RULE 72 [G.R. NO. 174975 : January 20, 2009] LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners, v. SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents. D E C I S I O N PUNO, C.J.: This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari a District Court, Fourth Shari a Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006 1 and September 21, 2006. 2 On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. 3 Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are their children. 4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died. 5 On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari a District Court. 6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer, Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montañer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05." 7 In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent. 8 Private respondents prayed for the Shari a District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent. 9 Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Shari a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents' complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. 10 On November 22, 2005, the Shari a District Court dismissed the private respondents' complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims. 11 1
Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Decision [1] dated April 28, 2000, and
Resolution[2] dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an
action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against
petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan,
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC,
respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena
Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife,
Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan
(Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the
return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the
numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus
Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondent’s demands for them to vacate the same.
5
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana
Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in
1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual,
physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years
and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified
that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilo’s daughter
while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilo’s wife, Rita
Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of
interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long
prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan,
Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.
On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed land was already covered by OCT
No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilo’s daughter).
On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the plaintiff the owner
of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan
Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance;
ordering the defendants to pay P10,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as Attorney’s fees; and P2,000.00 for litigation
expenses.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52273.
On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October 20, 1995 is
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Discounting petitioners’ argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA declared that respondent’s claim of
filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact
of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not
supported by evidence.
The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale[5] executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and
heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and the latter’s
nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogena’s status as the daughter of Juan
Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule 130[6] of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could
not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogena’s right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which
ultimately passed on to respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners’ possession of the disputed property could not ripen into
acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an owner.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending that the CA committed the
following reversible errors:
6
FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and without issue;
SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan,
the only child of a certain Hermogena Clareto “GABATAN”;
THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto “GABATAN” is the child and sole heir of Juan
Gabatan;
FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants
(petitioners) claim that they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan Gabatan
and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;
FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has been
barred by laches and/or prescription.[7]
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters.
In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts.[8] It is not our
function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its
impugned decision or resolution is based.[9]
However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact by the lower courts, such as (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[10]
Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of
errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not
assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or
to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but
raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which
the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. [11]
In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the case.
The respondent’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession of property. It is
undisputed that the subject property, Lot3095 C-5, was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime.[12] Before us are two
contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over
the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
7
or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.[13]
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,[14] this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals[15] where the Court held:
xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael
Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the
deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to
Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the
properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this
Court, we ruled that ‘such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it
being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be,
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,[16] the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the
rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose
of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,[17]this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to
be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.
However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[18] where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed
the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of
land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just
to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case,
could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners
(Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court
should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their
inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the
status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these
proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
We GRANT the petition.
After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring
upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her claim entirely on her alleged
status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic
document or a final judgment.
8
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of
status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates[19] of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony,
presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mother’s maiden
name was “Hermogena Clarito Gabatan.” Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten
birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the differences was respondent’s mother’s full maiden
name which was indicated as “Hermogena Calarito” in the handwritten birth certificate.
