~APPROVED FOR RELEASE- Historical Collection Division- HR70-14DATE: 04-26-2012
SPECIAL REPORT
NEW LOOK IN THE SATELLITE ARMIES
",CENTRAL.,INTELLIGENCE AGENCYOFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
TOP SECRETGROUP I Excluded from automaticdowngrading and declassification
This document contains classified information affecting the nationalsecurity of the United states within the meaning of the espionagelaws, US Code Title 18,Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibitsits transmission or the revelation of its contents in any .manner toan unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicialto the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of anyforeign government to the detriment of the United States.
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30 October 1964
NEW LOOK IN THE SATELLITE ARMIES
Accumulated evidence on equipment and organiza-tional developments in the satellite armed forcesshows that a major upgrading of their capabilitiesfor modern.warfare is under way. Although some ofthe equipment involved is capable of delivering nu-clear weapons, there is no evidence that the USSRis prepared to turn over nuclear weapons to 1tsallies. However, the receipt of this equipmentand the organizational streamlining undel way sug-gest that the satellites are to play an increas-ingly important role in Warsaw Pact operationalplans.
New Equipment
The most obvious develop-ment has been the acquisitionof new equipment, particularlytact ica 1 miss iles. J IC Ithepresidium of the Soviet centralcommittee, in consultation withpolitical representatives of theWarsaw Pact, decided sometimeprior to 1960 to begin equip-ping all the ~ast European satel-lites (except Albania) with sur-face-to-air and surface-to-sur-face tactical missiles by theend of 1961. Under the super-vision of Chief Marshal of Ar-tillery Varentsov, East Europeanofficers were brought to theUSSR for missile training, thensent back to train native cadreswith the assistance of Sovietinstructors who were assignedas consultants for a two- orthree-year period.
The missiles were shippedby authority of a special di-rectorate of the Soviet GeneralStaff, with the East Germans as-
signed first priority among thesatellites. Types of missilesspecified in the report in-cluded the Guideline, a SAM(surface-to-air missile) capa-ble of intercepting aircraftup to SO,OOOfeet; the FROG(free rocket over ground) sys-tem, capable of supporting adivision with either a conven-tional or nuclear warhead fora ra~ge of five to twelve miles;the Scud A surface-to-surfacemissile, which has a range ofup to SO nautical miles with anuclear warhead and up to 150nautical miles with a chemicalor conventional high-explosivewarhead; and the Shaddock, acruise missile first displayedin the November 1961 Moscowparade.
Since June 1960, when thefirst SAM site manned by satel-lite troops was observed, theconfirmed total of these siteshas risen to 121. The recentCzech press identification ofSoviet Marshal Sudets as com-mander of the Warsaw Pact Air
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SATELLITE MILITARY EQUIPMENT
POLISH SCUD A SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES SHOWN INWARSAW PARADE 22 JULY 1964
J"1I_IHUNGARIAN AMPHIBIOUS ARMORED
SCOUT CAR BRDM
- ...•HUNGARIAN T-54 MEDIUM TANKS SHOWN IN
4 APRIL 1964 PARADE
SU-7 FITTER NOW IN POLISHAND CZECH AIR FORCES
EAST GERMAN SNAPPERANTITANK MISSILE
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Defense Forces suggests thatthe USSR maintains indirectcontrol over these sites. SinceJuly 1964 East German SAM bat-talions probably are phasingin the latest type of SA-2,which includes the C-band FanSong E radar system and a modi-fied Guideline missile. Thisimprovement would put the EastGermans on a par with SovietSAM battalions in East Germany.
Reasonably credible re-ports of East German FROG andScud missiles appeared in 1962.In August 1963 the Rumaniallsdisplayed six Scud A missiles,a normal complement for a So-viet field army. This year thePoles and Rumanians each showed12 Scuds, and the East Germans'four. Czechs, Bulgarians ,andHungarians have been trainingwith the same missile this sum-mer and are expected to showthem by mid-1965 in parades.The FROG made its first publicappearance in East Europeanhands in Poland in July, andmore recently was in the 7 OC-tober East Berlin parade. Inaddition, the satellites havereceived some Snapper wire-guided antitank missiles. TheShaddock, however, has neverbeen confirmed in either Sovietor satellite forces in EasternEurope.
The satellites also ~resignificantly improving thequality of their armored ele-ments. In both East Germantank divisions the T-54 mediumtank has replaced the obsoles-cent T-34, and Rumania hasadded at least 100 T-54/55s in
the last year. Three types ofarmored personnel carriers werefar more widely seen this yearthan in previous years: thetracked BTR 50p seen in Poland,the eight-wheeled model givenby the USSR to Bulgaria, andthe East German armored scoutcar.
