SP's LandForces December 2011-January 2012

SP’s LAND FORCES6/2011

PAGE 6Pick Up the Pace

The emerging threats and challenges man-date that India should be prepared to fighthybrid wars in the future.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

PAGE 9Raging Debate on AFSPA Act in J&K

General (Retd) V.P. Malik

PAGE 11Offensive in the MountainsThe decision on the Mountain Strike Corps(MSC) is not only about the capability andthe implications. It is also about the mes-sage that India is, by its raisings, sending toChina. The message is one of deterrenceand resolve. It is not an aggressive one, butthe second prong of India’s strategy.

Colonel (Retd) Ali Ahmed

PAGE 13Exercise Sudarshan Shakti

The exercise aims to test and confirm freshconcepts, manoeuvres and structures thatwill finally allow one of the world’s largestland forces to fight its next war more nimbly, with drastically less response timeand much greater lethality.

Special Correspondent

PLUS

First 10Indo-Afghan Strategic Alliance 14Harmony in Asia-Pacific Region 15Geospatial Intelligence and C4I2 17News in Brief 18

Lest We ForgetOn the 40th anniversary of India’s victory in the Indo-Pak War 1971, Lt General (Retd) J.F.R. Jacob, the author, who was then the Chief of Staff in the Indian Army’s Eastern Command, narrates how thorough planning,coordination and bold execution led to the surrender of the Pak Army.

I NDO -PAK WAR 1971>>

SP’s A N S P G U I D E P U B L I C A T I O N

R O U N D U P

December 2011-January 2012

IN THIS ISSUE T h e O N L Y j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

Volume 8 No 6

SP’s LAND FORCES6/2011

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1

TREASURE

Turn to page 17

I am glad to know that SP Guide Publications, New Delhi is bringing out special editions separately for Indian Air Force, Indian Navy and Indian Army.

Since Shri Sukhdeo Prasad Baranwal founded SP Guide Publications in 1964, it has come along way in publishing monthly journals and magazines of repute on defence and strategic matters. In this context, its flagship publication SP’s Military Yearbook deserves a special mention.

I send my best wishes for the successful publication of these special editions on Indian Armed Forces.

A.K. Antony

Minister of DefenceIndia

i n d i a n a R M Y s p e c i a l

PHOTOGRAPH: Indian Army


SP’s LAND FORCES 6/20112

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ON DeceMBer 16, the 40thanniversary of the uncondi-tional public surrender of LtGeneral A.A.K. Niazi and93,000 military men of

the Pakistan eastern command, let us paytribute to all those in Bangladesh andIndia who gave up their lives in the strugglefor the liberation of Bangladesh. A specialtribute must be paid to the people ofBangladesh who rose against the Pakistanioppressors and resisted them most gal-lantly. Let us also not forget the tremendouscontributions of the freedom fighters ofBangladesh and the east Bengalbattalions who fought along with the Indianarmed forces.

On the midnight of March 26, 1971, LtGeneral Yahya Khan ordered the PakistanArmy to crack down on Dhaka Universityand other areas. Sheikh Mujiburrehman, the hero of the freedom struggleand leader of the struggle for the liberation ofBangladesh, was arrested. the brave peopleof Bangladesh led by rehman, laterdeservedly recognised as the father of thenation, rose up and resisted the PakistanArmy. the east Bengal battalions moved intoIndia and the refugees streamed into India.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided tohelp the freedom struggle and gave a verbalorder to the Indian Army to help the freedomfighters in east Pakistan. An official ordercame from her on April 29, 1971.

Meanwhile in early April, many leadersbegan arriving at Kolkata, prominentamongst them were tajuddin, Nazrul Islam,Mansur Ali, Qamaruzzam, colonel Osmaniand Group captain Khadkar. A governmentin exile was established in a bungalow at 8theatre road, Kolkata. During my interactionwith them, the leaders said that they wantedto have a meeting of the parliamenta-rians at Baidyanath tala to declare their inde-pendence. I suggested that they should issuea declaration as was done by charles deGaulle in World War II. tajuddin asked for adraft declaration. I gave him a short draft,which was expanded by legal experts. thedeclaration was issued on April 17, atBaidyanath tala within east Pakis-tan. We arranged the defection of personnelof the Pakistan Deputy high commission inKolkata and they integrated the governmentat 8 theatre road.

the Government of India asked us toassist the freedom fighters. After my recon-naissance, we initially set up eight camps inthe border areas and each camp had thecapacity to train 1,000 recruits.

the Army headquarters spelt out threetasks: l to advise and guide the provisional gov-

ernment.l to organise and equip a guerrilla force of

20.000 to be expanded to 1,00,000.l to plan and conduct guerrilla operations

in east Pakistan.We divided the area of operations for the

freedom fighters into different sectors. MajorZiaur rehman was to be responsible for thechittagong sector. Major Khalid Musharraffor comilla, Major Saifullah for Mymensingh,Wing commander Khademul Bashar forrangpur, Lt colonel Quazi Nooruzamanfor rajshahi, Major Abu Osman chowdhuryfor Kushtia, and Major M.A. Jalil for Khulna.“tiger” Siddiqui was to operate from tangailas did Sqaudron Leader Nurul Kadar.

Group captain Khadkar played apivotal role in overseeing the operations ofthe freedom fighters, as General MuhammadAtaul Ghani Osmani was most of the timeout at Sylhet with his east Bengal battalions.he formulated the tasks and guided the oper-ations of the freedom fighters. his contribu-tion to the successful operations of thefreedom fighters was a crucial factor in thefreedom struggle.

the freedom fighters played a decisiverole in the freedom struggle. they attackedthe Pakistan Army and their infrastructure,created an environment of fear among the

Pakistan Army by lowering their morale.Due credit must be given to them fortheir decisive contribution in the liberationof Bangladesh.

In early April, Field Marshal Sam hor-musji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw called meup to say that the government wants easterncommand to move in immediately into eastPakistan. I explained that we had mountaindivisions with no bridges or motor transport.We needed time for training. the monsoonwas about to break. he asked by when weshould move in. I said not before Novem-ber 15, by when the terrain should be reason-ably firm. he asked for a brief, which I sent byhand with Brigadier Adi Sethna.

A meeting was held in the operationsroom in Delhi which was attended by PrimeMinister Indira Gandhi, the Minister ofDefence, external Affairs, Finance, home, theDefence Secretary and the Director Military

Operations. Manekshaw read out my briefand Prime Minister Indira Gandhi acceptedthat we could move in after November 15.

Our Strategy We assessed that General Amir AbdullahKhan Niazi of Pakistan Army, would defend

the towns and territory. We thereforeadopted the following strategy:l Dhaka, the centre of gravity of east Pak-

istan, was to be the final objective. l Fortified towns to be bypassed. l thrust lines were to be along subsidiary

tracks. l Subsidiary objectives were to be commu-

nication, command and control centres.l the Pak Army was to be drawn to the

border areas by operations of the MuktiBahini.We made our outline plans accordingly

and sent them to the Army headquarters.Logistics was of paramount impor-

tance. We developed the infrastructure andbuilt up logistical cover. About 30,000tonnes were moved to tripura for a corps.Large tonnages were moved to tura, NorthBengal and West Bengal. this we did duringthe monsoon before the receipt of any orders.When the war started, troops did not haveto look back, as everything was in place. creating logistical backing was critical toour success.

regrettably, the bridges were onlyreleased in mid-August and were old WorldWar II repairable pontoon bridges. We wereable to repair these in time. the maps we hadwere about 50 years old. courtesy MuktiBahini, we were able to get the latest Pak-istani maps which the Survey of India repro-duced. the reproduced maps were issued toour troops in November.

In mid-August, Manekshaw and MajorGeneral K.K. Singh came to Fort Williamwith their draft operation instructions. theyspelt out the objectives to be the “entryports”of Khulna and chittagong. Dhaka wasnot an objective. I pointed out that Dhakawas the centre of gravity and it was impera-tive that we take Dhaka. Manekshaw sup-ported, but Lt General Jagjit Singh Auroradisagreed. he was adamant that it wasnot necessary to capture Dhaka. Air chiefMarshal P.c. Lall in his book, My Years withthe IAF, confirms that Dhaka was never anobjective. he states that there was no coordi-nation between service headquarters andthat once the limited objectives were agreedto, each service did what it thought was best.

We did not take either Khulna or chit-tagong but won the war. We had to findtroops to take to Dhaka. In November, wemoved down three brigades from the chi-nese border. When Manekshaw got the infor-mation, he ordered them back.

In October, we planned the air drop of abattalion group at tangail to take part in thecapture of Dhaka. the drop was planned totake place on D plus 7 and the link up 24hours later. the drop and link up took placeas planned. the operation order for the drop,issued in October, was signed by Air ViceMarshal charandas Gurudas Devasher whowas the SASO, eastern Air command;Brigadier Matthew thomas of 50 ParachuteBrigade and myself.

In November, we sent captain Ghosh of50 Parachute Brigade to tangail to mark thedropping zone and to inform Siddiqui that hewas to advance with our troops to Dhaka,which Siddiqui did not do.

In a master stroke, Prime Minsiter IndiraGandhi had the Indo-Soviet friendship treatysigned. this ensured that the chinese darednot intervene. the Soviets moved 40 divi-sions to the Sinjiang border and seven to the Manchurian border. throughout theoperations for the liberation of Bangladesh,Indira Gandhi stood firm and determined.She took pragmatic decisions. She neverwavered. Due credit for her decisive contri-bution must be given to her.

On November 22, a decision was takento move up to some 15 km into east Pakistanto counter Pakistan’s artillery fire. We usedthis opportunity to create jumping off areasfor the coming operations. this drove YayhaKhan in desperation, to order the bombing of

‘I did not blackmail him.Had I failed to get Niazito surrender, the UNwould have made us goback the next day. I didnot fail.’

PHOTOGRAPHS: Indian Army

Continued on page 4

Pakistani PoWs being marched to captivity

AD gunners in action

At the surrender ceremony

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our airfields in the west, on December 3. thewar had started.

We put our offensive plans inoperation. the thrusts into east Pakistanwent as per our plans. the para drop went offwell and by December 13 our troopsreached the outskirts of Dhaka.

On December 13, the Soviets vetoed a USresolution. they said there would be nomore vetoes; USS enterprise was in the straitsof Malacca. there was consternation inDelhi. We were on the outskirts of Dhaka.Manekshaw sent us an order to go back andcapture all the towns we had bypassed, butnot Dhaka. he copied this order to ourcorps commanders. We told our corps com-manders to ignore this order and to proceedwith the offensive as planned. It reminded meof Vice Admiral Lord Nelson at the battle ofcopenhagen in 1801, who on being asked towithdraw a flag signal, he put his telescopeto his blind eye and said, ‘’I see no signal towithdraw. Attack.’’ the rest is history.

We had not captured any town. I wasbeing blamed for the strategy for not captur-ing towns. If a cease fire was ordered, we hadno captured towns to show (Jessore andcomilla were abandoned by the PakistanArmy). On December 14, we got an interceptregarding a meeting in governmenthouse. the Air Force bombed the house. theGovernor resigned. that evening, Niazi andFarman Ali went to see the American consulGeneral, Spivack with the following cease-fire proposal :l ceasefire under the UNl hand over the government to the UNl Withdrawal of all personnel by the UNl No reprisals

there was no mention of India.the ceasefire proposal was given to PakistanPrime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in NewYork on December 15. It was rejected out-right by Bhutto. he stormed out of the UNSecurity council meeting later that nightswearing to fight on.

On the morning of December 16, Manek-shaw called up saying, “Jake go and get a sur-render.” I asked if I could negotiate on the draftinstrument of surrender that I had earlier senthim. he said ‘‘You know what to do, just go”.

the UN was in session. I took with me thedraft that I had sent which remained uncon-firmed. I took a chopper to Dhaka. represen-tatives from the UN met me and wanted tocome with me to take over the government. Ithanked them and declined. Niazi had sentme a Pak Army car with a Brigadier. therewas fighting going on between the freedomfighters and the Pakistan Army. We had

hardly gone a few hundred yards when theMukti Bahini fighters fired at the car. I jumpedout. they recognised my olive green uniformand stopped firing. they wanted to kill theBrigadier. I persuaded them to let us continueto Niazi’s headquarters. On reaching there, Ihad the draft instrument of surrender readout. there were snarls from the Generalsthere. Niazi said, ‘’Who said I was surrender-ing, you have only come for a ceasefire.’’ Far-man Ali said that they did not recognise thejoint Indo-Bangladesh command. I took Niaziaside and told him that I could not give himbetter terms as we had discussed this on thewireless. We had included protection of

all who surrendered as also that they wouldbe treated with respect as per the Geneva con-vention. I told him if he surrendered, wewould ensure protection of all military per-sonnel, their families and ethnic minorities. Ifhe did not surrender, we obviously couldnot take any responsibility for their safety. Iadded that if he did not surrender, I wouldorder the resumption of hostilities and thebombing of Dhaka cantonment. I gave him30 minutes to answer and walked out.

I was extremely worried. Niazi had26,400 troops in Dhaka and we had about3,000 stationed 50 km away. I had nothingin my hand. Aurora and his entourage were

to land in a short time. the ceasefire wasabout to expire.

I went back after 30 minutes. the draftwas on the table. I asked Niazi three timeswhether he accepted the draft instrumentof surrender. he did not respond. I picked upthe draft and said that I took it asaccepted. there were tears in Niazi’s eyes. Itold him he would have to surrender on therace course in front of the people of Dhaka.he resisted surrendering in public but reluc-tantly agreed. I told him he would provide aguard of honour. he said that there was noone to command it. I said his ADc wouldcommand it. We worked out themodalities for local surrenders. After lunch,we proceeded in Niazi’s car to the airport tomeet Aurora and his entourage. they arrivedat 1630 hours. We then went to the racecourse. the ceremony was basic and simple.We hardly had any troops in Dhaka. therewas neither the resources, nor the time forany frills. It was imperative to get the docu-ment signed at the earliest.

A ceasefire was converted within a fewhours into an unconditional public surren-der, the only one in history. After the docu-ments were signed, there were tears in Niazi’seyes. the people of Dhaka rushed tolynch Niazi. We had difficulty in gettinghim to safety.

Later, the hamoodur ur rehman com-mission of enquiry had questioned, ‘’GeneralNiazi, you had 26,400 troops in Dhaka andthe Indians were in a few thousands outside,you could have fought on for at least twomore weeks. the UN was in session and hadyou fought on for even one more day, theIndians would have had to go back. Whythen did you accept a shameful uncondi-tional public surrender and provide a guardof honour commanded by your ADc?’’

Niazi replied, ‘’I was compelled to doso by General Jacob who blackmailed me intosurrendering.” this he had repeated in hisbook, Betrayal of East Pakistan. I did notblackmail him. had I failed to get Niazi to sur-render, the UN would have made us go backthe next day. I did not fail.

the Pakistan National Defence collegestudy of the war stated, “the Indians plannedand executed their offensive in a text-book manner. It was a classic example ofthorough planning, minute coordinationand bold execution. the credit clearly goes toGeneral Jacob’s meticulous preparations inthe Indian eastern command and implemen-tation by his corps commanders.’’

thus was born a new nation, Bangladesh,and India emerged as a regional superpower.



