Specter CP - Michigan7 2015

Specter CP Michigan ‘15HJPV

Specter Proposal CP – HJPV


NotesBlanket immunity/amnesty in this context means that telecommunications companies aren’t subject to lawsuits regarding illegal surveillance – whether that be government enforced surveillance or corporate surveillance.

PRISM was what the TSP became – although it doesn’t fulfill the original role of the program.

One slight problem with the CP is that the solvency evidence for the specific amendment to the bill is very limited, but the good news is that the original piece of evidence is very solid

This should be paired with a “corporations fill in” circumvention argument.

Returning the current program back to the TSP would also allow for a legislative check on executive surveillance. This is because the whole reason that the TSP was removed was because Bush found another way to collect data without a legislative check. The original TSP allows for the Congress to check the executive on surveillance issues.


Negative


1nc

The United States Federal government should amend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to remove blanket immunity provisions for telecommunications companies. The United States federal government should oversight of the Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management (PRISM) program to the Terrorist Surveillance Program.

The CP allows for FISA effectiveness and Congressional oversight- solves all sqou NSA overstretch and the terror DAHLR, 09 (Harvard Law Review, Student run publication with articles from professors, judges, practitioners, and students; February 2009; Harvard Law Review, Vol. 122, No. 4 (Feb., 2009), pp. 1271-1278; “Electronic Surveillance — Congress Grants Telecommunications Companies Retroactive¶

Immunity from Civil Suits for Complying with NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program. — Fisa¶ Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436”; JSTOR)//JPM

¶ Senator Specter subsequently proposed an amendment that would¶

"substitute the U.S. Government as a party defendant for the telephone¶ companies," thereby shielding them from liability while still allowing¶ courts to rule on the legality of the TSP and the constitutional¶ questions raised by the President's assertions of executive authority.25¶ Government substitution would be dependent upon a finding by the¶ FISA court that the telecommunications companies acted "in good¶ faith."26 The Senate rejected this amendment by a vote of sixty-eight¶ to thirty.27 Ultimately, the Senate passed the bill and sent it back to¶ the House with the blanket immunity provision intact.28¶ ¶ On June 19, 2008, Representative Silvestre Reyes introduced the¶

FISA Amendments Act of 200829 in the House.30 This bill was substantially¶ the same as the version

passed by the Senate.31 On June 20,¶ the House voted to pass the bill.32 The Senate subsequently considered¶ the House bill and rejected three more amendments that would¶ have altered or eliminated the retroactive immunity provision.33 On¶ July 9, the Senate passed the House bill by a vote of sixty-nine to¶ twenty-eight.34 The President signed the bill

into law the next day.35¶ The final version of the immunity provision states that courts¶ should dismiss any suit against an electronic service provider alleged¶ to have provided assistance "in connection with an intelligence activity¶ involving communications that was . . . designed to detect or prevent a¶ terrorist atack .. . against the United States"36 if the

Attorney General¶ certifies that one of two conditions imet. Suits should be dismissed if¶ the Attorney General certifies either that the company was acting pursuant¶ to a "written request or directive" from the government indicating¶ that such activity was "(i)

authorized by the President; and (ii) determined¶ to be lawful,"37 or else that the company "did not provide the¶ alleged assistance."38 The Act provides for a "substantial evidence"¶ standard for judicial review of the Attorney General's certifications.39¶ Additionally, the Act provides that courts may limit public disclosure¶ of any certificationr supplemental materials that would prove harmful¶ to national


security.40¶ ¶ The blanket immunity provision retroactively validates presidential¶ directives to private parties that ordered them to conduct potentially¶ illegal actions.41 This result is problematic for several reasons. First,¶ it undermines the statutory framework that Congress originally established¶ in FISA. Second, it undermines the ability of Congress to play a¶ meaningful role in determining the proper procedures for gathering intelligence,¶ as it weakens the requirement that the Administration get¶ statutory approval before fundamentally changing surveillance policy.¶ Finally, it greatly reduces the chances that a court will be able to review¶ the legality of the TSP and the constitutionality of the President's¶ assertions of executive authority. Proponents of the blanket immunity¶ provision

argued that it was necessary for a number of reasons, including¶ fairness and national security.42 However, the amendment proposed by Senator Specter would have addressed most of these concerns¶ while avoiding many of the problems of the blanket immunity provision.¶ Congress should have adopted this amendment instead.¶ ¶ When Congress enacted FISA, it attempted to establish a clear and¶ exclusive framework for all parties to follow when the government¶ seeks the aid of private companies in conducting electronic surveillance.43¶ Members of the Bush Administration appear to have acknowledged¶ that the TSP operated outside this statutory framework,44¶ but they argue that the TSP was nevertheless legally justified both by¶ the Authorization for Use of Military Force45

(AUMF) passed by Congress¶ in 2001 and by the President's inherent authority under Article II¶ of the Constitution.46 The blanket immunity provision undermines¶ FISA by granting retroactive immunity to telecommunications companies¶ without requiring any showing that they reasonably believed that¶ assisting the intelligence agencies was legal;47 the Attorney General¶ merely has to certify that the company was told by the government¶ that its actions were legal.48

Since the Administration appears to have¶ based its legal reasoning upon executive authority rather than compliance¶ with FISA,49 neither the companies nor the President needed to¶ believe they were complying with FISA in order for the companies to¶ receive immunity. Congress has therefore allowed the Administration¶ and private companies to act outside of the statutory framework that¶ Congress created. The effectiveness of FISA as a comprehensive¶ scheme governing electronic surveillance is undermined if the President¶ can circumvent its procedures simply by asserting that he has the¶

executive authority to act outside of its framework. FISA's effectiveness¶ will be further undermined if telecommunications companies are¶ willing to cooperate with intelligence agencies even when FISA procedures¶ have not been followed.¶ ¶ Furthermore, as the intelligence community increasingly relies on¶ the help of private companies to conduct electronic surveillance, it is¶ essential that a range of government actors - including Congress -¶ gets to weigh in on important policy considerations, including the¶ proper balance between individual privacy rights and national security.50¶ Congress


can and should serve as a check on the executive, as¶ the executive branch may be "institutionally predisposed" to value security¶ over civil liberties.51 It is therefore important that Congress establish¶ the proper procedures for the Administration to follow when it¶ works with the private sector to conduct electronic surveillance, and¶ that Congress then makes sure that these procedures are followed.¶ When the Administration and private parties act outside of the statutory¶ framework, they should pay a price, even if Congress would have¶ approved of their actions had its approval been sought; in this case,¶ that price should be civil liability. There is nothing wrong with Congress¶ changing FISA at the request of the Administration; in other¶ provisions of the Act, Congress does just that - it updates and¶

changes the procedures for conducting electronic surveillance.52 However,¶

in order for Congress to play a meaningful role in determining¶

surveillance policy, the Administration should have to seek Congress's¶ approval before making a major policy change and acting outside the¶ statutory framework. Despite its intention to limit extralegal abe able to determine

the validity of the Administration's argument¶ that the President has the inherent constitutional authority to conduct¶ electronic surveillance without congressional approval and that this¶ authority is supplemented by the AUMF.55 Regardless of whether the¶ Administration's arguments would hold up in court, a decision one¶ way

or the other would provide more certainty to all parties involved:¶ the Administration would know whether it has to follow FISA under¶ all circumstances; Congress would know to what extent it can limit the¶ President's ability to conduct surveillance; and the telecommunications¶

companies would know whether they can rely on the Administration's¶ assertions that providing assistance is legal.

Also, since any pending¶ lawsuits will almost certainly be dismissed, individuals whose privacy¶ rights were violated will be unable to vindicate those rights in court.56¶ ¶ Because of these problems, Congress should not have enacted the¶ blanket immunity provision unless it was absolutely necessary, which¶ it was not. Proponents of blanket immunity argued that it was necessary¶ both to prevent unfairly punishing telecommunications companies¶ that tried to assist the government in preventing another terrorist attack57¶ and to ensure the cooperation of telecommunications companies¶ in the future.58 However, The amendment proposed by Senator Specter¶ would have accomplished both of these goals while avoiding some of¶

the problems inherent in the blanket immunity provision. Under this¶

amendment, any telecommunications company that complied with the¶

government and acted in good faith would be shielded from liability.¶

If the FISA court found that a company did act in good faith, then the¶

government would take its place in any lawsuits.59 According to Senator¶ Sheldon Whitehouse, it would be proper to hold the government¶ accountable because "if the companies acted reasonably and in good¶ faith at the direction of the Government but ended up breaking the¶ law, the Government truly is the morally proper party to the case."60¶ Furthermore, some companies had threatened that if they were not¶ given immunity, they would refuse to cooperate with the government¶ in the future "except under strict


compulsion."61 The Specter amendment¶ would enable most carriers to escape liability through a showing arrangements,¶ Congress has signaled to both the Administration and the telecommunications¶

companies that they can ignore the statutory framework¶ without suffering adverse consequences. As a result, the¶ Administration is likely to rely more on informal agreements with telecommunications¶

companies,53 and Congress's role in making policy¶ and providing oversight will be diminished.¶ Finally, the blanket immunity provision will also likely prevent any¶ judicial rulings on the underlying legal issues at stake.54 No court will of good faith, thereby providing them with the desired immunity and¶ encouraging their future cooperation.¶ ¶ In addition to

addressing many of the concerns of the proponents¶ of blanket immunity, the Specter amendment would also have reduced¶ some of the problems caused by the blanket immunity provision.¶ First, by protecting companies only after a judicial finding that they¶ acted in reasonable good faith, Congress would have sent a clear signal¶ to private companies that they must determine for themselves whether¶ a government request for assistance is legal.

Congress would also have¶ sent a message to the President that he cannot ignore existing statutes¶ and authorize private parties to commit potentially unlawful actions¶ without being subjected to intense judicial scrutiny. Congress would¶ therefore have encouraged both the Administration ad the private¶ sector to comply with FISA. As a result, Congress would have reasserted¶ its role in determining the proper surveillance procedures by¶ holding parties accountable for circumventing those procedures. The¶ Specter amendment may also have allowed courts to rule directly on¶ the legality of several aspects of the TSP. Finally, the amendment¶ would have given private citizens the "ability to vindicate their rights¶ in court regarding wiretapping abuses of the past."62¶ ¶ Senator Specter's amendment presented Congress with an opportunity¶ to encourage both the executive branch and the private sector to¶ follow the law, to provide some accountability for what appear to be¶ extensive violations of the law, and to reassert itself as an important¶ player in the debate over how to conduct electronic surveillance. Congress¶ could have achieved these goals without making any major sacrifices¶ in terms of fairness or national security. Yet Congress, at the behest¶ of the Administration and the telecommunications industry,¶ instead chose to provide blanket immunity to the telecommunications¶ companies and virtually ensure that important legal questions about¶ the TSP will remain unanswered.63 Although it is important to encourage¶ cooperation between telecommunications companies and the¶ intelligence agencies, it is also important for Congress to play a role in¶

determining the proper balance between security and civil liberties¶

rather than leaving such a determination to the Administration.64 By¶

allowing the Administration and telecommunications companies to ignore¶ FISA with impunity, Congress has abdicated this responsibility.



