http://cps.sagepub.com/ Comparative Political Studies http://cps.sagepub.com/content/2/4/443 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/001041407000200403 1970 2: 443 Comparative Political Studies B. Michael Frolic Soviet Urban Political Leaders Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com can be found at: Comparative Political Studies Additional services and information for http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://cps.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Permissions: http://cps.sagepub.com/content/2/4/443.refs.html Citations: What is This? - Jan 1, 1970 Version of Record >> at RYERSON UNIV on March 7, 2013 cps.sagepub.com Downloaded from
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http://cps.sagepub.com/Comparative Political Studies
http://cps.sagepub.com/content/2/4/443The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/001041407000200403
1970 2: 443Comparative Political StudiesB. Michael Frolic
Soviet Urban Political Leaders
Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
can be found at:Comparative Political StudiesAdditional services and information for
B. MICHAEL FROLIC is a Lecturer in Political Science at York Universityin Ontario, where he teaches such courses as Comparative Communism,The Chinese Political System, and Modernization. He has published articlesin The Town Planning Review and Urban Affairs Quarterly. His currentresearch is into problems of urban planning and administration in Torontoand Moscow, and Chinese local government.
THIS PAPER is a preliminary exercise in the comparison of Soviet andWestern urban political leaders. It developed from my larger study onSoviet municipal politics, and its major purpose is to show that meaningfulcomparisons of urban political leaders in both systems can now be made,provided we are aware of problems of data and method. It is my view that,given the present massive urbanization of the Soviet Union, we must studySoviet urban leadership groups, to see: (a) whether they encounter similarproblems faced by leaders in Western cities, and (b) whether they go aboutsolving them in a similar fashion. As the USSR continues to &dquo;modernize,&dquo;will leadership groups in her cities come to resemble leadership groups inWestern cities? And will decision-making slowly fall into the hands of&dquo;rational-technical&dquo; urban bureaucrats for whom politics and ideology
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become less relevant? The ten categories for comparison (figure 2) and thefive hypotheses for future research (page 455) should help us answer thesequestions. Based upon my own experience, it appears that further researchcan be conducted in the USSR, including follow-up interviews with
municipal political leaders.
SOME GENERAL COMPARISONS
We have seen that Soviet urban political leaders are becoming bettereducated with formal, higher education practically a prerequisite formunicipal officer 1 Most urban political leaders had followed partyoriented careers, and all except one were clearly identified as party mem-bers. When promoted, they were likely to move upwards from a party postin a large city or republic capital to a higher government post. Generally,crossover between party and nonparty posts was common in most Soviet
cities, although not in Moscow, where government and party career
patterns are more specialized and distinctive due to factors of scale andcomplexity in government and administration. The major characteristic ofSoviet urban political leaders was their professionalism. For them an urbanpost is a vocation rather than an avocation. Most Soviet urban politicalleaders have devoted their careers to government and politics and manyhave reasonable expectations of rising to higher office, possibly to thecentral level. Their careers are not, therefore, restricted to one community,and they do not enter city politics primarily as reformers or civic-mindedcitizens in order to help govern their particular community. Unlike themajority of Western municipal community leaders, Soviet urban politicalleaders frequently have no pronounced loyalties to the city in which theyhold a post.
Western municipal leaders are less likely to move upwards to a higherpolitical arena, and for many, city politics is an avocation. Compared toSoviet municipal leaders, these men are generally amateurs, a characteristicof many American political leaders on all levels:
The typical American politician is really only a semi-pro: he usuallycombines his public career with the simultaneous pursuit of a privatecareer in law, business, education, or journalism. If circumstances orthe voters retire him from his public career, he can pursue his privateone with little loss and perhaps with considerable benefit. His com-~~MC~ ? pO/~CS M f/~MS /!0f M~f/T~ ~ p~O/OMMj ~ ~Mf 0/ /!Hmitment to politics is thus not nearly as profound as that of hisSoviet counterpart. Even for the professional, politics in America is
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~ y?MM~ y~pcc~ ~fM ~oca~oM ~Aey ~/MM a yoca~oM. Only 5 of 513in many respects an avocation rather than a vocation. Only 5 of 513top political leaders in the United States from 1789 to 1953 had nocareer other than politics ... For his Soviet counterpart ... apolitical career is normally a more-than-full time commitment. Heenters upon it as an American might enter the priesthood or theArmy. He becomes engulfed in the apparatus [Brzezinski andHuntington, 1964: 142; italics added].
While Soviet city officials are party oriented, with party work the critical,full-time occupation, law and business are the preeminent occupations forWestern municipal leaders. If any Western occupation/profession can becompared to party work in the USSR as a prerequisite for political orgovernmental office, it would have to be law, although in some respects,the enterpreneurial talents of American businessmen most resemble theskills of full-time party apparatchiki. Western municipal leaders, like theirSoviet counterparts, are better educated than the average citizen. Soviet
municipal leaders are younger and come from somewhat lower class back-grounds. Western urban political leaders tend to view their city post asterminal and are more likely to pursue politics as a second, temporarycareer.
