of 131
Understanding Religious Militancy and Terrorism in Bangladesh
Research Report (Submitted to the Social Science Research Council, Planning Division, Ministry of Planning,
Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh)
Submitted by:
DHAKA INSTITUTE OF CULTURAL AFFAIRS (ICA BANGLADESH)
Mailing Address: GPO Box 972, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh Dhaka Office: Mouchak Tower, Suit # 1513 (14th Floor)
83/B New Circular Road, Malibag Moor, Dhaka - 1217, Bangladesh Tel: (+88) 06668242930/01817182610/084165719
Fax: (+88) 02-8322799, E-mail [email protected] Website: www.ica-bangladesh.org, www.ica-international.org
Author Note
Mohammad Azizur Rahman, Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology and Police Science, Mawlana Bhashani Science and Technology University &
Chairperson, ICA Bangladesh and
Mohammed Bin Kashem, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, National University, & Director, Centre for Criminological Research, Bangladesh (CCRB)
This research was supported by Social Science Research Council, Planning Commission, Government of Bangladesh Institutional Research Grant awarded to the Dhaka Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA Bangladesh)
December 2011
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... iiiLIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... vLIST OF APPENDICES ................................................................................................................. vLIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................. viACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................... viiiEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ x CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY .......................................................... 11.1. Study problem ........................................................................................................................ 131.2. Objectives of the study........................................................................................................... 161.3. Rationale of the study ............................................................................................................ 171.4. Methods and data ................................................................................................................... 171.4.1. Data collection techniques .................................................................................................. 171.4.2. Sampling ............................................................................................................................. 181.5. Scope and limitations ............................................................................................................. 20CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................... 222.1. The concept of terrorism and militancy ................................................................................. 22 2.1.1. Terrorism............................................................................................................................. 22 2.1.2. Militancy ............................................................................................................................. 22 2.1.3. Explanations of terrorism .................................................................................................... 282.2. History of Religious militancy and terrorism ........................................................................ 312.3. Organized crime and terrorism .............................................................................................. 332.4. Islamist Terrorist groups, networks, tactics, and activities .................................................... 352.5. Global action against terrorism, and War on terror ............................................................... 392.6. The Current Study .................................................................................................................. 45CHAPTER III: MILITANT OUTFITS AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ................................. 483.1. Number of Terrorist Groups .................................................................................................. 483.2. Nature of Terrorist Activities ................................................................................................. 513.3. Ideologies and Strengths of Islamist Militant Groups ........................................................... 573.4 Militant Networks, Tactics, and Strategies ............................................................................. 653.5. Terrorist Financing ................................................................................................................. 703.6. Factors and Causes of Islamist Militancy and Terrorism ...................................................... 72CHAPTER IV: ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES ..................................................................... 754.1. Laws, statues and conventions related to terrorism ............................................................... 754.2. Law enforcement measures against religious militancy and terrorism .................................. 774.3. Other Measures against militancy and terrorism ................................................................... 83CHAPTER V: CASE STUDIES ON SELECTED ISLAMIST MILITANTS ............................. 875.1. Shaikh Abdur Rahman ........................................................................................................... 875.2. Mufti Abdul Hannan .............................................................................................................. 895.3. Siddiqul Islam ........................................................................................................................ 905.4. Asadullah Al Galib ................................................................................................................ 925.5. Zahidul Islam Sumon alias Boma Mizan ............................................................................... 93
CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS OF KEY INFOMANT INTERVIEWS ........................................... 966.1. Public Perception ................................................................................................................... 966.2. Rise of Islamist Militancy ...................................................................................................... 976.3. Organization of Terrorist Groups ........................................................................................... 986.4. Terror Financing .................................................................................................................. 1006.5. Preventing Religious Militancy ........................................................................................... 1006.6. Impact of Terrorism ............................................................................................................. 103CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .............................................................. 1047.1. Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 1047.2. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 1117.2.1. Enforcement ...................................................................................................................... 1127.2.2. Intervention ....................................................................................................................... 1147.2.3. Prevention ......................................................................................................................... 1157.2.4. Other Recommendations ................................................................................................... 116References ................................................................................................................................... 119Appendices .................................................................................................................................. 125
LIST OF TABLES
Table: 3.1 Religious Militant Organizations in Bangladesh 37
Table: 3.2 Year wise Number of Terrorist Incidents and Persons Killed/Injured 39
Table: 3.2 Major Terrorist Activities in Bangladesh (1999-2010) 40
Table: 3.4 Strengths of the Major Terrorist Groups in Bangladesh 47
Table: 4.1 Year wise Number of Arrests by Militant Groups/Outfits (2003 2010) 66
Table: 4.2 No. of Convicts by Type of Sentences (2006-2010) 68
Table: 4.3 Year wise No. of Convicts and Type of Sentences (2006 2010) 70
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Research Instruments 112
Appendix 2. Analysis Coding Framework 116
Appendix 3 Year wise Number of Arrests (2003 2010) 118
LIST OF ACRONYMS ACHR Asian Centre for Human Rights AHAB Ahle Hadith Andolan (People of Hadith Movement) AL Awami League (Mass Peoples League) AMLO Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance APG Asia Pacific Group ATO Anti-Terrorism Ordinance ASK Ain o Salish Kendra BB Bangladesh Bank BCL Bangladesh Chatra (student) League BDR Bangladesh Rifles BGB Border Guard of Bangladesh BIPS Bangladesh Institute for Peace and Security Studies BIISS Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies BNP Bangladesh Nationalist Party CHT Chittagong Hill Tracts CHRI Commonwealth Human Rights Initiatives CID Criminal Investigation Department CPB Communist Party of Bangladesh CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service CTG Care Taker Government DGFI Directorate General of Forces Intelligence DB Detective Branch DU Dhaka University GoB Government of Bangladesh EU European Union HUJI-B Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (Movement for an Islamic Holy War)
Bangladesh HT Hizbut Towhid (Party of Oneness of God) HuT Hizbut Tahrir IBP Islami Biplob Parishad IBA Institute of Business Administration ICA Institute of Cultural Affairs ICM Institute of Conflict Management ICS Islami Chhatra Shibir (Islamic Student Camp) IED Improved Explosive Device IGP Inspector General of Police IIF Islamic International Front IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies INTERPOL International Police Organization IOJ Islami Okiya Jote (United Islamic Front) ISI Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan intelligence agency) JCD Jatiyabadia Chatra Dal JMB Jamaat-ul Mujahidin Bangladesh (Party of Mujahidin Bangladesh)
JMJB Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (Awakened Muslim Masses of Bangladesh)
JIB Jamaat-e-Islam (Party of Islam) Bangladesh JS Tatiya Sangsad (National Parliament) KII Key Informant Interviews KMO Kamtapuri Liberation Organization KNAB Khatme Nabuyat Andolon Bangladesh LeT Lasker e - Tayeba NDF National Democratic Front of Bodoland NGO Non-Governmental Organization NGOAB Non-Governmental Organizations Affairs Bureau NLFT National Liberation Front of Tripura NSI National Security Intelligence MP Member of Parliament PM Prime Minister RAB Rapid Action Battalion RAW Research and Analysis Wing (Indian intelligence agency) RIHS Revival of Islamic Heritage Society RPF Rohingya Patriotic Front RSO Rohingya Solidarity Organization SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SATF South Asian Task Force SATP South Asia Terrorism Portal SB Special Branch SF Security Force SSHI Servants of Suffering Humanity International SSRC Social Science Research Council TIB Transparency International Bangladesh TRI Terrorism Risk Index UAB Ulema Anjuman al-Baiyinaat (Clerics' Circle of Clear Understanding) ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund USDoS United States Department of State USAID United States Agency for International Development VDP Village Defence Police WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA) Bangladesh is thankful to the Social Science Research
Council (SSRC) of the Planning Division of the Government of Bangladesh for awarding the
Institutional Research Grant to carry out the timely and relevant study ``Understanding religious
militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh``.
