Informational Memorandum No. 82 • Spring 2010

ACUNSTHE ACADEMIC COUNCIL ON THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

1

c o n t i n u e d o n p a g e 2 >

A consensus seems to exist in Europe on the need to tackle contemporary intra-state conflicts through a multiplicity of actors who display different comparative advantages and levels of expertise. For the United Nations as well as for the regional organizations that, since the end of the Cold War, have emerged as crisis management actors, working together is the way forward. The UN and the EU run or have run simultaneous operations in Africa (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad) and Kosovo and have largely institutionalized their cooperation; the UN took over operations initially deployed by the African Union in West Africa and in Burundi and the two institutions have created a hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur; the EU is assisting the AU in the building-up of its Stand-by Force and finances AU operations; the EU, the OSCE and NATO have for some time shared the burden of security management in the Balkans. As noted in a UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) document, “reinforcing interoperability with key partners […] can enhance cooperation and ensure that we maximize finite global peacekeeping resources”1. Indeed, given the scope of crisis management needs, not least the UN overstretch, burden-sharing has become an imperative and its corollary, inter-institutional partnerships, equally central.

Why Institutions CooperateInstitutions cooperate mainly for materialist motives2. Cooperation reduces transaction costs; it provides access to information, expertise, finance or material resources that institutions are willing to share.

Inter-institutional cooperation may also allow for legitimacy transfer between a legitimizing institution and an organization whose action’s legitimacy is not generated internally. This legitimizing process may come from a UN Security Council resolution that confers both legality and legitimacy to a peacekeeping/peacebuilding operation, or simply from the multi-organizational nature of the operation. Furthermore, partnerships may be a way to gain visibility or influence within the partner institution or more broadly to enhance one’s position. For the EU, partnering with the UN or with NATO is a means to build up its status as a security actor.

At the same time, institutions may cooperate for ideational reasons, meaning that institutions’ values, normative base and culture shape their propensity and willingness to cooperate with other organizations, especially when these organizations have similar postures. Cooperation is not only interest-driven, but may also reflect a certain conception of international action. For example, the UN and the EU are presented as “natural partners, […] united by the core values laid out in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights”3. The two institutions cooperate because they share certain values such as the belief in the virtues of international law and multilateralism, a preference for the peaceful settlement of disputes and a related uneasiness with the use of force4. Whether or not this is true, this convergence is part of the official discourse on the nature of the partnership.

The Inherent Limits of Partnership in Contemporary Peace Operations

thIErry tArdy

In practice, partnerships have developed between security actors over the last decade. UN-EU cooperation is probably the most institutionalized, with two joint declarations on crisis management (2003 and 2007), the establishment of a joint Steering Committee, regular desk-to-desk dialogue and several experiences in field cooperation (in the Balkans and Africa in particular). The UN has also developed cooperation with the African Union, through capacity-building, technical and financial assistance. The UN Department for Peacekeeping operations and Department for Political Affairs are assisting the AU Peace Support Operations Division in the areas of planning, logistics and human resources management. Support is also provided in the field, to the AU Operation in Somalia in particular, and through the UN-AU Hybrid operation in Darfur, that took over the AU mission in 2008. The so-called regional organizations have also initiated partnerships that draw on their respective capabilities and mandates, and contribute to the establishment of a global crisis management system. The EU, NATO and the AU have all engaged in some sort of partnership, with different degrees of institutionalization and result.

the Limits of Building PartnershipsIn this context however, although contemporary peace operations are, in most cases, characterized by the simultaneous presence of several international institutions, the institutionalization of their relations has remained relatively slow. In reality, if building partnerships to enhance the effectiveness of multidimensional peace operations is theoretically essential and broadly accepted, in practice it faces fundamental difficulties and is hindered by a series of structural factors that will not be easily tackled. There are five reasons why building partnerships is and will remain difficult.

heterogeneous Institutions

First, regional organizations are highly heterogeneous in their mandate, institutional form, resources, political clout and level of development as crisis management actors. The UN occupies a key position in the crisis management field and in the development of relations with regional organizations. It aspires to play a central role in defining the terms of inter-institutional partnerships as well as in the elaboration of the legal, political and operational framework in which regional actors will operate. Yet institutions such as the EU, NATO, the African Union or the OSCE are sufficiently different to make any generic approach to their role in a global peace operations system close to meaningless. Be it in terms of capacity, experience or mandates, the EU and NATO can hardly be compared with the African Union or any other regional institution. Furthermore, some regions, such as the entire Asian continent, are currently deprived of any regional security body able to participate in a peacekeeping endeavour. It follows not only that partnerships concern only a very few institutions, but also that they develop as bilateral relationships with their own specificities, and with one

institution usually dominating the other and defining the terms of the interaction. As a result, what we see is un-balanced partnerships characterised by diffused reciprocity among the partners, far away from a global burden-sharing or interlocking system based on international institutions’ respective strengths.

Inter-institutional Competition

Second, inter-institutional relations are characterized by cooperation as much as by competition between organizations that must permanently demonstrate that they fulfill the functions for which they were created, and that they can adapt to new needs. Security institutions must display a certain number of comparative advantages, as well as ensure their visibility, efficiency and effectiveness as security actors. They are constantly struggling for limited resources, access to information, and identity. Therefore they develop their own agenda, interests and objectives. These imperatives are not, by nature, conducive to inter-institutional cooperation and may, on the contrary, create conditions for competition. Such competition is obvious between the EU and NATO that have similar membership and that both experience an identity crisis in the security field, but it also affects UN-EU or UN-NATO relations. In the field, institutions that are simultaneously present are watched and assessed relative to the other, which may hinder mutually-reinforcing cooperation.

the North-South divide

Third, some partnerships are reflections of a North-South divide that characterizes the international system and therefore accentuates the politicization of North-South relations rather than attenuates it. To put it bluntly, UN peace operations are decided and financed by Western states and implemented by countries of the Global South. As of January 2010, Western countries (United States, EU member states, Japan, Canada, Norway and Australia) contribute 8,831 military and police personnel out of the 99,943 deployed5 in the UN framework (which represents 8.8%), while financing approximately 90% of the consolidated peacekeeping budget. Furthermore, none of the main Troops and Police contributing countries – that mainly come from Africa and South Asia – sit at the Security Council as a permanent member, leading to a dichotomy between peace operations doers and peace operations decision-makers.