Solves: PRISM

Blanket immunity is the biggest problem facing domestic surveillance – pre-req to aff solvencyEFF, 2008 (Electronic Frontier Foundation, leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world; 2008; “Archive: The Case Against Retroactive Amnesty for Telecoms”; https://www.eff.org/pages/case-against-retroactive-amnesty-telecoms)//JPM

The litigation against AT&T and other companies is based upon clear, first-hand whistleblower documentary evidence¶ – authenticated in court by AT&T itself in the course of unsuccessfully trying to protect the documents as trade secrets – that¶ for years on end every e-mail, every text message, and every phone call carried over the massive fiber-optic links of sixteen separate¶ companies routed through AT&T’s Internet hub in

San Francisco – hundreds of millions of private, domestic communications¶ – have been illegally copied in their entirety by AT&T and knowingly diverted wholesale by means of multiple “splitters”¶ into a secret room controlled exclusively by the NSA. The whistleblower also discovered that there were at least five other such¶ rooms in San Diego, Los Angeles, San Jose, Seattle and Atlanta. Any filtering of the information took place only after the¶ entire fiber-optic data stream was copied and

diverted into the secret room.¶ As Judge Walker has held, it simply cannot be

credibly suggested that the Government’s telephone company

partners in ¶ a massive, ongoing, wholesale dragnet of millions

upon millions of domestic e-mail, text message and phone

communications ¶ were under the excusable “misimpression”

that this surveillance dragnet only “incidentally” might sweep

in the ¶ occasional domestic-to-domestic communications . To the

contrary, the AT&T whistleblower who installed and maintained¶ the “splitter” technology

(and whose documents and affidavit are at the core of the case against AT&T) has made it¶ clear that the system clearly was designed to capture – and did in fact capture –

hundreds of millions of ordinary domestic¶ communications , and had the

technical capability to analyze them in real time.¶ Furthermore, independent experts have confirmed that the location of these splitters in San Francisco is inconsistent with¶ surveillance aimed solely at international or foreign traffic. There are apparently no foreign communications cables that¶

emerge from the sea near San Francisco or near another of the secret room locations confirmed in the whistleblower’s documents,¶ hundreds of miles from the seashore in Atlanta, Georgia!

A federal court should weigh these facts.


Solves: NSA Overreach

Blanket amnesty allows the government to retroactively exempt telecommunications companies from legal consequences to conducting mass surveillance – means even if the plan can solve for NSA surveillance, they will be circumvented by companies, only the CP solves.

Amnesty provisions for the telecom industry are a prereq to combating NSA overreach

-Indicting blanket amnesty was what originally led to the creation of the FISC

Greenwald, 13 (Glen, journalist, constitutional lawyer, and author of four New York Times best-selling books on politics and law. His most recent book, No Place to Hide, is about the U.S. surveillance state and his experiences reporting on the Snowden documents around the world. Prior to his collaboration with Pierre Omidyar, Glenn’s column was featured at The Guardian and Salon. He was the debut winner, along with Amy Goodman, of the Park Center I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism in 2008, and also received the 2010 Online Journalism Award for his investigative work on the abusive detention conditions of Chelsea Manning. For his 2013 NSA reporting; 6/6/13; “"Digital blackwater": the National Security Administration, telecommunications companies and state-corporate crime”; http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/retrieve.do?sgHitCountType=None&sort=RELEVANCE&docType=Report&prodId=AONE&tabID=T002&searchId=R1&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&contentSegment=&currentPosition=1&searchResultsType=SingleTab&inPS=true&userGroupName=lom_umichanna&docId=GALE%7CA403918836&contentSet=GALE%7CA403918836)//JPM

In this article, we provide a framework for demonstrating the illegality of the NSA surveillance programmes by arguing that these activities should be considered acts of state-facilitated state-corporate crime.

That is, we contend that the broad and blanket surveillance of US citizens (Americans) who are not suspected of any criminal offence should be considered criminal activity that is

occurring through the collusion of state and corporate entities. Specifically, we maintain that the NSA's spying on Americans' electronic communications, in partnership with Verizon, Google, and other telecommunications companies, is (1) in violation of the right to privacy, as outlined by numerous international human rights treaties; (2) unlawfully secretive and thus lacks the transparency guaranteed by international human rights treaties and (3) antithetical to democracy by unlawfully attacking and seeking to punish whistle-blowers, thereby silencing discourse,

shirking accountability and ultimately undermining the rule of law. In

addition, we maintain that it is the weak system of checks and balances offered by the FISA Court, and specifically the changes made to it as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act 2001, that has facilitated the state and corporate mass surveillance system. Using the definition of state-corporate crime developed by Aulette and Michalowski (1993), we intend to highlight the dangers of these relationships for liberty, justice and

democracy.¶ State-Corporate Crime ¶ Given that this issue is devoted to examining state-

corporate crime, we offer only a brief review of the concept of state-corporate crime and the two types outlined by Michalowski and Kramer (2006). Michalowski and

Kramer (2006: 20) define state-corporate crime as¶ illegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually¶ reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in¶ pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of political¶ governance and (2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of


the¶ goals of one or more institutions of economic production and ¶

distribution.¶ Michalowski and Kramer distinguish between state-initiated and state-facilitated corporate crime and stress the importance of closely examining the interrelationships between state and

corporate actors. They argue,¶ State-initiated corporate crime occurs when corporations employed by a government engage in organizational deviance at the direction of, or with the tacit approval of, that government. State-facilitated corporate crime occurs when government institutions of social control are guilty of clear failure to create regulatory institutions capable of restraining deviant business activities, either because of direct collusion between business and government or because they adhere to shared goals whose attainment would be hampered by aggressive regulation. (Michalowski and Kramer 2006: 21)¶

Although the NSA surveillance can be seen as an example of both types, we focus here on examining the mass surveillance of telecommunications data as state-facilitated, documenting the direct collusion between telecommunications companies and the government and the weak legislative privacy protections that allow such companies to collect large amounts of personal, private data about individuals.¶ The NSA, Telecommunications Companies and Illegal Spying: A Brief History¶ The NSA has long coupled with the corporate sector to conduct warrantless surveillance of Americans. As Bamford (2008) wrote, the "rocky marriage" between the NSA and telecommunications companies began in the days following World War I, when cable companies turned over telegraph messages to the NSA. Project Minaret was a programme of the 1970s in which Radio Corporation of America (RCA), Western Union and other companies gave the NSA all incoming and outgoing US telephone calls and telegrams (Chaterjee 2013b). For decades, telecommunications leaders like AT&T "... have had a very secret, very cozy relationship with the NSA through the National Security Agency Advisory Board

(NSAAB), made up of top company executives" (Bamford 2008).¶ Project Minaret, and others like it, led to a series of congressional hearings in 1975. The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence

Activities, which was chaired by Frank Church of Idaho, resulted in the creation of the FISA. FISA created a special court, known as the FISA Court, which approves actions to gain intelligence via electronic surveillance of foreign powers or agents of foreign powers (Chaterjee 2013b). Eleven federal circuit judges, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, make up the FISA Court, which meets in secret. Proceedings from the FISA Court are not made public. Targets of FISA-approved searches are not notified that they have been targeted unless they are

to be prosecuted. Thus, any searches that result from FISA Court approval remain unknown to the public, and even to much of the Congress (Bamford 2008). They are not so secret, however, to the many private corporations with whom the NSA collaborates for intelligence gathering. FISA has been amended several times, each time weakening its provisions. The USA PATRIOT Act (1) eliminated the requirement that gathering foreign intelligence be the primary purpose of a warrant, replacing it with the language that it be a "significant purpose" (Keenan 2005). Keenan (2005: 104) explained, "When foreign-


intelligence gathering needs to be merely 'a significant purpose', it is more likely that the government will be able to use the lower standard to end-run the privacy protections of the Constitution."¶ As a result of the USA

PATRIOT Act changes to FISA, there has been a dramatic increase in warrants issued by the court. The number of warrants requested and granted increased 75 per cent between 2000 and 2004, and in 2002, FISA warrants outnumbered traditional federal search warrants for the first time (Keenan 2005). Bamford (2008) describes how, by 2008, the NSA was not only the largest and the costliest spy organization in the world but it had also become the most intrusive. No longer a "backwater agency whose director had to fight to sit at the same table with the CIA chief', the NSA currently has tens of thousands of employees and more than 50 buildings equipped with the most sophisticated technology

(Bamford 2008: 13). Every day the NSA intercepts and stores 1.7 billion emails, phone calls, texts and other electronic information. Its new data centre in Utah is 5.7 times the size of the US Capitol (Kelley 2012).¶ As early as the summer of 2002,

AT&T technician Mark Kline noted that the NSA was doing something illegal. Kline explained, "it appears the NSA is capable of conducting what amounts to vacuum-cleaner surveillance of all the data crossing the Internet--whether that be people's email, Web surfing, or any other data ... A lot of this was domestic" (in Bamford 2008: 191). Much of this huge volume of data

collected through the NSA's NARUS system located at AT&T's

San Francisco office came from the telecommunications

company's partners, like Sprint and Qwest (Electronic Frontier Foundation

n.d.). Moreover, " America's two major telecom companies, AT&T and

Verizon, have outsourced the bugging of their entire

networks--carrying billions of American communications every

day--to two mysterious companies with very troubling foreign

connections " (Bamford 2008: 236), both formed in Israel and having no oversight by Congress.¶

NSA-Corporate Programmes as State-Facilitated State-Corporate Crime¶ In this section, we demonstrate how the NSA's spying programmes meet the criteria to be considered state-facilitated state-corporate

crime.¶ Facilitated by state through weakening of checks and balances¶ Post 9/11, the growth in the amount of data being collected, as well as technological advancements, overwhelmed the NSA and prompted the need for more private contractors to do the increasing amount of data analysis.