ICA Bangladesh is very grateful to the authors of the report Mohammad Azizur
Rahman and Mohammed Bin Kashem for their brilliant work on complex and sensitive issues
like militancy and terrorism with limited access to the reliable data and appropriate subjects.
Deep appreciation should go to two research assistants (RAs) Muhammad Kamruzzaman and
Md. Jahangir Alam for their extraordinary pulling over the media reports, content analysis of the
secondary sources, and conducting expert interviews.
We must acknowledge with high appreciation the key informant and experts from
different organizations including DU, TIB, BIISS, and ASK for their time given for the interview
despite their busy schedule. We express our high gratitude to three Bangladeshi repatriate
academic scholars in the USA and Canada whose research works are related to this study.
Md. Zakiul Islam deserves our special thanks for his important management role from
signing the contract and maintaining accounts through organizing meetings, interviews and
submitting necessary documents of the project to team members and respective authorities. We
also mention SSRC officers and staff for their administrative support and cooperation. ICA
Bangladesh also would like to name ICA staffs and silent supporters Md. Nurunnabi Milton,
Mujib Ahmed Patwari, and Masudur Rahman. We must acknowledge Mr. Md. Mafizul Islam for
guardian role in the project agreement process.
We also would like to thank the Board and members of ICA Bangladesh for supporting
the team and staffs when needed to carry out the study project from time to time. Mr. Md.
Mohsin Ali is highly appreciated for his editorial assistance. Last but not the least, we
acknowledge the sacrifices of the spouses and children of the authors for giving time to
accomplish the project.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The main purpose of this study is to document and highlight the problem of Islamist
militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. It examined the nature of various Islamist militant groups
and the extent of their terrorist activities in Bangladesh. This study also investigated the
underlying causes of militancy, the funding sources of militant groups, and the strategies and
techniques used by terrorist groups. Recommendations are made on how best to address the
menace of militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. The study mainly used content analysis of
secondary sources and expert interviews. ICA Bangladesh conducted Understanding religious
militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh with a financial grant of the Social Science Research
Council, Planning Ministry of the Government of Bangladesh.
While religious militancy and terrorism have become a serious socio-political concern of
Bangladesh for a long time, it is still one of the most debatable and underresearched issues. The
study revealed that Islamist extremism and militant activities rose from 1999 to 2005. However,
homegrown and internationally linked Islamist terrorist outfits and groups have continued to
emerge in Bangladesh since 1992. International pressures from some western countries, donors
and neighboring countries and the international media heavily influenced the Bangladesh
government to fight Islamist militancy and terrorism especially aftermath the 9/11 US attacks
and the subsequent global war on terror campaign. By this time, Bangladesh has signed most of
the UN anti-terrorism conventions and enacted a number of laws to address the menace of
terrorism. Since 2006, Bangladesh has not faced any devastating terrorist attacks with bombing
or grenade attacks due to different measures by different governments such as the BNP
government`s banning of some outlawed Islamist militant groups and prosecution of militants;
the caretaker governments enactment and implementation of anti-terrorism and anti-terrorist
financing laws; and the present Awami Leage government`s serious counter-terrorism measures
ranging from banning outfits, arresting and prosecuting militants, updating laws, and initiating
other local terrorism prevention steps and regional policies.
While various reports and studies pointed out that political gaming with the Islamist
elements by two major political parties since the liberation war provided avenues for the rise of
Islamic political groups and Islamic extremism and militancy in the structure which subsequently
facilitated the uncontrolled growth of Islamist terrorist outfits and militant groups. The study
revealed that JMB, JMJB, HUJI-B and HT are the major terrorist groups which generated
thousands of members, and who have continued their activities under different names in different
times. Each of these groups has several thousand activists in the country. Though the exact
number of groups or outfits cannot be explored the number ranges from 12 to more than 50.
Data show that the top leaders and founders of these militant groups were educated in madrasha
(Islamic seminary institution), and later some of them joined teaching in madarsha at point of
their career. Some of them were also Afghan War veteran, and travelled to India, Pakistan,
Afghanistan and some other Gulf countries. Most of these Islamist militant groups have
symbiotic relationships among themselves and with foreign outfits based in Pakistan, India and
some other countries. These groups also have mutual support and cooperation from non-religious
insurgent groups within and outside the country such as ethnic militant groups in CHTs, Rohinga
refugee in Cox`s Bazar, and the Indian North East ethnic insurgent groups including ULFA.
The study found both positive and negative role of madrassa in facilitating the rise of
militancy. However, it is found that poor, unemployed and disadvantaged youth educated in both
general and madrassa lines and low educated and illiterate people from economically
disadvantaged districts are more likely to be brainwashed to join these militant groups.
Evidences suggest that politicians, teachers, community leaders, and peers are the mentors or
patrons of militancy in Bangladesh. Despite having various anti-militancy and counter-terrorism
measures by the governments, recent media and intelligence sources indicate that several militant
outfits and their members are being reorganized to publicly continue to do their activities.
The study identified a number of funding sources, mostly from local areas generated
through collecting zakat/sadka/fitra (donation on different religious occasions), donation in the
name of Islamic dawaat (invitation) for speech or lecture, educational or orphanage institutions,
and from local businesses. External funding came through Islamic charitable NGOs from Gulf
countries, USA, UK and other countries and through hundi (illegal money exchange) from
individuals living abroad. The militants are also found engaged in money laundering and
organized crime such as illegal underground business. The study also found that members of
these militant groups are trained in military tactics to use automatic weapons, guns and grenades,
IED (improved explosive device) and in making explosives such as powerful bombs, etc. They
also use high-tech information technology (IT) communication tools such as computer,
telephone, internet, compact disks (CDs) to propagate, disseminate or for terrorist attacks.
Bangladesh has been facing leftwing, ethnic and religious militancy since its
independence in 1971. However, the Islamist Militancy and terrorism has vandalized the lives of
the people and endangered law and order, and national, regional and international security, and
handicapped economic development. Therefore, we must eliminate the root causes of militancy
and terrorism in Bangladesh. In addressing these risk factors, a comprehensive and integrated
terrorism prevention strategy needs to be imparted, which is essential for a sustainable
democracy and socio-economic wellbeing in Bangladesh. Therefore, political parties and civil
society should work together to combat terrorism. The study concludes that the confrontational
political culture, the culture of immunity and lack of appropriate policies are the major obstacles
to control the Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. Otherwise, the problem of militancy will go
beyond control threatening the national sovereignty.
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
1.1. Study problem
Terrorism is one of the extreme forms of crime, since it involves serious violence against
civilians. The terrorist activities by the religious militant groups became a security challenge
across the globe especially in the post 9/11 era. Since the mid-1990, terrorism has become a hot
topic for research because of national and transnational security concerns and the international
war on terrorism. Research on terrorism focused on the issues of religious militancy, organized
crime, and financial crime. In modern times, militants and terrorists are synonymously used. As
terrorism is a complicated multifaceted form of crime, this discipline or sub-discipline is based
on the paucity of well-researched data and scientific literature.
