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by Joseph Miranda

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The American Revolution:

below — General Washington’s surprise attack on Christmas Day in 1776 was the first move against the Hessian forces at the Battle of Trenton.

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Decision in North AmericaEmanuel Leutze (American, 1816 –1868) | Washington Crossing the Delaware | 1851 | Oil on canvas | The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City | 378.5 × 647.7 cm (149 × 255 inches)

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Background

The first armed action of the American Revolution took placeon 19 April 1775. A column of

British troops had been ordered byMassachusetts Gov. Thomas Gageto seize arms stockpiled by unrulycolonists in the town of Concord. The“redcoats,” as they were commonlyknown, were met at Lexington Common

by Massachusetts militiamen. A firefightbroke out; the Americans withdrewbut continued to snipe at the column.The British fought their way throughto Concord and then back to Boston.

Though little more than a runningskirmish, Lexington-Concord proved tobe the point of no return. The politicalconflict between the British governmentand the American colonists, whichhad been simmering for several years,suddenly became a war. Both sidesmobilized. The British sent troopsand more generals to reinforce theirposition in Boston. The Massachusetts Assembly ordered the raising of13,000 militia to besiege that city.

The British had the advantage ofbeing able to draw on the resources oftheir globe-spanning empire. Immense wealth flowed in from colonies in Indiaand the Caribbean. The British alsohad a large base in the territories thatlater became Canada, which they’drecently conquered during the Frenchand Indian War (1754 – 63). Britainalso possessed the world’s strongest

navy, and with it could blockadethe rebel colonies while supportingtheir own forces in North America.

Yet there remained the question of

exactly who was going to fight the war onland. After the conclusion of the Seven Years War (the European portion of theFrench and Indian War), the British Army had been reduced in size. In 1775it amounted to only 45,000 men, andit had to police the entire empire as well as provide security for the homeisland. America, including the WestIndies, had 10,500 of those troops.

Britain had a population of about

eight million in 1775, three times thesize of that of the American Colonies.The British Army consisted largely oflong service professionals, recruited inthe main from volunteers. While Britaincould mobilize a better-disciplined forcethan the Americans at the start of thefighting, deploying and supporting it wasn’t going to be an easy matter giventhe logistics of the 18th century. Still,since the Americans had no regular armyin 1775, the overall military balanceseemed to be in favor of Britain.

At the same time, though, the American position was actually betterthan it might at first appear. Therebels had a considerable militaryinfrastructure, to use a modern term.That is, each colony had an extensivemilitia organization with a long historyof service. That militia was drawn fromall able-bodied men, was subject tomuster at any time, and served undervaried degrees of military discipline.There were also some fulltime unitsin each colony, generally known asprovincials , which were held to higher

standards of training and equipment.There had also come into existence aselect class of militia known as “minutecompanies,” made up of volunteers

ready to move at short notice — hencethe now famous term “Minutemen.”Many of those men were veterans of theFrench and Indian War as well as of fron-tier fighting against the Indians. There was also a pool of officers who had prac-tical experience in the field serving withthe British in those conflicts. While train-ing was of varying levels of quality, there was widespread patriotism and a populardesire to launch an open fight for liberty.

Politically the Americans had beenrunning their affairs to some degree for years via their provincial assemblies.The Continental Congress, which firstmet in 1774, acted as something of ageneral governing body from its start.Communications were maintainedamong the colonies by variousmeans, most notably Committees ofCorrespondence, which had their originsin the years before 1775 as a meansfor dissidents to disseminate politicaltracts and provide mutual support.

The Americans had a furtherpolitical advantage insofar as theyhad a doctrine based on the then widespread Enlightenment conceptsof individual rights, national libertyand defense of property. Added to that was the fact many in Britain sympa-thized with the rebels, to the pointseveral prominent generals declinedto serve in the war against them.

Finally, there was a well-developedNorth American economy that couldprovide a basis for creating andmaintaining an army in the field.

Most critically, there were iron worksand other industries in New Englandand the Middle Colonies that couldbe used to manufacture arms.

above — Thomas Gage

right — Statue depicting John Parker,

captain of the Lexington militia

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Abroad, Britain’s victory in the Seven Years War had led to resentment onthe part of the other European powers,most notably France and Spain, which were looking for an opportunity toright the balance of power in theirown favors. Thus the British had totry to plan their campaigns in such a way that large reversals weren’t risked,lest such defeats move other majorpowers to join the war against them.

Revolutionary War,Regular Army

On 14 June 1775 the ContinentalCongress officially created the appro-priately named Continental Army. It was to be made up of regular regimentsraised by the individual colonies(henceforth “states”), but it wouldoperate in the field as a unified nationalforce. George Washington, a popular Virginia planter with considerablemilitary experience, was appointed itsoverall commander. Interestingly, allthat took place more than a year beforethe Declaration of Independence would make official the break withBritain, which shows how far things hadalready gone on the American side.