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India is in an unenviable position with two adver-

saries, Pakistan and China, on its north-wester-

nand north-eastern flank respectively. All the

threenations are armed with nuclear weapons,

andhence prudence and wisdom should pre-

cludearmed conflict in this region. However, the

realityis quite different. The regional dynamics are

suchthat limited conventional wars are seen as a

pos-sibility and a sense of uncertainty exists.

Moreover,nuclear weapons have not deterred

Pakistan from waging a proxy war since 1989 and

they are continuing to do so while professing

friendship at thepolitical levels.

China, on the other hand, is so shaping the

environment in the region that it could undertake

military operations via land, sea and air at short

notice and is going full steam ahead for creating

infrastructure on land and at sea to ensure such a

capability. India, on the other hand, is so embroiled

in domestic issues, which are a result ofits poor

administration and governance that it is unable to

appreciate the external and internal threats and

challenges, which are looming large onthe horizon

in order to take corrective measures. Hence, the

preparedness status of our armed forces and

especially the Army, is abysmal, as compared to

our principle adversary, China.

Based on India’s security parameters, we

need to prepare for a broad spectrum of threats

and challenges that may be thrust upon us and

our genius should reside in utilising the available

budget in building a superior military capability

through tri-service synergy and not through

exclusive, single service focus. This demands

apolitical-military-bureaucratic synergy which is

conspicuous by its absence. Apart from apathy

inthe arena of weapons and equipment procure-

ment, we are lagging far behind China in infra-

structural development in the Northeast and

thiscould prove disastrous in war as it would pre-

cludespeedy movements of troops and logistics

and we would be denied flexibility in our

responses to battlefield situations.

In our modernisation efforts and operational

preparedness vis-à-vis China, the Indian Army

lacks long-range firepower, modern air defence

capability, night fighting capability, surveillance

capability in the mountains, network-centricity and-

communication assets, cyber warfare capability,

army aviation assets, modern weapons and gear

for the infantry soldier, aerial and ground mobility at

unit and formation level, and precision munitions.

To top it all, our war wastage reserves in many

critical items, are down to unacceptably low levels.

Years of accumulated neglect have created hollow-

ness in our capabilities and in the institutional and

organisational resilience of the Army.

Courage and bravado of our soldiers and

offi-cers notwithstanding, we need the political and

bureaucratic leadership to be far more responsive

to the needs of the second largest Army in the

world, if they have to acquit themselves with

honour and glory in future conflicts.

With this issue SP’s Land Forces completes

eight years of publication. We take this opportunity

to wish our readers a happy and prosperous new

year. Jai Hind!

ED

IT

OR

IA

L

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

Continued from page 2

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n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

GLOBAL AND reGIONAL SecU-rItY concerns along with thegrowing internal security prob-lems define India’s security envi-ronment. the conventional

threats from traditional adversaries collud-ing with each other, continuing presence ofterrorist and fundamentalist forces in itswestern and eastern neighbourhood hasprompted India to carry out force accretionin order to maintain a high level of defencevigilance and preparedness to face any chal-lenge to its security. the developments acrossIndia’s western border is alarming and dan-gerous as the drift in both Pakistan andAfghanistan shows the lack of state controland break down of economy, law and order,and governance. Both states are stayingafloat because of the aid from the interna-tional community. Moreover, there is also theever present possibility of hostile radical fun-damentalist elements gaining access to theweapons of mass destruction in Pakistan.

the proxy war conducted by Pakistanand the various radical jehadi outfits pro-moted by them through the instrumentalityof terrorism are continuing unabated. In theeast, china’s challenge to India’s security islooming large on the horizon. Its strategy ofencircling India through its neighbours andconfining it within the subcontinent isapparent and palpable apart from its out-landish claims on Indian territory ofArunachal Pradesh. Internally, India faces aseries of low-intensity conflicts charac-terised by tribal, ethnic and left-wing move-ments and ideologies, and these conflictshave the capacity of deflecting the IndianGovernment from their long-term social andeconomic development plans. India is alsoaffected by drug trafficking and proliferationof small arms. thus the security challenges

facing India are varied and complex. India’sresponse to these threats and challenges hasalways been restrained, measured and mod-erate in keeping with its peaceful outlookand reputation as a responsible and peace-loving country

Indian Army’s 600-odd modernisationschemes amounting to over `70,000 crorein the eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12)continue to be encumbered with elaboratebureaucratic procurement processes. therefined Defence Procurement Procedure(DPP) over the years has done little to accel-erate the pace of modernisation. A dispas-sionate analysis would indicate that the gapbetween the Indian Army and the People’sLiberation Army (PLA) apparently is widen-ing in favour of the latter. Moreover, facedwith a two-front threat, India needs to accel-erate the pace of modernisation of theIndian Army, duly prioritised and executedwithin laid down timeframes.

Future Trends in WarfareAnalysis of current and past conflicts in theworld, the emerging technologies, geostrate-gic environment and the emerging chal-lenges; indicate various trends in preparationfor and conduct of warfare. While the detailsof evaluation and appraisal differ in their con-tent and quality, some shared conclusionswith regard to the future trends emerge quiteclearly. Future warfare will be highly uncer-tain because the boundary between war andpeace is blurred and state boundaries too arebeing made irrelevant by non-state actors.today, we are confronted with a fluid, non-linear and adaptive battle space. It seems thatfull-scale conventional wars will be unlikely.the factors of globalisation and “nuclearisa-tion” of the region, devastating effect of mod-ern weaponry, sensitivity to large number ofcasualties, collateral damage and the crip-pling effects of war on economy of a nation

militate against full-scale all out wars. More-over, technology which will play a pre-domi-nant role in designing the conduct of futurewars does provide other options of waging dif-ferent types of wars.

the costs involved and the complexitiesof war waging may force nations to joinallies/coalitions, and weaker states will use“asymmetric warfare” to fight more power-ful opponents while the more powerful stateswill use positive asymmetry through c4ISrcapabilities to deliver significant lethal andnon-lethal effects with precision, speed andcrushing power.

Globalisation and interconnectednesswill make wars transparent, thus challeng-ing the political utility of using armed forces.hence military power is likely to be usedselectively in an integrated and synergeticmanner and with increasing discriminationin choosing means as well as ends as therewill invariably be an international pressureon warring parties.

In large standing armies, two or threegenerations of warfare will coexist as hasbeen the experience in all previous wars inhistory. American led world order will con-tinue to be challenged by Islamic terror net-works, sheltered by weak authoritarianstates e.g. Afghanistan-Pakistan region, andfunded by the richer nations of the Islamicworld. the strategy of global leadership andengagement by the United States, based onthe assumption that such a role is natural,will continue in the foreseeable future.

care will have to be taken to work withinthe limits of international law, including itsprecepts on the minimum use of force andproportionality of response. this rule howeverdoes not apply to superpowers like the US.

Combat Status to be Achieved byIndian Armythe Indian Army is organised, equipped and

trained for second and third generationindustrial age; low and medium level technology and conflicts. In view of thedevelopments in our neighbourhood andparticularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan,and Pak-china collusion, have broughtSouth Asia to the centre stage of conven-tional and subconventional conflict andinstability. Additionally, terrorism, low-inten-sity conflict motivated by economic disparity,religious fundamentalism, narcotics trade,threat of nuclear weapons falling in wronghands, etc remain issues of concern in ourregion. hence the emerging threats and chal-lenges mandate that India should be pre-pared to fight hybrid wars in the future whichmay involve the armed forces in simultane-ously fighting limited conventional conflictson two fronts, out of area operations,counter-insurgency and counter-proxy waroperations in the domestic arena, low inten-sity asymmetric wars, cyber wars, andUnited Nations peacekeeping and peacemak-ing operations.

the Indian Army’s focus should be on apreparedness profile and status which hasrapid Deployment Forces for defensive andoffensive operations, smaller fully integratedStrike Forces (integrated with air power andair assault formations) for the initial stagesof offensive operations followed by larger“follow up” formations if the war lasts longerthan anticipated. Additionally, it should haveforces for low-intensity conflict operations(LIcO), power projection and out-of-areacontingencies. the Indian Army would alsoneed Special Forces for special operationsand a nuanced internal security/counter-insurgency force for LIcO through reengi-neering of its existing forces.

Net-centric warfare (NcW) capableforces and c4ISr capabilities will become anecessity with enhanced situational aware-ness, capability of identifying, monitoringand destroying targets in near real time withenhanced ranges and lethality to achieveascendancy over the enemy. the aim wouldbe to employ overwhelming firepower/forceat the point of decision. the backbone ofsuch a structure would be a well designedcommunication architecture at the nationallevel with integrated networks which areintegrated with the sensors which would berequired to speedily transmit fused and inte-grated data through command and controlechelons enabling greater situational aware-ness for commanders at all levels.

Modernisation Plansthe modernisation plans of the Indian

Army in certain specific areas are as follows:

Arty Firepower As part of its more than `20,000 croreartillery modernisation plan, the Army islooking at inducting several types of how-itzers through inter-governmental pacts andglobal tenders. the last major acquisition oftowed gun-howitzers was that of 400 piecesof 39-calibre 155mm Fh-77B howitzerswith a range of 30 km from Bofors of Swe-den in 1987, which got embroiled in politicalcontroversy. this gun proved its mettle in theKargil conflict. After about 25 years of neg-lect during which the 100mm and 122mmfield guns of russian origin and the indige-nously developed and manufactured 75/24Indian Mountain Gun joined the long list of

MODERN ISAT ION>>


Pick Up the PaceThe emerging threats and challenges mandate that India should be prepared to fight hybrid wars in the futurewhich may involve the armed forces in simultaneously fighting limited conventional conflicts on two fronts, outof area operations, counter-insurgency and counter-proxy war operations in the domestic arena, low intensityasymmetric wars, cyber wars, and United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking operations

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Archer - 155mm FH77 B05 L52

PHOTOGRAPH: BAE Systems

SP’s LAND FORCES6/2011 7

MODERN ISAT ION <<

obsolete equipment, the Army still awaits theprocurement of about 1,500 howitzers of155mm, 52 calibre. Out of these, 400 are tobe procured outright and 1,100 manufac-tured indigenously with transfer of technol-ogy (tot). the request for proposal (rFP) forthese guns was issued in the beginning ofthe year 2011 and it is expected that theevaluation process would be underway.Additionally, 145 ultra light howitzers wereto be procured from the US through the for-eign military sales (FMS) route from BAeSystems. the fate of this procurement is alsohanging in balance due to legal complica-tions. the Army also needs 120 tracked and180 wheeled 155mm howitzers for itsArtillery divisions for use in offensive opera-tions, the fate of which is unknown.

One hundred and eighty pieces of130mm M46 russian medium guns havebeen successfully “up-gunned” to 155mmcalibre with ordnance supplied by Soltam ofIsrael. the new barrel length of 45-calibrehas enhanced the range of the gun to about40 km with extended range ammunition.however, the project for manufacture ofammunition which was to be done by theIAI of Israel, has been delayed as the firmhas been blacklisted.

It is now reliably learnt that when theBofors 155mm howitzers were procured in1987, transfer of technology was done andit has now been revealed that the OrdnanceFactory Board (OFB) has been sitting onthese designs for the past 25 years. On beingcoaxed by the Army, the OFB have nowaccepted to produce prototypes of 155mm/39 calibre, 45 calibre and 52 calibre guns fortrials by the Army.

counter-bombardment (US termcounter-fire) capability is also beingupgraded, but at a slow pace. At least about40 to 50 weapon locating radars (WLrs) arerequired for effective counter-bombardment,especially in the plains; but only a dozenhave been procured so far. In addition to the12 AN-tPQ 37 Firefinder WLrs acquiredfrom raytheon, USA, under a 2002 contractworth $200 million, Bharat electronics Lim-ited is reported to be assembling 28 WLrs.these radars will be based on both indige-nous and imported components and arelikely to be approved for introduction intoservice after extensive trials that are ongo-ing. the radar is expected to match the capa-bilities of the Firefinder system and will havea detection range of about 40 km.

Air Defence Artillery the corps of Army Air Defence holds a largevariety of guns and missile systems. It has40mm L/70, Zu-23-2 twin gun, ZSU-23-4Schilka and tanguska in its inventory. the40mm L/70 which is about four decades oldneeds immediate replacement. consideringthe high costs of new weapon systems, theArmy is going in for weapon upgrades for L-70, ZU-23-2 twin gun, and ZSU-23-4Schilka. Meanwhile, the Army is also look-ing for successors to L-70 and the ZU-23-2.Successor to Schilka (ZSU-23-4) alreadyexists in the form of tangushka, but in lim-ited numbers. A request for information(rFI) has already been issued to find a

replacement for Schilka. In the missile systems, Kvadrat (medium-

range) and OSA-AK (short-range) are also atthe end of their life cycle. they were to bereplaced by Akash and trishul surface-to-air(SAM) missiles but since these Defenceresearch and Development Organisation(DrDO) projects have been inordinatelydelayed, they will also require replacementsby foreign procurement.

the process for acquiring a successor ofOSA-AK in the form of quick reaction Sam(Qr-SAM) is in progress. Similarly, the succes-sor of Quadrat is to be a medium-range SAM(Mr SAM). It is understood that a joint devel-opment programme of DrDO with Israel hasbeen undertaken and when it fructifies, it willmeet the requirement of Mr SAM for all thethree services. two regiments of Akash SAMsare now being inducted for static missions ofprotecting vulnerable areas (VAs) and vulner-able points (VPs).

One major weakness in the overall airdefence matrix is the lack of a battlefield man-agement system which is also linked with thenational air defence network. Bharat elec-tronics Limited (BeL) has now undertaken thedevelopment of such a system.