Militancy and terrorism are not new to either Bangladesh or other South Asian countries such
as Pakistan, India, Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Various religious, ethno-national and
political rebel outfits, militant groups or insurgent groups have been operating in these countries
and many of these groups are interlinked as well (Riaz, 2008; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Datta,
2007; BIPSS, 2010). Despite terrorism being a subject of considerable public debate for a long
time, counterterrorism strategies has become the major governmental priority in these countries
to combat terrorism for national, regional and international interests. Since 1999, Bangladesh
has witnessed the rise of militant groups and terrorist outfits both homegrown and internationally
linked including al-Qaeda. Evidences suggest that terrorist attacks have increased from 1999 to
2006. Despite the fact that Bangladesh has not faced any major attacks since 2007 due to
governmental bold steps against militancy and terrorism, research and experts suggest that to
eliminate the roots of the menace of terrorism and militancy from Bangladesh society, integrated
and comprehensive terrorism prevention strategies must be formulated based on various
socioeconomic, political and cultural factors. Some experts argued that despite some significant
steps by the government, since independence ethnic and leftwing insurgency and militancy
continued in Bangladesh.
Islamist radicalization, extremism and militancy have gained accelerated currency in
Bangladesh politics in recent years (BIPSS, 2010; Riaz, 2008; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Datta,
2007). The mass-media, academics, researchers, politicians and the government have not
seriously brought the menace of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh before 2000s,
but aftermath the country-wide showdown of force and strength by two Islamist militant
organizations the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the Jagrata Muslim Janata
Bangladesh (JMJB) in 2005 (Riaz, 2008). International media, intelligence agencies, donors and
foreign governments have pointed to the rise of Islamist terrorist in the country since the US
attacks in 2001 (Quamruzzaman, 2011). Some researchers and experts do not think Bangladesh
is a safe haven for international terrorism, while other scholars ague that religious militancy is
homegrown due to various socioeconomic and historical factors and cannot be generalized the
menace in terms of international context and forms of terrorism.
Bangladesh is the 7th populous country and 3rd largest Muslim country located in South Asia.
It has a reputation for being a moderate Muslim country. In general people of this country are
peace loving and God believers. International concerns over Bangladesh as a hub of terrorists
have began since the US declared global war on terrorism after the 9/11 event. Various reports
by local and international media and intelligence sources claimed that Bangladesh has been
facing the rise of Islamist militancy, Talibanization by Islamist militants, becoming another
Afghanistan, becoming a regional terrorist hub linked with al-Qaeda or pro-bin Laden Jihadi
terrorism (Harrison, 2006; Vaughn, 2007; Rahman, 2004; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Institute for
Defence Studies and Analysis 2009; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2003. It is found
that the rise of religious militancy and terrorism are linked to various factors, such as domestic,
regional and international (Riaz, 2008); historical-political (Quamruzzaman, 2011); madrassa,
political patronage (Datta, 2007); and political, economic and cultural factors (Momen, &
Begum, 2005).
The growing number of Islamist militants, networks and their activities along with the
incidents of terrorist attacks since 1999 indicate that Bangladesh is very vulnerable to terrorism
in the name of Islam. The Bangladeshi governments have already shifted their position from
denying the presence of Islamist militant groups and their international links to the war against
terror to accepting the menace of militancy. The current Bangladesh Awami League (AL)
government in their earlier regime (1996-2000) failed to take action against Islamist militancy
and terrorism, but the present AL government (2009 onwards) has adopted the zero-tolerance
strategy. During the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led alliance government, religious
extremism and militant activities have risen as they initially denied its existence. But in the midst
of several terrorist incidents by a number of terrorist outfits and militants like Bangla Bhai across
the country finally they took measures to fight Islamist militancy. There has been allegation that
some of the then ruling party (four party alliance government) lawmakers and ministers used to
maintain relationship with the terrorist group leaders. At the same time, the party and the
government and state administration patronized some form of militant activities. In fact, the
international pressure from donors was a crucial factor in changing their position. A study by
Riaz (2008) pointed out that Islamist militancy is the result of both errors of omission (the state,
politicians and the civil society failed to do things that could have stemmed the rise of militancy)
and errors of commission (the state, politicians, and the civil society did things that worsened the
situation).
Terrorism is a complex term; it has a long history and different meanings, depending on the
context and the users. Terrorism literature has been growing tremendously. But this field is too
complex, multi-faceted and multi-dimensional in terms of forms, causes, patterns, consequences,
organization, and networks. Therefore, no single study can adequately explain religious
militancy in Bangladesh. Necessary data and appropriate subjects for studying such topic is
always an issue. As a result, there is hardly any rigorous scientific study on terrorism in
Bangladesh. Most of the studies on terrorism were descriptive in nature. Given these limitations,
the present study made efforts to explore the linkages between Islamist militancy and terrorism
in Bangladesh by looking at the growth of numbers and outfits, the links with regional and
international groups, the sources of funding, the patterns, trends and causes of Islamist militancy
and terrorism as well as the government responses to address the problem of terrorism.
In response to the current terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations
(UN) have introduced a global strategy by promoting democracy, dialogue and good governance
to tackle the root causes of radicalization.
1.2. Objectives of the study
The main objective of this study was to assess the extent and nature of religious militancy
and terrorism in Bangladesh. The specific objectives of the study were:
To identify the different Islamist militant and terrorist groups in Bangladesh
To understand the patterns of Islamist militant and their terrorist activities in Bangladesh
To investigate the strategies and techniques of committing militant and terrorist activities
in Bangladesh
To determine the underlying causes of Islamist militant and terrorist activities in
Bangladesh
To examine the anti-militant and counter terrorism measures in Bangladesh
1.3. Rationale of the study
The issue of Islamist militancy and terrorism is not just a law and order issue for
Bangladesh; it involves overriding concern over other issues including political stability, human
security, socio-economic development, and international relations. Available public perception
as articulated through various media, local and international reports and research evidences
supporting such claims is plentiful. This study identified various Islamist militant groups and
their terrorist activities in Bangladesh. It analyzed the trends, patterns, causes and consequences
of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. The study also looked at the funding sources,
strategies and techniques used by various terrorist groups. These findings can have policy
implications for undertaking future action plan in combating Islamic militancy and other terrorist
activities in Bangladesh.
1.4. Methods and data
1.4.1. Data collection techniques
Multiple methods were used to collect the data for this study. Secondary analysis was the
primary source of data. Despite the drawbacks of studying militancy and terrorism based on
secondary, official and biased journalistic sources, to ensure the maximum reliability and
validity, the same data were verified against different sources.
Content analysis: In the absence of primary data , a content analysis of secondary
sources such as newspapers reports, internet publications, books, magazines, journal articles, and
intelligence documents was the main method of data collection. This study also verified the content
of available and accessible books, booklets, leaflets, press briefings, press releases, reports, letters,
articles, magazines, and newsletters and internet publications or interviews or statements published in any
newspaper to to understand the actual agenda of the groups and the reasons of their militant activities.
Data on militant groups, their types, numbers, ideologies, activities, strategies, funding sources,
and locations were gathered from the newspapers. It is important to mention here that terrorism
and religious militancy as subject matter of study being very sensitive for investigation and very
hard to get access to all required information.
Key informant interview (KII): In-depth interview of key informants was conducted to
understand the underlying causes of terrorism and militancy, factors influencing involvement
with terrorist and militant groups, international linkages, trends and history of terrorism.
Case study: Case studies on five selected extremists/convicted terrorist/militants
belonging to five different militant outfits were conducted based on secondary analysis to find
information about their reasons for joining, involvement of activities. It is important to mention
that we have originally planned to conduct case studies on convicted terrorists who are serving
time in Dhaka Central Jail. We have not been able to conduct the interviews with the convicts
because the Home Ministry did not approve our request for obtaining permission to visit the
central jail and conduct the interviews. Under these circumstances we had to rely on
newspaper/magazine reports on the terrorists to present the case studies for this study.