Soviet political leaders are more dominant in community decision-making. In the Soviet setting political leaders make all the major decisions;they wield the influence and fully control the community power structure.In North American cities, political leaders are only one of several groups ofleaders who potentially influence decision-making, depending on the issueand circumstances. Dahl (1961: 84) notes that in New Haven, the eco-nomic and social notables share in municipal decision-making. &dquo;The Socialand Economic Notables of today ... are scarcely a ruling elite such as thepatricians were. They are, however, frequently influential on specificdecisions, particularly when these directly involve business prosperity.&dquo;Presthus identifies a separate community decision-making system which&dquo;is essentially economic, comprising leaders whose power resources rest onhigh formal positions in industry, finance and business, and superior classstatus, and who draw essentially upon ’private’ local resources to carry outtheir programs. Contrasted with political office, which is the major powerbase of political elites, economic leaders enjoy greater continuity in thepower structure.&dquo; He (1964: 406) then hypothesizes: &dquo;In communities
with limited leadership and economic resources the power structure will bemore likely to be dominated by political leaders whereas in those withmore fulsome economic resources it will probably be dominated byeconomic leaders.&dquo;
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According to Sayre and Kaufman (1960), decision-making in metro-politan New York is multicentered, and any combination of groups,individuals or leaders may exert influence on any issue. While only a smallpercentage of New York’s population participates in the making of aspecific decision, this percentage is not restricted to political leaders andcontinually changes its composition, depending on the issue.
The city government is most accurately visualized as a series ofsemiautonomous little worlds, each of which brings forth officialprograms and policies through the interaction of its own inhabitants.There are commentators who assert that Tammany, or Wall Street,or the Cathedral, or the labor czars, or the bureaucracy, or even theunderworld rules New York. Some of these, it is true, are especiallyinfluential in shaping some decisions in some specialized areas.
Taking the system overall, however, none, nor all combined, can besaid to be in command; large segments of the city’s government donot attract their attention at all. New York’s huge and diversesystem of government and politics isaloose-knitandmulticenterednetwork in which decisions are reached by ceaseless bargaining andfluctuating alliances among the major categories of participants ineach center, and in which the centers are partially but strikinglyisolated from one another [Sayre and Kaufman, 1960: 715-716].
In most Western municipalities urban political leaders share influencedepending upon a number of factors such as size of the community, itslevel of economic developments, its political culture, and so on. Presthus(1964: 410-411) suggests that political leaders are dominant &dquo;in com-
munities with limited leadership and economic resources,&dquo; thus linkingstrong political leadership to a shortage of capable leadership talent and anunderdeveloped municipal economy. Soviet cities certainly fall into this
category; the dominant and the only visible leaders are the politicalleaders, at least until the Soviet municipal economy and social structurebecomes more differentiated and multicentered. While modernization anddifferentiation need not imply convergence of systems and the develop-ment of pluralism, competitive politics and group conflict,2 the latter aremore likely to occur in a modernizing, differentiating economy andsociety. The more modern the city’s social and economic structure, themore likely that political leaders will have to share influence with othertypes of leaders, and the more likely municipal decision-making will cometo resemble Sayre and Kaufman’s (1960) description of New York citygovernment as &dquo;a series of semiautonomous little worlds.&dquo; Yet a recent
study of metropolitan Toronto suggests that the relationship betweenmore differentiation and more pluralism is not so automatic. While the
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author theorizes that generally, &dquo;a less differential social structure offers aless suitable basis for open-ended, pluralistic, competitive politics...&dquo; hefinds that in metropolitan Toronto (a modern, differentiated urban com-munity of over two million inhabitants), &dquo;... social structure is importantfor the affect it does not have on Metro politics. The Metro case is relevantto theories of politics and social structure mainly because it demonstrateshow a political system can become largely autonomous of social forces inthe community at large.&dquo; Why is there much less pluralism in Torontothan one would normally expect in an American city? A partial expla-nation lies in the Canadian political culture which is a deferential culture,maintaining a &dquo;unitary rather than pluralist view of the public interest. Inthe unitary view, informed persons in positions of authority, proceeding incamera and free of political pressures, search out the public interest.Canadians seem less willing than Americans to accept the notion that thepublic will emerge through the open agitation of issues and the open clashof opposing groups in a free political marketplace (see Kaplan, 1967).
