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    by W. T. StaceRELIGION AND THE MODERN MINDA CRITICAL HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY Myst ic i sm

    AND P h i l o s o p h yBY W . T . S t a c eM A C M I LL A N 8L C O L T DLondon 1961

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    Copyright 196o by W. T. Stace

    P R E F A CEThe aim o f this book is to investigate the question, What bearing,if any, does what is called "mystical experience" have upon the m oreimportant problems of philosophy? We start with a psychologicalfact the denial of which could only p roceed from ignorance. Somehuman beings do occasionally have unusual experiences which cometo be distinguished as "m ystical." These are recorded, or at least re-ferred to, in the literatures of most advanced peoples in all ages. Butsince the term "mystical" is utterly vague, we must first examine thefield empirically to determine what types and kinds of experience

    are called mystical, to specify and classify their main characteristics,to assign boundaries to the class, and to exclude irrelevant types. Wethen ask whether these experiences, or these states of mind, soselected and described, throw an y light on such problems , as thefollowing: Whether there is in the universe any spiritual presencegreater than man; and if so,- how it is related to man and to theuniverse in general; whether we can find in m ysticism any illumina-tion on the questions of the nature of the self, the philosophy oflogic, the functions of language, the truth or untruth of humanclaims to immortality, and finally the nature and sources of moralobligation and the problems of ethics generally.In the last paragraph I used the phrase "spiritual presence," whichI borrowed-from T oynbee. Its virtue is its vagueness. A distinguishedphysicist, giving a popular lecture, was recently irrelevantly asked by

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    6R E F A C Ea mem ber of his audience, "Do , you believe in G od ?" He replied,"I do not use the w ord because it is too vague." I think, this was thewrong answ er. He should have said, "I do not use the word 'G od'because it is too precise." This is w hy I speak o f a "spiritual presence."Perhaps this also is too precise.

    It is better to be vaguely right than to be precisely wrong.This enquiry is in some respects parallel to the quest ion, Whatbearing, if any, has our sense ex perience, e.g., our colour sensations,upon the p roblems of the nature and structure of the universe? Isay, "in so m e resp ec t s parallel." How far we can take the analogy seri-ously is itself one of our problems. But he w ho has perused nothingbeyond the p reface of this book is not entitled forthwith to rejectthe comparisonunless he wishes to convict himself of prejudice.I write as a philosopher, and not as a my stic. I do not profess tobe an ex pert in any of the cultural areas of m ysticism w hich thisbook discusses. I have selected in each area a limited num ber ofthose whom I take to be the greatest mystics in that area and havebased my conclusions mainly on an intensive study of these. More-over my app roach to philosophy is that of an empiricist and an analyst.But as an empiricist I do not hold that all experience must necessarilybe reducible to sense experience. And as an analyst I do not h oldthat analysis is the sole business of philosophy. I attach the greatestvalue to what w as once called "speculative philosophy," but considerthat analysis is an essential instrument of it. Analysis can be madean end in itself. But I prefer to use it as a preparatory step tow arddiscovery of truth.

    Most of m y predecessors in the field of mysticism either were nottrained philosophers at all, or they thought in terms of philosophicalmethods and ideas and idioms which we can no longer acceptatany rate in Anglo-Saxon lands. In these lands, the methods of phi-losophy were revolutionized about fifty years ago by a sm all band ofmen among w hom G . E. Moore was a main leader. I hold that what-ever in that revolution is likely in future history to be ad judged oflasting value can be seized and apprcipriated now w ithout attachingoneself to any of the one-sided rival schools of analysts who now d ivide

    PREFACEthe fieldthe logical positivists, the Carnap ian formalists, the O xford"ordinary language" philosophers, the Wittgensteinian true believers.O ur predecessors in the field of m ysticism have d one nothing tohelp us in many of the problems which I have had to discuss. Ihave had to chart a lone course without guidance from the past.Hence there are a number of ideas in this book w hich may seemalmost w holly novel, and no t a little rash. I say this not in order toboast of originality, but on the contrary, because I hope that someof the deficiencies which m y readers will find in my solutions mayreceive a more ready pardon. I could not help raising questions whichappeared to be essential to the whole enquiry but which apparentlydid not occur to m y predecessors at all. I had to struggle with themas best I could.It should be emphasized that in so difficult a field we cannot ex-pect "proofs," "dispro ofs," "refutations," "certainties." The m ysticindeed does not argue. He has his inner subjective certainty. But thisonly raises a new and puz zling problem for the poor philosopher. Atany rate, the utmost we can expect in this area is tentative hypotheses,reasonable opinions. And of course only nonscientists believe in thesupposed certainty of science. Scientists know that their solutions arehypothetical only; and ours will doubtless be much m ore so.The w ri ting of this book has been generously supported by theBollingen Foundation, which granted me a three-year fellowship,and then an extension of a fourth year. I am m ost grateful for theirhelp.

    W. T. S.

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    ContentsChapterag eI. Presupposi t ions of the Enquiry3y 1. The Enquiry-Is-Worthwhile13

    2. Mohammed's Donkeyx8.?. The N aturalistic Principle24. The Principle-of_Causal Indifference29X xperience and Interpretation338X2. T he Problem of the Universal Core1x. The N ature of the Problem41 L'yX 2. Visions and Voices Are N ot Mystical Phenomena . 473. Discounting Raptures, Trances, and Hyperemotionalistn 51X . 4. Towards a Solution55X 5. Extroversive Mysticism62-i-. Borderline Cases8115 u e e->' 7. Introvertive Mysticism-+ ` 88 . Introvertive Mysticism The D issolution of Individual-ityIII9. Is Hinayana Buddhist Mysticism an Exception? . . 12396. Catholicity of Evidence

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    IOONTENTSto. An O bjection Considered127I C) Conclusions131 ,.../The Problem of Objecti ve Reference( . . D The Argument from Unanimity134______.--------k 20. Transsubj ectivity146The Feeling of O bjectivity1534. Mystical Monadism1545. The Universal Self; and the Vacuum-Plenum6 16 . T h e Wo rd "Go d "17 87 . The Th eory of "Being I tself"18 28 . The Theory of "P oetic Truth"18 59. The Status of the Universal Self194Alternative Solution202D Pa nt he is m , Du a l i s m , a nd M oni s m

    5. M y s t i c i s m an d Lo gic511. The Mystical Paradoxes25 12. The Theory of R hetorical Paradox25 33. The Theory of Misdescription25 74 . The Theory of D ouble Location26 o5 . The Theory of Ambiguity26 26 . An O bject ion26 57 . Previous Recognitions of the Contradiction Theory268C D Philosophical Implications of the Paradoxes . .27 0 CONTENTSI0 ys t i c i s m an d Lan guage7 7O 1. The Problem Stated27 7()Alleged Scientific Revelations27 8(33 Common-sense Theories28 o(a ) The Em otion Theory28 1(b ) The Spiritual Blindness Theory28 34. The V iew That Mystical or Religious Language is Sym-bolic28 4(a ) The Dionysian Theory28 8(b ) The M etaphor Theory291Suggestions towards a New Theory29 5 1 - V7. M y s t i c i s m a n d I m m o r ta li t y0 78. M ystic ism , Ethics , and Religion23 ,..""I .TheMystical Theory of Ethics3232. Mysticism and the G ood Life in Practice3 3 3C pysticism and Religion34 1Index1 34X. Pantheism2. Dualism3. Critique of Dualism4. Monism2072072182292375. Justification of Pantheism24 o 34 5

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    CHAPTER 1Presuppositions of the Enquiry

    1. The Enquiry Is WorthwhileBertrand R ussell, a philosopher w ho cannot be suspected of senti-mentality, or of softheadedness, or of a bias in favor of mysticism,wrote in a famous essay as follows: "The greatest men who h avebeen philosophers hav e felt the need both of science and of my sti-cism." He adds that the union of the my stic and the man of scienceconstitutes "the highe st eminenc e, as I think, that it is possible toachieve in the w orld of thought." Further, "this emotion [mysticism]is the inspirer of whatever is best in man." 1 This, it will be seen,is a remarkably high estimate of the value of m ysticism.As exam ples of this union of mysticism and science in the great-est philosophers, Russell mentions Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato,and Spinoza, but this list is obviously intended to be only exem plifica-

    tory and not exhaustive.Two problems are thus indicated by Russell as tasks which philoso-phy ought to perform. First, since mysticism is so valuable as a com-ponent in philosophy, w e ought to investigate what influence it is

    logically entitled to have on the thoughts of philosophers. Secondly,what influence has it actually exerted in their thoughts? T he first isa problem of logic and systematic philosophy. The second is a prob-1 B e r t r a n d Russell, Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, London, Longmans,G reen & Co., Inc., 1921, pp. I, 4, and 12.