1.4.2. Sampling
Sample selection for content analysis
Two leading national dailies the Daily Ittefaq and the Daily Star have been purposively
selected for data collection. Considering the volume of circulation and the neutrality of these
dailies we have selected them. We covered ten (10) years of newspaper from 2001 to 2010. In
addition to that, the Daily Prothom and the New Age were consulted to supplement the news
reports and the recent government strategies and actions.
Sample selection for KIIs
Purposive sampling technique was used to select respondents for key informant interviews.
In this case respondents depth of knowledge on the subject matters was the primary
consideration. The sample is consisting of key officials of the law enforcing agencies, research
organizations, NGOs, and civil society members representing the following agencies who were
considered to be able to provide deeper understanding of their views on terrorism in Bangladesh:
1. Advocate Sultana Kamal, Executive Director, Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK), Ex. Advisor
to the Caretaker Government of Bangladesh, Chairperson of the Trustee Board,
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB)
2. Mr. Md. Nurul Huda, Ex. Inspector General of Police (IGP), Bangladesh Police, Ex.
Secretary, Government of Bangladesh
3. Dr. Ifthekharuzzaman, Executive Director, Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB),
Ex. Director, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS)
4. Professor Delwar Hossain, Chairman, Department of International Relations, University
of Dhaka
5. Professor Rafiqul Islam, Chairman, Dept. of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of
Dhaka
6. Professor Ali Riaz, Chair, Department of Politics & Government, Illinois State
University, Normal, USA & Author, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh (2008)
7. Dr. Shaheen Afroze, Research Director, Bangladesh Institute of International and
Strategic Studies (BIISS)
8. AM M Quamruzzaman, Author, Militia Movement in Bangladesh (2011) and PhD
Researcher, McGill University, Canada
An interview guideline was used to gather information from the respondents (Appendix 1).
We have not been able to conduct interviews with the IGP and DG, RAB because they were not
willing to give us interviews without prior permission from the Home Ministry in this regard.
Also, on some issues respondents were unwilling to answer any question.
Sample selection for case study
Five convicted militants were purposively selected given their involvement, leadership,
justice response and media coverage. The selected individuals are :
1. Sheikh Abdur Rahman
2. Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai
3. Dr. Asadulla Al Galib Mufti Hannan
4. Zahidul Islam Sumon alias Boma Mizan
1.5. Scope and limitations
The study confined its scope to Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. The
complexity of the phenomena of Islamist militancy and terrorism is a major limitation. The study
is based on the available and accessible secondary information derived from the content analysis
of two newspapers and views of experts gathered through Key Informant Interview (KII). Based
on secondary analysis supplemented with KIIs, it addressed the objectives. Limited scope, time
and resources as well as inaccessibility to appropriate subjects and experts affected the quality of
data and analysis of the study. Despite our repeated efforts, we could not interview some of the
respondents especially the chief executives of the law enforcing agencies such as police and
RAB. They were not willing to give the interview without permission from the Home Ministry.
The reliability and validity of data gathered from news media sources, which often count
on official sources, pose a significant question. Neither official data nor the news media are from
biasness. Many authors pointed out the drawbacks of terrorism and militancy studies
(Quamruzzaman, 2010). Government sources do not release actual information under the excuse
of security concerns and the government`s image issue. Despite non-implementation of the
recently enacted the Right to Information Ordinance (No. 50 of 2008), 2008 and act in 2009
along with the inaccessibility of such sensitive information, this study used various news media
as the main source of information. International and regional news media are used as well. In
Bangladesh, news media do not enjoy much freedom from government control and in most cases
media are not neutral in reporting as they represent specific view points and the same is also true
for international and regional media as well (Quamruzzaman, 2010).
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1. The concept of terrorism and militancy
2.1.1. Terrorism
Terrorism is a sociological concept. It is a global phenomenon now. Following Durkheim
(1973), terrorism is a social fact. It is a socially constructed concept. Following Becker, terrorism
a crime as it is labeled. ``Terrorism is more extreme than most common crimes since it often
involves the commission of serious violence against civilians who have done nothing to directly
provoke their victimization`` (Agnew, 2010). It has been used in various ways such as tactic and
strategy, as crime and a holy duty, as a justified reaction to oppression and inexcusable
abomination or war on terror. It has been used by different actors ranging from militant groups,
pressure group, state, a group of individuals, ethnic group, religious group, and so on. The term
`terrorism` has no common or universally accepted definition. It is also one of the most debatable
terms in the literature. Its meaning is continuously changing and especially aftermath the 9/11
incidence, the term get more complicated and multifaceted. The definition of terrorism varies
from international bodies like the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and North
Atlantic Organization (NATO) to governments. One government varies from another in defining
terrorism. Even within the same state, different agencies responsible for different functions in the
ongoing fight against terrorism use different definitions.
The most commonly accepted academic definition starts with the U.N. definition
produced in 1992; "An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)
clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons,
whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets."
According to the framework decision of the European Union (EU), terrorism combines two
elements: an objective element, as it refers to a list of instances of serious criminal conduct
(murder, bodily injuries, hostage taking, extortion, fabrication of weapons, committing attacks,
threatening to commit any of the above, etc.); and a subjective element, as these acts are deemed
to be terrorist offences when committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population,
unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from
performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization (EU
Website, http://europa.eu/ legislation summaries/justice freedom_ security/fight against_
terrorism/l33168_en.htm).
Among government definitions, some are always broad (the USA) and some are narrow.
According to the US Department of Defense, terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful
violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
ideological. This definition include three key elementsviolence, fear, and intimidation. The
U.S. Department of State defines "terrorism" to be "premeditated politically-motivated violence
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses this:
"Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political
or social objectives."
The British Government`s definition seem to be less specific and considerably less
verbose. According to their definition of 1974, terrorism is"the use of violence for political
ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the
public, in fear." Canada`s definition of terrorism has been regarded as broad as an act or
unlawful acts for purposes of influencing or intimidating governments and the civilian
population for 'motivated for political and ideological purposes'."
According to the US Immigration Act of 1990, terrorists can be anyone who used a
"firearm, explosive, or dangerous device" to "endanger the safety of one or more individuals or
to cause substantial damage to property. According to the EU framework decision, a terrorist
group is defined as a structured organization consisting of more than two persons, established
over a period of time and acting in concert, and refers to directing a terrorist group and
participating in its activities as offences relating to a terrorist group. This framework also
includes certain intentional acts as punishable offences linked to terrorist activities even if no
terrorist offence is committed: public provocation to commit a terrorist offence; recruitment and
training for terrorism; and aggravated theft, extortion and falsification of administrative
documents with the aim of committing a terrorist offence.
Since 1930s, international bodies such as the League of Nations and the United Nations,
has put terrorism in their agenda. Domestic agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) have defined terrorism in the late 1930s. Both domestic and international groups flourished
and had began to use techniques such as hijacking, bombing, diplomatic kidnapping and
assassination to assert their demands. Politicians, lawmakers, law enforcement and researchers
have viewed these groups and as real threats to Western democracies. Lawmakers, security
professionals and scholars started efforts to classify terrorism based on what kind of attack
agents an attacker uses (biological, for example) or by what they are trying to defend (as in
ecoterrorism). The US researchers have begun to distinguish different types of terrorism in the
1970s to understand how to counter and deter terrorism.