The creation of the Continental Army then also raised a question within the states: why have a regularnational army at all? That point wasn’tlost on the revolutionaries, since oneof their grievances against the British was their stationing of a standing force

on “American” soil. Even in Britainitself a standing army was seen assomething dangerous to the rights ofthe citizenry. That attitude went backat least to the 17th century, when OliverCromwell used the army to control thegovernment and appoint himself LordProtector, a de facto military dictator.

Yet the Continental Armyquickly became the centerpiece of the American cause. There were severalreasons for that. A regular army was arallying point for patriots and a visiblesymbol of the revolution. Just as criti-

cally, it was an attractive symbol to theEuropean governments from which the American leadership wanted to appealfor support and alliance. A regulararmy demonstrated the Americans were a force to be taken seriously.

That was shown at the conclu-sion of the Saratoga campaign in1777, when the Continental Armyaccomplished something no force ofpartisans would’ve been able to do:compel the surrender of an entireBritish army in the field. The strategic

outcome of Saratoga was the endingof the British threat to New York andNew England. The larger politicaloutcome led to the French and Spanishgovernments recognizing America asan independent nation and sendingtroops and ships to North Americato operate in full alliance with it.

That larger outcome had beenforeshadowed at the Battle of BunkerHill on 17 June 1775. There, American

militiamen stood their ground againstBritish assaults for the better part ofa day, before being forced to retreat when their ammunition ran out. While tactically Bunker Hill was aBritish victory, strategically it workedfor the Americans by demonstratingthey could stand up to regulars.

For the British, Bunker Hill was anindication the pacification of NewEngland — the political hotbed of therevolution — would be impossible toundertake with the forces then at hand.

Another useful thing abouthaving a regular army was itallowed the Americans to takethe strategic offensive. TheContinental Army could maneuveracross several states when militia

would’ve been politically limited.There was also the operational

matter of sieges. One aspect of Britishstrategy was to hold coastal enclaves:Boston, New York, Yorktown. Port gar-risons could be supplied by the RoyalNavy, and control of those ports meant

continued on page 12 »

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1775: Campaign for the NorthOpen fighting began with the actions at Lexington and Concord (19

April 1775), followed by American militia besieging the British garrison

in Boston. The British attempted to break the siege by attacking militia

positions at Breed’s Hill (Battle of Bunker Hill, 17 June). After clearing

the rebels from that position, however, the British were stilled pinned in

Boston. In upper New York, American forces under Benedict Arnold and

Ethan Allen captured Fort Ticonderoga, key to the water route to Canada.

Meanwhile the Continental Congress authorized the creation of a regu-lar army to be commanded by George Washington. Washington brought

that army to join the siege of Boston while other American forces took the

offensive into Canada (August), expecting an anti-British rebellion to sup-

port them. The Americans reached Quebec but failed to take the city when

the Canadian rebellion didn’t materialize. With enlistments expiring and

winter closing in, the Americans withdrew to New York, fighting a delaying

action down the Lake Champlain route. While the Canadian expedition

was a failure, the Americans still controlled New England and New York.

1776 – 77 & the Middle StatesIn 1776, of course, the Declaration of Independence was signed.

Until that time there had been some hope for reconciliation, but

the war was then changed to a conflict between sovereign nations.

Both France and Spain, still smarting from their defeats in the Seven

Years War, saw a chance to undermine Britain’s global power.

War materiel began to be smuggled to the rebels from France.

The British decided New England, the political hotbed of the revolu-

tion, was too strong to be conquered with the forces they had on hand, and

they therefore abandoned Boston (March 1776). Their new plan was to cut

off New England from the rest of the rebellious colonies while securing

the Mid-Atlantic States. Gen. William Howe landed on Staten Island with

a massive new force (July 1776), and from there took all of New York

City, driving Washington’s Continentals ahead of him into New Jersey.

Late that year, Washington turned and inflicted a sharp defeat on British

forces at Trenton (26 December 1776) and Princeton (3 January 1777).

For 1777 the British planned a campaign they expected to be decisive.

It involved a two-pronged drive into New York state, which was intendedto give them control of that rebel colony and isolate New England.

The northern wing of the offensive, under Gen. “Gentleman Johnny”

Burgoyne, marched down from Canada via the Champlain-Ticonderoga

route. The southern wing, commanded by Gen. Howe and based in

New York City, was to march north and link up with Burgoyne.

Burgoyne’s part of the plan initially worked well, capturing

Ticonderoga in July; however, Howe then took his army and headed into

Pennsylvania, capturing Philadelphia, the American capital (September)

while also defeating Washington at Brandywine and Germantown. In

central New York, Burgoyne had an increasingly difficult time making

headway along wilderness roads in the face of rebel militia domination

of the countryside. An American army under Gen. Horatio Gates

then blocked all further British advances, surrounding Burgoyne at

Saratoga. On 17 October, Burgoyne surrendered his entire command.Saratoga proved to be the major turning point, ending the British

threat to the northeast and bringing French recognition of the United

States, leading to an open alliance in February of the following year.