It is in this context that partnerships between the UN and the EU or NATO are developing. EU and NATO member states are reluctant to contribute troops to UN operations, and support to the UN through partnerships is partly conceived as a way to remedy these absences. EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping has made apparent the development of a ‘two-speed’ crisis management system: on the one hand the UN is mandated to intervene everywhere – not least where other institutions do not want to go – with a level of political and operational support that is insufficient; on the other hand the EU has a more selective approach, is better equipped and

2

It follows not only that the partnerships concern only a very few institutions, but also that they develop as bilateral relationships

with their own specificities, and with one institution usually dominating the other and defining the terms of the interaction.

c o n t i n u e d f r o m c o v e r >

1 “A New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping”, DPKO-DFS, 2009, p.vi.

2 See K. Haugevik, “New partners, new possibilities. The evolution of inter- organizational security cooperation in international peace operations”, NUPI Report, 2007.

3 See “The Partnership between the UN and the EU. The United Nations and the European Commission working together in Development and Humanitarian Cooperation”, United Nations, 2006, p.6. See also “Renewing Hope, Rebuilding Lives. Partnership between the United Nations and the European Commission in Post-Crisis Recovery”, United Nations, Brussels, 2009, p.4.

4 See T. Tardy, “UN-EU Relations in Crisis Management. Taking Stock and Looking Ahead”, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, Challenges Forum Report 2008, Stockholm, 2009, p.38.

5 See “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations”, 31 January 2010, UN website.

6 See B. Charbonneau, “What is so special about the European Union? EU-UN cooperation in crisis management in Africa,” International Peacekeeping, vol.16, n°4, August 2009.

politically stronger, and is willing, in an ad hoc manner, to come in support of the UN through EU-led ‘bridging operations’ (DRC in 2003, Chad in 2008-09) or ‘stand-by forces’ (DRC in 2006). Furthermore, while the EU is often presented as a soft, value-based power, the way it promotes norms and ideas as well as its own conception of its relationship with the UN also reflect power politics, in the sense that the EU pursues its own political agenda and wants to assert its primacy over its partners6.

The gap is even wider between the UN and NATO that have cooperated in a number of operations (Pakistan, Darfur, etc.), but whose mandates and political cultures are too different to allow for a truly mutually-reinforcing relationship. In 2008, the signature of a ‘secret’ UN-NATO Joint Declaration on cooperation in crisis management revealed the level of discrepancy between the two bodies. For some UN member states (Russia among others), the highly political nature of NATO posed a clear limitation to cooperation with the UN and its alleged impartiality.

division of Labour and Comparative Advantages

Fourth, if inter-institutional cooperation and burden-sharing have partly developed on the basis of comparative advantages displayed by each organization, the fact is that nearly all institutions aspire to embrace the entire spectrum of crisis management activities, with little prospect for the emergence of an interlocking system based on different competences (military, civilian, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, etc.). The expectation that NATO would rather do the military heavy lifting while the EU would do more civilian post-conflict peacebuilding and the UN a bit of everything while ensuring overall coordination and coherence of multi-actor activities does not seem to be the way ahead. The mere fact that the institution best-placed in a given theatre would be in the lead is not a likely and systematic development. This raises the issue of duplication and overlap in a context of scarce resources, leading back to competition dynamics. In relation to the UN, the debate is then on whether regional organizations’ capacities enhance or weaken the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding role.

External versus Internal Coordination

Finally, although partnerships are officially promoted by all institutions, internal coordination and coherence are, for each of them, a more important task than building inter-institutional links. For both the UN and the EU, the challenge of “delivering as one” through an integrated approach is a political and administrative priority that mobilizes energy and human resources in a way that is not comparable with the level of effort put into the development of partnerships. Furthermore, in those institutions, the compartmentalization of activities between different bodies of the same institution (Secretariat versus agencies on the UN side, European Commission versus Council secretariat and soon External Action Service on the EU side) complicates the establishment and the visibility of partnerships. In practice, partnerships often develop between organs of international organizations – the European Commission and UNDP; DPKO and the EU Council Secretariat – rather than between the organizations per se.

> ConclusionThe post-Cold War changes have led to the emergence and development of a variety of crisis management institutional actors that now interact with each other in an unprecedented way. These interconnections have allowed for the institutional, political and cultural rapprochement between organizations, the political and operational characteristics of which can be very different. Yet, inter-institutional relations have not led to the establishment of a crisis management architecture or inter-locking system. Partnerships are still ad hoc, uneven, and rather than show the emergence of a community of crisis management actors, they reflect disparities between institutions and divergences of political will to act in certain regions of the globe.

Thierry Tardy is a faculty member at the geneva centre for Security policy.

3

As a result, what we see is un-balanced partnerships characterised by diffused reciprocity among the partners, far away from a global burden-sharing or interlocking system based on international institutions’ respective strengths.

acunS Board Members 2 0 0 9 - 2 0 1 0Chair Christer Jönsson | Lund University

Past Chair Thomas G. Weiss | CUNY Graduate Center

Members Aldo Caliari | Center of Concern Sam Daws | UN Association, UK Lorraine Elliott | Australian National University Shin-wha Lee | Korea University Julie Mertus | American University Henrike Paepcke | Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy Roland Paris | University of Ottawa Ramesh Thakur | Balsillie School of International Affairs Margaret Vogt | United Nations Secretariat

acunS Secretariat Staff Patricia Goff, Executive Director

Brenda Burns, Administration, Communications and Program Development

ACUNS Wilfrid Laurier University75 University Avenue, West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5

T. (519) 884-0710, ext. 2766

F. (519) 884-5097

E. bburns@wlu.ca

www.acuns.org

I hope that all of you are well! For many of you, the school year is winding down and summer is on the horizon! As this issue goes to press, we are looking forward with great excitement to our June and July events. We’ll gather in Vienna for our annual meeting at the beginning of June to discuss “New Security Challenges.” In late July, we’ll hold our Summer Workshop in Geneva on Civil-Military Relations in Peace Operations. So, security issues are our preoccupation for the next few months!

One thing we’ve discovered as we’ve made our preparations for Vienna and Geneva is that how one thinks about security may depend on where you sit. For this issue of the newsletter, we’ve asked three

ACUNS members from different parts of the world to reflect on security concerns through a regional lens. Thierry Tardy, who will direct our 2010 Summer Workshop in Geneva, provides an important commentary on EU efforts to integrate into security partnerships with other regional and global international organizations. Swadesh Rana comments on the intersection of internal and external security threats in India. Alberto Cisneros Lavaller offers insight into security concerns in Latin America. Taken together, these articles point to the diversity and complexity of issues evoked by the notion of security. Perhaps this issue of the newsletter will spark some ideas that we can discuss over a sacher torte in Vienna!