Armourthe Army has already equipped two of itsregiments with Arjun tanks out of the 124Arjun main battle tanks (MBts) ordered byit earlier. As a result of the good performanceof Arjun tanks with the units and satisfac-tory feedback from the crews, an additional124 Arjun Mark II tanks have now beenordered for another two regiments. thesetanks will have substantially upgraded capa-bilities of firepower, mobility and protection.these are likely to be given by 2013. Asregards the t-90 tanks, 310 had beenordered from russia earlier. Of these, 124fully assembled tanks were directly imported

from russia and 186 kits were imported forassembly in India. the first indigenouslyassembled t-90S rolled out from the heavyVehicles Factory (hVF) Avadi on January 7,2004. these tanks have now been fully oper-ationalised. Additional 347 t-90S tankshave been inducted into service whichbrings the total to 647 t-90S tanks. thedefects in the fire control systems of t-90Stanks due to excessive heat in the turretsduring the summers is being remediedthrough air-conditioning of the interior.

the programme launched to modernisethe t-72 M1, Ajeya, MBts is still unsatisfac-tory and has not progressed. Around 1,700t-72 M1s have been manufactured underlicence at hVF, Avadi. the t-72 M1 moderni-sation programme under Project rhino willextend the service life of the MBt by 20years and enhance its accuracy with newfire control system (FcS) whose trials areunder way. this will give night fighting capa-

Indian Army’s 600-oddmodernisation schemesamounting to over`70,000 crore in theEleventh Five Year Plan(2007-12) continue to be encumbered withelaborate bureaucratic procurement processes

MODERN ISAT ION>>


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bility through a thermal imager integratedwith the tank’s FcS. three hundred t-72tanks of the Army have been fitted withthermal imaging standalone sights (tISAS)while 300 more are in the pipeline bringingthe total to 600 tISAS. however, the overallnight fighting capability of India’s armour iscurrently inadequate and operationallyunacceptable. the modernisation of the t-72 is way behind schedule due to compli-cated procurement procedures exacerbatedby delayed decision-making and in-housedisagreements.

the t-90, the improved t-72 M1 tanksand Arjun tanks will constitute India’sarmour might in the future till a new MBt ischosen or designed indigenously.

Mechanised InfantryMechanised Infantry has been equippedwith the BMP-2 IcV and 81mm carrier mor-tar tracked vehicle (cMtV). A commandpost, an ambulance, armoured dozer andengineer and reconnaissance vehicles havealso been developed based on the BMP chas-sis. the research and development of futureIcV is currently being done and it is expectedthat it will be manufactured indigenously.

the SS-11 B1 AtGM system has beenreplaced in missile battalions by MILANshoulder-fired anti-tank guided missiles(AtGMs).

Infantrythe Defence Acquisition council (DAc) hasapproved of a new assault rifle, 5.56mm cal-ibre and a new generation carbine. theassault rifles under consideration are theheckler and Koch G 36 modular 5.56mm,assault rifle (German), the Beretta 70/90(Italy), SAr 21 of Singapore technologies,heckler & Koch, XM8 (USA), Steyer A3(Austria), tavor tAr 21, and IMI Galil 5.56

and 7.62 from Israel, Arsenal AK-74 (Bul-garia), herstal F-2000 (Belgium), and SIGSG 551(Switzerland) among others. Newbullet proof jackets, ballistic helmets, andboots anti-mine are also being procured. theinfantry is also looking for a man portablethird generation anti-tank guided missileunder barreled grenade launchers, 60mmmortars, enhanced range 81mm mortars,and thermal imaging night sights for assaultrifles. Bullet proof vehicles and shot guns arebeing procured for counter-insurgency oper-ations. Incidents like 26/11 have underlinedthe need to equip all infantry battalions suit-ably for rapid reaction. this is being achievedby procuring specialised items for the GhatakPlatoons (commando Platoons) of InfantryBattalions. Multimode grenades have beenindented with the Ordnance Factory Board(OFB) while rFP has been issued for theammunition of the rocket Launcher MarkIII. the infantry is also being provided withmulti-purpose vehicles (MPVs), light bulletproof vehicles (Lt BPVs), light strike vehicles(LSVs) and additional snow mobiles.

F-INSAS the future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS) is being initiated to make theinfantryman a weapon platform with situa-tional awareness, increased lethality andsustainability in the digitised battlefield. F-INSAS is to be effected in three phases:Phase I includes weapons, body armour,clothing and individual equipment; Phase IIis the target acquisition system and Phase IIIcomprises the computer subsystem, radiosub system, software and software integra-tion. the infantry is planning to developPhase III of F-INSAS by themselves ratherthan being part of the battlefield manage-ment system (BMS) of the Army. this willamount to re-inventing the wheel.

Information Systems At the forefront of capacity building in net-work-centric warfare (NcW) is the tacticalcommand, control, communications andinformation (tac c3I) system under develop-ment with various subsystems catering toaspects of automated command and control,decision support, control of artillery fire, airdefence, air space management, battlefieldsurveillance, battlefield management, etc.the tac c3I is expected to be fully opera-tional in the latter half of this decade.

Communications the tri-service defence communication net-work (DcN) is some years away. the tacticalcommunication system (tcS) has beeninordinately delayed and rFP is yet to beissued. the latter is also a setback to therequired corps level test beds for the tac c3Isubsystems. the Plan AreN system ismostly outdated. the AScON currently haslimited capability to provide data links. theArmy intranet is not wholly secure and theArmy wide area network (AWAN) catersonly to text messaging albeit later versionsare planned to also have voice and videocapability.

Special Forces Special Forces are force multipliers in timesof both war and peace. Special Forcesshould primarily look beyond the borders tonip asymmetric threats in the bud and con-trol the fault lines of our adversaries. theirtasking should include asymmetric war-fare, unconventional/fourth generationwarfare, special operations, reconnais-sance, psychological operations, counter-proliferation and the like. equipping of Spe-cial Forces is lagging woefully. “Packagedequipping” of sub-units has not taken offand critical equipment like laser target des-ignators are yet to be provisioned. theArmy’s emphasis has been on expansion,ignoring the universally acknowledged fourSpecial Forces global truths: l humans are more important than hard-

ware l Quality is better than quantity l Special Forces cannot be mass produced

l competent Special Forces cannot be cre-ated after emergencies arise. It would be prudent to first consolidate the

existing seven Special Forces battalions andfully equip them before adding any more.

Army Aviation CorpsArmy Aviation, being a young arm of theArmy, has been under modernisation, sinceits raising in 1986, and the pace has been insync with the overall growth of the Army.Besides, the ‘Lancer’ helicopter, advancedlight helicopter (ALh) Dhruv has been inservice with the Army Aviation for morethan 10 years. the Army has four squadronsof Dhruv helicopters currently, which willincrease to eight in due course. there are afew more modernisation projects in thepipeline, ALh weapon system integrated(WSI) and battlefield support helicopterswhich need to be inducted as soon as possi-ble to give the necessary operational capabil-ities to the Army.

chetaks (Aerospatiale SA316 AlouetteIII) and cheetahs (Se316B Alouette II) heli-copters have been in service of the nation fora long time. the vintage of the helicoptershowever is posing increasing challenges formaintenance of these machines. the rFP for197 reconnaissance and surveillance heli-copters was given about two years back. Outof these, 66 helicopters are planned for theIAF and 131 for the Army. It is believed thatthe trials and evaluation of these helicoptershaving been completed, the deal would befinalised in the near future.

Restructure & RevitaliseDouhet had stated way back in 1921, “Vic-tory will smile upon those who anticipatechanges in the character of war, not uponthose who wait to adapt themselves afterchanges occur.” Our challenge is to find theappropriate balance between the old methodsof conducting war and the new ways. thereis no option but to restructure our organisa-tions, our force levels, introduce new tech-nologies and doctrines, and more importantlychange our mindset in order to address thechanging nature of threats and challengeswhich confront India in the future.

Western TheatreIn any offensive operations planned on thesubcontinent, the aims would either be tocapture the territory or destroy the enemyforces or a combination of both. Any ter-ritory captured across internationalboundary would invariably have to bereturned though it could temporarily beused for post-conflict bargaining. the ter-ritory captured across disputed border likethe line of control, may be retainedthough in the present global environmentthat would also not be realistic. hencedestruction of forces would be a moreimportant objective which would have along-term economic impact on the adver-sary. For destruction of large armouredand mechanised forces, battles will have tobe planned and orchestrated according toan integrated theatre plan so that largerforces comprising more than one strikecorps can be employed synchronouslyfrom one theatre or from two different the-atres to cause maximum destruction ofenemy forces. to achieve this capability,the jointmanship between the IndianArmy and IAF will have to be of a far supe-rior order and will involve joint planningfrom the conception stage and joint execu-tion of operational plans. the transforma-tion being attempted by the Indian Armywill focus on these issues.

Eastern Theatreeastern theatre (eastern Army and Air

commands) has always had serious voidsin terms of offensive and defensive capabil-ity, firepower, aerial strike and transporta-tion capability and mobility, light armourfor high altitude areas, cyber and elec-tronic warfare capability, and air defencecapability. It seems that some of thesevoids are now being addressed.

two divisions namely 56 and 71 havealready been raised with their headquar-ters at Zakhama in Nagaland and Mis-samari in Assam. the media has reportedan accretion of 1,260 officers and 35,011soldiers on account of these two forma-tions. Additionally, a Strike corps compris-ing two divisions costing about `60,000crore is planned to be raised in the futureto impart offensive capability to the IndianArmy in the Northeast.

It is also reported that India will spendmore than ̀ 60,000 crore over the next fiveyears on developing military infrastructureand capabilities for the western and easternfronts. If we take a conservative estimate ofthe defence capital outlay in the 2012-17timeframe crossing `4,00,000 crore, thenalong with the infrastructure and the costof raising the Strike corps for the North-east, it adds up to a staggering figure of`5,20,000 crore.

Conceptual Changes and Accretions

Carrier Mortar Tracked Vehicle

Tunguska-M Gun/Missile Air Defence System.

PHOTOGRAPHS: SP Guide Pubns

n GENERAL (RETD) V.P. MALIK, FORMERCHIEF OF ARMY STAFF

ALOt hAS BeeN written about theArmed Forces Special Powers Act(AFSPA) in Jammu and Kashmir(J&K). Should we start its gradualrevocation, or wait till overt and

covert security threats in the state are fur-ther weakened or eliminated? the ragingdebate through social and regular mediahas not only politicised a sensitive securityissue and made it more difficult to decide, ithas also created an undesirable confronta-tion like situation between political leadersof the state (some outside also!) and theArmy, and further demonised the AFSPAand maligned the Army in public percep-tion. this would also make it difficult for thecentral Government to promulgate AFSPAanywhere in future and thus restrict its abil-ity to call for Army assistance for counter-militancy operations.

counter-militancy operations are con-ducted in three stages. In the first stage,when secessionists’ activities and militants’violence are at their peak–as was faced inKashmir Valley in 1990 and the law andorder situation does not permit adequategovernance–the affected area is declared a‘Disturbed Area’ by the state and the centre.this legality paves the way for application ofthe AFSPA in the affected area to enable theArmy to conduct effective anti-militancyoperations. In the second stage, militarypressure on the violence perpetratorsenables return of administration andresumption of constitutional processes. thethird stage sees full-fledged functioning ofgovernance and civil administration andreturn of the Army to barracks.

there are no clearly defined dividinglines in these stages due to frequent setbacksin counter-militancy operations and the lawand order situation. these stages, therefore,tend to merge into each other and requireinformed and perceptive decision-making atstrategic and operational levels. During tran-sition, particularly between the second andthird stages, it is not uncommon to see a hotpolitico-military debate on the employmentof the Army or the application of AFSPA inaffected areas.

So, the first point I wish to make is thatthe current debate on the removal of the‘disturbed area’ tag, and thus revocation ofAFSPA from parts of J&K, should be viewedin that light and not as a confrontationbetween state political leadership and theArmy. A public debate on such a sensitivesecurity issue is best avoided.

In this context, let me narrate some per-sonal experiences.

In early 1990, I was commanding a divi-sion that had troops deployed for counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland andManipur. A political party leader, in order togarner students’ support and votes, madethe removal of the AFSPA a major electoralissue. After he won the elections and becamethe chief Minister, I called on him and askedwhat he planned to do about the AFSPA. hesaid that in view of the popular demand, hewould write to the home Ministry anddemand its revocation from the state. I told

the chief Minister that it was OK with me. Iwill pull out troops from the 60-odd posts,concentrate them outside Manipur and trainthem for their primary role of fighting a con-ventional war. “But you cannot do that!What will happen to the law and order situ-ation?” he said. I told him politely but firmlythat I couldn’t help him to maintain thatwithout a proper legal cover for my troops.Despite several elections in Manipur sincethen, the state, unfortunately, continues tohave a ‘disturbed area’ tag on it and contin-ues to have Army deployment on counter-military missions.

In late 1993, when I was commanding acorps in Punjab, we assessed that the lawand order situation was adequately undercontrol and we could pull out a brigade froman area for conventional training and rede-ployment. the chief Minister and the Direc-tor General of Police expressed seriousconcern but went along with me when I toldthem that Army would be made available atshort notice if required. Fortunately, therewas no such requirement.

In late 1997, then chief Minister of J&Kasked 15 corps to remove Army deploy-ments within Anantnag, Badgam, Baramulaand Sopore towns. We agreed and re-deployed troops outside these towns. therewas near normalcy in Kashmir Valley in1998. Next year, however, despite theLahore Declaration, Pakistan Army intrudedinto Kargil sector and forced us to go to war.After a resounding defeat and loss of face inKargil, Pakistan pushed foreign militantsinto the Valley and managed to intensify mil-itancy. Sopore became a militants’ strong-hold. It took a division size operation to getrid of them from this town and three moreyears to bring back militancy in the Valley tothe 1998 level.

AFSPAthe AFSPA has been much demonised bycivil society groups and the media in recentyears. two aspects need to be noted. Firstly,the AFSPA can be applied only after an areais declared a ‘disturbed area’ by thestate/centre. Secondly, it provides a legalcover for Army personnel in carrying out‘effective’ counter-militancy operations.

Under the AFSPA, in a ‘disturbed area’, acommissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or any other person ofequivalent rank in the armed forces can:l Arrest without warrant any person who

has committed a cognizable offence and

may use suitable force, if necessary to doso. enter any premises without a war-rant to arrest a terrorist/suspect, or torecover a wrongfully confined person,stolen property, or arms/explosiveswrongfully kept.

l Fire upon/use force, even causing death,against any person contravening lawand order or carrying weapons, ammu-nition or explosives, if in his opinion it isnecessary for maintenance of law andorder and after giving due warning.

l Destroy an armed dump or fortified posi-tion or a shelter from which armedattacks can be made or can be used fortraining by hostiles, if necessary to do so.the Act lays down that the arrested per-

sons will be handed over to the nearest policestation ‘with the least possible delay’, and noprosecution, suit or other legal proceedingcan be instituted against any person inrespect of anything done under this Actexcept with the previous sanction of thecentral Government.

the AFSPA may have been described asa ‘special power’. But those of us who havecommanded troops in such situations havealways looked upon it as a legal protection toconduct effective operations. On the flip side,


AFSPA <<

Raging Debate on AFSPA in J&K

The debate on the removal of the ‘disturbed area’ tag, and thus revocation of AFSPA from parts of J&K, shouldbe viewed in that light and not as a confrontation between state political leadership and the Army. A publicdebate on such a sensitive security issue is best avoided.

