THE SPRATLY ISLAND DISPUTE AND US. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
CAPTAIN CARLOS S. BADGER United States Navy
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USAWC CLASS OF 1997 -
US. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.
THE SPRATLY ISLAND DISPUTE AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
Captain Carlos S. Badger United States Navy
Colonel Robert C. Coon Project Advisor
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
ABSTRACT
AUTHOR: Carlos S. Badger, Captain, United S t a t e s Navy
TITLE : The Spra t ly I s l ands Dispute and U . S . National Secur i ty I n t e r e s t s
FORMAT: S t ra t egy Research P r o j e c t
Date: Apr i l 24, 1997 PAGES: 20 CLASSIFICATION: Unclass i f ied
The South China Sea i s a major maritime rou te
connecting t h e P a c i f i c and Indian Oceans. Disputes have
r i s e n among s e v e r a l coun t r i e s which have made c o n f l i c t i n g
claims t o t h e i s l a n d s and waters of t h e South China Sea.
Among t h e disputed i s l a n d claims a r e t h e Spra t ly I s l ands
which a r e claimed i n whole o r p a r t by Malaysia, t h e
Phi l ippines , Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei. China (PRC),
whose emerging leadersh ip is under pressure t o continue
economic growth, is t h e p r i n c i p a l t h r e a t and claims a l l of
t h e disputed i s l a n d s and most of t h e South China Sea basin.
The Spra t ly I s l a n d s d i spu te has importance t o U.S . na t iona l
s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s because it has become t h e key focus f o r
claims i n t h e South China Sea. This paper w i l l descr ibe what
t h e Spra t ly I s l a n d s d ispute i s about and how might i ts
reso lu t ion a f f e c t U . S . na t iona l s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s .
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SPRATLY ISLANDS GEOSTRATEGIC VALUE . . . . . . 4
RESOURCE RICH? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS . . . . . . . 7
CHINA IS THE PRINCIPAL AND KEY TO THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
HOW MIGHT A RESOLUTION IN THE DISPUTE AFFECT U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS? . . . . . . 12
CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO? 13
ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Introduction
The "b ig p i c t u r e m o r s t r a t e g i c view of t h e S p r a t l y
I s l a n d s d i s p u t e is r e a l l y no t t h e "Spra t ly I s l ands . " The
"South China Sea d i spu tev is t h e term t h e U . S . should focus
on. The S p r a t l y I s l ands are merely a subse t of a much
l a r g e r concern. However, t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e S p r a t l y
I s l a n d s d i s p u t e may be c r u c i a l because it w i l l l a y t h e
framework f o r t h e r e s o l u t i o n of f u r t h e r c la ims i n t h e South
China Sea and defuse t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of armed c o n f l i c t i n
t h e reg ion . 1
The S p r a t l y I s l a n d s are a sma t t e r ing of more than 100
i s l e t s , shoa l s , r e e f s and sandbanks midway between Vietnam
and t h e Ph i l i pp ines . They were named f o r a 19 th Century
B r i t i s h whaling cap ta in . Many of t h e S p r a t l y s a r e l i t t l e
more t h a n rocks which b a r e l y peep above t h e s u r f a c e of t h e
sea ; t h e l a r g e s t i s l e t is I t u Aba, which covers about 89
ac re s .
