SPRING 2002 - ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu · SPRING 2002 IN THIS ISSUE: Addressing the Hazards — As...

SPRING 2002

IN THIS ISSUE:Addressing the Hazards — As I See It

Decompression Sickness— School Notes

Aircraft Safety is Everyone’s Responsibility

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IN THIS ISSUE:Addressing the Hazards — As I See It

Decompression Sickness— School Notes

Aircraft Safety is Everyone’s Responsibility

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Directorate of Flight SafetyDirector of Flight SafetyCol R.E.K. Harder

EditorCapt T.C. Newman

Art DirectionDGPA–Creative Services

TranslationCoordinatorOfficial Languages

Printer Tri–coOttawa, Ontario

The Canadian Forces Flight Safety MagazineFlight Comment is produced 4 times ayear by the Directorate of Flight Safety.The contents do not necessarily reflectofficial policy and unless otherwise stated should not be construed as regulations, orders or directives.

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ATT:Editor, Flight CommentDirectorate of Flight SafetyNDHQ/Chief of the Air StaffMajor–General George R. Pearkes Bldg.101 Colonel By DriveOttawa, Ontario Canada K1A 0K2

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“To contact DFS personnel on an URGENT Flight Safety issue, aninvestigator is available 24 hours a day by dialing 1-888 WARN DFS (927-6337). The DFS web page atwww.airforce.dnd.ca/dfs offers other points of contact in the DFS organization.”

ISSN 0015–3702A–JS–000–006/JP–000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 ............................................................................Distraction = Danger

2........................................................................................Ice , Ice Baby!!

3 ................................................................................“I’m Experienced!”

4 .............................................................................Don’t Take a Chance

5.................................................................Drain It Before You Drop It!

6.....................................................................A Dark and Stormy Night

7 ..........................................................................It’s Still Dark At Night

8 .................................................Addressing the Hazards — As I See It

10 .................................................................................................Epilogue

14............................................................................From the Investigator

15 ...................................................................Good Sense vs. Good Luck

16............................................School Notes — Decompression Sickness

18 ...................................................Be Wise and Take The IFR Approach

19 ......................................................I Learned About Flying From That

20..........................................Aircraft Safety is Everyone’s Responsibility

21 ...............................................................Anxious, But Still Meticulous

22 ....................................................................Discussing Weekend Plans

23 ......................................................Do I Hate Greenwood That Much?

24 ..............................................................................Maintainer’s Corner

25 ............................................................................................Good Show

26 ...............................................................................For Professionalism

30 ............................................................................................Dear Editor

31...........................................................................It Can Happen To You

32.....................................................Does The Clothing Make The Man?

33 ..................................................Extension is the Better Part of Valour

34 ............................................................................What Back-up Plan??

35 ................................................................It Seemed to be a Good Plan

36 ..........................................................................Asleep At The Throttle

Flight Comment, no 2, 2002 1

Distraction DANGER--

Already in ancient times, Homerdescribed the devastating

effects of distraction in the Odyssey.To prevent his mariners from beingdistracted by the song of the Sirensand putting their boat in danger,Odysseus blocked their ears withwax. Nowadays, bus drivers useother strategies to avoid distraction.As a safety measure, and to avoiddistracting them, passengers areasked not to speak to bus drivers.

Most of the time, bush and heli-copter pilots are alone to carry outall the tasks related to flying the air-craft while, at the same time, theyare not isolated from their passen-gers. Team spirit often leads pilotsto interact with passengers. By talk-ing or by bringing their activities onboard the aircraft, passengers canbecome a dangerous source of dis-traction. As much as possible, pilotsmust isolate themselves and con-centrate on their work by remainingdistant. If pilots get involved intheir passengers’ conversations oractivities, their attention is greatlydiverted from flying the aircraft.A distracted pilot is no longer ableto control the situation, and his/hervigilance, which is essential during

an emergency, is compromised.Conversations in flight should belimited to those that are required bythe mission at hand — it’s a matterof safety. Professional pilots explainthis and enforce it from the cockpit.They can take the time to socializeand exchange opinions once theyare on the ground.

Here’s a classic example of distrac-tion: Imagine the passenger in yourhelicopter is a geologist. Youobserve him from the corner ofyour eye between two “scans” of theinstrument panel. You have beenflying over a rocky countryside for a good half-hour. Suddenly,he changes colour and yells in theinterphone to conduct a half-turntoward a heap of pebbles. You carryout the manoeuvre as an excitedvoice, raving about the mineralbeauty of these rocks, resonatesthrough your headset. The enthusi-asm overcomes you as well; yourwide eyes fixate on these stones andsearch to find the beauty in them,but you don’t see it — you are not ageologist! Suddenly, you regain yourcomposure and you notice, with asinking stomach and a strident cuss,that you are only one hundred feet

above the ground with a tailwindand no airspeed. You have put yourself and your passengers in adangerous situation. You alone areresponsible. You let yourself becomedistracted! You are very lucky ifthis story has a happy ending.Unfortunately, many fatal accidents(for example, collisions with powerlines) have pilot distraction as acausal factor.

Other dangerous forms of pilot distraction include spilled coffee in the cockpit, problems with aninstrument, or a passenger who isnot feeling well. The pilot divertshis/her attention to the problemwhile the flight continues with noreal control. The longer the flightcontinues at a low altitude, themore likely it is that this distractioncould have disastrous resultsbecause the room to manoeuvre isreduced. Pilots, beware of the songof the Sirens! ◆

Bernard Maugis, System SafetySpecialist, Quebec Region

Reprinted with kind permission of:Transport Canada’s Aviation SafetyLetter Issue 2/2001

2 Flight Comment, no 2, 2002

ICE ICEBaby!!There we were, on an IFR flight

plan from Shearwater toMoncton at 6,000 feet. The weatherhad been sunny and beautiful forthe first half of our flight, when upahead, we noticed a line of frontalcloud. As forecast, it was based at 3500 feet and topped at about6500 feet.

As flight in known icing conditionsis a bad thing in the helicopterworld and the freezing level was4000 feet, we decided to ask Centrefor higher. As is often the case,Moncton Centre was busy withrush hour traffic and we wereobliged to wait our turn. After several attempts we finally gotthrough, but not before enteringcloud. I wasn’t really concerned asthere seemed to be only a few hun-dred feet of cloud to break throughin the climb.

We finally got through, requested8000 feet, and were cleared for theclimb. So off we went. I was doingone of my checks and noticed thatwe were pulling 94% torque, andwe were only climbing at 200 feetper minute. Hmmm. I checked mysponson for ice build-up, and, sureenough, we were picking up ice. Wehad only been in cloud for aboutfive minutes. Hmmmm!

I mentioned this to my co-pilot,and as he was checking his sponson,he noticed ice building on ourwindshield wipers. The area fore-cast had predicted light to moderateicing in the vicinity of the toweringcumulus clouds. I checked the

torque again and we were at 100%and a nil climb. We were at 6400 feetand the airframe started to vibratelightly. At this point, we had been incloud for maybe seven minutes, andwe couldn’t climb any higher.

We had a quick discussionabout turning around ordescending out of cloudand continuing the tripVFR. We called back theCentre to request lower, andof course, everyone for a hun-dred miles wanted to talk to them.I stepped on half a dozen transmis-sions trying to get hold of Centre.I didn’t want to just descend withoutpermission because there was obvi-ously a lot of traffic around. When wefinally broke in on the radios, we weredescending at 100 feet per minutewith pretty good vibrations and102% torque. Not good! We had beenin cloud now for about nine minutesbefore we were able to transmit.

“Moncton Centre, this is Talon33. We are unable to climb to8000 feet and unable to maintain6000 feet due to icing. We are inthe descent to 3000 feet to breakout of cloud.” There was silenceon the radios. I guess everyoneheard a little tension in my voiceand decided to listen out.

“Talon 33, roger. Cleared todescend to 3000 feet, your discretion. Say type and severity of icing.”

“Talon 33 in the descent.We’ve got moderate to severemixed icing at 6000 feet.”

“Talon 33, roger. Air Nova flight1422, are you picking up ice inyour area?” I assumed the AirNova flight was in the samecloud, but he didn’t report his position.

“Moncton, Air Nova 1422,negative. We’re not…” There was an audible ‘bong’ on theradio. “Yep, there it is now.We’re picking up some ice.”

At this point, Moncton asked AirNova 1422 for type and severity,which they called light rime icing.Meanwhile, we were pretty muchauto rotating down through cloudto get out of the icing conditions asquickly as possible, and we startedto shed the ice as the temperaturerose. We broke out of cloud at 3800feet and the outside air temperaturewas five or six degrees.

We sorted ourselves out, cancelledIFR, thanked Moncton Centre, andswitched off to file VFR to our des-tination and continued with the


After having completed a touras an instructor in Moose Jawon the Tutor, I was posted tofly the mighty C-130 Herculesmother-ship. After breezingthrough the OperationalTraining Unit (OTU), I was gladto finally be flying for anoperational squadron. Now Icould get some of that highlyprized “real experience” I hadheard so many speak of dur-ing my tenure in Moose Jaw.

Shortly after arriving to thesquadron, I was scheduled to fly a trip that was tasked to carry some cargo fromTrenton, across the country, toComox. The aircraft comman-der (AC) and I sat down dur-ing the pre-flight briefing todiscuss the flight and myunderstanding of the proce-dures. “No problem” I toldhim, I knew what it was liketo fly across Canada. After all,I had done it many timesbefore in the Tutor. After eas-ily convincing him that I knewmy stuff, we headed out forwhat I considered a routine,mindless trip. “After all,” I thought, “I had a tour under my belt, and I wasexperienced!”

After take-off, the AC gave mecontrol as weclimbed to ourcleared altitudeof 16,000 feet. Air Traffic Control(ATC) camethrough on theradio during theclimb and alteredour routing, butno one recog-nized one of theidentifiers we hadbeen cleared toalong the route.

Both the navigator and theAC pulled out the enroutecharts to find it. ATC came onthe radio a short time laterand asked us to confirm ouraltitude; all of us looked upfrom the maps and saw thealtimeter passing through16,600 feet. The loadmastersoon found himself practicinghis floating techniques as wepushed over in our attempt toreturn to the proper altitude.

That was when the AC lookedover at me and saw the eggsmeared all over my face.Some “experienced” pilot I had turned out to be. Ilearned first-hand one of thesimplest and most importantrules in a crew cockpit — theone in control flies the air-plane. My overconfidenceallowed me to become com-placent and could have costthe AC his ticket.

There are other fully qualifiedcrewmembers in the cockpitwho can find the requiredanswer without my help. Nomatter how much experienceyou think you have, you cannever get away from the oldadage….”aviate, navigate,communicate.” ◆

Captain Harbour

“I’m Experienced!”

trip. What would I do differ-ently if I were faced with thesame situation again? First,I wilfully flew into cloud

above the freezing level, which isalmost certainly asking for icing.When I did start to pick up ice,I did not make the proper decisionto turn around and go back to theVMC conditions I had just left.Second, I misunderstood what light to moderate icing meant toour aircraft type. What was lighticing to the Air Nova flight wasmuch more severe from our pointof view. The speed of ice build-upto the point where level flight couldnot be maintained was incredible.

If we hadn’t had the escape routeswe had, and the gas to deal with it,this incident would have been morefrightening. It is better to have inyour mind at the beginning of theicing season what your reaction willbe when you find icing on your air-plane, than to hope you’ll have thetime to make the right decisionwhen time is more precious. ◆

Captain Savage


We had just started our nightshift and we were getting

debriefed for the flying require-ments of the next day. A minimumof two serviceable Buffalo aircraftwere required — one was for Searchand Rescue (SAR) and the otherwas for the 426 Squadron FlightEngineer (FE) course. As luckwould have it, we only had one!

The most promising aircraftrequired a Fuel Control Unit (FCU)change and some other minorwork. Everything went quite well;I was surprised at how seldom wewere pulled away to do other, morepressing, tasks — like parking, start-ing, after and before-checking, andrefuelling the Labrador helicoptersfor night training. The FCU and therigging were a “piece of cake.” Ouronly problem was the wind — it hadcome up and increased until it wasalmost above the allowable limits.I was the only technician who was

run-up qualified that evening and I felt extremely uncomfortable. Iinformed the crew chief of my con-cern, however, I was reminded ofthe school’s need. They would haveto cancel the course and reschedulethe FE to come back at a later date.Due to the awkwardness of the situ-ation and the fact that the wind wasstill legally within limits, I reluctantlyopted to carry out the run-up.

