zuricher Zeitung, 23 July 1984.26. Carl-Olof Ryden, 'I Forarhytten: Ryska Militarer", Aftenbladet, 26 September

1982; 'Soviet "Spy Trucks'", Canberra Times. 28 September 1982; and Sune Olsson,'Osllangtradare Leder Rymdspionaget Ratt", Svenska Dagbladet, 6 December 1987.

27. James M. Markham. "The West Germans Stop Soviet Truck", New York Times.21 July 1984; William Drozdiak, 'Dispute Over Truck's Cargo is Settled in Bonn",Washington Post, 23 July 1984; James M. Markham, "Soviet Lets Bonn Aides PeekInto Truck", New York Times, 23 July 1984; and "Ende der Affare Um EinenSowjetischen Camion: Kontrolle des "Diplomatengepacks" in Bonn", Neue ZuricherZeitung, 23 July 1984.

28. Drozdiak, 'Dispute Over Truck's Cargo is Settled in Bonn", Washington Post,23 July 1984; p.Al7; and Markham, Soviet Lets Bonn Aides Peck Into Truck",New York Times. 23 July 1984.

29. See, for example, Ryden, "I Forarhyttcn: Ryska Militarcr', Aftenbladet,26 September 1982; Thomas Kristiansson, 'Ryska Lastbilarna Mal For Spion-satcllit'.'". Aftenbladet, 20 February 1983; 'Ostlastbilar Pa Spaningsturcr", SvenskaDagbladet, 23 November 1986; 'Ubatar Pa Hjul", Svenska Dagbladet, 24 Novem-ber 1986; 'De Rullande Spionskeppen', Eskilstuna-Kuriren, 24 November 1986;'Mobiliseringstorrad Kartlaggs". Vestmunlands - Lanstidnig, 24 November 1986;'Krig Pa Svenska Vagar", Gefle Degblad, 25 November 1986; 'Star Vi HandfallnaNar Ost Rekognoserar?', Hallandspotsen, 26 November 1986; Sune Olsson, 'TullenVille Stoppa Ostlangtradare", Svenska Dagbladet. 30 November 1986; Ake Ekdahl,'Inte Var Sak Stoppa Spioner", Dagens Nyheier, 5 December 1986, p. 12; ColonelEinar Lyth, 'Salt Stopp For Spioneriet!", Dagens Nyheter, 4 March 1987, p.5;Thore Davidson, "Farliga Spioncr Pa Vagen", Dagens Nyheter, 7 March 1987;

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"Forst Ubatar Nu Lastbilar', Dagens Nyheter, 11 March 1987; "Spioner Vid SidanAv Vagen', Dagens Nyheter, 12 March 1987, Gudrun Norberg, "Fp Kraver AtgardMot Spionaget', Dagens Nyheter, 19 March 1987; Viktor Samochvalor, 'OgrundadcBeskyllningar', Dagens Nyheler. 6 April 1987; and Olsson, 'Ostlangtradare LederRymdspionaget Ratt', Svenska Dagbladet, 6 December 1987.

30. Peter Spalli, 'Lastwagen der Ostblockstaaten auf Schweizer Strassen: UngebeteneGaste und Konkurrenz fur das Schweizerische Transportgewerbe', SchweizerSoldat. No.11, 1986.

31. 'Spy Season Puts Swedes on Alert'. Financial Times, 25 March 1987.32. Olsson, Tullen Ville Stoippa Ostlangtradare', Svenska Dagbladet, 30 Novem-

ber 1986.33. Ibid., This incident was also described by Gudrun Norberg in the Riksdag on 4

December 1986.34. 'The KGB in the Car Business', Foreign Report (The Economist Newspaper

Limited), 26 April 1978.35. 'Attractions of Northern Norway', Foreign Report (The Economist Newspaper

Limited), 16 August 1984.36. 'Turks Scold Neighbors', Washington Times, 14 December 1987.37. Erich Grolig, 'Staatspolizei Jagt Spionage-Lastwagen", Kurier, 13 January 1985.38. Paul Lewis, 'French Arrest Ex-Serviccman on Spy Charge", New York Times, 1