N o t e s f r o m t h e E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r

STAYI NG on topic: ThINkING AheAd

QueSTIoNS of SecurITY at the ANNuAl meeTING and Summer workShop

Patricia Goff, Executive Director, ACUNS

AM102010 ACuNS ANNuAL mEEtINgvIENNA, AuStrIA

3 - 5 J u N E , 2 0 1 0university of vienna

vienna International Centre Austrian Parl iament

vISIt WWW.ACuNS.org for INformAtIoN

Security Challenges

5

c o n t i n u e d o n pa g e 6 >

latin american security issuesDrawing conclusions about security perils and opportunities for the region

ALBErto CISNEroS LAvALLEr

an old “story”: The “National Security Doctrine”After World War II, the globe was split into two main blocks. In the East, Soviet republics lead by Moscow and in the West, liberal democracies steered by Washington. That was the beginning of the Cold War, a real confrontation between two ideologically opposed systems: Marxism vs. Capitalism.

In that bipolar world, the confrontation traveled to Latin America and in some countries, especially from the Southern Cone, a new concept of national security was developed in order to meet Marxism in the region.

This new doctrine, developed in some “Écoles militaires” from Chile, Argentina and Brazil, was based on the establishment of permanent national objectives and in the formulation of policy in order to achieve those goals. These policies were a reaction to leftist movements that, in some countries, had taken a radical and combatant’s stance.

Thus, the concept of total war was developed. Through a military regime model, those polities changed their status to become militarized states. These concepts were developed to give the state strength and control over rebels’ attacks. But unfortunately, military regimes’ actions became permanent policies harming human rights and civil rights.

This “story” is relevant due to the similarities of political systems in the region nowadays to those of the sixties and seventies. Thus, when we hear that current Latin America is split into two camps: one Liberal (center-right) and another Leftist populist, it resembles a bygone era when the world was divided into two blocs as mentioned above.

On the other hand, in 1947, many of the American countries from Canada to Argentina gathered in Rio de Janeiro and signed The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (in Spanish TIAR). The core principle envisioned by that accord was that an attack against

one of their members is to be considered an attack against them all; this was known at the time as the “Hemispheric Defense” doctrine.

This pact was criticized by some Latin American countries claiming that this treaty was an instrument for the USA to control hemispheric defense. During the Malvinas war, the USA decided not to support the Latin American country, but rather the European country (attempting to replace “the status quo ex-ante”). However, the second bench test for TIAR was in September 11 of 2001, when the USA asked for help to attack Afghanistan. Only some Central American countries decided to participate in the “War on Terror”.

During the government of Vicente Fox, Mexico formally denounced the Treaty. By September 2004, after the required two-year period, Mexico ceased being a signatory. Fox argued that TIAR was obsolete and useless and proposed the creation of a new pact.

a new “story”: UNASUR & Regional Security “Doctrine”

By 2008, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) created a new regional security council to take defense issues into their own hands. Twelve countries are members of this council, from Colombia to Argentina, including Suriname and Guyana. The main difference to other treaties is the exclusion of the USA from the regional defense context.

The South American Defense Council (SADC) was proposed by Venezuela and Brazil to serve as a NATO-like mechanism for regional security, promoting military co-operation and regional defense; to assure external defense for UNASUR nations; and to overcome differences in military expenditure between nations. Up to now, the SADC has not participated in any regional military conflicts. Due to its recently developed frame, policies have not been implemented yet.

These notes discuss, through a non-canonical approach, the most significant and current security issues in Latin America. thus, they are not explored through a bibliographical review of experts and scholars that have written on the subject, but rather stem from empirical facts and policy formulations that, by and large, had an impact on regional security.While we will bring into the discussion some broad theories that were developed in Latin America, the article focuses on where the region is heading in terms of security. thus, more than a presumptuous but valid intent to build an empirical theory for reality, it is in departing from it that we attempt to draw some conclusions about security perils and opportunities for the region.

In order to accomplish these endeavors, three conversations will be brought into debate. The first one relates to an old doctrine structured (articulated through policy formulation at the time) in Latin America during the sixties. The second is linked to the emergence of a “New Doctrine” (so recently aired by Latin American governments that it has not been implemented in many countries yet). Last but not least, the third story (the core of our discussion) deals with security deeds and policy implementation that lately have been enforced in reality that may cast a somber future over regional politics.

6

On common sense grounds alone, one would suspect that states that devote large fractions of their resources to military expenditures would be more war prone than those that do not.

Diagram A

Diagram B

Diagram C

the third “story”: Issues Confront Reality: “Mini Arms Races” in Latin AmericaHowever, if we take our attention to the empirical analysis of facts, deeds, and recent security policies, our third story takes shape. Do they differ diametrically from the integrative vision given by SADC or do they suggest a new reality? These are challenges ahead that we discuss below.

On common sense grounds alone, one would suspect that states that devote large fractions of their resources to military expenditures would be more war prone than those that do not. This assumption, however, contradicts the off repeated homily “If you want peace, prepare for war”.

The United States has been playing an important role in operations against illegal drugs, mainly cocaine trafficking, in northwestern South America during recent years. To play this role, the US army has installed Air Bases in Ecuador and Colombia. In 1999, the U.S. signed a ten-year agreement with then-Ecuadorean President Jamil Mahuad that allowed the U.S. to station up to 475 military personnel at Manta, rent-free. During Rafael Correa’s administration, it was decided not to renew this agreement, which is the principal reason why the USA is moving its air force component to Colombia.

After the disclosure of the plan to install US bases on Colombian territory, the Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, claimed that this is a real threat to the region. During the UNASUR meeting, where all regional leaders gathered to discuss Latin America integration, the Brazilian president also expressed his worries about US air bases.

A couple a weeks after UNASUR, French president Nicolas Sarkozy met the Brazilian president Lula in Brasilia and signed a 16 billion dollar agreement that involves the manufacture of military equipment. A week away from the disclosure of the Brazilian weapons purchase, the Venezuelan president visited Moscow where the Venezuelan government signed a 2 billion dollar agreement to be spent on military equipment. A preliminary interpretation of these facts and deeds suggests the beginning of an arms race in the region (as some experts and press reports reflected).

Weapon SupplyDuring the seventies, in order to reduce and eliminate the presence of Communist rebels in the region financed by Cuba and USSR, the United States supplied weapons to have more influence in the region.