Pluralism, shared influence, and competitive politics will probablyoccur in modern, differentiated cities, but the example of Metro Torontoshows that other factors can mute pluralism and encourage the supremacyof political leaders. While personalities and unique events (see Kaplan,1967: 210-211) played a major role in Toronto, Canadian political culturemay have discouraged the sharing of influence in Toronto politics. Sovietpolitical culture may similarly reinforce the dominant role of politicalleaders in Soviet cities despite differentiation and specialization of
municipal social and economic structures. Thus, modernization would notnecessarily diminish the dominant role of Soviet urban political leaders,although, conversely, modernization would not enhance this dominanceeither. This view corresponds to Fischer’s (1968) theory of an evolving,monist, modern model of society, where the top political leaders possessdual skills and can direct a rapidly differentiating society along monistlines. I am not prepared to accept the equation, modernization equalspluralism, nor its opposite, that the only alternative is a modern, monistmodel dominated by a political elite. The truth lies somewhere in betweenthese two views, and today Soviet urban political leaders are becoming lesshomogeneous, more differentiated, more likely to rely on the opinions andtalents of nonpolitical leaders in municipal decision-making, althoughcertainly not yet sharing their influence in decision-making in the mannersuggested by Sayre and Kaufman (1960) or Dahl (1961), or even inKaplan’s (1967) unitary Toronto system. One must simply state that
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modernization is more likely to be accompanied by a sharing of influencein municipal politics among several groups, including political leaders, butthe degree of sharing does not necessarily depend upon the amount ofdifferentiation.
Soviet urban political leaders possess common characteristics distin-guishing them from other members of their communities, and the group isnot easily penetrated by outsiders. Dahl (1961 : 91) noted, &dquo;In New
Haven ... the political stratum is easily penetrated by anyone whoseinterests and concerns attract him to the distinctive political culture of thestratum. Openness, cleavage, ease of entry and heterogeneity of thepolitical leadership all reflect the pluralist and amateur bent of Americanurban politics. Politics on this level can be a spare-time occupation, or theproduct of sudden mid-career civic concern without deep commitment toparty and politics as a permanent way of life. However, access to thepolitical leadership group is not completely open; in Toronto, politicalleadership is restricted to middle-class politicians and middle-class values inkeeping with that city’s middle-class image:
The Metro political elite represented less the Toronto of 1962 thanthe Toronto of 1932-a tightly integrated, socially homogeneous,middle-class community, dedicated to the Crown and Empire, theConservative Party, the Toronto Telegram, the Anglican Church,temperance, and Sunday blue laws. Underrepresented in the 1962political elite were Catholics, Italians, and eastern Europeans, andpersons of low income. (Also underrepresented was the area’shighest income group-those individuals earning over $25,000 ayear.) ... The social homogeneity of the area’s population had beendissolved by recent immigration, but the social homogeneity of thelocal leadership changed little [Kaplan, 1967: 200] .
Toronto political leaders are essentially middle class, somewhat conserva-tive and not representative of the city’s current population. The group ispenetrable, but not by all citizens. In New Haven, political leadership ismore heterogeneous probably because politics are more inherentlycompetitive than in Toronto, and pluralist values are widely held andaccepted. Despite the greater heterogeneity among political leaders in NewHaven, the group is distinctive, and Dahl (1961: 90-91) notes some of thecommon features of New Haven’s urban political leaders:
Members of the stratum read the same newspapers and magazines; inNew Haven, for example, they are likely to read the New YorkTimes or the Herald Tribune, and Time or Newsweek.
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... members of the political stratum are, in a sense, relativelyrational human beings. In the apolitical strata, people are less calcu-lating ; their political choices are more strongly influenced by inertia,habit, unexamined loyalties, personal attachments, emotions, transi-ent impulses. In the political stratum, an individual’s political beliefstend to fall into patterns that have a relatively high degree of co-herence and internal consistency; in the apolitical strata, politicalorientations are disorganized, disconnected, and unideological.
Soviet urban political leaders have common characteristics setting themapart from other members of the community: as a group they read thesame papers, belong to the same elite organization (the party) comprisingless than five percent of the total population, have comparable educationalbackgrounds, and are more nationally oriented than most communityresidents. Just being a member of the party provides substantial homo-geneity and uniqueness. (After a few months’ stay among students atMoscow State University, I invariably could tell who was and who was nota Party member. A certain demeanor, assurance, commitment to thesystem, and simple maturity seemed to characterize party members amongstudents.) Party membership is the primary common characteristic ofSoviet urban political leaders, and lack of party membership is an effectivebarrier to admission into the Soviet urban political elite. Without partymembership, one cannot become a political leader and since one cannotjoin the party overnight, access to Soviet urban political leadership is
limited. Winning the right to possession of the little red party membershipbooklet is a major achievement in Soviet society and some form of ap-prenticeship in political activity usually precedes full membership (i.e.,Komsomols, a directing post of some kind, or the like). Party membershipitself carries obligations far beyond those of any Western political party(there is only one party and it monopolizes policy-making and execution).The important point to stress is that entry into the Soviet urban politicalelite is restricted to party members and party membership is a privilegegranted by the party according to highly formalized procedures.
