Staff Department THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
Fort Benning, Georgia
ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS COURSE 1949-1950
THE OPERATIONS OF THE 2D BATTALION, 350TH INFANTRY (88TH INFANTRY DIVISION) AT MOUNT BATTAGLIA, SOUTH OF BOLOGNA, ITALY, 27 SEPTEMBER 1 OCTOBER 1944.
(NORTH APENNINES CAMPAIGN)
Type of operation described: INFANTRY BATTALION CAPTURING AND DEFENDING A KEY TERRAIN FEATURE IN MOUNTAINOUS COUNTRY
Major Bernard J. Scherer, Infantry ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX •••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ORIENTATION •
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Introduction • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • The General Situation • • • • • • • • • • • • • Disposition arid Plans of the 350th Infantry • •
The Battalion Situation • • • • • • • • • • • •
The Battalion Plan of Attack • • • • • •• • • •
NARRATION ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
~
1
2
3
3
4
'7
8
9
10
The Attack on Mount Battaglia • • • • • • • •• 10
The First Day and Night on Mount Battaglia • •• 12
Second Day and Night on Mount Battaglia •••• 16
Third Day and Night on Mount Battaglia • • • •• 20
Fourth Day and Night on Mount Battaglia • • •• 24
Last Day of Fight1n~ on Mount Battaglia • • •• 26
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 28
LESSONS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 33
MAP A - Landing at Salerno
MAP B - Approaching the Gothic Line
MAP C - II Corps Sector, Gothic Line
MAP D - 88th Division Attack of Santerno Valley
MAP E - Attack on Mount Battaglia
MAP F - Defense of Mount Battaglia
1
"
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A-l Fifty Army History, Part VII US Army, Fifth Army (TIS Library)
A-2 Operations in Sicily and Italy, Department of Military Art and Engineering, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 1947 (TIS Library)
A-3 From Salerno to the Alps, A History of the Fifth Army, By Lt. Col. Chester G. starr, Infantry Journal Press (TIS Library) •
A-4 Report by Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, Italian Campaign, Part II and III, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, England, (TIS Library) .
A-5 The Blue Devils In Italy, A History of the 88th Infantry Division, By John P. Delaney (TIS Library)
A-6 Historical Narrative of Operations of the 88th Division, Se~tember 1944. Film #245 (TIS Library) .
A-7 One Week In Hell, By Colonel J. C. Fry, U. S. Amy (Personal possession of author)
A-8 19 Days From the Apennines to the Alps, A Story of the Po Valley Campaign, Fifty Army. (Personal possession of author)
A-9 Personal Statements of Lt. Col. Corbitt Williamson, then Battalion Commander, 2d Bn., 35~th Int. Regt.
2
THE OPERATIONS OF THE aD BATTALION, 350TH INFANTRY (88TH INFANTRY DIVISION) AT MOUNT BATTAGLIA, SOUTH OF BOLOGNA, ITALY, 27 SEPTEMBER - 1 OCTOBER 1944
(NORTH APENNINES CAMPAIGN)
ORIENTATION
INTRODUCTION
This monograph covers the operations of the 2d Battalion,
350th Infantry, 88th Division, in the battle of MOUNT BATTAGLIA,
ITALY, 27 September - 1 October 1944, during the late fall of-
fensive.
To clarity the reader's concept of this operation, it will
be necessary to briefly recount the major events of military
significance which led up to this particular encounter.