Statistics for Latin American countries during the Cold War show the United States to be the main weapons supplier; France had only one client in the region and the Soviet Union was the “fournisseur” of weapons to the guerrillas along the continent.

See Diagram A (right - top)

Today, in a globalized world, there are many high technology weapons suppliers in different countries. Diagram A shows the weapons supply for 2008-2009.

See Diagram B (right - middle)

Thus, the United States has lost an important market share, but still remains the first supplier in Latin America. It is also important to highlight that Chile decided to diversify its weapon supply, buying arms from different countries.

7

Top Ranking in LAA in Military ExpenditureAbove and beyond the idea that Latin America could be considered (at first sight) a “trouble free” region; when researching and scratching below the surface, one discovers that there are contenders for an arms race.

See Diagram C (right - bottom, previous page)

Brazil is at the top of the ranking list, with spending at about $15.4 billion for 2008 according to SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). The second in the region is Colombia at $6.5 billion. Chile has been supplied military weapons by Russian, Swiss, German and American technology. In 2008, Chile spent $4.7 billion, Argentina $2.07 billion and Venezuela in fifth place, far from its neighbors, Colombia and Brazil.

If one analyzes the trends in military spending for the decade, one sees increases in four nations. And there are two nations, Brazil and Colombia, exhibiting incremental trends in weapon spending.

See Diagram D (left - top)

Venezuela’s spending in 2006 was $2.7 billion and in 2008 reached $1.98 billion. Chile reduced its spending by only 4 percent.

TensiometerSome time ago, Alain Newcombe developed an instrument known

as the Tensiometer to forecast a war in a nation after the analyses of two proxy variables: Gross Domestic Product and Military Expenditure. The first index he developed was the Tension Ratio and the second one was the Burden Defense Index.

Diagram E shows the Tension Ratio in Latin American and other countries in conflict in order to compare those scores. This index states that countries with a score (index) of more than 150 are more prone to go to war or experience civil war, invasions or coup d’états.

See Diagram E (left - middle)

As we can see, Colombia is the nation with the highest Tension Ratio but it is far from 150 (the critical score). We also charted nations such as Israel, Syria and USA that are more ready to be engaged in conflicts than Latin American countries.

The second Index is the Defense Burden, which consists of military spending as a percentage of gross domestic product. A nation with more than 4.63 percent in a given year is a nation likely to go to war during the next five years.

The nation closest to 4.63 percent is Chile with 2 percent. For Colombia, weapons purchase represented 1.7 percent in 2008.

In spite of the $16 billion spent in weaponry, Brazil’s defense burden is relatively low at about 0.8 percent. In general terms, it does not matter how much a nation expends in weaponry but rather how much that expenditure represents against GDP.

See Diagram F (left - bottom)

After the assessment of Newcombe’s index, one can conclude that Latin American countries are unlikely to be involved in a war. In the case of Venezuela, in spite of threats from Hugo Chavez’ administration to Colombia, it is far from ready for a war (according to the indicators). Venezuela’s neighbor is more ready for involvement in armed conflict in terms of equipment, techniques and training than the Venezuelan army currently is.

Diagram D

Diagram E

Diagram F c o n t i n u e d o n pa g e 8 >

8

Brazil has argued, among other security reasons, that it needs French submarines and Rafale’s aircrafts to supervise “her oil operations off shore along the coast and especially because they made important oil discoveries in recent years”.

The Colombian army has been struggling against rebels since the sixties and drug trafficking since the Plan Colombia started. This situation forces this nation to make important military expenditures.

Chile considers itself as a nation without a neighborhood. The last resource they needed from a neighbor was natural gas, but the LNG terminal in the Pacific coast will soon be ready, making Chile an independent nation in terms of energy. On the other hand, the conflict about the access of Bolivia to the sea still is latent.

The block of the radical populist countries are the only to be afraid of an eventual US invasion. In the case of Venezuela, military expenditures respond to Colombia’s plan to install US Air Bases. Chavez thinks that the US could repeat an invasion such as “Bahia de los Cochinos” during the Cold War.

A final accounting for security issues: Now & the Future AheadIn summing up, it is fair to assess that:

• With regard to national security doctrine, its postulates are not feasible in current Latin America. However, militarized political systems (like in the sixties and seventies) through Populist leftists’ regimes seem regrettably to put some regional countries on a back to the future type of path.

• A regional security framework as suggested by the SADC’s UNASUR seems to be a plausible integrative effort where the region could work out their differences “independently” from the USA.

• Nevertheless, these political systems very recently have articulated policies for incremental military expenditures in the region. Their foreign policy formulation has been in practical terms more concerned with weaponry supply and some sort of development of mini arms races in the region rather than improving development (i.e.: the non-conventional faces of security: economic, physical and social implications).

Each country has different needs in terms of military expenditures. As we mentioned above, each country has its own dynamics, its own problems.

This assessment shows that Latin American countries are not preparing for war. The analysis shows that no country is preparing for conflict soon. Only Colombia showed important levels of military expenditures due to its internal conflict against rebels.

Venezuela made an important purchase of arms from Russia, but $2 billion is still far from the $15.4 billion spent by Brazil and the $6.5 billion by Colombia. Venezuela made this purchase in order to show its disagreement with the installation of US bases in Colombia, but it is possible that those US bases will be installed and in a couple of months nobody will remember the issue.

On the other hand, it is known that many Latin American countries need infrastructure and an important percentage of the population remains in poverty with basic needs such as health, education, and housing that still need to be met. There is no doubt that this level of military expenditure is a waste of resources and responds more to populist propaganda than strategic considerations. An opportunity lost when development is badly needed.

Thus, it can be concluded that some Latin American nations are far from what William Gladstone quoted 200 years ago, “Here is my first principle of foreign policy: Good Government at home.”

Alberto Cisneros is a professor at the institute of Higher Studies of administration (ieSa), caracas, venezuela.

c o n t i n u e d f r o m pa g e 7 >

There is no doubt that this level of military expenditure

is a waste of resources and responds more to populist propaganda than strategic

considerations. An opportunity lost when development

is badly needed.

latin american security issues

9

AM10 Security Challenges

University of vienna • the vienna international Centre • aUstrian Parliament

K e y n ot e s p e a K e r

Danilo türk

p r e s i D e n t o f t h e r e p u b l i c o f s l o v e n i a

“New Security challeNgeS”

J o h n W. h o l m e s m e m o r i a l l e c t u r e

Dame margaret ansteef o r m e r u n u n D e r - s e c r e ta ry G e n e r a l

“what price Security”

10

ACUNS/ASIL SUMMer WorkShop | ACUNS, Wilfrid Laurier University | 75 university ave. W. | Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5 canada

tel: 519.884.0710, ext. 2766 | fax: 519.884.5097 | email: bburns@wlu.ca

The growing complexity of multidimensional peace operations

makes civil-military relations inherently difficult, though crucial

to the success of the operation. Fundamentally, what is at

stake is the ability of military and civilian actors to work

together in the field without jeopardizing their respective

identities, strengths, and capacities.