To summarize the foregoing, Soviet and Western urban political leaderscould be compared in several categories, as outlined in figure 2 below.These ten categories were not primarily designed to further any theory ofcomparative urban political leadership and are only suggestive of some ofthe potential areas of similarity and conflict between Western and Sovietpolitical leadership groups. They are not comprehensive and do not easilylend themselves to systematic comparison of the two leadership groups.
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Yet the fact that there are as many as ten likely categories for comparingthese two groups is encouraging-even if sufficient data can be found foronly two or three meaningful comparisons. Regardless of the results of thisresearch, we will better understand the nature, functions and role of Sovieturban political leaders at its conclusion. The five suggested hypotheses forfuture research are also an outgrowth of this initial, limited ten categorycomparison.
Figure 2. COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND WESTERN URBANPOLITICAL LEADERS, TEN CATEGORIES
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Figure 2 suggests several areas where comparison of Soviet and Westernurban political leaders can be extended through further research, andwhere hypotheses can be formulated and tested, subject to data andmethodological limitations. Because comparative analysis of Soviet andWestern urban political leaders, while always implicit throughout this
study, was not a primary focus of my research, these hypotheses have notbeen deeply tested. They are essentially a by-product of my currentresearch and warrant full-scale investigation in a future study. Develop-ment and testing of hypotheses is not an easy task since successful furtherresearch requires the surmounting of three critical problems of data andmethod: (1) lack of data for Soviet urban political leaders; (2) unevennessof data for urban political leaders in both systems; (3) the need for aredefinition of categories and concepts to urban political leaders in bothsystems.
Lack of data makes it impossible, for instance, to discuss the socialmobility or class orientation of Soviet urban political leaders. Class israrely listed in Soviet biographies and frequently is suspect whenmentioned because of the Soviet propensity deliberately to make classorigins as proletarian as possible. It is likely that Soviet urban politicalleaders come increasingly from blue and white collar families, especiallyfrom the latter, and that they have higher class origins in comparison withSoviet provincial political leaders. Equally lacking are data about the class,residence, occupation, and education of the fathers of Soviet urban
political leaders. Thus, we cannot make any assumptions about the kindsof social and economic backgrounds rendering these leaders distinctive as agroup. Are the sons of city dwellers, with a higher education, holding ablue or white collar job more likely to be urban political leaders than sonsof uneducated peasants? Without information on the careers of fathers,these assumptions cannot be tested. Lack of data can also distort com-parison with Western urban political leaders. For instance, we obtain bio-graphical information on only a few urban officials holding party orgovernment posts in selected cities. Identification of leadership accordingto the post held-the positional method of examining community powerstructure-invariably focuses on political leaders and may fail to uncoverall the leaders or the real leaders. Western studies often rely upon thereputational method, with selected individuals being asked in question-naires who they think are the most influential. Those uncovered as
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community leaders based on this method are not necessarily identical tothose picked by the positional method. The latter essentially identifies apolitical elite, whereas from reputational analysis, one discovers the signifi-cant influence exerted, for example, by economic and social elites. A thirdmethod of leadership identification, decision-making analysis, basicallyexamines the municipal decision-making process to see who exerts themost influence on selected issues. These would be the community leaders,generally a mixture of political, economic, and social leaders, with verylittle overlap among several issues. Both the reputational and decision-making methods cannot be applied to Soviet urban politics, for obviousreasons. Questionnaires asking about the locus of real power (thus imply-ing that the party does not dominate politics) are unthinkable at the
present time. Decision-making analysis is inapplicable where decision-
making takes place in a closed arena under party supervision. Because ofthese factors, the positional method is the only way to secure data onSoviet urban leadership, and as a result, we focus exclusively on politicalleaders, excluding right from the start the possibility that nonpoliticalleaders could exert some influence in Soviet urban politics. While theamount of influence that such leaders could exert, in comparison with thatwielded by Western nonpolitical leaders, would probably be minute, giventhe nature of Soviet politics, nevertheless, lack of data on their existenceand influence could distort our comparison, especially when examining theamount of shared influence and the relative dominance of political leaders.