PHOTOGRAPH: PIB

Chief Minister of Jammu andKashmir Omar Abdullah

>>

SP’s LAND FORCES10

AFSPA / F I RST

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whenever law and order situation improvesin a ‘disturbed area’ and we have elected rep-resentatives governing the state, they find itdifficult to continue with this Act. the rea-sons are:l Democratic societies all over the world

abhor large scale and extended deploy-ment of troops in their midst.

l human rightists and the media over theyears have dubbed the AFSPA as a ‘dra-conian’ power given to the militaryagainst the civilians. It has become aconvenient tool for the secessionist ele-ments, and those in opposition, toembarrass the government and demandwithdrawal of troops.

l Despite strict discipline and training,there are aberrations of human rightsviolations by troops. these aberrationscan be reduced but seldom eliminated inthe kind of operational duties whichhave to be performed.

AFSPA, Human Rights and the ArmyKeeping in view the incidents of humanrights (hr) violations by some personnelwhen AFSPA is applicable, the Army, over theyears, has taken several preventive measures.these include setting up of human rights cellsat Army, command and corps headquartersto monitor, seek factual details and take followup action on all hr-related cases (receivedfrom any source) and to maintain records.these cells, after investigations, prepare a‘Detailed Investigation reports’ (investigationis conducted jointly with civil authoritiessometimes) for submission to higher head-quarters and preparation of affidavits to theNational human rights commission.

According to statistics made available tome in July 2011, 1,485 cases of humanrights violations were reported in KashmirValley from 1990 to July 2011. Out of these,1,439 cases (96.9 per cent) were provedfalse. In 43 cases proved true, 96 personnelwere punished. As punishment, four officerswere cashiered/awarded rigorous imprison-ment (rI), 33 personnel dismissed from serv-ice, 17 personnel reduced in ranks/awardedimprisonment in military custody, one per-son forfeited seniority for promotion, and 14personnel were awarded ‘Severe repri-mand’. I doubt if any civil court would haveacted faster or stricter on this issue.

there has also been a strong drive on con-tinuous training and briefing of troopsemployed in such operations to respect

human rights and avoid collateral damage. A‘code of conduct’ (appreciated by theSupreme court) is issued to every individual.the ‘rules of engagement’ have been modi-fied. Wherever possible, operations are con-ducted jointly with the civil police and madeaccessible to the media. In the last year and ahalf, beside preventing infiltration and con-ducting only intelligence based joint opera-tions, the Army in Kashmir Valley under LtGeneral Ata hasnain, has taken some extraor-dinary people-friendly initiatives. theseinclude reducing visibility of personnel andconvoys on roads during the day, ‘Jee Janab’(cultural sensitivity) and ‘Awam aur Jawan,Aman hai Mukam’ (the soldiers and populacewant peace as their objective) and the KashmirPremier League matches to engage the youth.these initiatives have made substantial con-tribution in improving civil military relationsand ensuring peaceful summer.

Notwithstanding the above-mentionedcivilised measures, there is still a need for theArmy to become more transparent on humanrights violation cases and where necessary,expedite sanction from the central govern-ment to prosecute personnel guilty of delib-erate human rights violations. that would bein the interest of Army discipline as well as forcreating confidence in public.

AFSPA in J&Kthe chief Minister of J&K, supported by hispolitical heavyweight father in the UPA’sUnion cabinet, the Left Front and someother party leaders have made a strong pitchfor revocation of AFSPA from selected dis-tricts in the state. the political view point isthat these districts are no longer considered‘disturbed’, our relations with Pakistan areimproving, and the AFSPA-considered as ‘anoppressive military regime’ needs to be selec-tively revoked to provide the requisite atmos-pherics of bringing peace to the state. the

chief Minister is justified in considering theissue although it is apparent that under thecover of this demand, there is also an ele-ment of political expediency to hijack theAFSPA agenda from opposition parties andseparatists.

Unfortunately, there is considerable con-fused thinking about the AFSPA. A memberof the centre appointed interlocutors on J&Khas stated publically that “in a free India,which attained freedom by practising non-violence, laws like the AFSPA, which jeopar-dise democratic and human rights, have norelevance”. One wonders if the Union homeMinister would agree with such an argu-ment! the interlocutor stated further that“despite various suggestions made from timeto time to the State Government, there is noworthwhile monitoring mechanism toensure effective implementation of recom-mendations for ameliorating the conditionof the people.” And yet, the same inter-locutor opines that “programmes like Oper-ation Sadbhavna, designed, managed andfinanced by the security forces for providingeducation and health-care facilities, shouldbe ideally left to the local bodies, as has beenthe practice in other states.” In the currentgovernance environment in J&K, it is difficultto see any linkage between implementationof State development programmes and the AFSPA.

the Army, opposed to selective revoca-tion of the AFSPA, believes that PakistanArmy has not given up its efforts to supportmilitancy and terrorism in the State. thecurrent run of peace is, at best, fragile. thesecessionist elements in the State have notbeen adequately neutralised. they continueto provide logistic support to anti-nationalelements and have used, or created, oppor-tunities during many summers in the past—except last summer—to raise ‘azadi’ flagsand slogans. Selective revocation of AFSPAwill make its assets (including Srinagar Air-field) and convoys vulnerable. Selective rev-ocation of AFSPA may also revive overt andcovert militancy in these areas, as has beenexperienced in Imphal in the past. the Armyfeels that more time and effort is required tobring about normalcy in the State.

Pakistan Army and the ISI have alwaysbeen a major factor in the militancy swingsof J&K. they treat and nurture Jehadi terror-ist groups as a strategic asset and a hedge onPakistan’s eastern and Western borders. theISI continues to support these groups, their

training and communication networks inPOK despite its pre-occupation on theAfghan border. the Army believes that thereis no change in Pakistan Army’s strategicagenda. continuing military-terroristsnexus in Pakistan has been confirmed in thelatest ‘Memogate’ exposure.

ConclusionI have no doubt that every Indian would liketo see the end of terrorism and militants’ vio-lence in J&K. More so the security forces,who have lost 6,013 personnel since 1988due to such violence in the state. this is pos-sible only through a synergetic effort of thepolitical leadership, state administration andthe security forces including the Army, onthe ground. the synergetic effort has to befocused on public; to restore its confidence inthe polity and administration; to ensure thatit denies support to militants and enablestheir isolation. the militants will then eitherfall in line or get eliminated.

While it is desirable to give more and morepolitical space to the State leadership, theAFSPA is necessary till we are fully confidentof checking infiltration from across the borderand the overt and covert support to the mili-tancy in the State is reduced considerably. theneed for legal cover to soldiers conductingcounter-militancy operations is unquestion-able. Due to changed circumstances, it isessential to review the conduct of operationsin the areas suggested for revocation of theAFSPA. My suggestions would be to (a) fur-ther reduce army footprints in all civil areas.Let the civil police take over operations in theareas recommended by the State chief Min-ister and call for military only when the oper-ation is beyond its capability (b) militaryconvoys passing through these areas shouldcontinue to be protected (c) the Army shouldbe more transparent in its dealing withhuman rights aberrations, and (d) the centralGovernment should explain reasons when-ever permission to prosecute a person accusedin human rights violations is not given.

I believe that it is incorrect and unfair onthe part of political authorities to put pres-sure on the Army through social and regularmedia. this is not in the interest of objectivedecision-making or cordial civil militaryrelations. Political leaders in ‘disturbedareas’ need to assess the security situationand resolve such issues through a consensusin Unified command instead of making sen-sitive security issues a public agenda.

It is incorrect and unfairon the part of politicalauthorities to put pressure on the Armythrough social and regular media

The Indian Army has acquired its firstmobile robot, the remotely operatedvehicle (rOV) ‘Daksh’, which will

equip the force to handle and clear impro-vised explosives devices and other haz-ardous objects.

the first batch of six units of a totalconsignment of 20 was handed over tothe Army in the premises of the researchand Development establishment (engi-neers) (r&De(e), part of the Defenceresearch and Development Organisation(DrDO) that has developed the indigenoussystem at Dighi near Pune.

the rOV which underwent extensiveuser trials in Jammu and Kashmir prior tolimited series production has “a robustmanipulator arm having six degrees offreedom” which can be extended toremotely extract IeDs, in addition to a

detachable x-ray equipment that can beused to confirm the presence of the explo-sives, he said.

Daksh which can also come handy foranti-terrorist operations in addition to thebattlefield exigencies, will be an “invalu-able asset” for the bomb disposal units ofthe Army, according to Major Generalrakesh Bassi, Director General (combatengineers), who accepted the rOV onbehalf of the Army.

S. Guruprasad, Director r&De(e) said,“Daksh is capable of climbing stairs aswell as negotiating cross country terrainand has an on board shotgun for blastingthrough door locks and breaking thewindshield to handle likely car bombs.” “Itis also capable of towing a suspected vehi-cle away from a crowded area.”

S. Sundaresh, Defence Secretary and

chief controller r&D of DrDO, said,“Daksh has been developed indigenouslywith the involvement of private sectorand has strengthened an industrial base in the country for development of

robotics. he said that the state-of-the-art

design of ‘Daksh’ offered good exportpotential with possible international collaborations.

F I R S T

The remotely operated vehicle Daksh will come handy for anti-terror-ist operations in addition to the battlefield exigencies, and will be anasset for the bomb disposal units of the Army

Army’s First Mobile RobotPHOTOGRAPH: SP Guide Pubns

n COLONEL (RETD) ALI AHMED

The cABINet cOMMIttee ONSecurity has recently approved theraising of a Mountain Strike corps(MSc) along with two independentmountain brigades. the MSc is to

be located in the eastern theatre with itsheadquarters at Panagarh and the two inde-pendent mountain brigades would be atLadakh and Garhwal himalayas.

It will take time to set up the MSc as itinvolves an expansion by 86,000 troops,reportedly the largest since mechanisationin the 1980s. even as the organisationbusies itself with the personnel, acquisi-tions, budgeting, logistics and infrastructuredetails; there is a necessity to also concen-trate on the very purpose of the MSc, in theinterim. What will it be deployed for andemployed to do? how will it deliver on itsobjectives? What are the implications interms of the ‘two front’ rubric? the nuclearbackdrop cannot be lost sight of either. thisarticle attempts to set the stage for discus-sions by attempting an outline of the impli-cations of the capability from a publicinformation point of view. It first discussesthe reason why an MSc is to come aboutand then on what operational task it wouldbe required to undertake.

The Necessitythe logic behind the proposal is that thereneeds to be an offensive component to deter-rence. currently, India’s is a defensive deter-rent posture with respect to china. thephilosophy subscribed to is deterrence bydenial. the idea is to make any ingress socostly that the attacker would have to paycosts out of proportion to the gains made,even while making any such gains a ques-tionable proposition. however, in relation tothe nature of the adversary and its strength,it is assessed that such deterrence lendsitself to being tested by the adversary. Inlight of china’s military modernisation, itrequires reinforcing.

china has been creating the requisiteinfrastructure and rapidly increasing itsdeployment of force capacity. the resourcesfor operations will require placement overthe preceding summer seasons and subjectto perma-frost, etc over the duration.Besides, the figures that find mention in themedia is of the need for half a million troopsto be placed in perspective. the operationswill be at the very end of a long line of com-munications, where the terrain will dictatedeployment levels.

If ‘teaching a lesson’ is intended, then itwould suffice for India to give a ‘bloodynose’ in emulating Vietnam. For this, defen-sive deterrence is adequate and is being fur-ther strengthened by the two divisionsunder raising. these will not only thickendefences, but also provide sectoral reservesfor counter attack and hold lines in depth incase adverse situations develop.

however, given the chinese depth it hasin military resources, both manpower andmaterial, it would be able to pay a formida-ble price for the gains it seeks. territorialgains will be tangible, but political ends arethe more consequential. Learning from the1979 lessons, china may be prepared to paya higher price. this means that even if thereare formidable defences, effective defencewill be difficult, all things being equal.

With the MSc, India is catering forexpansive war aims not impossible to visu-

alise, such as may be the case when a hege-monic war is forced on it. china is after allthe only challenger to the offshore balancer,the US. India, due to its own power trajec-tory, has become a player and may on thataccount need to be ‘fixed’. the capability forfighting back needs to be on hand frombefore. the MSc therefore helps decrease thepossibility of the ‘more likely’, even whileenabling coping with the ‘less likely’, but inthe ‘worst case’ scenario.

From the approval of the MSc, itappears that a switchover to deterrence bypunishment has been deemed desirable. theraisings of the two divisions currently underway in Nagaland and Assam will ensurethat deterrence by denial is not neglected.Supplementing this with deterrence by pun-ishment will only reinforce deterrence.therefore, the raising of the MSc is as muchthe creation of a capability, as also an exer-cise in deterrence in demonstrating resolve.It shifts India’s posture from defensive deter-rence to offensive deterrence.

Anticipated Missionsthe Kargil War has proven that it takes con-siderable force levels to retake the lost terri-tory. this owes to higher force ratios for attackin mountains of the order of 9:1. Multi-direc-tional attacks, attacks in echelons, holding offirm base, infiltration manoeuvres, securinglines of communications, recreating reserves,etc are all tasks that consume troops. thisimplies that offensive capability even of theorder of an MSc will be fairly meagre inmountains. the operational ambition mustbe tailored accordingly. An offensive capabil-ity gives the theatre commander an ability torespond as also to be proactive, but the objec-tives must be ‘doable’.

A template for thinking on strike corpsvalid for strike corps in the plains sector canbe adapted for the MSc. In terms of responseoptions, there is the counter attack mode inwhich the territory taken is to be recapturedthrough a corps counter attack. this wouldbe reactive and would be dependent on thenature and location of the enemy attack.the aim would be to retrieve the territoryand restore the status quo ante. Since Kargilhas proven that retaking territory can provecostly in terms of casualties, there is a casefor a counter stroke or a corps level ‘riposte’.this must aim at slicing off the territory lostby targeting the launch pad or base area,thereby enabling retaking of the territory inthe long haul.

the second option is in launching acounter offensive. this could be at a placeand choice of own choosing, other than in

areas in which enemy forces have made sig-nificant headway. the aim would be to takeat least an equivalently valuable territory soas to arrive at a trade off on the negotiatingtable. It will help in political face saving bypresenting the enemy with a military quidpro quo.

the more significant capability that theMSc confers is the ability for proactive offen-sive. this enables wresting of the initiativeat the very outset, thereby keeping theenemy reactive. the prerequisite for this is atimely political go-ahead, predicated onpolitical will. this is not infeasible in light ofthe national interests in a given strategic cir-cumstance. Proactive offensives may also bein the context of an ongoing conflict inanother theatre requiring response in thetheatre of location of the MSc. the latter ismore likely to be the case since India’sstrategic doctrine is not compliance butdeterrence.