First, let us consider the mission of this campaign. The
primary 6bjective was to contain as many of the enemy forces as
possible, in this theater, thus eliminating their possible use
on the eastern and western fronts. In addition, these forces
were to be destroyed and disorganized to prevent them fram oc
oupying probable defenses in NORTHERN ITALY and SOUTHERN
BAVARIA. (1)
The campaign, up to the present operation was oonduoted
in three major phases. Phase one was the suooessful landings
at SALERNO and TARANTO by the Amerioan Fifth Army and the
British Eighth Army. (2) (See Map A) By 1 Ootober the port
of NAPLES was established and by 1 January 1944, the enemy had
been driven back to his first prepared defenses whioh were just
north of the GARIGLIOANO and SANGRO RIVERS. (See Jla,p A)
(1) A-4, p. 1 (2) A-3, p. 36
3
Phase two_ the capture of ROME_ its surrounding air
fields and the port of CIVITAVECCHIA was completed by the
. Fri. A1!my on 2 June 19440' (3) (See Map A) It was during
this phase that the ANZIO BEACHHEAD was established. Here
too_ was where the German Fourteenth Arm7_ the major opposi
tion of the Fifth,received its greatest setbacks and heaviest
losses. (4) Phase three, from ROME to the GOTHIC LINE_ enemy
opposition was oontinuous but less severe. In this one hun
dred thirty mile advanoement no major pookets of resistanoe
were enoountered. This was due largely to our air superiority
and the weakened oondition of the German Fourteenth Army. By
25 August enemy forces of all large units were withdrawn and
ooncentrated behind their last well prepared position, the
GOTHIC LINE. (5) Units opposing the Fifth ~ were the ,
16th SS Armored Infantry Division, 65th Infantry Division,
362d Infantry Division, 334th Infantry Division, and the tough
4th Paraohute DiVision. (See Map B)
THE GENERAL SITUATION
The GOTHIC LINE_ the main line of German defense in
NORTHERN ITALY_ extended one hundred miles east from VIA
REGGIO on the west coast to RIMINI on the ADRIATIC side.
(See Map B) It was oonstruoted to take maximum advantage .of
the rugged APENNINE MOUNTAINS and the few roads that passed
over them. This formidable fortress was by no means oontinuous
or strong in depth. Likely approaohes were fortified with
every oonoeivable weapon from anti-personnel mines to tank
traps.
(:5) 1-2, p. 81 (4) A-3, p. 2'71 (5) A-4, p. 57
4
The first plan of ~ifteenth Army Group in July 1944,
to attack the GOTHIC LINE, had to be cancelled because of
canny and rapid shifting of enemy defense units. The final
plan adopted on 16 August 1944, called for the Eighth Army
on the right to attack in force along the ADRIATIC, while
the Fifth made a secondary attack toward BOLOGNA. When the
Eighth,Army's attack showed progress, the main effort would
be made by the Fifth Army north of FLORENCE.
The Fifth Army plan to breach the LINE called for a
coordinated attack in which all three Corps would partici
pate. (6) The main effort and critical zone was assigned
the II Corps, commanded by Major General Geoffrey Keyes.
II Corps employed three divisions, the 34th, 9lst and 85th
in the attack with the 88th in reserve. (See Map 0)
By 17 September the 85th Division had captured MOUNT
ALTUZZO and at this point enemy resistance generally col
lapS'ed all along the front. The GOTHIC LINE had been breach-
ed. In a matter of hours, II Corps controlled a sevenm1le
stretch of the GOTHIC LINE on each side of IL GIOGO PASS. (7)
Phase two of II Corps plans called for a continuation
of the attack. The line of advance was to folloW HIGHWAY 65
northward toward BOLOGNA_ Bad weather and enemy resistance
was bogging down the Eighth Army advance on the right. Gen
eral Clark, Fifteenth Army Group Commander, ordered the II
Corps to change direction and attack to the northeast along
HIGHWAY 6528 toward IMOLA. (8)
On 20 September Gener~ Kendall, Commanding General of
the 88th Division, received Corps orders to assemble his troops
(6) A-l, p. 39 (7) &-3, p. 322 (8) A-3, p. 332
5
near MOUNT .a.LTUZZO and pass thJ::ough the right elements of the'
85th Division and attack down the SANTERNO VALLEY. (9) The
88th Divisio~ had been held in reserve since early August,
just south of FLORENCE. Here they were trained and briefed
on the operations that were soon to follow. Plans were made
and executed to familiarize all units with the front line
situation. Officers and NCO's were sent forward to observe
the action of the front line companies in the other three di-
visions.
Morale in the diVision was high. The men were becoming
impatient for the eventful blows that were soon to come. All
felt that now was'the time to jump-off, it was good fighting
weather and the Germans were tiring. Division strength was ,
about normal and supplies and equipment were all in good con
dition. The main German opposing forces, the 362d and 44th
Infantry Divisions were badly beaten and poorly supplied.
However, inclement weather was greatly aiding the Germans in
their defense. And too, General Kesselring's masterful handl
ing of what troops he had, made further progress difficult.
Efficiency of both forces was considered good. Both had ex
perienced a ye~ of heavy fighting and numerous oasualties.
OUr greatest morale factor was our continued success.