The aircraft was towed outside andpositioned into the wind to carryout the high power run-up. Therun-up progressed quite well; thedry and wet engine rotations for thefuel leak check were uneventful.The ground/flight idle and themaximum power adjustment wereboth looking good, as was the highpower four-point check. The partthat worried me was the high powerslam check. This is a quick move-ment of the throttle in one direc-tion. It is done in three parts: first,

a flight idle to maximum powerforward slam response is carriedout. Second, a flight idle to maxi-mum power reverse slam is doneand, thirdly, and most dangerous,is the maximum power forward to maximum power reverse slam.These are carried out to ensure thatthe engine does not flame out in anemergency abort situation. I saw noproblem with the forward slam asthe propeller was biting into thewind; it was the reverse part that I was uncomfortable with. I knewthat in less than three to five sec-onds the propeller would be push-ing hard against the high wind.I moved the power lever to fullreverse slowly so I could feel theaircraft’s response; nothing hap-pened. So…I proceeded with theflight idle to full reverse slam. Thenose tires lifted slightly but, accord-ing to the ground man, they neverleft the ground. Even though it

DON’T Take a


DRAIN IT BEFOREYOU DROP IT!It was just another configura-tion change. Nothing special— just a couple of 480-gallonexternal fuel tanks to remove.I had just arrived at AETE, Iwas a Master Corporal, andhad not worked on the CF-188before. I had installed andremoved many EFT’s on the CF-104 and I had a good ideaof how this should work….back off the sway braces,unlatch the rack, lower thetank, and you’re done.

Being new to the CF-188, I was just along to watch, lend a hand, and perhapslearn something. The fullyqualified Master Corporal crew chief got his crew together and off we went.

The two most importantthings one must do prior toremoving a tank is to removethe explosive cartridges and toensure that the tank is empty.The cartridges were removedand the crew chief noted thatthere was a little fuel remain-ing in the tank but that it was-n’t much and we were good togo. We used an MJ1A bombjack to lower the tank fromthe wing pylon; so far, sogood. The next trick was toget the tank from the jackonto the trailer. We decided to just manhandle it — twopeople at each end, lockhands, lift and lower, and the job was done.

We quickly realized that therewas too much fuel for us to lift it. Undaunted, the MasterCorporal got one of the tech-nicians to get another jackwith a boom and a sling andmove it that way. We got the

tank in the air and began tomove it towards the trailerwith a tech at each end toguide it. The nose of the tankstarted to drop; fuel in thetank was migrating rapidly tothe nose and there appearedto be considerably more thanwas first thought. Instincttold me to put all my weighton the back end and thetechnicians on the front didall they could to lift the frontend. We hoped this wouldreverse the fuel flow andlevel the tank off. No suchluck! Before I knew it, I wasbeing lifted off the groundand the nose of the tank wasabout to hit the floor. Luckilythere was a mattress rightbeside us and one of thetechnicians, thinking quickly,put it under the nose whilethe jack lift driver slowly lowered the tank and me to the ground.

made me uneasy, I was reminded ofthe need for the aircraft. As I feared,when the power lever was slammedfrom maximum forward power tomaximum reverse power, the air-craft weight shifted so fast that thenose jumped up approximately oneto two feet into the air. A quickabort was carried out and the nosewas brought back down to the pave-ment. An aircraft check was carriedout for damage to the nose landinggear and surrounding areas.

We got extremely lucky; no damagewas found and the engine neverflamed out. This gave us a service-able aircraft for the school’s course.What I learned that day was that no matter how much pressure thesection is put under, if all the condi-tions are not favourable…don’t takea chance! ◆

Sergeant Bolduc

Chance

As luck would have it, no harmwas done to the tank. We, onthe other hand, had damagedour pride a little realizing that anyone who had seen thislittle fiasco must have beenimpressed. Needless to say, weall learned a lesson that day. If there is any fuel in the tank,drain it before you drop it! ◆

Sgt Schmidt


A Dark and Stormy

we were able to avoid, we almostreached our destination uneventfully.We were just seven miles outfrom VK when we noticedsomething odd. The usualscattering of lights on thehills all around were nolonger on our left side andthey were disappearingahead of us as well! The clouddeck was lowering until it wasengulfing the hills to our left and up ahead.

The rain was heavy now and wemade a quick circuit to assess ouroptions. We realized that the route we followed to get here was closingoff behind us and a return trip to BL would be a risky venture. We fol-lowed the only open valley in sight,heading north and perpendicular toour intended track. I was starting tobreathe heavily now and I could readthe headlines back home already,“PRESSING PILOT PILES IN.” I feltstupid, knowing I had been safe andsound in BL just forty minutes ago.Our crew day was nearing its end andwe weren’t at our best any more. Nowwe faced the most hazardous situa-tion we had seen that day, that week,and, thus far, that tour! In Canada,we could have simply landed in afield to wait out the weather. But, thatwas only a last and desperate optionin mine-strewn Bosnia.

I must have been through the thirditeration of my “please, God, helpme out of this mess” prayer when I saw the opening. I noticed a gapbetween the hills on our left and I could see the light of the valleybeyond clearly. A way past thecloud!! We took it, hoping like crazy that our map was accurate andthat there weren’t any wires strungacross the gap as we flew through it.The rain continued unabated but,beyond the gap, the ceiling washigher and we could breathe easier.We could already see VK ahead ofus, glowing like a lighthouse in thefog, less than five miles away.

My arms and legs were rubbery, andthe FE’s NVG’s were literally washedout by the downpour as we made

We had been in theatre foralmost a month. It seemed like

summer came early to Bosnia, withhigh temperatures and hardly anysnow by the end of March. But, todayhad been different. We had alreadylogged more than six hours of flyingbefore leaving Split, Croatia andreturning in the rain to Banja Luka(BL) with the Commander of Multi-National Division — South West(MND SW). It was dusk and theweather was deteriorating but, dodg-ing low cloud and showers, we madeit to BL near the end of our crew day.

Bosnia poses a number of difficultiesfor us as aviators, ranging from mini-mal safe landing areas to minimalweather reporting or forecasting.The Balkans region is very moun-tainous and the weather can changedrastically from one valley to thenext; it’s as if each vale has it’s ownseparate weather system.

The thought had occurred to us tostay overnight in BL, but a quick esti-mate of the time required to reachour base in Velika Kladusa (VK) hadus getting home inside our eighthours flying limit. A weather call toVK confirmed the conditions therewere still good. We strapped on ournight vision goggles (NVG’s) afterrefuelling and decided to go for it.Despite enroute showers and theoccasional thunderstorm cloud that

Night


It would seem that we are alla little resistant to change, atfirst. Usually, we adapt, over-come, and go on to the pointof dependency. An exampleof dependency is our use ofcomputers. I recently pur-chased a microwave ovenfrom a large warehouse.After purchasing the product,I was informed that theywere in stock but that Icouldn’t take one with mebecause their computer had“crashed.” It would seem thatthis company had grown sodependant on their computersystem, that they couldn’tallow me to take the item.The sales slip had to beprinted, the item had to beremoved from their stock,and the loading dock had toreceive notification throughthe computer system to physi-cally remove a microwavefrom their shelves and turn it over to me at the customerpick-up counter. I wonderwhat kind of future would lieahead for this company if avirus were to invade their system and shut itdown regularly oreven permanently.

How does this apply to “Flight Safety” you ask? Well, theCanadian Forces wereintroduced to NightVision Goggles (NVG’s)for aircrew a numberof years ago. Whenthey were first intro-duced, there was someinitial opposition andthen, over time, air-crews have adapted.Are we now in the

throes of dependency? I’m surethat you’ve all heard it saidthat NVG’s do not turn nightinto day. In fact, they are toolsand, subsequently, have limita-tions. First and foremost is thatthey must have ambient lightto function. The light doesn’tnecessarily have to be in thevisible spectrum, but it must be present never the less.Secondly, NVG’s only provide uswith a 40º field of view, when,if fact, we are used to havingapproximately 180º. Again, we can and do adapt, butthere are still limitations.

So…what is my point? Whenflying with NVG’s, don’t forgetthat they are a tool and, assuch, that they have limita-tions. If something occurs inflight and they no longer func-tion, you should have enoughsituational awareness to allowyou to transit to instrumentsand not be trapped flyingblind. ◆

Remember…it’s still dark at night.

Master Corporal Lawrence

IT’S STILL DARK AT NIGHT

our descent. It took three passesbefore we landed safely in the heli-copter-landing site and we couldstart breathing normally again.

It didn’t take long for complacencyto set in and, sometimes, our “cando” attitude gets in the way of goodjudgement. It took all the experienceand skill we had as a crew to get ussafely on the ground. A little moreexperience and we would haveknown to call it a day in BL. We allstrive to be professionals and we allwant to get the job done. We takepride in our ability to do so espe-cially in trying circumstances, orwith minimized resources. But,pride, on occasion, gets in the way of sound judgement. ◆

Captain Noppers


Over the last year, I have visitedalmost all the Wings, Units

and Headquarters in the Air Force.During those visits, I asked you,the people on the flight lines, in the hangars, and at staff desks whomake our Air Force work, what youthought were the most significantthreats to the safety of our flyingoperations. I received a great deal of very useful feedback.

You said that your biggest concernwas experience levels; people in theaircraft and on the hangar floorswere more likely to make mistakesbecause of their lack of experience.You noted that some factors exacer-bate the experience shortage, suchas low flying rates, complex yet age-ing aircraft, broad mission scope,and high supervisory workload.You also told me that you were concerned about the shortage ofpeople, especially fully qualified andproficient people. This was causedby higher than normal attrition,establishments set lower than neces-sary during downsizing, and by a high ratio of untrained people.You said that fewer people doingthe same amount of work meansmore pressure on those who arequalified, and thus an increasedlikelihood of errors, whether in theair, during maintenance actions,or in a headquarters.

You have also mentioned that youdon’t believe there is enough time

to train on essentials while there istoo much mandated training whichdoes not contribute directly to themission; this constrains time foroperational training and increasesworkload. Operational tempo is notallowing technicians to do traderestructure training, and is increas-ing workload for supervisors.Headquarters (HQ) reductions andunderstaffing, along with the demiseof Group HQs has meant most HQstaff have insufficient time to payattention to all parts of their jobs,and unit level people are sometimesbeing asked to do staff work whichwas previously done by Group HQs.

Many aircrew as well as theirCommanding Officers (COs) toldme they believe we have set currencyrequirements below what is requiredfor real proficiency. As a result, theysometimes accept the risk of lowproficiency in one area to allow forbetter training in a more hazardousregime (e.g., low level night visiongoggle (NVG) flying).

I was told of many other concerns,but these were the biggest pan-AirForce issues. So what do we doabout it? Firstly, you should knowthat our commanders at all levels arevery much aware of these concernsand are doing all in their power toaddress them. But I want to focus onwhat you, the people on the flightline, can do to compensate for these

factors. I think there are five mainconcepts that encompass virtuallyevery action that can be taken. Ifyou’ve seen the 2001-02 annual DFS briefing, you will recognizethem, but let me go through them individually:

• Risk Management. This is theprocess of identifying the hazardsassociated with what we areabout to undertake (perhaps withthe aid of a list of potential haz-ards), assessing them in terms oflikely severity and probability,finding ways of reducing the risk(possibly from a list of options),and deciding whether to amendthe task or not do it. The processseeks to ensure that only neces-sary risk is undertaken, that ben-efit outweighs the risk and thatrisk decisions are taken at anappropriate level (i.e., someonewho really knows how importantthe task is and understands therisks of doing it).

• Crew Resource Management/Human Performance inMaintenance (CRM/HPIM).Central Flying School has beentasked to further the Air ForceCRM and HPIM programs and iscalling them Human Performancein Military Aviation (HPMA).This concept recognizes that peo-ple perform more effectively andare less likely to make mistakes ifdecisions consider the percep-tions and knowledge of everymember of the team; the pro-gram provides people with skillsthat help us to do just that.

ADDRESSING AS I SEE ITAS I SEE IT


• Supervision. When experiencelevels are low, people don’t thinkof all the potential hazards or thethings they can do to mitigate the effects of those hazards, andsupervision becomes an absolutelycritical barrier to accidents hap-pening. I believe that everyonewho supervises flying should takethe flying supervisors course thathas been running again inWinnipeg for the last couple of years (similar maintenancesupervisor training is being con-templated). When supervisors arealso relatively inexperienced, wemust provide them with the skillsto recognize the hazards implicitin the activity, the hazards associ-ated with the conditions of thepeople or equipment, as well ashazardous behaviours and atti-tudes, and to identify ways toreduce the risk. Any supervisorcan significantly decrease the riskby being another set of eyes tolook at the plan and anotherbrain to think it through, butonly if he or she takes the time togo through that with those aboutto undertake the mission or task.This is not about questioning theintegrity or professionalism ofthe crews involved, it’s aboutanother line of defence.