Unevenness of the data also markedly affects comparison of Soviet andWestern urban leaders. Most of the information about the nature of Sovieturban leadership comes from biographical data on urban political leadersin the large Soviet cities; we have little or no data on small Soviet com-munities. Detailed examination of Soviet municipal politics invariablybecomes an analysis of the politics of Moscow or Leningrad. If we com-pare Western metropolitan studies [Sayre and Kaufman (1960), Kaplan(1967)] and community studies [Dahl (1961), Presthus (1964)], it is
apparent that metropolitan areas such as New York and Toronto differ inany number of ways from smaller urban communities. For instance, thepolitical leaders in a large metropolis generally are much less homogeneousand more penetrable than political leaders in a smaller urban community.3 3Is it methodologically sound, therefore, to compare Dahl’s and Presthus’findings about smaller community power structures with data on
Moscow’s politics? Yet small community studies are an advantage sincethey conceivably are a miniature model of the larger metropolitan political
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system. As long as we remember that our information about Soviet urbanpolitics essentially describes Soviet metropolitan politics, whereas much ofour data on Western cities comes from community studies, then we mayanticipate, and possibly weight our comparisons to account for the un-evenness of data due to the size factor. Data unevenness also results from
the sparse biographies of Soviet urban leaders: we can easily obtain twoand three times the biographical information for Western municipalpolitical leaders.
The need for a redefinition of categories and concepts common tourban political leaders in both systems is a third problem inhibiting com-parative research. For instance, does the term &dquo;political leader&dquo; have thesame comparative meaning in both systems? Class does not mean the samething in North America as in the USSR. Can we equate our middle classwith the Soviet worker categories? In the USSR, politics is a vocation, andpolitician is either an occupation or a profession. But in North America,politics is usually an avocation and is not generally listed as one’s occupa-tion/profession. How can we compare political leaders according to
occupation/profession when most Soviet municipal political leaders arepoliticians by profession? Lawyers are the occupational/professional groupfrom which over two-thirds of Western political leaders derive, but Sovietprofessional politicians and Western lawyers are not at all comparable. Noris party membership a comparable professional or associational charac-teristic, since party denotes something quite different in each system. Inthe Soviet Union, party usually means full-time professional commitmentto politics, but in the Western setting, urban political leaders frequentlybelong to no party, and for others, party work is only a part-time affair.Another major category requiring redefinition is education, specificallyhigher education. Many Soviet urban political leaders possess a highereducation which ranks below the average Western college degree. While theeducational qualifications of Soviet urban political leaders are risingrapidly, to speak of nine out of ten such officials having a higher educationis unrealistic, based on our standards. Furthermore, what about HigherParty School education? The Soviets list this as higher education, but itranks below acceptable Western standards in comprehensiveness andquality. &dquo;Values&dquo; or &dquo;political culture&dquo; are two concepts requiring defi-nition. Despite a rapidly differentiating social and economic structure inToronto, &dquo;political culture&dquo; explained the high homogeneity of that city’spolitical leaders. As &dquo;X&dquo; factors which help to explain why predictablepatterns do not appear in another political system, &dquo;political culture&dquo; and&dquo;values,&dquo; when more precisely defined, could be most useful.
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The three critical problems of data and (lack of data, unevenness ofdata, the need for a redefinition of categories and concepts) will not beovercome prior to, or during future research in this area. But an awarenessof their existence can direct our investigation into those areas where thebetter comparative data are likely to be, and where conceptual problemshopefully diminish. The following discussion of five promising hypothesesfor future research comparing Soviet and Western urban leadership groupstakes cognizance of these problems of data and method, both in theirformulation and explication. The five hypotheses emerged as the mostlikely to produce tangible results if intensive research comparing urbanleadership in both systems were carried out. As is the case in social scienceinvestigation, it is expected that other hypotheses will develop from such aproject, and that some of the original five may be discarded or altered dueto problems of data and method. The hypotheses are:
(1) Soviet urban political leaders are less autonomous within the wholepolitical system than Western urban political leaders.
(2) Party and education are the most important career criteria forSoviet urban political leaders, whereas occupation and social classare more important for Western urban political leaders.
(3) Soviet urban political leaders are a more homogeneous leadershipgroup than Western urban political leaders.
(4) Soviet urban political leaders are more mobile than Western urbanpolitical leaders.
(5) Shared influence, power, among urban leaders in both systems ismore likely in large, modern, differentiated units.
COROLLARIES TO HYPOTHESIS FIVE:
(a) In all political systems, the larger the urban unit, the more likelythat influence and power are shared among political and non-political leaders.
(b) In all political systems, the more modern the urban unit, the morelikely that influence and power are shared among political andnonpolitical leaders.
(c) Soviet urban political leaders resemble urban political leaders indeveloping areas and comparison of leadership groups in the USSRand in developing areas should be encouraged.
(d) Urban bureaucrats wield more influence, power, as urban unitsbecome more modern in all political systems.