Key questions to be addressed include:

• What is the added value of the military in humanitarian tasks?

• How do the concepts of “integrated mission” or “comprehensive approaches” influence civil-military relations?

• What lessons do particular cases of civil-military coordination (Afghanistan, Iraq, Darfur, etc.) teach us? Are they generalizable beyond their specific context?

• How does the privatisation of some security actors influence the civil-military interface?

• How is the humanitarian-military interface perceived by local populations?

For more information visit www.acuns.org

Benefits for members:• subscription and electronic access to the quarterly journal, Global Governance and acunS’ quarterly newsletter

• access to official UN system meetings and library collections thanks to our Category 1 consultative status with ECOSOC

• access to our global network through our liaison offices in Delhi, Geneva, New York, and Vienna

• opportunities to participate in acunS events that address pressing global issues by putting researchers in conversation with practitioners

PLUS Institutional Members can designate up to four representatives who will each receive the same benefits plus the opportunity to profile new programs or projects on the acunS website.

Civil-Military Relations in Peace MissionsJuly 19 - 28, 2010 • Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Switzerland

Mohammed Sajid Ali Ivo Böttcher Marijke Breuning Clayton Cleveland Neil Fishman Coralie HIndawi John Karlsrud Eszter Lukács

Aoife O’Donoghue Mark Purdon Stefano Recchia Carlotta Minnella Kate Seaman Bruno Van Der Maat Zoryana Vovchok

New Individual Members

Environmental Ambassadors, Belgrade, Serbia and MontenegroUSGM (University for Graduate Studies in Management) Monarch Business School, Nicosia, Cyprus

New Individual Members

11

the gravest threat to India’s National Security

the indian security establishment stepped into the 21st century with a hangover from a military confrontation with Pakistan on the snowy Kargil in november 1999. almost to date in 2009, prime minister manmohan Singh alerted a combined conference of the chiefs of army, navy and air force that Indian troops should be “trained to fight anywhere, anytime and under any conditions.” Around the same time, strategic doctrine planners and operational field commanders assembled in a closed-door brainstorming session with security policy analysts to debate if india should revisit its voluntary commitment to a no first use of nuclear weapons policy to meet the double jeopardy of a reported increase in Pakistan’s minimum nuclear deterrent and the incremental conditions being attached to its no first Use pledge by China. By December last year, General Deepak Kapoor, Commander in Chief of the 1.13 million person Indian army, reported “a major leap” with a cold start strategy to go to war promptly on the two fronts of Pakistan and China within 96 hours of a red alert as compared to the 25 days taken by the Indian army to mobilize at the border in 2003 after a foiled terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani nationals whose dead bodies were never claimed. throughout the last year and in early 2010, Defense Minister A.K. Anthony repeatedly called attention to “the hostile security environment” to announce the biggest-ever single hike in the country’s defense budget: by 25% in 2009 followed by another 10% in 2010. the indian public and media mostly accepted or endorsed what they heard.

Be it in the lingering threat of another military confrontation with Pakistan over the mostly undefined Line of Control; the jihadi militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and its sporadic incidence elsewhere; the dozen on-again, off-again insurgencies in India’s North East; the expanding reach of renewed Naxalite violence; or a risk of nuclear blackmail, terrorism now looms larger than ever before in public perceptions of grave threats to indian national security. in addressing those concerns, a pledge document of the ministry of Home Affairs commits itself to treat terrorism as “a challenge that any responsible government must address on a war footing” (emphasis added). Using force simultaneously to defeat both the external and internal dangers of terrorism is central to this pledge by the congress party led united political alliance (upa) government. and for now the upa has accorded its highest priority to overpowering the naxalites violence as a threat that is already here while raising its military capabilities to defeat the danger of Jihadi militancy.

With terror as a tool of combat to wage a war against the state on behalf of the country’s marginalized people, the 43-year old Naxalites violence is driven by a maoist ideological commitment to armed revolution. in an unusual

public disclosure of the nature and intensity of the naxalite threat today, chidambaram says that the naxalites have a presence in 200 of india’s 626 districts, are capable of striking in 84 districts and virtually dominate 34 districts. Insiders familiar with the government’s counter-Naxal strategy estimate that starting with less than 300, the permanent armed cadre of the naxalites has grown into a force of nearly 40,000 with 100,000 militia members who control a “Red Corridor” consisting mainly of dense forests stretching from West Bengal to the border of Nepal. Indian security officials believe that the naxalites plan to expand their activities into major cities including Mumbai and Kolkata. Since 1998, they have killed about 7,500 people according to government figures with close to a 1000 in a single year in 2009. As compared to the earlier attacks, mostly on the state police and state run means of transport like railways, they are targeting schools, public buses and primary health care centers. among their most gruesome recent acts of terror was beheading a primary school teacher for being an informer in view of a traumatized class full of school children in a remote village in West Bengal. Shortly thereafter they faced condemnation by an enraged crowd before they let go an express train detained by them in route to Delhi from Jharkhand.

Acknowledging that Naxalite violence is an outcome of poverty in some tribal regions that remain “the poorest of the poor because the nation’s development activities did not yet reach them,” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh upholds a holistic approach to naxalism with a promise of investing more national economic and political energies to end the alienation of the people. “But observance of the law of the land would be a precondition to any social and economic development. The Maoists can’t be taking the law of the land into their own hands,” he warned as the Indian government initiated its largest ever security operation in all the naxalite strongholds in november 2009. By march 2010, Home minister chidambaram expressed his confidence that the government would defeat the Naxalites within two to three years and accept no “Ifs, buts” and conditions for peace talks with their leaders unless they renounced violence. “We are confident that before the term of upa ii (the government’s second term) ends, we will get rid of naxals and will have considerably strengthened our security to face any threat,” he said.