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    14YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYlem for the historian of philosophy . It is with the first of these twoproblems that we shall be con cerned in this book.No doubt a majority of contemporary Anglo-American philoso-phers think that phi losophical doctr ines which p ast phi losophersderived, consciously or unc onsciously, from m ysticismsuch as thatt ime is unreal, that space is an appearance, on ly, that there is anAbsolute w hich is perfect, that the good and the real are identical=are to be rejected. But even if this is so, does it follow that no beliefsat all can be derived from m ysticism, and that the whole subject shouldbe dismissed as hocus-p ocus or hallucination? N ot at all. To thinkthis would be as illogical as ' if, finding that all sorts of false beliefshave in primitive science been based on sense exp erience, we shouldreject sense experience as a source of any know ledge at all. If thebeliefs which past philosophers have based on mysticism are unac-ceptable, we ought now to ask whether some better interpretationsof mystical experience should replace them. This com parison ofmystical experience with sense experience may be entirely mislead-ing. But this must be a conclusion of enquiry, not an assumption usedto prevent enquiry. Hence the first problem to be faced in this bookis whether m ystical experience, like sense experience, points to anyobjective reality or is a merely subjective psychological phenomenon.We m ay put the problem of the book in another way. What truths,if any, about the universe does mysticism yield which the m ind couldnot obtain from science and the logical intellect? If, however, wephrase the question in this way, Russell's reply is that mysticismyields no truths at all. O nly science and logical thinking give ustruths. What my sticism contributes is fine and no ble emotional atti-tudes towards the truths which have been discovered by the logicaland scientific intellect. Russell's argument for this position is a de-lightfully s imple syllogism. Th e essence of m ysticism, he says, isemotion. Emotions are subjective in the sense that they supply noobjective truths about the extramental w orld. Therefore mysticismis subjective and supplies no objective truths about the extramentalworld. "Mysticism," he writes, "is in essence little more than a certainintensity and depth of feeling in regard to w hat is believed about

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRY5the universe." 2 We may let the assertion that emotions are subjectivepass. But no one who h as the slightest knowledge of the world-wideliterature of m ysticism could possibly accept R ussell 's description ofit as only an emotion.Mystics may be mistaken in their interpretations of their experi-ences. But they ought to know w hat the experiences themselvesare like better than R ussell does., And they invariably say that theyare more like p erceptions than emotions; though i t is not deniedthat, like all perceptions, they have their own emotional tinge. Who-ever wishes to prove mystical experience subjective will do betterto attribute to it the subjectivity of an hallucination rather thanthe subjectivity of an emotion.R ussell might be r ight in his conclusion that mysticism is sub-jective and reveals no truth about the worldthat is one of themain questions w e have to discuss. But let no one be run away w ithby R ussell 's facile syllogism, based a s it is on the false and carelesspremiss that mystical states of mind are emotions. First of all wemust try to get a little genuine knowledge of wh at mysticism actu-ally is before we decide thus sum marily to dismiss its claims to pos-sess truth-value. I shall try to give some accou nt of the actual factsabout it in the next chapter. Even then w e shall find that the diffi-culties in the way of d eciding whether it has any cognitive value, andif so what, are extremely complex, elusive, and subtle. To discussthem thorough ly will be the object of our third chapter.Meanwhile we may remark that the very word "mysticism" is anunfortunate one. It suggests mist, and therefore foggy, confused, orvague thinking. It also suggests mystery and miraclemongering, andtherefore hocus-pocus. It is also associated with religion, againstwhich m any academic philosophers are prejudiced. And som e ofthese latter persons might be surprised to learn that, although m anymystics have been theists, and others pantheists, there have also beenmystics who were atheis ts. It would be better if we could use thewords "enlightenment" or "illumination," which are comm only usedin India for the same pheno menon . But it seems that for historical

    p. 3 ,

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    16YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYreasons w e in the West mu st settle for "mysticism." A ll that we cando is to try gradually to overcom e the prejudices which it tends toarouse.In referring to Russell's views I used the w ords "subjective" and"object ive," which he did n ot use himself . Careful contemporaryphilosophers perhaps tend to avoid these words because o f theirambiguity. They have been used in several different senses, whichare apt to become confused. B ut they will be very convenient to usin later stages of this discussion, provided w e indicate in what sensewe us e them. In Chapter 3 I shall endeavour to define the criteriaof objectivity, in the sense meant here, as precisely as I can. But atthis stage I can perhaps sufficiently elucidate the matter by givingexamples in lieu of abstract definitions. We shall be using the w ordsin this book in that sense in which veridical sense perception may b ecalled objective while hallucinations and dreams m ay be called sub-jective. When in veridical sense perception I find presented to myconsciousness som ething which I c all a house, this presentation isobjective in the sense that it reveals the existence of a real househaving a place in the extramental world independently of my con-sciousness of it. (What exactly this means and what grounds w e havefor believing it are not questions which it is necessary to examine atthis point.) But the presentation of a house which I have in a dreamis subjective because there is no such real house in the extramentalworld. It is in this sense that the question is raised whether ysdcalexperience is objective or sulissmieD oes it reveal the existence ofwing outside the mystic's own mind and independent of hisconsciousness? If so, what sort of existence does it reveal?

    Whatever conclusions we draw in this book about the above, orrelated, questions will not necessarily have the status of ind uctiveor deductive inferences. It is better to use the word " interpretation"rather than "inference." I propose to enquire whether the types ofexperience called m ystical give rise to any interpretations regardingthe nature of the universe which, w hether they are logical infer-ences or not, can be shown to be such that they ought to be ac-cepted by reasonable m en. The basic concepts of physics are inter-

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRY7pretations of sense exp erience which cannot be logically inferredfrom the existence of the sense experience but are nevertheless inter-pretations which reasonable men should accept : 3 Indeed the veryexis tence of a world independ ent of consciousness is an interpre-tation of sense experience which is not capable of being logicallydemonstrated. And seeing that our f i rst problem is to be whethermystical experience is objective in a way w hich is analogous to theobjectivity of sense experience, we need n ot be surprised if such aconclusion would have to be assigned an analogous interpretationalstatus. But no conclusion can be accepted un less it is capable of ra-tional justification of some kind.'O ur enquiry, as I have remarked , is philosophical and systematic,not historical. I t is not a p rime quest ion for us what beliefs suchphilosophers as those mentioned by R ussell have derived from mysti-cism; but rather what beliefs, if any, w e ought to derive as reasonablemen. But w e shall naturally take account of historically held beliefs,if only to consider w hether they are rationally justifiable or not. Forinstance, the proposition that "time is unreal" has frequently beenput forward on the basis of m ystical experience. We shall certainlyhave to ask w hat this statement means, and whether there is anysense of the word "unreal," usual or unusual, in terms of whichthis proposition can be understood to have meaning; and alsowhether such a propositionif we c an understand itis a reasonableinterpretation of mystical experience. But w e shall not be concernedwith history for the sake of history. I hope to discuss the actual in-fluence of mysticism on the great philosophers of the past, the my sticaltradition in philosophy, in a later book.

    These remarks about the views derived from m ysticism by phi-losophers are also for the most part applicable to the views derivedby m ystics themselves from their own experiences. An enquiry ofOn this point see, for example, Einstein's remarks quoted in Philipp Frank,

    Einstein: His Life and Times, New York, Alfred A. K nopf, Inc ., 1953, pp. 217-218.*The prob lem of the rational justifications of those basic principles or commitmen tsof science, philosophy, ethics, politics, etc., which cann ot be proved either deductivelyor inductively, has recently been investigated by P rofessor James Ward Smith in hisbook Theme for Reason, Princeton, N.J., Princeton U niversity Press, x957.

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    x8YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYthis kind ought to be as independen t of the opinions of mystics asit is of the opinions of philosophers. N aturally their views are to beconsidered as worthy of the highest respect and attention. But wecannot be tied dow n to any blind acceptance of the interpretationswhich m ystics have made of their own exp erience. For one thingthere is reason to suppose that w hat are basically the same exp eri-ences have been differently interpreted by d ifferent my stics . Thepoint is that just as sense experiences may b e misinterpreted by thepersons who have the sense experiences, so mystical experiences maybe misinterpreted by mystics. Hence an independent critical exami-nation and analysis of their beliefs is just as necessary as is a similarexamination of the beliefs of anyone else.2 . M o h a m m e d 's D o n k ey

    There is a story, which I have read somewhere, to the effect thatMoham med once com pared a scholar or phi losopher who w ri tesabout mysticism without having had any mystical experience to adonkey carrying a load of books. It is a presupposition of our en-quiry that this admirably w itty epigram, if taken literally and at itsface value, exaggerates the foolishness of scholars, and that it is pos-sible for the philosopher or scholar to make a worthwhile contribu-tion to the study of my sticism.It is perhaps natural that the mystic should distrust the pryingey e of the scholar and the p robing intellect of the philosopher. Thisattitude is well expressed by the anonymous author of The Cloudof Unknowing. This book w as written in the fourteenth century andis believed to have been composed b y its author to help one of hisdisciples to attain the highest levels of mystical contemplation. Hebegins with a strong adjurat ion that no o ne should read the bookwho has not himself a full intention of following the m ystic pathto the end. It is not intended, he says, for "the idly curious, whetherthey be learned me n or not," and he hopes that they will not "med-dle with it." He objects to "the curiosity of much learning and literarycunning as in scho lars . . . coveting worldly fam e . . . and the flat-

