SpecPro Digests.pdf

7/22/2019 SpecPro Digests.pdf

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Rules that govern special proceedings

Subject matter of special proceedings

Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90)

A. Jurisdiction and Venue

1. Which court has jurisdiction

Mendoza vs. Hon. Angelito Teh

Facts:

On October 28, 1994, petitioner "for herself and as administratrix of the

intestate estate" of her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed beforethe Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint for "reconveyanceof title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition forpreliminary injunction". Said complaint states, among others:

"2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, theIntestate Estate of the late Norberto B. Mendoza in her capacity as thesurviving wife of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died onDecember 29. 1993;

"3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this HonorableCourt as the judicial administratrix of her co-plaintiff for purposes of this

case;"

On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismissinvoking lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches andprescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction, privaterespondents contend that a special proceedings case for appointment ofadministratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary actionfor reconveyance.

The trial court dismissed the action.

Issue:

Whether in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointmentas administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over

the whole case?

Held:

No.

Ratio:

An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property worthmillions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizableby the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions"incapable of pecuniary estimation," such as the appointment of anadministratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estateproceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction ofthe RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On theother hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within theambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate.By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrixousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondentsconfuse jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular13-95 provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in theprovince where the property is located, in this case, Batangas. Themere fact that petitioner's deceased husband resides in Quezon City atthe time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the

Court.

Jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decidequestions of ownership or title to property is not applicable in this case,because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the RTC ofBatangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified thatwhether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in theexercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction,is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure .Moreover, the instant action for reconveyance does not even invoke thelimited jurisdiction of a probate court. Considering that the RTC has

jurisdiction, whether it be on the reconveyance suit or as to the


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appointment of an administratrix, it was improper for respondent judge todismiss the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.

2. Venue in judicial settlement of estate

De Borja vs. Tan

Facts:

On October 25, 1940, petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in thelower court for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of his deceasedwife Josefa Tangco. The will was probated on April 2, 1941, and namedFrancisco de Borja as executor thereof. Due to the physical inability ofFrancisco de Borja to fully administer the estate he being quite weak andunable to see, on August 25, 1951, on petition of Matilde de Borja, one ofthe heirs, the lower court appointed Crisanto de Borja, another heir, as co-

administrator. Crisanto qualified as co-administrator on August 29, 1951.

On April 9, 1952, the trial court according to petitioner, without petition ofor notice to anyone appointed respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator, this, after holding in abeyance consideration of Franciscode Borja's amended account dated March 25, 1952. Francisco, Matildeand Crisanto moved for reconsideration of the appointment of Jose deBorja but by order of August 14, 1952, respondent Judge indirectly deniedthe motion for reconsideration, and acting upon an alleged ex-partepetition of the heirs Jose, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamedDe Borja, revoked the appointment of Crisanto as co-administrator anddirected administrator Jose de Borja to comment on the amended account

filed by Francisco de Borja.

On July 22, 1952, Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto filed a notice of appealfrom the order appointing Jose de Borja as co-administrator and the orderdenying the motion for reconsideration and later they filed thecorresponding record on appeal. By order of December 27, 1952,respondent Judge Tan disapproved the record on appeal and refused togive due course to the appeal on the ground that the appointment of Josede Borja as co-administrator was interlocutory in nature and so was notappealable. Hence, this petition for mandamus, as already stated, tocompel respondent Judge to approve the record on appeal and to givedue course to the appeal.

Issue:

Whether the appointment of Jose Borja is appealable

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable. On the otherhand, according to Rule 105, section 1 (e) an order appointing a specialadministrator is not appealable. Respondents contend that a co-administrator is not a regular or general administrator, and his duties andfunctions rather partake those of a special administrator; consequently, hisappointment is not subject to appeal. We cannot share this view. Thepowers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited. UnderRule 81, section 1, a special administrator is appointed only whenthere is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administrationoccasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will orfrom any other cause, and such special administrator is authorized tocollect and take charge of the estate until the questions causing the delayare decided and an executor or administrator thereon appointed. UnderRule 87 section 8, a special administrator is also appointed when theregular executor or administrator has a claim against the estate herepresents and said special administrator shall have the same power andsubject to the same liability as a regular executor or administrator. In otherwords, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and

for a specific purpose.Naturally, because of the temporary and specialcharacter of his appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable forany party to appeal from said temporary appointment. On the other hand,a co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises allthe powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in theadministration. Further taking into consideration the circumstancesobtaining in this case, that petitioner Francisco de Borja though originallydesignated administrator, is and has for several years been one only inname due to his physical and mental disability, as a result of whichrespondent Jose de Borja is now practically the sole administrator there isno question that for all practical and legal purposes the appointment of


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Jose de Borja as co-administrator is equivalent to and has the same effectas a sole regular or general administrator.