In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff
herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit “A” for the plaintiff and Exhibit “1” for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine,
and which is falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The Court is of the observation that Exhibit “A” for the
plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form and bears the “as is and where is” rule. It has the impression of the original
certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950’s. Her mother’s maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito
Gabatan. While Exhibit “1”, the entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used is
of latest vintage. The entry on the space for mother’s maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an apparent attempt to
thwart plaintiff’s mother filiation with the omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court is
inclined to believe that Exhibit “A” for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of live birth.[20]
Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the above-quoted findings of the trial
court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It
uses a form of 1950’s vintage[21] but this Court is unable to concur in the trial court’s finding that Exhibit 1[22] was of a later vintage than
Exhibit A which was one of the trial court’s bases for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the
upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states “Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised, January 1945)” which makes it an older form than Exhibit
A. Thus, the trial court’s finding regarding which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on
record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondent’s
birth certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten
with the notation “(Sgd.)” also merely typewritten beside their names. The words “A certified true copy: July 6, 1977” above the
signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would
seem that Exhibit A and the information stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was
never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were identified by
respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of
dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8) were
duly authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City
Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa,
Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of birth records in their respective offices,[23] and (b) the certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth certificate
registered in their respective offices.[24] Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten birth certificate
before the trial court and respondent’s counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a
faithful reproduction of the original.[25] Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of respondent’s birth certificate
exists in their records except the handwritten birth certificate.[26] Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the original of respondent’s
handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially
9
transmitted to their office by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.[27] Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought
their respective offices’ copies of respondent’s birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there is no
showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between respondent’s Exhibit A and petitioners’
Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable
document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondent’s filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit
A, if it had been credible and authentic, would have proven was that respondent’s mother was a certain “Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan.” It does not prove that same “Hermogena Clarito Gabatan” is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the
conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.[28]
It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan
Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of
such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of
these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules
of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of Hermogena’s
relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or
final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who
testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondent’s mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married
to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had personal
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born
or were very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of them
were present at Juan and Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been
told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondent’s witnesses’ testimonies. The records would show that
they cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than
Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.[29] His testimony regarding the relationships within the Gabatan
family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,[30] this
Court is wary of according probative weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her
(respondent’s) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.[31] In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of
petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of respondent’s husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the
outcome of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of
Absolute Sale[32] (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of
Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, “Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased
Juan Gabatan” was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo
Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.[33] The CA considered the same
statement as a declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.[34]
However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as competent evidence
was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners’ counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.[35] After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.
10
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself.[36] Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the
presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for
the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,[37] we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary
evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original
instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or
whether it was recorded in any public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this, respondent relied on the
stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true xerox copy and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto
P. Velez, Sr., Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessor’s office. Regarding the authentication of public
documents, the Rules of Court[38] provide that the record of public documents, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.[39] The attestation
of the certifying officer must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be.[40]
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H was registered or exists in the
records of the local assessor’s office. Furthermore, the stamped certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit
H since Velez’s certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Even worse, Velez was not presented as a
witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an
attestation since the assessor’s office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal
custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his notarial register and to
forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the proper court that has custody of his notarial register that could have
produced the original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana
who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no
personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who
secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessor’s office.[41] To be sure, the roundabout and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit
H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of
Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it still nonetheless
would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation
of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that respondent produced to
demonstrate her filiation to “Hermogena Gabatan” (respondent’s Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence
presented by petitioners.
As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to respondent’s own testimony,[42] Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedent’s property
from third parties or to quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if they were
truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to
recover the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan.[43] However, that
case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.[44] Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of
11
action, i.e. the present case.[45] She claimed that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita
was then already old.[46]
We cannot accept respondent’s flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her contemporaries (who might have
personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent should have
exerted every effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy:
“Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights…[O]ne may not sleep
on a right while expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity.”[47]
All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently verifiable
proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the
weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a
tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her
own cause of action. If the Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52273, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case
No. 89-092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
12
Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManila
THIRD DIVISION
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, G.R. No. 157912 Petitioner, Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., - versus - Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, andESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, REYES, JJ.VICTORIA S. MEDINA- Administratrix, Promulgated: Respondent. December 13, 2007x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their
respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's
commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate,
and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the
grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner
failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money
claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds
advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim
should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of
its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written explanation on the
service and filing by registered mail?[2]
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-
forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that
Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in
The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section
2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[3]
The petition is imbued with merit.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in
special proceedings is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings,
as far as practicable.
The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.[4] This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as
possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say
that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing,
and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are
applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against
respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling
that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate
proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will . Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are
mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred,
subject to certain exceptions.[5]
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of
the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and
dependent upon the principal remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is
contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money
claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the
estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section
2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.[9] After all, the
trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees
for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in
the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and
those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid.[13] The ultimate
purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained inUnion Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,[14] thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case
of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator
of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the
decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal
service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and
April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give
due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING Present:CORPORATION, Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
Acting Chairperson, TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., - versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** andBRION, JJ.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE Promulgated:AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, May 8, 2009Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIXJULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.[1] At the time of his
death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then
a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x” While the language of Section 1,
Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the
legal interest required of an intervenor “must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant.”[17]
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in
special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that “[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.”