S i x n a t i o n s l a y c la im t o va r ious p a r t s of t h e S p r a t l y
I s l a n d a rch ipe lago . They are: t h e Peop le ' s Republic of
China (PRC), Taiwan, Vietnam, t h e Ph i l i pp ines , Malaysia and
Brunei. Five c o u n t r i e s ( a l l bu t Brunei) maintain a
cont inuous m i l i t a r y presence i n t h e area. These m i l i t a r y
f o r c e s occupy a number of t h e i s l a n d s and r e e f s , and t h e
c la imant governments have s tepped up economic and m i l i t a r y
a c t i v i t y i n t h e region. A l l bu t China and Taiwan a r e
members of t h e Associat ion of South Eas t Asian Nations
(ASEAN). Each Nation has l a i d i ts cla im based on e i t h e r
discovery rights, historical ownership, islands are part of
a nation's continental shelf, or the islands lie within its
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Between 1973 and 1982, over 150 nation states
participated in the United Nations Convention of the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS convention provides rules for
determining the legality of maritime claims. By defining
maritime zones: the territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ,
and continental shelf, which upholds the security and
resource interests of coastal states, it also balances
against the interests of maritime nations which require free
access to the seas for navigation, overflight, and other
traditional uses. By establishing a standard for maritime
claims it was hoped to exert pressure on parties to reduce
excessive maritime claims and thereby reduce tensions in the
long-term. With the exception of Taiwan, the countries
surrounding the South China Sea (including the other Spratly
claimants) have signed the 1982 UNCLOS Convention.
What is the Spratly Islands dispute about? There are
several reasons why the claimants desire the Spratly
Islands. First is the geostrategic location of the islands.
They are situated in the midst of a major intersection of
international sea and trade lanes.4 The nations that
surround the South China Sea rely heavily on trade among
themselves and with other nations for their continued
economic growth and political stability.
Second, aside from their geostrategic value, the area
surrounding the Spratly Islands are also rich in natural
resources. It has long been a productive fishing ground and
a source of guano for use in fertilizing crops. Recent
speculations of oil, gas and mineral resources, though not
fully known (due to secrecy imposed by nations doing the
exploration), are believed to be sizable in an order
comparable with the North Sea discoveries. 5
U.S. national security interests have been mostly tied
to regional stability and geostrategic importance. The U.S.
has long taken the view that the islands are critical to the
strategic interests of Western Pacific nations and the
impact of a Chinese forced occupation of the islands would
be highly destabilizing for the entire region.6 Chinese
aggression in the islands would confirm deep seated regional
fears about Chinese hegemony and ambitious behavior. Lack
of U.S. involvement would most likely spur an arms build up
in the area and peripheral players, like Japan, might well
be induced toward a major expansion of its naval forces if
it perceives the U.S. as unwilling to restrain the Chinese
in the Spratlys. This would also raise latent fears in the
region about Japanese ambitions. 7
Geostrategically, the U.S. also has a direct interest
in ensuring unimpeded transit of its naval vessels between
the Pacific and the Indian ~ c e a n . ~ Loss of current access
to the South China Sea would have a serious detrimental
effect on our ability to react quickly and effectively to a
contingency in Southwest Asia.
Spratly Islands Geostrategic Value
One quarter of the world's seaborne trade passes
through the sea lanes that border the Spratly Islands. This
includes vital oil from the Middle East to Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan. The proximity of the Spratlys to South
China Sea shipping lanes would be an important strategic
element if any island claimant would decide to disrupt trade
or create a conflict in the area. Significant regional
trade passes from the Asian continent and Southeast Asian
archipelagos through the South China Sea. The regions
economic growth and security depend upon continued freedom
of navigation for both merchant and military traffic.
Likewise, the world economy is highly dependent on the free
flow of goods through the South China Sea. Indonesia is
especially concerned because it establishing a natural gas
processing plant at Natuna Island, very close to China's
water claims. For this reason, Indonesia has sponsored a
series of informal workshops with claimant countries aimed
at dispute settlement in the South China Sea. 9
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) also considers the
South China Sea to be an area of great strategic importance
for the security of its maritime borders. Although the
PRC1s navy is one of the largest in the world and devotes
itself almost entirely to coastal defense, PRC military
leaders believe their country is highly vulnerable from the
sea. The PRC1s coastline covers over 6,000 miles. The
mainland Chinese navy has limited range and is not capable
of projecting power great distances. The currents along its
southern coast confine shipping to narrow sea lanes, leaving
the PRC vulnerable to a naval blockade. If the PRC were
able to exercise sovereignty over much of the Spratlys, it
could improve the security of its southern flank. 10
In addition, the United States has a direct need for
freedom of navigation through the area. U.S. interests
include an open economic region that adheres to principles
of international law. Openness is promoted by the lack of
any dominant power that may threaten regional stability and
growth. Regional development is enhanced by the maintenance
of international trade through the free flow of shipping.