Fule vs. CA

Facts:

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance ofLaguna, at Calamba, a petition for letters of administration. The petitionstated, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner ofCalamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estateand personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, withinthe jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved exparte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. Oneven date, May 2, 1973, the said court granted the motion.

Preciosa B. Garcia, who alleged to be the surviving spouse of thedeceased, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Insupport of her claim, she offered the death certificate which provides thatthe last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, CarmelSubdivision, Quezon City.

Issue:

Whether the action filed in Laguna should be dismissed due to impropervenue

Held:

Yes. It should have been filed in RTC-QC.

Ratio:

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If thedecedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters ofadministration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of FirstInstance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First

Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court firsttaking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shallexercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The

jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place ofresidence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall notbe contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from thatcourt, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appearson the record."With particular regard to letters of administration, Section2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petitiontherefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make theappointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such asdeath, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, andsitus if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and theright of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, orotherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his lastresidence within the country are foundation facts upon which allsubsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if

the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death,and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court togrant letters of administration.

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place ofresidence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is inreality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." Itcould not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of proceduredealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing;

jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority ofthe court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedurein a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changedby procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power orauthority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that ifthe power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of theprocedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the powerto exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of

jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court maythereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may therebybe rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. Theappearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong


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presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court overthe subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, ofconvenience to the parties.

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of FirstInstance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place ofresidence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courtsof First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however purposedlyfixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori,the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate ofwill, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute anelement of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive ofvenue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properlyconsiders the province where the estate of a deceased person shall besettled as "venue."

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides"mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent atthe time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of theobject or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In theapplication of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of theRevised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicileis the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technicalsense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms aresynonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." Inother words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popularsense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in aplace and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term meansmerely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence ordomicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in agiven place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and alsoan intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time ofresidence is required though; however, the residence must be more thantemporary.

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and PreciosaB. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the timeof his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before theCourt of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measelystated "(t)hat on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of

Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estateand personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places withinthe jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed thepetition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improperlaying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile orresidence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "propertyowner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is,according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claimsthat, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fuleherself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residenceof Amado G. Garcia was at Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, QuezonCity. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule

categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence wasat Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceasedAmado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, QuezonCity, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible toprove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, thedeath certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence byVirginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his lastplace of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,Quezon City.

Eusebio vs. Eusebio

Facts:

This case was instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebiofiled with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointmentas administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died onNovember 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City ofQuezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicenteand Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating thatthey are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was


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domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that thecase be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed.By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection andgranted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, fromsaid order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and

brothers.

Issue:

Whether the action filed in Rizal should be dismissed for improper venue

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of thedecedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for overseventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile,and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary,for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a newdomicile is gained". Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar,if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been oneof choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely:(1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presenceat the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently.

Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicileand had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, theissue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that placepermanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does thedecedent appear to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in saidcity. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the olddomicile 1 which is particularly strong when the domicile is one of theorigin 2 as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards saiddecedent has not been offset by the evidence of record.

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:

". . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the placeof residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not becontested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, inthe original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."

if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased residentare instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue israised before the same, the court in which the first case was filedshall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so heldin the case of Taciana Vda. de Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955).Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, thatvenue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should bedismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, beinitiated in the proper court.

In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death,

domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance ofRizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estateof the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that itshould, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissedappellee's petition.

3. Extent of jurisdiction of probate court

Lim vs. CA

Facts:

May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and beincluded in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?

Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review oncertiorari, the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the ordersdated 04 July 1995 2, 12 September 1995 3 and 15 September 1995 4 ofthe Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probatecourt.


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Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Limwhose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in SpecialProceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y.Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".

Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance MarketingCorporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and ActionCompany are corporations formed, organized and existing underPhilippine laws and which owned real properties covered under theTorrens system.

On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, assurviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, filedon 17 March 1995, a joint petition 5 for the administration of the estate ofPastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in theinventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion 6 for the liftingof lis pendens and motion 7 for exclusion of certain properties from theestate of the decedent.

Issue:

Whether the properties of the corporation as well as the corporation itselfcan be included in the estate of the deceased

Held:

No. (obviously)

Ratio:

Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of theestate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and areregistered in the name of private respondent corporations, whichunder the law possess a personality separate and distinct from theirstockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil ofcorporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favorof private respondents should stand undisturbed.

Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents'motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court,acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as aprobate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusionof certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to

adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is noless true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by

jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard andcaution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.

Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under theTorrens system in the name of private respondents, and as such were tobe afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate courtobviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded toissue the impugned orders.

Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of privaterespondent corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate butalso the private respondent corporations themselves. It is settled that acorporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that ofthe persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of thepersons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personalindebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all ornearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficientreason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation,the wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannotbe presumed.

Heirs of Sandejas vs. Lina

Facts:

On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition (Record, SP.Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 8-10) in the lower court praying that letters ofadministration be issued in his favor for the settlement of 'the estate of hiswife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17, 1955. On July 1,1981, Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing


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Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the estate of the late RemediosSandejas.

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene andpetition-in-intervention was filed by movant Alex A. Lina alleging amongothers that on June 7, 1982, Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity asseller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns,to sell absolutely several parcels of land which formed part of the estate infavor of Alex Lina. A new administrator was later appointed after the deathof Eliodoro Sandejas. Alex Lina filed an omnibus motion with the probatecourt to approved the deed of conditional sale entered into by him and theprevious administrator from which the new administrator opposed.

Issue:

Whether the conditional sale should be approved

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

Petitioners fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction overordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to compelperformance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestatecourt; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor or

administrator, and no one else, to file an application for approval of a saleof the property under administration.

We are not persuaded. We hold that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows thisaction to proceed. The factual differences alleged by petitioners have nobearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subjectconditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to thesettlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86 91) and the probate of wills (Rules75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removalof administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to mattersincidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognizedpowers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty

belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended tosettle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flowfrom such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and thebeneficiaries.

In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle thedecedent's obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearlyfalls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court . To requirerespondent to file a separate action on whether petitioners shouldconvey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty willunnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of thedeceased spouses.

The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale betweenEliodoro Sr. and respondent to one that was and a definite, clear andabsolute document of sale," as contended by petitioners. Upon the

occurrence of the condition, the conditional sale became a reciprocallydemandable obligation that is binding upon the parties. That Acebedo(case cited by petitioners) also involved a conditional sale of real propertyproves that the existence of the suspensive condition did not remove thatproperty from the jurisdiction of the intestate court.

However, because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their idealshares in the disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the scope of thereceipt to the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it correctly modifiedthe intestate court's ruling by excluding their shares from the ambit of thetransaction.

De Borja vs. De Borja

Facts:

The heirs contended that the administrator of the decedents estateerroneously accounted for the properties of the deceased. They filedseveral motions in court praying that the administrator clarify and accountfor the deficiencies in the estate. The administrator in the same specialproceeding filed a counter-claim for moral damages against the heirs.

Issue:


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Whether the counter-claim for moral damages can be allowed in theprobate court

Held:

No.

Ratio:

Special Proceedings No. 6414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal(Pasig branch) was instituted for the purpose of settling the IntestateEstate of Marcelo de Borja. In taking cognizance of the case, the Courtwas clothed with a limited jurisdiction which cannot expand to collateralmatters not arising out of or in any way related to the settlement andadjudication of the properties of the deceased, for it is a settled rulethat the jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special. Although

there is a tendency now to relax this rule and extend the jurisdiction of theprobate court in respect to matters incidental and collateral to the exerciseof its recognized powers, this should be understood to comprehend onlycases related to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes. For itwas even said that:

"Probate proceedings are purely statutory and their functions limited to thecontrol of the property upon the death of its owner, and cannot extend tothe adjudication of collateral questions".

It was in the acknowledgment of its limited jurisdiction that the lower courtdismissed the administrator's counterclaim for moral damages against theoppositors, particularly against Marcela de Borja who allegedly utteredderogatory remarks intended to cast dishonor to said administratorsometime in 1950 or 1951, his Honor's ground being that the courtexercising limited jurisdiction cannot entertain claims of this kind whichshould properly belong to a court of general jurisdiction. From whateverangle it may be looked at, a counterclaim for moral damages demandedby an administrator against the heirs for alleged utterances, pleadings andactuations made in the course of the proceeding, is an extraneous matterin a testate or intestate proceedings. The injection into the action ofincidental questions entirely foreign in probate proceedings should not beencouraged for to do otherwise would run counter to the clear intention ofthe law, for it was held that:

"The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefitof the creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance orlegacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid, isthe ruling spirit of our probate law".

Adapon vs. Maralit

Facts:

On December 16, 1936, Pedro Adapon presented for probate the last willand the testament of his deceased father, Rudocindo Adapon, in the Courtof First Instance of Batangas. The will was admitted to probate, and Pedro

Adapon, having been appointed administrator by the court, filed aninventory of the properties and assets of the estate. The surviving spouseof the testator by a second marriage, Felisa Maralit, the oppositor-appellee here, through counsel, presented a petition asking the court to

order the administrator to pay her a monthly allowance of P50, and toinclude in the submitted inventory the several properties alleged tohave been omitted.

Issue:

Whether the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the question ofownership over properties claimed by the administrator and a third person

Held:

No.