Over the past year thePolish, East German, and Czechair forces were equipped by theUSSR for a more active role inair defense and ground support.Since August 1963 the PolishAir Force has received at least20 Fishbed-D all-weather inter-ceptors, and five SU-7s (Fit-ters) for ground support. Dur-ing the same period, at least22 Fisnbed Ds were sent to theCzech A ir Force and 15 to theEast German Air Force. With atleast 45 Fitters now on hand,the Czechs have the best tacti-cal air support for groundforces among the satellites.
In the East European navies,the four Osa-class guided mis-sile patrol boats displayed bythe East German Navy in Octoberconstitute the only notable newequipment.
The new Soviet equipmenthas been supplemented by satel-lite production. Tanks fromthe Labedy plant in Poland haveappeared in East German regi-ments and Polish Mazur primemovers are being used to'haulCzech artillery. The Czechpress has recently publicizedthe development of a general-purpose machine gun which may
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ELITE UNITS IN SATELLITE ARMED FORCES
K-61 AMPHIBIANS TRANSPORT GDANSK DIVISION IN 22 JULY WARSAW PARADE
PARACHUTE TRAININGIN EAST GERMAN ARMY
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!~~~~~.l~~:CAMOUFLAGED CHECHOSLOVAKSOLDIER CROSSING WATER BARRIERDURING TRAINING POLISH FROGMEN
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even replace the Soviet 7.62Goryunov as the standard ma-chine gun in the Warsaw Pactforces. In mid-1963 bloc airforces, including the USSR, be-gan to receive the Czech L-29,expected to become the standardjet trainer for the Warsaw Pactcountries. The Poles producesmall experimental rockets , andnegotiations between Prague andthe Soviet Chief Engineering Di-rectorate during 1964 indicatethat the Czechs may be prepar-ing to produce a SAM or Scud.
ReorganizationThe satellite ground forces
have undergone reorganizationssimilar to those noted in Soviet'forces and are now characterizedby smaller, more mobile units.During ~964, airborne forces re-ceived special attention. Inthe 22 July parade in Warsaw thepublic for the first time sawthe red-bereted 6th AirborneDivision from Krakow. Membersof this high-morale unit areselected for their aptitude inforeign languages, are givenbetter food and more privilegesthan ordinary conscripts, servethree years instead of the nor-mal two, and receive instruc-tion similar to that given USairborne troops. In severalexercises over the past two yearsthey have appeared in an "ag-gressor" role to simulate USSpecial Forces attacks againstPolish security troops and regu-lar line units.
In April a Czech defectorfrom the 7th Airborne Regimentreported that his unit had be-
gun training in unconventionalwarfare, on orders from Moscowin 1961, and even bore the des-igna.tion "Special Forces"(Zvastniho Urceni). The EastGerman press has hinted obliquelythat the black-bereted EGA para-troopers who first appeared inthe september 1963 Dresdenparade will be expanded in num-ber and upgraded in importance.The other satellites have onlytoken airborne forces, but aregiving wide publicity to para-chute training, both militaryand civilian.
Blue-bereted troops seenin the Warsaw parade belongedto an amphibious divisioncreated during 1963 at Gdansk,paralleling to some extent therecently reactivated Sovietmarines.
The number of satellitetank divisions has been expandedduring the past twelve months.poland now has five; three ofthe five divisions in the Sile-sian Military District--in south-west Poland--are tank divisions.A three-to-one tank to rifledivision ratio appears to beemerging in the First CzechArmy just across the border.
There is some indicationthat the Rumanians have con-verted an infantry division intoa tank division. Armored forcespersonnel seen by Western at-taches in the August 1964
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Rumanian parade seemed olderand more carefully selected thanthe average Rumanian conscripts.
During 1964, the Czech,Polish, and East German press re-ferred briefly to "rocket troops,"indicating that such personnelhave been receiving specialtraining.