A pre-emptive offensive, based on situa-tional awareness of imminent enemyattack, is a possible variant. Since retakingterritory is a difficult exercise, preventingloss of territory may prove alluring. how-ever, this would entail prior preparedness,the levels of which are difficult to sustainover a long duration. Preemption strategiescan also lead to misperceptions, resulting ina competitive ‘cold start’ scenario. thisundercuts crisis stability with its unwelcomestrategic implications.

the MSc need not necessarily beemployed as a whole. It must be capable ofinduction and employment in its constituentforce levels, be it in its divisions and brigadesized forces. Mountains make firepower pro-vision and sustenance of large forces diffi-cult. therefore, the MSc must be exercisedfor employment not only as a whole but alsoin its constituent parts. the nature of the

ongoing conflict may be such that it may notbe employed as an integrated fighting forma-tion, but employed piecemeal. If the KargilWar is taken as precedence, in case there isterritory that has been lost to enemy actionand there is an over riding strategic need forlimiting the area of conflict, then the MScmay find action only in part.

the ability for recreation of reservesmust exist so that even if partially employed,the MSc has the ability to recoup its capa-bility by absorbing either forces inductedinto the theatre or preexisting reserveslocated therein. the corps must be capableof taking under command additional forces.

the MSc must be versatile enough formoving out of the theatre for tasks elsewhere.the possibility of diplomatic action keepingone of the possible two fronts quiet cannot beruled out in light of the precedence. In such acircumstance, the MSc is unlikely to sit out awar. the familiarity with the ‘other’ frontmust be equally high, given that the likeli-hood of outbreak of conflict to the west ishigher in the middle-term.

the MSc will, in such circumstance, becommitted to an operationally happeningsituation. the employment therefore couldwell be directly in operations with telescopedpreparatory procedures due to time pressureor for posturing. In the latter role, its verymovement would be of significance, imply-ing that a certain transparency may accom-pany the move. therefore, demands onsituational awareness, flexibility, resilienceand leadership at all levels will be exponen-tial. Of considerable importance would bethe manner it is able to retrieve, reel in,reform and re-launch. the transit willinvolve multiple modes of transport overgreat distances.

even as the MSc is It enabled, it would befighting in underdeveloped terrain. this willentail being Spartan, self-reliant and have theability to work with traditional movementmethods such as with porter, pony and man-pack. high fitness levels, especially to transitto high altitude warfare in early timeframe,would be sine qua non. As a costly nationalresource, the MSc would require having anelite ethos. Its psychological conditioningmust be of an equivalent order as its materialpreparation. All things being equal, the MScmay have little else to rely on.

Politically Rightthe decision on the MSc is not only about thecapability and the implications. It is also aboutthe message that India is, by its raisings, send-ing to china. the message is one of deter-rence and resolve. It is not an aggressive one,but the second prong of India’s strategy. thestrategy of engagement is well-known. theannouncement prior to the Defence Secretarylevel talks between the two countries earlythis month, suggests that India wishes it to bemade known, that it is not negotiating from aposition of weakness but of equivalence. thisis not only a message for china, but also forIndia. Since the negotiations will eventuallyentail a ‘give and take’, India would be unwill-ing to be dictated on this. If it has the requisitemilitary power, then it would be making con-cessions if any, as the sovereign’s decision andnot as something forced upon. therefore, theMSc raising has to be seen as fulfilling thepolitical purposes too. But in so far as the mil-itary is concerned, India would require givingthe military such a fine shape that chinaknows that half century on since 1962, itfaces an India with a difference.

Offensive in the MountainsThe decision on the Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) is not only about the capability and the implications. It isalso about the message that India is, by its raisings, sending to China. The message is one of deterrence andresolve. It is not an aggressive one, but the second prong of India’s strategy

PHOTOGRAPH: Indian Army


MOUNTA IN STR I K E CORPS <<

The MSC need not neces-sarily be employed as awhole. It must be capa-ble of induction andemployment in its con-stituent force levels, be itin its divisions andbrigade sized forces.

A patrol in the mountains

T ECHNOLOGY>>


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ArtILLerY GUNS AND rOcKetlauncher systems have recentlywitnessed a quantum enhance-ment of their capability of accu-rate firing. this has been made

possible by accurate navigation systems onthe modern 155mm guns, which allowsartillery to manoeuvre from forward con-centration areas/hides to pre-determinedgun positions without the conventional ‘gunconvoys’. Accurate navigation and laying ofguns is also possible on dark nights and dur-ing the most adverse weather condition offog or low visibility, and at the same speedand accuracy as in daylight.

Gun/rocket batteries would no longerrequire survey. Modern technology has sorevolutionised artillery manoeuvre that eachgun has the ability to be independent anddeployed in an autonomous mode. this isextremely important especially in a highintensity air or counter fire threat by surfacemeans. the move and deployment is also pos-sible without the global positioning system(GPS), which may be frequently jammed inbattle. All the above capabilities are possible

due to accurate navigation capabilities whichare onboard modern 155mm guns.

Artillery philosophy lays emphasis ondestruction rather than neutralisation, andhence the importance of accuracy of deliverymeans. With improved pointing systems,guns are able to align on the targets and bringdown accurate and consistent fire quickly.Such navigation and pointing/ alignment sys-tems also have the ability to align on the movein a shoot and scoot mode. When it comes tothe firing session, the gun shall be aligned “onthe move” to reduce the delay to manoeuvre,be laid on the designated target as quick aspossible, shoot directly to the target withoutneeds of fire adjustment and scoot to the next firing position.

contemporary gun systems have a rangein excess of 40 km, while multi-rocketlaunches can fire up to a distance of 80 to150 km. With their enhanced ranges, highaccuracy of positioning and azimuth are ofcritical importance.

today’s navigation systems enable mod-ern artillery guns to have the following com-bined performances:

l An orientation accuracy enabling firingerrors contribution limited to 35 m at 40km firing range, therefore better than 0.9miles.

l A fixation accuracy after a tactical trav-elled distance of 40 km of 20 m ceP(0.05 per cent of tD) in X,Y and fivemetre ceP in Z (0.02 per cent of tD).

l A fast alignment time of five minutes andless than five minutes in case of “align-ment on the move”.

l An alignment on the move without theaid of GPS or Glonass.Direct firing capabilities and night firing

capabilities are now possible with the intro-duction of modern thermal image basedsighting systems. these sights are directlymounted on the gun and can have a detec-tion range of two km and engage a target atnight at more than one km.

the most recent artillery programmes inthe world like for instance the truck mountedcAeSAr of Nexter and Archer of BAe, thetowed guns Fh77B05 of BAe and Fh2000 ofStK or the German DONAr, are all equippedwith the most accurate navigation, headingand pointing system, sighting systems whichenable them to have unsurpassed firing, andmanoeuvring capabilities.

the Indian Army has entered into aperiod of massive 155mm gun acquisitioneither through global tendering or throughindigenous efforts. It should be ambitious inits requirements in order to have the mostmodern 155mm guns with accurate naviga-tion, elevation and azimuth system in orderto defend the nation efficiently.

Modern Trends in Artillery & Navigation SystemsThe Indian Army has entered into a period of massive 155mm gun acquisition either through global tenderingor through indigenous efforts. It should be ambitious in its requirements in order to have the most modern155mm guns with accurate navigation, elevation and azimuth system in order to defend the nation efficiently.

PHOTOGRAPHS: KMW, BAE Systems, Nexter

Modern technology hasso revolutionisedartillery manoeuvre thateach gun has the abilityto be independent anddeployed in anautonomous mode

DONAR; (below left) DONAR front view; (belowmiddle) CAESER; (below right) FH77B05


ARMY ’S VA LOUR <<

n SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

DeScrIBeD AS ONe OF the largestand most ambitious war gamesIndia has ever conducted, exer-cise Sudarshan Shakti whichplayed out over the last six weeks

in India’s desert sector, was part of a hugeeffort to validate the integrated theatreoffensive concept. contrary to stubborn per-ceptions that the Army is a bloated and lum-bering force, Sudarshan Shakti aims to testand confirm fresh concepts, manoeuvresand structures that will finally allow one ofthe world’s largest land forces to fight its nextwar more nimbly, with drastically lessresponse time and much greater lethality.that, at least, is the aim.

the force level commitments for exerciseSudarshan Shakti have been unprecedented.the Army committed 50,000 troops, 500armoured vehicles including improved t- 72Ajeya, t- 90S Bhishma, Arjun battle tanks andBMP-II armoured personnel carriers to leadthe swift assault across simulated enemy lines,with back-up support from the Army’s artilleryand rocket regiments and the Indian Air Force(IAF) assault helicopters providing cover.

Officially, the government has describedSudarshan Shakti as a trendsetter for the “Inte-grated theatre concept”, adding that, “thetransformation of the force is at making theArmy a more agile, versatile, lethal and net-worked force. In this exercise, we will be tryingout new structures, strategies, and test beds of

an integrated, seamless air-land battle.”A decade since Operation Parakram—

the touchstone confrontation in 2002 thatcompelled the enormous introspection thatthe Army went into to improve logistics andresponsiveness—the Army is confident thatit is a fleeter force.

“there is a transformation at play, whichwe are testing and validating. At the end ofSudarshan Shakti, we will have a clear pic-ture of whether the decisions we have takenwork, and how well they work when com-pared to past practices,” said Lt General San-jeev Langer, GOc 21 corps, India’s mostpotent strike formation.

While the Army still refuses to acknowl-edge any “cold Start” doctrine, the overarch-ing purpose of Sudarshan Shakti is quiteclear— test the deployment of more compactfighting units and formations without wait-ing for massing of forces. essentially, the inte-grated use of fighting elements includingmechanised infantry, main battle tanks withclose air support, forward air control andmaintenance operations provided by IAFassault helicopters. the Army’s rocket andfield artillery regiments provide the requiredsoftening of targets at stand-off range as for-ward units mount a blistering offensive.

the integrated battlespace concept is notnew to the military. It has conducted severalexercises in the last few years to war gamefights in an environment drenched in net-work-centric signals and sensors. In otherwords, a dramatically more transparent bat-

tlefield where surveillance, reconnaisance,communications intelligence, support meas-ures, jamming and early warning take on adeeply important role, one that could turnthe tide of the fight at hand.

While the Indian military is regularly crit-icised for war gaming in isolation without anymeaningful jointmanship between the Serv-ices, Lt General Langer said, “With air supportplaying a major role in future battles,increased air assets of the IAF and IndianArmy have been employed in an integratedmanner. employment of attack helicopters,airborne special forces, air maintenance werepractised during the exercise.”

the concepts on transforming the Army,that have been put through the motions atSudarshan Shakti, were authored by theArmy’s Southern commander Lt GeneralA.K. Singh, an armoured corps officer, andchief of the Army Staff, Lt General V.K.Singh, an infantryman.

Like the previous war games, includingVijayee Bhava, Vayu Shakti and Brazenchariots, the Army and the IAF also madefull use of space assets during SudarshanShakti. For instance, the classified joint oper-ations centre in Barmer sector of rajasthan,that oversaw the intelligence and communi-cations feeds during the exercise, had real-time satellite feeds and information fromother sources.

“the use of space-based elements in thefuture battle will be a standard. We have cer-tain technologies, and are testing some new

ones. All of these are pieces of the overall net-work centric standard that we are attemptingto build. It is a long process, but we are work-ing towards it,” said Lt General Langer.

While India did inform Pakistan aboutthe exercise well in advance, the November26 attack by NAtO in the Mohmandprovince that killed as many as 24 Pakistanitroops, gave the Indian exercise a new com-plexion. certain sections of the Pakistanimedia interpreted Sudarshan Shakti to be aprovocative pressure tactic on Pakistan bythe Indian Army. In India, however, theArmy dismissed all notions of the exercisebeing Pakistan-centric.

“the exercise has certain objectives, andis not pointed at any country. We are testingcertain concepts which we need for anyfuture war, but this is not country-specific.We have certain objectives. But historically,our Army has always played only the defen-sive role,” said Lt General Langer.

exercise Sudarshan Shakti played out atime when the Army is steeped in efforts tomodernise precisely the strike elements atplay. Parallel efforts to procure new fieldartillery, stalled for more than a quarter cen-tury, are finally expected to take off in the nextmonths, the Army is looking forward tospeedier deliveries of the licence-built t-90Stank and the Arjun Mk.II will move into aphase of crucial trials in the desert sector nextmonth. Separately, the Army is also lookingto procure new battlefield communicationequipment and sensors of all kinds.

Exercise Sudarshan ShaktiThe exercise aims to test and confirm fresh concepts, manoeuvres and structures that will finally allow one ofthe world’s largest land forces to fight its next war more nimbly, with drastically less response time and muchgreater lethality

PHOTOGRAPHS: Special Correspondent

9K58 Smerch & Pinaka MBRLsystems providing fire support

Infantry in action

Armoured Assault usingBMP-II Sarath

Armoured Assault using T-90

Armoured Assault usingT-90s, Arjun MBTs and BMP-II Saraths

D I P LOMACY>>

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6/2011

n LT GENERAL (RETD) HARWANT SINGH

INDIA’S PrOPeNSItY tO ShOOt at itsfeet is indeed phenomenal. Be it thegiveaway of tibet, Shimla Agreementor Operation Blue Star, which resultedin the killing of Prime Minister Indira

Gandhi, or intervention in Sri Lankathrough Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)which resulted in the killing of Prime Minis-ter rajiv Gandhi. the more recent case beingthe handling of yoga guru ramdev andAnna hazare agitations; the flip-flop on Lok-pal Bill; and foreign direct investment (FDI).the list is endless.

the replay of the ‘Great Game’ inAfghanistan, at which the British had failed,is the latest misadventure by India. russianstoo had to beat a hasty retreat and nowAmerica and the UN will depart, withoutleaving any trace of peace or stability. In thecase of russian intervention, it was Amer-ica and Pakistan which played the spoilsport and now it is Pakistan which is playingthe double game to negate American andUN efforts in Afghanistan. In the long run,it is Pakistan and china which will rallyagainst the Indo-Afghan strategic allianceand there is little that India will be able to doin this case.

It is Afghanistan that has been the mostdifficult country for military campaigns andequally difficult to govern. Both the natureof terrain, climate and the warlike tribes thatinhabit the land create an amalgam ofharshness and lawlessness. even Alexanderthe Great experienced considerable difficul-ties in traversing through this land on hisway to India.

While a trade agreement between Indiaand Afghanistan makes sense, more so ifPakistan too is taken on board; it is the term“strategic alliance”, covering many areas ofcooperation between the two countries,which is irritating Pakistan.

this alliance covers a wide areas of tradeand infrastructure; creating facilities toexploit minerals and hydrocarbons, educa-tion, etc. And more importantly, trainingand equipping Afghan National SecurityForces. It also includes regular political con-tact and cooperation at the United Nations.this agreement has vastly enlarged thescope and span of cooperation withAfghanistan and has understandably raisedalarm signals in Pakistan.

A consortium of Indian companiescalled AFIScO, which includes JSW Steel,JSW Ispat, Monnet Ispat, etc and public sec-tor companies like the Steel Authority ofIndia Limited (SAIL) have cornered therights to mine iron ore from hajigak groupof mines (B, c and D blocks). But for trans-portation of this ore, a railway line is to bebuilt from a port on the Iranian coast (closeto Pakistani port of Gwadar being built bythe chinese) and from there acrossAfghanistan to hajigak. Once the talibanscome back, the operation of these mines andthe railway will be in serious jeopardy.