Ratio:

Under section 599 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the probate jurisdictionof the Court of First Instance relates only to matters having to do with thesettlement of estates and probate of wills of deceased persons, theappointment and removal of guardians and trustees, and the powers,duties, and rights of guardians and wards, trustees, and cestuis que trust."As may be seen, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probatecourt to the determination of questions of ownership that ariseduring the proceeding. In the case of Bauermann vs. Casasthis court, in


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passing upon the same question now raised observed that "the mere factthat one of the parties is an executor or administrator of a certain estatedoes not give exclusive jurisdiction to the probate court wherein the estateis being settled, of questions arising between such the executors oradministrators and third persons, as to the ownership of specific

property.

Paz vs. Madrigal (missing case)

Bernardo vs. CA

Facts:

Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The firstdied on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of hisestate was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. His will was

admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties infavor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, allsurnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamedBernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petitionof Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased EusebioCapili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs,namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes;and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.

On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project partition in the testateproceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating theestate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception

of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral relativesaforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition tothe executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project ofpartition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will ofthe deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to thelatter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. One of thecollateral issues raised by the parties is the validity of donationwhich the probate court declared as void. Now, petitioners questionthe jurisdiction of the probate court to rule on such collateral issue.

Issue:

Whether the probate court has jurisdiction to rule on such issue

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

In a line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that as a generalrule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate orintestate proceedings, except where one of the parties prays merelyfor the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property , inwhich case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the questionwithout prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. However,we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of thedeceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a

question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probatecourt may definitely pass judgment thereon; and that with the consent ofthe parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may betaken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceedingprovided interests of third persons are not prejudiced.

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question ofownership of certain of the properties involved whether they belong tothe conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matterproperly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily hasto liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of thedecedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to

the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented,because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted uponpetition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. Thereare no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs ofthe deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widowis, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property . And it is this rightthat is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, theclaim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and,consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that theparties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented byrespondents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.


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Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submittedthemselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of thedetermination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. Thisis not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed thatthey were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the

questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, asrepresentatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the projectof partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doingso all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolutionin the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard toinsist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus,have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character ofthe properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of therespondents". In other words, by presenting their project of partitionincluding therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they weredonated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issuethe question of ownership of the properties which is well within the

competence of the probate court and just because of an oppositionthereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or theissue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiverwhere the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the courtin motion. They can not be permitted to complain if the court, after duehearing, adjudges the question against them.

4. Powers and Duties of probate court

Bernardo vs. CA (supra)

Vda. De Manalo vs. CA

Facts:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Maniladied intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S.Manalo, and his eleven (11) children. At the time of his death on February14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila andin the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and styleManalo's Machine Shop. On November 26, 1992, herein respondents,who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, fileda petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the

judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, andfor the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administratorthereof. Petitioners opposed the petition contending that a conditionprecedent to the filing of the action (absence of earnest effortstowards compromise among family members) was not satisfied.

Issue:

Whether such condition precedent is applicable in special proceedings

Held:

No.

Ratio:

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an actionor proceeding, the averments15and the character of the relief sought16inthe complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. Acareful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 beliesherein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civilaction. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in apetition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fatof death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as hisresidence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact ofdeath of the decedent and of his residence within he country arefoundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in theadministration of the estate rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirsincluding a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which aresought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief'sprayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard theintention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek

judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo.

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certainaverments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action . Hereinpetitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the


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petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed bythe trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials,special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual,moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in anapparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and

ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules ofCourt vis--vis,Article 222 of civi l of the Civil Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat thepurpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate ofthe late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant andimmaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court,siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 andcannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which maybe properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition,the rule has always been to the effect that thejurisdiction of a court, aswell as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by theaverments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in theanswer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a caseeither thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simplestrategem.21So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

Moreover, the condition precedent requirement is applicable only toordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to anaction by one person or persons against another or other in a court of

justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords himfor the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law orin equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice,whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or theprevention or redress of a wrong.

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are notbeing sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in factno defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of

Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No.92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedywhereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, ora particular fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein)merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequentlyto be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that

they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement andliquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited andspecial jurisdiction of the probate court.

B. Summary Settlement of Estates

1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs, whenallowed

Guevarra v. Guevarra (Original is 34 pages long)

Facts:

Ernesto M. Guevarra (legitimate son) and Rosario Guevara (naturaldaughter) of Victorino L. Guevara (deceased) are litigating over theirinheritance. Rosario instituted an action to recover from Ernesto what she

claims to be her strict legitime as daughter of the deceased which is aportion of a large parcel of land in Pangasinan.

Victorino executed a will, apparently with all the formalities of the law,wherein he made several bequests and devises.