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to
creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors.
In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean
the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special
Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle “any interested persons” or “any persons interested in the estate” to
participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section
1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of “any person interested” to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for
administration;” (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to
the known heirs, creditors, and “to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate;” (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a
“person interested in the estate” to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in
the estate of the deceased “to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent,
or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;” (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account “to persons interested;” (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court
to give notice “to the persons interested” before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows “any person interested in the estate” to petition for an order for the
distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed
their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of
administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.[19] However, it appears that the claims
against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank.
Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case[21] was already pending review before this Court at the time
of Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in
the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the
judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed.
A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an
account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that
there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context
of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with
contingent claims against the estate
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the
administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the
interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence
or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners
should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of
Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates
of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122646. March 14, 1997]
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late NORBERTO B. MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. Hon. Angelito C. Teh, Presiding Judge, Branch 87, RTC, Rosario, Batangas, Sps. Herminio & Clarita Tayag @ Sps. George T. Tiglao & Clarizza T. Tiglao and/or @ Teofilo M. Esguera, Leonor M. Esguera. Leticia M. Esguera, Joel M. Esguera, Ricardo M. Esguera, Voltaire E. Tayag, Benito I. Tayag, Merlie Malig, Alberto T. Tayag, Rosemarie T. Tayag. Leticia E. Lulu and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Batangas, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner “for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate” of her deceased husband Norberto
Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint for “reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in
Batangas) and damages with petition for preliminary injunction” docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009.[1]Paragraphs 2 and 3 of said
complaint states:
“2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto B. Mendoza in her capacity as
the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on December 29, 1993;
“3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of her co-plaintiff for purposes of
this case;”[2]
Private respondents filed on January 21, 1995[3] their “answer with motion to dismiss”[4] alleging among others that the complaint
states no cause of action and that petitioner’s demand had already been paid.[5] On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed
another pleading entitled “motion to dismiss” invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches and
prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for
appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance. In her opposition to the
On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandro’s estate should first undergo settlement proceedings before
partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary
for such settlement.
On June 26, 1997,[7] the RTC[8] rendered judgment nullifying Carolina’s affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of absolute sale of
Lot 707. It also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate. The RTC,
however, dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyanceand damages on the ground that it could not grant the reliefs prayed for
by petitioner without any (prior) settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the properties should first be effected.
On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioner’s action for partition for being premature. The CA reversed the decision,
however, with respect to the nullification of the self-adjudication and the deed of sale. Upholding the validity of the affidavit of self-
adjudication and deed of sale as to Carolina’s one-half pro-indiviso share, it instead partitioned Lot 707. Dissatisfied, respondents
elevated the CA decision to this Court in G.R. No. 151334, entitled Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla.[9]
The issue for our consideration is whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate estate (that is, an
accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other legal
requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed.
Respondents claim that: (1) the properties constituting Leandro’s estate cannot be partitioned before his estate is settled and (2)
there should be an accounting before anything else, considering that they (respondents) had to spend for the maintenance of the
deceased Leandro Figuracion and his wife in their final years, which support was supposed to come from the income of the properties.
Among other things, respondents apparently wanted petitioner to share in the expenses incurred for the care of their parents during
the ten years she stayed in the United States, before she could get her part of the estate while petitioner apparently wanted her gross
share, without first contributing to the expenses.
In any event, there appears to be a complication with respect to the partition of Lot 705. The records refer to a case
entitled Figuracion, et al. v. Alejocurrently pending in the CA. The records, however, give no clue or information regarding what exactly
this case is all about. Whatever the issues may be, suffice it to say that partition is premature when ownership of the lot is still in
dispute.[10]
Petitioner faces a different problem with respect to Lot 2299. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so
as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the moment of death of the
decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of Leandro Figuracion, petitioner has a legal interest in Lot 2299. But can she
compel partition at this stage?