The Continental Army spent the winter of 1777 – 78 in Valley

Forge, reorganizing and training under Baron von Steuben. In

June 1778 the British, commanded by Sir Henry Clinton, evacu-

ated Philadelphia. Washington caught up with him at Monmouth (28

June), where a tactically indecisive battle took place. Even so,

Clinton then found himself pinned in New York City. By the end

of 1778 the Americans had control of the Middle States.

1778 – 81, War on the PeripheryBoth the British and Americans sent small expeditionary forces into the

Ohio River valley to lay claim to that frontier region. George Rogers Clark

led a contingent of irregulars, defeating the British in a series of actions

and planting the American flag at Fort Vincennes (February 1779). On the

British side, Gov. Henry Hamilton, at Fort Detroit, supported Indian raids

against nearby settlers. In September 1779, Gov. Don Bernardo de Galvez

of Spain’s Louisiana colony took the offensive into British Florida. He also

sent an expedition up the Mississippi, reaching the Great Lakes and secur-ing those far western lines of communication for the Americans (see p. 46).

1778 – 81, War at SeaThe American alliance with France paid off when Count d’Estaing

brought the French fleet across the Atlantic in the summer of 1778,

skirmishing with the Royal Navy ships of Adm. Richard Howe (brother of

William) and then taking the offensive in the West Indies. The British,

fearing the loss of their income producing colonies in the Caribbean,

transferred forces to fight there. The Caribbean became the scene of back

and forth naval operations involving British, French and Spanish squadrons.

French naval reinforcements under Adm. De Grasse gained ascendancy off

the American Atlantic coast, landing French reinforcements and supporting

the siege of Yorktown. In 1780 Britain declared war on the Netherlands

due to that nation’s smuggling supplies to the Americans, thereby bringing

another maritime power into the war against them. Elsewhere at sea

American frigates engaged in commerce raiding, causing damage to

British shipping and winning some spectacular victories in individual

actions, though they had little effect on the overall course of the war.

1779 – 81, Decision in the SouthThe revolution had opened for Virginia in 1775 with small parties of

American militia taking control of key points. In June 1776 the British

launched an amphibious attack into South Carolina, attempting to take

Charleston, but they were repulsed. For the next couple years, partisan

warfare continued between pro-British “Tories” and American patriots.

In 1778 the British took the offensive in the South. They believed they

could mobilize large numbers of Loyalists there as well as seize criticalagricultural areas, thereby starving the Continental Congress of tax

income. The long southern coastline allowed the British to exploit their

naval superiority, and the campaign got off to a good start for them with

the capture of Savannah (29 December 1778) and the creation of a Tory

militia. The next year saw both sides locked in an increasingly vicious

struggle across the South, with the British generally coming out ahead.

Clinton besieged defiant Charleston, taking it in May 1780. Gen,

Cornwallis then marched inland, defeating Gates, hero of Saratoga, at

Camden (16 August). Banastre Tarleton, commanding a cavalry force

of Tories, spread terror in the interior while American guerilla leaders

such as Francis Marion raised havoc across the same countryside. The

British seemed to be in the ascendancy, accentuated by mutinies in

the Continental Army over poor pay and the seemingly endless war.

Washington restored the situation, though, addressing the troops’ concernsand appointing veteran Gen. Nathaniel Greene to command in the region.

Greene fought a mobile campaign based on the increasing American

militia control of the countryside. A series of battles were fought and,

despite some British tactical successes, Cornwallis found himself losing

the initiative. He therefore decided to concentrate in Virginia in order to

cut American lines of communication there with the Middle and New

England States. He was outmaneuvered by Franco-American forces

under the Marquis de Lafayette, and he fell back on fortifications set up

at Yorktown (August 1781). Washington besieged Yorktown, which was

then fully cut off from reinforcement and resupply due to the efforts of the

French Navy. Cornwallis surrendered on 17 October 1781. The Treaty of

Paris (November 1782) recognized the new United States of America. ◆

The Course of the War

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control over much of the larger regionaleconomy. The Continental Army, fromearly on, proved to be a force capable ofeither pinning down the forces in thoseBritish enclaves or reducing them viasiege warfare. The decisive Americanvictory at Yorktown (17 October 1781) was thus a victory for the regulars (withconsiderable French assistance) thatcouldn’t have been achieved by militia.

Opposing Strategies

British strategy centered on launch-ing a series of campaigns aimed atstriking against what they perceivedto be the rebels’ vital political center,their capture of which would causethe collapse of the revolution. Whenthe initial New England campaignproved unfruitful, the target shiftedto the Mid-Atlantic States: New York,New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Theyseemed to present decisive objectivesbecause they held the commercial andgovernmental centers of the Americans.Philadelphia was the location of theContinental Congress and thus the de facto capital. New York City was a majormercantile center as well as being ahub of considerable Loyalist sentiment.