He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed ofeither by him during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto in orderto pay all his pending debts and to degray his expenses and those of hisfamily us to the time of his death.

Subsequently, Victorino executed a document whereby he conveyed toErnesto a parcel of land of which he had disposed by will in considerationof the sum of P1 (for the northern half) and the obligation of paying off thehis debts (for the southern half).

Victorino died. His last will and testament was never presented to thecourt for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever beeninstituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legateesmentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or have evenbeen given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositionstherein made in their favor is unclear. Ever since the death of Victorino,Ernesto appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him and to


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have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying thedebts left by his father.

In the meantime, Rosario, who appears to have had her father's last willand testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke thetestamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testatoracknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certainlegacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of thelarge parcel of land described in the will. However, 4 years afterVictorinos death, she sued Ernesto for the purpose of recovering her strictlegitime; and it was only during the trial of the case that she presented thewill to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to provethat the deceased Victorino had acknowledged her as his naturaldaughter. Rosario was arguing that she is entitled to her claim on theassumption that Victorino died intestate, because the will had not beenprobated.

Issue:

Whether the procedure adopted by Rosario is legal

Held:

No. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice bypublication to the whole world and with personal notice to each of theknown heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator (sections 3 and 4,Rule 77). Although not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due executionof the will and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of

sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, andundue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court,and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of acertificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal ofthe court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereofand of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register ofdeeds of the province in which the land lies. (Section 12, Rule 77)

The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and itsallowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. Toassure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a person whoneglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding

P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committedto prison and kept there until he delivers the will.

The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of the lawand held that a will, unless probated, is ineffective. Nevertheless itauthorized the procedure adopted by Rosario for the following reasons:

The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case isdismissed ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it wouldcause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much expense to theparties, and that therefore, it is preferable to leave them in thevery status which they themselves have chosen, and to decidetheir controversy once and for all, since, in a similar case, theSupreme Court applied that same criterion, which is nowsanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Besides,section 6 of Rule 124 provides that, if the procedure which thecourt ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is notspecifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitableprocess or mode of procedure may be adopted which appearsmost consistent to the spirit of the said Rules. Hence, we declarethe action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law.

Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partitionof the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration." Itdoes not say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legateesmay divide the estate among themselves without the necessity ofpresenting the will to the court for probate. The petition to probate a willand the petition to issue letters of administration are two different things,

although both may be made in the same case. The allowance of a willprecedes the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration (section4, Rule 78). One can have a will probated without necessarily securingletters testamentary or of administration. Under section 1 of Rule 74, inrelation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and theheirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of theestate, they must first present that will to the court for probate anddivide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregardthe provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law.Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to thecourt for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary tolaw and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and


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public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated andnotice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person todispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as isattempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees anddevisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will,

could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some ofthe heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate amongthemselves to the exclusion of others.

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees otherthan the present litigants had received their respective legacies or thatthey had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will.Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights beobliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the willto present it to the court for probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question asto the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirsmay sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that willwithout first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first,because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass eitherreal or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the propercourt"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is aproceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by anyother proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending againstpublic policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose ofhis property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rightsof the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided bylaw, among which are the publication and the personal notices toeach and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approveand allow the will presented in evidence in such an action forpartition, which is one inpersonam, any more than it could decreethe registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in anordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition.

Section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of Appeals, does notauthorize the procedure adopted by Rosario.

Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the actioninstituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It also erred in

awarding relief to the plaintiff in this action on the basis of intestacy of thedecedent notwithstanding the proven existence of a will left by him andsolely because said will has not been probated due to the failure of theplaintiff as custodian thereof to comply with the duty imposed upon her bythe law.

The parties are ordered to present the document to the proper court forprobate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as theprovincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take against the responsible party orparties under section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document is approvedand allowed by the court as the last will and testament of the deceasedVictorino, the heirs and legatees named may take such action, judicial orextrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition the estate of the testator.

2. Two-year prescriptive period

PEZA vs. FERNANDEZ and the Heirs of Deceased Sps. Juan Cuizonand Florentina Rapaya

FACTS:The subject of this controversy was Lot No. 4673 in Lapu Lapu City whichhad an area of about 11,345sqm and registered in the names ofFlorentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon, Isidro Cuizon, Ursula Cuizon, BenitoLozano, Isabel Lozano, Pelagia Lozano, Augusto Lozano, ValerianoYbaez, Jesus Ybaez, Numeriano Ybaez, Martino Ybaez, EutiquioPatalinghug, Celedonio Patalinghug, Santiago Patalinghug and SilvinoPatalinghug in OCT No. 2537.

In May 1982, Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon (notnamed above) executed an Extrajudicial Partition, in which they declaredthemselves as the only surviving heirs of the registered owners of theaforesaid lot. Consequently, they were issued TCT in July 1982.