• Flight Discipline applies to anyflying related activity, not just flying. Why would disciplineimprove safety? Essentiallybecause exercising disciplinemeans taking only those risksthat need to be taken to get thejob done. It means that dangers,risks or hazards — things thatcould go wrong — are antici-pated and planned for. It means

that time is managed so thatthere is time to pay attention tothe information most likely tothreaten the success of what we’redoing. It means that we recognizein others and ourselves the atti-tudes and behaviours that couldprevent the safe conclusion of thetask. It also means that we makethe right decisions for the rightreasons. A very important featureof flight discipline is planning —both before and during the flightor flying related activity. It all hasto do with reducing the likeli-hood or uncertainty of some-thing happening which willimperil our task — and that’swhy real professionals focus on planning.

• Safety Culture. Attitudes, behav-iours, and expectations can affectindividual and group discipline,so it’s important to encourage anappropriate safety culture. Here,it’s important to remember thateveryone is a leader, because aleader is someone who influencesother people. Even when we areat the lowest point in the chain of command, we influence theattitudes of those around us andabove us by how we approach thethings we do. In other words, weall contribute to the culture ofour team, group or organization.A most important result of anappropriate culture is somethingcalled organizational alignment— this means that the behaviourof everyone within the organiza-tion is fully aligned with the stated policies and procedures.Everyone, at every level, recog-nizes the need for those rules,obeys them to the letter, makes it

clear by both statement andbehaviour that they support and obey them, and focuses on changing them when they’rewrong rather than skirting them.Only in this way will the cultureof the organization foster safeoperations.

Why should we pay so much atten-tion to safety when our accident ratedoes not seem to be that bad? Well,for a start, although it’s not bad byhistorical standards and relativelyfew accidents have, thankfully, beenfatal or catastrophic, the number ofaccidents was higher in 2001 than atany point in the last five years, andthe accident rate (number of acci-dents per 10,000 flying hours) is thehighest it’s been in almost 20 years.Accidents cost the Air Force morethan they ever have, so this trend is not a positive one. If you’re notyet convinced, the safety issues listedat the beginning of this article tendto have a delayed effect — it takesseveral years for them to have theirmost serious impact. If we want to avoid feeling that effect, we’re all going to have to concentrate on safety.

Finally, all the five measuresdescribed above have been provennot only to keep accidents fromhappening, but also to significantlyimprove operational effectiveness,so they offer a win-win approach —at least, as I see it. ◆

Colonel Ron HarderDirector Flight Safety

THE HAZARDS


The glider was being flown in support of theEastern Region Spring Familiarization Flying

Program at the St-Jean-sur-Richelieu Airport nearMontreal. The pilot was a member of a local AirCadet Squadron and was building time in order tobe qualified as a Familiarization Pilot.Immediatelyprior to the accident flight he had received acheck ride from a Glider Instructor and then hadproceeded on a solo flight. This flight was his fifth this season.

After a normal tow to 2500 feet above sea level(ASL) followed by some upper air work consistingof gentle and medium turns, the pilot joined a left downwind for the paved strip parallel to runway 29 at 1300 feet ASL. The elevation of the St-Jean airport is 136 feet ASL. Surface winds werereported by the St Jean Tower as 290° Magnetic at 20 Knots. He turned onto the base leg at 900 feet ASL and opened the spoilers to half.After turning final, he noted that he was low and closed the spoilers.

The left wing of the glider struck two treesapproximately 30 feet AGL. The first, smallerimpact at the wing tip initiated a slight flat turnto the left. The second, more severe impact atmid-wing caused the glider to pivot rapidly to theleft in a flat attitude. The glider turned 180° andthe tail raised as the glider was travelling back-wards at this point. The glider struck the ground1300 feet from the normal touchdown point onthe gliding site in approximately a 70° nose down,wings level attitude, about 75 feet upwind fromthe tree it originally struck. The wind, blowingfrom the bottom of the glider then pushed thefuselage past the vertical to a 45° inverted atti-tude when the wings came to rest against sometrees. The pilot unstrapped and egressed from the rear left window.

The investigation revealed that the accident wasmost likely caused by the pilot experiencing tasksaturation in the high winds and falling behindthe aircraft to the point that he did not alter hiscircuit enough to compensate for the winds andunnecessarily deployed the spoilers during thebase leg of the approach producing an excessivesink rate in the strong winds and preventing himfrom reaching the intended landing area. Also, thepilot’s self imposed pressure to land at the launchpoint, in order not to cause delays in the opera-tions of the site, probably led to “tunnel vision” or “task fixation” and prevented him from realiz-ing that he would not reach the airfield and didnot lead him to take alternative action.

It was therefore recommended that all RegionalCadet Air Operations Officers be made aware ofthe self-imposed pressure felt by some junior staffmembers. Site Commanders should continue tostress to their junior staff that they are notexpected to be able to consistently land the gliderat the launch point and that they have their fullsupport if landing long or off the airfield is thesafest course of action for the conditions. ◆

TYPE: Schweizer 2-33 Glider C-FEAF

LOCATION: St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, QC

DATE: 14 May 2000

EPILOGUE


On the morning of 26 July 2000, asolo Air Cadet undergoing private

pilot training under the Air Cadet flying scholarship program, departedSt-Jean PQ for Bromont PQ in a Cessna172M. The purposes of the flight wereto acquire more solo cross-country timein order to meet the 5 hours require-ment for the private pilot licence and to practicetouch and go landings away from the student'sbase at St-Jean, as that airport was also host tothe Air Cadet League's regional glider school andthe circuit was very busy.

The aircraft was established for a touch and gowith a slight crosswind from the left (45 degreesat 5 to 10 Kts). On touchdown, flaps were selectedup and full power was applied. The aircraft beganto move left, then right of the centre-line. Thestudent pilot elected to continue the take-off roll,went around the circuit and attempted anothertouch and go. Again, after touchdown, the air-craft moved left and right of the centre-line. The take-off roll was continued and a decisionwas made to carry out one more circuit to a touchand go, with the provision that if the aircraftexhibited the same tendency to cross the centre-line the student pilot would stop and phone hishome base in St-Jean to report the aircraft's directional problems to the flying school staff.

The investigation revealed that the accident wasmost likely caused by the student not adequatelycompensating for the crosswind and the enginetorque on take-off. This was most likely caused bya combination of inexperience and fatigue. Also,the student’s lack of experience, combined withhis overconfidence, led him to attempt to trouble-shoot a perceived mechanical problem at a criticalmoment in the flight. It was therefore recom-mended that All Regional Cadet Air OperationsOfficers ensure that the Officers supervising the

Cadets on flying scholarship maintain an environ-ment conducive to learning by more closely moni-toring their cadet’s rest and nutrition. They shouldalso keep a closer watch on the cadets perfor-mance and attitude. Any observation should beimmediately brought to the attention of theschool’s Chief Flying Instructor.

The investigation also revealed that the flyingschool owners were unaware of the requirementfor DFS to investigate this accident. Since the CadetFlying Scholarship is subsidized by DND, the aircraftare considered to be Military Conveyances and accidents are subject to DFS investigation underArticle 18 (3)(4) of the Canadian TransportationAccident Investigation and Safety Board Act. It wastherefore recommended that all Regional Cadet Air Operations Officers should ensure that theSupervising Officers of Flying Scholarship Cadetsare aware of the requirement to follow the articlesof the A-GA-135-001/AA001 in case of an accident.These officers should be made familiar with thepublication and should more closely liaise with the school Chief Flying Instructor on matters ofFlight Safety. ◆

EPILOGUE

TYPE: Cessna 172 C-GVWT

LOCATION: Bromont, Québec

DATE: 26 July 2000


During a maintenance ground run, the pilotstarted the number two engine without first

starting the number one engine and spreadingthe rotor blades. The pilot had briefed the three-person start crew of his intentions to deviate from the normal start procedure, and to do so single pilot.

In order to accomplish the briefed start procedure,the pilot used the 'emergency start' switch to override the 'safety interlocks', which are designedto ensure that the number two engine cannot bestarted without the rotor system spread and num-ber one engine running with the utility hydraulicsystem pressurized.

With the number two engine started, the pilotobserved the Ng (engine RPM) was fluctuating,and two members of the start crew joined thepilot in the aircraft. In an attempt to stabilize the fluctuations, the pilot elected to advance thenumber two Speed Selector Level (SSL). When the SSL was advanced to between 85-95 % Ng,the rotor head shifted causing damage to thefolded rotor blades, the tail rotor and the pylonstructure. During this action, a loud bang wasnoted in the cockpit and the pilot secured thenumber two engine.

With the blades folded, the only mechanicaldevice stopping the main rotor head from rotat-ing was the rotor brake. It is designed to hold thefolded head in a fixed position. The rotor brake’smaximum holding capacity is about 80 shafthorsepower. The output shaft horsepower of a normal operating Sea King engine is up to 1350 shaft horsepower. When the SSL wasadvanced from ground idle towards the normaloperating range (85-95 % Ng), the engine shafthorsepower exceeded the design holding capacityof the rotor brake resulting in the rotor headshifting and contacting the airframe. The rotationof the main rotor head in the folded positiondirectly caused the C category damage. Therewere no injuries sustained in this occurrence.

The AOI for the CH124 contains a 'Caution' aboutnot starting the number two engine without therotor system in the flight-spread position. Also,the ground crew voiced concerns to the pilotabout the proposed procedure; but they did notdo so emphatically, nor did they seek advice fromsuperiors. The pilot did not perceive the concernas an indication that his plan was ill advised, andproceeded to use the 'emergency start' switch tooverride a 'safety interlock' with the result beinga badly damaged aircraft.

The investigation concluded that the pilot hadcontravened the operating instructions by inten-tionally starting the number two engine whilethe blades were folded. His decision to advancethe throttle was a further error in judgement.

This was not the first time this pilot had demon-strated what could be called undisciplined behav-iour and squadron supervisors may not have beenas attuned as required to fully address the situa-tion. The absence of Human Performance inMaintenance (HPIM) training was also noted as contributory to the occurrence.

It has been recommended that all flying supervi-sors be equipped with the knowledge andresources required to detect undisciplined ten-dencies and behaviour, and to address them formally through a recognized process. It wassuggested that HPIM training be considered as mandatory training for all ground crew andthat a case history of this accident be included in Crew Resource Management (CRM) training, as a preventative measure. ◆

TYPE: CH-124A419 Sea King

LOCATION: Shearwater, NS

DATE: 4 May 1999

EPILOGUE


The aircraft was number five of a9-plane formation landing after

an on-field air show practice at 19 Wing Comox.During touchdown on runway 29, the aircraftexperienced a firm landing and the right-handmain landing gear and nose-gear collapsed.

The aircraft was kept on the runway and came toa stop without interfering with the rest of the for-mation. The pilot shut down the aircraft withoutfurther incident. There were no injuries.

The positions in the formation are depicted as follows:

As the formationtouched down, num-ber five overcorrectedfrom being slightlyhigh on number 4 andexperienced a firmlanding. The aircraftthen bounced andbecame airborne. The

aircraft then, being affected by the preceding air-crafts jet wash and down wash, quickly descendedtowards the ground, struck the runway surfaceagain and all three landing gears contacted therunway surface heavily. The right-hand main gearwas forced upwards through the top surface ofthe right wing and collapsed. The nose-gear alsopartially collapsed. The aircraft became airborneagain as the pilot attempted an overshoot, how-ever, the engine had been rendered non-func-tional, as it had ingested FOD from the damagednose gear. The aircraft was then settled backdown on the runway surface, slid along the runway on the right-hand smoke tank, left-handmain gear and partially collapsed nose-gear, and came to a stop. The pilot egressed from the aircraft with no injuries.

The investigation is now complete.

The damage sustained by aircraft #5 occurred dueto a hard landing after a bounced touch-downexacerbated by preceding aircraft jet wash anddown wash.

The inability to practice overshoots from thismanoeuvre and possible ambiguity on overshootoptions as well as a low level of experience duringthe “9” or “7” plane landing were potentially con-tributing factors in this accident.

Other peripheral issues with 431 (AD) Sqn such as;Team Lead duties; recent Team accident rates;internal pilot rotation and tour length, and generally lower CF pilot experience levels, were also highlighted.

The following safety actions have been taken orare recommended:

• A formal risk assessment was conducted assess-ing the viability of the “9” or “7” plane landingsfor 431 (AD) Sqn. This manoeuvre was subse-quently removed from the list of manoeuvresperformed by the Team.