Moreover, a Middle States campaigncould be supported from Canada viathe Ticonderoga water route. Anotherreason to seize control of the region wasmost American manufacturing capacityoutside New England was located there.

When the Middle States strategy went down to defeat at Saratoga, theBritish, by strategic default, came toconcentrate on the South. That area wasknown to have considerable pro-British

support, which (it was hoped) could betranslated into a large Loyalist militia.

There was some validity in theassumptions behind both the Middleand Southern States strategies, butthe British couldn’t make them workeffectively. One reason such efforts wentnowhere was the American politicalcenter of gravity wasn’t really in the cit-ies. It was decentralized throughout thecountry in the form of revolutionary agi-tation, and it was also in the Continental Army, the most visible center of resis-tance. That was something Washingtonunderstood. His imperative was alwaysto keep intact the army: as long as it was in the field the revolution remainedalive. He therefore generally refused tofight battles on any but his own terms.

A major exception to that approach was the New York campaign of late

1776, where he tried to contest Howe’slandings and met with a series ofreverses. Washington would later turnand attack at Trenton-Princeton. Therehe grabbed some local victories that hadpolitical impact out of all proportion totheir military significance. They gavethe American cause a morale boost when it most needed one, as well asproviding more grist for Americandiplomats attempting to get the

support of Britain’s rivals in Europe. What finally counted in all the

campaigns was the American ability tocreate local superiority by mobilizingmilitia. The Americans were able todo so in New England to keep theBritish pinned in Boston; then, duringthe Saratoga campaign, to decisivelyreinforce Gates’s regulars; and in theSouth to keep control of the country-side. Conversely, the American defeatat Quebec in the winter of 1775 – 76 was in no small part due to theirfailure to spark a rebellion among theCanadians. The unsupported Americanassault on Quebec (31 December1775) meant Canada wouldn’t be joining the revolution. It also allowedthe British to maintain Canada as abase from which they could launchtheir 1777 campaign into New York.

» continued from page 9

Battle of Bunker Hill , as published in Scribner’s Magazine in February 1898. The original was owned

by the Delaware Art Museum, but was missing in 2001 and presumed stolen.

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What all that indicated was a con-ventional strategy could prove success-ful if it could be properly supported.Battles could be decisive, but thequestion was how to gain that decision.Therein lay the dilemma for both sides.

Arms & Men

The armies of the AmericanRevolution were small by contemporary

European standards. Field armiesin European wars of that time oftenamounted to 100,000 men, yet thelargest single concentration of Britishforces in America was Howe’s armyat New York City in 1777, with 34,000.Even Burgoyne’s army in the Saratogacampaign amounted to just 8,000 men(including 1,000 or so Canadian militiaand Indians). His opponent, Gen. HoratioGates, had 7,000 American regulars,though they were supplemented bymilitia. Cornwallis’s army at Camden (16 August 1780) amounted to 2,400 men,

and Gates’s opposing American forceamounted to some 3,000. Decisive battlesin America were fought by “armies” that would’ve amounted to only a few bri-gades in any respectable European war.

Throughout most of the war, Washington’s hard core of theContinental Army rarely amountedto 10,000 men, though it could bereinforced with militia and state unitsat times of crisis. That points up a

major difference between the Britishand Americans: the British lacked theregulars needed to control the vastreaches of America, while the Americanscould temporarily get large numbersin the field by mobilizing militia. TheBritish made some attempts to do thesame, but they never succeeded tothe same extent as the Americans.

Demographics were part of it. America was sparsely populated, with 3million people spread over an area equalin size to all of western Europe (when thetrans-Appalachian region is included).Ninety percent of the populace lived inthe countryside; “cities” were little morethan large towns. Boston, for example,had a population of 16,000, whilePhiladelphia, the largest city, had 40,000souls. That provided only a relativelylow recruiting base for the British, whoprimarily operated out of the cities.

The demographics also impactedlogistics. There wasn’t the density offarmland to provide the surplus on which armies could live. To be sure,food and other supplies could always be

requisitioned, but it was the era of theEnlightenment and there was a generalreluctance to pillage. That would changesomewhat when it came to partisan warfare, but by and large the conflict waskept within civilized bounds. One reasonfor the hardships the Continental Armysuffered at Valley Forge was Washingtondidn’t want to requisition from thesurrounding populace. Similarly, theBritish tried to keep tight control of their

troops, though that was more difficult toenforce when it came to their Germanmercenaries and Indian auxiliaries.

For the British, transport was also amajor constraint, even though Britainitself had the industries needed to armand equip, and the agriculture to feed, itsarmies. The catch was most items — food, weapons, ammunition, etc. — had tobe shipped across the Atlantic Ocean, a journey of several weeks that could benightmarish for troops crowded aboardships. The situation on the transports was summed up by one British officeras: “There was continued destructionin the foretops, the pox above-board,the plague between decks, hell in theforecastle, and the devil at the helm.”