Meanwhile, said Lot No. 4673 was subject of an expropriation proceedingpending before the RTC of Lapu Lapu City. The court rendered a partialdecision approving the Compromise Agreement entered into betweenExport Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and the new registered ownersof Lot No. 4673; namely, Igot-Soroo, Booc and Cuizon. Under theCompromise Agreement, EPZA would pay P68,070 as just compensationfor the expropriation of Lot No. 4673, which was to be used for an export


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processing zone to be established in Lapu-Lapu City. PEZA then acquiredtitle over Lot No. 4673 by virtue of the Compromise Agreement and a TCT12788 was issued in PEZAs name.

In July 1996, private respondents, Heirs of Deceased Sps. Juan Cuizon

and Florentina Rapaya, filed a complaint for Nullity of Documents,Redemption and Damages against petitioner PEZA and Igot-Soroo,Booc and Cuizon, alleging that the private respondents had beenexcluded from the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. It likewise soughtthe nullification of several documents, including TCT No. 12788 issued inthe name of PEZA.

PEZA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription. Such motionwas denied, as well as the subsequent MR. PEZA filed a Petition forCertiorari before the CA, which the latter dismissed. The CA, in effect,held that Booc, Igot-Soronio and Cuizon committed a breach of trustwhich enabled them to execute a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition[,] Special

Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of EPZA to theprejudice of the plaintiffs as their co-heirs And if the action involve(s) thedeclaration of the nullity or inexistence of a void or inexistent contractwhich became the basis for the fraudulent registration of the subjectproperty, then the action is imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the CivilCode.

ISSUE:Whether the claim of the Heirs against the subject property had alreadyprescribed.

RULING: YES, the action had prescribed.

Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides: "Section 4. Liability ofdistributees and estate. - If it shall appear at any time within two (2) yearsafter the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with theprovisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir orother person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in theestate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of theestate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose ofsatisfying such lawful participation

Based on the foregoing, persons unduly deprived of their lawfulparticipation in a settlement may assert their claim only within the two-yearperiod after the settlement and distribution of the estate. This prescription

period does not apply, however, to those who had no part in or had nonotice of the settlement. Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is notmeant to be a statute of limitations. Moreover, by no reason or logic canone contend that an extrajudicial partition, being merely an ex parteproceeding, would affect third persons who had no knowledge thereof.

However, it cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the mannerprovided by law, a transaction may be known actually or constructively.

In the present case, private respondents are deemed to have beenconstructively notified of the extrajudicial settlement by reason of itsregistration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot.From the time of registration, private respondents had two (2) years oruntil July 8, 1984, within which to file their objections or to demand theappropriate settlement of the estate.

On the matter of constructive notice vis--vis prescription of an action tocontest an extrajudicial partition, an authority in land registration said that

while it may be true that an extrajudicial partition is an ex parteproceeding, yet after its registration under the Torrens system and theannotation on the new certificate of title of the contingent liability of theestate for a period of two years as prescribed in Rule 74, Section 4, of theRules of Court, by operation of law a constructive notice is deemed madeto all the world, so that upon the expiration of said period all third personsshould be barred [from going] after the particular property, except wheretitle thereto still remains in the names of the alleged heirs who executedthe partition tainted with fraud, or their transferees who may not qualify asinnocent purchasers for value

The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is when the title

remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused thepartition of the subject property or in those of their transferees who cannotbe considered innocent purchasers for value. However, title to theproperty in the present case was no longer in the name of the allegedlyfraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value the government. Moreover, the government is presumed to have acted ingood faith in the acquisition of the lot, considering that title thereto wasobtained through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in properexpropriation proceedings.

Even assuming that there was in fact fraud on the part of the other heirs,private respondents may proceed only against the defrauding heirs, not


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against PEZA which had no participation in or knowledge of the allegedfraud. The remedy of an owner alleged to have been prejudiced orfraudulently deprived of property that was subsequently sold to aninnocent purchaser for value is an action for damages against the personor persons who perpetrated the fraud.

3. Affidavit of self-adjudication by sole heir

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR.,Petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.

Facts:

Jose Q. Portugal had 2 wives: (1)On 1942, Paz Lazo, the mother ofrespondent, Leonila (born April 11, 1950); and (2) On 1948, Isabel,petitioner, mother of Douglas, other petitioner (born September 13, 1949).

This is a case centering over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located inCaloocan. The land originally belonged to Mariano, father of Jose. OnMay 16, 1968, Jose and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and waived their rights in favor of Jose. The TCT stated:'Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo. On February 18, 1984, Pazdied, while April 21, 1985, Jose died intestate.