Regional stability and growth are reinforced by peaceful
settlement of disputes and a preference for the rule of law.
The threat or use of military force would be seen as
disrupting regional peace, prosperity and security. Also,
non-regional neighbors such as Japan have a paramount energy
interest in maintaining an open South China Sea area. The
Middle East provided 68% of Japan's oil needs in 1994. An
additional 10% of Japan's oil came directly from
Indonesia. 11
RESOURCE RICH?
A very c l e a r motivator behind t h e Spra t ly I s l and
claimants is t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r p r o f i t s i n t h e form of o i l ,
gas, f i s h , and mineral resources . The waters and a r e a
around t h e Spra t ly I s l a n d s a r e r i c h i n f i s h s tocks and may
conta in l a r g e o i l and gas d e p o s i t s , t i n , manganese, copper,
coba l t , and n icke l . While t h e r e is no r e a l proof of
e x i s t i n g l a r g e o i l and mineral r e s e r v e s t h e p o t e n t i a l is
enough t o motivate c la imants t o use claimed t e r r i t o r i e s t o
extend each n a t i o n ' s EEZ and c o n t i n e n t a l she l f zones. This
extension under i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w , w i th in which a country
may c o n t r o l explora t ion , e x p l o i t a t i o n , and preserva t ion of
n a t u r a l resources , provides a d d i t i o n a l motivation f o r t h e
na t ions involved t o s t rengthen t h e i r claims. The dec i s ion
by Malaysia t o develop tourism f a c i l i t i e s on Swallow Reef
may have been dr iven , i n l a r g e p a r t , by an United Nations
Convention on t h e Law of t h e Sea (UNCLOS) s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t
an i s l a n d t h a t cannot s u s t a i n human h a b i t a t i o n o r an
economic l i f e on t h e i r own cannot genera te EEZ o r
con t inen ta l she l f c la ims. l2 Phi l ipp ine and Vietnamese
development of some of t h e i s l e t s under t h e i r con t ro l may
a l s o be intended t o demonstrate "an economic l i f e on t h e i r
ownf1 f o r t h e s e claimed and occupied t e r r i t o r i e s . l3 China
with a huge and growing populat ion and ever-dwindling
a g r i c u l t u r a l and energy resources is e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d
i n keeping i ts op t ions open i n t h e South China Sea. For
China, even though t h e South China Sea c a n ' t grow r i c e , it
does have important f i s h resources and p o t e n t i a l energy
suppl ies . 14
This b e l i e f t h a t t h e South China Sea does conta in l a r g e
d e p o s i t s of resources has exacerbated t h e p u r s u i t of a
peaceful r e s o l u t i o n of t h e t e r r i t o r i a l d i sputes . Indonesia
has a l s o been drawn i n t o t h e d i s p u t e a s t h e Chinese claim
extends i n t o i t s EEZ, and subs tan t ive na tu ra l gas f i e l d s t o
t h e nor theas t of Natuna Is land.