The usual 18th century Europeansystem of logistics was based on“magazines,” large supply depots usuallyestablished in fortresses. The magazines would concentrate food, weapons,ammunition and other essentials as well as replacement personnel. They would be sent forward to the field armyin supply wagon trains. Generally an

above — Infantry of the Continental Army

below — Gen. George Washington was

appointed Commander-in-Chief of the

Continental Army on 15 June 1775.

continued on page 16 »American forces at Saratoga

British forces at Saratoga

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Baron Von Steuben & theFounding of the US Army

In February 1778 the Continental Army, encamped at Valley Forge,

was disintegrating before Washington’s eyes. One of the problems was

his Inspector of Troops, Gen. Thomas Conway. Conway was a close

associate of Gen. Horatio Gates (a rival of Washington’s), and he was

proving less than helpful. Washington had endured months of Conway’s

sarcastic comments and criticisms while at the same time he did nothing

to accomplish his job: seeing to the army’s morale and training.

The situation with Conway was coming to a crisis, as he’d petitioned

Congress to have Washington replaced by Gates or himself. Washingtonfound out about that and decided it was time to move. When he received

word a possible replacement for Conway was available from Prussia,

he acted. Conway was fired and Washington replaced him with an

unknown German who titled himself Baron Friedrich Von Steuben.

Von Steuben was an experienced Prussian officer with command

and staff experience in the Seven Years War. By the end of that

conflict he’d gained prestigious assignment to the personal staff of

Frederick the Great. His further prospects fell apart, though, when

postwar cutbacks eliminated many officer positions, including his.

For the next 10 years he bounced from service to service among the

small kingdoms and fiefdoms that constituted 18th century Germany.

During that period he picked up several questionable titles and

ranks, including an “honorary” baronet in Hohenzollern-Hechingen.

Von Steuben eventually contacted Benjamin Franklin in Paris

and offered his services to the revolutionary cause. He was sent

on to America with a glowing letter of recommendation.

Steuben had a sense of timing and drama. On his arrival in the

colonies he declared he wouldn’t accept pay, and then traveled to Valley

Forge without delay. He made a curious first impression there, arriving

with a staff of aides and assistants who also served as translators. He

only wore dress uniforms showing all his decorations and was constantly

accompanied by his dog, a greyhound named Azor. He stood in contrast

with the ragged Continental Army soldiers freezing in their huts.

Washington was blunt with the Prussian: the army was in

danger of collapse; Von Steuben was therefore to conduct a quick

assessment and submit his list of recommendations to stave

off that fate. Washington, pessimistic at that time in the war,

expected few results, but Von Steuben quickly went to work.

He would rise at 3:00 a.m. each day and take until sunup to plan

his schedule. After breakfast he and his staff would begin eight to 10

hours of riding or slogging through the snow from unit to unit. He was

quiet and polite to officers and foot soldiers alike. He initially presented

himself as a warm gentleman with a robust sense of humor. Many of

the soldiers from Pennsylvania spoke German, and he reminded them

of a kindly uncle. In the evening he would dictate observations to his

staff that became notes for his report. After a late supper he would

sleep and then resume that routine the same time the next morning.In three weeks Von Steuben amassed facts, figures, observations

and suggestions into a concise report. He had five conclusions. The first

was the greatest immediate threat to the army was the health situation.

There were no sanitary accommodations or regulations. For example,

soldiers butchered starved horses for food alongside open sewers.

His second observation was that defensive preparations

around the encampment were inadequate; the only

thing preventing a British attack was the snow.

His third conclusion was discipline was so lax that operations by

the army could only be planned on the basis of hoped-for good luck.

His fourth conclusion was the army had to be reorganized

from its militia roots into that of a fully professional force.

Finally, he concluded the quickest way to improve the

overall situation was to implement a simple training system

that could be taught quickly throughout the army.

Washington reviewed the report and told Von Steuben he had

authority to do whatever was required to implement it. Early on the

morning of 19 March, then, Steuben began to make himself into the

archetype and architect of the US military system. The kindly uncle

overnight turned into the toughest drill instructor imaginable. Starting

that first day he woke the troops to a strict regime and put them to

bed at night exhausted. He instituted health regulations, including

standards for food preparation and control of sewage. Latrines were

dug and central kitchens were established to pool supplies and

improve the delivery of rations. The haphazard collection of huts was

reorganized into streets with separate enlisted and officer quarters.

He began making inspections of the camp guard at all hours of theday and night. His attention to the vigilance of that guard set the new

standard for discipline. He also personally oversaw the improvement

of the camp’s defenses so as to prevent the possibility of a British

surprise attack. Cannon were sited; entrenchments were dug, and units

were placed on alert via a rotational schedule. Valley Forge went from

the appearance of a refugee camp to that of a military installation.