There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2[11] and through
commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.[12]
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedent’s estate. While Section 8 of Rule
69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property’s income (rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition,[13] there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedent’s estate may be answerable, such
as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While
petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal heirs,
she does not dispute the finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including those related to her father’s final illness and burial have not
been properly settled.[14] Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father’s estate to settlement because the
determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.
61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.[4] Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother,
Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents’ residence on the death certificates in good
faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late
years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same
way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Perico’s residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The
death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents’ residence in light of the other documents
showing otherwise.[5]
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.[6] Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial
court ordered that the petition be archived.[7]
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.[8] After the parties submitted the names of their respective
nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea
Jao.[9]
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon
City was the last place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were
supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own
representation by taking an inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit movant’s motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11,
1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.[12] Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY
CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100
PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF
DECEDENT’S RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER
business interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in
special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals[19] and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,[20] we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, “residence”, in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.[21] All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was
properly laid in the Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95574 August 16, 1991
HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and BASSER MUSA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, Cotabato City and HADJI
JAHARA ABDURAHIM, respondents.
Randolph C. Parcasio for petitioners.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an intestate proceeding are herein raised.
Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who passed away on 31 December 1987. He had six (6) wives, three
(3) of whom he later divorced, and twenty three (23) children. He had extensive real and personal properties located in the provinces of
Maguindanao, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA Musa, are among those he
divorced, while private respondent Hadji Jalai a ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving widows, RIZAL Musa and BASSER Musa are
two (2) of his sons.
On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the Administration and Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the Late
Jamiri Musa and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership," before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato
City (SDC Spec. Proceedings No. 89-19) (the Intestate Case). That Court embraces the province of Maguindanao within its jurisdiction
but not the provinces of Davao del Sur and Oriental.
The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, left various properties located in the
provinces of Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61 hectares), and Davao Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the settlement of
the vast estate, also prayed for was the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets of the decedent and ABDURAHIM and the
segregation and turn-over to the latter of her one-half (1/2) share.
Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the divorced wives, who also claim to be widows of the deceased:
RIZAL, Putih Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the decedent; and BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues was
improperly said and that the properties of the decedent located outside Aguinaldo were beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a District.
Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Respondent Judge issued the Order of Publication on 1 July 1989 and
initially set the case for hearing on 18 September 1989.
All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on said date where petitioners, through counsel, manifested their desire
to have the case amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in the interest of peace and harmony among the heirs of the deceased Jamiri
Musa," appointed the following as Special Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL. for all
properties situated in Davao Oriental; and BASSER. for all properties situated in Davao del Sul.
However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation and Motion to Cite for Contempt," accused BASSER, among others, of
having allegedly fired upon the house of her son in-law in Maguindanao on 21 September 1989.
Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for Administration and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership" was filed by
Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally married to the decedent and, as such, there was "nothing to support her claim"
of having had a conjugal partnership with the latter; and that venue was improperly laid. Petitioners also asked that RIZAL be issued
Letters of Administration instead.
In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her marriage to the decedent was admitted by the latter in various
Deeds of Sale he had signed, which were presented as documentary evidence. Since there was no amicable settlement reached,
hearings on the Joint Petition were conducted, commencing on 27 December 1989.
On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix upon the finding that she was
legally married to the decedent. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.
In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June 1990, incorporating the testimonies of the two (2) other
witnesses presented by Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order, dated 16 May 1990. Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM
as Regular Administratrix was maintained.
On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Motion to Dismiss," raising once again, mainly the questions of
venue and of jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the real properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur
and Davao Oriental.
Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22 August 1990. Hence, the elevation of
the instant Petition for Prohibition before this Court seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari'a
District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, from further taking action on the "Joint Petition ."
Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have dismissed the Intestate Case for lack of jurisdiction and for improper
venue. Private respondent maintains the contrary.
We rule against Petitioners.
Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, explicitly provides that exclusive
original jurisdiction, in matters of settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, belong to Shari'a District Courts. Thus:
Art. 143. Original Jurisdiction.—The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdictionover:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of
administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property. (Chapter
1, Title I, Book IV, par. (b), (Emphasis supplied).
Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim is, in fact, involved herein, the Joint Petition was
correctly filed before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention to the Rules of Court mandating that:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73). (Emphasis supplied).
38
It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at the time of his death was actually in Davao City, not Maguindanao, as
averred by ABDUHARIM, the proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, and that venue is
more properly laid in Davao City before the Regional Trial Court since there are no Shari'a District Courts therein.
At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the deceased in an estate proceeding is not an element of jurisdiction over
the subject matter but merely of venue. The law of jurisdiction confers upon Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts)
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased (In the matter of the intestate estate of Kaw
Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).
To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, and Davao City. In fact, in various Deeds of Sale
presented as evidence by the parties, the decedent alternately stated his place of residence as either Linao, Upi,Maguindanao which is
the residence of ABDURAHIM, or Davao City, where Petitioners reside. As this Court held in Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954), "a
man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence." Venue,
therefore, ordinarily could be at either place of the decedent's residence, i.e., Maguindanao or Davao City, but for the provisions of the
Muslim Code vesting exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and settlement of estates of deceased Muslims, in Shari'a
District Courts (supra).
But petitioners also contend that the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, presided over by respondent Judge, has no territorial
jurisdiction over properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental, citing as statutory authority
therefor the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, which provides:
Art. 138. Shari'a judicial districts.—Five special judicial districts, each to have one Shari'a District Court presided over by one judge, are
constituted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The Fifth Shari'a District, the Provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the City of Cotabato.
Indeed, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental are not comprised within the Fifth Shari'a District. In fact, those provinces are outside the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao created by Republic Act No. 6734, its Organic Act. But as stated in that law, "the Shari'a
District Court and the Shari'a Circuit Courts created under existing laws shall continue to function as provided therein." (Art. IX, Sec. 13).
Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides;
(4) Except in cases of successional rights, the regular courts shall acquire jurisdiction over controversies involving real property outside
the area of autonomy. (Art. IX, Section 17[4]). (Emphasis supplied)
Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled with the fact that the decedent was also a resident of
Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in that province, venue has been properly laid with the Shari'a District
Court, Fifth Shari'a District, winch is vested with territorial jurisdiction over Maguindanao, notwithstanding the location in different
provinces of the other real proper- ties of the decedent.
A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to the detriment of the expeditious settlement of estate proceedings (See Ngo
Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 30 June 1988,163 SCRA 237 [1988]). Besides, the judgment that may be rendered by the Shari'a District Court, Fifth
Shari'a District, may be executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.
When an action covers various parcels of land situated in different provinces, venue may be laid in the Court of First Instance of any of
said provinces, and the judgment rendered therein may be executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated
(National Bank v. Barreto, 52 Phil. 818 [1929]; Monte Piedad v. Rodrigo, 56 Phil. 310 [1931]; El Hogar Filipino v. Seva ,57 Phil. 573 [L-
1932]; Bank of P.I. v. Green, 57 Phil. 712 [1932]).
The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts(Rule 73, sec. 1). There should be no impediment to the application of said Rules as they
apply suppletorily to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, there being nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the latter statute
(Article 187 of said Code).
And while Rule 73 provides that "the jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
39
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record," we have taken cognizance of this Petition for Prohibition considering that the
jurisdiction of a Shari'a District Court, a relatively new Court in our judicial system, has been challenged.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the case hereby REMANDED to the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District,
for continuation of the intestate proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 74
THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO G.R. No. 161220and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO substituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and Present:ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents, YNARES-SANTIAGO, - versus - Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS,namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian,Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos,represented by their attorney-in-fact,Salud Cuyos,
CHICO-NAZARIONACHURA, andREYES, JJ. Promulgated:
Respondents. July 30, 2008x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking to annul the Decision [1] dated July
18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution[2] dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration issued in CA-G.R. SP
No. 65630.[3]
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud,
Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered
by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before
the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition[4] for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding
(SP) No. 24-BN entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner.” The petition was opposed by Gloria’s
brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the
parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date issued an Order[5] appointing Gloria as administratrix of the
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the undivided half accruing to his
spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after posting a
nominal bond of P1,000.00.[6]
Subsequently, in the Order[7] dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing was called on that date,
respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositorFrancisco, together with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Francisco’s counsel,
manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres
C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the
approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within 30
days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report[8] dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to
cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to
arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per return of the service, these
three heirs could not be located in their respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided outside the province of Cebu, they
decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was
administering the properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court) as having been properly and duly accounted for.