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRY9tery of others." 5 Yet not all the mystics have felt like this. Many havethemselves been scholars and p hilosophers, for instance, Plotinus,Erigena, Eckhart, and many others.It is plain that mysticism, like other subjects, may arouse either apractical or a theoretical interest. The p ractical interest is that of theman w ho aspires to tread the myitic path. The theoretical interest,whether in my sticism or any thing else, is that of the man who simplydesires to know, and w ho values knowledge for its own sake. Theauthor just quoted calls the impelling motive of such a m an "curi-osity." Aris totle would have called it "wonder." But w hether oneuses a w ord with derogatory overtones or one which has pleasanterassociations, the rights of the theo retical intellect to investigate anysubject matter whatev er can hardly at this date be disputed by edu-cated men.But the point of the story of Moham med's donkey is perhaps notso much that the scholar has no right to investigate mysticism, butrather that it is a comp lete impossibility for him to do so if he hasno my stical experience himself. It is sometimes said that just as aman born bl ind cannot imagine what colour is l ike even though theseeing man tries to tell him about it, so a nonm ystic cannot imaginewhat a m ystical experience is like even though the my stic tries todescribe it to him. It is then. argued that a nonmystic, howeverclever, cannot contribute anything of value to the discussion of mysti-cism for the same reason as a man born blind, however clever, couldnot contribute anything of value to the understanding of light orcolours.It cannot be denied that there is much fo rce in this contention tothe extent at least that the man born blind is under a p sychologicaldisadvantage in discussing the theory of light because he cannotimagine it. And the nonmystic discussing mysticism labors underthe same so rt of disadvantage. But it is far from clear that it wouldb e impossible for a blind man to contribute anything of value tothe physics of light and colou r, for instance, to the controversy be-

    s The Cloud of Unknowing, trans. by Ira Progoff, New York, The Julian Press,inc.. 1 957, P P . 59 and 79 .

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    20YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYtween the corpuscular and the wave theories of light which at onetime was a crucial problem. For what the physicist needs is an und er-standing of the structure, not an acquaintance w ith the experientialcontent, of light. This comparison cannot be pressed too far becausethe typical mystical experience, unlike light, is said to have no struc-ture, being "formless." But the comparison does show that the argu-ment from the alleged impossibility of a blind man discussing thetheory of light cannot even get started because it is not clear thatthere is any such impossibility.As against the view that the philosopher w ho does not profess to ,be a mystic cannot say any thing of value about mysticism, it mustalso be pointed out that many such philosophers have in fact doneso. The names of William Jam es, J. B. Pratt, Dean Inge, and R udolfO tto immediately spring to mind, and one could no doubt m ake outa long list of such cases if it were worth doing so. It may be saidthat what they wrote may have been thought valuable by otherscholars, but would not be of any value to a my stic. Perhaps it mightnot be of value in the p ractical living of the my stic's spiritual life.But if the mystic were himself interested in the theory and philosophyof my sticism, as P lotinus and many others have been, there is noreason why his philosophical reflections on mysticism should not behelped by the analytical or speculative powers of a nonmystic.It is worthwhile to look a little more closely at the case of W illiamJames. He wrote of himself that his own constitution shut him offalmost ent irely from the enjoym ent of my stical states so that hecould speak of them only at second hand. In consequence, he modestlyexpressed doubt as to his own capacity to offer anything of muchvalue, Yet I do not see how it can be denied that his contributionto the understanding of the subject w as in fact of very great value.An important part of the reason for this was obviously that, al-,though James m ay have enjoyed no my stical states of consciousness,his temperamental sympathy with mysticism was very strong. Thissuggests that sympathy w ith mysticism, even on the part of a non-

    'William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, New York, Modern Library,Inc., p- 370.

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRYImystical philosopher, may give him some measure of insight intothe mystic's state of mind and therefore some cap acity for discuss-ing it. It has often been suggested that all men, or nearly all men,are in some sense or other rudim entary or unevolved m ystics , a l-though in m ost of us the my stical consciousness is so far buried inthe unconscious that it appears in the surface levels of our m indsme rely in the guise of vague feelings of sym pathetic response to theclearer call of the mystic. To use the common cliche, when the mysticspeaks, something in his utterance "rings a bell" in the psyche o fthe more sym pathetic and sensitive of his hearers.It might be contended, however, that an attitude of sympathy isnot appropriate in a philosophical investigation since it would inter-fere with impartiality and objectivity. A feeling of sympathy m ightproduce a predisposition to admit too easily the claims of the mysticthat he obtains through his experience a knowledge of the natureof reality which is not available to other men. The philosopher, theargument will proceed, should be guided by his intellect only andnot by his feelings. No dou bt there is something in this contention.But not m uch.- For a human being without feelings is an impossibil-ity. Hence no human being can have quite the impartiality of acalculating machine. If the critic says that a sympathetic attitudeought to be avoided by the philosopher, he would surely not rec-ommend an unsympathetic or hostile attitude which would be equallyprejudiced on the other side. Should one then have a co mpletelyneutral a ttitude? But a neutral a ttitude w ould amount s imply to alack of interest in the subject: It seems to m e that Ru ssell has saidthe last word o n this subject. "In studying a philosopher," says he,"the right attitude is neither reverence nor contem pt, but first a kindof hypothetical symp athy, until it is possible to know w hat it feelslike to believe in his theories, and only then a revival of the criticalattitude." 7

    There is another point which the nonmystical philosopher mayurge on his own behalf, which is that mystics themselves philosophize.'Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, New York, Simon andSchuster, Inc. , 1945, p. 39.

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    22YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYIn doing so they d escend to the intellectual plane and therefore can-not expect to escape from intellectual criticism and analysis. Theycannot invade the philosopher's fie ld and at the sam e time refuseto the philosopher an y right to discuss their philosophical assertions.If they confined them selves to descriptions of their special kind ofexperience, the philosopher who has no such experience could notcriticize their statements, except that he would be entitled to askhow these statements are compatible with the further statementusually made b y the my stic, namely, that his experience is ineffableand indescribable. But mystics usually go beyond m ere descriptions.They make general philosophical inferences about the world, aboutthe nature of reality, about the status and source of value judgments all of which m atters fall within the legi t imate province of thephilosopher. For instance, they may make the statement that "timeis unreal," or is a "mere ap pearance" or an "illusion." It cannot becontended that the philosopher has no competence to examine, toanalyse, and, if he s ees f i t , to disagree with propositions of this kind.Mystics also do no t even stop short at asserting general but isolatedphilosophical prop ositions of this kind. At least in the O rient theyhave gone further and constructed complete philosophical systemsbased on their m ystical experiences. It is clear that in doing so theygive a right to all other philosophers to exam ine and evaluate theirsystems.As we have already admitted, the philosopher who is withoutmystical experience has the psychological disadvantage that he musttake at second hand the mystic's descriptions of his experiences.There are plenty of such d escriptions in spite of the talk about in-effability. The philosopher must try as far as p ossible to overcomehis disadvantage by the insights given by a sym pathetic imagination.

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRY3without exception by natural causes.We must now examine some of the things which this naturalist icprinciple im plies, and also take note of a few things which it doesnot imply. It is applicable, according to our statement of it, to allmacroscopic events. These are the only events with which we shallbe concerned in this book. Hence we need take no account of theprinciple of indeterminacy in nuclear physics. Also the fact that thelaws of nature in the m acroscopic world are said to be statistical andnot absolute need make no difference to us. The possibility that watermay run u p hill once in a billion years can be ignored.The naturalistic principle has no bearing on the problem of freewill. Determinism, if that is implied by the principle, is not incon-sistent with free will, and indeterminism is no help to it. I havediscussed this matter at length elsewhere and will not repeat thediscussion here. 8

    y\he naturalist ic p rinciple forbids us to believe that -' t th4 .e;;\ Iver"occur interruptions in the natural working o f events or capriciousinterventions by a supernatural being. David Hume defined a m ir-acle as a breach of the law s of nature. O ur principle denies that mir-acles, as thus strictly defined, ever occur. But there may be otherlooser or more liberal conceptions of miracles which are not in-consistent with naturalism. For instance, Professor B road has, forcertain specific purposes connected w ith psychical research, definedmiracles as events wh ich are exceptions, not to natural laws, but tocertain sped e w common-sense presumptions,The alleged miracles at Lourdes may very w ell be explicable bynatural laws of which we are at present ignorant. That deep emo-t ional disturbancessuch as may be involved in many religiouscrisesare often accompanied by important physical changes inthe organism is well known, though w e cannot yet formulate thelaws of such events. Similar considerations apply to the healing pow-ers sometimes attributed to religious geniuses. But we can use

    'See nd the Modern Mind, Phi ladelphia , J . B. Lippincot t Company,.5 2*'C . 13. Broad, Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research, New York, Harcourt,Brace an d Comp any, 1953, Chap. x .3. The Naturalis t ic Princ ipleW e assume, at least as a methodological postulate, the universal-i ty of the reign of law in nature. This means that a ll macroscopicexistences and events occurring in the space-time world are explicable