• Any informal discussions and information, withrespect to multi-plane landings and overshoots,should be reassessed for accuracy and includedin both the SOPs and the computerized trainingpackage;

• The internal pilot rotation should be reassessedto confirm that its benefits outweigh its disadvantages;

• An independent assessment to determinewhether the highlighted peripheral issuesand/or other issues have negatively affected the likelihood of Snowbird accidents should be undertaken; and

• Action to reduce the Team Lead’s CommandingOfficer duties has been taken and should be monitored. ◆

EPILOGUE

1

3 2

49 8

67

5

TYPE: CT11142

LOCATION: Comox airport, British Columbia

DATE: 10 Apr 2001


On 10 October 2001 a civilian registered Bell 206 Jet Ranger (C-GBXK), operated by

408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron crashed whileattempting a practice extended range autorota-tion, to a prepared grass strip, at CFB Edmonton.

The aircraft initially touched down short of theprepared surface in a flat attitude, at approxi-mately 70 Knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). The aircraft then bounced approximately 50 feet in

TYPE: Bell 206 Jet Ranger

LOCATION: CFB Edmonton

DATE: 10 October 2001

FROM THE INVESTIGATOR

This was a solo pilot mission in a dual CF18 accident aircraft conducting an IFR cross-country

to Toronto. Shortly after take-off from runway 29at Bagotville, yellow, acrid smoke began to fill thecockpit. The landing gear and flaps were selectedup and although the gear indicators showed threewheels “up and locked”, the light remained on in the gear selection handle indicating the geardoors were not completely closed. The pilotselected the gear down while carrying out theemergency procedures for smoke in the cockpit.

While informing ATC and Squadron operations of the situation, several system advisories werenoted culminating in Bleed Air Closed (both leftand right) and failures of the right Digital DisplayIndicator (DDI) and the DDI on the centre console(with the horizontal situation indicator).

The aircraft, which had been manoeuvred into the left downwind pattern for runway 29, was in position for an approach end arrestor gearengagement for runway 36 and decision was made to engage the cable on runway 36. Duringthe engagement on runway 36, the arrestor gear failed damaging the aircraft’s right side; since the

TYPE: CF188906 Hornet

LOCATION: Bagotville QC

DATE: 31 July 2001

airspeed was still high, the pilot took off.Attempts to jettison the fuel tanks resulted in theright tank remaining on the aircraft. Eventually,the aircraft was successfully landed on runway 29(without the arrestor gear) and was taxied off theactive runway without further incident.

Analysis of the arrestor gear system tape hasrevealed that the failure was likely the result ofhigh aircraft engagement velocity rather thanweight. DFS has recommended that all CF18 pilotsbe made aware of the risk of arrestor gear failureat high (above 180 KIAS) engagement speeds.

The investigation is ongoing and is now focusedon the root causes of the multiple emergenciesshortly after take-off; initial indications point to ableed air problem. It will also refine the nature of the arrester gear failure. There were no injuriesbut the aircraft sustained C category damage. ◆

the air, rotated through 720 degrees and impactedthe ground 200 feet from the point of initialground contact. The pilots received minor injuriesand the aircraft sustained “A” category damage.

The accident is under investigation ◆

t was the afternoon before Christmas break,and all through the hangar,not a tool was stirring,and we had no mouse.Then, the Sergeant came in, all haggard,saying, hey you…054 must be run before she is housed.

In a hurry,we borrowed a truck;And off to the buttswe quickly unloaded the trim testerand did our hook up.

As it was, a light snow was falling, and,like a clod,A quick brush with my foot,found no FOD.Fired up the engines and completed the run;back to the barn to join in the festive fun.

Early New Year, first day back,the run of last year long forgotten.I found what I thought to be a Good Show,of this I was certain.

But, clean through a compressor blade, a hole;my glory short-lived, I would not reach my goal.The quick brush of my foot to clear the snow,that miserable broken punch it did not show.

For it had fallen from the bed of the truck,And, instead of good sense,I had relied on luck.

Lou Vautour

Good Sense vs.Good Luck


I

CANADIAN FORCES SCHOOL OF SURVIVAL AND AEROMEDICAL TRAINING

SCHOOLNOTES


The “bends” is a term that conjuresup a physiological condition

that you vaguely remember hearingon your basic or recertificationAeromedical training. You are prob-ably saying “I think there is a pagein our emergency checklist for this.”But, what does having the bends or,more appropriately decompressionsickness (DCS), actually mean?What are the possible consequencesand, most importantly, what has tobe done if someone is the victim ofdecompression sickness. Althoughthere have been very few in-flightincidents in recent years, the possi-bility still does exist. Because ofthis possibility, an overview of DCS,its causes, symptoms, risk factors,and emergency procedures will be reviewed.

DCS is the physiological action ofdissolved nitrogen being releasedfrom our internal tissues in responseto Henry’s Law (the mass of gasabsorbed by a liquid or tissue isdirectly proportional to the partialpressure of that gas above the liquidor tissue) as we ascend to altitude.When we ascend, the atmosphericpressure decreases, and thisdecrease will in turn cause the par-tial pressures of all the gases presentto become lower, one of which isnitrogen. A helpful illustration is tothink of a pop bottle. The liquid ina soft drink is capped under pres-sure, when the cap is removed theinternal pressure equalizes with the atmosphere causing a release of gas in the form of bubbles.

As an ascent is made a quantity of nitrogen in the tissues diffusesinto the blood, to the lungs and isremoved through normal breathing.However, this diffusion is not thesame for all body tissues. An exam-ple of diffusion differences is fatversus lean muscle, with lean mus-cle diffusing nitrogen faster than fat tissue. If the nitrogen is not adequately removed, the tissuebecomes supersaturated. Under certain circumstances, this supersaturation may give rise to the for-mation of bubbles. Once a bubble is formed, it will grow in size as thealtitude is increased (Boyle’s Law).The good news is that there is acritical super saturation level thatthe body can tolerate without caus-ing nitrogen to come out of tissuesto form the bubbles. This altitudehas been estimated to be 18,000feet. This level may be lower ifthere are underlying factors such as diving prior to flying.

If a bubble is formed in the body,it may remain in one area or it may travel via the blood stream toanother location where it will mani-fest itself in the clinical symptomsof DCS. The most common form ofDCS in flying is the “bends;” a con-dition where the bubble is locatedin a limb joint or a major muscle.With the “chokes” a bubble hasoccurred in the lungs, and althoughconsidered a serious form of DCS,it is relatively rare. If a bubble’s final resting place is under the skin it is known as the “creeps” or

“skin disturbances.” This form isconsidered minor and rarely pro-gresses to the more serious forms.The most serious form of DCS is“central nervous system disorders”(CNS). The bubble in this case islocated in the brain or spinal cord.

The symptoms that one may havewill largely depend on the type ofDCS contracted. Symptoms of the“bends” include pain, numbness,tingling and a gravelly sensation inor around the joint. Pain is usuallythe most common symptom andcan range from mild to severe.Other symptoms may or may notbe present. The “chokes” will usuallygive the person a sense of constric-tion around the lower chest and adry persistent cough, especially ifyou take a deep breath. The “creeps”will give you the sensation of bugscrawling on the skin, rash and/orredness in the affected area. A CNS“hit” can give you a variety ofsymptoms depending on exactlywhere the bubble is located. Someof the more common symptomsinclude visual problems, orientationproblems, numbness and/or tin-gling in an extremity, paralysis ofa limb(s), speech problems, andheadaches. Again, it must bestressed that not all the symptomswill be present or other symptomsnot described above may be involved.

Now that we know what DCS is andsome of the symptoms, we will lookat some of the risk factors that canaffect our susceptibility to DCS.

Decompression Sickness


initiated DCS is small, thepotential for such occur-

rences remains a healthconcern.” Other

personal factors such as individual tolerance,dehydration, exercise,age, body build,previous injury to a joint/limb mayincrease risk to DCS.Another factor is thefrequency of expo-sure; reports indicatethat individuals who

work in the hypobaricchamber environment

and undergo two to fouraltitude exposures per

week have a three-foldincrease in susceptibility to

DCS as compared to students(“Fundamentals of AerospaceMedicine,” 2nd Edition, pg 138).

Prevention of DCS is very important.In-flight this can be accomplished byensuring as low an altitude as possi-ble, which is achieved automaticallyby pressurizing the aircraft. Limitingthe time at altitude is an importantconsideration should a decompres-sion occur. Descent to a “safe”altitude should be done as soon as possible. Another strategy toreduce the possibility of DCS is pre-oxygenation or denitrogenation.This entails breathing 100% oxygenfor at least 30 minutes prior to anascent to altitude. Pre-breathingenhances nitrogen elimination and“is the main protective measureagainst altitude DCS” (B. Stegmann,A.A. Pilmanis — “Prebreathing As AMeans To Decrease The Incidence OfDecompression Sickness At Altitude;”1991). However “even appropriateschedules (prebreathe) do not totallyeliminate altitude DCS hazard” (B.J.Stegmann, “Prebreathing Theory,”Krug Life Sciences). Although pre-breathing is impractical in current

flying operations, it is done forhypobaric chamber flights above18,000 feet.

So, what should you do if you sus-pect you have DCS during flight?The first and foremost thing youshould do is to get on 100% oxygen; this starts the treatmentprocess and you should stay on100% oxygen until a Flight Surgeonor other competent authority (i.e. civilian doctor) says otherwise.A descent to a lower altitude andlanding should be made as soon as possible. One thing to remember is that when a descent is initiated,the symptom(s) may disappear ordecrease in intensity because ofbubble shrinkage. Once on theground, you should be examined by a Flight Surgeon to determine if further treatment is required.

Prior to 1959, there were eighteendeaths attributed to altitude DCS(“Fundamentals of AerospaceMedicine,” 2nd Edition, pg 132).The last reported death was a U.S. aviator in 1988 (“FatalPulmonary DecompressionSickness: a case report;” AviationSpace Environmental Medicine1988;59:1181-4). In light of theseand other reports, DCS is a condi-tion that aircrew should take seriously because there can be long-term effects.

This article has reviewed the condi-tion of DCS, its cause, symptoms,risk factors, prevention and treat-ment. Even with the preventativemeasures of prebreathing and pres-surized aircraft DCS, albeit rare,still can and does occur. If you arefaced with this situation, it has to betreated as a physiological emergencyand you have to seek medical referralas soon as possible. ◆

MCpl Keith LamotheCFSSAT Winnipeg

The biggest factor is altitude, thehigher the altitude, the greater therisk. 18,000 feet has been the“accepted” safe altitude, with DCSbeing a rare occurrence up to about25,000 feet. Secondly, in associationwith altitude, is the time spent ataltitude. The longer you stay, thegreater your risk of developing DCS as any bubbles present willgradually increase in size with time,with maximum occurrence between20 to 60 minutes. A subsequentexposure to altitude greater than18,000 feet within three hours willdefinitely increase possibility ofDCS even if the first exposure (above18,000 feet) was asymptomatic. If aperson had symptoms on the firstexposure, they will almost certainlyhave recurrence on the secondexposure. In the Aerospace MedicalAssociation Journal (November1990 Vol 61, No 11 pg 1028), areport by the USAF Department of Hyperbaric Medicine concluded,“although the number of caseswhere sequential chamber and aircraft hypobaric exposures has


Here I was in Moose Jaw in the late1980’s where I was put on “H”

flight (Holdover flight) after wingsgraduation waiting for a posting to my Operational Training Unit (OTU).It was a beautiful sunny day and I wastasked to fly down to London, Ontariofor a mobile repair party (MRP).I departed Moose Jaw late that after-noon, taking along a technician andan aircraft part for the broken aircraft.

After witnessing a magnificent sunset,I was starting my descent intoLondon, where I had never beenbefore. The weather was clear and thewind was favouring runway 33. As Iwas approaching the airport from thenorthwest, I was cleared to 6000 feetand asked to report the field in sight.Being unfamiliar with the airfield andits surroundings, and having limitednight-flying experience, I had diffi-culty visually locating the airport.In order to help me out, Air TrafficControl (ATC) gave me radar vectorswhile pointing out the airport positionand repeatedly asked me to advisewhen I had the field in sight. Atapproximately ten miles back from therunway on a 45˚ intercept to the finalapproach course and still at 6000 feet,I could now positively identify the air-port. I immediately advised the con-troller who cleared me to the airport

for the straight-in visual approachfor runway 33 and handed me overto tower for landing clearance. WhileI was switching the radio to thetower frequency, I started to config-ure the airplane for landing and Iinitiated a steep descent. As I wasdescending through 3000 feet, thetower controller directed me to leveloff and overshoot straight ahead tojoin a right-hand circuit for the run-way, stating that there was a Cessna172 on final approach below me!