According to retired Air Force General and former director of the NSA, Michael V. Hayden, "the government's massive data collection and surveillance system was largely built not by professional spies or Washington bureaucrats but by Silicon Valley and private defense contractors" (quoted in Hirsh 2013). As

Bamford (2008: 197) noted, "The NSA's new willingness to outsource eavesdropping, plus the warrantless eavesdropping and other new programs, thus became a giant boon to a growing fraternity of contractors who make their living off the NSA." The fact that the US national security functions have been delegated increasingly to corporations reflects a wider pattern of privatization and deregulation that has been gaining momentum since the Reagan administration. Not only has the

national intelligence apparatus increasingly relied on private


contractors, but the leadership of the national intelligence agencies is essentially the same as those with whom the government has contracted for surveillance services. These people are "... ideological allies",

who are " sympathetic to industry's interests. In this new

environment, corporations and private entities of all sorts

enjoy a new measure of sovereignty and the capacity to

determine for themselves what they will and will not disclose

to the public " (Gup 2007: 24). Put simply, this is the "power elite" about whom sociologist Mills (1956) cautioned as having disproportionate power and influence. For example, Booz Allen Hamilton, a privately owned consulting company located in Virginia worth an estimated $5 billion annually, is one of the largest of the companies that contracts with the government to conduct surveillance. The current Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James Clapper, is a former Booz Allen executive. The company's current vice chairman, Mike

McConnell, was the DNI in the George W. Bush administration (Goldman 2013).¶ There seems to be no end to the expansion of the government-corporate spying programme. A 2012 investigative report by Wired magazine revealed that the NSA is building a massive supercomputing facility in the Nevada desert (Bamford 2012, 2013). Former NSA employees who have examined the FISA order asking Verizon to provide information to the NSA note that as few as 40 and as many as 79 companies likely received similar orders in 2013 alone (Eisler and Page 2013). In November 2013,

Snowden revealed additional documentation demonstrating that the NSA relies on relationships with corporations to obtain the vast amount of data it collects from fibre-optic cables (MacAskill and Rushe 2013). In a presentation prepared by the NSA's Special Source Operations Division, the opening section states the agency's goal to "Leverage unique key corporate partnerships to gain access to high-capacity international fiber-optic cables, switches and/or routes throughout the world" (MacAskill and Rushe 2013).


--Ext. Congressional Oversight Solvency

Solely executive control of surveillance ineffective- invades privacy and needs legislative checksBendix and Quirk, 15 (William, assistant professor of¶ political science at Keene¶ State College. His research¶ focuses on Congress,¶ legislative deliberation, and¶ homeland security and civil¶

liberties policies; Phil Lind Chair in U.S.¶ Politics and Representation¶ at the University of British¶

Columbia and a former¶ research associate at¶ the Brookings Institution.¶ His work focuses on¶ debate and deliberation in¶ Congress and the mass¶ public; March 2015; “Secrecy and negligence:How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance”; Issues in Governance Studies Vol. 68; http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligence-congres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf)//JPM

¶ During the last five years of legislative debates over the PATRIOT Act, Congress has failed to define¶ or control surveillance policy. Prior to the Snowden leaks, most members had little awareness of¶ NSA activities and Congress had little capacity to impose constraints. Now, more than 18 months¶ after Snowden exposed the mass seizure of phone records, not much has changed. To a great¶ extent, the source of difficulty has been the inadequacy of the institutional arrangements for¶

legislative deliberation on secret programs. Some members have declined opportunity to learn about¶ domestic-spying practices, while others have opposed placing restrictions on the NSA for fear of¶ giving terrorists any tactical advantage.¶ ¶ If Congress had conducted thorough,

informed deliberations at all stages, we suspect it would have¶

endorsed extensive collection of communication records, but it would have also imposed limitations¶ and constraints to minimize the harm to privacy interests. Instead, it gave the executive branch¶ essentially unfettered authority to operate a massively intrusive program.¶

Congressional oversight fills in for FISA failuresHLR, 08 (Harvard Law Review, Student run publication with articles from professors, judges, practitioners, and students; June 2008; Vol. 121, No. 8; “NOTE: SHIFTING THE FISA PARADIGM: PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES BY ELIMINATING EXANTE JUDICIAL APPROVAL”; http://www.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/shifting_the_FISA_paradigm.pdf)//JPM

¶ The testimony during the initial FISA hearings of two former Attorneys¶ General, themselves responsible for authorizing foreign intelligence¶ surveillance in the pre-FISA arrangement, is instructive .

Former¶ Attorney General Ramsey Clark observed that “we greatly¶ exaggerate the safety and value of” a requirement that “all wiretaps¶ . . . be approved by a judicial officer.” Arguing that “[t]he idea¶ that there can be a meticulous review of these applications by the Judiciary¶ is contrary to our experience,” he put primary emphasis on political¶ checks through reporting requirements and congressional oversight¶ and standard- setting.91 Additionally, former Attorney General¶ Elliot Richardson noted the “important role in assuring that this sensitive¶ tool is not abused” to be played by the Senate, via both direct¶ oversight and the confirmation of the Attorney General and

Director¶ of the FBI.92¶ ¶ More importantly, the legislative history suggests that the most¶

consequential element of FISA is not its judicial review provisions.¶


Rather, FISA’s crucial move was to institute a reliance on the use of¶

“public laws, publicly debated and adopted, which specify under what¶

circumstances and under what restrictions electronic surveillance for¶

foreign intelligence purposes can be conducted.”93 The reliance on political¶ checks proposed in this Note avoids the problem identified by¶ Congress when it initially enacted FISA and raised by the TSP — that¶ “the substantial safeguards respecting foreign intelligence electronic¶ surveillance [then] embodied in classified Attorney General procedures” were not enough to overcome “the inappropriateness of relying¶ solely on executive branch discretion to safeguard civil liberties.”94¶ Here, the Executive is subject not merely to internally created standards¶ that it might change or ignore at will, but also to those set ¶

down by the statute, which were themselves created through the¶

public “weighing of important public policy concerns” that Congress¶

performs.95¶ ¶ Congress is better situated constitutionally and

better equipped institutionally ¶ to make the sort of value

judgments and political determinations ¶ that are necessary to

fulfill FISA’s purposes. If “[t]he government ¶ may abuse FISA

in situations like that involving the L.A. ¶ Eight, when intrusive

electronic surveillance is undertaken based on ¶ political

activities, rather than on support for terrorist activities,”96 it ¶

seems that Congress will be much better than courts at

sniffing out ¶ such violations and fashioning broader and more

flexible remedies . If¶ one hopes to realize the core purpose of FISA — as described by the¶ ACLU, “to prevent future presidents from intercepting the ‘international¶ communications of American citizens whose privacy ought to be¶ protected under [our] Constitution’ ever again”97 — then a new approach¶ is needed.


--Ext. FISA Effectiveness Solvency

An effective FISA court threads the needle between stopping terror attacks and maintaining civil libertiesBlum, 08 (Stephanie, attorney for the Transportation Security Administration,¶ Department of Homeland Security. She is currently on a detail to the Department of¶ Justice. Ms. Blum holds a M.A. in security studies from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate¶ School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security, a J.D. from The University of Chicago¶ Law School, and a B.A. in political science from Yale University. She has published a book¶ and various articles on homeland security issues. She would like to thank Professor Robert¶ Chesney and the participants at the annual national security law junior faculty workshop for¶ their suggestions. The views in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent¶ the views of the U.S. Government to include the Department of Homeland Security and¶

Department of Justice; 2008; “WHAT REALLY IS AT STAKE WITH THE FISA¶ AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 AND IDEAS FOR¶ FUTURE SURVEILLANCE REFORM”; http://128.197.26.34/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/pilj/vol18no2/documents/18-2BlumArticle.pdf, HeinOnline)//JPM

FISA does provide some added protection for U.S. citizens and permanent¶ resident aliens (referred to as “U.S. persons” in FISA). To obtain a FISA

warrant¶ targeting a U.S. person, there must also be probable cause to believe that¶ the person is “knowingly” engaged in activities that “involve or may involve a¶ violation of the criminal statutes of the United States.”48 In other words, while¶ suspicion of illegal activity is not required in the case of aliens who are not¶ permanent residents – as applied to them, membership in a terrorist group or Applications for FISA warrants go to federal judges that comprise the Foreign¶ Intelligence

Surveillance Court (FISC). Like a grand jury proceeding, the¶ FISC conducts its business ex parte, meaning the government is the only party¶

present at its proceedings. Appeals from the FISC go to the FISCR. The FISC¶ has jurisdiction to hear applications for, and to grant court orders approving,¶ electronic surveillance or physical searches anywhere in the United States to¶ obtain foreign intelligence information under FISA.¶ In order for an executive official to get a FISA warrant to conduct “electronic¶ surveillance,” the FISC must approve several requirements: (1) probable¶ cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power or a foreign power (and the¶ additional requirements discussed above if

the target is a U.S. person);50 (2)¶ probable cause that the target is using or about to use the “facility” to be monitored;51¶ (3) applicable “minimization procedures” designed to minimize the acquisition¶ and retention, and to prevent the dissemination, of information concerning¶ U.S. persons that is unrelated to foreign-intelligence;52 (4) a¶ certification that the information sought “cannot reasonably be obtained by normal¶ investigative techniques,”53 and (5) the Attorney General must approve the¶ application and a high-ranking intelligence official must certify that a “significant¶ purpose” of the surveillance is to gain foreign intelligence information.54¶ If the target is a U.S. person, the basis for the aforementioned review is subject¶ to review for clear error.55

http://128.197.26.34/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/pilj/vol18no2/documents/18-2BlumArticle.pdf


--Ext. Removing Blanket Immunity Solvency

Blanket immunity provisions allow for companies to hide NSA overreach – prereq to aff solvencyMasnick, 14 (Mike, founder and CEO of Floor64 and editor of the Techdirt blog; Jul 9th 2014; “Senate Intelligence Committee Approves Dangerous Cybersecurity Bill”; https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140708/18003227819/senate-intelligence-committee-approves-dangerous-cybersecurity-bill.shtml)//JPM

We've written about the Senate's dangerous CIPA bill -- which is Congress' latest

(bad) attempt to help increase the NSA-led surveillance state by giving companies blanket immunity if they share private information with the government... all in the name of overhyped "cybersecurity." We, of course, have been through this fight before, with the CISPA bill, which passed in the House a few times, but couldn't get any traction in the Senate. This time around, the (really bad) Senate version passed out of the Senate Intelligence Committee by a 12-3 vote (held in secret, of course). Not

surprisingly, two of the three who voted against it are Ron Wyden and Mark Udall. ¶ By now you should know: if Ron Wyden and Mark Udall are against something

related to surveillance, you should be against it too (and the opposite is true as well). ¶ The "good" news is that despite the overwhelming support by the NSA's biggest cheerleaders on the rest of the Senate Intelligence Committee, it seems unlikely that the bill will have enough support in the overall Senate. And it will hopefully remain that way. This bill is a dangerous one, that is solely designed to give the NSA and some companies additional legal "cover" for aiding the NSA's surveillance efforts. Thanks to Snowden's revelations, companies are, in general, a lot less willing to do that these days anyway, but giving those companies blanket liability to do so is a bad, bad idea. ¶ And while there's still little to no evidence that the "cybersecurity threat" is anywhere close to as big as what the FUDmongers insist it is, even if that is true, no one has yet explained what laws actually get in the way of having companies share critical cybersecurity information as needed. And, if such laws really do exist, any solution should to just be narrowly focused on fixing those laws, rather than granting broad immunity for sharing just about any info.


