SSSP

SpringerSeries inSocialPsychology

SSSP

Action Control

From Cognition to Behavior

Edited byJulius Kuhl and Jiirgen Beckmann

Springer-VerlagBerlin Heidelberg New York Tokyo

PD Dr. Julius KuhIDr. Jurgen Beckmann

Max-Planck-Institut fur psychologische ForschungLeopoldstrasse 24, D-8000 Munchen 40, F. R. Germany

With 19 Figures

ISBN-I3: 978-3-642-69748-7 e-ISBN-13: 978-3-642-69746-3001: 10.1007/978-3-642-69746-3

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is con­cerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations, broadcasting, reproduction by pho­tocopying machine or similar means, and storage in data banks. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law,where copies are made for other than private use, a fee is payable to 'Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort', Munich.

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1985

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1985

The use of registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply even in the absence of a spe­cific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and thereforefree for general use.

Typesetting, printing and binding: G.Appl, Wemding2126/3140-543210

To Martha,who is well acquainted with the limitsof action control

Preface

"It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for thesake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates backmore than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo­gists. For more than 40 years theories of human action have assumed that cogni­tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different asS-O-R behaviorism, social learning theory, consistency theories , and expectancy­value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common :they all assume that "thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any­thing," that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior.

In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in­volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not alwaysdo what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capableof reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complexpsychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions,such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions, and the enactment of the be­havior suggested by those cognitions.

In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus whichpresumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main­tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside bycompeting action tendencies.

Recently, many investigators from several subfields of psychology have dis­covered cognition-behavior inconsistencies. This led to several studies of the var­ious factors contributing to observed discrepancies between cognition and be­havior. Social psychologists have studied attitude-behavior inconsistencies .Clinical psychologists have become increasingly aware of the disruptive effectswhich self-regulatory deficits can have on an individual's ability to behave ac­cording to her/his preferences, feelings, and beliefs. Personality psychologistshave studied various strategies employed by people when they find it difficult tomaintain and enact an intention (e.g., in situations requiring delay of gratifica­tion or resistance to temptation). Finally, cognitive psychologists have construct-

VIII Preface

ed increasingly more complex computer models simulating problem-solvingmechanisms, aiding in the enactment of intentions in difficult situations.

This book is an attempt to increase cross-fertilization across research areasconcerned with the cognition-behavior relationship. Until now there have beenvery few attempts in this direction. Despite the common theme, the methods andtheoretical assumptions differ considerably across these subfields. We believethat most of these differences are complementary rather than contradictory. Thedifferences in theory and methodology arise from the fact that each approach fo­cuses on a different facet of the problem. Although we have to confine ourselves,for the most part, to isolated facets of complex phenomena, it can be useful to"look across the border" occasionally and recognize the blind spots inherent inour own approach. Aside from its heuristic usefulness, cross-fertilization high­lights the interaction between the various processes studied within isolated para­digms.

Preparing this book has taught us that there are some factors along the pathfrom cognition to behavior which are difficult to control. Encouraging col­leagues from quite different areas to contribute to a joint volume was not an easytask. Some authors had more problems in transforming their intention to partici­pate in this project into the appropriate behavior than others did . All of us had toemploy a substantial amount ofaction control to push aside the many competingaction tendencies that beset our working day.

Several people helped us in this effort . Thanks are due Dr. Martin Irle for hisencouragement and advice, and Hermann Huttl and Britta Kotthaus for secre­tarial assistance. Part of the editorial work was made possible by the support ofboth editors by the German Science Foundation (DFG) and by a fellowship atthe Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences awarded to the senioreditor. These individuals and institutions helped us to transform "thought assuch" to "thought which is for the sake of something and is practical," to useAristotle's definition.

Stanford and MunichMarch 1985

Julius KuhlJurgen Beckmann

Contents

1. Introduction and Overview

Julius Kuhl and Jurgen Beckmann

Part I. Cognitive and Motivational Determinants ofAction

1

2. From Intentions to Actions:A Theory ofPlanned Behavior

Icek Ajzen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11

Predicting and Explaining Volitional Behavior:A Theory of Reasoned Action ....Empirical Support . . . . . . . . . .The Intention-Behavior Relation .Plans, Goals, and Actions . . .A Theory of Planned BehaviorSummary and Conclusions ..

3. Knowing What to Do: On the Epistemology ofActions

Arie W.Kruglanski and Yechiel K1ar . .

A Theory of Lay EpistemologyConclusion . . . . . . . . . . .

121418242935

41

4158

X Contents

4. The Pursuit ofSelf-Defining Goals

Peter M.Gollwitzer and Robert A.Wicklund . 61

A Central Distinction: Self-Definingvs. Non-Self-Defining Goals . 61ATheory of SymbolicSelf-Completion . . . . . . . . 62Self-Symbolizing:The Cognition-Behavior Relation . . . . . . . . . 65The Relation Between Self-Report and Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . 68Self-Symbolizing:The Interference withGoals That Are Not Self-Defining 80Summary . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

PartJJ. Self-Regulatory Processes and Action Control

5. Historical Perspectives in the Study of Action Control

Julius Kuhl and Jiirgen Beckmann ..