I proceeded as directed and joinedthe circuit. When I called “down-wind” I was informed that I wasnumber two behind a Navajo onbase leg. I started slowing down toensure proper spacing in order toland behind the traffic that, unex-pectedly after landing, kept rollingdown to the end of the runway.I was now on a very short finalapproach, without landing clearance,still hoping that the Navajo wouldclear the runway, when the towertold me to do a 360˚ to the right andto keep it tight as there was a DC-9on final. At this point I was no morethan 100 feet above the ground and,not without hesitation, I initiated aclimbing right turn. I thought aboutraising the gear and flaps but I wasconfused; things just didn’t look

right. I gained a few hundred feet,rolled out momentarily on downwindand then started a descending turntowards the runway. I was feeling veryuncomfortable; I was low and slow ina 30˚ bank turn. Tower now clearedme to land but I had to increase thebank in order to line up with the runway and then, suddenly, I got thestick “shaker.” Thanks to my flyingtraining, I recovered promptly,without incident.

I felt privileged to have learned earlyin my flying career that, ultimately, thesafe operation of an aircraft rests withthe pilot. Up to that point, my miscon-ception led me to believe that, just asthe young military officer does with-out question what he is told to do,so does the pilot.

So, if you, as the person responsiblefor the safe completion of your mis-sion, are ever in doubt or feel uncom-fortable with an ATC clearance ordirection, don’t hesitate to requestsomething you know is more appro-priate. In most cases, sticking to thestandard operating procedures (SOP’s)will keep you out of trouble. And, bythe way, if you are landing at night atan unfamiliar aerodrome…be wiseand take the IFR approach. ◆

Captain Lessard

BE WISE AND TAKE THE IFR APPROACH


The time frame was around mid-October and we were embarked

on a Frigate for an exercise withSNFL (Standing Naval ForceAtlantic). It was night and the fleethad divided for an encounter exer-cise. Our mission was to launch andlocate the other half of the fleet.In order to stay hidden, our half ofthe fleet was EMCON (emissionscontrol) silent. We were to launch“ZIPLIP” (silent) and proceed atleast 20 nautical miles from the ship before using our radar.

The weather brief took place ontime. The weather was forecast tobe generally VFR with a smallchance of isolated TCU/CB activity.We asked the meteorological tech ifthere were currently any TCU/CBcells in the area, but he was unsureas the ship was EMCON silent andhe could not use the radar. The SAC(Ship Aircraft controller) thenbriefed our mission and added that

two helicopters were already air-borne. We really wanted to see a radar picture to check on CBactivity, but other helicopters wereflying and we could just avoid any “isolated” CB activity; right?

We completed our brief and pro-ceeded to launch on time. We hadjust left the well-lit environment ofthe flight deck and continued intothe black void. We completed ourinstrument departure and contin-ued to turn eastward to start ourmission. Our night vision was notyet developed as we flew into apocket of light hail. We quicklyturned 180° and flew out of thehail. Even though we were only tenmiles from the ship, we decided toflash our radar to have a look andto stay clear of the cell that we hadjust flown under.

To our surprise, the AESOP(Airborne Electronic Sensor

Operator) reported that there werebig cells in all quadrants, includingone between our ship and us! Atthis point, we attempted to contactour ship and pick our way throughthe cells to make an immediaterecovery. To make a bad situationworse, the cells started releasingcloud-to-cloud lightning. The light-ning was close enough to cause static in our inter-com system,and ruined whatever night visionwe had built up to that point.

After several attempts to contact theship, they finally answered and wepicked our way through the cellsand recovered without incident. Itwas an interesting mission, and wewere anxious to show SNFL why wewere the best. The “can do” attitudeled to our decision to take off withincomplete weather informationand put us into a bad situation. ◆

Captain Keddy

I LEARNEDABOUT FLYING FROM THAT


At the time of this story, I wasacting as the fourth crewmem-

ber on a three-pilot crew on a CP-140 Aurora. The flight wasmeant to be a local training flight,however, we had been tasked to flyinto Summerside, P.E.I. to pick up a passenger. I was new to the crew,having completed my training on type only a few weeks before.Normally, such trips would beplanned entirely under InstrumentFlight Rules (IFR), but sinceSummerside only had NDB andGPS approaches, both of which theAurora is not authorized or equippedto conduct, approach and departurein Summerside had to be conductedunder Visual Flight Rules (VFR).Weather there was near the mini-mum for a VFR flight, but we wereconfident that conditions would notdeteriorate before the completion of our flight.

We departed and flew our first legIFR to Charlottetown without inci-dent. After that, we continued VFRfor our trip into Summerside. As

expected, ceiling and visibility werelow but within limits for VFR flight.Having completed my duties as thefourth crewmember, I proceededonto the fight deck with a map to assist in navigation. Upon ourarrival, the flying pilot, who Iassumed had been to Summersidebefore, chose to join the circuit on aright base. This profile would allowus to land and pick up our passen-ger with minimum delay. When wewere about two miles back on finalapproach and configured for land-ing, I proceeded to my seat. On myway, I noticed something movingon the runway. I took a few secondsto analyze what I was looking atand soon realized that it was a largeflock of seagulls that had just takenoff from our intended runway.At this point, neither the flying nor non-flying pilot had seen orsuspected anything, so I immedi-ately brought it to their attention.After a few seconds of searching,they confirmed my sighting andconducted an overshoot. We esti-mated the number of birds to havebeen a few hundred to a thousand.

Following the overshoot, we con-tacted Air Traffic Control (ATC) to let them know our problem and

asked if they could send someoneout to disperse the birds. Our pas-senger was the only person presenton the airport but he managed toget a vehicle and fulfill our request.Although the birds were still in thevicinity, we managed to land andget our passenger without incident.Upon our return to Greenwood, wefiled a CF-218 Bird Strike Report.Other crews were made aware ofthe bird problem in Summersidethrough our story and, to myknowledge, no other crew has experienced any problems theresince our encounter.

I believe the main lesson to belearned here is that everyone on an aircraft, including non-flyingpersonnel, are responsible to help ensure aircraft safety. In thisinstance, I was able to advise thepilot of an upcoming hazard thatwas easily avoided nice and early in the approach. If the flock hadnot been identified as early as itwas, a near miss or a bird strikecould have occurred. In addition,reporting this event through theFlight Safety system made this hazard known to other aviators,thus minimizing the potential forincidents or accidents. ◆

Captain Kenny

AIRCRAFT SAFETY IS EVERYONE’S

RESPONSIBILITY

AIRCRAFT SAFETY IS EVERYONE’S

RESPONSIBILITY


The white paint of the Slingsbyaircraft gleamed in the mid-

afternoon sun, accented by its redand black stripes. I studied its linesas I walked up to it. Certainly, it was a lot different then the C-152’sI had flown just after high school.If definitely looked a great dealsportier. It was the first week of myflight training, and I was lookingforward to getting into the airplanefor this, my third, training flight.

I began my walk-around. This was only the first time I was doing it without the eye of my flightinstructor watching me, and I triedto be as meticulous as possible.Nevertheless, I found myselfincreasing my pace as I went

through, anxious to get in the airand take advantage of the beautiful,spring day. After checking the oillevels, I bent to examine the frontnose gear and, suddenly, a smallalarm went off in my head. Theoleo and linkages were wet and afew drops were on the ground atthe base of the gear. I traced theleak back up over the gear andfound it dripping from inside theengine cowling. Maybe it was justwater condensation beading on thecold metal. I bent and took a whiffand was rewarded with the strongsmell of aviation gas.

A technician was walking down theline in the opposite direction and Icalled him over. He looked at the

ANXIOUS, BUT STILLMETICULOUS

oleo, clucked and proceeded to pullthe cowling off the front of the air-plane. “Yup,” he said, “that’s fuelalright. Looks like the seal to thefuel filter is leaking. Good thing youcaught it. There could have been aground fire when you started it up.”

Walking back to the operations desk to sign out another aircraft,I vowed that I would always take the time to be as thorough andmeticulous as possible, regardless of my excitement level. ◆

Lieutenant Rutley

ANXIOUS, BUT STILLMETICULOUS

…anxious to get in the

air and take advantage

of the beautiful,

spring day.


It was just another one of thosehot Moose Jaw days; it was the

type of day where you could thinkof a million other things you couldbe doing. I was a newly promotedcorporal with around three yearsunder my belt in this unit. MooseJaw was one of the busiest basesthen, owning approximately 100aircraft. Flying started at around six in the morning and could carryover into the early part of the nextmorning if night flying was sched-uled. Everyday around 1830 thesound of silence would finally blan-ket the flight line after twelve hoursof constant flying. That particularevening, there was a lot of excite-ment in the air as it was the start of a three-day weekend. Amongstother tasks assigned to me thatnight, one was to change the twooxygen regulators on aircraft #162as they were time expired. Beingabout a one-hour job pending noproblems, I prepared the paperwork, grabbed my tools, andheaded out to the aircraft.

When I strolled out on the flight line, I spotted four of myfriends standing around an air-craft so I joined them to discussthe weekend plans. After planswere made, I jumped into that

aircraft and proceeded to removethe regulators. Removing andinstalling regulators was not a braindrain job, but the trick was not todrop the two very small nuts, whichretained the electrical lugs, behindthe dash. The job went easy and,just as I was completing it, I couldsee the Master Corporal comingover to do the independent check.With the independent check com-pleted, we replaced the shroud cov-ering the dash and chattered ourway back to the servicing desk. Onthe way in, I turned to the aircraftto confirm everything was closedup for the evening when I had thisgut feeling something was not right.I shrugged off the feeling and wecleared all the entries pertaining tothe job. Everything was done so wewere sweeping up and preparing to

go out for the evening. Still, some-thing was bothering me and I hadto figure it out. I headed out to theflight line for one last look. I walkedover to aircraft #162 and jumped infor a second look, and there it wasstaring right at me. When I hadgone out to change the regulatorsearlier, I remembered walking up to talk to some of my friends, thenclimbing into the aircraft. Well, theaircraft they were standing by wastail number #114, not #162, whichwas the next aircraft and the one Iintended to work on. So, by beingdistracted, I changed the regulatorsin the wrong aircraft.

What happened that evening waseasy to figure out, but much easierto go undetected. Talking to myfriends took my mind off the joband allowed me to jump into the wrong aircraft. The MasterCorporal doing the independentcheck followed right into my tracksassuming that I was in the right air-craft. What was learned from thisincident was very straightforward;it was a huge lack of attention onmy part and on the part of mysupervisor. From now on I save discussing my weekend plans untilafter my shift is complete. ◆

Discussing Weekend Plans


Do I Hate Greenwood That Much?

Iwas going to fly from Greenwoodto Bagotville in VFR conditions.

I had about 70 hours on the CT-133.It was getting dark and Greenwoodairport was having electrical prob-lems at the time, therefore therewere no runway lights. I was push-ing it because I didn’t want to stayovernight in Greenwood. I took offsolo with a full load of fuel andwhen I raised the gear, one maingear stayed down. I executed whatwas listed in the yellow pages toraise the gear, but without success.I wouldn’t have enough fuel to goto Bagotville with gear down, and I couldn’t come back to Greenwoodbecause it was going to be completedark after I burned enough fuel tobe able to land. It was quite a stress-ful experience flying at night withmany maps flying around in thecockpit, trying to find a place whereI could land. I chose to go toShearwater, but it was closed.Halfway to Shearwater, I had to

change my destination to Halifax.As I was getting closer to Halifax,Greenwood tower called me onguard frequency. They wanted toadvise me that the lights on therunway in Greenwood were backonline. I came back to Greenwoodwithout an incident. With my levelof experience at the time, it was

stupid to take off in those condi-tions. I was lucky that I was inVMC conditions. I still ended upsleeping in Greenwood, but I placedmyself in a potentially dangeroussituation because I was anxious tocome back home. ◆

Captain Gagnon

I was pushing it because

I didn’t want to stay

overnight in Greenwood.


Do you have any ideas for future articles? Do not hesitate to send them to DFS for submission, careof Sgt Anne Gale, DFS 2-5-4, via e-mail (Intranet or Internet at [email protected]) or regular mail.

Prior to takeoff, the T-33 aircraftcommander (AC) completed

an external inspection and foundeverything satisfactory. In flight, thesecond pilot proceeded to performcertain instrument exercises. Whilethe latter was under the hooddoing a standard jet letdown,an unusual vibration in therudders was felt at about7000 feet. A visual checkrevealed nothing wrong,but the AC wisely proceededdirectly to base. An inspection onthe ground revealed that the upperaccess door to the port engine hadbeen torn and twisted back for adistance of approximatelyfour feet. The accessdoor is directlybehind the cockpitso the damage was not visible in the air.