AT: Signal/Perception Solvency Deficits

Congressional oversight is a stronger IL to NSA perception and legitimacySchneier, 15, fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center,

and the Chief Technology Officer at Resilient Systems, Inc (Bruce, Data and Goliath: the Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World, Ch. 13)//AK

More members of Congress must commit to meaningful NSA reform. We need comprehensive strategic oversight by independent government agencies, based on full transparency. We need meaningful rules for minimizing data gathered and stored about Americans, rules that require the NSA to delete data to which it should not have access. In the 1970s, the Church Committee investigated intelligence gathering by the NSA, CIA, and FBI. It was able to reform these agencies only after extensive research and discovery. We need a similar committee now. We need to convince President Obama to adopt the recommendations of his own NSA review group. And we need to give the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board real investigative powers.¶ Those recommendations all pertain to strategic oversight of mass surveillance. Next, let’s consider tactical oversight. One primary mechanism for tactical oversight of government surveillance is the warrant

process. Contrary to what many government officials argue, warrants do not harm security. They are a security mechanism, designed to protect us from government overreach.¶ Secret warrants don’t work nearly as well. The judges who oversee NSA actions are from the secret FISA Court. Compared with a traditional court, the FISA Court has a much lower standard of evidence before it issues a warrant. Its cases are secret, its rulings are secret, and no one from the other side ever presents in front of it. Given how unbalanced the process it is, it’s amazing that the FISA Court has shown as much backbone as it has in standing up to the NSA (despite almost never rejecting a warrant

request).¶ Some surveillance orders bypass this process entirely. We know, for example, that US Cellular received only two judicially approved wiretap orders in 2012—and another 10,801 subpoenas for the same types of information without any judicial oversight whatsoever. All of this

needs to be fixed.¶ Start with the FISA Court. It should be much more public. The FISA Court’s chief judge should become a position that requires Senate confirmation. The court should publish its opinions to the extent possible.

An official public interest advocate should be assigned the task of arguing against surveillance applications. Congress should enact a process for

appealing FISA rulings, either to some appellate court or to the Supreme Court.¶ But more steps are needed to put the NSA under credible tactical oversight. Its internal procedures are better suited to detecting activities such as inadvertent

and incorrect surveillance targeting than they are to detecting people who deliberately circumvent surveillance controls, either individually or for the organization as a whole.

To rectify this, an external auditor is essential. Making government officials personally responsible for overreaching and illegal behavior is also important. Not a single one of those NSA LOVEINT snoops was fired, let alone prosecuted. And Snowden was rebuffed repeatedly when he tried to express his concern internally about the extent of the NSA’s surveillance on Americans.¶ Other law enforcement agencies, like the FBI, have their own internal oversight mechanisms. Here, too, the more transparency, the better. We have always given the police extraordinary powers to investigate crime. We do this knowingly, and we are safer as a society because of it, because we regulate these actions and have some recourse to ensure that the police


aren’t abusing them. We can argue about how well these are working in the US and other countries, but the general idea is a sound one.


Ext. Terror Net Benefit

The CP doesn’t decrease domestic surveillance, clearly we don’t link to the Terror DA.

CP resurrects the TSP- solves terror attacksSessions, 5/20/15 (Jeff, Senator from Alabama, former practicing attorney in Russellville, Alabama, United States Attorney for Alabama’s Southern District, a position he held for 12 years. Sessions was elected Alabama Attorney General in 1995, serving as the state’s chief legal officer until 1997, when he entered the United States Senate; “Why Should Terrorists Be Harder to Investigate than Routine Criminals?”; http://www.nationalreview.com/article/418675/why-should-terrorists-be-harder-investigate-routine-criminals-jeff-sessions)//JPM

The 9/11 attacks exposed the dangerous wall separating the intelligence and law-enforcement communities. In response, Congress developed a number of tools to eliminate those barriers so that critical information could be timely and appropriately shared to address radical Islamic terrorism. Among them was Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.¶ In 2006,

the National Security Agency transitioned the bulk telephone-metadata acquisition program authorized under the president’s

Terrorist Surveillance Program to the business-records court-

order authority of Section 215 . Since shortly after 9/11, this

program has been helping to keep Americans safe by acquiring

non-content call records, i.e., telephone numbers and the date,

time, and duration of a call. This program has yielded

invaluable intelligence that has helped prevent attacks and

uncovered terrorist plots.

The TSP in its current form (PRISM) won’t stop attacks – a revival of the original program is neededTaylor, 13 (Robert, writer for PolicyMic; 7/19/13; “PRISM Probably Never Stopped — and Never Will Stop — a Terrorist Attack”; http://mic.com/articles/49449/prism-probably-never-stopped-and-never-will-stop-a-terrorist-attack)//JPM

Thanks to NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, we now know many of the dirty details behind the U.S. government's surveillance programs and the creation of a vast surveillance and data storage system.¶ Not only has Snowden helped further unturn the rock of secrecy behind these surveillance programs but his revelations and leaks have helped spark the debate about the proper balancing of freedom and security. If we are to supposedly accept these unprecedented powers and violations of civil liberties, does this type of mass surveillance at least actually keep us safe?¶ While the official party line, repeated ad nauseum, is that the NSA surveillance program has helped stop "dozens" of terrorist attacks, a closer look at the claims made by the White House and the


program's defenders cast serious doubt about the program's actual effectiveness.¶ In a recent congressional hearing, Senators Mark Udall and Ron Wyden

released a joint statement calling on NSA head General Keith Alexander — "Emperor Alexander" of the covert national security state — to be more forthcoming about the surveillance program. The senators argue that the attacks Alexander claims were thwarted "appear to have been identified using other collection methods. The public deserves a clear explanation.” They also could have been one of the FBI's many, many "terrorism" sting operations.¶ Washington's Blog cites numerous sources — including an NSA veteran, Fortune Management, Wired, and constitutional and military law expert Jonathan Turley —

which show that the NSA PRISM program, and other Orwellian surveillance programs, are useless and ineffective, resulting in false information and are actually hindering the process of good police work and intelligence gathering. It didn't stop the Boston Bombing or 9/11 either.¶ Apparently the more eyes Big Brother has, the less he actually sees. The surveillance state is, after all, a massive centrally-planned government bureaucracy so one shouldn't be surprised by incompetence. Do we really want to entrust the government this type of surveillance power "to keep us safe" when it doesn't even know who it's killing with drone strikes?


Ext. Politics Net Benefit

Blanket immunity provisions unpopular in CongressMcGarity et al 13 (Thomas O., CPR Member Scholar, Prof. at UT, Editor of the Texas Law Review, leading scholar in the fields of both administrative law and environmental law; Sidney A. Shapiro, Prof. Law at Wake Forest, Frank U. Fletcher Chair of Administrative Law; Nicholas Vidargas, former Policy Analyst with the Center for Progressive Reform, honors attorney fellow at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9, Office of Regional Counsel, in San Francisco, where he worked on enforcement of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and on Clean Water Act rulemaking, and where he initiated the first enforcement action under the Clean Air Act General Duty Clause in Region 9, Stanford University Grad; March 2013; “Sweeping Corporate Immunity¶ for the Fuel Industry:¶ The Next Front in the¶ ‘Corporate Accountability’ Wars”; http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Corporate_Immunity_Fuel_Industry_1303.pdf)//JPM

The latest battle in the corporate accountability wars is an

effort to persuade Congress to ¶ grant blanket immunity to

entire industries that might face litigation for defective

products ¶ or corporate negligence that endangers human

health, imperils the environment, and ¶ damages private

property . The concept of sweeping corporate immunity from state tort law¶ –

a twisted cousin of federal preemption legislation that also dismisses the rights of victims of ¶ corporate negligence – was born in response to the hugely successful tobacco litigation of the ¶ 1980s and 1990s, and later attempts at comprehensive litigation against gun manufacturers ¶ and the fast food industry .

Blanket immunity provisions specifically unpopular in Congress- Specter and Feinstein Nakashima, 07 (Ellen, writer for The Washington Post, national security reporter for The Washington Post. She focuses on issues relating to intelligence, technology and civil liberties. She previously served as a Southeast Asia correspondent for the paper. She wrote about the presidential candidacy of Al Gore and co-authored a biography of Gore, and has also covered federal agencies, Virginia state politics and local affairs. She joined the Post in 1995; Nov. 1, 2007; “Roadblock for Telecom Immunity”; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/31/AR2007103103126.html)//JPM

In a blow to the Bush administration, the Senate Judiciary Committee's top Democrat and Republican expressed reluctance yesterday to granting blanket immunity to telecommunications carriers sued for assisting the government's warrantless surveillance program.¶ Committee Chairman

Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) and the ranking Republican, Sen. Arlen Specter (Pa.), had said that before even considering such a proposal, they would need to see the legal documents underpinning the program, which began after Sept. 11, 2001, and were put under court oversight in January.¶ On Tuesday, the

committee was given access to some of the documents. But Leahy said yesterday that he had a "grave concern" about blanket immunity, saying that "it seems to grant . . . amnesty for telecommunications carriers for warrantless surveillance activities."¶ The activities seem to be "in violation of the privacy rights of Americans" and of federal domestic surveillance law, he said, noting that he is still "carefully considering" what is in the


documents.¶ The immunity provision sought by the White House would wipe out about 40 lawsuits that accuse AT&T, Verizon Communications and Sprint Nextel of invading Americans' privacy and constitutional rights by assisting the government in domestic surveillance without a warrant.¶ The Senate intelligence committee approved the provision two weeks ago as part of a larger bill to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which governs some aspects of domestic surveillance. The Judiciary Committee will take up the bill next.¶

Immunity "is designed to shield this administration from accountability for conducting surveillance outside the law," Leahy said.

Dismissing the lawsuits would eliminate "perhaps the only avenue" for "an honest assessment" of the legality of the warrantless surveillance program, he said.¶ Specter agreed that the "courts ought not to be closed" to such lawsuits. "If, at this late date, the Congress bails out whatever was done before -- and we can't even discuss what has been done -- that is just an open invitation for this kind of conduct in the future," he said.¶

Specter added that he thinks the carriers "have a strong, equitable case" but that his inclination is toward indemnification, where the government would assume any financial penalties.¶ Sen. Dianne

Feinstein (D-Calif.) said the immunity provision was one of "two big issues" she had with the bill, and she suggested that limiting damages might be an alternative. She noted that the lawsuits could cost carriers as much as $30 billion in penalties -- a problem if taxpayers were to pick up the tab.¶ Assistant Attorney General Kenneth L. Wainstein told the committee

that immunity was a question of "fairness" for the carriers. He also said that proceeding with the cases risks the divulgence of classified information. The government has invoked a claim of state secrets to stop the litigation. "If we don't prevail with state secrets," Wainstein said,

"then there's no guarantee that that information is not going to get out. In fact, even just the filing of lawsuits and the allegations made can actually end up . . . compromising sensitive sources and methods."