On February 15, 1988, Leonila executed an 'Affidavit of Adjudication bySole Heir of Estate of Jose adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel ofland. As a result, the TCT was cancelled and was issued on March 9,1988 in the name of respondent, 'Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to

Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.

Therefore, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23,1996 a complaint against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of

Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued inher name.

In their complaint,

(1) petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever tothe deceased Portugal, hence,

a. not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land andb. that she perjured herself when she made false

representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.(2) Petitioners accordingly prayed

a. that respondent's Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in

her name be declared void andb. that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to

cancel the TCT in respondent's name and to issue in itsstead a new one in their (petitioners') name, and

c. that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney'sfees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.

After tria l, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, dismissed thecase for lack of cause of actionon the ground that petitioners' status andright as putative heirs had not been established before a probate ( sic)court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case citing Heirs of Guido andIsabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario:

However, the establishment of a status, a right, or aparticular fact is remedied through a specialproceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), notan ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another forthe enforcement or protection of a right, or the protectionor redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in theformer is 'to establish', while in the latter, it is 'to enforce',a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of thedecedent not having been established, as yet, theComplaint failed to state a cause of action.

The court, not being a probate (sic) court , is withoutjurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs' cause to establish theirstatus and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have thepersonality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation toSecs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra). (Italics in the original;emphasis and underscoring supplied).

The Court of Appeals (2002) likewise affirmed the trial courts ruling andstating that the ruling of Cario is inapplicable to the case, even ifpromulgated in 2001, while the of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay case in1999. The reason because the the main issue in the Cario case was the


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validity of the two marriages, and notannulment of title toproperty,which is the main issue in this case. Thus, the institution of an ordinarycivil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it isaxiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit orallow indirectly.

Issue:

Whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determinetheir status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment ofrespondent's Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.

Held:

Yes. GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is herebySET ASIDE and the records be REMANDED to the trial court.

Ruling:

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverseparties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to thespecial proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings arepending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under thecircumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of,among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said specialproceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had beenfinally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost theright to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he

can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can befiled for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of thepartition or distribution or adjudication of a property or propertiesbelonging to the estate of the deceased.

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she wasthe sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 thequestioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception tothe general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it shouldbe judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a

qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in casethe deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executortherein.

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. Aprobate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are theheirs of a deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of theintestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to stillsubject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceedingwhich could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status ofpetitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to theestate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.

And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case 'subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presentedevidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the caseupon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being nocompelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to administrationproceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could beachieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceedto evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial andrender a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DELGADOFACTS

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado maybe divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, andgrandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of GuillermoRustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimatechild, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by oneLucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to thecouple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, allsurnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo,hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of FelisaDelgado.


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However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgadoslife. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, LuisDelgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which wasadmittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of RamonOsorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever gotmarried is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determinewhether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule againstreciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimaterelatives. If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married,then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother ofJosefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latters intestate estate.Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She wassurvived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitionersherein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustiaexecuted an affidavit of self-adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

ISSUEWhether the self-adjudication executed was validHELDNoRATIOTo determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questionedstatus of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with RamonOsorio must first be addressed.Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgadoand Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely torely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of suchcountervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her

son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgadosand Caridad ConcepcionsPartida de Casamiento identifyingLuis as "hijonatural de Felisa Delgado"(the natural child of Felisa Delgado).

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame therebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osoriowere never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out ofher relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and hishalf-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and thedecedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children andlegitimate children of the same parent, even though there is

unquestionably a tie of blood between them. Notwithstanding this,however, we submit thatsuccession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers andsisters are only of the half-blood. Here, the above-named siblings ofJosefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her

half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inheritfrom each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from JosefaDelgado.We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews,nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral linetakes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephewsand nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews andgrandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgadowho are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers andsisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death onSeptember 8, 1972.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermocould not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74,Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of thedecedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed onlyif he is the soleheir to the estate:SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If thedecedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or theminors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives dulyauthorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters ofadministration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit bymeans of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of

partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself theestate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register ofdeeds. x x x (

Cua vs. Vargas

Facts:

A parcel of residential land was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. OnFebruary 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs wasexecuted by and among Paulina Vargas heirs. Florentino, Andres,


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Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester,Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra JudicialSettlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune forthree consecutive weeks.

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs withSale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the sameproperty and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester,Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and theirrespective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua,petitioner herein.

According to respondent Gloria Vargas, she was unaware of the two extrajudicial settlement that took place. She filed the complaint against Cua toexercise her right of redemption.

Issue:

Whether the extra-judicial settlement was binding on respondent

Held:

No.

Ratio:

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding.