Issues like India training the Afghansecurity forces, and the term “strategicalliance”, is what is conjuring up Pakistan’sworst fears more than the other provisionsof the agreement. Pak military has alwaysdreamt of exercising control over Kabul,albeit through a substitute. the possibility ofthis perceived enemy gaining influence inKabul is an anathema for Pakistan. Speakingto David Bradlay of Atlantic Media com-pany, General Musharraf reflected the Pak

military’s view when he said, “InAfghanistan, there has been a kind of proxyconflict going on between Pakistan andIndia. India is trying to create an anti-PakAfghanistan and has the vision to dominatethe region and weaken Pakistan.”

President hamid Karzai’s writ does notrun over greater parts of Afghanistan. hehas failed to get taliban to join in a dialogue.the recent killing of former PresidentBurhanuddin rabbani who was appointedby Karzai as an interlocutor with the talibanis an indication that the latter is not willingto accommodate Karzai in any future politi-cal dispensation. Pakistan’s own designs andits full backing of haqqani group is a factorthat will inevitably play its full course afterthe American and United Nations (UN)troops leave Afghanistan. Pakistan’s obses-sion with ‘strategic depth’, flawed as it maybe, is the raison d’être of its Afghan policy. Itwould not like India to fish in, what Pakistanconsiders its backwaters. Pakistan has hadan inalienable relationship with the talibanand other terrorist organisations. It has trav-elled too far down the terrorist highway topull back.

American frustration with Pakistan’scontinued support to the haqqani networkfinally came out in the open, when AdmiralMike Mullen was forthright in his accusationof Pakistan’s ‘double game’ of running withthe hares and hunting with the hounds. theUS President Barack Obama and formerPresident Bill clinton too have warned Pak-istan against this duality in its stance. Atsome point, America will distance itself fromPakistan. America cutting down aid willimpact rawalpindi, but will not dissuade itto delink itself from taliban. On the otherhand, it will drive Pakistan more and moreinto the arms of china.

establishing the taliban regime in Kabulgives Pakistan the added advantage. In thatit would have neither the influence nor thepower to aggressively assert Afghanistan’shistorical claims to territories seized fromdefeated Afghan rulers by the ImperialBritish power. the British had termed thenew boundary line as Durand Line.

While Pakistan is likely to view Indian

alliance with Afghanistan as an attempt tosqueeze it from both sides, china may appre-hend its exploitation of Afghan mineralwealth in jeopardy. china has already takencontract of copper mines in Afghanistan andis currently extracting this valuable mineral,as also exploring the possibility of more con-tracts. Moreover, china will be loathed at theprospect of the spread of Indian influence inthis important region. china’s relentlessquest for hydrocarbons and minerals in thisregion would seek to negate Indian influencein these countries so that its relentless questfor hydrocarbons and minerals go unhin-dered.

On its part India does not have the capac-ity and will to carry through this strategicalliance with Afghanistan, especially whenPakistan in cohorts with china, militatesagainst it. For India there is no air or landlink with Afghanistan except through Iran.the geography itself is a major roadblockagainst this alliance with Kabul. It will alsobring to naught Manmohan Singh’s persist-ent efforts of befriending Pakistan. Flip-flopin its policy on the issue of granting mostfavoured nation (MFN) status to India is theresult of uncertainty in the direction Pakistan wants to take; though it realises the tremendous economic advantage Pak-istan will have from this trade agreementwith India. In any case, India is wellacquainted with the duality of Pak politics.

President Karzai has been makingfriendly overtures to Pakistan and calling itAfghanistan’s “twin brother”, but he knowsit well that amendment is not possible andPakistan has a different game plan in mind.With the dateline of 2014 approaching fast,when the bulk of American and UN troops

will leave Afghanistan; and Pakistan’s inten-tions known, he has tried to latch on to theonly country he could find willing to helphim. On India’s part, the contours of thisalliance and their likely fallout on Pakistanhave simply not been fully thought through.

Given the constraints of geography andIndia’s own limitations to go the whole hogwith Kabul, the deal should have been purelytrade oriented; conceding Pakistan’s legiti-mate interests in that country and shouldhave taken the latter on board in thisarrangement. Karzai too needs to build bet-ter relations with Pakistan and assuage themisgivings and apprehensions. Peace in thisregion is in the best interests of Afghanistan,Pakistan and India. For India to have trans-border trade with central Asian republicsand revival of something akin to the silkroute can only be realised by fully involvingPakistan in this grandiose scheme, the lattertoo stands to enormously gain from suchtrade. that is the reality we must come toterms with and not give in to some fancifulscenarios. On the other hand, china is wellon its way to building trade corridors withPakistan and the Middle east and finally aland bridge linking the Pacific coastline withthe Atlantic.

the more recent development whereNAtO helicopters attacked a Pakistan Armypost on the Afghan border, killing two dozensoldiers has resulted in a nationwide protestsagainst America and brought the Pak-USrelations to a breaking point. While the pre-cise reasons for this attack on the Pakistanpost are not clear, with both sides fielding dif-ferent versions, General Ashfaq ParvezKayani had ordered his troops to retaliatewith fire any future attack by North Atlantictreaty Organisation (NAtO)/US troops. Pak-istan has since taken over Shamshi Air Basein Balochistan, from where drone attackswere being launched by the US. Before leav-ing, the US troops destroyed stores that couldnot be carried. china has lost no time to riseto Pakistan’s defence. the immediate fall outof this incident is that Pakistan has stoppedpassage of NAtO supplies through its terri-tory. More recently, it is threatening to denyPak space to US aircraft. Pakistan declined toattend the Bonn conference in order to dis-cuss the future of Afghanistan after the UStroops withdraw. this conference is designedto engage all interested parties with vestedinterest in Afghanistan, the principalamongst these being Pakistan. While Pak-USrelations will not break, it is likely to remainstrained and cooperation will decrease, atleast in the immediate future.

Indian diplomacy has so far not donewell with countries on its immediate periph-ery. Given the ground reality, this hoppingacross Pakistan and working out a strategictie up with Kabul to the exclusion of Pak-istan, has its own pitfalls. All Indian invest-ments in Afghanistan could come to naught.

this alliance with Kabul will bring addedpressure from china on the border withIndia, as detailed by the Institute for DefenceStudies and Analyses (IDSA) and the terror-ist activity in Jammu and Kashmir could pos-sibly increase. Such are the dynamics of thegeopolitical realities of the region. Pakistanis quite unmindful of its disastrous policiesin building Jehadi network and theinevitable fallout of these on itself and theconsequent instability.

The author is a former Deputy Chief of ArmyStaff (Policy and Systems), Indian Army.

Indo-Afghan Strategic AllianceWhile a trade agreement between India and Afghanistan makes sense, more so if Pakistan too is taken onboard; it is the term “strategic alliance”, covering many areas of cooperation between the two countries,which is irritating Pakistan

Indian diplomacy has so far not done well with countries on itsimmediate periphery

PHOTOGRAPH: PIB

Dr Manmohan Singh with President ofAfghanistan Hamid Karzai in New Delhi

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

The ASIA-PAcIFIc eNcOMPASSeSnumerous countries including Aus-tralia and New Zealand in the Southand its locus in the Association ofSouth east Asian Nations (ASeAN).

In a world where a bulk of the consumers inmost countries reside outside the country’sborder, Asia Pacific economic cooperation(APec) itself comprises 40 per cent of theglobal population. Many of these economiesare growing faster than the world averageand have together generated 56 per cent ofglobal GDP in 2010. While the ASeAN spon-sored ASeAN Free trade Area (AFtA) is gain-ing momentum, the east Asia Summit (eAS)too has focused on issues of trade, energy andsecurity. Non-traditional security issues thataffect the well-being, dignity and survival ofhumanity too need to be addressed. Futuresuccess of the region will depend uponimproved global integration with the worldbecoming flatter in every aspect. coopera-tion in the region is overshadowed with strifein the South china Sea and lack of appropri-ate regional security arrangements. Withworld seaborne trade pegged to reach41,800 billion tonne by 2014, half theglobal super tanker traffic transiting thisregion and lack of a multilateral approachto combat maritime security challengesholistically; strife and conflict are likely toheighten in the Asia Pacific region.

Regional GroupingsAsia is a region with large standing armies,four declared nuclear weapon states, coun-tries engaged in production and export ofmissiles and seven of the 10 most populouscountries of the world. Its demography, civil-isation and political diversity, provide addi-tional volatility. It is estimated that in the next25 years, Asia will account for 57 per cent ofworld GDP even though recession in the Westaffects the region. South east Asia derives itsgeostrategic significance by virtue of its loca-tion of sitting astride the waters that connectthe Indian and the Pacific Oceans and strate-gic chokepoints of the Malacca, Lombok andSunda Straits. Sea lines traversing Asia-Pacific carry 50 per cent of global trade and33 per cent of global oil. More than 550 mil-lion people inhabit South east Asia andregional economies total to more than $1 tril-lion (`50,00,000 crore) . economies of the USand its allies in the region depend on securityof the sea lanes and stability of the region.About 97 per cent of Indian trade is by seaand the $60 billion (`3,00,000 crore) annualIndia-china trade is predominantly by sea.Major subregional groups are like ASeANand South Asian Association for regionalcooperation (SAArc) and cross-subregionalblocs are ASeAN Free trade Area (APtA),APec, Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral technical and economic cooperation(BIMStec), etc. Bilateral trade pacts are beingpursued for deep integration. Subregions are also building up network with other coun-tries and regions separately, for example,ASeAN+3, ASeAN+6, ASeAN-china,ASeAN-India. though trade is the main vehi-cle of collaboration, other areas are alsoincluded in the cooperation activities.

ASeA, established in 1967 as a geopoliti-cal and economic organisation of 10 coun-tries of South east Asia, has expanded overthe years, aiming for accelerated economicgrowth, social progress, cultural develop-ment, protection of regional peace and stabil-ity. Post the east Asian Financial crisis of1997, there has been better integrationbetween the economies of ASeAN as well asthe ASeAN+3 countries (china, Japan andSouth Korea). the bloc has also focused onpeace and stability in the region, ratifying theSouth east Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zonetreaty. the idea of east Asia Groupings,mooted in 1995, resulted in a number of eastAsia Summits (eAS) involving ASeAN, + 3countries and countries that have Full Dia-logue Partner status of ASeAN and signato-ries to the treaty of Amity and cooperation(tAc). eAS focuses on multiple issues ofenergy, finance, education, natural disaster

mitigation, environment, climate change,sustainable development and mutual appre-ciation of each other’s heritage and historyleading to initiatives like revival of NalandaUniversity in India, a track II study on a com-prehensive economic Partnership in east Asia(cePeA) and establishment of an economicresearch Institute for ASeAN and east Asia(erIA). Adoption of the “Singapore Declara-tion on climate change, energy and environ-ment” led to mobilising financial support,capacity building, development of clean tech-nologies, exchange of scientific and technicalexpertise, joint studies, promotion of publicawareness and development of policy meas-ures. china plays a significant role in Southeast Asia with its development making eco-nomic gains and strategic inroads in SouthAsia. the ASeAN-china free trade agreementsigned in 2010 is well-known, as is also itsparticipation in a lot of subregional coopera-tion arrangements.

India-ASeAN cooperation covers numer-ous fields like trade and investment, scienceand technology (including It, biotechnology,advanced materials, space sciences and theirapplications), tourism, human resourcedevelopment, education including languagetraining, transport, infrastructure, health andpharmaceuticals.

TradeBuilding regional architecture and institu-

tions to sustain growth, deepening in-ternational integration and managingaccompanying risks of economic and politi-cal instability through global systems is apriority. Measured in purchasing power par-ity terms, Asia’s share of global GDP willamount to around 31 per cent in 2020, withchina accounting for over 14 per cent.hence, china and India will substantiallyimpact the world economy. the scale andweight of income growth in Asia will have ahuge impact on trade in goods and servicesglobally and within the region. the incomegrowth cannot be sustained without contin-uing to maintain the openness to interna-tional trade and private capital flows thathas already helped successful growth. tradeis an engine of driver in ASeAN and eastAsia, but South Asia still has to cover moredistance. At present, every state has enor-mous autonomy over trade matters—from

taxes to procedures. through unilateral lib-eralisation process many of the Asianeconomies achieved high growth. Due to thediverse nature of economies, integrationprocess through economic cooperation hasbecome complicated and slow. that does notimply that Asian economies need to wait forfurther convergence. Initial conditions areimportant but not decisive for integration.

APec has facilitated growth of partici-pants by optimising interdependence amongAsia-Pacific economies and enhancing asense of community, aimed at improvingregional trade, economic performance andlinkages for prosperity of the people in the

region. It has helped to reduce tariffs andother barriers to trade across Asia-Pacific,reducing business transaction costs by about10 per cent and creating an environment toensure safe and efficient movement of goods,services and people across borders throughpolicy decisions, and economic and techni-cal cooperation.

Free trade Areas (FtAs) enable free inter-nal trade while external tariffs against outsidecountries differ among member nations.these factors create the “trade creation effect”and the “trade diversion effect” throughrespective actions of a shift in the geographiclocation of production from higher-cost tolower-cost member nations as well as a shift inthe locus of production of formerly importedgoods from lower-cost non-member nations tohigher-cost member nations.

SecurityDuring the cold War, South east Asianregion witnessed power play between the USand the Soviet Union with both having navalbases in the region and their fleets patrollingthe high seas. With the rise of china, espe-cially on the territorial and resources fronts,china’s policy is giving rise to conflict withits neighbours. economic prowess of chinais supported by massive foreign direct invest-ment (about $106 billion (`5,30,000 crore)in 2010 alone) which is a catalyst to growth.Much that china may portray its peacefulintentions and say that its interests arepurely economic, it’s territorial assertivenessand past record does not instill much confi-dence, which is likely to increase strife in theregion directly affecting regional coopera-tion, economic and political security. Across-section believes that the chinese mind-set is well-rooted in its historical “tian Xia”(under the heaven) concept which views “allterritories” as belonging to the chinese anddue to which, the chinese, traditionally,attach no sense to territory. Due to chineseaspirations to emerge as the second pole in anew global strategic order, South east Asianregion is increasingly emerging as the arenafor US-china strategic power play. By andlarge, countries in the region (perhaps lessNorth Korea) want continued US presencein the region even though economic andtrade dependence of some is on china.

there seems to be no sound mechanismin South east Asia to deal with issues likethailand-cambodia border problem orMalaysia-Indonesia sea boundary dispute.china’s claim to entire South china Sea,Spratley and Paracel group of islands hasaggravated tensions. In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have built up their naval,submarine and fighter jets assets to upgradedefensive capabilities for withstanding aggres-sive instincts and strategic coercion by china.One may expect South east Asian region heatup. there are fundamental positional differ-ences between the US and china. the US saysthat the disputed Senkaku Island comesunder the jurisdiction of the US-Japan Secu-rity treaty which china hotly contests. Fur-ther, the US says the South china Sea Islandsdispute should be solved multilaterally whilechina says the issue should be solved bilater-ally. china views South east Asia region as itsstrategic backyard and wants the US to quit

The challenge is to carefully consider thedirection, structure and function of futureregional security architecture throughrenewed diplomatic anddefence initiatives

SP’s LAND FORCES 15

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Harmony & Collaborationin Asia-Pacific RegionSouth East Asia in tandem with East Asia is likely to be the arena of future US-China power tussle. If Chinaindulges in strategic and military brinkmanship, localised armed conflicts may occur. The major powers need tointensify the cooperation efforts and stop revival of Cold War mentality that further destabilises the region.