Blanket amnesty for telecommunications companies are unpopular in Congress- Blue America lobbyKlein, 08 (Howie, writer for HuffPo; 7/18/2008; “Blue America Thanks Some Of The Patriots Who Stood Up For The Constitution”; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/howie-klein/blue-america-thanks-some_b_111919.html)//JPM

"The House of Representatives, with the support of Republican Scott Garrett, recently passed a bill that would grant President Bush and future administrations unprecedented powers to spy on American citizens without a warrant or review by any judge or court. The new law would also let our nation's largest telecom companies off the hook for knowingly violating the law and releasing their customers' private information at the behest of George Bush.¶ "Our constitutional right to protection against unsupervised searches was written into our Bill of Rights for good reason by Founders whom we rightly celebrate.¶ "Neither President Bush nor Scott Garrett are

as wise as James Madison.¶ "It is unfortunate that it appears that the telecom industry has managed to falsely conflate its quest for retroactive immunity for


lawbreaking with the issue of national security. The Founding Fathers understood that our safety as a nation depended on our being a nation of laws. Retroactive immunity undermines the rule of law, and therefore undermines our principles and security as a nation.¶ "The President, his advisers, and his rubber stamps in Congress, including Scott Garrett,

have demonstrated a pattern of disregard for the laws of the United States.

This bill not only immunizes telecom companies from lawsuits, but it would also block the American people from ever knowing the full extent of the Bush Administration's illegal behavior.¶ "I urge my fellow Democrats in the Senate to vote against this unnecessary and deeply troubling law.¶ "I believe that Congress must protect the rights of citizens and the laws of our country from career politicians in Washington too willing to cave to special interests and endanger the fundamental rights that we, as Americans, hold so dear."¶ State Senator Andrew Rice (D-OK)

is running a strong campaign against one of the most extremist members of the U.S. Senate, James Inhofe, who raked in $12,550 from the Telecoms this year and was determined to grant them retroactive immunity -- and positively giddy about giving the government the right to listen in to all phone

conversations and read all e-mails without a court order. Andrew disagrees -- strongly:¶ "Congress must remain vigilant in order to protect Americans from another terrorist attack. However, the bill that is before Congress this week bargains away the privacy of law-abiding American citizens while protecting the companies that allegedly participated in the President's illegal wiretapping program. The Senate should stick to the narrow fix it set out to accomplish by making it clear that the government does not have to obtain a warrant to listen to foreign-

to-foreign communications. Instead, this bill allows a significant expansion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act so that government can eavesdrop on the international communications of innocent American citizens. Since losing my brother on 9/11, I have vowed to improve America's anti-terrorism capability without sacrificing the freedoms that so many Americans have died to protect."¶ Rick Noriega is running

in that big ole state just south of Oklahoma. His opponent, rubber stamp corporate shill John Cornyn has taken $15,250 from the Telecom industry this year and he is as eager as Inhofe to grant them retroactive immunity. Rick has thought about the issue more seriously and from a different perspective than just helping out campaign contributors.¶ "Many times throughout my lifetime I have sworn an oath to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States .

This isn't a part-time Constitution. We as a nation cannot grant anyone sweeping amnesty if they break the rules. It's appalling that my opponent, John Cornyn, puts his special interest campaign contributors ahead of the Constitution. Texans have had enough.¶

Americans will not accept an abuse of power, and they will not accept corporations getting away with

breaking the law.¶ We already have a law in place that balances national security concerns while adhering to the Constitution. This is not the time to compromise the privacy of the American people and not the time to disregard the Constitution of United States. I regret that the Senate has voted this way."¶ Jim Himes is standing firmly with his state's senior senator, Chris Dodd on this issue. Fake moderate Chris Shayes is once again eager to rubber stamp the Bush-Cheney agenda, somehow trying to say that granting Bush the ability to wiretap all American citizens


without a court order makes us "safe." Jim sees right through that craven, partisan posturing:¶ "In Congress, I will always stand up for the fundamental American belief that no man, and no corporation, is above the law. As always, this is a matter for the courts to decide-- not for Congress, and absolutely not for the same Bush Administration who may have violated the law in the first

place. It is great to see so many American citizens of all backgrounds coming together to stand up for the rule of law and in opposition to retroactive immunity for telecommunications companies who may have illegally spied on American citizens at the Bush Administration's request. I am disappointed that Chris Shays and so many others continue to stand with President Bush by refusing to

stand up for this most fundamental of American principles."¶ Jon Tester (D-MT) was a populist underdog who ran for the Senate in 2006 against an Insider Democrat backed by Chuck Schumer and the Beltway Establishment. He beat him in the primary, beat an entrenched Republican incumbent in November and has gone on to represent the interests of regular Montana folks in DC. His statement

about the this fight was an inspiration and may well have influenced his Montana colleague: "It deals with the freedoms that so many people have fought and died for. If we want to get serious about the War on Terror, we need to make the investments to fight the war on terror. We ought not be taking rights away from honest citizens. If we've got terror cells around the world, then let's invest in human intelligence. Let's invest in our Special Forces. Let's go after 'em, and let's be serious, and not get

sidetracked by Iraq. Right now, we're taking rights away from honest people. If they think you fall into their list, you're a target. By the time they figure out there's a terror cell, they can get a warrant.... The government ought not be taking away our freedoms."¶ Darcy Burner is running against a corporate hack and rubber stamp in Washington, Dave Reichert, who is all about rewarding his corporate donors with retroactive immunity. Reichert took $6,000 for the Telecoms so far this year and thinks they should not be accountable for crimes they may have committed. Darcy has been one of the most outspoken opponents of this bill; watch the 30 second video. After the bill passed in the

House, she didn't despair; she start rallying for action:¶ Like many of you, I'm incredibly disappointed with today's vote on retroactive immunity for the telecommunications companies. I've made my position on this issue very clear, and I've been happy to be fighting to ensure that we uphold the Constitution through all of this. But the real question is what we do going forward. We need to make sure that we elect people to Congress who are going to defend the Constitution


--A2: Sqou Solves

Blanket immunity and the other problems of the 2008 FAA exist in the sqouByellin, 7/10/15 (Jeremy, attorney practicing in the areas of family law and estate planning; “Today in 2008: the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 are signed into law; http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/today-in-2008-the-fisa-amendments-act-of-2008-are-signed-into-law/#sthash.eBlyln0M.dpuf)//JPM

The U.S. Government’s mass surveillance programs have become increasingly visible to the public over the past several years, thanks in part to disclosures by parties such as Wikileaks and Edward Snowden. Just because the public is more aware of these programs doesn’t mean that they have stopped operating, or that the laws purported to authorize them aren’t still fully in effect.¶ In fact, one such law, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, is marking the seventh anniversary of its enactment and has since that time even survived a Supreme Court challenge. The amendments, signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 10, 2008, provide a slew of tools to further facilitate the operation many of these surveillance programs.¶ For example, the act releases telecommunication companies from any legal liability for furnishing information to or otherwise assisting the “Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence.” Furthermore, the act prevents the states from investigating or requiring disclosure from telecommunication companies over any such assistance provided to the federal government.¶ Beyond protecting telecoms, the act also allows the government to destroy any records of the searches and surveillance it performs, whereas government agencies are normally required to retain records for a period of ten years.¶ While the act allows for the surveillance of foreigners who are

abroad, most pertinent to the surveillance of U.S. citizens, the Amendments Act authorizes the wiretapping of Americans who are also overseas. These last two provisions were the primary subject of the aforementioned Supreme Court case challenging the act’s constitutionality: 2013’s Clapper v. Amnesty International.¶ In Clapper, a group of attorneys with clients who have faced or are facing terrorism charges, a group of journalists, and a human rights organization (Amnesty International), all sued challenging the constitutionality of the amendments, claiming that they all engaged and continue to engage in sensitive communications


with individuals believed to be the target of surveillance under the act.

The CISA* bill will maintain sqou blanket immunity and government overreach – only the CP checks

*The CISA bill has been introduced but not passed the Senate or House-The argument is that even though it’s marketed as a cyber security bill, it’s really more of a surveillance bill, so if the opponent asks you why it’s relevant say that

Jaycox, 3/19/15 (Mark, Legislative Analyst for EFF, educated at Reed College, spent a year abroad at the University of Oxford (Wadham College), and concentrated in Political History, Former legislative research assistant for Lexis Nexis; “Senate Intelligence Committee Advances Terrible " ̶C ̶y̶b ̶e ̶r ̶s̶e ̶c ̶u̶r ̶i̶t̶y̶" ̶ ̶B ̶i̶l̶l̶ Surveillance Bill in Secret Session”; https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/03/senate-intelligence-committee-advances-terrible-cybersecurity-bill-surveillance)//JPM

The Senate Intelligence Committee advanced a terrible cybersecurity bill called the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA) to the Senate floor last

week. The new chair (and huge fan of transparency) Senator Richard Burr may have set a record as he kept the bill secret until Tuesday night. Unfortunately, the newest Senate Intelligence bill is one of the worst yet.¶ Cybersecurity bills aim to facilitate information sharing between companies and the government, but their broad immunity clauses for companies, vague definitions, and aggressive spying powers make them secret surveillance bills. CISA marks the fifth time in as many years that Congress

has tried to pass "cybersecurity" legislation. Join us now in killing this bill.¶ The newest Senate Intelligence bill joins other cybersecurity information sharing legislation like Senator Carper's Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015. All of them are largely redundant. Last year, President Obama signed Executive Order 13636 (EO 13636) directing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to expand current information sharing programs. In February, he signed another Executive Order encouraging regional cybersecurity information sharing and creating yet another Cyber Threat Center. Despite this, members of Congress like Senators Dianne Feinstein and Richard Burr continue to introduce bills that would destroy privacy protections and grant new spying powers to companies.¶ New Countermeasures and Monitoring Powers¶ Aside from its redundancy, the Senate Intelligence bill grants two new authorities to companies. First, the bill authorizes companies to launch countermeasures (now called "defensive measures" in the bill) for a "cybersecurity purpose" against a "cybersecurity threat." "Cybersecurity purpose" is so broadly defined that it means almost anything related to protecting (including physically protecting) an information system, which can be a computer or software. The same goes for a "cybersecurity threat," which includes anything that "may result" in an unauthorized effort to

impact the availability of the information system.¶ Even with the changed language, it's still unclear what restrictions exist on "defensive measures." Since the definition of "information system" is inclusive of files and software, can a company that has a file stolen from them launch "defensive measures" against the thief's computer? What's worse, the bill may allow such actions as long as they don't cause "substantial" harm. The bill leaves the term "substantial" undefined. If true, the countermeasures "defensive measures" clause could increasingly encourage computer exfiltration attacks on the Internet—a prospect that may appeal to some "active defense" (aka offensive) cybersecurity companies, but


does not favor the everyday user.¶ Second, the bill adds a new authority for companies to monitor information systems to protect an entity's hardware or software. Here again, the broad definitions could be used in conjunction with the monitoring clause to spy on users engaged in potentially innocuous activity. Once collected, companies can then share the information, which is also called “cyber threat indicators,” freely with government agencies like the NSA.¶ Sharing Information with NSA¶