!he Division plan of attack called for two Regiments
abreast and one in reserve. The right boundary would be the
boundary between II Corps and XIII Corps; the left boundary
adjacent to the 85th Division would be approximately one and
a half miles west of and parallel to HIGHWAY 6528. (See Map D)
The first objective was to capture the high ground southeast
(9) 1-5. p. 130
6
of the SANTERNO RIVER. These high ridges were neoessary to
oontrol the highway and the valley below. Fighting here
would present tremendous supply problems. but the ground was
oritioal and haa to be taken. On 19 September, General Ken~
dall issued orders oommitting the 349th Infantry on the left
and the 350th Infantry on the right. keeping the 351st in re
serve. D-Day and H-Hour Were designated as 0500 hours. 21
September. (10) The attaok was launohed at the appointed
time and favorable gains were made immediately. The 349th In
fantry soon took MOUNT LAFINE and the 350th MOUNT FAGGIOLLI.
(See Map D)" At this point ene~ resistanoe stiffened ap
preoiably and heavy lOsses were inflicted on both sides. It
soon beoame eVident that MOUNT PRATOLUNGO. MOUNT CARNEVALE and
MOUNT BATTAGLIA had to be taken to relieve this oontinuing
resistance. (11) II Corps assisted byreduoing the Division
frontage and allowing concentration on these points. The 349th
was assigned MOUNT PRATOLUNGO and the 350th MOUNT BATTAGLIA.
(See Map D)
DISPOSITION AND PLANS OF THE 350TH INFANTRY
on the 25th of September the 350th Infantry. oommanded
by Colonel Fry. was attacking in a northeasterly direotion in
an effort to capture the high ground between the SANTERNO and
SENIO RIVERS. (See ~ap D) Leap-frog tactics were being used
oonstantly in an effort to gain eaoh high objeotive. one bat
talion would take a hill. oonsolidate it, and then another
would pass through to take the next one. To seize MOUNT
BATTAGLIA the regiment planned to use the 2d Battalion. The
(10) A-6. G~3 Log (11) A-l, p. 93
7
1st Battalion was to protect the right flank and the 3rd Eat
talion was to be held in reserve at MOUNT ACUTO and follow to
MQUNT CARNEVALE. which was the 2d Battalion's first objective.
THE BATTALION SITUATION
On 25 September, Colonel Fry, Regimental Commander,
ordered the 3d Battalion to take MOUNT CARNEVALE and the 1st
Battalion PUNTALE. The 2d Eatta1ion was to be held in re
serve on MOUNT ALTO, and be prepared to pass through the 3d
to take BATTAGLIA. orders were changed at the last minute,
assigning MOUNT CARNEVALE to the 2d Battalion, thus making it
the first objective on the way to BATTAGLIA.
When Lt. Colonel Corbitt Williamson, the 2d Battalion
Commander received the Regimental Order to take MOUNT CARNE
VALE and MOUNT BATTAGLIA, he assembled the battalion in the
vicinity of MOUNT ACUTO for a day's rest prior to the jump
off. That was all the time that could be allowed for prepara
tion. Here men were ordered to strip down to the barest es
sentials. Three days "K" rations, 3 bandoleers of lIlIIII1U.Ilition,
3 grenades, first aid packet, full canteen of water, halozone
tablets, entrenching equipment, knife and fork, and raincoat
were the only items to be carried. Blankets, overcoats, shoe
packs and pup tents were not available. (12) Attached to the
Battalion for supply transportation, were 27 mules from the
Regimental mule group. These were placed under the direction
of the A & P Platoon Leader and would be supervised by Bat
talion S-4, who was to remain with the Regimental Supply Train.
It was impossible for any type vehicle to move in this ter-
(12) 1-9
8
rain. Only one mule trail led to the. top of the mountain
from the south. (See Map E)
Because the entire regiment was moving forward at such a
fast rate, prior reconnaissance by foot patrols was impossible.
The tops of CARNEVALE and BATTAGLIA could be seen trom MOUNT
ACUTO. That was all the terrain information known. Maps were
unavailable, old and very inaccurate. Photos could not be ob
tained. (13)
THE BATTALION PLAN OF ATTACK
The line of departure was to be the mountain trail 20
yards left of VILLA DI VALMAGGIORE on HILL 69B, which was for-·,
ward of MOUNT ACUTO, about 700 yards. H-Hour was to be 0600,
27 September 1944. (14)
The plan of attack called for the battalion to attack in
a column of companies, G Company leading, followed by F Com
pany, E Company, and Headquarters Company. The Heavy Weapons
Company had only two B1 mm mortars and six light machine guns.