PHOTOGRAPH: MEA

PM with leaders at the 9th ASEAN-India Summit in Bali

D I P LOMACY / ARMY ’ S VA LOUR>>


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the region, declaring South china Sea her“core concern”, implying that it is prepared togo to war to ensure sovereignty. concurrently,the US along with other nations has declaredthat Global commons which are not limitedto maritime waters but extends to aerospaceare common heritage of everyone and nocountry can declare sovereignty over them.

A Vision Statement for ASeAN regionalForum (ArF) for 2020 was adopted at the16th ArF Ministerial Meeting in July 2009.It recognised ArF as the central pillar in theemerging regional security architecture, call-ing for strengthening ArF’s role in raisingawareness on security challenges and inten-sifying confidence building and cooperation.the 18th ArF Ministerial held on July 23,2011, adopted a Work Plan on PreventiveDiplomacy as well as a Work Plan on Mar-itime Security, which provides the frameworkfor taking forward cooperation activities inthe respective areas.

Present Scenariothere is no denying the fact that the Asia-Pacific region is economically stronger thanwhat it was more than a decade back andhas managed to get over the 1997 recessioncomfortably. however, the increase in indi-vidual gross domestic products (GDPs)includes the profits made by the MNcs. therapidity with which Asia-europe Meeting(ASeM) member countries have opened theireconomies in the last few years is impressive.Although all of the South east Asianeconomies initially embarked on import-substituting industrialisation, with time theyshifted to export-oriented industrialisationpolicies. export-oriented industrialisation ledto an opening of the economies for moremarkets and the promotion of foreign directinvestment (FDI) as a means of upgradingthe industrial structures through the trans-fer and diffusion of advanced industrial tech-nologies. As a result, the exposure of theeconomies to foreign trade became large.While most Asian countries reduced theirdependence on the US and eU, china hasincreased its share to these markets. Move-ments in both trade volumes and world mar-ket prices for traded commodities haveimpacted the foreign demand for ASeMcountry exports in various degrees. theimportance of foreign firms in the exportsector is well-documented and there is ample

evidence that export orientation is one of themost important determinants of the FDIflows. the current downturn in economicactivity throughout Asia highlights the vul-nerability of the export-led economic growthmodel to external shocks. this situation hasengendered widespread interest in rebalanc-ing the economies in a way that would shiftexport-driven growth to domestic demand-led growth.

trade is an engine in ASeAN and eastAsia, but South Asia appears to be goingslow. even within ASeAN, there are diver-gent views for further integration. As thingsstand today, every state has enormousautonomy over trade matters right fromtaxes to procedures. through unilateral lib-eralisation process many of the Asianeconomies achieved high growth. Due todiverse nature of economies, the integrationprocess through economic cooperation hasbecome complicated and slow. It does notimply that Asian economies need to wait forfurther convergence. Initial conditions areimportant but not decisive for integration. Atthe same time, less developed countries thathave large pools of unskilled labour and usethis force intensively for products that may be good for trade, have the danger oflocking themselves in a stagnant situationinhibiting the domestic growth of elementsof capital, entrepreneurship, technical skillsand the like, which are indispensable forfuture development.

the role of multinational corporations(MNcs) also needs to be examined dispas-sionately notwithstanding their contribu-tion to development. MNcs, which are anomnipresent reality, need to be taken intoaccount in analysing the impact of FtA onASeAN development and the Asia-Pacificregion as a whole.

The Futurethough Asia-Pacific region countries havetheir own individual sovereignties, a futureenvironment of closer cooperation shouldaim for the following:l help develop less developed countries in

getting favourable trade concessions fromdeveloped countries in terms of loweredbarriers for the export of labour-intensivemanufactured goods and permit creationof “regional trading blocs” among devel-oping countries at relatively equal stages

of industrial development and similarmarket sizes.

l Adopt measures avoiding resource alloca-tion for socially undesirable projects—encourage MNc participation on basis ofholistic growth.

l expand AFtA to a wider global economiczone encompassing entire Asia-Pacificregion as a first step. AFtA within eastAsian economies should not diminish theindependence of ASeAN countries, sub-ordinating them to stronger countries.

l ASeAN and AFtA must acknowledgethat strong member countries of theWtO do not desire total liberalisation, butonly a liberalisation which favours indi-vidual national interests. to that end,ASeAN-WtO relations need to be treatedwith caution. Under FtA, which assuresa total liberalised area, no institutionscan regulate the activities of the MNcs.FtA must not be considered an extensionof the actual WtO, but should be seen asa strong step towards concretising theMNcs dream.

l track III dialogue in ASeAN and Asia-Pacific region needs to be encouraged toensure public participation, holisticgrowth taking into account grassrootsissues and empowering communities forbetter development.

l More focus is required on issues likeresource management, climate change,energy and environmental security,nuclear and missile proliferation, disar-mament, poverty alleviation, counter-terrorism and transnational crime.

l the current Asia-Pacific regionalarrangements also fail to effectively sep-arate political, economic and securityissues which lead to an organisation likeAPec to also tackle non-traditionalsecurity issues, apart from economiccooperation.

l ASeAN-India free trade pact does notinclude the “services” sector. Also, Indiacan offer assistance to east Asian nationsin building capabilities to protect sea linesof communication (SLOc) and Southeast Asian nations in the non-traditionalsecurity field.

l Asian integration should be furtherimproved through convergence mecha-nism among various groups. the cuecan be taken from BIMStec which

focuses on micro issues like sectoralcooperation apart from macro issues liketrade agreements.

l Non-traditional security issues affectingthe well-being, dignity and survival ofhumans are beyond the confines of statesovereignty and territorial integrity.cooperative inter-state mechanism isneeded as the response would not suffice.

l Finally, the region has the potential ofconflict, as mentioned above. the ArFhas a major role to play in this regard,including promoting peaceful discussionson territorial gains, maritime disputes andprotection of SLOcs. conflict, chances ofwhich are high, will retard progress in theAsia Pacific region. the dialogue couldtake a cue from the conference on Inter-action and confidence Building Measuresin Asia (cIcA) aimed at enhancing coop-eration through elaborating multilateralapproach towards promoting peace, secu-rity and stability.

Cooperative Arrangementsto maintain high, sustainable economicgrowth in the Asia-Pacific region, nationsneed to control their own strategies within aninternational context in the post-economiccrisis period. It is essential to strengthen coop-eration at the regional level and define andundertake new initiatives in accordance withthe changing dynamics. the Asia-Pacificregion has the capacity to be a global driverespecially since Asia’s unbridled capacity forgrowth has pushed it to the forefront. thechanging regional security environment willhave an impact on how Asia-Pacific can leadthe region. the trends of the last decade indi-cate that this new century will be dominatedby the power of technology and a globalisedeconomic system.

South east Asia in tandem with east Asiais likely to be the arena of future US-chinapower tussle. If china indulges in strategicand military brinkmanship, localised armedconflicts may occur. the major powers needto intensify the cooperation efforts and stoprevival of cold War mentality that furtherdestabilises the region. the challenge is tocarefully consider the direction, structureand function of future regional securityarchitecture through renewed diplomaticand defence initiatives. ArF has a major roleto play in this.

President Creates HistoryPresident Patil became the first Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to rideon a T-90 main battle tank, during Exercise Sudarshan Shakti

President Pratibha Devisingh Patil along with Defence Minis-ter A.K. Antony and Army Chief General V.K. Singh with a T-90 tank; (above) The President addressing troops during aSainik Sammelan, after witnessing the Strike Corps OffensiveOperation by GOC-in C Southern Command & GOC 21 Corps,at Pachpadra, Rajasthan on December 5, 2011

PHOTOGRAPHS: PIB


T ECHNOLOGY <<

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

GeOGrAPhIc, GeOSPAtIAL OrSPAtIAL data forms the founda-tion of all planned human activ-ity. Disaster management,management and conservation

of natural resources, infrastructure planningand development, and land use planning arejust a few examples of areas in which deci-sion-making is contingent on availability ofaccurate and high quality spatial data. Devel-opments in digital technologies, particularlythe rapid advancements in geographic infor-mation systems (GIS) and global positioningsystems (GPS) have now made it possible tocorrelate and use diverse map information, inconjunction, at the click of a mouse. Intelli-gence plays a vital role in the decision-makingprocess of any nation or organisation. Withthe end of the cold War, regrouping of tradi-tional alliances and erstwhile blocks, andemergence of threat of transnational terror-ism has forced government’s world over inadopting organisational restructuring to dealwith aspects of national security. Unlike con-ventional warfare, terrorism is not restrictedto specific battle ground or geographic space.It can manifest in attacks and threats in thehinterland at any place and any time. thus,the geographic database for war fighting is nomore restricted to areas adjoining interna-tional boundaries, rather, the effort has toinclude own territory as well. this alsoincreases the volume of information thatneeds to be processed to filter out meaningfulintelligence.

the aim of any such system should,therefore, be to fuse data from multiple andsometimes unrelated sources to enable pro-duction of a comprehensive intelligence pic-ture encompassing all aspects of information.

Geospatial IntelligenceGeospatial Intelligence has been defined bythe National Imagery and Mapping Agency(NIMA), which was the predecessor toNational Geospatial Intelligence Agency(NGA) as “the exploitation and analysis ofimagery and geospatial information todescribe, assess and visually depict physicalfeatures and geographically referenced activ-ities on the earth”. this definition clearlydepicts the magnitude of the effort requiredto build a database of geospatial intelligenceso as to provide support to government agen-cies entrusted with the task of national secu-rity. the need for having access to maximumdata pertaining to the topography anddemography of an area of interest by thecommanders of armies is well establishedover the years. transparent overlays withdetailed supplementary information placedover printed topography sheets are just oneexample of this necessity. With computersand associated technology came the era ofdigital mapping where such supplementarydata could be displayed, queried andprocessed, based on the requirement and verysignificantly without cluttering the base map.

the capability of any application basedon a GIS is limited to the quantity and qual-ity of data provided as inputs. A digitisedcartography map needs a huge amount ofattribute data before it can become suitableas GIS input. While generally this data hasbeen assumed to pertain to terrain featuresonly, a true GIS ready map should logicallycover the complete spectrum of datarequired by various disciplines of geodetic

science. this definitely calls for inputs evenfrom agencies other than those dealing withtopographic survey.

Infrastructure Neededto optimally exploit the available informationin a geographic context, the military willhave to rely on other agencies of the govern-ment. Any effort in isolation will leave largegaps in intelligence which would be crucialat the time of critical decision-making. It is,therefore, essential that any agencyentrusted with the task of producing geospa-tial intelligence will essentially have to bemultifaceted with representation from allagencies dealing with aspects of intelligence,cartography, oceanography, civic infrastruc-ture creation, public utility, safety servicesand the like. cartography in an urban envi-ronment is a challenging task due to lack ofnatural features that can be selected as con-trol points and the problem of line of sight forsurveying.

Some of the major nations are well ontheir way to establish agencies dealing withthis important aspect of intelligence. Post-9/11, the United States has carried out amajor restructuring of the governmentagencies and formation of the NationalGeospatial Intelligence Agency by mergingelements from the cIA (central IntelligenceAgency), Defense Intelligence Agency,National reconnaissance Organisation(NrO), State Department, etc, in meeting avital requirement of network-centric war-fare (NcW) and command, control, commu-nications, computers, intelligence andinteroperability (c4I2) systems in the mod-ern era. NGA is undoubtedly a major arm ofthe United States Government assisting inimplementing the national goals of USA. Forproduction and analysis of data required asa base for geospatial intelligence, numerousagencies are involved. this would includehigh resolution imagery products, elevationdata sourced through ground/air/spacebased survey, electronic intelligence (eLINt)and human intelligence (hUMINt) assets,cartographic data, inputs from agenciesdealing with internal security, urban andrural development agencies, forest manage-ment agencies, intelligence community andthe like. It is only when the seemingly unre-lated events collected individually by theseagencies are merged a comprehensive intel-ligence picture in the geographic domaincan emerge.

Indian SceneBoth the Kargil review committee (Krc)and the Group of Ministers (GoP) had madenumerous recommendations with respect toissues related to streamlining the agencies inthe country. however, a lot of work is yet tocommence on the issues related to fusion ofintelligence data. While within the armedforces, the Defence Intelligence Agency(DIA) has been established, and at thenational level the National technicalresearch Organisation (NtrO) has come up,these steps may still not be sufficient to dealwith aspects pertaining to geospatial intelli-gence. establishment of the National SpatialData Infrastructure (NSDI) has been a goodstep but it will be awhile before it achievesthe required capability. the NSDI aspires todevelop the nation’s ability to create largevolumes of different data sets in conjunctionwith one another in a networked environ-ment, add value to it, and make availableinformation to society, government, indus-try, business, research, etc. however, in thecurrent dispensation, the NSDI deals withonly ‘some’ aspects pertaining to creation ofmetadata from available geospatial data anddoes not cater to inputs from the intelligence

community or for that matter the defenceservices, which is a major flaw. Moreover,only through common conventions andtechnical agreements, standards, metadatadefinitions, network and access protocols; itwill be easily possible for the NSDI to comeinto existence. Within the Indian armedforces, the DIA within hQ IntegratedDefence Staff (IDS) is the central repositoryfor all intelligence inputs pertaining to thethree services including the imagery intelli-gence (IMINt) and eLINt. however, aspectsof topography are yet to be integrated withthe DIA, which again is a major flaw. Also,within the existing setup, adequateresources in terms of remote sensing, eLINtpayloads and cartography are not availableto produce high quality fused data.

Much more is required at the nationallevel in terms of integration of various gov-ernment agencies. While certain isolated link-ages between certain government agencieshave come into being, such connectivity hasto be extended to all necessary arms of thegovernment over a national security informa-tion grid for optimal exploitation of variousmultilayered data sets. though the NationalInformation Grid (NAtGrID) stands sanc-tioned and is under establishment, ideally, acomprehensive geospatial intelligence dataset should be able to generate large-scalemaps, surface models to include natural andmanmade structures, walk through criticalinfrastructure and buildings, and computermodels to support aspects pertaining tonation building as well as national security.the establishment of the Disaster Manage-ment Authority of India recognises theimportance of geospatial science in nationbuilding. An organisation like this has to dealwith varied amount of data pertaining to dis-parate sources of information in order to per-form the assigned tasks. NAtGrID will be abasic prerequisite for the collection and assim-ilation of data coming from various parts ofthe country, dealing with different aspects ofnational security. till the NAtGrID is estab-lished, our existing/interim communicationinfrastructure is definitely not in a position todeal with information flow of a magnitudenecessitated by large-scale disasters.