Within days he established his “model company.” It was made

up of 120 men who would be the first to be trained intensively in the

new system. Those men would in turn train the rest of the army. The

unit’s enlisted and officers were drilled for four hours each day.

Each day began the same way. Just before 9:00 a.m. the model

company was mustered on the parade ground. At precisely 9:00

a.m. the Baron and his staff would gallop onto the field and present

themselves for the beginning of training. Drill began with basicmovements. The model company was taught how to march and move

in every direction as a unit. Length of stride was standardized and

a pace of 75 steps per minute was set as the “common step.”

Everyone from privates to Washington came to watch the

model company drill. Early derision by the spectators soon turned

to admiration. Von Steuben stressed discipline in drill was the

basis for unit cohesion under fire. He said the Prussian experience

bore out the lesson that troops hardened and trained through

repetitive drill were less likely to break and run under fire.

After a week the model company had completed initial training.

Von Steuben then expanded the drill to include weapons handling and a

manual of arms. The British manual of arms was complicated, involving

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dozens of movements simply to fire a musket. Von Steuben simplified it

to a handful of movements. Soon the men of the model company were

conducting training throughout the army. The lessons of discipline and

uniformity began to take hold. No one was exempted from training.

One of the biggest changes was the switch from the British to

the Prussian system of training. The British relied on harsh discipline,

with officers rarely engaging in training with the line soldiers. The

Prussian system was equally harsh, but officers were expected to lead

by example and attend all training sessions. Training both officers

and enlisted together enhanced unit cohesion, as everyone went

through a common regime and everyone knew their entire unit, and

by extension the rest of the army, was proficient in military skills.Due to the cold, daily training was limited to two hours in the

morning and two hours in the afternoon. Soldiers and officers received

homework in the form of handwritten study materials about the next

phase of training. Von Steuben would dictate at night in French; his

words would be translated and made into handwritten copies given

to NCOs and officers. He followed up by visiting the troops at their

campsites to review what had been taught and answer questions.

Von Steuben became known for issuing blistering barrages

of curses at any person failing to properly execute drill. He would

follow up by grabbing the offending soldier’s musket, stepping

into the line and demonstrating the correct movement.

Von Steuben also invented a useful device that’s been the heart

and headache of US officers and NCOs ever since: the staff report.

After the first week of the transformation, Washington received

a detailed report from him listing all the changes made, details

of the current state of training and information related to overall

readiness. That unexpected but welcome source of information gave

Washington a good picture regarding the condition of his army.

The staff report was soon followed by a system Von Steuben

called “Brigade Inspectors and Drill Sergeants.” Those positions

were filled by the officers and enlisted of the model company. The

Brigade Inspectors were the Baron’s personal representatives in each

such unit. They made evaluations of the progress of training, with

an important part of their reports coming in the form of estimates of

the regimental officers’ conduct and capabilities. That information

was transformed into further staff reports for Washington. The

Drill Sergeants carried out hands on training at company level.As training continued throughout the regiments, Von Steuben

faced a further problem: the faulty supply system. The army had

records of the equipment received and issued, but no data about its

present whereabouts, condition or serviceability. When enlistments

ran out, soldiers left camp. Von Steuben discovered that when they

left they usually took with them their musket, cartridge belt, knapsack,

blanket and anything else of value below the size of a howitzer. Those

items were often sold or kept as valuable going away presents.

Von Steuben instituted a system of accounting for equipment issued

and a supply collection system for troops mustering out. Eventually each

soldier received a small book in which he was required to keep track of all

equipment issued to him. While that system couldn’t overcome the chronic

shortages within the army, it slowed the drain of serviceable equipment as

troops went home. It also became the basis of the “property book” systemthe US armed forces still use to keep track of equipment and supplies.

The next step in preparing the army was drilling with entire

regiments and brigades. Von Steuben knew the importance of

maneuvering with successively larger organizational components.

Finally it was time to show what the army had learned. On 6

May 1778 the first grand review of the whole army was held. With

Washington and various dignitaries watching, a series of brigade-level

maneuvers and a massive “pass and review” were successfully held.

On 17 June a washerwoman cleaning Gen. Sir Henry Clinton’s laundry

overheard that the British would be evacuating Philadelphia and heading

into New Jersey. That news soon reached Washington and he immediately

broke camp. He began following Clinton with four brigades totaling 13,000

troops on 22 June. Von Steuben rode along as part of Washington’s staff.

Their progress was slow because they were burdened by taking along all

their heavy equipment and supply train. Clinton was aware the Americans

were following, but he saw no threat from Washington’s “rabble.”

The American advance guard caught up to the British at Monmouth

Courthouse in New Jersey. The initial American attack was led by

Gen. Charles Lee. He only tentatively pressed forward, giving the

British time to regroup and counterattack. After some disorganized

fighting he ordered a retreat. Washington arrived, confronted Lee

about the withdrawal and relieved him of command. Von Steuben and

Henry Knox were ordered to rally the troops and reestablish a line.