Several methods of improv-ing the professional competencyof troops are being tried inthe newer, more complex typesof units. The Rumanians raisedmilitary pay scales this yearto encourage career enlistments;East German military authoritiesnow hold out the opportunityfor higher education as a re-ward for a three-year enlist-ment instead of the required 18months; Poles and Czechs whochoose certain military occupa~tion specialties, such as theair force or the airborne troops,receive better pay and more bene-fits than members of the lessfavored units. Some of the sat-ellites, particularly East Ger-many, have staggered the induc-tion and discharge periods sothat conscript classes aresmaller and more manageable andthe general combat level remainsrelatively even throughout theyear. As a general appeal tothe patriotic sentiments of con-scripts and professionals, theCzech Ministry of Defense changedthe uniforms this year from theSoviet to a more traditionalstyle, and the East Germans nowallow noncommissioned officersto wear the same uniforms asofficers.
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In another approach, thesatellites may also be takingadditional measures to elimi-nate from combat units men theyconsider politically unreliable.An East German conscript mayelect, as a conscientious ob-jector, to serve his obligatedperiod in a construction unit,where he receives no combattraining and no weapons. He issupervised by politically morereliable, armed troops. Forthe past two years young Poleshave had the option of workingin the mines as members of thearmy instead of learning tofight, and recent reports fromBulgarian and Rumanian defectorsindicate that a similar, if lessvoluntary, system has been op-erative in both countries forat least four years. The un-usual numbers of Hungarian andCzech soldier-laborers noticedduring the past year may indi-cate a similar development. Inthis way, the satellite regimesprobably hope to create combatunits more likely to carry outtheir missions against NATOforces. This may mean thatthere will be fewer, but moreeffective divisions.
Economic Aspects
Increases in satellite mili-tary expenditures are imposinggreater burdens on economies al-ready experiencing considerabledifficulties, but still consti_tute only a small part of boththe national product and thestate budget. Poland and Czecho-slovakia both produce majormilitary hardware and East
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Germany appears to be enteringthe field. All of the satel-lites have been receiving in-creasing quantities of Sovietequipment for which it is be-lieved they must make payment.Accompanying increases in costsfor personnel, training, and op-eration and maintenance resultfrom the possession of equip-ment of greater complexity aswell as quantity and from thechanging role of satelliteforces.
A firm basis for judgingthe magnitude of the increasedeconomic burden cannot be foundin available evidence, eitheron separate categories of ex-penditures or on over-all mili-tary budgets. Total quantitiesof material produced, purchased,or sold are uncertain, as arethe allocations of costs forsuch operations as the bloc airdefense network. Published sat-ellite military budgets areknown to be incomplete, and inaddition may record some pur-
SA lELLITE MillY ARY EXPENDITURESPERCENTAGE CHANGE
SECRET 1960-1964MILITARY MILITARYBUDGET * PERSONNEL
chases at less than full cost.However, the published mili-tary budgets for five of thesatellites do provide some in-dication of the trend. Thetabulation below shows the per-centage changes from 1960 to1964 in the military budgetsfor the five countries contrastedwith the changes in the esti-mated numbers of personnel intheir respective militaryforces.
These figures show thatthe military budgets increasedsubstantially more than thenumbers of military personnel,although the budgets are be-lieved to be a better reflec-tion of personnel and operat-ing expenditures than of do-mestic procurement of hardware.In each of the countries, ex-cept Poland, the planned budgetfor 1964 was slightly lowerthan in 1963, indicating a pos-sible leveling-off of thoseexpenditures provided for inthe budgets. It is not knownwhether purchases of militarygoods from abroad, which prob-ably grew rapidly after 1960,are included in the publishedbudgets. If not, these budgetsunderstate the total increasein expenditures.
B'ULGARIACZECHOSLOVAKI AHUNGARYPOLANDRUMANIA
+ 45+ 25+ 99+ 49+ 21
+ 13+ 10
No Change+ 10~ B
Emerging Deployment Patterns
It appears that the betterequipped and reorganized
• Calculated from actual expenditure. for 1960 and planned'expenditures for 1964, on the basis of current prices.
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satellite ground force divi-,sions are intended to operateas elements of field armiescontaining only satellite di~visions. Previously, satel-lite units were believed to beintended as fillers for Sovietdivisions or armies. Most of thefirst-line satellite divisionshave been assigned to nine fieldarmy areas. These are MilitaryDistrict V in East Germany, thePomeranian and Silesian mili-tary districts in poland, the1st and 4th Czech Armies, the
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2nd Bulgarian Army, twounde-termined military districts inRumania, and one in Hungary.The other areas appear to con-tain most of the reduced-strength, supply, general sup-port, and administrative units.If the forces in each of thekey areas are formed into anoperational field army, as islikely, the satellites will havein a relatively combat-readystatus two probable tank armiesand seven combined-arms armie~about 35 divisions in all.~~
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