In all the years since the first Maoist uprising in 1967 by peasants in the village of naxalbari in West Bengal, the indian government has never before given itself a deadline to defeat the naxalites by force. nor was there another time when a security operation simultaneously aimed at the strongholds of naxal presence in 8 of the 28 states in the indian federation, including the

SWAdESh m. rANA

homE mINIStEr PALANIAPPAN ChIdAmBArAm has virtually tiptoed over a division between external and internal dangers in designating the naxalites as the gravest threat to india’s national security. “They have declared a war on the Indian state,” he told a media conclave in Delhi on March 10. Comparing the maoism-driven naxal violence to the jihad-motivated islamic militancy as the two biggest threats, he rated the former as the more serious. “Jihadi terrorism can be countered, usually successfully, if you are able to share information and act in real time,” said Chidambaram. “But Maoism is an even graver threat.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had previously described the Naxalites as the biggest internal threat to india’s security leaving open an implication that a greater external danger was posed by the Pakistan-based jihadi militants, like those who committed the first-ever act of terror by foreigners looking for foreigners on indian soil in mumbai on 26 november 2008. made months earlier than chidambaram’s, the prime minister’s comments came amidst an intense public debate over india’s preparedness to meet the multiple threats to its national security at the onset of the second decade of the 21st century.

c o n t i n u e d o n pa g e 1 2 >

12

most densely populated and severely affected West Bengal. Hitherto handled mostly by the governments of the states where they were active, the naxalites now are confronting a federally-led swoop whereby the central government is assisting state governments with paramilitary forces, intelligence sharing and technical help. referred to as operation Green Hunt by the media, the fighting core of the ongoing security operation is estimated to consist of 40,000 paramilitary personnel, several thousand state police forces from the affected states, along with 7,000 commandos especially trained in jungle warfare. the operation is focused on the worst naxal-affected sectors in the adjoining states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Orissa and West Bengal. a multi-million dollar plan for the districts dominated by Naxalites is in the offing in parallel with the security operation.

Indian military forces are not engaged in fighting the Naxalite threat and remain wary of getting involved. “Decision would have to be taken at the highest level,” said Air Chief Prasana Vasant Naik in December 2009 referring to the indian political leadership as the ultimate authority. He was reacting to media speculation over whether the Indian Air Force (IAF) was being authorized to strike back after the Naxalites had fired at an IAF plane in Chhattisgarh. “Conditions under which my air crew are going to fire are very very stringent. We put up a set of rules of engagement, roe, as it is called. and these roe are very very stern. no excessive force, no collateral damage, positive assurance, positive identification, only then,” he said after a meeting with chidambaram and the cabinet committee on Security that considered authorizing the IAF to “take adequate counter-measures to protect its choppers and pilots from Naxal attacks.” Chidambaram subsequently invited Naxalite leaders for talks within 72 hours of their renunciation of violence. a ping-pong of peace offers has ensued in the months since with a 72 days ceasefire overture by a Naxal leader who had previously ignored chidambaram’s call.

In February this year, Koteswara Rao - known as Kishanji - offered to renounce violence between february 25 to may 7 if the government agreed to his pre-conditions. a demand for the release of four communist Party of India-Maoist politburo members; a call for government security forces to stop their operation; and an appeal to “intellectuals and human rights organizations and mass organizations to mediate between the two sides” were among the conditions first put forward and then replaced one after another by Kishanji. The government let pass the February 23 deadline without reacting. It has instead made its offer of peace talks conditional not merely on a naxalite renunciation of violence but actually laying down their weapons. close to 100 of the naxalite leaders have been captured within the last two months as compared to a dozen taken into custody over the last decade.

insiders privy to homeland security plans share chidambaram’s confidence about defeating the Naxalites before the national elections in 2013, not only because of a very determined and extremely well coordinated security operation without precedent. the naxalites are also losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the indian peasantry

that has been both their political base and the major source of manpower as well as fighting cadres. Without any clearly spelled-out political agenda, the naxalites’ mostly agrarian political appeal rested upon putting the peasantry in a category separate from the other under-privileged sectors of society including the backward classes. With a 60% electoral turnover the national elections in 2009 however, saw more peasants voting along the natural bonds of their caste rather than the ideological affinities of their class. “A thin stratum of rich peasantry, a bulky presence of middle class peasantry and a sizeable number of poor peasants now distinguish the peasantry as a class from the other backward classes,” says Javeed Alam, a long standing activist in and a critical observer of the emerging predicament of leftist politics in india (1).

Since 1971, when they were reported to have been approached by China to support Pakistan during the Bangladesh War of Liberation with the assistance of the indian army, the naxalites got mixed ideological and scant material support from the 30-odd splinter groups of the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist CPI (ML), which broke away from the Communist party marxist cpi (m) in 1969. during its thirty-years rule in West Bengal, making it the world’s longest-running democratically elected communist government, the CPI (M)- led Left Front did little either to meet Naxal demands for poverty alleviation or to restrain it from resorting to violence in the rest of the country or to draw it into the political process of decision making at the state level. After years of reluctance to do so, the CPI (M) led coalition has asked for direct help from the Central government to crush the naxal violence by force in West Bengal. the naxalites have moved a distance from their maoist supporters in nepal who successfully contested the national elections in 2009 and are now engaged in drafting a new constitution along with the nepalese congress party. a longstanding supplier of weaponry and training to the naxalites, the Liberation Tamil Tigers Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka was militarily routed last year by President Rajapaksha who got re-elected this year with a clear majority vote including some by the Sri Lankan Tamil population that was the staunchest popular base of LTTE.

Facing heavy odds against continuing the armed struggle and lacking a clear political agenda, the naxalite violence in india is turning into a threat unto itself with increasing alienation from those on whose behalf it is committed. it need not be so in the world’s largest democracy with an open offer for the Naxalites to “disarm, disband and join the political mainstream.” Among all the pre-conditions that they put forth this year for renouncing violence, missing is one that would be hard to ignore. The Naxalites should ask the UPA government to commit itself to a two to three year deadline for a more equitable distribution of its promised socio-economic developmental assistance to all the 84 districts under the Naxal influence and not only the 33 districts facing intensified violence. Were the Naxalites to reconsider their hitherto unshakeable avowal of non-participation in the electoral process, such a commitment could be an innovative part of their own political platform to adapt a theoretically rigid division between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie to the reality of an expanding middle class in india.

c o n t i n u e d f r o m pa g e 11 >

The Naxalites are also losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the Indian peasantry

that has been both their political base and the major source of manpower as well as

fighting cadres.

upwardly mobile and robust, its neo-liberalism is seen by some disheartened left front ideologues in india as stealing their socialist agenda while remaining apathetic to their ideology.

counter-insurgency veterans in india proudly proclaim that their objective is not forcibly to resolve the impasse between the government and the insurgents but to persist in confronting the naxalites until they are willing to negotiate. When the naxalites are ready, they would need more than insistence upon armed struggle as both an objective and a strategy for the undefined cause they are upholding unless it is to pose the gravest threat to india’s national security. a securitization of the danger of external terrorism and a criminalization of the threat of internal terrorism, with or without external support is for now on the top of the UPA government’s agenda on national security. As a first real time threat to test it out, and unless they opt out of violence to join the political mainstream, the Naxalites are likely to become more of an irritant rather than the gravest obstacle to accomplish that agenda. this could possibly happen sooner than the next general elections when the upa government would be accountable for its commitment to the entire nation to “get rid of the Naxals.”