At that moment the discipline learned at Valley Forge came intofocus. Monmouth could’ve turned into a rout for the Americans, but the

army held together. The brigade commanded by Gen. Anthony Wayne

began the turnaround by standing its ground. By late afternoon the

Americans had rallied and again began to move forward. The British

counterattack slowed to a halt, and scattered redcoats began to fall out

of their formations and flee. Gen. Clinton determined the best course

of action was to retreat. The day ended with the British retreating for

the six hours, only finally stopping at Middletown around midnight.

While far from the victory Washington had hoped for, the Continental

Army had rallied and recovered from an initial setback and then pushed

the enemy from the field. Morale shot up. Alexander Hamilton summed

it up: “The behavior of officers and men was such as could not easily

be surpassed. Our troops, after the first impulse from mismanagement,

behaved with more spirit and greater order than the British troops.”

Von Steuben remained indispensable throughout the war. He was

appointed Inspector General of the Continental Army with the rank of

major general. He authored the first US Army regulations, which became

known as the “Blue Book.” From July 1780 to May 1781 he oversaw the

defense of Virginia against several attacks, including the James River

assault led by Benedict Arnold. He assisted Daniel Greene with the

rebuilding of the southern army, which led to successes at the Battles

of Cowpens, King’s Mountain, Guilford Courthouse and Eutaw Springs

Von Steuben mustered out at the end of the war. He was

awarded property by Congress near Rome, New York, as

recognition of his valuable service. He lived there until his death

in 1794, and his influence has been felt by every American

who served in the US armed forces since 1778.◆

— Roger Mason

far left

Baron von Steuben portrait

by Ralph Earl

above

The revolutionaries learn

military readiness and confidence

under von Steuben

right

General Von Steuben, 1930 Issue

8/12/2019 ST270 Article


Big War or Little War?

The American Revolution saw considerable use of both regular and militia forces, and

that wasn’t unanticipated. In the mid-18 th century there was interest among European military

thinkers in what was known as petit guerre (small war), which called for campaigning

primarily via raids, outposts, partisans and light forces. That interest was in part due to the

experience of decades of colonial warfare in the Americas, and with Indian fighting in which

small units, ambushes and marksmanship made the difference. The doctrine was given a

leap forward with the French and Indian War (1754 – 63), as the American component of the

Seven Years War (1756 – 63) became known. One of the more memorable actions in that

conflict was “Braddock’s Defeat” (9 July 1755), where a small force of French light infantry

and Indians destroyed a British column under the command of Gen. Edward Braddock. George

Washington, incidentally, was under Braddock’s command at the time as a volunteer.Further, it wasn’t only in America where petit guerre was practiced. In Europe

there was the experience of warfare in the Balkans, against the Ottoman Turks, in

which light forces were heavily employed and in which cross-border raiding was

a norm. Marshal Maurice de Saxe, France’s premier commander in the first half of

the 18th century, wrote extensively on the topic while advocating the employment

of light troops. He also popularized the concept of the “legion,” a combined-arms

division that could conduct independent mobile operations. Both the Americans and

British adopted a modified form of legion organization for some irregular units.

Despite all that, there was also a reluctance to employ guerrilla warfare in the American

theater. Enlightenment era thinkers believed guerilla warfare would degenerate into massacre

and pillage, as well as lead to the devastation of the countryside, thus making it impossible

for regular armies to operate. As things turned out in the southern campaign, there was

truth to those concerns. Much of the fighting was done in the south by quasi-independent

partisan and militia formations, and there were massacres of prisoners and other assortedoutrages against civilians — though they never reached the scale seen in later wars.

By and large the American Revolution was a relatively tame affair. In the run up to the

outbreak of open fighting at Lexington — 1770 to 1775, the period of the Boston Massacre,

the Boston Tea Party and the Intolerable Acts — while there was occasional mob violence and

much inflammatory rhetoric on the part of the rebels, there was little in the way of outright

killing. Indeed, the Boston Massacre (5 March 1770) shocked contemporary sensibilities

precisely because it resulted in the deaths of five civilians. Interestingly, the British soldiers

involved were put on trial, were defended by John Adams, and were all found innocent of

murder. Whatever the rhetoric, both sides had a vested interest in keeping passions under

control. If nothing else, astute leaders on both sides realized some kind of reconciliation

would be needed if the country were to be governed civilly after the fighting ended. ◆

army would operate no more than a week’s march ahead of its magazines,since beyond that point the draughtanimals required more food than couldbe transported to them in the wagons. Water transport allowed for extendedoperations via river and canal boats.

Most of that system was missingin America, which lacked the greatfortress cities of Europe. Many of the

major forts, such as Ticonderoga and Vincennes, were located in wildernessborder areas with limited resources. And while the Americans could manufacturesome weapons, gunpowder was inshort supply (due to pre-war Britishlaws restricting that item’s manufacture within the colonies). That meant areliance on arms being smuggledthrough the British blockade or, oncethe French and Spanish got involved,direct shipments via their navies. Oneof the great benefits the French brought

the rebels was their supply organization,the intendance, plus hard currency with which to purchase food and equipment.

Even when supply was potentiallyavailable, there was no guarantee it wasgoing to get to the army. It mostly hadto be transported via the abominable“roads,” with tracks and trails the norm,though there was a good post roadrunning parallel to the coast.

Logistics made local militias all the

more important. Being able to call outmilitia meant reinforcements wereavailable for the field army whenever itappeared on the scene. Militia, since it was raised and supported locally, couldalso take the field without putting muchstrain on the larger logistical situation.Of course, militia was generally limitedgeographically as to where it coulddeploy, but even so, it could be usedto temporarily expand the size of anarmy at the moment of decision in acampaign. Militia on the scene also

meant a degree of further logistical sup-port could be provided to the regulars inthe form of food and wagons providedby the locals. Militia also proved effectivein harrying enemy supply columnsand forage parties, thereby aggravatinghis logistical situation. Lastly, havingeffective militia meant having control ofthe countryside in which it operated, and with it the ability to raise more troops,supplies and taxes while preventing

the other side from doing the same. As the war progressed, militia

also proved able to take the offensive.George Rogers Clark conducted hisexpedition into the Ohio Valley in1779 – 81 largely with state forces andirregulars, defeating small British forcesand their Indian auxiliaries. As a resulthe solidified the American claim to theterritories west of the Appalachians.

Yet there was a point of diminishingreturn. The longer the militia was inthe field, the more the local economy was undermined as farmers, trades-men and community leaders wereabsent from home. Moreover, militia would often refuse to fight in distantcampaigns, and its units were subject tothe common problem of men depart-ing the ranks at their own whim.

As things turned out, it was a long war. In theory that should’ve workedin favor of the Americans. The British were supposed to tire of fighting and gohome, but the protracted operations alsomade things difficult for the rebels. Thelonger the war lasted the more overseas

trade was cut off, leading to a decliningstandard of living. That helped bring ona depreciation of the currency as wellas stimulating dissent in the ranks.

When the war broke out in 1775,many patriotic Americans enlisted in thenew Continental Army in accordance with the right of citizens to serve assoldiers. When their enlistments were up,many of those same patriots promptly went home, declaring that was also theirright as volunteers. That, for example, leftthe American force in front of Quebecin dire straits, one of the main reasons

for the Canadian campaign’s collapse.The Continental Congress recognized

the situation and implemented longerenlistments, for three years or the dura-tion of the war, whichever came second.Congress also promised enlistmentbonuses and rewards of land uponcompletion of service, yet even thosemeasures didn’t solve the problem ofmorale. There were frequent grievancesessions and occasional mutinies.The solution of Washington and hissenior officers was generally to meet

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with the malcontents and hear theircomplaints; often that meant giving into their demands. The British, with theirlong service professionals and Germanmercenaries, didn’t face the same levelof disciplinary issues, though there wassome problem with desertions due tothe fact American propaganda promisedsuch troops a free life in the New World.

The World Upside Down

The major turning points of the American Revolution came in three mili-tary campaigns: Lexington-Concord-Bunker Hill, which mobilized Americanresistance while initiating openhostilities; Saratoga, which brought inEuropean support for the Americans;and Yorktown, which effectively endedBritish offensive capabilities in America.Those decisions came about becausethe Americans were able to combineboth regular and militia forces to createsituations of local superiority that couldbe translated into victories with widerpolitical ramifications. Each of thosecampaigns also gave the Americans de facto control of a major sector of thecolonies: respectively New England,the Middle States, and the South.

At the same time the campaignson the periphery — the far west,the Mississippi, Florida, theCaribbean — drew away British strengthfrom the main theater of operation. Another critical aspect of the foreigninterventions was the resultant British

loss of naval supremacy, even thoughonly temporarily. That allowed forFrench and Spanish land campaignsin America, as well as the isolationof British forces in coastal bases.

The weakness in overall Britishstrategy was in their political inabilityto mobilize militia to supplement theirregulars. In the bigger picture, theaftermath of the Seven Years Warhad left the British in a position in which they were increasingly isolateddiplomatically. The Americans exploitedthat military and diplomatic situation

and thus won independence. ❖

SOURCES

Dupuy, Ernest and Trevor. The Encyclopedia of MilitaryHistory.New York: Harper & Row, 1986.

Hoffman, Robert, & Peter Albert, eds. Arms andIndependence. Charlottesville, NC: Univ. Press, 1984.

Huston, James. Logistics of Liberty.Newark, DE: Univ. of Delaware, 1991.

May, Robin & G.A. Embelton. The British Army in North America. London: Osprey, 1992.

Murdoch, David, ed., Rebellion in America. Oxford: Clio, 1979.

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