February 1986.39. 'Bulgaria's Spy Lorries', Foreign Report. (The Economist Newspaper Limited), 31

May 1984.40. Jean-Marie Pontaut, 'L'Etrange Affaire des Camions Bulgares', Le Point,

(No.583), 21 November 1983, pp. 126-127.41. US Department of State and Department of Defense, The Sandinista Military

Build-up (Washington. May 1985), p. 15.42. Desmond Ball. A Base For Debate: The US Satellite Station at Nurrungar (Sydney,

1987), pp.62-65.43. William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse. Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links

in the Arms Race (Cambridge, MA 1985). pp.200-201.44. Ibid.45. 'Soviet Eavesdropping Techniques', NBC Nightly News, 19 August 1986, transcript.46. Major General J.M. Bunyard, Patriot Project Director, in interview with Robert

Windrem, NBC Nightly News. February 1983.47. Arkin and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields, p. 174.48. 'Soviet Eavesdropping Techniques', NBC Nightly News, 19 August 1986. transcript.49. William Moore. 'KGB Spying in Bay Area', San Francisco Chronicle, 20 May 1978;

and Richard Davis, 'Scenario for Snooping: Soviets Picking Silicon Valley Clean',Electronic Warfare/Defense Electronics (May 1978), pp.22-4.

50. Pete Carey, "Valley's Shroud of Secrecy: Walls of Steel Protect Defense Projectsfrom Spies', San Jose Mercury News, 7 February 1988.

51. Bob Windrem and Oksana Makarushka-Cliomut, 'The Vernon Valley Earth Con-trol Stations as Soviet Intelligence Targets'. Sussex County Voice, Vol.2, No.4(September 1987), pp.8-11.

52. 'Soviet Bloc Espionage", NBC Nightly News, 23 December 1987, transcript: andinformation provided by Robert Windrem, NBC Nightly News. New York.

53. 'Soviet Bloc Espionage", NBC Nightly News. 23 December 1987. transcript.54. Information provided by Robert Windrem. NBC Nightly News. New York.55. 'Soviet Bloc Espionage". NBC Nightly News. 23 December 1987. transcript.56. Ibid.57. Information provided by Robert Windrem. NBC Nightly News. New York.58. US Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Foreign Missions

Act and Espionage Activities in the United States (Washington, 1986), pp.163,198.

59. Information provided by Robert Windrem, NBC Nightly News, New York.60. Ibid.

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61. Markham, 'The West Germans Stop Soviet Truck', New York Times, 21 July 1984.62. Cited in Grolig, 'Staatspolizei Jagt Spionage-Lastwagen', Kurier, 13 January 1985.63. Lyth, 'Satt Stopp for Spioneriet!', Dagens Nyheter, 4 March 1987.64. 'Soviet Bloc Espionage', NBC Nightly News, 23 December 1987, transcript: and

information provided by Robert Windrem, NBC Nightly News, New York.65. Cited in Geoffrey Dodd. 'Russia Using Spy Lorries Inside Scandinavia', The Times

(London), I I March 1978.66. Cited in 'East Block Truckers Are Accused of Spying', Philadelphia Inquirer, 10

January 1986.67. Ibid.68. Ibid.69. 'Off the Record', Journal of Defense and Diplomacy Vol.5. No. 10, (1987), p.56.70. 'Soviet Truckers Suspected of Spying", Washington Times, 23 December 1982.71. Grolig, 'Staatspolizei Jagt Spionagc-Lastwagen', Kurier, 13 January 1985.72. 'Off the Record', Journal of Defense and Diplomacy. Vol.5, No. 10, (1987), p.56.73. US Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Foreign Missions Act

and Espionage Activities in the United States, (US Government Printing Office,Washington. DC., 1965), p. 165.

74. Olsson, "Ostlangtradare Leder Rymdspionagct Ratt', Svenska Dagbladet, 6December 1987, p.6.

75. US Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Foreign Missions Actand Espionage Activities in the United States (Washington, 1965), p. 171.

76. Ibid., p. 163.77. Pete Carey, Valley's Shroud of Secrecy: Walls of Steel Protect Defense Projects

from Spies', San Jose Mercury News. 7 February 1988.78. Ibid.

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