However, it must be noted t h a t exp lo i t ing t h e o i l
resources may be t o o r i sky /cos t ly a t t h i s time. Insecur i ty
is being f e l t i n t h e manner i n which hydrocarbon explora t ion
and production is o r w i l l be conducted i n t h e area. While
hydrocarbon explora t ion and production opera t ions a r e wel l
e s t ab l i shed along t h e c o a s t a l a r e a s of t h e l i t t o r a l s t a t e s
l i t t l e is known of t h e r e s t of t h e South China Sea and t h e
S p r a t l y s i n p a r t i c u l a r . The c o s t of explora t ion and
d r i l l i n g f o r o i l and gas i n t h e Spra t lys w i l l most l i k e l y be
c o s t l y , e s p e c i a l l y i f t h e use of deep seabed techniques a r e
employed. The p o l i t i c a l r i s k s of d r i l l i n g i n disputed a r e a s
must a l s o be weighed. 15
United S t a t e s National I n t e r e s t s
The South China Sea i s important t o U.S . na t iona l
s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s i n seve ra l r e spec t s : i t s c e n t r a l
l o c a t i o n which borders most of t h e Southeast Asian s t a t e s
and s t a t u s as a major t r a d e rou te , and i ts s t r a t e g i c
loca t ion adjacent t o maritime passages between t h e P a c i f i c
and Indian Oceans used by t h e U . S . Navy t o r e in fo rce t h e
Persian Gulf. The involvement of U.S. o i l companies adds t o
U . S . i n t e r e s t s . 16
The waters ad jacent t o t h e Spra t ly I s l ands a r e c r i t i c a l
t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e and U.S. i n t e r e s t s . A s d iscussed
previously, t hese t r a d e r o u t e s a r e heavi ly r e l i e d upon by
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, as wel l a s t h e reg ional na t ions
t h a t border i t s waters. A s a r e s u l t , t h e maintenance of
U . S . c r e d i b i l i t y and inf luence i n t h e reg ion have come t o
depend on t h e U . S . ' s w i l l ingness t o defend t h e i n t e r e s t s of
t h e smaller na t ions a g a i n s t t h e ambitions of t h e l a r g e r
ones. I n o t h e r words, t h e U . S . a s a m i l i t a r y power w i l l
remain a welcome a l l y t o t h e g r e a t major i ty of reg ional
na t ions , but only as long as it r e s t r a i n s any excessive
Chinese o r Japanese naval ambitions t h a t would d e s t a b i l i z e
t h e region.
Chinese aggression i n t h e a r e a is we l l documented. A s
t h e U . S . works towards coping with t h e Chinese m i l i t a r y
build-up t h a t i s happening now, an important by-product of
a c t i n g t o preserve r eg iona l s t a b i l i t y wi th t h e Chinese would
be t h e prevent ion of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a major Japanese
rearmament e f f o r t a s wel l . Since Japan regards t h e s e s e a
lanes as e s s e n t i a l t o i t s v i t a l i n t e r e s t s , it might w e l l be
pushed toward an expansion of i t s naval f o r c e s i f it
perce ives these sea l a n e s a r e threa tened . Such a growth i n
Japanese military strength would tend to destabilize the
region. 17
In addition to the importance of securing the major
trade routes, the U.S. has a direct interest in the Spratly
Islands and the South China Sea to ensure unimpeded transit
of its combat ships and naval support vessels between the
Pacific and the Indian Oceans. As an example, the loss of
access to the South China Sea and hence the straits of
Malacca would have a very serious detrimental effect on the
U.S.'s ability to quickly react to a contingency in
Southwest Asia. Alternate routes would add several transit
days and damage U.S. effectiveness to respond.
China is the Principal and Key to the Dispute Resolution
Were it not for China's disconnect of words and deeds,
it is commonly felt that ASEAN and Taiwan would be fully
capable of settling claims collegially. l8 However, the
ramifications of the efforts of the People's Republic of
China to gain a more prominent position in the post-Soviet
world order could turn a long-standing sovereignty dispute
over the Spratlys into a serious international conflict.
Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the
significant military presence of American and Soviet navies
in the South China Sea area discouraged any of the countries
claiming the Spratly Islands from reinforcing its position
with military action. Now, as the U.S. continues to draw
down and t h e former Sovie t Union h a s reduced its r o l e i n t h e
P a c i f i c , t h i s has l e d many t o b e l i e v e t h e PRC w i l l soon
pursue a m i l i t a r y r e s o l u t i o n i n t h e Spra t ly I s l and d i spu te .