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While all cities suffer restrictions on their autonomy, Soviet cities as
part of a tightly integrated national system, are conspicuously less auto-nomous than are Western cities within the whole political system. It
follows that Soviet urban political leaders are less autonomous within thewhole political system than are Western urban political leaders. Furtherexpansion of this hypothesis necessitates definition of autonomy as theboundaries of urban sovereignty are properly delineated. Indices of
autonomy include control of local financing, influence over leadershipselection and legislative competence. Western cities have greater financialindependence than Soviet cities. New York raises almost two-thirds of itsoperating revenues from local taxes imposed on sales and property,4whereas in the USSR, less than ten percent of municipal revenues arelevied by municipal governments. Local finance acutely concerns everymodern city throughout the world as local revenues consistently fall shortof current needs. Cities in all political systems have increasingly to rely oncentral governments for funds, but this reliance is almost total in the
Soviet system. Because of this financial dependence on the central authori-ties, Soviet urban leaders have less maneuverability vis i vis higher officialsthan their Western counterparts. Further research on local financing andthe independence of municipal officials is feasible for Western cities
although clearly limited in the Soviet context.Another index of relative autonomy is the municipal leadership
selection process. To what extent do cities select their own leaders?
Western municipal leaders invariably are chosen from within the com-
munity, although in major cities, state party officials may play a consulta-tive role in the selection of mayors and other top municipal officials. TopSoviet urban leaders, however, are imposed upon the community from ahigher level. We lack data on which top municipal appointments in theUSSR require higher-level approval, whether higher-level authorities
propose candidates or just approve or disapprove of candidates put forthby the city party organizations, and whether city party organizationsincreasingly wield more influence in the selection of their own leadingofficials. In any case, when a community has to accept leaders imposed byhigher authorities or is merely subjected to their vetoes, the leadership ofthat community suffers mortal limitations to its autonomy.
Because Western cities have a comparatively larger sphere of legislativecompetence than Soviet cities, Western urban political leaders ought to berelatively more autonomous than their Soviet counterparts. Even so, the
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independence of Western urban governments frequently is threatened byhigher governmental intervention. Mayor Lindsay of New York Cityrecently found himself unable to settle a city garbage collection strikewithout the unwelcome intervention of Governor Rockefeller. Comparisonof Western and Soviet urban legislative competence is also hampered bythe smaller role played by government in the lives of citizens of eachsystem. In Western cities control of production only indirectly concernsmunicipalities, whereas in the USSR this is a major function of govern-ment. Yet despite the much larger general Soviet governmental sector, oneconcludes that Western cities have comparatively more legislativeautonomy, certainly relative to their respective higher governmentalauthorities. The party dominates policy-making and legislation, and citygovernments take their cues from higher party and governmental decisions.An example of this was the establishment of massive industrialization ofhousing construction by a central party resolution in 1957 and the mannerin which the Moscow city party organization followed this resolution witha series of measures applying this directive to the city of Moscow. Whencity officials take their only cues in policy-making from higher levelbodies, can one speak of legislative autonomy?
This first hypothesis requires definition of the formal and informalpowers or urban governments, data on local financing and budgets, anddetails on how leaders are selected in each system. The major researchproblem is lack of data in these areas for Soviet cities, although someinformation can be obtained The hypothesis compares the relative
autonomy of both cities and leaders in each system and as such is avaluable first step in the testing of the other four hypotheses.
Career Criteria
Party and education are the most important career criteria for Sovieturban political leaders, whereas occupation and social class are more
important for Western urban political leaders. The four variables of party,education, occupation, and social class could be ranked, and changes inthis ranking over time could be noted. The development of this hypothesisrequires definition of these categories (not an easy task) and the collectionof substantial data on career patterns of Soviet and Western municipalofficials in cities of similar size and importance. If the hypothesis weresubstantiated by the data, then we could conclude (a) that the criteria forurban leadership in each system vary significantly, and (b) that politicaland educational criteria are more relevant than social and economic
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criteria for Soviet urban political leadership. Conceivably, we might rankthese variables for each leadership group as follows:
Figure 3. PROPOSED RANKING OF CRITERIA FOR URBAN
POLITICAL LEADERS
When these variables are arbitrarily weighted in terms of their relative
importance for admittance into each leadership group, they should rank asfollows (highest weighting is ten):
Has the relative ranking of these variables changed in recent times, and canwe project likely changes in the future? In the Soviet city, occupationaland class considerations probably will become more important and Partymembership will rank lower as the political elite becomes more penetrableand the urban social structure more differentiated. Such projections, whileonly speculative, would be a natural result of the testing of this hy-pothesis, and if soundly based on current trends, would imply that the twoleadership groups shall resemble one another much more in the future.