The mortars were attached to E Company and the machine guns
to G Company.
The Battalion Commander with a radio operator was to move
forward with the leading company, while the Battalion Execu
tive Officer would bring up the remaining headquarters ele
ments in rear of E Company.
En~ strength or disposition on MOUNT BATTAGLIA was un
known.Most of the enemy activity had been observed about
five miles to the west in the vicinity of CASTEL DEL RIO, the •
important road junction on HIGHWAY 652B. This was in the
(13) 1-9 (14) A-9
9
sector or the 35lst Inrantry.
The rirst objective was to be MOUNT CARNEVALE. where a
hurried reorganization would take place. The battalion would
then move on to BATTAGLIA. G Company was to make a rrontal
attack, and ir delayed considerably. F Bompany would deploy
and make a rlank attack on the right.
Radios were to be used ror communication. Up to this time
the SCR 300 had proved very erricient and each company had at
least two good sets. The Communication Platoon in Headquarters
Company built up a good stock pile or extra batteries and dis
regarded the wire laying equipment and wire.
The mule train was to be rully loaded arid rollow the last
company in the attack. In case the battalion was held up. the
loads would be dumped and the mules returned immediately to
MOUNT ACUTO ror res~pply.
Men would be given their last hot meal at 0400 hours, 27
September and be ready to march by 0500. (15)
NARRATION
THE ATTACK ON MOUNT BATTAGLIA
Company G, led by Qaptain Robert E. Roeder, crossed the
line or departure in a column rormation at about 0600 hours,
27 September 1944.
He was accompanied by Lt. Col. Williamson. the Battalion
Commander, and Lt. Vergot, the Artillery Liaison Orficer.
When about 700 yards from the top of MOUNT CARNEVALE, the lead
ing patrol of G Company waS fired upon, but it Was only amall
(15) A-9
10
arms. It was not voluminous or acourate. In faot. the lead
ing patrol by fast aotion and immediate maohine gun fire.
drove the few soattered Germans baok toward the summit. G
Company moved quiokly and upon reaohing the only good trail
to the top, Captain Roeder deployed the 1st Platoon and ordered
them to make a frontal assault. '!'he 60 mill mortars and light
maohine guns took positions where they oould support the at
tack with overhead fire.
In less than three hours- MOUNT CARNEVALE and fifty pri
soners were oaptured. The speed of the attaok was the big
faotor in this suooess. The Germans did not have time to dig
in and there were no. artifioial obstaoles or buildings to af
ford them proteotion. Partially dug fox holes and deserted
entrenohing tools were the only remains of the battle. A small
number of the enemy fled along the trail toward MOUNT BAT
TAGLIA. OUr losses were minor, one killed and six wounded.
As G Company was reorganizing on MOUNT CARNEVALE a band
of renegade partisans, about 25 strong, appeared and informed
Col. Williamson that there were n9 Germans entrenohed on MOUNT
BATTAGLIA and that they, (the partisans) knew the only trail
leading to the ore st. They argued that there were many Ger
mans in the vioinity and that the sooner we moved forward the
fewer oasualties we would suffer. '!'his information was radioed
direotly to the Assistant Division gammander. General Ramey,
who warned Col. Williamson of probable sabotage. After oon
siderable discussion, gol. Williamson decided to follow the
partisans along the narrow mountain trail, which supposedly led
to the top of BATTAGLIO. For seourity, patrols were sent to
11
the front and the nanks and close surveillance was kept over
the partisan leader and his cohorts. He was warned that any
unusual actions on his part would bring immediate death. (16)
The battalion moved slowly forward in a column of files.
This Was necessary because the ridge was so narrow. At in
tervals of about two hundred yards. baskets full of enemy
anti-personnel mines had been piled. These were quickly
destroyed. No enemy fire or resistance were met anywhere
along the route.
THE FIRST DAY AND NIGHT ON MOUNT BATTAGLIA
The leading elements of the battalion reached the peak
'-about 1500 hours. Upon arrival. the mountain was found to be
"yft shaped. very barren in most places and deeply indented on
the east by the fingerlike tributaries of SENlO CREEK. Prom
the summit and from a spur extending to the northeast. the
mountain slopes steeply to the northwest. The eastern and
southern slopes are more gradual. The only route from the
south was the hog back ridge which the troops had just come
over. Since the moun~ain was surrounded by peaks of almost
similar height. enemy observation was obtained from HILLS
602. 621. 620. 592 and 5'75. which were on the left. f'ront and
"right. In the vicinity of HILL 5'75 a German self-propelled
88mm started firing from a concealed position into the bat
talion area. This fire proved exceedingly troublesome and
later made supple movements to the front extremely dsngerous~
As soon as G Company had closed on MOUNT BATTAGLIA. Col.