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    24YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYagainst miracles, if defined as actual breaches of law, an argum entmuch stronger than the one Hume em ployed. N o matter how as-tonishing, or supernormal, an event m ay be, w e could nev er, t il lwe are o mniscient, have sufficient grounds for asserting that it is abreach of natural law. W e could not assert this unless we were cer-tain that we fully knew and understood every natural law in theuniverse, since any law of which w e were ignorant m ight afford theneeded explanation.If prayer is understoodas perhaps no instructed theologian doesnow understand i t as a request to the Deity to alter the naturalcourse of events , then we cannot believe in the efficacy of prayerso interpreted. For example, prayers to send rain in time of droughtare absurd, because the weather is solely determined by m eteor-ological conditions. O f course prayers, even if made as requests, maythemselves in certain cases go a long w ay to bring about the changesasked for. This is l ikely to occu r when what is sought is a changein the heart , mind, or even b ody of the p erson praying and n ot achange in the external world. Prayers for improvements of health,or for greater moral or spiritual strength, will tend to set in m otiontrains of psychological events, such as expectations and improve-ments of morale, which seem to come as answers to the prayer.This is what any psyc hologist would expec t, and is of course in noway m iraculous or even surprising.But the history of m ysticism provides a mu ch deeper justificationfor the practice of prayer than the rather superficial considerationsjust mentioned. Pray ers, or "orisons," as they are called, as under-s tood by the C hris tian m ystics , dim primari ly at communion, orunion, with what they take to be a Divine Being, and are not re-quests for favorsexcept, of course, in so far as such un ion is it-self regarded by the mystic as the supreme favor which a human b e-ing can seek. Such orisons constitute steps in the ladder of spiritualexercises which lead to the desired goal of mystical consciousness.St. Teresa of Avila, among others, is well kno wn for the detai ledaccounts she gave of these steps, in their order and one by one.Ev eryone knows that there are breathing exercises which tend to

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRY5produce m ystical states. In the same way there are many mental'ff cexercises, certain kinds of disciplined meditation and concentration,0 4u nderstood, is another name for these spiritual efforts to reach upto mystical experiences. Prayer con sidered as a petition for a favoris merely a popular corruption of genuine prayer.It is a misunderstanding of the naturalistic principle to confusei t with m aterialism or to suppose that it imp lies materialism. N a-turalism is not inconsistent with the Cartesian view that thoughts,and p sychological events generally, are nonm aterial. For even ifpsychological events are nonphysical, they may be just as rigorouslygoverned by psychological laws or psychophysical laws as physicalevents are by physical laws.The naturalistic principle is not inconsistent with belief in an"ultimate reality," or Absolute, or G od, outs ide of or beyond thespace-time w orldw hatever the metaphors "outs ide of" and "be-yond" m ay mean. A ll that the principle requires is that such a be-

    ing or reality shall not interrupt the causal sequences of the na turalorder. For instance, it is not inconsistent with the philosophical sys-tems of Hegel or Bradley. Such systems are very m uch out of favorin the present-day climate of philosophical opinion. But those whoreject them do so usually on emp iricist or positivistic grounds, noton the ground that they are inconsistent with naturalism. That theyare not contrary to the naturalistic principle will be obvious fromthe definition of that principle, namely , the proposition that all thingsand events in the space-ime world are explicable without exceptionby natural causes.

    The m ost important question for us at this time is to understandwh at bearing the naturalistic principle has upon m ysticism and thephilosophical problems which it raises. Naturalism implies, first, thatthe genesis of mystical states in a human mind is itself the resultof natural causes, and in no way constitutes an exception to the reignof law. It may be worthwhile to note that this view is held, notmerely by the present writer, but by many mystics . For instance,M. Bucke w rote his book Cosmic Consciousness as a direct result

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    26YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYof a sudden m ystical il lumination which came to him unexpectedand unsought. "Cosmic consciousness" w as his name for m ysticalexperience. H e wrote: "Cosmic consciousness . . . must not be lookedupon as being in any sense supernatural or supernormal as any-thing more than a natural growth." 1 In line with this view hemaintained that such consciousness is now in process of evolutionaccording to normal evolutionary principlesin the human species,and that it is destined someday to become the psychological condi-tion of a majority of the human race. O ne may perhaps regard thislat ter prophecy as being unsuppo rted by evidence, but at least i tattests to Buckets firm adherence to naturalism . In the same spirithe also suggested a natural explanation of "photisms"the percep-tion of a subjective but quasi-physical light which som etimes, butnot always, accompanies the onset of mystical consciousnessas dueto molecular rearrangements in the brain. 1 1 Edw ard Carpenter, whowas an other natural mystic and subject to periodic states of illumina-tion, also everywhere disclaims that mystical states are supernatural,or miraculous. They are, in his view, subject to the usual laws ofpsychological evolution. 1 2No doubt these views conflict with ideas often expressed by medi-eval Christian mystics such as St. Teresa, St. John of the Cross, Hein-r ich Suso, and many others, who regarded their own experiencesas supernatural gifts from G od. But while adm itting their outstand-ing greatness as mystics, and the general im portance of their testi-mony (on which w e shall often have to rely in succeeding chapters)as to the phenomenological characteristics of mystical experiences, wecannot accept w ithout careful sifting and analysis their theologicalor philosophical interpretations of those experiences. In view of theprescientific ages in which they lived, andat least in the case of S t.Teresa a lack of critical ability, it is not surprising that they didnot understand or accept the principle of the universal reign of law .W e may take it then that the genesis of mystical consciousness is

    " R . M. Buck e , Cosmic Consciousness, New York, E. P. Dutton dc Co., Inc . , p . 12.nibid., P. 345 .'Edward Carpenter , From Adam's Peak to Elephanta, pp. 242-24 6, as quot ed byR. M. Bucke.

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRY7explicable in terms of the psychological and physiological make-upof those who have it . I t is , however, of paramount importance toun derstand that this has no bearing upon the problem of its allegedcognitive character, its subjectivity or objectivity, its claim to revealtruths about the nature of the universe. For determination by physio-logical and psychological preconditions is also characteristic of senseexperience and of all human consciousn ess. The seeing of an objectwith the eyes is determined by the structure of the eye and the con-dition of the nervous system, as well as by psychological background ,habits, and expectations. So also the reasoning processes of the geom-eter are presumably conditioned by prior bodily and m ental proc-esses. Yet no one doubts that sense perception and reasoning yieldtruths about the external universe. There is no mo re reason for sup-posing that mystical perceptions are illusory because they cannot behad w ithout brains and nervou s systems than for supposing thatvisual perceptions must be illusory because they cannot be had with-out eyes and optic nerves.It may be said that sense perceptions are only part-caused by thestructure or cond ition of the organism, the other essential part causebeing the stimulus from the outside world; whereas in the case ofmystical states of mind there is no reason to suppose that they arenot who lly the results of intraorganic and intrapsychic causes; andthat this difference is what may justify us in considering m ysticalstates to be purely subjective while of course ad mitting that senseperceptions have objective reference because of the external stimuliwhich are their part causes.But this argumen t will not hold. For the existence of the externalstimuli in the cas e of sense perception is not known independentlyof the sense experience. Their existence is itself an interpretation ofthat experience. Hence in this respect sense experience and mysticalexperience are on the sam e footing. In both cases the existence ofanything objective to which they refer is an interpretation of theexperience, and nothing more. If the fact that we cannot perceivematerial objects without eyes, ears, and brains does not prevent usfrom , interpreting sense experiences as having objective reference,

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    30YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYexperiences are indistinguishable, so far as can be ascertained, thenit cannot be denied that if one is a genuine mystical experience theother is also. This will follow notwithstanding the lowly antecedentsof one of them, and in spite of the understandable anno yance of anascetic, a saint, or a spiritual hero, who is told that his careless andworldly neighbour, who never d id anything to deserve it, has attainedto mystical consciousness by swallowing a pill .But it is still a question whether in fact any mescalin experienceever is intrinsically similar to, or descriptively indistinguishable from,the experience of the saint, in which case only wou ld our principlef ind an emp irical applicat ion. As to this quest ion, my opinion isthat we do not y et know enough ab out the effects of these drugs toanswer it with any confidence. Important experiments are now in 'progress on such drugs, as well from the spiritual as from the medicalstandpoint, and we have to aw ait results.O ne guess may be hazarded. The drug-induced experience mayperhaps in som e cases indistinguishably resemble the extrovertivetype of my stical experience, but it is most unlikely that it resemblesthe far more important introvertive type. This distinction will beexplained later.Mean while the problem has little importance in this book becausein all the very numerous phenomenological descriptions _whichareto be quoted in support of our various conclusions there is only asingle case in which the experience described follow ed on the tak-ing of mescalin. The resulting experience in that one case undo ubt-edly resembled, and in fact seemed indistinguishable from, the ex-trovertive type of experience reported by the mo re traditional non-drug-taking m ystics. I shall indicate that one case when I c ome toit. It could perfectly w ell have been om itted without serious loss tothe cumulative mass of evidence on which our conclusions will bebased, and its omission would no t affect those conclusions.Another application of our principle which might be quoted arisesin connection with the second of the three well-known periods ofmystical illumination in the life of Jakob Boehm e. This second illu-mination is stated to have been induced by gazing at a polished

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OP THE ENQUIRY1disc." Looking at a polished surface seems just as lowly and u n-spiritual a causal condition of my stical experience as the taking ofa drug. Yet no one, I believe, will deny that Jakob Boehme w as ag enuine" mystic.5. Experience and Interpretation

    It is a presupposition of our enquiry that it is important as wellas possible to make a distinction between a my stical experience it-self and the conceptual interpretations which m ay be put upon it .This is analogous to the distinct ion w hich can be m ade betweensense experience and its interpretation. And this analogy is validand useful notwithstanding the often misleading character of a com-parison between mystical and sense experience to which I have pre-viously drawn attention.