Homogeneity
The third hypothesis, that Soviet urban political leaders are a morehomogeneous leadership group than Western urban political leaders
follows from the second. Homogeneity refers to similar career back-
grounds, shared interests and common goals. By simply belonging to oneparty while Western political leaders belong to several parties (or noparties), Soviet urban political leaders are more homogeneous in that their
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political goals are more alike. Since in the USSR, political leadership isprofessional in nature, it can almost be considered a career type in itself,again contributing to a more homogeneous group. Lack of party member-ship is an effective barrier to admission into the Soviet urban politicalelite, rendering it closed to amateurs and restricting entrance to those withsimilar backgrounds. Comparative research in this area would ask threequestions: (a) To what extent is the Soviet urban political leadership moreheterogeneous than we imagined? (b) To what extent are Western urbanpolitical leaders more cohesive as a group than we realize? (we can recallKaplan’s (1967: 200) observation that the political leadership in MetroToronto is quite homogeneous, reflective of middle-class conservativevalues and not representative of the larger urban community. (c) AreSoviet urban political leaders becoming more heterogeneous at the presenttime? While it would not be difficult to begin testing the second questionpertaining to Western leaders, data for Soviet leaders are a problemlimiting analysis in this direction. The ultimate goal, the successful admin-istration of a questionnaire probing the attitudes and goal orientations ofleaders in both systems is clearly out of reach at this time.
Mobility
The fourth hypothesis is much easier to verify: that Soviet urban
political leaders are more mobile than Western urban political leaders.Earlier we saw that Soviet urban political leaders move upwards to higherposts on the republic and central levels, less frequently than Soviet pro-vincial officials, but in significant numbers regardless. One of the assump-tions made after a brief comparison of Soviet urban and provincial politi-cal leaders was that the former moved upwards more rapidly than initiallyanticipated, based on an analysis of their career patterns. How do Westernurban political leaders compare, given the avocational nature of Westernurban politics? While Mayor Lindsay of New York has been touted as aRepublican national candidate, and several other mayors have risen to topUnited States posts, the large American cities have not yielded an im-pressive number of higher level officials, and one rarely moves from a topcity post in the United States or Canada to national office. None of thelast six mayors of New York reached a post in any way comparable tosecretary of the CPSU, Central Committee, a post reached by Demichev,Furtseva, and Kapitonov, all former Moscow party first secretaries.
Figure 4 shows that the highest post reached by the mayors of New YorkCity was Ambassador to Mexico, a post held by William O’Dwyer.
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Figure 4. UPWARD MOBILITY OF NEW YORK CITY MAYORS,1926-1965 (adapted from Sayre and Kaufman, 1960: 687)
Concerning upward mobility in American politics, C. W. Mills (1963:205) observed: &dquo;As many elite politicians began their careers on thenational level as on the local... if you want to reach the political top, itseems better to start on the state level rather than on the local or thenational.&dquo; American urban political leaders do not move from city to cityas occasionally occurs in the USSR: the colonizer/wanderer, career typewould in all probability be branded a &dquo;carpetbagger&dquo; in America.
This fourth hypothesis is more manageable than the first three, anddata are relatively more accessible. It would not be difficult to trace thecareers of ex-mayors and top officials of selected American cities to seewhat higher offices, if any, they attained following their city post. Onewould quickly see that Soviet municipal officials move upwards andlaterally in much larger numbers and more rapidly than Western urbanpolitical leaders.
Shared Influence, Power
The fifth hypothesis, that shared influence and power among urbanleaders is more likely in large, modern, differentiated units in both
systems, is, with its four corollaries the richest and most intriguing of thefive hypotheses. At the outset, such concepts as shared influence, sharedpower, modern and differentiated need to be defined. The essence of this
hypothesis is the assumption that factors of scale and complexity presentin a modern, urban community will inevitably diminish the dominant roleof Soviet urban political leaders. This does not mean the same thing asconvergence of systems, where modernization equals division of labor
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equals specialization of function equals groups equals pluralism equalsdemocracy. I only hypothesize, as have others before me, that in large,complex, modern communities, it is less likely that political leaders candominate community decision-making and the community powerstructure. An elite will still govern, yet need not be comprised solely ofpolitical leaders, and will still govern, yet need not be comprised solely ofpolitical leaders, and will frequently change in composition depending onthe issue at hand.
The corollary that the larger the urban unit, the more likely influenceand power are shared among political and nonpolitical leaders seemsreasonable when we contrast Presthus’ small town study, for instance, withSayre and Kaufman’s analysis of New York City. A major conclusion inthe latter was that power was shared and that decision-making was multi-centered. Presthus (1964: 408) stated, &dquo;One may conclude tentatively thatsize per se is an important variable in determining the degree of pluralismfound in local power structures,&dquo; and, &dquo;It appears that there is an inverseassociation between overlapping (elitism) and size. For example, in
Madison and New Haven (100,000+) overlapping rates were nineteen andsix percent respectively; in Bennington and Edgewood (10,000+), theywere thirty-nine percent.&dquo; The smaller the unit, the higher the elitism andthe more the same leaders participate in all major decisions. Since wecannot yet obtain any data for small Soviet communities, we must look toSoviet metropolitan politics for signs of shared influence and power. Ifnone exists in the larger units, the hypothesis will be disproved, regardless.The second corollary that the more modern the urban unit, the morelikely that influence and power are shared among urban political leadersclosely follows the first, since size and modernity tend to be tightly inter-connected. Usually, the large cities are also the most modern in a develop-ing area. Moscow and Leningrad are more modern than Soviet provincialindustrial centers such as Gorky, Sverdlovsk, or Volgograd. Modern is
difficult to define precisely, but the term when used in conjunction withdifferentiated refers to the economic and social structure and not directlyto political structure and pluralistic tendencies. Research problems alongthese lines are many, involving both data and method, but if an index ofmodernity suitable for the Soviet context could be constructed and moredata on leadership were available, the results would be rewarding.