Williamson assigned them the summit, which included an old
stone castle with a large retaining wall, running about 100
(16) A-9
12 ,
yards along the topographioal orest. It was evident that
whoever held the oastle, oontrolled the mountain. The i~G Co.
oommander was ordered to make immediate plans for all-around
seourity, because intermittent mortar fire was beginning to
fall.
F Company followed shortly and they were instruoted to
oocupy the northeast spur as far forward as possible, keep
ing in contaot and coordinating their boundaries with G Com
pany on the right.
F Company could not satisfactorily cover the entire spur.
so a platoon from Headquarters Company with 'two additional
light machine guns was sent down to assist them. !hey were
assigned the left seotor. The partisans wer.e told to stay
with F Company. but as soon as they learned the battalion did
not oarry a large supply of food. they immediately started to
desert our ranks, and by night fall of the first day, all had
vanished. (17)
Upon arrival, E Company was assigned a large sector to
the right of G Company leading baok along the ridge. They
were ordered to dig in immediately and by nightfall have a
patrol in oontact with the Headquarters Platoon on the left
flank.
The Battalion Command Post was originally looated in
E Company's area because it oontained the only other stone
building on the mountain. It was a two story struoture with
a dirt floor. The lower seotion was given to the medios as
an aid station while the upper floor was used as an operations
room. It was looated about 1200 yards to the right rear of
(17) 1-9
13
the castle.
Lt. Vergot. the Artillery Liaison Officer. went to the
crest upon arrival to start registrations for artillery con
centrations in front of. and to the right of the battalion
position. This was quick to prove its value. for no sooner
had he finished. four concentrations. by name. Beoky. Mary.
Susie and Daisy. than the first German counterattack started
to materialize. Initial indioations of th~ attack were vOlleys
ot harassing mortar and artillery fire. These lasted for about
thirty minutes and then the very sky began to erupt with
bursting shells. To add to the utter confusion a heavy rain
began to fall and by 1600 hours, visibility was limited to a
few yards. As soon as the preparation was lifted large num
bersof advanoing Germans trom the 44th and 715th Grenadier
Divisions assaulted the G Co~pany position from the northeast
and east. They moved hurriedly up to the east slope of the
mountain tiring machine pistols and other automatic weapons
as they advanced. One light machine gun squad managed to in
filtrate to the crest of the hill and tor a short while laid
deadly fire all along the rear slope. Suddenly out ot nowhere.
Sergeant Beni Mazzarella of G Company charged the enemy posi
tion trom the left rear and with one well placed grenade
silenced the menacing killer forever. On the forward slope
the attack ~as not sucoessful, beoause reinforcements were
dispersed by the artillery concentrations. The assaulting
elements suttered numerous casualties attempting to get through
the deadly fire of the front line BAR's that were dug in on
the forward slope. In the tirst real test the battalion held.
14
---------~ ~ ~ ~ -~-~--~
but already the ammunition was diminishing and the aid sta
tion was soon over-running with casualties. Emergency re
quests were being sent to regiment for additional ammunition,
medical supplies and litter bearers. To assist the cause, am
munition from our dead and wounded was immediately gathered
and redistributed. (18)
The mountain was an eerie sight. Darkness, rain and fog
engulfed the area and dead were strewn all about. The eight
litter bearers originally assigned the battalion suffered two
casualties and the remaining six were called to the battalion
aid station to assist Qaptain Stoner, the Battalion Medical
Officer.
Officers and NOOIS were busily engaged In trying to re
organize their positions and assist those who needed medical
help. Everyone knew by now that Jerry was very determined to
regain this strategic height.
All through the night the enemy shelled the mountain.
Artillery rounds were coming in from the north, east and south,
which was positive proof that our adjacent unit on the right
was many miles to the rear.Oontact with them had been lost
days before. The thought of a surprise attack on the right
flank or the right rear was an additional hazard.