(1). Javeed Alam. “Class trapped in Caste: Left’s Predicament in India” at the Columbia University conference in New York. April 1, 2010

Swadesh M rana is Senior fellow at the World policy institute, New York, She was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for defense Studies and analyses, new delhi from october 2009 to february 2010.

13

acunS dissertation award program | ACUNS, Wilfrid Laurier University | 75 university ave. W. | Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5 canada

tel: 519.884.0710, ext. 2766 | fax: 519.884.5097 | email: bburns@wlu.ca | Website: www.acuns.org

The ACUNS Dissertation Award,

in the amount of $1000 US,

is intended to distinguish the

selected recipient as one who

combines both innovation and

excellence in his/her work.

the academic council on the united nations System is pleased to announce the winner of the

2010 diSSertation aWard

Carlotta Minnella University of Oxford

for her dissertation entitled,

“Delegitimizing Violence: The Cultural Sources of National Security and Counter-Terrorism Policies after September 11th”

congratulations, ms. minnella!

please send your donation to:

friendS of acunS, c/o Jean Krasno, Yale university 31 Hillhouse Avenue new Haven, ct 06511

friends of acunS is incorporated under New York State and federal law as a not-for-profit public charity with 501(c) (3) status.

Interested in helping? value our work?

help to secure ACuNS’ future. Support the friends of ACuNS endowment. your gift will help to ensure the financial future of ACuNS and the continuation of its programs. Contributions are tax-deductible.

Why Not CoNSIdEr donating your book royalties to the friends of acunS?

the gravest threat to India’s National Securityc o n t i n u e d f r o m pa g e 1 2 >

14

Security & Development: Searching for Critical Connectionsedited by Necla Tschirgi, Michael Lund, and Francesco ManciniPublished By: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009 ISBN: 978-1-58826-668-2

Although policymakers and practitioners alike have enthusiastically embraced the idea that security and development are interdependent, the precise nature and implications of the dynamic interplay between the two phe-nomena have been far from clear. the authors of Security and development: Searching for critical connections realistically assess the promise and shortcomings of integrated security-development policies as a strategy for conflict prevention. Addressing cross-cutting issues and also presenting detailed country case studies, they move beyond rhetoric and generalization to make an important contribution to the international conflict prevention agenda.

The United Nations and Civil Society Legitimating Global Governance – Whose Voice?Nora MckeonPublished By: Zed Books, 2009 ISBN: 978-1-84813-275-7

This book assesses the United nations’ success in opening up to civil society organizations which can help defend its founding values in a globalized world in which non-state actors impact strongly on what formerly were purely intergovernmental processes.the global governance of food and agriculture is used to ground the story. food is a basic need and agriculture provides a livelihood for the majority of the world’s popula-tion. the food price surges of 2007 triggered off uprisings in cities around the world and a long overdue effort to revisit the global governance of this key sector. These developments have attracted the attention of organizations representing rural social movements of the South, which have been underrepresented in other global forums, sparking off significant innovations in FAO-civil society relations.this case study is set into the context of system-wide research evaluating the degree to which civil society-un interaction has contributed to:• changes in development discourse within the UN system;• institutional innovation to accommodate civil society input into global policy debate;• building two-way links between global policy dialogue and action at the country level.the author concludes that the un system has generally failed to move from episodic interaction, primarily with

northern ngos, to meaningful involvement of civil soci-ety actors in global political process. the bases for such involvement are far more solid than they were a decade ago, particularly in terms of the structures and capacities of social organizations directly representing the sectors of the population who are the object of the mdgs. at the same time, the interests behind the neoliberal agenda that these organizations contest are just as present as ever on the global scene. the challenge before the un is to provide a terrain on which meaningful confrontation and negotiation can take place, starting off from principles and practices proposed in the concluding section.

A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini’s Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relationsedited and with an Introduction by Stefano recchia & Nadia UrbinatiPublished by: Princeton University Press, 2009 ISBN: 978-1-4008-3131-9

this anthology gathers giuseppe mazzini’s most important essays on democracy, nation building, and international relations, including some that have never before been translated into english. these neglected writings remind us why Mazzini was one of the most influential political thinkers of the nineteenth century--and why there is still great benefit to be derived from a careful analysis of what he had to say. Mazzini (1805-1872) is best known today as the inspirational leader of the italian risorgimento. But, as this book demonstrates, he also made a vital contribution to the development of modern democratic and liberal internationalist thought. in fact, Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati make the case that Mazzini ought to be recognized as the founding figure of what has come to be known as liberal Wilsonianism.

the writings collected here show how mazzini developed a sophisticated theory of democratic nation building–one that illustrates why democracy cannot be successfully imposed through military intervention from the outside. He also speculated, much more explicitly than immanuel Kant, about how popular participation and self-rule within independent nation-states might result in lasting peace among democracies. in short, mazzini believed that universal aspirations toward human freedom, equality, and international peace could best be realized through independent nation-states with homegrown democratic institutions. He thus envisioned what one might today call a genuine cosmopolitanism of nations.

A C A D E M I C C O U N C I L O N T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S S Y S T E M

Critical Currents No. 8: Can We Save True Dialogue in an Age of Mistrust? The encounter of Dag Hammarskjöld and Martin Buber

Lou Marin

Published by: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2010 ISBN: 1654-4250

Dag Hammarskjöld and martin Buber met three times between 1958 and 1961. they conferred about the possibilities of true dialogue in the political and cultural setting of a united nations confronted by the cold War and an atmosphere of general mistrust. Hammarskjöld observed ‘Walls of distrust’ between the superpowers’ representatives at the united nations and in their propaganda-filled speeches. Buber described the social atmosphere created by nuclear threat, the palestinian question and the cold War as an ‘age of mistrust’. Both were in search of a common understanding of the political blockages of the time, while their perspectives on re-structuring society differed.