I f t h e d e c l i n i n g superpower m i l i t a r y presence i n t h e region
r e s u l t s i n t h e f u r t h e r crowding of t h e S p r a t l y t s wi th
c la imant warships, t h e l i k e l i h o o d of a more s e r i o u s
conf ron ta t ion w i l l i nc rease . 19
However, even i f t h e PRC would l i k e t o t a k e advantage
of t h e s h i f t i n superpower r e l a t i o n s t o e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f a s
t h e major power i n t h e South China Sea, a m i l i t a r y a c t i o n t o
t a k e c o n t r o l of t h e S p r a t l y s would be d i f f i c u l t and may not
be n e c e s s a r i l y success fu l . Despi te t h e f a c t t h a t i ts
m i l i t a r y budget has increased s i g n i f i c a n t l y s i n c e 1989, t h e
PRC still does n o t appear t o have t h e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y t o
f i g h t a prolonged w a r over t h e S p r a t l y s . With i ts nea res t
m i l i t a r y base more than 600 m i l e s from t h e i s l a n d s and no
a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s t o provide suppor t , t h e PRCts f i g h t e r
p lanes do no t have t h e combat r a d i u s t o f l y t o t h e S p r a t l y s
and back. Moreover, t h e PRCts economic i n t e r e s t i n t h e
i s l a n d t s n a t u r a l resources would be s e r i o u s l y lessened i f it
had t o f inance a lengthy m i l i t a r y campaign f a r from i t s
borders before it could begin t o e x p l o i t t hose resources . 20
Because t h e s e f a c t o r s a l l weigh i n favor of t r y i n g t o
r e so lve t h e S p r a t l y ques t ion through non-mili tary means, t h e
PRC has been developing i ts l e g a l c la ims t o t h e i s l a n d s a t
t h e same t i m e t h a t it has been s t r eng then ing i ts m i l i t a r y
presence i n t h e a rea . The PRC t rea ts t h e d i s p u t e as an
issue of legal rights. The official statements issued after
the 1988 naval clash with Vietnam, for example, all suggest
that the PRC1s primary concern in the wake of the incident
was to reaffirm its claim under international law. However,
a recent study by the Stanford Journal of International Law
indicates that it does not appear that the PRC has a
meritorious claim to the Spratlyls under international
law. 21 Therefore, it seems unlikely that the PRC would
submit to the binding determination of an international
arbitration board or judicial body on the question of
sovereignty over the Spratlys.
It remains to be seen then how the shifting military
roles in the Pacific will affect the thinking of Chinese
leaders in ~eijing regarding the Spratly dispute. If the
U.S. further reduces its military presence in the area of
the South China Sea, the PRC could well determine that its
military strength relative to rival claimants exceeds the
strength of its legal claim. Such a determination, which
might be spurred by new evidence of vast oil reserves in the
South China Sea seabed or by increased tensions along the
Sino-~ietnamese border, could lead the PRC to pursue a
military solution to the Spratly Islands controversy, and,
in the process, upset the peace and stability of the entire
Southeast Asian region. A settlement, negotiated either
multilaterally under the auspices of ASEAN or the United
Nations or bilaterally between the claimants, seems of
urgent importance.
How Might a Resolution in the Dispute Affect U.S. National
Interests?
The resolution of the dispute over the Spratly Islands
has clearly become a strategic issue for the United States.
Global interests which affect directly the U.S. and its
allies such as freedom of navigation and our relationships
with the regional nations are of deep concern. Further
outbreaks of incidental violence, instigated principally by
China, are probable. The U.S. must dispel the notion that
somehow "small scale" violence is not really conflict. It
is and will most likely escalate. 22 Diplomatic efforts over
the years through numerous agencies such as the ASEAN
Regional Forum, Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference and
the Indonesia Workshops have progressed very slowly towards
any meaningful resolution, hence the status quo remains. 2 3
Even these diplomatic efforts have come under attack lately
by its members for their regional "appeasement" of China and
the fact that these forums have been culpable in supplying
China a guaranteed risk-free environment for saying that
China is indeed participating in the "multilateral" process
when she is not. The facts do suggest that China has been
able to move with impunity provided she avoids violence and
the use of force. 2 4
Complicating the diplomatic issues would be the
implications of responding to a PRC and Vietnam conflict in
the South China Sea that was fought along the land borders.