    It is probably impossible in both cases to isolate "pure" experience.Yet, al though we m ay never be able to find sense experience com-pletely free of any interpretation, it can hardly be doubted that asensation is one thing and its conceptual interpretation is anotherthing. That is to say, they are d istinguishable though not co mpletelyseparable. There is a doubtless apocryphal but well-known anecdoteabout the Am erican visitor in London w ho tr ied to shake handswith a w axwork policeman in the entrance of Madam e Tussaud's.If such an incident ever occu rred, i t must have been because thevisitor had a sense experience w hich he firs t wrongly interpretedas a live policeman and later interpreted correctly as a wax figure.If the sentence w hich I have just w ritten is intelligible, it provesthat an interpretation is dist inguishable from an experience; forthere could not otherwise b e. two interpretations of one experience.There were two successive interpretations, although it may be truethat at no time was the exp erience free of interpretation and eventhat such a pure experience is psychologically impossible. No doubtth95, phe original

    2 5 5 .gi5nal something seen at the entrance was im mediately recog-

    " S ee E v e lyn U n der h i l l, M y i t i c i r m , paperback ed., N ew Yo r k , M er i d i an B o o k s , I n c . ,

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    32YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYnized as a m aterial object , as having some sort of colour, and ashaving the general shape of a human being. And since this involvedthe applicaticin of classificatory concepts to the sensations, there wasfrom the first some degree o f interpretation. It seems a safe positionto say that there is an intelligible distinction between experience andinterpretation, even if it be true that we can never come upon aquite uninterpreted experience. Moreover, the distinction, howeverrough, is used every day in our p ractical living, and we could hardlyget on without it. A w itness in a law court is instructed to give evi-dence only of what he actually observes, avoiding inferences andinterpretations. This instruction is essential and works w ell enough,notwithstanding that if the witness says he observed the defendantat the scene of the crime, som e philosopher m ight try to insist, likeMill, that all the witness actually saw was a coloured surface, and thatto call this "the defendant" w ould be to indulge in an inference.We have to mak e a parallel distinction between mystical experi-ence and its interpretation. But here too we c annot expect to makea clear separation. The difficulty of deciding what part of a m ystic'sdescriptive account of his experience ough t to be regarded as actu-ally experienced and w hat part should be taken as his interpretationis indeed far greater than the corresponding difficulty in the caseof sense experience. And yet it is of vital importance to ou r enquirythat the distinction should be adm itted, should be grasped and heldcontinually before our minds, and that we should m ake every possi-ble attempt to apply it to our m aterial as best we can, how ever diffi-cult it may be to do so. There are tw o reasons why it is important.First, as with sense exp erience, although the pure experience, ifit could be isolated, would be indubitable, yet any interpretation,whether made by the experiencer or another, is liable to be mistaken.It is often said that the nonmy stic cannot deny that the my stic hasthe experience w hich he says he has. But this is only true of the ex-periential com ponent of his desc ript ion. I t does not imp ly that aphilosopher wh o is not himself a mystic is not ent i tled to probe,examine, analyse, and call in question those parts of the mystic'sdescript ion w hich seem to him clearly to involve elements of in-

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRYterpretation. The philosopher m ust claim his proper rights.The second reason for insisting on the distinction is of even greatermom ent. Writers on mysticism have frequently argued that mysticalexperiences are basically the sam e, or similar, all over the w orld, inall different ages, cultures, and in all different religious associations.N umerous wri ters have based upon this an argument for the ob-jectivity of such experience. For instance, R. M. Bucke wrote as fol-lows: "Y ou know that the tree is real and not an hallucination be-cause all other persons having the sense of sight . . . also see it,while if it were an hallucination it would be visible only to yourself.By the sam e method o f reasoning do w e establish the reality of theobjective universe tallying cosmic consciousness. Each person whohas the faculty is made aware of essentially the same facts. . . .There is no instance of a person who has been il lumined denyingor disputing the teachings of another who has p assed through thesame experience." 1 4

    The examples of persons who possessed cosmic, i.e., mystical, con-sciousness given by Bucke include persons as w idely separated intime, space, and culture as St. Teresa and the Buddha. There is nodoubt that Bucke enorm ously overstates his case. In the next chapterI shall quote Professor C. D. B road's version of the argument, w hichis the most careful, conservative, and guarded statement of it withwhich I am acquainted. But in the meanw hile , the essential logicof it is evident even in the exaggerations of Bucke. The argum entdepends on an analogy w ith sense perception. It alleges that we dis-tinguish between v eridical perception and hallucination by the uni-versal agreement of human beings in veridical perception as opposedto the private and unshared character of hallucinatory perceptions.I t contends that there is an analogous agreement among mysticseverywhere in the w orld about what they ex perience, and that thissupports belief in the objectivity of the experience.Two quest ions are here raised. First, is it a fact that mysticalexperiences are basically the same, or similar, all over the world,or at any rate that they all have important com mon characteristics?

    "Backe, op. di., p. 7r.

    33

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    cI

    34YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYSecondly, if this is true, does it , constitute a good argument for be-lieving in their objectivity? I maintain that the whole argum ent hasnever been properly probe d, analysed, and impartially evaluated byany previous wri ter . And this is a task which I propose to under-take. Now the first questionhow far the mystical experiences re-, ported by C hristians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, and Bud dhists, andalso by mystics who have not been adherents of any specific reli-gious creed, are similar or differentis one of extreme difficulty. Weshall have to struggle with it, but we cannot hope to get anyw herenear a true answer unless we m ake the distinction between experi-ence and interpretation and endeavour to apply it to our material .The reason for this may be made clear by the following exam ple.The Christian mystic usually says that what he experiences is'"union with G od." The Hindu mystic says that his experience is onein which his individual self is identical with Brahman or the U ni-versal Self. The Christian says that his experience supp orts theismand is not an experience of actual identity with G od, and he under-stands "union" as n ot involving identi ty but some other relat ionsuch as resemblance. The Hindu insists on identity, and says thathis experience establishes what w riters on mysticism usually call"pantheism"though H indus usually do not use that Western word.The Buddhist m ystic at least according to some versions of Bud-dhismdoes not speak of G od or Brahman or a Universal Self , butinterprets his experience in terms which do no t include the conceptof a Supreme Being at all.There are thus great differences of belief here, although the beliefsare all equally said to be founded on my stical experiences. How dowe exp lain these facts? There are two different hypotheses by w hichthey can be explained, and we have to m ake a choice between them.O ne hypothesis is that the experiences of the Christian, the Hindu,and the Bud dhist are basically different, although there may be somesimilarities, perhaps only superficial ones, which justify us in call-ing them all "mystical." The other hypothesis is that the experiencesof them all are basically the same though perhaps there may besome differences but that each puts upon his experiences the in-

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRY5tli in terpretations which he 'as derived from the peculiaritiesof-his own culture. The C hristian interprets the experiences in termsbi a pre-existent Christian orthodoxy in w hich he has been reared,the Hindu in terms of m ore characteristically Indian ideas, and theBuddhist in terms of conceptions which may have come from preAryan sources or w ere possibly at least in part freshly minted by theBuddha himself. There are three mutually inconsistent interprets-dons of the same expe rience. Plainly we cannot even state these al-ternative hypotheses, much less com e to a rational decision betweenthem, without making use of the distinction between experience andinterpretation.The importance of the distinction has not comm only been graspedeven by the most eminent writers on mysticism. Professor J. H. Leubadoes indeed exp licitly make use of it. He uses it to support his viewthat mystical experience is subjective. He criticizes William Jam esfor having been sy mpathetic to the belief in its objectivity as a re-sult of having confused the indubitable pure experience w ith thehighly doubtful elaborations or interpretations put upon it by themystics. 1 5 But Leuba talks glibly about the "pure experience" aphrase which he perhaps picked up from James himselfw ithoutapparently having any clear understanding of the extreme d ifficultiesinvolved in any a ttempt to isolate it or to apply the idea in practice.He him self makes no use of the dis tinction except as a s tick with'Which to beat James.A m uch more recent writer, Professor R. C. Zaehner, in his bookMysticism, Sacred and Profane shows that he is in some sense con-scious of there being a difference between the experience and theinterpretation, but he is in my opinion g ravely misled by his failureto hold the dist inct ion clearly in mind, to grasp i ts implicat ions,and to make effective use of it. For instance, in the records of in-' trovertive mysticism one finds frequent descriptions of the experi-)eiice of an absolute undifferentiated and distinctionless unity in-which all multiplicity has been obliterated. This, as we shall see- Stu, is described by Christ ian my stics such as E ckhart and R uys-. . . -- 1 I. H. L e u b a , T h e P s y c h o l o g y o f R e li g i o us M y s t i c i s m , Chap. 12.