2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the Court)
also one of the heirs as having been properly and duly accounted for.
3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been
withdrawn.
4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00 subject to the condition that should
any of the heirs would be in a position to buy the properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000.00) each.
5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their respective share of P4,000.00.[9]
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all those present in the conference of her desire to buy
the properties of the estate,to which everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the submission of
the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to make some consultations on what was already agreed upon
by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the information that
respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be given the sum of P5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of
properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray their father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order[10] dated December 16, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same being not contrary to law, said
compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the
deed of sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the payment to her of the sum ofP36,000.00. The said
sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the
remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. [11]
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of P5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly disregarded by the heirs present
during the conference.
In an Order[12] dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis
of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to the early
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[13] over the six parcels of land constituting the intestate estate of the
late Evaristo Cuyos in favor ofColumba for a consideration of the sum of P36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and
Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729,
000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely,
20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columba’s name; and that later on, Original Certificates of Titles
covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba; that some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred tothe names of
spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer
certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of
the Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.[14]
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.[15]
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation[16] of the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,[17] and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was null and void and of no effect, the same being based on a
Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their
father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit, as well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took
place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the estate of their parents and that they never received any payment from the supposed sale of
their share in the inheritance; that the report was done in close confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the
Commissioner's recommendation, should the same be approved by the probate court; that since the report was a falsity, any order
proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in favor of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the
CFI which issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not incustodia legis of the
consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the
administration expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had not yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the
appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that they never received their corresponding share in the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in
manifest connivance with administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their right to the property without due process of law, thus, clearly showing that
extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998
was preposterous, as respondents were represented by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this
was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they have been in
possession of the six parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that
no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of
the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the
status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order issued by the Court of First Instance
of Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent
transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is
hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be continued.[18]
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and truthfulness of the Commissioner’s Report, which
was used by the trial court as its basisfor issuing the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all the concerned
parties to be present in the conference; however, such was not the scenario since in their separate sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent
attested to the fact that no meeting or conference ever happened among them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence, there is
a presumption of regularity in the performance of an official duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence to prove the contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioner’s Report never
mentioned the names of the heirs who were present in the alleged conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the names of those who
were present were equally essential, if not even more important, than the names of those who were absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any proof of
conformity to the agreement from the attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as regards the agreed mechanisms for the estate’s
settlement; (3) there was lack or absence of physical evidence attached to the report indicating that the respondents were indeed properly notified about the
scheduled conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence of the respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise agreement did not
stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and
Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyer’s authority to compromise cannot be
simply presumed, since what was required was the special authority to compromise on behalf of his client; that a compromise agreement entered into by a
person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v.Butalid;[19] that being a void compromise agreement, the
assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties
to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise agreement which
served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of P36,000.00 to the administrator as consideration for the sale,
except for the testimony of NumerianoCuyos admitting that he received his share of the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that he
received; that even so, such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial court’s order for the administratix to execute the
deed of sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to theadministratrix of the sum of P36,000.00;
that said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for,
the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor was said money placed
under custodia legis as agreed upon; that the Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not
yet been terminated and that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of the
estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which included the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the
issuance of new Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that
the compromise agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers made by petitioners through fraud cannot be made a legal basis of their ownership
over the properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the expense of the respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud attendant
in this case was one of extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by
petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy where the aggrieved party had other appropriate
remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of
Court - an official act which enjoys a strong presumption of regularity -based merely on belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said
official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed which is a sufficient ground to annul the
lower court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. [20]
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance
executed by the heirs of LopeCuyos[21] and respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares[22] on February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004, respectively. In both
affidavits, the affiants stated that they had no more interest in prosecuting/defending the case involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject
estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and they had already received their share of the purchase price. Another heir,
respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an Affidavit[23] dated December 13, 2001, stating that the subject estate was sold
toColumba and that she had already received her share of the purchase price on May 18, 1988. In addition, Numeriano had issued a
certification[24] dated May 18, 1988, which was not refuted by any of the parties, that he had already received P4,000.00 in payment of his share, which