Bear in mind there are different bilateral frameworks that
the U.S. has within ASEAN: Treaty allies, which are
Thailand and the Philippines; a communist country, Vietnam;
and the rest which are considered just "allies." If
Vietnam called on ASEAN for institutional support, while the
PRC threatened the ASEAN members individually, ASEAN itself
would be divided within its membership over what to do. The
U.S. would be faced with the dilemma of how to
simultaneously manage ifengagement" on three fronts. One,
with a culpably aggressive China; another with how to handle
a bilateral agreement with Vietnam under fire from China;
and third, how to deal with conflicting requests for action
from ASEAN collectively and/or it various members
individually.
Conclusion: What should the.United States Do?
up to now the United Stat opted a hands-off
policy. The Clinton administration has acknowledged that
conflicting claims to the islands in the Spratly chain are a
source of tension in East Asia and that, in the worst case,
could lead to regional instability. 2 5 The following State
Department statement has been issued:
The United States is concerned that a pattern of unilateral actions ... in the South China Sea has increased tension in that region. The United States has an abiding interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea. The United States calls upon claimants to intensify diplomatic efforts which address issues related to competing claims, taking into account the interests
of a l l p a r t i e s , and which c o n t r i b u t e t o peace and p r o s p e r i t y i n t h e region. The United S t a t e s is w i l l i n g t o assist i n any way t h a t c la imants deem he lp fu l . ... Maintaining freedom of naviga t ion is a fundamental i n t e r e s t of t h e United S t a t e s . Un- hindered naviga t ion ... is e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e peace and p r o s p e r i t y of t h e e n t i r e Asia-Pacific reg ion , i nc lud ing t h e United States. The United S t a t e s t a k e s no p o s i t i o n on t h e l e g a l m e r i t s of t h e competing c la ims t o sovere ign ty over t h e va r ious i s l a n d s , r e e f s , a t o l l s and cays i n t h e South China Sea. The United S t a t e s would, however, view wi th s e r i o u s concern any maritime claim, o r r e s t r i c t i o n on maritime a c t i v i t y , i n t h e South China Sea t h a t was no t c o n s i s t e n t w&Eh i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w , i nc lud ing t h e 1982 UNCLOS.
The ques t ion is should t h e United S t a t e s cont inue t o
a l low t h i n g s t o remain i n "S ta tus Quow. This op t ion has
some dangerous r i s k s which have involved armed c o n f l i c t i n
t h e p a s t and is l i k e l y t o involve more i n t h e f u t u r e . Most
of t h e pos tu r ing over t h e S p r a t l y s is f o r c o n t r o l of t h e
n a t u r a l resources i n t h e a rea . Though e x p e r t s agree t h e
p o t e n t i a l f o r v a s t r e s e r v e s is t h e r e , up t o now no
s i g n i f i c a n t f i n d has been repor ted . None of t h e n a t i o n
c la imants c u r r e n t l y possess a b lue w a t e r Navy capable of
s e i z i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g t h e e n t i r e area. China s e e m s t o be
b u i l d i n g toward t h a t c a p a b i l i t y b u t w i l l no t achieve it
anytime soon, i f eve r . I f a nego t i a t ed peaceful s e t t l emen t
is n o t reached, and s i g n i f i c a n t petroleum re se rves are
r e a l i z e d , Chinese m i l i t a r y a c t i o n becomes, however, more
l i k e l y . ~ d d i t i o n a l l y , due t o f u r t h e r downsizing, a reduced
U . S . forward presence would by a b s t i n e n t i a i n c r e a s e Chinese
m i l i t a r y supremacy i n t h e region. The appropr i a t e U.S .
response t o a Chinese m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s would be t h e
app l i ca t ion of coercive diplomacy/mili tary a c t i o n t o ensure
freedom of navigat ion and ensure reg ional access t o t h e
na tu ra l resources of t h e archipelago.