Such sharing will occur because under this bill, DHS would no longer be the lead agency making decisions about the cybersecurity information received, retained, or shared to companies or within the government. Its new role in the bill mandates DHS send information to agencies—like the NSA—"in real-time." The bill also allows companies to bypass DHS and share the information immediately with other agencies, like the intelligence agencies, which ensures that DHS's current privacy protections won’t be applied to the information. The provision is ripe for improper and over-expansive information sharing.¶ Overbroad Use of Information¶ Once the information is sent to any government agency (including local law enforcement), it can use the information for reasons other than for cybersecurity purposes. The provisions grant the government far too much leeway in how to use the information for non-cybersecurity purposes. The public won’t even know what information is being collected, shared, or used because the bill will exempt all of it from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.¶ In 2012, the Senate negotiated a much tighter definition in Senator Lieberman's Cybersecurity

Act of 2012. The definition only allowed law enforcement to use information for a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, an imminent threat of death, or a serious threat to a minor. The Senate Intelligence Committee's bill—at the minimum—should've followed the already negotiated language.¶ Near-Blanket Immunity¶ The bill also retains near-blanket immunity for companies to monitor information systems and to share the information as long as it's conducted according to the act. Again, "cybersecurity purpose" rears its overly broad head since a wide range of actions conducted for a cybersecurity purpose are allowed by the bill. The high bar immunizes an incredible amount of activity. Existing private rights of action for violations of the Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act, and potentially the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act would be precluded or at least sharply restricted by the clause . It remains to be seen why such immunity is needed

when just a few months ago, the FTC and DOJ noted they

would not prosecute companies for sharing such information. It's also unclear because we continue to see companies freely share information among each other and with the government both publicly via published reports, information sharing and analysis centers, and private communications.


--A2: Circumvention

CP avoids circumvention- civil justice systemMcGarity et al 13 (Thomas O., CPR Member Scholar, Prof. at UT, Editor of the Texas Law Review, leading scholar in the fields of both administrative law and environmental law; Sidney A. Shapiro, Prof. Law at Wake Forest, Frank U. Fletcher Chair of Administrative Law; Nicholas Vidargas, former Policy Analyst with the Center for Progressive Reform, honors attorney fellow at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9, Office of Regional Counsel, in San Francisco, where he worked on enforcement of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and on Clean Water Act rulemaking, and where he initiated the first enforcement action under the Clean Air Act General Duty Clause in Region 9, Stanford University Grad; March 2013; “Sweeping Corporate Immunity¶ for the Fuel Industry:¶ The Next Front in the¶ ‘Corporate Accountability’ Wars”; http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Corporate_Immunity_Fuel_Industry_1303.pdf)//JPM

The civil justice system not only serves as a backstop for federal regulation, it supports¶

federal regulation and makes it more effective. Professor Thomas McGarity describes the¶ informational interactions between regulatory agencies and the courts as “feedback loops ...¶ in which each institution draws on information, experience and different incentives of the¶ other.” 62

Immunity legislation eliminates this possibility that the civil justice system will¶ make the regulatory system more effective. ¶ As a result of tort

actions, Congress is informed of problems in the regulatory system.¶

Consider, for example, how the civil justice system prompted legislation and regulation¶ in response to the Ford Explorer/Firestone tire problem. In 2000, Congress passed the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act,¶ which required NHTSA to develop a new system for gathering and analyzing reports¶ of tire, equipment, and

motor vehicle defects.63 Regulatory agencies obtain technical data,¶ analyses of the state of the science from the relevant literature, and other information¶ that can inform subsequent regulatory decisions. At the same

time, the courts look to the¶ agencies for analysis of the risks and benefits of regulated products, as well as regulatory¶ standards that can factor into decisions about whether regulated parties have met their duty¶ of care. Feedback loops “have unquestionably improved the quality of decision-making¶ in both institutions .”64¶ Immunity legislation destroys the feedback loop, unwisely limiting the useful information¶

that is obtained from the tort system. Tort claims filed in state courts are a primary source¶ of information for agencies about potential holes or gaps in the regulatory protection system.¶ Simply by virtue of a claim having been filed, the tort system provides signals that defects¶ may exist or

existing safety standards may be inadequate. “The availability of damages in state¶

tort lawsuits can give injured citizens the incentive to come forward and share potentially¶ valuable information .”65¶ At each successive step in the

litigation process, tort suits provide additional opportunities¶ for the development of information that could be useful to federal agencies.66 Pre-trial¶ discovery can turn up technical data about the risks posed by a product or practice.¶ The discovery process can also uncover useful information about decisions made¶ by manufacturers concerning safety and

environmental decisions, thereby adding a level¶ of public accountability. Regulatory agencies may also be informed by expert testimony¶ given in discovery or at trial when the testimony is bolstered by the experts’ analysis of the¶

state of the science. In addition, expert analysis of the specific facts that give rise to tort¶ claims sheds light on how injuries actually occur in


the real world.67 Finally, jury decisions,¶ whether in favor of injured plaintiffs or

manufacturer defendants, provide insight about¶ evolving social norms, information that can be useful to agencies when they analyze¶ the potential impacts of proposed regulations.¶ Immunity legislation would destroy this vital source of information about corporate¶ misconduct in areas subject to the immunity shield. Attorneys for the plaintiffs in the¶ MTBE litigation, for example, uncovered dozens of “smoking gun” documents showing¶ that the petroleum companies knew full well that MTBE was contaminating groundwater,¶ that it caused that water to be

unfit for drinking, and that they had not disclosed information¶ to EPA. If Congress passes the DFA, there will be no civil justice actions to ferret out¶ evidence of corporate misconduct relating to ethanol and future fuel additives.¶

Adequate protection of public health depends on the continued existence of state common¶ law as a complement to federal regulation. Common law has a unique ability to provide¶ corrective justice and is a useful way to fill regulatory gaps caused by outdated or imperfect¶

regulation. States have traditionally enjoyed primary authority to protect the health, safety,¶ and

welfare of their citizens. Federal immunity legislation such as sweeping fuel immunity¶ efforts weaken this fundamental principle of American government in a simplistic effort¶ to relieve corporate defendants of liability for producing dangerous products.


---A2: Companies Protected under SSD

Federal judges agree- SSD doesn’t stop the telecom. Industry from presenting defenses in courtsEFF, 2008 (Electronic Frontier Foundation, leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world; 2008; “Archive: The Case Against Retroactive Amnesty for Telecoms”; https://www.eff.org/pages/case-against-retroactive-amnesty-telecoms)//JPM

The federal judge who is considering all of the lawsuits against communications carriers has already held that the common ¶ law state secrets privilege does not prevent phone companies like AT&T from presenting their defenses to the court, ¶ in camera and ex parte . To the

extent that Congress wants to ensure this result, EFF urges Congress to clarify that FISA’s existing ¶ security procedures, codified at 18 USC §1806(f ), already permit defendants in the pending cases to present all relevant ¶ evidence in their defense. EFF has shared such draft language with key Members of Congress and staff.


---A2: President has the Authority

Judicial branch checks the executive – simple checks and balancesEFF, 2008 (Electronic Frontier Foundation, leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world; 2008; “Archive: The Case Against Retroactive Amnesty for Telecoms”; https://www.eff.org/pages/case-against-retroactive-amnesty-telecoms)//JPM

The courts should be allowed to determine whether the President has exceeded his powers by obtaining wholesale access ¶ to the domestic communications of millions of ordinary Americans from AT&T and the other communications companies,¶ based on the claim that Article II of the

Constitution and the Authorization for Use of Military Force in Afghanistan allowed¶ both the President and the companies to ignore the Fourth Amendment, FISA, and multiple other privacy statutes.


---A2: Common Law Doctrines Shield Defendants

Common law doesn’t overrule specific Congressional rules like Blanket AmnestyEFF, 2008 (Electronic Frontier Foundation, leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world; 2008; “Archive: The Case Against Retroactive Amnesty for Telecoms”; https://www.eff.org/pages/case-against-retroactive-amnesty-telecoms)//JPM

Generally in law, common law immunities do not trump specific legal duties imposed by statute, such as the specific statutory ¶ duties Congress has long imposed on telecommunications companies to protect their customer’s privacy and records. Specifically, ¶ in the pending case against AT&T, the judge – consistent with this venerable hierarchy of legal authority – already ¶ has ruled unequivocally that: “AT&T cannot seriously contend that a reasonable entity in its position could have believed that ¶ the alleged domestic dragnet was legal.” Even so, the communications company defendants can and should have the opportunity ¶ to present these defenses to the courts, and the courts – not Congress preemptively – should decide whether they are ¶ sufficient. Again, the court should decide.


---A2: Hurts Companies Reputation/Consumer Base

Won’t hurt companies- risk already exists, no empiricsEFF, 2008 (Electronic Frontier Foundation, leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world; 2008; “Archive: The Case Against Retroactive Amnesty for Telecoms”; https://www.eff.org/pages/case-against-retroactive-amnesty-telecoms)//JPM

There is no evidence that this litigation has or will reduce the defendant companies’ bottom lines or customer base, and¶ vague assertions that the pending litigation might result in “reputational” damage to the defendant companies is utterly¶ belied by the facts. Despite nearly two years of very public litigation in which AT&T has lost motions at every turn, AT&T¶ just announced record profits for the third quarter of 2007: a 41% increase over the previous year. AT&T publicly attributed¶ its success to signing a record number of new customers. As to possible threats faced by the companies and their personnel¶ here and abroad,

permitting the litigation to proceed will not increase such risk as already may exist. Ironically, telecommunications¶ companies’ recent hand-in-glove participation in national security surveillance has been perhaps most¶ effectively broadcast around the globe by the Administration, including statements by the Director of National Intelligence,¶ along with other senior Bush Administration officials. Silencing the pending suits will not expunge these admissions from¶ the public record.