Can you guesswhen this incidentwas written up? Ifyou said last month,you were a bit off. Thisincident was published inthe 1955 October issue of“Flight Comment.” Can you guessthe year of the following incident?

the yaw with the rudder, performed acontrollability check and returned forlanding. Upon landing, the door wasinspected and no damages were found.

If you said 1955, you were wrong.Sorry! This one was entered in theFlight Safety Information System on November 21, 2001.

As you can see, both incidents are almost identical; they bothoccurred on a CT-133 (maybeeven the same tail number), withthe same door left unsecured and

missed on the before-flight (“B”)check. However, I’m fairly certain

that it wasn’t the same technicians orpilots that were involved in the inci-dents. Well, or so I think..…

This little trip down memorylane illustrates very well the

old saying that there areno new errors, just newpeople making the sameold mistakes. That cycleseems to be unbreakablebut, maybe by givingour undivided attention

to the task at hand,we can break that cycle.

Maybe, one day, that old saying will be a fallacy touted

only by old people! ◆

Sergeant Gale

DFS 2-5-4

MAINTAINER’SCORNER

WHAT IS OLD IS NEW AGAIN, AND AGAIN, AND AGAIN …

Loose Panels Can Be Deadly

The aircraft experienced uncommandedyaw on departure. The pilot of the second aircraft confirmed that the incident aircraft’s port upper plenumdoor was open. The pilot neutralized

GOOD SHOW


On the evening of 7 March2001, Corporal Drake was dispatched to complete anafter-flight (“A”) check onHercules aircraft #130306.While attempting to start theground power unit that wasconnected to the aircraft, heheard loud humming andcracking sounds. These noises,

along with a burning smell, made him realize thatthe starter was not engaging. He immediately wentfor assistance and requested that the firefighters benotified. Upon return to the aircraft, it was evident

On the morning of 20 June1999, Private Arsenault, alongwith another maintainer, wasdispatched to park Hercules aircraft #317. When the aircraftwas parked and the engineswere completely shutdown, thetechnicians smelled the unmis-takable odour of hot brakes. Asthey approached the aircraft to

install chocks, they noticed the right-hand rearbrake smoking profusely. Upon closer inspection,they noticed that the brake was on fire. Wasting

PRIVATE ERIC ARSENAULT

CORPORAL AL DRAKE

no time, Private Arsenault retrieved the fire extin-guisher from the ground power unit. Though thefire was rapidly spreading, he confidently fought thefire until it was completely extinguished. The othermaintainer notified the Wing Fire Department.

Private Arsenault’s alertness and quick response withdecisive actions were instrumental in preventing further damage to the aircraft. The implications of a rapidly spreading brake fire are potentially catastrophic. Although, at the time, he was not anexperienced technician, Private Arsenault was ableto readily determine the correct action and react ina bold and daring manner. Private Arsenault is to becommended for the professionalism and dedicationhe displayed. ◆

VAMPIRE 3 CREW problem and determined that the best course ofaction would be to reduce the power on the affectedengine to idle and feather the propeller.

After approximately ten minutes in this configurationthe engine, without warning, flamed out. The crewmade multiple attempts to contact various agenciesvia HF and VHF, but due to their remote location andhigh solar activity, radio contact was unsuccessful. The crew decided to continue to Alexandra Fiord. The temperatures in the area were consideredextreme even for the region. Overnight lows were in the range of -40C to -48C, and daytime highs were reaching only -35C. After circling overhead forapproximately twenty minutes, the crew determinedthat their best option was to land at Alexandra Fiord.

They executed a successful single engine ski landing,on sea ice, without further incident. Of note, sea icelandings are deemed to be the most challenging ofski landings. To be able to perform such a feat on asingle engine required exceptional crew co-ordinationand skill. Captain Crouch, Captain Lord, and MasterCorporal Pierce displayed textbook Crew ResourceManagement (CRM) in a very high stress environ-ment. It was their ability to remain focused underextreme conditions that helped prevent a tragedy. ◆

that the power unit had caught fire while still connectedto the aircraft. Wasting no time, Corporal Drake imme-diately towed the burning power unit to a safe distanceaway from the aircraft and proceeded to fight the fire.Although the fire was rapidly spreading, he confidentlyfought the fire until it was completely extinguished.

Corporal Drake’s alertness, quick response and decisiveactions were instrumental in preventing further dam-age to the ground power unit. His quick thinking also prevented the spreading of fire near an aircraft.Both situations were potentially catastrophic. CorporalDrake was able to readily determine the correct courseof action and react in a bold and daring manner. He is commended for his professionalism and for the dedication he displayed. ◆

CAPTAIN GAVIN CROUCHCAPTAIN FRED LORDMASTER CORPORAL ABALSOM PIERCE

On April 6th, 2001, the Vampire 3 crew was conducting an enhanced sovereignty patrol at an abandoned RCMP outpost at Alexandra Fiord onEllsemere Island with a ski-equipped Twin Otter aircraft #138803. While over open water at 1000’ AGL, enroute between Grise Fiord and theAlexandra Fiord Base Camp site, the aircraft’s rightengine torque began to fluctuate. Captain Lord was in the left seat at the time and immediately initiated a climb. Captain Crouch, the AircraftCommander (AC), was in the right seat at the timeof the malfunction. He and the Flight Engineer (FE),Master Corporal Pierce, began troubleshooting the


CORPORAL ROBIN WILLIAMS

On 16 September2000, CorporalWilliams was carry-ing out his post-startwalk-around as theFlight Engineer onRescue 416 duringSAR HESSE. Thoughbarely discernible,after the secondengine start henoticed a smallamount of oil on the left side of theGriffon helicopter,just forward of the

oil cooler. To be more precise, the oil was locatedin the rearmost area, inside the door track on theleft side of the aircraft. The detection of this leak is the direct result of the high level of vigilanceroutinely employed by Corporal Williams.

FOR PROFESSIONALISM

He investigated further by opening an additionalpanel not normally checked on the post-start walk-around, where he discovered the excessive oil leak.He returned to the front of the helicopter and signaled the pilot to shut down. Corporal Williamsascertained that the oil leak was from the combin-ing (C) box rigid oil line that leads from the C-boxto the oil cooler. The line had worn through, caus-ing it to rupture. While no test data is available, it is strongly believed that loss of C-box oil pressuremay result in the seizure of the main and tail rotorswithin seconds. The crew’s flight profile for thismission was an initial climb to 10,000 feet; if thisleak had gone undetected, the results may verywell have been catastrophic.

Despite the fact that Corporal Williams had spentextensive hours searching for a missing plane andit’s pilot in rugged terrain during the last five days,he remained totally focused on the task at hand.His professionalism, attention to detail, and dedica-tion to duty quite likely prevented the loss of thishelicopter and crew. ◆

CORPORAL VAL GREENWOOD

As a member of a Dash-8 enginechange crew,Corporal Greenwoodwas tasked withacquiring new nutsfor the engine fronttop mounts. Duringinitial withdrawalfrom supply, shereceived two pack-ages of nuts thatwere different butidentified with thesame part number.

Upon query, supply verified that the nuts had beenreceived with the proper part numbers. Thisheightened Corporal Greenwood’s suspicions.

She contacted the Life Cycle Material Manager(LCMM) who subsequently determined that one ofthe packages was entirely incorrect. The investiga-tion found that the supplier had procured the nutsfrom two separate civilian sources over a period of time, indicating that the wrong nuts had beenissued and in use for years. Corporal Greenwoodimmediately removed the remaining stock ofincorrect nuts from supply.

A fleet-wide special investigation was initiated andit revealed that a large percentage of the fleethad incorrect nuts installed. Corporal Greenwood’ssteadfast professionalism and persistence in thismatter averted a very serious and potentially catastrophic failure of the engine mounting system on Dash-8 aircraft. ◆


FOR PROFESSIONALISM

PRIVATE MATT WALLACE

On 25 October 2000,Private Wallace was conducting aDaily Inspection on a CF-18 aircraft#188913. He noticedan O-ring protrud-ing from the cabindefog diverter valvein the nose-wheelarea. Upon furtherinvestigation, henoticed a clampmissing from thesame area. He

immediately informed his supervisors and initiateda flight safety report; the aircraft was quarantined.Although this area requires a daily visual inspec-tion, it does not call for this specific item to beinspected. Had this situation gone unnoticed, itcould have resulted in the loss of cabin pressure.This had the potential for causing an in-flightemergency and the subsequent loss of valuableresources.

Private Wallace’s diligence and attention to detailresulted in the discovery of a serious unserviceability.He is to be commended for his outstanding profes-sionalism, alertness, and dedication. ◆

MASTER CORPORAL PAUL NOLAN

CORPORAL BARRY HILDT

CORPORAL PIERRE RIOUX

On 31 December 2000, the aircraft pressurizationsystem on Hercules CC130339 malfunctioned, producing an excessive rate of change in thecabin altitude. Unfortunately, this caused injury to a crewmember and to a passenger. This aircrafthad suffered similar occurrences in the previousthree months and had undergone many repairs to rectify the previous problems.

After the latest incident, Master Corporal Nolan,Corporal Hildt, and Corporal Rioux were assignedthe task of repairing CC130339. In the course oftheir duties, the members attempted obvioussolutions but were not satisfied with the results. It was only after intensive and time-consuminginvestigation into the bowels of the aircraft systems that they were able to discover a looseportion of the atmospheric line. This line providesrequired input into the pressurization system inorder for its dual modes to function properly.

Master Corporal Nolan and Corporal’s Hildt andRioux not only displayed professionalism, theyalso showed tenacity and dedication to theirwork. Without their trouble-shooting, the problem would have likely continued to go undetected. ◆


SERGEANT GERRY GALWAY

On 19 April 2001, during a routine consultation ofthe Canada Flight Supplement (GPH 205), SergeantGalway found that the page he required was miss-ing. He initially suspected that a single copy of this book had been damaged, but realizing thevital importance of accurate Flight InformationPublications (FLIPs), he immediately proceededwith a page check of the remaining copies held atthe Flight Planning Center. Upon further investiga-tion, he discovered that six of his eight books had59 pages missing and/or large groups of pages outof sequence.

Considering that these FLIPs are carried aboard all14 Wing aircraft, some of which were deployedoverseas, Sergeant Galway immediately alerted the Wing Instrument Check Pilot while continuinghis investigation. Within an hour, the problem wasclearly identified. A temporary preventive measure(page check directive) and a partial solution (use of the GPH 205-S, which was found error-free)were immediately implemented. The rest of the Air Force was urgently warned via the Flight Safety

FOR PROFESSIONALISM

system, the InstrumentCheck Pilot network,and aeronautical service personnel at NDHQ. Correctedbooks were eventuallyreprinted to replacethe spoiled batch.

This was the first timethese errors werenoticed since thefaulty series of publi-cations was issued on 22 March 01. An important flightplanning document,

the GPH 205 is often consulted in flight to gainessential information on communication, naviga-tion, and flight services. Thanks to SergeantGalway’s vigilance and professional approach to his duties, a potentially serious occurrence wasalmost certainly avoided. ◆

MR. SAM SULAK

On 22 February 2001, Mr. Sam Sulak, an AircraftMaintenance Engineer Apprentice, with theRegional Cadet Air Operations (Pacific) was con-ducting part of a 100-hour inspection on an L-19Cessna tow plane, CF-TGF. He discovered what hebelieved to be was a cylinder-head crack. Hebrought this to the attention of his supervisor, and it was subsequently determined through Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) that the cylinder

head was indeed cracked. The cylinder head waschanged and the aircraft was returned to service.

On 02 March 2001, Mr. Sulak was again conduct-ing an aircraft inspection when he thought he discovered another crack on aircraft CF-TGA. This time the crack was discovered on the engine-mount. It was in a very difficult position to detectclearly and could really only be viewed properlywith a mirror and a flashlight. The mount wasremoved and X-rayed and was found to becracked. Had this engine-mount crack gone unde-tected, the failure of the mount in the air couldhave led to severe vibrations and a very serious in-flight emergency. The mount was sent for repair and a new engine-mount was installed on the L-19.

Mr. Sulak, still working under supervision as anapprentice, has already demonstrated his profes-sionalism and dedication to the Cadet organiza-tion. He is to be commended for his attention to detail and keen powers of observation indetecting these two cracks. ◆


FOR PROFESSIONALISM

WARRANT OFFICER DAN DANIELS

On 18 May 2001,Warrant OfficerDaniels, a FlightEngineer on the CC-130 Hercules at424 Transport andRescue Squadron, was completing hispre-flight inspectionof Hercules #130306when he discoveredwhat appeared to bea bolt on the aileronboost quadrant cableguide installed incor-rectly. This assembly

had seven bolts installed facing aft and one boltfacing forward. Warrant Officer Daniels took thetime to call the technicians to confirm this was notthe correct installation.