could be the reason why he refused to sign the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved
the Commissioner’s Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character[25] and will not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by
final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions
of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.[26]
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. [27] Extrinsic fraud exists when
there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.[28] Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or
from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the ground of
extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack
of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and to prepare the project of partition for
submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his
Commissioner’s Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the
place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the conference
scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly found, the
Commissioner did not state the names of those present, but only those heirs who failed to attend the conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and
Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the return of service, could not be located in their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the
scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably present in the
conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had executed an affidavit[30] dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not
called to a meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. WhilePatrocenia had executed on December 17, 2004 an Affidavit
of Waiver and Desistance[31] regarding this case, it was only for the reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and
that she had already received her corresponding share of the purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that retracted her previous statement that
she was not called to a meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement[32] that there was no meeting held. Thus, the veracity
of Atty. Taneo’s holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate
properties, since they were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which
embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise agreement over the estate
of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their
interests. Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying their alleged agreement, it was necessary that
the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a conference among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in the
Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules
on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection with the performance of an official act in the line
of his duty was legally done, such presumption may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence
of the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence
showing that respondents were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was not held accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of
Petitioners attached a Certification[33] dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to
show that copies of the Commissioner’s Report were sent to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as enumerated in
the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the accompanying registry receipts.[34]
In Cua v. Vargas,[35] in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and
partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not
participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before
any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of
the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because
the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either
of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these
extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are
concerned[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement was
arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and
approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the
statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus,effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The
CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find
that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate proceedings in the trial court were duly represented
by respective counsels, namely, Atty.Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the case
amicably, they manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January 30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person need not hire his own lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented by the judicial administrator who retains the services
of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he
represents; that when the trial court issued the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties’ lawyers were
duly served said copies of the Order on December 21, 1976 as shown by the Certification[37] dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that
notices to lawyers should be considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by counsel, service of notices of orders and pleadings shall be
made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy such
as a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time,but they failed to do so without giving any
cogent reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioner’s Report was received by Attys. Yray and Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and
Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the other heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was Gloria’s
counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration,while Atty. Yray was Francisco’s lawyer when he filed his opposition to the petition for
letters of administration and his Motion to Order administrarix Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the estate. Thus, the other heirs
who were not represented by counsel were not given any notice of the judgment approving the compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998 that
respondents learned that the tax declarations covering the parcels of land, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were
canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in Columba’s name, and Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued in favor
of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right
or of any obligation.[38]
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,[39] we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned
decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void
decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System
vs. Sison, this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by
any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those
who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a
nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in
before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a
lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.”[40](Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.[41] Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must be
declared null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on
ground of laches and estoppel.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four
years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[42]
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances.[43] The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will
not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result.[44]
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and filed the petition for annulment of judgment in
2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing that an
action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe.[45]
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation
of law, it is non-existent. Hence,the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles
pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are voidab initio. No reversible error was thus committed by the CA in annulling the
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No. 24-BN
for the settlement of the Estate of EvaristoCuyos.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115181. March 31, 2000]
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR.,
TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents. SdaaÓ miso
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574
as well as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of
letters of administration to an action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent
Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs
of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino, Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma.
Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as
SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate
on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an
action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:
"Acting on the ‘Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition’, considering that the petitioner is the only heir not
amenable to a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of
the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
Serna prepared an extrajudicial settlement, which the heirs, with the exception of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., then only 15 years old,
signed. The document was notarized by Atty. de la Serna on April 12, 1961. As a result, OCT No. 622 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3447 (T-2411) was issued on April 13, 1961. On April 14, 1961, upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on
the land, the loan was approved by the bank.