The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate orhad no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. Itcontemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed ofsettlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling allinterested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlementand partition), and not after such an agreement has already beenexecuted as what happened in the instant case with the publication of thefirst deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice tothe heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because thesame was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of

publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was neverintended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedentsestate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm thatrespondents never signed either of the settlement documents, havingdiscovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present

complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bindrespondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consentis invalid insofar as they are concerned.

4. Summary settlement of estates of small value, when allowed

5. Remedies of aggrieved parties after extra-judicial settlement ofestate

PEREIRA V. CAFacts:Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines,passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was

survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitionerVictoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the hereinprivate respondent.

On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of theRegional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining tothe estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verifiedpetition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and VictoriaBringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that thedeceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that thedeceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from thePhilippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), thePAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and theSocial Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with thePhilippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial andIndustrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at BarangayPamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased(herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse andas such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.

On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismissthe petition of private respondent 2alleging that there exists no estate of


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the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative,that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the saidestate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.

In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed

private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestateestate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in theamount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all thereal and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventorythereof within three months after receipt of the order.

Issue:Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent diesintestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint thesurviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of thedeceased instead of the surviving spouse?Held:

The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before whichthe administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the bestposition to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the partiesas to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and therights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function ofresolving whether or not a certain property should be included in theinventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator isone clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, thecourt's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, andis subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be institutedby the parties.7

Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres deGuzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find theadministration proceedings instituted by private respondent to beunnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein belowdiscussed.

The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the sameshould be judicially administered and the competent court should appointa qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, incase the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to

name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established inSection 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are oflawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree inwriting to partition the property without instituting the judicial administrationor applying for the appointment of an administrator.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does notpreclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if theestate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for goodreasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirsto divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort toan ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them todo so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. 10Itshould be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if theestate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons fornot resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either inor out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration

proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leavingpending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are notbound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is alwayslong and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by theCourt. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicialadministration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluousand unnecessary proceedings .

C. Production and Probate of Will

1. Nature of probate proceeding

2. Who may petition for probate; persons entitled to notice

Alaban v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 156021

Facts: Respondent Francisco Provido filed for the probate of the Last Willand Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado. The RTC


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allowed probate of the will and eventually directed issuance of letterstestamentary to respondent. Four months later herein petitioners filed amotion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. Petitioners claimedthat the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction ove the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of

notice to the other heirs. The RTC held that there was sufficientpublicatioin in the probate proceedings first filed to notify the petitioners-oppositors. The CA dismissed petitioners appeal.

Issue: Whether petitioners have or have not become parties to theprobate proceedings filed by respondent.

Ruling:Unde the RoC, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will,or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after thedeath of the testator, petition the court having jursidiction to have the willallowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must bepublished for 3 consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation

in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other knownheirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that aproceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with thecorresponding publication of the petition the courts jurisdiction extends toall persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate.

As parties to the probate proceedings (through the valid publicationnotice), petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion fornew trial or reconsideration and petition fo relief from judgment. In fact,petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for newtrial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the settingof further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having beenfiled out of time, long after the Decision (in the probate proceeding

instituted by respondent) became final and executory.Petitioners action to annul the final judgment based on extrinsic fraudmust also fail. Petitioners claim they were ommited from respondentspetition for probate of the decedents will. According to the Rules, notice isrequired to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees ofthe testator. A perusal of the will shows that the respondent was institutedas the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and neices ofthe decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled tobe notified of the probate proceedings under he Rules. Respondent hadno legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or topersonally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified,the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all,personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience andnot a jurisdictional requisite.The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged

failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constituteextrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they werenot prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting theircase before the probate court.

D. Allowance or Disallowance of Will

1. Contents of petition for allowance of will

2. Grounds for disallowing a will

3. Reprobate; Requisites before will proved outside allowed in thePhilippines; effects of probate

In Re: In the matter of petition to approve the will of RupertaPalaganasFacts:

Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, diedsingle and childless. In the last will and testament she executed inCalifornia, she designated her brother Sergio as the executor of her willfor she had left properties in the Philippines and in the US.

Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta filed with the RTC a petitionfor probate of her will and for his appointment as special administrator.

Petitioners, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground thatthe will should be probated in the States where it was executed.

The RTC allowed the probate of the will and designated Ernestoas special administrator to administer the decedents properties in thePhilippines.Issue:

Whether a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated inthe Philippines although it had been previously probated and allowed inthe country where it was executedHeld:

The TCs decision is affirmed.Ratio:


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Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed byforeigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated andallowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legaleffects in our jurisdiction.

Our rules merely require that the petition for the allowance of a will

must show, so far as known to the petitioner: a) the jurisdictional facts; b)the names, ages and residences of the heirs, legatees and devisees ofthe testator or decedent; c)the probative value and character of theproperty of the estate; d) the name of the persons for whom letters areprayed and;

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