Geospatial Intelligence and C4I2In times to come, as India emerges as a global player and also gets increasingly involved in the UN-backedconflict management activities, we will need to continuously review our policies and carry out organisationaladaptations to operate seamlessly with other member countries of the UN, at least the major ones

www.spsmilitaryyearbook.com

4 0 t h I s s u e

PHOTOGRAPH: US Army


News in Brief

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TAVOR RIFLE WITH INDIAN ARMYAfter several stops and starts, including problems with stabilityand the lack of certain features, the Israel-built IWI tavor tAr-21 assault rifle is now comfortably in Indian use, inducted andoperational in several agencies including the Army para com-mando units, marine commandos, rashtriya rifles, SpecialFrontier Force and certain paramilitary units. Fitted with anM203-class grenade launcher, the tAr-21 is likely to be orderedin larger numbers shortly.

the Army has also begun fitting its tavors with telescopicsights, accessory rails, dual magazine clips, self-luminous reflexsight for the under-barrel grenade launcher and single eye nightvision with head band. the light-weight fast-point/shoot Israeliweapon is being considered a mainstay design alongside the Bel-gian FN herstan F2000 bullpup assault rifle, the latter in usewith agencies that include the VVIP Special Protection Group’scounter-assault force that was raised in 2008.

Apart from further inductions of both weapon types, theArmy is engaged in a slew of small arms procurement efforts.For instance, the tAr-21 and F2000 are likely contenders in atender that the Army announced in December 2010—one thatit will float shortly for a new modular assault rifle as part of itsF-INSAS infantry modernisation programme. In May last year,the Army also announced its interest in procuring an unspeci-fied number of 7.62mm amphibious assault rifles that could beused immediately after being brought out of water by specialforces personnel.

Also, to augment Glock 17 and Fn-35 9mm pistols in servicewith the Special Forces and para units, the Army has been scout-ing over the last two years for a new 9mm semi-automaticsidearm. to round off its requirement, the Army is also lookingout for a new 5.56mm close-Quarter battle carbine and7.62mm light machine gun (LMG).

INDIAN ARMY LOOKING FOR NEW MACHINE GUNS

In the latest of a raft of small-arms acquisition efforts, the IndianArmy has announced that it is looking to purchase new generalpurpose machine guns for its Parachute (Special Forces) battal-ions to augment and later replace the licence-built BelgianMAG-58 and Soviet-era PKM general purpose machine guns(GPMGs) currently in use by the battalions.

the weapon needs to be fully interoperable with the currentweapons in terms of ammunition compatibility (OFB7.62x51mm rounds, which will have to be demonstrated in tri-als), with a barrel life of at least 20,000 rounds. the Army hasstipulated that it requires a 7.62 x 51mm calibre weapon toserve as both a light and medium machine gun.

the Army is looking for a weapon with greater range thanan LMG and lighter than an MMG, with a maximum effective

range of 1,000 metres. the Army would prefer parallel supplyof telescopic sights by the OeM, but definitely wants standardMil 1913 picatinny rails on the weapon to mount different typesof sighting systems. As with the two current weapons in service,the Army will be looking to use the new GPMGs in multiplemodes: as an infantry weapon in different profiles, vehiclemounted and heliborne operations.

In March 2010, the Army said it was also interested in look-ing at a new 12.7x99mm heavy machine gun for use on a lightstrike vehicle/infantry fighting vehicle and in a ground rolewhile mounted on vehicle and tripod respectively. A year later,the Indian Navy also announced its interest in purchase newhMGs specifically for the ship-mounted anti-piracy role.

INDIAN ARMY USES ARJUN IN LARGEST WARGAME

the indigenous Arjun main battle tank (MBt) was an integralpart of the Army’s strike corps war game Sudarshan Shakti thatplayed out over the last few weeks in rajasthan’s border sectors.With 124 tanks in two regiments, the Army put the squadronof Arjuns through the paces as part of its integrated theatreoffensive validation effort. Performing alongside the mainstayt-90S Bhishma and t-72 Ajeya, the Arjun is slowly finding anoperational niche within the Army’s arsenal. the troubled pro-gramme, delayed for years by non-stop development and usertrials, will however see limited scope in its current avatar.

the Army is now preparing to test the Arjun Mk.2 early nextyear, a heavier version of the original and with a host ofimprovements including a crucial night-fighting capability(through a thermal imaging night sight for the driver), a capa-bility to fire missiles from its primary 120mm gun tube, explosivereactive armour protection and advanced navigation features.the Army has placed an in-principle indent for 124 ArjunMk.IIs, though this order will only be formalised if the DrDO’scombat Vehicles r&D establishment (cVrDe) succeeds in car-rying out recommended modifications to the Arjun and inte-grating a host of fresh capabilities, including new advancedelectronic equipment.

One of the dilemmas facing the programme currently isuncertainty over the number of Arjuns the Army will finallyprocure. With the future main battle tank (FMBt) programmesoon to begin taking up development resources, scientists fearthe Arjun programme may not recover the investments thatthe government has made in the project since the 1970s. theArmy on its part is clear that it wants the Arjun, but only witha stipulated and non-negotiable list of modifications andimprovements.

ARMY LOOKING FOR CORNERSHOT CAPABILITYthe Indian Army is looking ahead to acquire a system thatallows it to mount in-service 9mm pistols enabling firing fromaround a corner—a capability widespread with tactical specialunits in the US and Israel. the Army is understood to be seekingthe capability specifically for its rashtriya rifles units deployedin Jammu & Kashmir, the units regularly involved in firefightswith militants holed up in residential areas.

After expressing initial interest in such a capability in 2009,the Army is now understood to be interested in giving this capa-bility to its standard-issue 9mm pistols, which include the Aus-trian Glock 17, Italian Beretta 92 and German-Swiss SIG SauerP226. the capability involves an enhancement kit integratedwith an existing weapon system with a certain degree of dis-mantling. A video camera and monitor allows the user to pointthe weapon at a fulcrum around a corner and use the weaponto survey, target and fire accordingly. the Army also wants the

cornershot capability for use with in-service under-barrelgrenade launchers (UBGLs). the US-Israeli firm cornerShot isunderstood to have demonstrated the capability to the IndianArmy on at least two occasions.

the Indian paramilitary forces, particularly those engagedin anti-Maoist operations have also evaluated the capability.

PRITHVI-II FAILS

A crucial salvo test of the Prithvi-II tactical ballistic missile bythe country’s Strategic Forces command had to be aborted onDecember 21 following a system failure. According to an initialestimate, propellant system glitches were detected in both sys-tems very close to launch from the Integrated test range (Itr)off Orissa’s coast.

the test was to validate firing two separate Prithvi-II missilesapproximately 20 minutes apart as part of a salvo assault.Unlike the solid-fuelled Agni family of ballistic missiles, thePrithvi series is liquid fuelled, and therefore has attendant work-up, preparation and maintenance issues. the nuclear commandand Army are both keen on a family of tactical surface-to-surface missiles that are containerised and fully road-mobile,allowing operational and deployment flexibility.

Sources reveal that the Prithvi series do serve as potent bor-der deterrents in the present scenario, but their technology israpidly reaching obsolescence considering the effort required toprepare and deploy the weapon system. In June this year, theArmy tested the Prithvi-II to a high degree of accuracy, reaffirm-ing the weapon’s guidance systems. In December 2010, thenuclear command tested two Prithvi-I ballistic missiles about anhour apart successfully. however, in April 2010, a Prithvi targetmissile malfunctioned on launch and pitched into the sea, spoil-ing a test of the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile defencesystem. the nuclear command plans to conduct a salvo test ofthe Prithvi-II in January.

BY SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

PHOTOGRAPH: Cornershot

PHOTOGRAPH: DRDO

US TO PROVIDE SUPER COBRA HELICOPTERS TO TURKEY

the US Defense Security cooperationAgency has notified congress of a potentialsale of three Ah-1W Super cobra attack hel-icopters to turkey. Under the estimated$111 million foreign military sale (FMS),turkey also requested seven t700-Ge-401engines, inspections and modifications,spare and repair parts, personnel trainingand training equipment and other relatedlogistics support. the proposed sale will fur-ther enhance turkey’s ground defence capa-bilities as well as self-defence, modernisation,regional security, and interoperability withUS and other North Atlantic treaty Organi-sation (NAtO) members. the helicopters willbe sold from the US Marine corps’ (USMc)inventory and five contractor representativeswill be assigned to turkey for a period of upto 90 days.

BOEING DELIVERS FIRST BLOCK IIIAPACHE HELICOPTER TO US ARMYBoeing has delivered the first Ah-64D

Apache Block III multirole attack helicopterto the US Army. the Ah-64D Apache BlockIII helicopter has been designed to benefitsoldiers and battlefield commanders duringpeacekeeping missions worldwide. the heli-copter incorporates 26 new technologies,including an improved drive system, newcomposite main rotor blade and enhanceddigital electronic control unit. the new tech-nologies will enhance the aircraft’s capabili-ties in combat aviation with improvedperformance and increased payload. the USArmy has plans to acquire 690 ApacheBlock III aircraft while Boeing will produce51 helicopters under a low rate initial pro-duction contract.

INDIAN ARMY RECEIVES SECONDBRAHMOS BLOCK II MISSILEthe Indian Army has received the secondregiment of BrahMos Block II variant super-sonic cruise missile systems to bolster itscombat capabilities. Lt General Vinod Naya-nar, Director General Artillery, said, “Wehave guns for near range and Smerch rock-ets for ranges of 75 km. BrahMos is the sys-tem which has added tremendous firepowercapability to the Indian armed forces for tar-gets as deep as 300 km.” the second Block IIvariant missile regiment consists of mobilelaunchers, command post, replenishmentsystems, fire control systems installed withadvanced electronic hardware and softwareas well as several communication systems.the 290-km range missile has a speed ofMach 2.8 and can be launched from land,ship, submarines and air platforms. theArmy has already inducted a full Block-I reg-iment for precision attack.

POLARIS INDUSTRIES RECEIVES FIRSTORDER FOR INDIAN ARMYUS-based vehicle maker Polaris Industrieshas received its first order from the IndianArmy. Polaris military vehicles wouldstrengthen the security in border areas. “Wehave already received our first order from theIndian Army,” Polaris India Managing Direc-tor Pankaj Dubey informed the media.“Polaris light tactical vehicles would helpachieve quick movement in anti-insurgencyand anti-terrorist operations.”

INDIAN ARMY TO INDUCT RUDRACHOPPERSthe Indian Army will soon induct the rudraadvanced light helicopter (ALh), armed withadvanced air-to-air and anti-tank missiles,along the Pakistan border and western front.

the twin-engine chopper is a variant ofthe ALh Dhruv helicopter and is armed withan array of guns, rocket pods, and air-to-airand anti-tank guided missiles. the aerialplatform will enable Army field commandersto use decisive combat power anywhere inthe battlefield. the weaponised helicopter ispart of the modernisation and capabilitydevelopment efforts and is expected to boostthe Army’s aerial firepower capabilities. theIndian Army will also induct and deploy 114light combat helicopters (Lch) along themountainous terrain.

US ARMY TESTS NEW WATER, FUELCONTAINER SYSTEMthe US Army paratroopers have recentlycompleted testing of a new water and fuel container system for airdrops inAfghanistan. During two of the three testdrops, the Lifeliner container-unitised bulkequipment (cUBe) safely delivered hundredsof gallons of water to the ground underdual, 100 ft-wide parachutes from over1,000 ft. the new container can be trans-ported by truck or sling loaded beneath ahelicopter, is 40 per cent of the cost of exist-ing equipment and can be easily handled forstorage by one person. the 307th BrigadeSupport Battalion commander Lt colonelPaul Narowski said that the test validatedthe airdrop procedures for delivering 400gallons of fuel, water or unitised supplies toforces anywhere on the battlefield. More

than 200 systems have already been fieldedto deployed units till date.

DRDO DEVELOPS ARTILLERY GUNSFOR INDIAN ARMYthe DrDO is developing an indigenous155mm 52-calibre howitzer for the IndianArmy. DrDO chief V.K. Saraswat said that thelaboratory is currently developing advancedmetallurgy for the barrels to increase thehowitzer’s firepower. Production of the self-propelled howitzer is expected to be completedin the next four years. DrDO has begun thehowitzer development work on a self-fundingbasis, but the project could not be accom-plished due to issues pertaining to Boforsguns. the Indian Defence Ministry recentlycancelled the procurement tender of 180wheeled 155mm 52-calibre howitzers.

MDA TEST-FIRES THAAD MISSILESYSTEM WITH STSS

the US Missile Defence Agency (MDA) hascompleted an integrated flight test of the ter-minal high-altitude area defence (thAAD)radar weapon system at the Pacific Missilerange Facility at Kauai, hawaii. A thAADinterceptor missile successfully intercepted amedium-range target (Mrt) launched from ac-17 cargo aircraft and a short-range target(Srt) launched from a mobile platform.

During the flight test, the space trackingand surveillance system (StSS) demonstra-tion satellites’ sensors tracked two differentmissile targets, displaying the system’s pre-cision, real-time missile-tracking capability.Northrop Grumman’s Aerospace Systemsmissile defence and warning Vice PresidentDoug Young said that the StSS satellitesdemonstrated hard-body detection and

INDIA TEST-FIRES AGNI-IV MISSILEIndia has successfully tested its Agni-IVindigenous nuclear-capable advanced sur-face-to-surface ballistic missile from WheelerIsland, off the Orissa coast. the missile wasfired from a road mobile launcher and hit thepre-designated target in the Bay of Bengal,meeting all desired mission objectives. thetwo-stage, 20 metre-long, 17t Agni-IV car-ries a payload of 800 kg and has a range of3,000 km. the missile has been equippedwith state-of-the-art technologies, includingindigenously developed ring laser gryo andcomposite rocket motor.

INDIAN ARMY TO BE EQUIPPED WITHE-BOMBthe Indian Army would soon be equippedwith an “electromagnetic bomb” (e-bomb),terminal Ballistic and research Laboratory(tBrL) Director Dr Manjit Singh said, “Itwould be equally capable of damaging thecommunication system and other technolo-gies ensuring maximum and sudden setbackto the enemy.” the bomb, developed by tBrL,would be based on explosive-driven, high-energy pulse power technology, which canproduce a pulse current of 1.4MA fromenergy released by 2.8 kg of explosives. theweapon would be designed to neutralise anenemy’s command, control and communica-tion systems, as well as cause huge destruc-tion without harming humans. the researchand development phase on the weapon isexpected to be completed within the 12th FiveYear Plan period. the company is also pro-ducing more than one million multi-modegrenades (MMG) for the Army to replace theexisting 36m grenades. tBrL is the ballisticlaboratory of Defence research & Develop-ment Organisation.


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