There has been no internationally agreed UN definition yet or there cannot be a universal
definition of such complex and debatable term overnight. However, given criminal law violation,
terrorism is a criminal act, one of the cruelest forms of crime that influence the audience beyond
the immediate victim.
2.1.2. Militancy
The term militancy has not clear definition like the term terrorism. The word militancy
can be understood as the acts of individuals, groups or parties displaying engaging in violence
usually for a cause whether religious, political, ideological, economic, or social. Nowadays, the
term militant is synonymously used with the term terrorist. This complexity is reflected in the
use of the term in both academic and non-academic literature such as security studies and
intelligence reports (Firdous, 2009; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Firdous, 2009). There some words
that often seem to be confusing to understand militancy.
The word militant comes from the 15th Century Latin militare meaning to serve as a
solider. Militia is the related modern concept described as a defensive organization grew out of
the Anglo-Saxon Fyrd (Firdous, 2009). According to the Oxford English Dictionary (London:
Oxford University Press 2009), militia is an organized group of people comparable to a military
force. Etymologically, the term 'militia' derives from Latin miles or milit- meaning 'soldier;'
adding the suffix -ia, the word militia literally means 'military service (An Elementary Latin
Dictionary edited by Charlton T. Lewis (London: Oxford University Press, 1997) . The
contemporary sense of the term militia as paramilitary force motivated by religious or political
ideology, especially one that engages in rebel or terrorist activities in opposition to a regular
army" is associated with the US usage in the early 1990s as applied to a number of rightwing
groups opposed to gun control and distrustful of the federal government (Quamruzzaman, 2010).
In modern times, various movements seek to apply militancy as a solution, or use
militancy to rationalize their solutions for issues. But these movements do not share common
tactics. Usually, a militant uses violence as part of a claimed struggle against oppression. To Hall
(1995), a militia movement as a social movement has three common elements goals, collective
actors and collective action. According to Freilich et al. (2001), a militia movement has five
dimensions ideology, motivation, mobilization, organization and ritual. These elements are
also common to Islamist militancy or terrorism. This word is sometimes used to describe anyone
with strongly held views (e.g., militant Christian, militant Atheist). A militant sometimes hold an
extremist position. A militant person or group expresses a physically aggressive posture while in
support of an ideology or a cause. A militant person is a confrontational person regardless of
physical violence or pacifistic methods (http:/ http:/encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/
Miltancy). Two common traits shared by many militants are: use of force or violence directly,
either in offence or in defense, and justification of the use of force using the ideological rhetoric
of their particular group (http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/47081/4/Critical_Analysis_of_
the_Rise _of_Islamic_Militancy.pdf).
Abuza (2003) did not define militancy, but used the words radical, extremist, militant and
terrorist interchangeably (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). There are several other terms such as
insurgency, extremism and militia, which often have similar meanings or usages. However, they
have different connotations in different contexts. Some view these movements as social
movements or resistance movements while others view as criminal acts like terrorism. Following
Becker, these are socially constructed, and depend on who is labeled and who labels. Usually the
powerful or authorities define militias as terrorists or insurants and terrorists as in this present
world, the US or hegemonic powers determine what movements are terrorism (Quamruzzaman,
2010). From the late nineteenth century, militant is sensed as ``aggressively active in pursuing a
political or social cause``. In earlier times, it has been referred to a person engaged in warfare.
Wright-Neville (2004) theorized that there is a continuum linking activists to militants
and militants to terrorists. Based on publicly available information on the attitudinal dispositions
of Southeast Asian Islamist groups (JI members), he argued that movement between these
behavioral categories is a function of relative degrees of existential anger and alienation. Many
reports also inform that the existential motives of Southeast Asian terrorists and their
counterparts in other corners of the world are similar in many respects (ICG 2002, 2003;
Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 2003). He writes `` JI members differ from activists and
militants at many levels, but one of the most obvious is their transcendence of parochialism and
commitment to a supra-national Islamist agenda. This is especially evident in their tendency to
paint the US and the West more generally as the main source of what they see as the
marginalization and oppression of Muslims around the world. In other words, as Southeast Asian
Muslims they see the causes of their plight as indivisible from those that deprive Muslims in
South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere`` (Wright-Neville, 2004:39). In
Southeast Asia, the majority of Islamic political organizations are activist groups; they infuse
national politics with a more Islamic flavor, and prefer to work within existing political or
democratic frameworks. As activists, they have moderate degree of political alienation. Activists
become militants due to their accumulated frustration generated by a sustained period of political
impotence. Their degree of alienation becomes high. Terrorists are characterized by extreme
degree of political alienation. The activist groups of Southeast Asia are Nahdatul Ulama and
Muhammadiyah (Indonesia), Sisters in Islam and Muslim and ABIM (Youth of Malaysia)
(Malaysia) and Philippine Association of Islamic Ulamas and Islamic Movement for Electoral
Reform and Good Government (Philippines). At militant level, Islamist groups are KISDI
(Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World), Hizbut Tahrir, Front Pembela Islam and
Laskar Jihad (Indonesia), Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS), Al Arqam and Al Ma`unah (Indonesia);
and MNLF, Bangsamoro People`s Consultative Assembly, MILF and Abu Sayaf group
(Philippines). JI appears as terrorist groups in all three countries.
2.1.3. Explanations of terrorism
There are various causes and forms of terrorism. Religious militancy is as old as
terrorism. From the definitions of terrorism, it is evident that the purposes of terrorism are
manifold; it could be for politically motivated, state sponsored, ideological and so on. Over the
last two decades, terrorists have committed extremely violent acts for alleged political or
religious reasons. It has been observed that the actors who use terror tactics belong to different
groups of our society, local, regional, international. The actors can be individuals, group or even
state.
There are various explanations of terrorism in academic literature. While much terrorism
research showed that strains or grievances are a major cause of terrorism (Rosenfeld, 2004;
National Research Council, 2002 as cited in Agnew, 2010). These strains may include material
deprivation, the problems associated with globalization/modernization; resentment over the
cultural, economic, and military domination of the West particularly the USA; territorial, ethnic,
and religious disputes resulting from postcolonial efforts at nation building; economic, political
and other discrimination based on race/ethnicity or religion; the problems (unemployment/
discrimination or the clash between western and Islamic values) encountered by certain
immigrant groups; the denial of basic human rights; harsh state repressions over certain groups;
displacement or the loss of one`s land/home; military occupation of certain types; and threats to
the status of working class, white, male heterosexuals (Agnew, 2010).
Agnew (2010) linked collective strains to terrorism. According to him, the core
characteristics of collective strains are high in magnitude, with civilian victims; unjust; and
caused by more powerful others, including complicit civilians, with whom members of the
strained collectivity have weak ties. The likelihood of terrorism increases due to a number of
reasons - negative emotional states and traits caused by strains, reduced ability to effectively
cope through legal channels, common crime, and military means; reduced social control; beliefs
favorable to terrorism; and a collective orientation and response to the strain. A number of
factors that condition the effect of strains on terrorism include a range of coping resources, skills,
and opportunities; various types of social support; level of social control; selected individual
traits; association with others who support terrorism; beliefs related to terrorism, and the
anticipated costs and benefits of terrorism. Terrorists explain their actions in terms of strains they
experience and these are reflected in the publicity materials (video, website etc), in the names of
their organizations (such as the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the
Organization for the Oppressed on Earth).