What significance does their exchange have for today’s problems? the cold War has ended, but the atmosphere of mistrust prevails. the crucial questions of the middle east remain unsolved. only the concept of what constitutes the enemy has changed: fundamentalist terrorism has replaced the Soviet union as a challenge for the West, while the West’s answer to all challenges remains war – the opposite of the word, as both Buber and Hammarskjöld affirmed. True dialogue seems to be as impossible as it was in Buber’s and Hammarskjöld’s times. However, remembering their discussions about the chances of true dialogue is simultaneously an inspiration for the quest for solutions in our times.

Development Dialogue No. 53, Responses to mass violence– mediation, protection, and prosecutionhenning Melber, hans Corell, peter Wallensteen, Mona Juul, Martti Ahtisaari, Melanie Greenberg, I. William Zartman, Fiona Dove, Denis halliday, phyllis Bennis, John Y. Jones, Alex obote-odora, randi Solhjell, Charles AbugrePublished by: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation ISBN: 978-91-85214-54-9

This volume engages with a normative framework shaped by discourse and resolutions within the system of the United Nations. The authors seek to provide beacons that can guide the course of those committed to fundamental human values. most of the contributions were originally prepared for events relating to the Foundation’s work during 2008. These included two seminars on conflict mediation, a panel debate on the responsibility to protect as well as the second Voksenåsen Conference with an

emphasis on sexual violence as a means of war. the contributions by practitioners, activists and scholars alike represent and reflect upon efforts to bring more justice and protection to this world within the institutionalised framework of a UN system that seeks to help bring about the fulfilment of a variety of human rights. In different but complementary ways, they thereby map the challenges and opportunities for paving the way towards a more humane global society.

The Ethics of Dag HammarskjöldContributions by hans Corell, Inge Lønning and henning MelberPublished by: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation ISBN: 978-91-85214-56-3

This booklet contains three speeches on the topic of Dag Hammarskjölds ethics, held during 2009. a lecture by Hans corell presented on the occasion of a commemorative event on the 48th anniversary of Dag Hammarskjöld’s Death at the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, on 18 September; The first Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture in Voksenåsen presented by Inge Lønning on 2 October; and Henning Melbers comments to this lecture.

World Religions and Norms of Waredited by Vesselin popovski, Gregory M. reichberg, and Nicholas TurnerPublished by: United Nations University Press, 2009 ISBN: 978-92-808-1163-6

Recent armed conflicts—domestic and international—have drawn fresh attention to age-old questions concerning when war can be justified, and what methods and targets are permissible during war. over more than two millen-nia, the world’s leading religious traditions—Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam—have pro-vided guidance in these contested domains. this volume examines how the religions have responded to pressing moral challenges such as offensive and defensive war, the protection of noncombatants, asymmetric tactics, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.Written by an international team of distinguished specialists in their respective traditions, World Religions and Norms of War takes the reader on a unique journey through the evolution within the major world religions of attitudes and teachings related to the ethics of war. it systematically explores the historical roots and interpretations of norms within these traditions, linking them to the challenges of modern warfare. this combination of deep historical analysis and application to contemporary issues provides valuable insight, and even prompts us to rethink our understanding of the role and influence of religion in the state and politics.

R e c e n t M e m b e r P u b l i c a t i o n s

please note: submissions of books for inclusion in the acuns newsletter should be for publications no earlier than 2009.

c o n t i n u e d o n n e x t pag e >

15

16

mis

C-03

41-a

pr10

aCU

ns n

ewsle

tter s

prin

g #8

2 19

.04.

10

mEmBErShIP form

member Information

Prefix: o dr. o mr. o ms. o mrs. o miss

First Name:

Last Name:

Address:

Country: Telephone:

Fax: Email:

o yes, I would like to receive the ACuNS newsletter electronically

What best describes your area of area of expertise? (optional):

membership type

o renewal o New member o Institutional member

Payment options

o Check enclosed o money order enclosed

o mastercard o visa

Card Number: ___ ___ ___ ___ /___ ___ ___ ___ /___ ___ ___ ___ /__ ___ ___ ___

Expiration Date: ___ ___ /___ ___

Signature:

fee SchedulePlease note that membership fees are in uS funds.

Institutional Membership (US $) Annual Fee $360.00 oIndividual Membership (US $) Annual FeeExtended Term (five year) $425.00 oSponsoring $155.00 oOver $40,000 income $ 95.00 oUp to $40,000 income $ 70.00 oRetired Person Student $ 50.00 o

rEturN PAymENt to:

ACuNS / Wilfrid Laurier university 75 university Avenue West Waterloo, oN • N2L 3C5 CANAdA

or fax: 519.884.5097

Cheques must be made payable to WLU-ACUNS. IPOs must be payable at Canadian banks.

for morE INformAtIoN, PLEASE CoNtACt:

tel: 011 44 519.884.0710 ext. 2766 or visit www.acuns.org

An ACUNS annual membership is based on four quarters to coincide with four issues of the journal, Global Governance, which you receive with your membership.

THE ACADEMIC COUNCIL ON THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

> continued from page 11

International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance 2nd edition

Margaret p. karns and karen A. Mingst

Published by: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009 ISBN: 978-1-58826-698-9

thoroughly updated, this new edition of the award-winning International Organizations reflects the wealth of developments in the world arena since the first edition appeared in 2004.

Professors Karns and Mingst trace the evolving roles of the full range of igos, ngos, state and nonstate actors, norms, rules, and other pieces of global governance. in addition, four issue-based chapters—on peace and security, development, human rights, and the environment—present current case studies and examine the elements of global and regional governance that are involved. New case studies include the conflict in the DRC, the current global economic crisis, and efforts to combat human trafficking and other slave-like practices.

throughout, the authors highlight questions of the legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness of global governance.

Global PoliticsW. Andy knight and Tom keatingPublished by: Oxford University Press, 2010 ISBN: 9780195417173

Addressing issues of conflict and conflict resolution, war and peace, the environment, health, and human rights, this new text implores students

to be attentive to the world around them and become informed global citizens. potential solutions to global problems are explored through a framework that highlights how issues are interconnected. providing an accurate and accessible view of global politics today, this book also offers a clear set of possible improvements for the structures and processes of global governance. Global Politics is an essential resource for students of global politics.

Recent Member Publ icat ions