Further, it strains credulity to suggest that the foreign enemies of the nation have not been aware for¶ decades of this obviously necessary partnership


---A2: Legal In-Roads Check

The attorney general’s check on blanket amnesty is a rubber stampSingle, 08 (Ryan, blogger and journalist covering tech business, tech policy, civil liberty and privacy issues. His work has appeared extensively in Wired.com, and Singel co-founded the Threat Level blog; 6/19/08; “Dems Agree to Expand Domestic Spying, Grant Telecoms Amnesty”; http://www.wired.com/2008/06/dems-agree-to-e/)//JPM

Under the longstanding rules of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the government was free to engage in dragnet wiretapping outside the United States, but in order to tap communications inside the country, the government needed court approval and individualized warrants if an American’s communications would be caught.¶ Additionally, the bill grants amnesty to the nation’s telecoms that are being sued for allegedly breaking federal wiretapping laws by turning over billions of Americans’ call records to government data-mining programs and giving the government access to internet and phone infrastructure inside the country. The bill strips the right of a federal district court to decide whether the companies violated federal laws prohibiting wiretapping without a court order.¶ Instead, the attorney general would need only certify to the court either that a sued company did not participate, or that the government provided some sort of written request to the companies that said that the president authorized the program and that his lawyers deemed it to be legal. That would be presented to federal district court Judge Vaughn Walker, who is overseeing the more than 40 consolidated cases

against the telecoms. Walker’s authority would be limited to judging whether the preponderance of the evidence is that the companies did get a written request, and if he finds that to be true — as the Senate Intelligence

Committee has already publicly stated — he must dismiss the cases.¶ That’s immunity, and it’s unconstitutional, according to the ACLU’s Caroline Fredrickson.¶

"The telecom companies simply have to produce a piece of paper we already know exists, resulting in immediate dismissal," Fredrickson said in a

written statement. "That’s not accountability. Loopholes and judicial theater don’t do our Fourth Amendment rights justice."¶ Hoyer, under pressure from so-called Blue Dog Democrats wanting to avoid being labeled soft on terrorism in the fall campaigns, justified the bill as a necessary compromise.¶ "It is the result of compromise, and like any compromise is not perfect, but I believe it strikes a sound balance," Hoyer said in a press release announcing the deal.¶ That’s a significant change for Hoyer, who in March in a House floor speech opposed blanket immunity, saying "I submit that a reasonable — responsible — Congress would not seek to immunize conduct without knowing what

conduct or misconduct it is immunizing."¶ The bill itself oddly admits that the government’s surveillance activities included more than the previously admitted "Terrorist Surveillance Program." That program, admitted by the president after The New York Times revealed it in December 2005, targeted Americans to intercept their international phone calls and e-mails without getting court approval. In a provision authorizing an oversight investigation, the bill refers to the "President’s Surveillance Program," of which

the so-called TSP was just one part.¶ That all but confirms what many have


reported and suspected: that there was much more unilateral surveillance than the president or his lawyers have ever admitted.


Affirmative


Blanket Immunity Plank


Fails – 2ac

Legal in roads to blanket immunity allow for functional checks against overstretch- Attorney General specifically answers their authorSanchez, 08 (Julian, American libertarian writer living in Washington, D.C.. Currently a Senior fellow at the Cato Institute, he previously covered technology and privacy issues as the Washington Editor for Ars Technica;

There are 50 ways to leave your lover, but only five ways for a company to be entitled to immunity under the FISA Amendments Act. Three are versions of "they provided assistance, but it was lawful under the statutes in effect at the time." Another is not to actually have provided any assistance. The final, and most contentious, is the new form of retroactive amnesty provided by the law: The attorney general can assert that the company provided assistance calculated to prevent a terrorist attack on the United States in the wake of 9/11, pursuant to a written directive from a high administration official assuring them that the surveillance had been authorized by the president and determined to be legal. ¶ Mukasey's certification says only that one or more of these excuses applies to all the defendants in the consolidated wiretap litigation, asserting that the public disclosure of any more specific information about the grounds for immunity "would cause exceptional harm to the National Security of the United States." It's therefore impossible to know which of the

defendant telecoms provided assistance, or under what circumstances.¶ The attorney general also denied EFF's contention that, in addition to narrowly targeted

eavesdropping on suspected Al Qaeda affiliates, there was any broader program of "dragnet collection on the content of plaintiffs' communications." Precisely what this latter contention means is unclear: As Ars noted last week, there is some legal controversy over when, precisely, the "collection" of a communication takes place.

Therefore Mukasey's denial could mean that, despite the evidence provided by

AT&T whistleblower Mark Klein, there was no blanket interception of communications for keyword analysis. But it could as easily mean that the attorney general does not believe that whatever form of "inside the box"

analysis of those communications NSA conducted counts as "collection" for the purposes of FISA or the Fourth Amendment.


Doesn’t Solve Terrorism – 2ac

Telecommunication blanket immunity is key to stop terror attacks- their authorEtzioni, 3/9/15 (Amitai, prof. of IR at George Washington, senior adviser to the Carter White House and taught at Columbia University, Harvard University, and the University of California at Berkeley; “Do Tech Companies Owe It to the Public to Cooperate With Surveillance?”; http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/tech-companies-owe-it-to-the-public-to-cooperate-with-surveillance/387094/)//JPM

For decades, the communication companies, led by AT&T, played a

key (and quiet) role in helping to protect national security . The government regularly gained access to their communication hubs and collected billions of phone records, email messages, and other communications to search for patterns that would identify which people pose a risk to the United States. This close cooperation lasted throughout the

Cold War and intensified after 9/11. Edward Snowden shattered this cozy relationship by publicly revealing the details of these arrangements and by claiming that they led to abuses.¶ The Snowden revelations greatly troubled the corporations involved for more reasons than one. Some nations, like Brazil, considered setting up their own versions of the Internet to protect their citizens

from American snooping—a move that would harm the business of companies such as Google and Facebook that greatly benefit from the unified World Wide Web. (Google is used by 1.17 billion people worldwide, while 1.35 billion use

Facebook.) These same corporations also feared that Americans would stop using their services if they felt that their privacy was compromised. Many of their CEOs hold the libertarian view that that government regulations are a costly burden and that the government that governs least governs best. And they still seem to hold on to the vision that cyberspace is a new world that can govern itself.¶ High-tech corporations decided to use high-power encryption methods that will secure privacy for their customers—and that law enforcement and security agencies will be unable or at least will find it very difficult to crack. Some of these measures are designed so that even the companies themselves cannot decrypt the messages. Hence even if a court ruled that there are compelling reasons to seek the records of a person who is suspected to be a terrorist or a serial killer, the companies would be unable to decode the messages.

Cooperation with telecommunications companies are vital to stopping terror attacksCBS, 08 (CBS News; 2/12/2008; “Bush: No More Debate Over Spy Program”; http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bush-no-more-debate-over-spy-program/)//JPMPresident Bush pressured the House on Wednesday to pass new rules for monitoring terrorists'

communications, saying "terrorists are planning new attacks on our country ... that will make Sept. 11 pale by comparison."¶ Mr. Bush said he would not agree to giving the House more time to debate a measure the Senate passed Tuesday governing the government's ability to work with


telecommunications companies to eavesdrop on phone calls and e-mails between suspected terrorists. The bill gives phone companies retroactive protection from lawsuits filed on the basis of cooperation they gave the government without court permission - something Mr. Bush insisted was included in the bill.¶ About 40 lawsuits have been filed against telecom companies by people alleging violations of wiretapping and privacy laws. The House did not include the immunity provision in

a similar bill it passed last year.¶ " In order to be able to discover ... the

enemy's plans, we need the cooperation of telecommunication

companies ," Mr. Bush said. " If these companies are subjected to

lawsuits that could cost them billions of dollars, they won't

participate. They won't help us. They won't help protect

America ."


Econ DA

Blanket immunity provisions stops the Telecom. Industry from being subject to expensive lawsuits and upholds governmental cooperation key to the overall industry (same card as below) Etzioni, 3/9/15 (Amitai, prof. of IR at George Washington, senior adviser to the Carter White House and taught at Columbia University, Harvard University, and the University of California at Berkeley; “Do Tech Companies Owe It to the Public to Cooperate With Surveillance?”; http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/tech-companies-owe-it-to-the-public-to-cooperate-with-surveillance/387094/)//JPM

For decades, the communication companies, led by AT&T, played a key (and quiet) role in helping to protect national security. The government regularly gained access to their communication hubs and collected billions of phone records, email messages, and other communications to search for patterns that would identify which people pose a risk to the United States. This close cooperation lasted throughout the Cold War and intensified after 9/11. Edward Snowden shattered this cozy relationship by publicly revealing the details of these arrangements and by claiming that they led to abuses.¶ The Snowden revelations greatly troubled the corporations involved for more reasons than one. Some nations, like Brazil, considered setting up their own versions of the

Internet to protect their citizens from American snooping—a move that would harm the business of companies such as Google and Facebook that greatly benefit from the unified World Wide Web. (Google is used by 1.17 billion people worldwide, while 1.35 billion use Facebook.) These same corporations also feared that Americans would stop using their services if they felt that their privacy was compromised. Many of their CEOs hold the libertarian view that that government regulations are a costly burden and that the government that governs least governs best. And they still seem to hold on to the vision that cyberspace is a new world that can govern itself.

Spills over to the global economyChi et al, 2014 (Jian, China Unicom; Wenji Chen, China Center for Information Industry Development; Yaoqiang Han, China Center for Information Industry Development; Jing Li; Master CandidateSchool of Software and Microelectronics, PekingUniversity; “Research on Fourth Generation 4G Mobile¶ Communication Industry Spillover Effect¶ Empirical Case Study of Beijing”; file:///Users/jpmickyd/Downloads/lemcs0573.pdf)//JPM

Abstract—Along with the development of information ¶ technology, the impact of information on global economic ¶ and social has become more and more profound. Mobile ¶ communication (4G) industry has

brought huge spillovers to ¶ the economic and social benefits.