However, many scholars argue that various historical and politico-religious factors
contributed to the rise of militancy and terrorism in the region over the years (Millard, 2004;
Abuza, 2003; Gunaratna, 2003). The direct and indirect presences of al-Qaeda and homegrown
militant groups are associated with major terrorist violence in Southeast Asia (Hamilton-Hart,
2005; Wright-Neville, 2004). The 1990s witnessed the rapid expansion of Islamic political
organizations and activists like PAS to establish Islamic state and rule and there is a continuum
linking activists to militants and militants to terrorists (Wright-Neville, 2004). Various factors
can be considered motivators of terrorism, such as ideologies, slogan and rumors (Gur, 1970);
poverty, deprivation and westernization (Hafez, 2000), technological factors (Castells, 1997).
Islamist militants are individuals, groups, organizations and parties that see Islam a guiding
political doctrine that justifies and motivates collective action on behalf of that doctrine (Hafez,
2003).
While the causes of terrorism in Southeast Asia involve two separate types of
explanations religion-driven and politics driven, it was argued that both processes are working
to produce Islamic radicalization and Islamic fundamentalism leading to terrorism (Hamilton-
Hart, 2005). Religion-driven explanations call for ideological responses to terrorism (Hamilton-
Hart, 2005). Radical or extremist version of Islam mobilizes violence by using Islam as an
emotive force and by distorting proper religious teachings (Abuza, 2003; Millard, 2004;
Gunaratna, 2003) as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). These studies also argued that the absence of
counterpropaganda through disseminating good Islamic teachings, placing curbs on religious
schools, preachers, enlisting the support of moderate Islamic figures, and related failures of
Muslim governments in this region lead to the rise of terrorism. Political grievances, repression,
conflict as well as social injustice and economic marginalization are emphasized in politics
driven explanations of terrorism and counterterrorism strategies addressing these underlying
political causes are paid attention (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). The US extended war on terrorism and
has been supporting governments in the Southeast, South Asia, Middle East and Africa for
counterterrorism operations. Research also suggests that all Islamist groups are violent, anti-US
and anti-democratic vehement in Southeast Asia, and unless the US takes account of the
important differences that divide Islamist groups, there is a risk of more activists to become
militants and more militants to become terrorist (Wright-Neville, 2004).
Another dominating causal explanation of terrorism in Southeast Asia is pathological
approach (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Deviant religious teachings and religious brainwashing by
certain individuals drive to terrorism (Farish, 2002 as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Anti-US
anger, anger at local governments and religious justification of state terrorism killing innocent
civilians in the name of war on terrorism are associated with the problem of militancy and
terrorist violence (Hamilton-Hart, 2005).
2.2. History of Religious militancy and terrorism
The history of terrorism and militancy indicates that terrorism has been used since the
beginning of the recorded history and the meaning of terrorism depends on the context and on
the perspective of the perpetrators. Terrorist and religious groups can be traced back to ancient
times. Terrorist groups, like the Zealots of Judea (Jewish group against Roman occupation
forces), the assassins, and Nizari Ismails Shia faction in Northern Iran) existed in the fourteenth
century and modern terrorist groups are similar in many aspects like motivation, organization,
targeting, and goals, but key ingredients for terrorism were not before 1700s. These groups used
underground campaign, assassination, killing of enemies (the killers waited next to their victims
to be killed or captured). The term terrorism appeared in 1795 in the Reign of Terror initiated by
the Revolutionary government. Maximillian Robespierre, the radical leader in the post-
revolutionary period, famously said that virtue is powerless without terror. Royalists and other
opponents of the Revolution State against states oppressing their populations employed terrorist
tactics such as assassination and intimidation in resistance to the Revolutionary agents. The
Parisian mobs used such extra-legal activities as killing prominent officials and aristocrats in
gruesome spectacles starting long before the guillotine was first used.
The 19th century witnessed political terrorism and small group of revolutionaries started
to attack nation states employing weapons technology. Nationalist conflicts (Irish nationalism)
also brought decolonization. Such nationalism ideological force continued throughout the 2oth
century terrorism. After the World Wars, members of ethnic groups, such as both the Irish and
Macedonians in Europe chose terror as a method to conduct their struggle for independence and
bring their states back from the absorbers. They used terrorism to bring international attention
and sympathy.
During the 20th century, leaders of nationalist insurgencies and revolutions used terrorism
as a tactic for independence from colonial rule within the framework of larger movements, and
coordinated with political, social, and military action. The Palestinian campaign against Israel
combined with other activities. The Soviet Union provided direct and indirect assistance to
revolutionary movements and many anti-colonial movements with free weapons and training
during the Cold War era. Extremists learned to employ violence and terror as the means to
realize their ambitions. Afghanistan`s Taliban are also blessed by this. Outside the Middle East,
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force in Northern Ireland, Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, the Shinrikyo cult in Japan, and the Shining Path
guerrillas in Peru are its luminous example.
The age of modern terrorism can be attributed to the activity of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which hijacked an El Al airliner en route from Tel Aviv to Rome
in 1968. Palestinian groups got cooperation from European radicals in the early 1970 and with
the Japanese Red Army (JRA) in 1974. Since then the internationalization of terror has been
growing by cooperating terrorist groups through training, operations, and support.
The 21st century witnessed the new age of Islamic terrorism with 9/11. This is the largest
act of international terrorism held in a set of coordinated attacks on the USA where terrorists
hijacked civilian airliners and used them to attack the World Trade Center towers in New York
City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Since then various terrorist attacks have been going
on across the world. Among them, major terrorist attacks include New Delhi (Indian Parliament
attacked); Bali car bomb attack; London subway bombings; Madrid train bombings and two
recent attacks in Mumbai (hotels, train station and a Jewish outreach center, opera house).
The history of terrorism shows that political ideology divides between left extremists and
rights extremists; religious ideology divides between Islamist extremists, Christian extremists,
Jewish extremists, Hindu extremists and so on. In many countries, terrorism has been used by
political ideology based groups such as left extremists (Bangladesh), Maoists (Nepal and India).
Nationalists sharing a common ethnic background also use terrorism (Tamils in Sri Lanka,
separatists in Northeastern India). Special interest groups also use terrorism for legitimate causes
justifying their use of violence to achieve their goals. Members of these groups are people who
use terrorism to uphold anti-abortion views, animal rights, and radical environmentalism.
2.3. Organized crime and terrorism
Since 1920s, organized crime has emerged as another field of study despite the paucity of
data and literature. Organized crime has no uniform definition and its definition has always
been problematic (Levi, 2008). Organized crime is often invisible, insidious in its network, and
dangerous as it involves violence and resilience. Organized crime is sometimes shaped by
political, economic and legal factors. Power elites alliance with criminal elements is more
threatening than the criminal groups (von Lampe, 2008). Legal political structures (by the police,
judiciary and government) also facilitate criminal organizations, and illegal enterprises continue
and flourish. Organized crime is not just crime (specific type of criminal activity) but it involves
a systematic condition (the concentration of power whether in the form of an underworld
government and/or in the form of alliance between criminals and political and economic elites
(Von Lampe, 2008). Organized crime includes four levels of complexity the individual
characteristics of organized criminals, the structures (networks and groups linking to
individuals), the overarching power structures (hierarchical superior to individuals and
structures) and the nexus between these illegal structures and the legal structures of society (Von
Lampe, 2001).
The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime included three elements of
organized crime - organized criminal group, structured group and serious crime (Retrieved
June 14, 2010 from UNTOC, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/ Publications/
TOC%20Convention/ TOCebook-e.pdf). Van der Heijden (1998) looked at organized crime
quantitatively and argues that a group of people, commission of serious criminal offences and
profit seeking interest are must for any crime or group to be called organized crime (c.f.
Gilmour, 2008).