    1

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    36YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYbroeck on the one hand, and by the ancient Hindu my stics who com-posed the Upanishads on the other. The language of the Hinduson the one hand and the C hristians on the other is so astonishinglysimilar that they give every appearance of d escribing identically thesame experience. They w ere of course wholly unknown to, and in-dependent of, one another. Yet Professor Zaehner, who is a R omanCatholic, insists that their experiences mu st have been different be-cause Eck hart and R uysbroeck built their accounts of the experienceinto the orthodox Trini tarian theology which they accepted fromthe Church, whereas the Hindus understood it pantheisticallypantheism being, according to C atholic theologians, a serious "heresy."We may leave the question open (for the present) whether Pro-fessor Zaehner is right in thinking that the Christian and the Ind ian'experiences are quite different from on e another in spite of the al-most identical words in which they are often expressed. He may beright. We have admitted, or rather asserted, that there are two al-ternative hypotheses for explaining the facts. -Professor Zaehnerchooses one of them. W e have n ot yet ourselves investigated thequestion of wh ich is right. But the point is that Professor Zaehner'sconclusion simply does not follow from the mere fact that the be-liefs which C hristian mystics based upon their experiences are dif-ferent from the beliefs which the Indians based on theirs . And thedifference of beliefs is really the only evidence w hich he offers forhis view. A genuine grasp of the distinction between experience andinterpretation, and especially of the difficulties involved in apply-ing i t , might have resulted in a fuller , fairer , and m ore impart ialexamination and treatment of the two po ssible hypotheses.

    I shall close this section w ith some rem arks on terminology. I usethe word "mysticism" to mean the w hole subject which we are dis-cussing in this book. It therefore includes both m ystical experienceand its interpretations. I use the word "mystic" to mean a personwho ha s himself been subject to mystical experienceonce at least,shall we say , if it is necessary to be so specific. It does not thereforecover a thinker who studies the subject or writes about it sympathet-ically or has been influenced by my stical ideas and believes them.

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRY7roegel was influenced by mystical ideas, but was nota mystic. cedca Plato was deeply influenced by m ystical ideas, and thereinainstance, in my sense of the word. Nor wa s William Jamespassages in his writings which suggest that he was him-selfare usea eeveralthes e d but no one kno ws this for certain.w ord "interpretation" to mean anything which the con-ceptual intellect adds to the experience for the purpose o f under-standing it, whether what is added is only classificatory concepts, oror an exp lanatory hypothesis. Also the interpreta-dologmca ly infeneerhe cw,work of a m ystic or a nonrnystic. Thus if I shotildconclude in this book that m ystical experience is objective, or if Ishould conclude that it is only subject ive, these would be m y in-terIprsehatiuld bns .be noted that there are different levels of interpretationof mystical experience, just as there are of sense experience. If a mansays, "I se e a red c olour," this is a low-level interpretation, since itinvolves nothing except simple classificatory concepts. But a phys-icist's wave theory of co lours is a very high-level interpretat ion.Analogously, if a mystic speaks of the experience of "an u ndiffer-entiated distinctionless unity," this m ere report or description usingonly classificatory w ords may be regarded as a low-level interpreta-tion. But this is being mo re fussily precise than is usually necessary,since for all intents and p urposes it is just a description. If a m ysticsays that he experiences a "mystical union with the Creator of theuniverse," this is a high-level interpretation since it includes far moreintellectual addition than a mere descriptive report. It includes anassumption abo ut the origin of the world and a belief in the exist-ence of a p ersonal G od. N ote that the phrase "undifferentiated unity"contains no reference to G od or the Absolute. If a man says on thealleged basis of my stical experience that time is unreal, this is plainly'a general philosophical theorem w hich is a high-level interpretation.I occasionally use the phrase "mystical idea." This is roughly thesame as an interpretation, but it generally implies that the proposi-tion or concept wh ich is here called an "idea" was originally an in-.terpretation of some actual mystical experience by the person who

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    38YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYexperienced it, but has since passed into the general history of ideasand may be accepted by peop le who are unaware of i ts mysticalorigin. For instance, Hegel's concept of the "identity of oppo sites"may be considered a m ystical idea in this sense. It is a transcriptionof certain characteristics of mystical experience which we shall haveto study. But i t is spoken of and cri t icized by m any w ho have noknow ledge of its mystical origin. Pan theism is also a mystical idea,even if i t is adopted on purely logical grounds by a thinker whoconsiders himself a rationalist.6. C a t h o l ic i t y o f E v i d e nc e

    It is a presupposition of our enquiry that whatever conclusionswe draw ought to be based on a survey of evidence as wide as pos-sible . This means that we should consider not o nly the my sticismof a single culture, for instance Christian my sticism, but rather themysticisms of all the higher culturesat least as many and as m uchas this enquirer is in a position to study, having regard to his ownlimitations of knowledge and scholarship. I shall therefore try totake account, so far as these limitations allow, of Ch ristian, Islamic,Judaic, Hindu, Buddhist , and Taoist mysticisms. Zen Bud dhism,which is of co urse highly mystical, first appeared as a special brandof Budd hism in China from w hence i t passed over into Japan. I tis included, of course, under the head of Buddhist mysticism. Theonly expressions of mysticism indigenous to China with w hich I .am acquainted are some well-known passages of Taoist writers towhich we may have occasion to refer in later pages.

    In addition to the sources just mentioned, w e ought also to con-sider the mystical experiences recorded by m en w ho have not beenadherents of any p art icular religion let us call them unattachedmystics . It is a common popular assumption that a ll mysticism isas such religious. There is a sense in w hich this is t rue, since allmysticism is conc erned with the highest spiritual aspirations of theselfwe need not consider certain alleged demonic and evil aberra-tions of mysticism. B ut it is not true in the sense that every my stic

    PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ENQUIRY9is a believer in some one or other of the organized religions of theWorld. He need not be a believer in any religious creed as that phraseis ordinarily understood. Plotinus is an obvious example among theancients. He accepted the philosophy of P lato, but not any specifically'religious creed. But apart from classical and famous exam ples thereare many cases of recent and contemporary unattached mystics whosereports of their experiences should be of great importance to thephilosophical enquirer. We shall very often find that the experiencesof such men as Tennyson, 1 6 J. A. Symonds, R. M. Bucke, EdwardCarpenter, and even quite unheard-of and unknown contemporaryunattached mystics are of great value to us.Thus the evidence on which w e ought to rely should come fromat least three kinds of sources: first, the mysticisms which have beenhistorically associated with the great world religions; second, his-torically famous nonattached my stics such as Plotinus; third, con-temporary mystics whether well-known or obscure, whether un-attached or associated with a particular religion.

    The reasons for this emphasis on catholicity of evid ence shouldbe obvious. There is, of course, no reason why a writer should notfor limited purposes confine his studies exclusively to the mysticismof a single culture. But he cannot do this if his purpose is to examinethe philosophical implications of mysticism as such. This requiresa survey of all the main areas of m ysticism. A nd there is also in ourcase a special reason. In the previous section it was m entioned thatmany w riters have urged the similarity of my stical experiences indifferent cultures, religions, and ages all over the world as an argu-ment in favor of their objectivity. O ur very firs t duty, then, mustbe to examine the evidence for this view. And we plainly cannot dothis unless we take into account, to the best of our ability, at leastall the main areas of mysticism in time and place.To undertake this task does not involve making any value judg-ment as to the relative intrinsic values of different cultures or differ-" Tennyson was a Christian, but I cal l him unattached because his description ofhis experiencewhich w ill be quoted in its proper placew as not expressed in terms`of any specifically Christian or other religious concepts. For instance, he did not calli t "union with God."

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    40YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYent branches of mysticism as such. C hristian writers no doubt nat-urally believe that Christian mysticism is more valuable, true, andimportant than any other. Hindu writers may be pardoned if theyconsider that theirs is the best. O ur practice of taking into accountthe evidence of the m ystics of all cultures should not be construedas implying the opinion that all are of equal intr insic value, anymore than the practice of a law cou rt of hearing the evidence of allrelevant witnesses on any m atter implies that the court regards theevidence of them all as equally t ruthful or valuable. And i t doesnot appear that there is any necessity for usat any rate at the pres-ent stage of our enquiryto express an opinion as to whether themysticism of one culture is in itself inferior or superior to that ofany other.