This paper combines¶ theoretical analysis and empirical research to analyze it’s¶ spillovers effect. It uses the input-output model to carry an¶ empirical study of mobile communications (4G) spillovers¶ effect. At last, from the perspective of both qualitative and¶ quantitative, it analyzes the contribution of mobile¶

communication (4G) industry to the economy and society.¶ Keywords- mobile communications (4G); spillovers effect;¶ empirical research¶ I. INTRODUCTION¶ With the accelerating informatization all

around the¶ world, the application of information technology not only ¶


promote the optimal allocation of global resources and ¶ innovation of development model, but also profoundly ¶ affect the politics, economy and culture of society. ¶ National Twelfth Five-Year Development Plan proposes to ¶ speed up the upgrading of industrial restructuring to cope ¶ with the increasingly fierce international competition, ¶ which presents new challenges to industrial technological ¶ innovation . Information and communication industry as a ¶ support, high permeability basic industries, the ¶ development of the whole economy and society has a ¶ considerable contribution rate. As a supportive and high ¶ permeability basic industry, telecommunication industry ¶

makes a considerable contribution to the development of ¶ the

whole economy and society .¶ 4G technology is an important

component of the next¶ generation of information technology, which has become a¶ new

growth point of world economy . The world's major¶ telecom operators will or have started to

deploy 4G¶ commercial network. By 2015, the global industry scale of ¶ communication, including 4G, will reach 1.5 billion Yuan.¶

<Extend Econ Impact>


---Ext. Telecom K2 Econ

Telecommunications key to overall US econ growthHogendorn, 10 (Christaan, Associate Professor of EconomicsWesleyan University; May 2010; Rutgers Center for Researchin Regulated Industries Eastern Conference, Skytop, PA; “Spillovers and Network Neutrality”; http://chogendorn.web.wesleyan.edu/spillovers.pdf)//JPMMagnitude of GPT Spillovers. Several studies find that spillovers from GPTs, and

from¶ information technology (IT) in particular, are very large and affect entire economies.¶ Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) estimate that one sixth of the United

States’ productivity ¶ growth from 1990–96 was attributable to

IT . Röller and Waverman (2001) find that up¶ to one third of OECD economic

growth 1970–90 is attributable to telecommunications ¶

infrastructure . Czernich et al. (2009) find that an increase of 10% in broadband¶ penetration increases annual GDP growth by 0.9–1.5 percentage points. Jorgenson et¶ al. (2008) show that U.S. productivity growth in the early 2000s was based on a wide¶ variety of industries adopting new forms of IT in production. Indeed, most research on¶

economic growth and GPTs suggests that economies need GPTs in order to grow. (LCB,¶ Jovanovic and Rousseau 2005)


TSP Plank


Fails – 2ac

TSP fails to solve attacks – worse than the sqou, guts FISA effectivenessAnderson, 08 (Austin, J.D./M.B.A from Ohio State Moritz College of Lawand Fisher College of Business, Class of 2009. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree inPolitical Science from Baylor University in 2004; 2008; “The Terrorist Surveillance Program:¶ Assessing the Legality of the Unknown”; http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2012/02/Anderson.pdf)//JPM

Despite the dearth of information regarding the TSP,¶ commentators have frequently condemned the program as a violation¶ of FISA .34 These critics assert that the procedures codified in FISA¶ represent the sole method through which the executive branch can¶ conduct electronic surveillance, a relationship unchanged by¶ subsequent legislatio n.¶ It is generally accepted that

the president has the power to conduct¶ electronic surveillance.36 However, this power is not unlimited: the¶ Constitution serves as a fundamental check on the executive’s power¶ to conduct electronic surveillance.37 Furthermore, Congress enacted¶ FISA to regulate the executive branch’s use of electronic surveillance¶ when gathering foreign intelligence information.38¶ The real debate centers on the degree to which FISA regulates or¶ limits the executive’s power to conduct electronic surveillance. The¶ U.S. Code explicitly states that FISA is “the exclusive means by which¶ electronic surveillance . . . may be conducted.”39 In light of this¶ language, critics argue that FISA regulations governed the activities¶ conducted through the TSP.40¶ However,

FISA contains a provision that permits Congress to¶ amend the Act through subsequent legislation.41 The Bush¶ administration believes that, since Congress empowered the president¶ to conduct the war in Afghanistan through the AUMF, it amended¶ FISA by implication to allow the TSP.42 However, critics deny the¶ contention that the AUMF, or any other statute, has repealed the¶ procedural constraints on electronic surveillance contained in FISA.43¶ In countering the president’s claims,

critics frequently employ a¶ variety of interpretive tactics. Critics are quick to point out that the¶ law disapproves of repeals by implication.44 Commentators assert that¶ Congress would not silently amend FISA through a statute that never¶ once refers to the NSA, electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens, or FISA itself.45 In fact, Congress has amended FISA five times since the¶ September 11th attacks without any mention of the AUMF.46¶ Critics also reject the administration’s assertion that the AUMF¶

impliedly repeals FISA based on a simple dissection of the plain¶

meaning of the AUMF.47 The AUMF authorizes the president “to use¶ all necessary and proper force” to defend the U.S. against terrorists.48¶ In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the administration convinced the Supreme¶ Court that the detention of enemy combatants was a “necessary and¶ appropriate force” to fighting a war.49 Here, the administration¶ arguably encounters more difficulty in

characterizing electronic¶ surveillance as “force.”¶ d The administration’s attempts to broadly interpret the language of¶ the AUMF appear to be inconsistent with Congress’ intent. While the¶ Court is not likely to consider congressional reaction, Congress’¶ response to the TSP provides some evidence of congressional intent.¶ Senator Tom Daschle stated that the government


considered granting¶ the president authorization to use “appropriate force in the United¶ States and against those nations [that support terrorists]. . . ,” before¶ ultimately deciding to limit the authorization

to “appropriate force¶ against those nations.”50 Senator Daschle explained that the Senate¶

rejected the former language because it “would have given the¶

president broad authority to exercise expansive powers not just¶

overseas—where we all understood he wanted authority to act—but¶

right here in the United States.”51¶ The Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision could provide useful insight in¶ grasping how the Supreme Court is likely to interpret the AUMF. In¶ Hamdi, the Supreme

Court interpreted the clause in the AUMF that¶ authorizes the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations . . . he determines planned . . . the terrorist¶ attacks.”52 The Court held that the clause “necessary and appropriate¶ force” provided the president with the authority to detain enemy¶ combatants because the detention of troops was a “fundamental¶ incident of waging war .”53¶ Some critics contend that the use of electronic surveillance is not a¶ fundamental incident to war. On its

face, a more likely interpretation¶ is that the act of capturing a prisoner of war on the battlefield is far¶ easier to classify as a “fundamental incident of waging war” than¶ intercepting communication between U.S. citizens and suspected¶ terrorists abroad .54 Furthermore, wiretaps gather a broader range of¶ information without discerning whether the content has any relation to¶ national security. 55 The existence of a congressionally approved¶ manner of using wiretaps necessitates the finding that this less¶ discerning method of gathering information is not a “fundamental¶ incident to war.”56 ¶ As previously noted, FISA contains two exceptions that provide¶ conditions where the government may conduct electronic surveillance¶ without first obtaining a warrant .57

Some critics believe that the¶ presence of the second exception reinforces the illegitimacy of the¶ TSP . Suzanne Spaulding, who served as the executive director of the¶

National Commission on Terrorism, noted:¶ FISA anticipates situations in which speed is essential. It¶ allows the government to start eavesdropping without a court¶ order and to keep it going for a maximum of three days. And¶ while the FISA application process is often burdensome in¶ routine cases, it can also move with remarkable speed when necessary, with applications written and approved in just a¶ few hours.58¶ Additionally, the special court overseeing FISA warrants has been¶ extremely accommodating over the years; through December 25, 2005,¶ only four of 5,645 applications for warrants were denied.59¶ Critics contend that the collective weight of these arguments¶ proves that Congress did not amend FISA through the AUMF. With¶ FISA surviving without amendment, the TSP was subject to the¶ procedural guidelines established in the Act. The TSP indisputably¶ operated outside the FISA regulations; therefore, critics conclude that¶ the program was a clear violation of federal law.


Ext. Fails

CP can’t solve privacy – infringes on 1st and 4th amendment rightsAnderson, 08 (Austin, J.D./M.B.A from Ohio State Moritz College of Lawand Fisher College of Business, Class of 2009. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree inPolitical Science from Baylor University in 2004; 2008; “The Terrorist Surveillance Program:¶ Assessing the Legality of the Unknown”; http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2012/02/Anderson.pdf)//JPM

The Bush administration and critics of the TSP predictably differ¶ as to the program’s constitutionality. The Department of Justice warns¶ that congressional intrusion into the President’s implied power to¶ gather intelligence could be unconstitutional.80 Alternatively, critics¶ assert that Congress operated within its constitutional power in enacting FISA81 and that the TSP raises First and Fourth Amendment¶ issues.82 ¶ The president’s powers are established in Article II of the U.S.¶ Constitution.83 Among those powers

granted to the president are the¶ powers to act as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and to¶ tend to the United States’ foreign affairs .84 The Justice Department¶ proposes that the duty to protect the U.S. from foreign enemies is¶ entwined within these constitutionally- guaranteed powers.85¶ The right t o collect intelligence follows the duty to protect the U.S.¶ from its enemies: the president needs information to make informed¶ decisions regarding matters of national security . The Supreme Court¶ has frequently determined that the president has authority to employ¶ espionage to gather information necessary to protect the country.86¶ Consequently, the Bush administration has warned that any attempt to¶ limit the president’s power to obtain foreign intelligence could be an¶

unconstitutional infringement on the executive’s Article II power.87¶ Many critics maintain the TSP is unconstitutional despite the¶ presidential power to guard the U.S. from foreign enemies.88 Some¶ dissenters doubt the administration’s assertion that the Constitution¶ grants the president the power to gather foreign intelligence;89¶ however, even assuming that the administration does have this power,¶ some critics argue that congressional authority to legislate in the field¶ of foreign intelligence is well established.90 Therefore, they insist FISA is the product of constitutionally permissible congressional¶ action.91

Prefer empirics- previous court cases prove it’s illegal and violates FISAAnderson, 07 (Austin, J.D./M.B.A from Ohio State Moritz College of Lawand Fisher College of Business, Class of 2009. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree inPolitical Science from Baylor University in 2004; 2007; “The Terrorist Surveillance Program:¶ Assessing the Legality of the Unknown”; http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2012/02/Anderson.pdf, HeinOnline)//JPM

The response to the revelation of the TSP in The New York Times¶ has been significant.161 Several law schools across the nation have¶ held symposia on the topic.162 Members of Congress, from both ¶ parties, introduced a number of bills on the topic in 2006. In January 2007,


The New York Times described the controversy as “13 months ¶ of bruising national debate.”163¶ Perhaps the most relevant response to the TSP is the recent ¶ litigation challenging the abandoned program’s legality. In August¶ 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union won a judgment against the ¶ National Security Agency.164 In the opinion, District Judge Taylor ¶ found the TSP unconstitutional in that it violated the Fourth ¶ Amendment and FISA .165 The administration appealed the case, and¶ the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment in July 2007.166 ¶ The Circuit Court’s decision turned on the Plaintiffs’ standing, rather ¶ than the constitutionality of the TSP .167¶ Another case, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, has ¶ made national headlines in 2007.168 Al-Haramain sued the Bush ¶ administration for allegedly conducting warrantless surveillance on the ¶ organization and its directors. 169 The district court denied the ¶ government’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary ¶ judgment, a decision from which the Defendants appealed.170 The ¶ case appeared before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth ¶ Circuit on August 15, 2007, for oral arguments ,171 and the Court held¶ that Plaintiffs could not establish standing because the state secrets¶ privilege presently empowered the government to withhold evidence.172 However, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the ¶ district court for a determination on the issue of whether FISA could ¶ preempt the state secrets privilege.17 3

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