What seems t o be needed i n t h e Spra t ly d i spu te i s f o r
t h e United S t a t e s t o t ake a g r e a t e r pro-active r o l e by
providing more t ransparent p o l i c i e s through Confidence
Building Measures ( C B M s ) . This opt ion would seek t o reduce
t h e high degree of mutual suspic ion and f e a r among t h e
coun t r i e s i n t h e region. This would r e q u i r e t h e adoption of
more t r anspa ren t po l i ces i n t h e South China Sea than
previously exerc ised t h a t could improve and make more
p red ic t ab le t h e a c t i o n s of t h e claimants and t h e i r a l l i e s .
This opt ion would cen te r on t h e process of c o n f l i c t
r e so lu t ion through CBMs. An i d e a shared by ASEAN and
reg ional l eade r s . 27 The U.S . could promote through var ious
means such a s b i l a t e r a l and m u l t i l a t e r a l t a l k s , ASEAN
Regional Forum, Asia-Pacific ~conomic Cooperation, e t c . , t h e
app l i ca t ion of t h e following CBMs: u n i l a t e r a l r e f r a i n i n g
from using f o r c e i n t h e d isputed areas; s topping f u r t h e r
occupation and annexation of t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h e Spra t lys ; no
new m i l i t a r y exe rc i ses o r a c t i v i t i e s ; i f provocative
exe rc i ses a r e an t i c ipa ted , provide ample n o t i f i c a t i o n t o
avoid sending wrong s i g n a l s t o t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s ; coordinate
an SOP ( s tandard opera t ing procedures) f o r m i l i t a r y
t r a n s i t i n g o r opera t ing i n t h e a r e a t h a t would promote a
p o s i t i v e maritime order; devise some mechanisms t o allow
communication and contact between the local military
commanders to reduce hostility through person to person
dialogue; and non-stationing of dangerous long-range weapons
and platf oms. 28 In general, the CBMs Should assist the
claimants to recognize the national sensitivities
surrounding all claims. Even though states may not want to
recognize each other's claims, they should recognize the
sensitivities resulting from these claims.
Additionally, the United States should promote joint
ventures among the claimants in the exploration and
exploitation of the natural resources in the area. The
United States could act as the "honest brokern to work out
production-sharing agreements in contested areas, and
request disputants put their sovereignty claims on hold. 2 9
In summary, the Spratly Islands are of strategic
importance to the United States. The resolution of the
dispute will affect our national interests. CBM1s provide a
low risk means for the U.S. to reaffirm our interest and our
commitment to stability for the countries in the region
while improving and ensuring our own national security
interests.
Endnotes
Greg Ansley, "The Spratlys: Asia's Next War?" New Zealand Defense Ouarterlv (Winter 1995): 8-11.
Ibid, 8.
Mark G. Harstad, South China Sea Reference Book (Camp Smith, Hawaii: U.S. Pacific Command, April 1996), 26.
Brian J. OIConnell, "Spratly Islands Issue: Strategic Interests and Options," Research Paper, Naval War Colleae (20 November 1992): 3.
Ibid, 4.
Rodney Tasker, Line in the Sand," Far Eastern Economic Review (6 April 1995): 14-16.
Peng Er Lam, "Japan and the Spratlys Dispute, Asian Survev, Universitv of California 36, no. 10,(10 Oct 1996): 995-1010.
Department of Defense, United States Securitv Strateuv for the East Asia - Pacific Reaion, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 1995) 20.
Ian Townsend-Gault , "Testing the Waters, Harvard International Review 16, no. 2,(Spring 1994): 16-19.
lo Michael Bennett, "The People's Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute," Stanford Journal of International Law 28,(1992): 432.
Harstad, 12.
l2 Ibid., 32.
l3 Ralph A. Cossa, "Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea," Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report (June 1996): 10.
14 John Zeng, "Focus China's South China Sea," Asia- Pacific Defense Reworter (July-August 1995): 10.
l5 Anonymous, "The Implications of Hydrocarbon Development in the South China Sea," Universitv of British Columbia Working Group (1996): 2.
l6 Larry A. Niksch, !!The South China Sea Dispute, "
Conaressional Research Service Report f o r Congress (29 August 1995): 1.
l7 Lam, 1010.
l8 Anonymous, "The S p r a t l y s Spat, Far Eastern Economic Review (13 Apr i l 1995): 5.
l9 Jn Mak, llArmed, But Ready?, It Harvard I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Review 16, no. 2, (Spring 1994): 20-24.