Overview of EarlyTheories of Volition .Ach's Psychologyof Volition .

6. Volitional MediatorsofCognition-BehaviorConsistency.. Self-RegulatoryProcesses and Action Versus State Orientation

Julius Kuhl .

ATheoretical FrameworkEmpirical EvidenceConclusion .

7. Dissonance and Action Control

89

8994

101

103109121

Jiirgen Beckmann and Martin Irle . .. . 129

The Relevance of the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance for Processesof Action Control 130Implications for the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 140Conclusion , . . . . . . . 146

8. Action Control and the Coping Process

Claudia Herrmann and Camille B. Wortman .

Copingwith Life Crises:The Gap Between Theory and PracticeAction Control and the Coping Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

151

152155

Contents XI

Coping with Undesirable Life Events : Implications for the TheoryofAction Control . 167Conclusions and Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

PartIII. Problem-Solving and Performance Control

9. Mechanisms ofControl and Regulation in Problem Solving

Rainer H. Kluwe and Gunnar Friedrichsen

Requirements ofa Theory of Problem-SolvingModels of Cognitive Control in Problem Solving .Models of Planning: A Metacognitive Activity . .Empirical Results : Evidence for Executive Control

· 183

· 184· 186· 195· 205

10. Thinking and the Organization ofAction

Dietrich Domer . . . 219

The Organization of Behavior: A General Picture . 219Heuristic Processes : Their Elements and Determinants . . 222Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

11 . A Control-Systems Approach to the Self-Regulation ofAction

Charles S.Carver and Michael F.Scheier . . 237

A Control-Systems Model of Self-Regulation . 238Reassertion and Giving Up : Helplessness and Alternative Interpretations . 247Applications : Ineffective Self-Management, and Behavior Change . . .. . 252Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

12. From Cognition to Behavior:Perspectivesfor Future Researchon Action Control

Julius Kuhl . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

From Predictive to Explanatory ModelsFrom Molar to Molecular Levels of Analysis .

. . . 267

· 268· 269

XII Contents

From Simple Cases to Psychologically Representative Behavior . 271From Associationistic to Dynamic Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272From "Cognition-Behavior Consistency" to " Motivational Stability" . . 273Conclusion 274

Author Index.

Subject Index

.277

. 283

List of Contributors

Prof. Dr. leek AjzenDepartment of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003,U.S.A.

Dr. Jurgen BeckmannMax-Planck-Institut fur psychologische Forschung, Leopoldstrasse 24,0-8000 Munchen 40, F. R. Germany

Prof. Dr. Charles S.CarverDepartment of Psychology, University of Miami, P. O. Box 248185,Coral Gables, FL 33124, U.S.A.

Prof. Dr. Dietrich DornerUniversitat Bamberg, Lehrstuhl Psychologie II, Postfach 1549, 0-8600 Bamberg,F. R. Germany

Dipl.-Psych. Gunnar FriedrichsenFachbereich Padagogik, Abteilung Psychologie,Hochschule der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Postfach 700822,0-2000 Hamburg 70, F. R. Germany

Dr. Peter M. GollwitzerMax-Planck-Institut fur psychologische Forschung, Leopoldstrasse 24,0 -8000 Munchen 40, F. R. Germany

Dipl.-Psych. Claudia HerrmannFachbereich Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswissenschaften, W7 der FreienUniversitat Berlin, Habelschwerdter Allee 45, 0 -1000 Berlin 33, F. R. Germany

Prof. Dr. Martin IrleFakultat fur Sozialwissenschaften der Universitat Mannheim, A5,0-6800 Mannheim 1, F.R.Germany

XIV List of Contributors

Yechiel KlarDepartment of Psychology, Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv, Tel Aviv, Israel

Prof. Dr. Rainer H. KluweFachbereich Padagogik, Abteilung Psychologie, Hochschule der BundeswehrHamburg, Postfach 700822, 0-2000 Hamburg 70, F. R. Germany

Prof. Dr. Arie W.KruglanskiDepartment of Psychology, Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv, Tel Aviv, Israel

PO Dr. Julius KuhlMax-Planck-Institut fur psychologische Forschung, Leopoldstrasse 24,0-8000 Munchen 40, F. R.Germany

Prof. Dr. Michael F.ScheierDepartment of Psychology, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213,U.S.A.

Prof. Dr. Robert A.WicklundFakultat fur Psychologie und Sportwissenschaft der Universitat Bielefeld,Abteilung Psychologie, Postfach 8640, 0-4800 Bielefeld, F. R.Germany

Prof. Dr. Camille B.WortmanInstitute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106,U.S.A.