    C H A P T E R 2

    The Problem of the Universal Core

    I. The Nature of the ProblemIn the previous chapter I referred to R. M. Bucke's version of theargument for the objectivity of mystical experiences which variouswriters have based upon the alleged fact that such experiences in

    all times, places, and cultures have been basically the same, or that,in spite of some differences, they possess a universal core of commoncharacteristics. Bucke's version, we observed, overstated and ex ag-gerated whatever degree of validity the argument m ay reasonablybe supposed to have. P rofessor C. D . Broad, who states that he hasno religious belief, and that he has never had anything which w ouldbe called a religious or mystical experience, ' and who cannot be ac-cused of any special sym pathy for mysticism, presents another versionof the argumen t. It is the most careful, guarded, conservative, mod-erate version with which I am acquainted. This m akes it speciallysuitable as a basis for the philosophical discussion of the argument,and I shall use it as such. His statement is as follows:

    Finally I com e to the argument for the existence of G od w hich is basedon the occurrences of specifically m ystical and religious experiences. Iam prepared to adm it that such experiences occur among p eople of dif-ferent races and social traditions, and that they have occurred at all'C. D. Broad, Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research, New York, Harcourt,Brace and Com pany, Inc . , 1953, pp. a and 192.

    41

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    42YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYperiods of history. I am prepared to admit that, although the experienceshave differed considerably at different t imes and places, and althoughthe interpretations of them have differed sti ll more, there are probablycertain characteristics which are com mon to them all and suffice to dis-tinguish them from all other kind s of experience. In view of this I thinkit more likely than not that in religious and mystical experience mencome into contact with some Reality or some aspect of Reality which theydo not come into contact with in any other way.But I do n ot think there is any reason to suppose that this Reali ty .. .is personal?

    Since Broad is discussing argum ents in favor of the existence ofa personal G od, the last sentence in the quotation is inserted by himin order to indicate that he rejects the view that there is any reasonto think that the Reality which may be revealed in the experienceis a personal G od. With this question we are not at present concerned .It will be time enough to discuss what is the nature of the Realitywhich is supposed to be revealed when we have analysed and evalu-ated that part of the argumen t which pu rports to show that thereis any such Reality. O ur first question is whether mystical experienceis objective. If we decide that it is, the question may then be raisedwhat kind of an entity it reveals. I quote Broad's last sentence onlybecause I am anxious not to m isrepresent him by om itting reserva-tions which he thinks ought to be m ade as regards the conclusionswhich may be drawn from the argument.O n a later page he repeats the sense of the above passage in slightlydifferent words and say s that the R eali ty referred to is probably"a certain objective aspect of reality." 3W illiam James is plainly referring to what is essentially the sameargument when he w rites:

    This overcom ing of all the usual barriers between the individu al andthe Abso lute is the great mystic achievement. In my stic states we be-come one w ith the Absolute and we become aw are of our oneness. This'ibid., pp. 172-173. As will be pointed out in the proper place (see p. 136),Broad does not suppose that the agreement of experiences is by itself sufficient toprove objectivity, since such agreement is often found in experiences which are knownto be illusions, e.g., mirages.'Ibid., p. 197. The italics are mine.

    THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSAL CORE3is the everlasting and trium phant m ystical tradition hardly altered bydifferences of clime or creed. In Hinduism, in N eo-Platonism, in Sufism,in Christian my sticism, in W hitmanism, we find the sam e recurring note,so that there is about mystical utterances an eternal unanimity whichought to make the critic stop and think. 4It is of interest to note that in his list of the many differe nt cul-tures and religions in which agreement is found he om its Buddhism.This is not a case of inadv ertence. It is no doubt a deliberate om is-sion. And the reason for i t must be that the Hinayana version ofBuddhism with which alone it is probable that James was at allfully acquainted, is generally regarded as atheistic and also w ithoutany such concept as the Absolute. But Buddhism w as founded onthe enlightenment experience of the Budd ha, and every Buddhistis supposed to seek that experience as his goal of aspiration. Andsince that experience w as certainly in some sense my stical, it willbe seen that Buddhism, at least at first sight, presents a difficultyfor the theory that in my stical experiences in all cultures we "be-come one with the Absolute." This apparent exception is so impor-tant that I shall have to devo te a special section of this chap ter toit. But even if this exception had to be admitted, it might still bethe case that the. agreement among mystics might be impressive ifi t extended to all the cases mentioned by James, and it could s tillbe true that the argument for objectivity which has been based u ponit might be in part valid, and not wh olly destroyed. For the momentI shall proceed with the exam ination of the argument without tak-ing account of the difficulty raised by the case of Buddhism.

    The problems which the argumentof which I shall take Broad'sversion as the patternraises are two:t. Is there any set of characteristics which is common to allmystical experiences, and distinguishes them from other kinds ofexperience, and thus constitutes their universal core?2. If there is such a universal core, is the argu ment for o bjectivitywhich has been based up on it a valid argument?

    `William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, New York, Modern Library,Inc., p.

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    44YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYI shall devote this chapter to the first problem, and the follow ingchapter to the second, discussing also in that chapter any other argu-ments for objectivity which may present them selves, and endeavor-ing to reach a. conclusion on that matter. ;Althoug h so many w riters have asserted that there is a universalcore of common characteristics, they have not as a rule made anyserious attempt to justify the statement by a careful survey of theempirical evidence, nor even to give clear and comp lete lists of whatthe common characteristics are; nor are such lists as different writer'shave given consis tent with one another. James l is ts four comm oncharacteristics, namely: (x) noetic quality, by which he means theimmed iate feeling of the revelation of objective truth which accom -panies the ex perience a nd is a part of it, (2) ineffability, (3) tran-siency, and (4) passivity.5 R. M. Bucke gives the following: (I) thesubject ive light , or photism, (2) moral elevation, (3) intellectualillumination, (4) sense of immortality, (5) loss of fear of death,(6) loss of sense of sin, (7) suddenness. D. T. Suzuki gives thefollowing list of the comm on characteristics of safari, which is theJapanese word for what non-Japanese Bud dhists usually call en-lightenment. He does not say that they are the common charactersof all mystical experiences including those outside the sphere ofBuddhism, nor does he discuss that question. But if the generaltheory of the existence of a common co re is correct and is supposedto include the area of Buddhism, there should be a correspondence.His list is: (1) irrationality, inexplicability, incommun icability; (2)intuitive insight; (3) authoritativeness; .(4) affirmation (positivecharacter); (5) sense of the beyond; (6) impersonal tone; (7) feel-ing of exaltation; (8) mom entariness (roughly equivalent to Bucke's"suddenness") . 7 It is of little use to institute a detailed analy sis andcomparison o f these lists. There are vague correspondences, several

    5 M i d ., pp. 371-372.R. M. Bucke, C o s m i c C o n s c i ou s n es s , New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., pp.72-73 and 79.'D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki, ed. by WilliamBarrett, New York, Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., pp. 103i off.

    THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSAL CORE5cases of a total lack of correspondence, and no t one characteristic"hich is clearly and indubitably common to all three lists. Thus wej:an hardly expect much light from past writers whose statements"Ahave plainly been more or less haphazard. We shall have to tacklethe problem ab inif io. There is only one way of doing this We m ust

    , . . . : quote a num ber of representative descriptions of their experiences-which have been given by mystics, taking them from all historicaltime s, places, and cultures, as widely separated as po ssible; and byan examination of these descriptions we must try to arrive induc-tively at their common characteristics, if there are any..Let us begin by asking what it is reasonable for us to expect to.find in the way of comm on characteristics. That all plane triangleshave as a defining comm on character the fact that they are boundedby three straight lines is an analytic truth. It goes without say ingthat our enquiry into whether mystical states of mind have any/common characteristics is an empirical enquiry in which we can-not expect any absolutely universal a priori si tuation such as w ehave in mathematical models.Is it , then, reasonable for us to expect any set of c omm on char-acteristics in such an inductive situation? We have an assem blage

    . or group of psychological states which are in comm on language per-l iaps somewhat vaguely marked off from various other groups of,psychological states, and which ar e al l commonly described by one: Word , the word "mystical ," the other groups being called "non-,-.4nystical." It has been too readily taken for granted by writers onzpiysticism that all "mystical" states must necessarily have commoncharacteris tics to justify the app lication of the one w ord to them.;,13At as the Wittgensteinians have recently been insisting, the multi-,.Ta:rious objects or phenomena which are all called by one name maythus grouped together, not because of an identity of comm onO ali ties, but only because they bear to one another a relat ion ofgully resemblance." P may resemble Q because both possess thecommon quality a. Q may resemble R because, although R does notpossess quality a, both it and Q possess the common q uality b. R