The technicians confirmed that the bolt facing for-ward was indeed installed incorrectly. Further, thepublication covering the installation of these boltsstates, “Failure to ensure that the threaded endsof the cable clamp bolts are installed pointing aftmay result in an aileron jam.”

Warrant Officer Daniels went above and beyondthe normal pre-flight requirements and took the time to inspect the aileron boost quadrantcable guide. His attention to the smallest of details prevented a potential accident or serious incident. ◆

MASTER CORPORAL DOUG CARLYLE

On 12 March 2001, the maintenance crew chargedwith re-installing the No. 1 power section inGriffon aircraft #146494 had noticed some dam-age to the fire detection wires for the accessorygear-box (AGB.) Master Corporal Carlyle wasasked to confirm that the wires did, in fact, needreplacing. After thoroughly checking the wires, heperformed a quick visual inspection of the entirearea. As he was briefing the installation crew onhow difficult and tight the engine fit was, hethen noticed a few scratches and a dent on thefront firewall, for which he called an AircraftStructures (ACS) Technician to inspect prior to proceeding with the engine installation.

He continued with his inspection and noticed aglossy shine inside the customer service bleed airvalve. At first, it seemed just the glint from thestainless steel inside the valve, but it lookedwrong. Upon closer examination, he discoveredthat the glint was actually oil. There was roughly35 ml of oil inside the valve. A CF-349 mainte-nance form was raised and he instructed the crewto remove the valve and check for any oil thatmight have migrated past the valve.

Had the oil not been detected prior to engine instal-lation, upon engine run-up the bleed air from theengine would have superheated the oil. Then, afterselection of the heater, it would have caused toxicfumes to enter the cabin or even a fire in the mixingunit, placing both aircrew and aircraft at risk.

By taking the time to examine an unrelated problem and what he perceived to be unusual,Master Corporal Carlyle, acting in a timely and professional manner, averted an impending incidentthat could have potentially damaged CF resources. ◆

I was very surprised to see an article I wroteappear in the summer 2001 edition of “FlightComment” magazine. I wrote this article sometime ago, while attending the basic Flight Safetycourse in 1999. Part of our course curriculum wasto write an “I learned about…” article, but I neverexpected mine to be chosen for publication. Thearticle I wrote was “I Learned About HypoxiaFrom That.”

I would like to inform you that the correctspelling for my last name is Ruston (not Rusta)and I no longer have the Master Corporalattached as I retired from the CF in July 2000,after 22+ years as an aircraft technician. I am now employed by Bombardier Aerospace as asenior technician on the Harvard II at the NatoFlight Training Centre in Moose Jaw. I am activelyinvolved in the Flight Safety program here and am lucky enough to still read and enjoy your finepublication. I’m not sure if you print corrections,but I had to pass this on. Thanks.

Mr. Brad RustonNFTC, Moose Jaw

Dear Mr. Ruston,

I do, indeed, print corrections and, at the sametime, I print apologies. I’m sorry for misspellingyour last name. I would like to think that it won’thappen again but, the truth is, I’m afraid it may.Most of the submissions I receive are hand-writ-ten and I am awful at deciphering the writing.

For others — please, if you are submitting some-thing, even as a course requirement that mayeventually be passed on to me, try either to use a computer or to ensure that your handwriting is very neat.

Captain Tammy NewmanDFS 3-3

Dear Editor,

Dear Editor,

I must say that there are some very good articles inthe Fall 2001 edition of “Flight Comment,” which I thoroughly enjoyed reading as well as learningsomething at the same time. However, and I don’twant to appear to be picky, I would like to pointout a discrepancy in the story entitled “A Link InThe Chain”. I know, having had the privilege andgreat opportunity of being a DFS member myselffor four excellent years, that DFS prides itself ontruthfulness and accuracy in the name of flightsafety. It is therefore, with some reluctance, that I point out the fact that this article, which has avaluable lesson to learn, never the less, is mislead-ing. This incident described did not take place atCanadian Forces Base Comox, which one wouldimmediately assume when looking at the photo-graph on the same page as the article is printed,which says in plain English, (excusez-moi, in plain

French) “BIENVENUE A LA BASE DES FORCES CANADIENNES COMOX.” We have been mentionedin your magazine on enough legitimate occasionsthat we don’t need this gratuitous accolade.

Major KippelDeputy Regional Cadet Air Operations Officer

Dear Major Kippel,

I can think of no better way of assuring my readersthat this event did not take place in Comox thanby printing your letter. The photo is merely meantto enhance the story, not to point a finger at anyone. Please accept my apologies.

Captain Tammy NewmanDFS 3-3



approach and then suddenly a carturned down this beautiful littlegravel road. “OH NO! HEAD-ON!!!” What now?? Then suddenly,the car began to back up in the distance. The road was mine. Myairspeed was fast but I had to getdown before that house, just in casethere was a power line. Time forround out, hold-off, and I finallyrolled to a stop. You know — inthose last few feet, we did roll undera power line that went to that house.I was so glad to be safe.

What did I learn? Take time to thinkand control your aircraft; analysethe situation; pick the largest field;know your emergencies; evaluate,re-evaluate, then choose; know yourskills. I chose the road and it wasnarrow. The aircraft suffered nodamage. If someone has an emer-gency, whether perceived as a heroor destroying an aircraft, I believethe pilot does his best. He needsyour support in all cases.

If you are getting those warm andfuzzy feelings, consider your brushwith death. Trust your gut feeling,it is telling you something. As aninstructor, remember, never be too complacent. It can happen to you!!! Remember to pass on your knowledge and experience to your students. ◆

Mike Bohemier

Control, glide, carb heat; lookingfrom crosswind the runway seemedtempting. I began a right turntoward the runway we had justdeparted from and quickly realizedthat the runway would not bereachable. Field? Field? Which onedo we choose? Cornfield, tall crops?The choices in August were notgreat since the crops were grownbut not yet harvested.

I picked a field next to a little gravel road. Restart, throttle…pushthe throttle in and out, nothing!Mixture-rich; carb heat-hot; mags-both; fuel-both tanks. Things werestill and very silent. While doingthis and flying the aircraft, I askedthe student to notify FSS ofour situation. The student did a beautiful job.

We were lined up on final approachand the aircraft appeared to sinkmuch faster (like a rock)! As I wasmanoeuvring for the field, I decidedto change my plan. The little gravelroad was clear and so I lined up. Inthe distance I could see a house onthe left side of the road. I remem-bered something an instructor had said to me many years before;“remember, if there is a house,there are probably power lines.”

The road was clear now so I contin-ued my approach….only a fewhundred feet more. I continued the

Have you ever had that warmand fuzzy feeling? Have you

ever wondered how you would han-dle a situation? You are on a routinetraining mission with your student.You have briefed, checked theweather, done an aircraft pre-flight,checked the logbooks, and checkedyourself. The mission is a “go.” It is a beautiful, early evening flight;winds are calm.

This was a training flight where Iwas to ensure that the student wouldexperience emergency training in thecircuit. We would be simulatingengine failure practice. After havingpreviously conducted numerous circuits, the student was handlingsituations very well. I was a happyand content instructor. This studentwould be able to solo shortly. Wedeparted for our last circuit. Thetake-off, the climb, and the posttake-off checks were all normal.At 500 feet we turned crosswind inthe climb. As an instructor, we arealways contemplating introducingscenarios for emergencies. I was considering one more surprise formy student when, all of a sudden,silence!!!!!!!

Silence. Yes, silence!! That beautifulroar of the engine stopped dead.That reliable piston-powered aircrafthad quit. It was like someone shut-ting off the magnetos in flight.What were we going to do now?

IT CAN HAPPEN TO YOU

?


During a recent Safety Systemsbriefing, a film was shown

which concerned two Americanpilots who survived a helicopter fire.They were badly burned where theywore only one layer of clothing; theparts of their flying suits that wereVelcro had melted into the flesh ofthese poor souls, and had to be surgically removed.

This was an extremely painful experience for them, one I hopenever to feel. The film did invokesome thought, however, and mademe think back to all the flight gearthat I have worn. Yes…it has been awhile, but during my early training,we were issued with four long-sleeved, white turtleneck t-shirts andfour pairs of long johns. Two of eachwere lightweight for the summer,while the other two of each wereheavyweight for the winter months.We were told that they would pro-vide the required two layers of fireprotection when worn under the flying suit, and that the turtleneckwas a great design to protect ourneck area from fire injury.

As I progressed through numeroussquadrons, I collected a varied arrayof different coloured turtlenecks tosatisfy each squadron’s particularflavour, or I wore the white issuedshirts. Today, the CO authorizessquadron apparel and, for thesquadron I presently belong to,we have a T-shirt. It is still cotton,but now has short sleeves and noturtleneck. A long-sleeved turtleneckis available, but not too many are

bought or worn. I also know thatvery few long johns are worn dur-ing the summer.

In the same vein, I can remembereither sewing all rank and badgeson the flying suits, or taking the lotto the base tailor to be sewn, free of charge. This also has becomeunfashionable with the advent ofVelcro. Now the Velcro is sewn onthe badges and the flying suit, andthe two are stuck together. Thismethod saves some money for us,because only one or two of eachbadge is needed instead of the fouror five required for each article oflight clothing. Just peel it off of oneflying suit and stick it on the next.The “official” reason for the Velcrois to quickly sanitize the uniformduring an escape and evasion sce-nario. It seems funny that, for years,aircrew have just been ripping thestitches and discarding the badge ornot wearing the badge into combat.What really seems ironic though,is that our squadron number, ourunofficial squadron name, and evena picture of our aircraft is embla-zoned on our squadron T-shirt…just one zip away from beingexposed to the enemy we are trying to fool!!

Since my inception into the AirForce, I have been taught andbriefed innumerable times on theproper wearing and operation ofeach piece of kit. There are evenorders to tell me when to wear certain clothing. Years of researchhave been done, millions of dollars

have been spent, and the constantreminders from injured aircrewhave determined the clothing andequipment requirements for air-crew. The goal is to protect the bodies inside the machine.

And what of the legal implications?Is your pension in jeopardy or yourpersonal life or disability insurancevoid if you are not properly wearingthe issued clothing? Can you ignoreall of this because you think wehave solved the problem of fireonboard aircraft? Do you reallywant to feel what those two heli-copter pilots suffered through?So…does the clothing make theman, or make the man as safe as possible? ◆

Captain Brennan

Does The Clothing Make

THE MAN


The pursuit of personal perfec-tion is an admirable goal, onethat is the driving force behindmany air traffic controllers. Thejob of an air traffic controllerallows individual skills to bedeveloped exponentially abovethat of the team, yet still allowshighly developed teamwork.Unfortunately, the individual’spursuit sometimes allows hidden traps to be created for the unwary.

One quiet Sunday afternoonsome time ago, one such trapdeveloped just for me. Ouractive runway had just beenchanged to runway 31 when an A-310 Airbus, full of cadetsready for their summer training,showed up looking for aPrecision Approach Radar (PAR)approach. Due to my aggressivecontrol nature, all aircraft undermy control are given tight patterns at the lowest possible altitude. Trying to save time forthe flight crew, I descended theaircraft to the minimum radarvectoring altitude (MRVA) andadjusted the vector to provide a three-mile downwind leg. As runway 31 has a glide pathangle of 3.2 degrees, I knewthat an eight-mile base leg wasnot out of the question. Thetrap was now set.

As the aircraft took longer thanexpected to complete the baseleg turn, I increased the turnand commenced descent. Thetrap started closing as the Airbustightened the turn, ending upwell left of the on-course atseven miles final. At that time, Iprobably should have taken theaircraft out of the pattern andtried again, but, while ignoringthe growing dread, I decided toroll the dice and keep the air-craft inbound, anticipating alarge course correction aroundtwo or three miles on finalapproach. After all, the cadetswere enjoying all of the com-forts of the Airbus while lookingforward to military excitement,some of which I am sure I pro-vided just prior to touchdown.This time, the trap did not succeed and the cadets weredelivered safely.

What did I learn? Primarily, each aircrew is different and willreact differently to similar con-trol instructions. Secondly, don’texpect all aircraft to have identi-cal turn radii. Finally, rememberthat because itinerant aircraftare not familiar with local pecu-liarities, extension is the betterpart of valour! ◆

Corporal Banks

EXTENSION IS THE BETTER PARTOF VALOUR


There I was, sitting in a VFR toweron a sunny, summer day. It was

my first shift of the week, so I wasfeeling rested and confident, lookingforward to a busy day. Alas, it wasgoing to be more than just a busyday. In fact, I was about to learn avaluable lesson in just where myboundaries lay.