20 Michael Bennett, 428.
21 Ib id , 449.
22 Mark J. Valencia, !!Damping t h e Growing Danger i n
t h e Spra t lys , " Asian W a l l S t r e e t Journal Weeklv (27 February 1995)
23 Mark J. Valencia, "Solving t h e Spra t ly Disputes -- Some f o r Each o r Some f o r A l l , " Honolulu, H a w a i i , East-West Center Report, ( 5 January 1995): 2.
25 Department of Defense, United S t a t e s Secur i tv
Stratecrv f o r t h e E a s t Asia-Pacific Reaion (February 1995).
26 C h r i s t i n e Shel ly , S o r a t l v s and t h e South China Sea, (Washington DC: U.S. Department of S t a t e , Off ice of t h e Spokesman), 10 May 1995.
2 7 Hamzah Ahmad, "The South China Sea Conf l ic t : The
Need f o r Pol icy TransparencyIft Asian Defence Journal (January 1993): 125.
28 Ib id , 125.
29 Lloyd R. Vasey, "Co l l i s ion i n t h e China Sea,"
Chr i s t i an Science Monitor (22 June 1995): 1 9 .
Selected Biblioara~hv
Ahmad, Hamzah. nThe South China Sea Conflict: The Need for Policy Transparency." Asian Defense Journal (January 1993):125.
Anonymous. nThe Implications of Hydrocarbon Development in the South China Sea." University of British Columbia Working Group (1996): 2.
Anonymous. nThe Spratlys Spat." Far Eastern Economic Review (13 April 1995): 5.
Ansley, Greg. "The Spratlys: Asia's Next War?" New Zealand Defense Ouarterlv (Winter 1995): 8-11.
Bennett, Michael. "The Peoplels Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute. " Stanford Journal of International Law 28, (1992): 432-449.
Clinton, William J. A National Security Strateav of Enaaaement and Enlaraement. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 1996.
Cossa, Ralph A. "Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea." Pacific Forum CSIS Special Re~ort (June 1996).
Department of Defense, United States Securitv Strate? for the East Asia - Pacific Region. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1995.
Harstad, Mark G. South China Sea Reference Book. Camp Smith, Hawaii: U.S. Pacific Command, April 1996.
Lam I
Mak,
Peng Er. "Japan and the Spratlys Dispute." Asian Survey, Universitv of California 36, no. 10 (10 October 1996): 995-1010.
Jn. "Armed, But Ready?ll Harvard International Review 16, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 20-24.
Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. The Strateaic Quadranale. New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations, 1995.
Niksch, Larry A. "The South China Sea Dispute." Congressional Research Service Report for Conuress (29 August 1995): 1.
OIConnell, Brian J. "Spratly Islands Issue: Strategic Interests and Options." Research Paper, Naval War Colleae (20 November 1993): 3.
Shalikashvili, John M. National Militarv Strategy of the United States of America 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.
Shelly, Christine. Spratlvs and the South China Sea. Policy Statement, Office of the Spokesman. Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 10 May 1995.
Tasker, Rodney. "A Line in the Sand." Far Eastern Economic Review (6 April 1995): 14-16.
Townsend-Gault, Ian. "Testing the Waters." Harvard International Review 16, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 16-19.
Valencia, Mark J. "Damping the Growing Danger in the Spratlys." Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, 27 February 1995.
. "Solving the Spratly Disputes -- Some for Each or Some for All." East-West Center Report, - Honolulu, Hawaii (5 January 1995): 2.
Vasey, Lloyd R. wCollision in the China Sea." Christian Science Monitor (22 June 1995): 19.
Zeng, John. "Focus China's South China Sea." Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter (July-August 1995): 10.