Both terrorism and organized crime have conceptual, definitional and policing
challenges. The linkage between organized crime and terrorism has been growing. Ridley (2008)
argued the increased linkage based on his analysis of money laundering and financial crime
associated with terrorist financing in the post 9/11 era. In the UK, two-thirds of the organized
crime groups were involved with some form of terrorism in 2005 (Ridley, 2008). According to
Russian sources, Chechen terrorist groups received about 8 million US Dollars annually by 2003
from overseas donations and foreign groups engaged in various forms of criminal activity
(Ridley, 2008). They used various channels to receive these monies, such as via offshore
entities, and used Georgia as the transit country (from overseas to Russia), cash couriers (Russia
to Chechnya), transferred to a second bank account, opening bank accounts on false
documentation and stolen or forged travel or identification documents. Ridley`s (2008) case
study also showed that thefts items are counterfeited and sold in illicit markets under through
front and subsidiary companies. In this Russian case, resistance groups used Moscow based
accounts to receive from or transfer money to accounts in the UK, USA, Poland, France and EU
countries. In another case, a small group of individuals active in London was associated with
credit card forgery and false sale of false credit card, across the UK, Belgium, France, Spain, and
other EU countries. Perpetrators were linked to Algerian Islamic extremist group (the GIA)
which had affiliation to Al Qaeda since the mid-1990s.
Organized crime and terrorism together maintain status quo of partial breakdown of
government and law enforcement and disrupt democratization and economic development to
continue their activities (Ridley, 2008). In developing transition or failing states, domestic
terrorist groups make common cause with organized groups. Research evidence indicates that
Bangladeshi Islamist militants have political and administrative patronization during the BNP-
led alliance government. They are organized, engaged in money laundering for financing their
activities, and run underworld businesses to raise funds.
2.4. Islamist Terrorist groups, networks, tactics, and activities
Religion has appeared as a potential weapon to mobilize and unite people. It has been
used and misused for terrorism throughout the human history. Religious militancy results from
historical circumstances and again depends a lot on the perspectives of the perpetrators whether
the challenge or threats to a portion of the community is cultural, political or economic.
Religious extremism leads to militancy resulting in extremist movements and terrorist attacks
across the globe. This relationship can be evident in the international or transnational conflicts
such as Arab-Israel (Muslims and Jews), India-Pakistan (Hindus and Muslims), the 9/11 plots.
Within the national boundary such relationship are also prevailing in various countries such as
India (between Hindus and Muslims, Ireland (between two Christian sects), Bangladesh
(Islamist), Pakistan (Islamist), and so on. Religious extremists want to establish legal system
based on their religious beliefs and often reject secular governments. In Bangladesh, Islamists
militant outfits and terrorist groups are mostly organized to achieve their main goal.
Islam has meanwhile occupied a prominent place in the critical study of terrorism and
militancy. Several studies also portrayed the rise of Islamist groups and al-Qaeda networks in
Southeast Asia (Hamilton-Hart, 2005; Wright-Neville, 2004). According to the US State
Department (2003), a number of indigenous terrorist groups connected in some way with al-
Qaeda are not only existing in Southeast Asia but also in North and East Africa as well as in
Central and South Asia, and even Central and South Asia contain many more of these groups
than Southeast Asia (as cited in Wright-Neville, 2004)
In the case of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia), a series
of studies have shown that Islamic extremism has been associated with terrorism (Abuza 2003;
Millard 2004; Barton, 2005; Rabasa, 2003). In these countries, some political parties are alleged
to have links to terrorism and Islamic extremism (Millard, 2004; Stewart, 2003 as cited in
Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Al-Qaeda and indigenous groups like JI posed a potent threat to regional
security of this region (Wright-Neville, 2004). For example, in Malaysia, some members of PAS
(Prosperous Justice Party) had alleged links to terrorist groups (Stewart, 2003 as cited in
Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Various studies revealed that the genesis of militant groups can be linked
to the US funding and CIA support, US cooperation with Pakistan intelligence service, and arms
transfer for the anti-Soviet militants in the 1980s and 1990s (Kepel, 2002; Gunaratna, 2003,
Abuza, 2003 as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Many scholars argued that the US connection to
and patronization of these groups got no proper attention (Gunaratna, 2003; Kepel, 2002 as cited
in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Religious fundamentalism and the groups like JI (Jamaah Islamiyah) in
Indonesia have grown with Saudi Arabia`s funded mission of Wahhabism (Abuza, 2003;
Millard, 2004; Gunaratna, 2003) as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). There is also an argument for
the inclusion of groups like PKS in the mainstream politics to count on their voice to address
radical Islamism (Fox, 2004, Bubalo & Fealy, 2005 as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005).
The age of modern terrorism beginning in the 20th century can be attributed a lot to
Islamist militancy and terrorism. The operational and strategic epicenter of Islamic terrorism can
be attributed to Pakistan and Afghanistan. As mentioned earlier, the new age of Islamic
terrorism was identified with 9/11 experiencing coordinated attacks characterized by hijacks of
airliners used to demolish the World Trade Center and the Pentagon preceded by the attacks in
New Delhi, in Bali, in London subway, in Madrid train, and in Mumbai. These groups use
violence and militancy to either establish Islamic state, implement Islamic laws or political
issues. Israel Palestine conflict, Taliban regime in Afghanistan, India Pakistan Kashmir,
Issues with al-Aqsa mosque in Israel, Babri mosque in India, led to the rise of a number of
Islamist militant groups who used terrorism as tactic to revenge in the name of Islam. During the
cold war era, many of these groups were trained, sponsored or assisted by two super powers,
USA and Soviet Union. European radicals and the Japanese Red Army (JRA) cooperated
Palestinian groups in the 1980s. There are linkages between Islamist militant groups with non-
Islamist groups in the areas of training, operations, and support. In South Asia, such nexus is
discovered among Nepalese Maoists, Indian Maoists, Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) such as
ULFA, Sri Lankan LTTE, Islamist groups in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an El Al airliner en
route from Tel Aviv to Rome in 1968. Palestinian groups got cooperation from European
radicals in the early 1970 and with the Japanese Red Army (JRA) in 1974. Since then the
internationalization of terror has been growing by cooperating terrorist groups through training,
operations, and support. Osama Bin Laden sponsored the World Islamic Front for Jihad against
Jews and Crusaders (WIFJAJC). Various attacks, for example, bombing of Los Angeles
International Airport, the USS Cole bombing in October 2000 and September 11 attacks. In
1996, al-Qaeda was formed by Bin laden having large base of operations in Afghanistan, when
the Islamist extremist regime of the Taliban had seized power.
The major terrorist attacks in Bangladesh from 1991 reveal that linkage between various
Islamist militant and terrorist groups and outfits go beyond national boundaries. Al Qaeda is one
of them. For bomb blasts in India, Pakistan-based LeT has been accused. HUJI is a Pakistan-
based international militant group. HUJI Bangladesh is the Bangladeshi chapter founded by the
Afghanistan holy jihadist from Bangladesh. There is also allegation that Bangladeshi militants
have supported Pakistan based militant groups in terrorist attack and expanding their networks in
India. HUJI-B is also connected to homegrown Islamist militant groups like JMJB, AHAB. In
the Middle East today, various terrorist groups are operative, such as Hamas (Islamic groups),
Kach or Kahene Chai (Jewish groups).