I have frequently been drawn to comparing Soviet and non-Westernleaders, and the third corollary, that Soviet urban political leaders re-semble urban political leaders in developing areas and comparison ofleadership groups in the USSR and in developing areas should be
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encouraged, derives from an assumption that the USSR must be treated asa successfully modernizing nation rather than as a developed nation.Similarities between Soviet and non-Western political leaders occur
especially in their common overvaluation of education as a criterion for
advancement, in the relative scarcity of trained leaders in both Soviet andunderdeveloped political systems, and in the overt role played by thepolitical elite in both systems. A long-range study comparing Soviet andnon-Western urban political leaders in most of the categories cited in thissection would unquestionably be a valuable contribution, if only to deter-mine the extent to which our assumptions about Soviet urban leadershipcan be applied to urban political leaders in underdeveloped areas. It wouldalso be useful to discover where Soviet and non-Western urban leaders
differ, particularly with respect to the higher valuation of class or thelower politicization of leaders in developing areas. Finally, in developingareas cities, elites, and national politics generally fuse, and the nationalelite is basically urban-oriented:
A study of elite as a whole inevitably leads one to the cities, whereare found the majority of the elite and the circumstances out ofwhich they grew, and it is not too difficult to accept as a dominantone the role of the city in the emergence of this new class. It is onlyin the city that there are enough of them to form a class; it is chieflyin the city that high-status jobs and activities are available; it is in thecities that the elite pattern of living is known and recognized[Smythe and Smythe, 1960: 45].
How applicable is this statement to Soviet politics? To what extent, if at all,have the Soviet city and its leaders become dominant in Soviet society?
The fourth corollary, urban bureaucrats wield more influence andpower as urban units become more modern, is based on the assumptionthat a modern city is a bureaucratized city where bureaucrats engage indecision-making and are influential in the urban decision-making process.Sayre and Kaufman (1960: 402, 405) emphasize the importance of theorganized city bureaucracies:
The bureaucrats in the city governments are important participantsin the city’s politics. Like the other participants-the party leaders,the elected and appointed officials, the leaders of nongovernmentalgroups-they seek to influence a wide range of governmentaldecisions which have special relevance to their interests.
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In the city, where several of the large organized bureaucracies arenotably mature and self-conscious, they give evidence of desiring tolive a life of their own, to create a self-contained world of their own,to make their own choices of direction and emphasis, to decide forthemselves the methods and procedures they will use.
According to Weber, a modern, differentiated society will be characterizedby a rational-technical ideal type bureaucracy which on the one handstabilizes and routinizes the system, but on the other hand could immobi-lize and ultimately subvert the system. It is the former tendency that con-cerns us here: the degree to which urban administrators apply rational-tech-nical criteria to decision-making and policy implementation, and the con-comitant influence they will wield in urban politics. Our investigation,therefore, ought to establish whether Soviet urban administrators are
evolving towards Weber’s rational-technical ideal type and at the same timewhether they are acquiring some influence in urban politics. To whatextent are procedures becoming standardized, are merit principles the rule,and are charismatic expressions routinized? Can we identify a group ofurban administrators who wield significant influence in Moscow’s politics?Most of my interviews in 1965 were with Soviet urban administrators and
while they possess many common characteristics as a group, and are moti-vated towards rational-technical methods, the extent of their influence ondecision-making can still only be guessed. A long-range study, hopefully,could be made of Soviet and Western urban bureaucrats through follow-upinterviews, comparing the procedures and powers of each and measuringtheir relative influence in urban policy-making.
NOTES
1. In an earlier chapter, I analyzed a group of 84 Soviet urban political leaders,using data obtained from official Soviet biographies and from personal interviews inten Soviet cities.
2. George Fischer (1968) argues that the USSR can be both modern and monist.3. Even where the urban political leadership in a metropolis is exceptionally
homogeneous (Toronto), this assumption holds true. Smaller communities in Ontariohave an even more homogeneous political leadership stratum than Toronto.
4. An estimated 36.6% of New York City’s 1967-1968 budget comes from stateand federal sources (see New York Times, 1967: 78).
5. For example, from personal interviews with Soviet municipal officials in
1965, I secured a great deal of hitherto unpublished data on municipal budgets andfinancing.
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