The first part of my day wasuneventful. Traffic was moderate,although visibility was down to five miles in smoke, due to forestfires in the vicinity. The most excit-ing part of the morning was thescrambling of a pair of CL215 waterbombers, along with their spotter,a Cessna 310.

Several hours later, after breaking forlunch, I was working a moderatelybusy traffic circuit, with several twin-engine aircraft flying circuits, and aCitation doing simulated approachesto the opposite end. The groundcontroller passed me an IFR estimateon an inbound Med-evac, a Jetstream,due in about fifteen minutes. At thesame time, he asked if I would mindtaking ground as well as workingtower, as he was in dire need of abathroom break, and a bite to eat.Although we were short-staffed as itwas, I thought nothing of letting himgo, expecting that he would be backshortly. Also, another controller wasdue to report for duty anytime soon.Anyway, things were going well, andI was teeming with confidence.

Away he went, when the Med-evacchecked in, about to call the beaconoutbound on an ILS approach. Thiswas, after all, a procedural environ-ment. Moments later, the Citationreported the final approach fix forthe backcourse. I advised him thiswas to be a circling approach, andthat he was to call downwind forsequencing. Moments later, one of the previously departed waterbombers reported at eight milesand inbound for landing, and herequested I telephone his Ops cen-tre, as they were not answering hisradio calls. It seemedthere might be a problem with one of his engines. Iacknowledged his call,and I gave him clear-ance into the zone.

At this point, I’d beenworking alone for amere five minutes,and I realized thingswere about to get a lit-tle hot around here. Iquickly called thebomber’s Ops, whileat the same time hit-ting the bells to acti-vate CFR (crash & fireresponse) for theCL215. I also advisedmy circuit aircraft toclimb, and fly throughuntil further advised. Ifully expected my

lunch-munching buddy downstairsto be up here by now. NO JOY!

Finally, I got things under control.The Med-evac landed; the waterbomber followed suit, after report-ing that he no longer had an engineproblem. The Citation, hearing allthe chatter, elected to climb, andfollow the rest of the circuit traffic.And where was my relief? Heshowed up shortly after hearing the sirens outside; you see, he washaving a cigarette. And the othercontroller who was due for worksuffered a flat tire on the way in.

What Back-up


PLAN?It was the beginning of eveningshift and our standby Labradorhelicopter was performing aSAR mission. Our second heli-copter, which had been awayand gone unserviceable, wasreturning around suppertimewith the mobile repair party(MRP) crew. While waiting forour aircraft to return, we wereinformed that it would requirea quick turn-around since it wasneeded for a SAR mission tomed-evac a child who had suffered head injuries.

The aircraft arrived and duringour maintenance checks a smallamount of fuel was detectedunder the fuel pressure trans-mitter of the #1 engine. As we AVN technicians were dis-cussing an appropriate courseof action, the medical staffbegan arriving and loadingtheir equipment on the aircraft.Feeling like the mission wasbeing delayed, we elected not to replace the transmitter.Instead, we would try changingonly the transmitter Q.D. andcall for an engine ground run.The Q.D. was replaced and theengine ground run was donewith no evident leaks. TheLabrador then departed for the mission.

Later that evening, we wereinformed that the flight engineer (FE) again checked the transmitter, which was now found to be leaking. The aircraft was forced to landand shut down at an isolatedlighthouse. An MRP was dis-patched with the standby helicopter and the mission was completed.

Why did we not replace thetransmitter? Was it pressure?No one pressured us but wedefinitely felt a need to hurry.Why did we replace only theQ.D? It seemed to be a goodplan. We got the aircraftturned around and ready togo quickly. In the end, we didthat child no favours! ◆

Master Corporal Clarke

IT SEEMED TO BE A GOOD PLAN

That day was perhaps one of themost intense moments I have everexperienced. I learned how quicklytasks could accumulate and exceedone’s physical capabilities. I alsolearned to ensure I have a backupplan. In this case, a reasonable plan“B” would have been to ensure my ground controller came rightback from his bathroom break,as scenarios can change instantly. ◆

Mike Fontaine


What is fatigue? Fatigue andsleepiness are often consid-

ered to be the same. It is the state of tiredness due to prolonged workor insufficient sleep. Its effects areunderestimated because there is no“Breathalyzer™” for fatigue, andsleepy pilots are reluctant to admitthey fell asleep on the job, especiallyif an accident results. Fatigueimpairs alertness and performance,often without your awareness. Infact, sleepiness/fatigue producesperformance problems similar tothose caused by alcohol. Fatigue is asignificant risk factor in all aspectsof aviation.

Is fatigue a big problem?Approximately 63 million Americanssuffer from moderate or severe daytime sleepiness. Because of this,on-the-job concentration, decision-making, problem solving, and performance are adversely affected.Forty percent of adults say theirdaily sleep is inadequate. Many personnel find it impossible to stayalert during their night jobs becauseof inadequate sleep during the day.

When is fatigue worse? Our biolog-ical rhythms are set to 24-hourcycles by exposure to daylight,knowledge of clock time, mealintervals, and activity schedules.Because of this, we feel sleepier atnighttime and don’t perform as well as we do in the day. Alertness is greater during the day than at night.

What is the cost of fatigue? In theUSA, for example, fatigue costs 18 billion dollars in industrial pro-ductivity every year. Fifty percent of aviation mishaps are caused byhuman error, and fatigue is thoughtto be directly responsible for manyof these.

Why are we so tired? Inadequatesleep and extended periods ofwakefulness are the two maincauses of fatigue. Many people sleepless than 6.5 hours per day (farbelow the recommended amount of 7.5 to 8 hours). Shift workersreceive even less. This adverselyaffects job productivity, personalsafety, and well-being.

What are the warning signs ofinadequate sleep? Indicators ofinadequate sleep include:

• Difficulty waking up without theaid of an alarm clock.

• Repeatedly pressing the snoozebutton to sneak in a few extraminutes.

• A strong desire to take naps during the day.

• Difficulty staying awake while in meetings, riding in a car,or watching TV.

• Falling asleep in less than sevenminutes after going to bed atnight.

• Looking forward to weekendswhen one can “catch up onsleep.”

• Sleeping two or more hours than usual on days off.

How much sleep is necessary foralertness? Most adults need abouteight hours of nightly sleep in orderto be fully alert during the day, butthere are individual differences.The only way to establish your sleeprequirement is by trial and error.Determine your sleep needs andthen ensure you receive enough to maintain on-the-job alertness.

How much sleep is right for me?Two ways to determine your sleepneeds are:

1. While on vacation. Sleep withoutan alarm clock for several days,and record the amount of nightlysleep you receive. The average ishow much sleep you naturallyneed. When trying this, startkeeping records on the third day, after you’ve overcome any pre-existing sleep debt.

2. While on your regular work sched-ule. For a week, increase yourusual amount of nightly sleep byone hour. At the end of the week,evaluate how alert you feel eachday. If more sleep is needed, addan hour the next week and so on.

Can I train myself to need lesssleep? No. Simple tasks can bemade resistant to sleep loss by practicing them until they becomeautomatic; but this will not workwith tasks that require vigilance,thought, and/or judgment. Sleepdeprived individuals performpoorly, but often are unaware oftheir level of impairment.

ASLEEP AT THE


How can I improve my nightlysleep? Sleep problems often stemfrom behavioral or environmentalfactors. If you repeatedly are unable to fall asleep at night,do the following:

• Stick to a consistent bedtime and wake-up time.

• Use the bedroom only for sleep.

• Develop a soothing nighttimeroutine (read or take a warmbath just prior to going to bed).

• Resolve daily problems beforebedtime.

• Once in bed, avoid watching the clock.

• Include aerobic exercise in yourdaily routine, but not withinthree hours of bedtime.

• Don’t take naps during the day.

• Don’t consume caffeine withinfour hours of bedtime.

• Don’t drink alcohol within three hours of bedtime.

• Don’t smoke cigarettes within an hour before going to bed.

• If you can’t fall asleep, don’t lie in bed awake. Instead, do a quietactivity until sleepy.

Correcting problems due to poorsleep practices may take several days or weeks.

Does shift work make me sleepy?Shift lag is fatigue caused by aninability to adjust to disruptions of body rhythms when changingwork/rest schedules. Daytime sleepis not normal and because of thisand other factors, night workerstend to get two to four hours lesssleep than day workers. It is difficult for people to adjust to new schedules.

How do I adjust to a new workshift? The following can help youadjust to a new schedule and mini-mize how long feelings of fatigueand discomfort will last:

• Maintain the new sleep/wakeschedule, even when off duty.

• Adjust meal times to agree withthe new schedule.

• Talk to friends and family aboutyour need to sleep at a differenttime than they do.

• Unplug the phone, disconnectthe doorbell, put blackout shadeson the windows, and turn on afan to mask out noise.

• Take naps if it’s impossible to get an eight-hour block of sleep.

• If possible, (with medical officerpermission), use a sleeping med-ication for the first three days to promote sleep.

• Timely use of caffeine canenhance on-the-job alertness,but don’t use caffeine withinthree to four hours before yourscheduled sleep period.

• If trying to sleep during the day,minimize morning light exposurewith dark glasses and avoid beingoutside before bedtime.

How can I improve my alertnesson night shift? Avoiding fatigueduring night flights is difficult. Ifthere is no flexibility in establishingwhen a flight will take place, thefollowing strategies should beimplemented:

• Obtain plenty of sleep before the flight.

• If the flight is late in the day or at night, take a 45-minute napbefore takeoff.

• Avoid alcohol consumptionwithin 24 hours prior to nightflights.

• During the flight, swap tasksbetween pilot and copilot tominimize boredom.

• Consume caffeine immediatelybefore and/or during the flight.

• Avoid hot refueling in favour ofshutting down and walkingaround for a few minutes.

• Note that increasing radio vol-ume and exposure to cold air donot fight off sleep.

• Remember that after being awakefor a long time, you may involun-tarily fall asleep, despite your best efforts.

THROTTLE


What are some fatigue warning signals? When there is no choice butto fly when tired, be aware of theseindicators that you are at serious riskfor falling asleep:

• Eyes go in and out of focus/

• Head bobs involuntarily;

• Cannot stop yawning;

• Thoughts become wandering and disconnected;

• Cannot remember things you did;

• Navigation checkpoints are missed;

• Routine procedures are not performed;

• Control accuracy degrades.

If you experience even one of thesesymptoms, the safest course ofaction is to end the flight as soon as possible and get some sleep.

Can napping really help? Researchstudies have shown that long napscan help restore the performance ofsleep-deprived people to near nor-mal levels. Also, naps taken shortly

• Place the nap when sleep is naturally easy (1400-1600 or0300-0600), if possible.

• Make the nap as long as possible.

• Consider napping in the afternoon prior to an all-nightmission.

• Plan the nap early in the sleepdeprivation period.

• Allow 15-20 minutes after awak-ening to become fully alert beforeresuming work tasks.

No nap, now what??? Aircrew whofind themselves in situations wherethe flight must be done despiteinadequate sleep and heavy fatigueshould:

• Be sure to eat high protein foodslike yogurt, cheese, nuts, andmeats.

• Avoid high fat foods (candy bars and potato chips) and highcarbohydrate foods (sweets,cereals, and breads, etc.).

• Drink plenty of fluids.

• Converse with other crewmem-bers and rotate tasks to minimizeboredom.

• If possible, try to move around inthe cockpit. Definitely exerciseduring refuels.

• Consume caffeine once fatiguebecomes noticeable.

Remember that any of thesecounter-measures (with the possibleexception of caffeine) are only min-imally effective after someone hasbeen awake for 18 hours or more.

Awake at the Throttle!!!!Recognizing the threat posed by on-the-job sleepiness, identifyingthe causes of insufficient sleep,implementing countermeasures toensure proper rest, and developingcrew rest cycles that will ensurewell-rested and alert crews is thebest defense against fatigue. ◆

Dr. John A. Caldwell, Ph.D.

Director, Sustained OperationsResearch

Reprinted with kind permissionfrom the US Army.

before a period of sleep deprivationcan improve alertness and performance.

How long should a nap be? Thelonger the nap, the better its abilityto lower the impact of fatigue.Although two-hour naps will notrestore performance to normal lev-els, they are very beneficial becausethey provide sufficient time to go tosleep and complete one full sleepcycle. However, short naps of only30-45 minutes are far better thangetting no sleep at all. Even a ten-minute nap is better than nothing.

How should I plan my naps?When implementing naps,do the following:

• Establish a relatively quiet,dark, and comfortable place for napping.

• Use sleep masks or earplugs ifnecessary to block out sunlightand noise.

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