The perpetrators of terrorist attacks from 1991 in Bangadesh claimed responsibility for
the attacks, identifying themselves to be various Islamist militant groups and terrorist outfits. The
agenda and the links between these groups vary from one location to another. Some attacks are
for political reasons such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MLIF) in the Philippines,
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front in India, Pakistan, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine. Others are for religious ideologies, such
as JMB, JMJB in Bangladesh, Islamic Jihad and Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. But these days,
terrorism in Asia becomes regionally coordinated. Hizbul Mujahedin and Harakat ul Mujahedin
claimed responsibility for various attacks in India. They mostly used bombs for attacks. Hamas,
Hizballah, and al-Qaueda are attacking on Israel. Al-Qaeda is a global militant group of Osama
bin Laden founded before 19990. It claimed responsibility for various attacks including 9/11,
1998 US embassy bombings, and 2002 Bali bombings.
2.5. Global action against terrorism, and War on terror
In 2005, the UN says, whatever may be the purpose, the international community will
not tolerate any form of terrorism. The international community put terrorism on the UN agenda
since 1934. They looked for a convention for the prevention and punishment of terrorism.
Despite its adoption 1937, it never came into force (UN website http://www.un.org/terrorism/
instruments.shtml). Since 1963, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has
collated the 13 universal conventions (international agreements) and 3 protocols against
terrorism signed to create consensus that certain acts count as terrorism (for example, hijacking a
plane), in order to create the means to prosecute them in signatory countries.
These sixteen universal instruments dealing with terrorism were elaborated to prevent
terrorist acts.
1. 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
2. 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation
1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons
3. 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages
4. 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
5. 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
6. 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation
2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation
7. 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
10. 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection
11. 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(Terrorist Bombing Convention)
o Creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional use of
explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against various defined public
places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or with intent to cause
extensive destruction of the public place.
12. 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(Terrorist Financing Convention)
o Requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists,
whether direct or indirect, through groups claiming to have charitable, social or
cultural goals or which also engage in illicit activities such as drug trafficking or
gun running;
o Commits States to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or
administratively liable for such acts; and
o Provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist
activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other States on a
case-by-case basis. Bank secrecy is no longer adequate justification for refusing to
cooperate.
13. 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
In response to the current terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) and the The United
Nations (UN) has introduced a global strategy by promoting democracy, dialogue and good
governance to tackle the root causes of radicalization. At the World Summit 2005 of the
United Nations member states condemned all forms and manifestations of terrorism, and
agreed to reach a common definition and a comprehensive combating strategy to address
international terrorism (retrieved March 5, 2011 from http://www.un.org/terrorism
/background.shtml).
On 8 September 2006, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNCTS) was
adopted as a unique global instrument to enhance national, regional and international efforts to
counter terrorism. It underscores the importance of existing international counter-terrorism
instruments. The Strategys four pillars include: tackling the conditions conducive to the spread
of terrorism; preventing and combating terrorism; building States capacity to prevent and
combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and
ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight
against terrorism. In 2005, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was
established with 31 international entities o provide member states with the necessary policy
support and spread in-depth knowledge of the Strategy, and wherever necessary, expedite
delivery of technical assistance. The biennial review of the UNCTS in 2010 also reaffirmed the
support for the Strategys four pillars.
Following the terrorist attacks in the USA (in 2001) and Europe (Madrid and London in 2004
and 2005), the European Union`s (EU) action against terrorism undertook four pillar approach
(prevent, protect, pursue and respond) based on the Amsterdam Treaty. To address this
transnational phenomena, the EU focuses on preventing and cracking down terrorist acts,
protecting infrastructures and citizens and tackling the causes, resources and capacities of
terrorism provided that coordination between law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities
within the EU and international cooperation are essential. The EU strategy includes the following
objectives:
increase cooperation with third countries (especially in North Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia) and provide them with assistance;
respect human rights;
prevent new recruits to terrorism; better protect potential targets; investigate and pursue members of existing networks; improve capability to respond to and manage the consequences of terrorist
attacks.
Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) expressed the vulnerability of Alliance members to large-scale
terrorist attacks. NATOs Article 5 declaration and subsequent operations demonstrated the
Alliances resolve to deal with this threat (NATO Website http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_69482.htm.).
The UNODC Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) has been contributing critically for many
years to counter- terrorism capacity building among member states. To fight international
terrorism, the UNODC supported for different (inter) regional action against terrorism in Africa,
Asia, Europe, and other organizations.
G8 also vows joint action against terrorism. Leaders of the G8 promised to work together to
combat terrorism threat and to support weak governments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Sahel,
Somalia and Yemen to fight terrorism.
The USA is leading the War on Terror also termed as the Global War on Terror or the War
on Terrorism. Its policy, politics, and pursuit of a global war on terrorism influenced the rest of
the world. War on terror is an international military campaign with the support of other North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as non-NATO countries mainly to fight against
militant Islamists and al-Queda. President George W. Bush first used the phrase War on
Terror. President Barack Obama used the term Overseas Contingency Operation. Even before
Bush, the Reagan Administration used the term "war against terrorism" in 1984 as part of an
effort to pass legislation designed to freeze assets of terrorist groups and marshal the forces of
government against them. Following the 9/11 attack, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 was passed in
order to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world to enhance law
enforcement, investigative tools, and other purposes. To protect the US from terrorist attacks,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is working closely with a range of partners and are
using growing suite of investigative and intelligence capabilities to neutralize terrorist cells and
operatives here in the U.S., to help dismantle extremist networks worldwide, and to cut off
financing and other forms of support provided by terrorist sympathizers (FBI website,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism). The US military action against terrorism
predates 2001. The USA enhanced military action and attracted support from many countries
including Russia following the 9/11 attacks. In Aaugust 1998, the US ground troops undertook
airstrikes against terrorist training camps in Khost, Afghanistan. Following the bombings of US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, US President Bill Clinton launched Operation Infinite Reach,
a bombing campaign in Sudan and Afghanistan against targets.
Canada is a strong ally of the USA in fighting against terrorism. It has been leading that front
since 1963, and it has signed 12 conventions related to terrorism (CSIS Website,
http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/prspctvs/200004-eng.asp). The Anti-terrorism Act (ATA)
represents Canada's overall anti-terrorism strategy like the USA Patriot Act passed in the same
time frame. The ATA focuses on terrorists and terrorist groups, and aims to protect the safety,
security and fundamental rights of Canadians.
Since the 9/11 event, various western governments have undertaken various programs to
support developing countries facing the problem of terrorism outside the war on terror in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The US is on the lead to support countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and
India in South Asia. Bangladesh received training and technical assistance, for example, security
forces including Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) was trained in the USA. Scotland Yard helped to
investigate some terrorist attacks outside the Interpol. The US government also provided
capacity building assistance to Bangladesh Bank in addressing the money-laundering problem to
check and monitor terrorist financing.
2.6. The Current Study
In Bangladesh, militancy and terrorism have become a socio-economic and political issue.
Over the last two decades, a number of Islamist groups and terrorist oufits both homegrown and
internationally-linked have emerged in the country. Though the number of terrorist attacks by
Islamist militants has increased since 1999, various militant groups continued to exist in the
country since 1992. Various militant groups have grown over the years enhancing strengths in
terms of manpower and skills, and widespread networks to conduct terror campaigns (Datta,
2007; The Daily Star 2005; The New Age xtra, 2009; BIPSS, 2010, 2011; ICM, 2011; Munir,
2011). On January 27, 2005, Janes Intelligence Review, the leading defence magazine of the
world, reported:
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on earth, on the brink of being a failed state, and that makes it a perfect target for al- Qaeda and its-ever expanding network of Islamist extremist organizations. Virtually unnoticed by the world at large, Bangladesh is being dragged into the global war on terrorists by becoming sanctuary for them.
Another report by the Canadian Security Intelligence S