Rosario Diez exercised rights of ownership over the land. In 1985, she brought an ejectment suit against petitioner Jovita Yap
Ancog’s husband and son to evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the land for failure to pay rent. Shortly thereafter,
petitioner Jovita Ancog learned that private respondent Rosario Diez had offered the land for sale.
Petitioner Ancog immediately informed her younger brother, petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., who was living in Davao, of their
mother’s plan to sell the land. On June 6, 1985, they filed this action for partition in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3094. As private respondent Caridad Yap was unwilling to join in the action against their mother, Caridad
was impleaded as a defendant.
Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and therefore void. They claimed that in signing the
instrument they did not really intend to convey their interests in the property to their mother, but only to enable her to obtain a loan
on the security of the land to cover expenses for Caridad’s school fees and for household repairs.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated:
1. That the parcel of land in question originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez Yap;
2. That Gregorio Yap, Jr. is the legitimate child of spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez Yap;
3. That Gregorio Yap is not a party in the execution of the Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate dated April 4, 1961;
4. That all the encumbrances found in TCT No. (3447) T-2411 which is now marked as Exh. C for the plaintiffs and Exh. 2 for the
defendants as Entry No. 6719, 6720, 11561 and 11562 are admitted by the plaintiffs subject to the condition that the Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate dated April 4, 1961, was made by the parties that the same was only for the purpose of securing a loan with the
Philippine National Bank.[3]
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners’ action. It dismissed petitioners’ claim that the extrajudicial settlement
was simulated and held it was voluntarily signed by the parties. Observing that even without the need of having title in her name
Rosario Diez was able to obtain a loan using the land in question as collateral, the court held that the extrajudicial settlement could not
have been simulated for the purpose of enabling her to obtain another loan. Petitioners failed to overcome the presumptive validity of
the extrajudicial settlement as a public instrument.
The court instead found that petitioner Ancog had waived her right to the land, as shown by the fact that on February 28, 1975,[4] petitioner’s husband, Ildefonso Ancog, leased the property from private respondent Diez. Furthermore, when the spouses Ancog
applied for a loan to the Development Bank of the Philippines using the land in question as collateral, they accepted an appointment
from Rosario Diez as the latter’s attorney-in-fact.[5]
The court also found that the action for partition had already prescribed. The registration of the land under private respondent
Rosario Diez’s name amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership. Therefore, petitioners had ten (10) years from April 13, 1961
within which to bring an action to recover their share in the property. While it is true that petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor at
the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, his claim, according to the court, was barred by laches.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the extrajudicial settlement and sustained the trial court’s dismissal of the
case. The appellate court emphasized that the extrajudicial settlement could not have been simulated in order to obtain a loan, as the
new loan was merely “in addition to” a previous one which private respondent Diez had been able to obtain even without an
extrajudicial settlement. Neither did petitioners adduce evidence to prove that an extrajudicial settlement was indeed required in order
to obtain the additional loan. The appellate court held that considering petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog’s educational attainment (Master of
Arts and Bachelor of Laws), it was improbable that she would sign the settlement if she did not mean it to be such. Hence, this
petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred:
I. IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT RULING THAT THE CONTESTED EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT (EXHIBIT “B”) IS NOT A SIMULATED ONE;
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to respondents Chuan Lung Fai,[3] but not included in the Deed of Settlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are now registered
under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-
A, 560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Victorino Detall[4] and was
subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square
meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo Detalla[5] and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who registered it
under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT
No. T-10206. Lot 560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The
remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion College and was
registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208.[6]
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to
Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter
refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint
was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation “that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the
plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed.”[7]
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its ruling was premised
on the following grounds:[8]
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the validity of the partition, and since she is already
estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that the partition
would have been alright had she been given a more equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year period provided
for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code;[9]
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 20, 1994.[10]
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals in -
I. ……FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID
TRANSACTION
II. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
III. ...…CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE
DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS IN AC[C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208
IV. ……SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES’ CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN
ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS “S” AND “I”
V. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER
OF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS