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    46YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYmay resemble S by -possessing in commo n with it the quality c, al-though S does not possess either the quality a or the quality b. Thusthere is a chain of resemblances running through P, Q, R, an d S,although no comm on quality is shared by them al l . And this familyresemblance traceable through P, Q, R, an d S may be what causesus to call them all by the same nam e. Wittgenstein thought that thiswas the si tuat ion with the wo rd "game," and he also noted that i tis likely to be what we shall find in wo rds standing for concepts inethics and aesthetics.Shall we find that mystical states are so called because they allshare a set of common qualities, or because they have only a fam ilyresemblance to one another? There is no a priori way o f decidingthis question. We shall have to see after enquiry into the facts. ButI will somew hat ant icipate our future f indings for the purpose ofproviding the reader with a preliminary sketch, of the conclusionswe shall reach. We shall find neither the situation of a pure comm oncore shared by all m ystical states nor a pure fam ily resemblance sit-uation. Neither the one extreme nor the other, but rather a mixtureof the two w hich may b e described as follows: there will be a cen-tral nucleus of typical cases which are typical because they all sharean important set of comm on characteristics. But there will be border-line cases. These are usually, or often, called "mystical experiences"because, although none of them possess all the comm on character-istics of the nucleus, some of them p ossess some of these c haracter-istics, others others. Thus they bear the relation of family resem blanceboth to the nucleus and to each other. This is what we mean bythe phrase "borderline cases." The typical and central my stical statesshade off through borderline cases into the wholly nonm ystical. Thismay be illustrated by a d iagram:

    THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSAL CORE7The diagram is perhaps oversymmetrical in that there are prob-a bly not two distinct sets of family resemblance gro ups one at each.'end. This feature of the diagram is meant merely to em phasize thec e n tra lity, or essentiality, of the nucleus. For it will be seen that,n- the situation described, the central core of mystical experiences isof far more importance to our argument than the family resemblancegroups. So m uch is this the case that after we have given a no d ofrecognition to the borderline cases out of respect to the family re-,semblance school of philosophers we shall be justified in concen-trating thereafter wholly on the central nucleus as being the inneressence of mysticism. We c an then ignore the borderline cases. Butwe must first recognize the existence of the borderline cases, not onlyas a gesture of respect, but because it is important for our argum entthat we should do so. O therwise, if we should find that the universalcore in the central nucleus consists of the com mon characteristics a,b, c, d, and if a critic were to bring up one of the bord erline casesand say, "This is w hat people call a mystical experience, but it doesnot share all these characteristics a, b, c, d," we should have no an-swer. But if we have taken the preliminary precaution of recogniz-ing borderline cases, we shall have an answ er to that critic.2. Visions and Voices Are Not Mystical Phenomena_:Let us begin by exclud ing from the class of mystical states cer-tain , experiences which popular opinion may perhap s tend to regard

    as-,mystical, but which are not genuinely so. By d oing this, and giv-- ing the reasons for it, we shall be able to learn not only what areno t mystical phenomen a, but by implication we can learn some im-pO rta.nt facts about those phenomena which ar e mystical. The chief10C h occurrences to be excluded are visions and voices. N ot only is: ::this:; the opinion of m ost comp etent scholars, but it has also beenth'e-opinion which the great mystics themselves have generally held.4hey have often been subject to visions and voices, but have u sually'discounted them as of doubtful value or importance and at any rateas not to be confused with genuine mystical experiences.

    Family resem-amily resem-blance grouplance groupABCDFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVXYZTrue class relation of a set ofcommon characteristics

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    48YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYA C atholic saint may have a vision of the Virgin Mary or heara voice wh ich he at tr ibutes to Jesus. A Hindu may h ave a visionof the goddess Kali. N either these nor the voices heard by St. Joanof Arc, Socrates, or Mohammed, are to be accounted as mystical phe-nomena, although it is quite possible that these persons may alsohave been the subjects of genuine m ystical experiences. St. Paul isoften called a mystic. The light which he is alleged to have seenon the road to Damascus and the voice which he heard saying, "Saul,Saul, why persecutest thou me?" should not as such be classed as .mystical experiences, although there may be other grounds for class-ing him as a m ystic. The words in which he speaks of another ex-perience as that of a man w ho w as "caught up into the third heaven. . . and heard unspeakable w ords which i t is not lawful for a ma'to utter," have som ething of the true mystical ring. Even here thereis some doubt because it is not clear whether the word "words" isto be taken literally or metap horically. If literally, then this wouldamount to a voice w hich would rule it out from the class of mysti-cal phenomen a. The reference to the "third heaven" is also subjectto the same doub t since it may be interpreted either metap horicallyor literally as an actual vision. What how ever gives the sentence agenuine mystical ring is the expression "unspeakable" and the words"which it is not law ful for a man to utter." That their experiencesare "unspeakable" or "ineffable" is a common statement made bymystics, although there are, as we shall see, different interpretationsof this fact. The words "not lawful" m ay perhaps refer to a peculi-arity of Jewish mystics, namely that in their tradition it is gener-ally considered improper and indecorous for any m an to give a per-sonal account of his ow n m ystical experiences. Such accounts , ifgiven by a writer, were usually kept secret and not included inpublished versions. 8 St. Paul's statement "I live, yet not I but C hristl iveth in me" is a lso sometimes quoted as evidence that he was amystic. If so, the word "Christ" is (rightly or wrongly) taken to referto the realization in Paul of what Eckhart calls the birth of God

    Cf. G. G . Scholem (ed.) , Major Trends o f Jewish Mysticism, New York, SchockcnBooks Inc., 1954.

    THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSAL CORE9n'the apex of the soul, and what Bu ddhists refer to as the realiza-voices from the class of mystical phenom ena is due to an arbitrarytiWeofmh e B r a u i de d h t h a en a ituuersedionn awm e nhwhether our exclusion of visions and.decision, or whether any good reason can be given fo r it. The an-- Swer is that good reasons can be given . The main point is that themost typical as we ll as the mo st important type of mystical experi-ences is nonsensuous, whereas visions and voices have the characterof sensuous imagery . The introvertive kind of mystical states are,according to all the accounts we have of them, entirely devoid of allimagery. Extrovertive experiences may indeed be called sensuous,since they consist in a transfiguration of actual sense perception, buteven this is not imagery but is direct perception by the eyes. Extrover-tive experience, there is some reason to think, is no more than a step-ping stone to the higher introvertive state, and in any c ase is of lessimportance. These assertions w ill, of course, be fully explained anddocum ented in the proper place. Introvertive experience is allegedby the experients of it to be void of content and form less. Eckhartand R uysbroeck and m any other mystics warn us that sensuousimagery must be forcibly extruded by a m ind which seeks the goalof the mystic.

    St. Teresa frequently saw visions. She w as not an intellectual asEckhart w as, and not capable of m uch analytical or philosophicalthinking. Y et she was aware that her visions, or at least some ofthem, were hallucinations. She suspected that some of them weresent by the d evil to distract her from her efforts to attain union w ithG od. She thought that others might be sent by G od as a help andcomfort, although even in these cases she was apparently not de-ceived into supposing that what she saw in the visions was objec-ively existent.1. St. John of the Cross writes that whether visions are from G od or',the devil

    the understanding should not be encumbered by them or feed upon them,nor should the so ul desire to receive and hold them, if i t wishes to re-main detached, em pty, pure, and simple, as is required for the state of

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    50YSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHYunion. For, as God is not com prised in any image or form, nor containedin any particular kind of knowledge, the soul, in order to be united withG od, must not take hold of any distinct form or any p articularized knowl-edge:3O n the other hand, although visions and vo ices are clearly dis-tinguished by mystics from the higher states which they attain, thereis a certain correlation between the types of persons w ho have m ysti-cal experiences and those who see visions and hear voices. That iswhy they themselves are so careful to distinguish them.The U panishads are of course among the earliest known docu-ments of Indian my sticism, or indeed of any m ysticism, dating asthey do from the first half of the first millennium B.C. They in-variably describe the mystical experiences as being "soundless, form:less, intangible,". 3i.e., devoid of sensuous content. But in the mentionof the practices of controlled breathing and concentration and otherspiritual exercises in the Svetasvatara U panishad w e find the state-ment:

    As you practice meditation you m ay.see in vision forms resembling snow,crystal, wind, smo ke, fire, lightning, fireflies, the sun, the moo n. Theseare signs that you are on the way to the revelation of Brahman. 1 1The distinction is here clearly made between visions and thegenuine, my stical state, but the correlation referred to above is alsoasserted. The curious difference between the kind of visions men-tioned by the Indian m ystic, fireflies for instance, and the pious visionsof the Virgin of which C hristian mystics speak, may perhap s tell atale about the differences between the tw o cultures , but the pointis that both are sensuous images, and as such are excluded from theclass of mystical phenomena, although it is recognized that the mysticis peculiarly liable to them . O n the essential point of distinguish-'st. John of the Cross, The Dark Night of she Soul, trans. by Kurt F. Reinhardt,New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1957, Pt. I, Bk. 2, Chap. x6, pp. 62-63."The Upanishads, trans. by Swami Prabhavananda and Frederick Manchester,New York, Mentor Book MD 194, New American Library of World Literature, Inc.,1957, Katha Upanishad, p. 20 (O rigi


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