About midnight the patrol from E Oompany captured 15 Ger
mans in the vicinity of their company area, who confessed they
were lost. They stated that the afternoon counterattack was
supposed to have been a coordinated assault with their group
attacking from the vicinity of HILL 602, .• 1mnltaneous1y with
the effort in front of G Company. (See lp - F)
(1s) A-9
15
SECOND DAY AND NIGHT ON MOUNT BATTAGLIA
At 0530 hours, 28 September anotner terrific mortar
barrage descended upon the mountain. It ceased in fifteen
minutes and the Jerries struck again. The main effort was
again directed at G Company. The forward outposts were soon
overrun and the attacking troops were beaten back only atter
they had reached within a few yards of the crest.
Again the artillery played a tremendous part in re
pelling the effort. The heroic actions of Lt. Vergot who
defied all risks and dangers stayed at his observation post
and direc ted the deadly fire on all the critic al areas. l ., ~ " " "
Several minor attacks continued during the morning and
small groups of 25 to 30 attempted unsuccessfully to pene
trate the outer lines.
By now it beCame evident that the men in G Company could
not stay in their prepared positions 'on the forward slope, be
cause the constant mortar and rifle grenade shelling was mak
ing their positions very dangerous and costly. Captain Roeder
consulted Lt. Col. Williamson and they decided to develop the
rear slope for daylight occupancy. which would afford pro
tection from enemy observation to the front and right.
Everyone knew by now when the Germans would assault -
immediately following the cessation of preparation fires. It
would be a case now of beating the lU'auts to the hll+ top and
occupying positions, so that grazing tire could meet his
desperate rush. " .
Casualties'were so numerous that the command post was
moved into a large defiladed area in the open and the entire
16
,
command post building was turned over to the medics. Plasma,
bandages, and drugs were getting very low. The Battalion 8-4
had sent a ten team mule train forward from ACUTO on the morn
ing of the 27th, but as yet nothing had arrived. Litter
bearers and the walking wounded were scattered all along the
ridge to the rear. Morale and spirits were very low and the
mud drenched soldiers still wallowing in their flooded fox
holes were a discouraging sight. Rifles were becoming dirty,
machine guns needed new barrels and the mortars were useless
because they had no ammunition. only dauntless courage and
bull dog tenacity kept the men at their posts. (19)
In the afternoon, the enemy attacked in force. Commenc
ing at 1400 hours, artillery and mortars to the front and
right rear began a concentrated shelling of the summit which
continued without let up until 1700 hours, when a force of ap
proximately three battalions from the 7l5th and 44th Grena
dier Divisions launChed a coordinated attack. An estimated
battalion attacked from the open right flank in the sector in
front of Company E, while· the remainder struck at G Company
positions in front of the castle. Carrying pole charges,
flame throwers, and knee mortars they fought their way to the
very orest, but before they could surge across they were thrown
back. It was in this attack that Captain Roeder was killed.
During the morning attack he had beenlknocked unconscious and
wounded by a shell fragment, but had refused to go to the aid
station. Previous to thiS, he had been allover the hill,
constantly checking his men, pointing out targets, outlining
new strategy, never sleeping and getting little rest. During'
(i9) A-9
17
the afternoon counterattack he dragged himself to the castle
door and braced against the sill. He had two dead men's
rifles, which he continued to fire at the approach1ng enemy
and ID9 ant1me shouting encouragement and orders to his men.
Re fo~ght until a knee mortar shell burst a rew feet away and
that was the end. His men would not allow h1m to be removed
until the h1ll was securely held. Even in death h1s piesence
was felt. Every man seemed to abso1'b st1'ength from h1s near
ness. The Medal of Hono1' was awarded him posthumously.
The flanking attack directed toward the E Oompany sector
was very successful at first, because the large spur running
toward the f1'ont, on the east side of the mountain, could not
be cove1'ed by smell arms fire since all the company positions
we1'e on the 1'ear slope. Mortar fire normally assigned this
position was not aVailable. Th1s allowed the Germans cOVer
and protection, until they made their assault. At first it
appeared as if the Krauts might overrun Company E's position.
It became so apparent that Oaptain Oussans, the company com
mander asked that artlllery fire be b1'ought down only 25 yards
in front of his own troops.' This proved to be extremely ef
fective and was very instrumental in stopping a reinforced
rush over the h1ll.
On 27 September the Regimental Oommande1' had sensed the
impo1'tance of holding MOUNT BATTAGLIA. The fanatic and con
tinuous efforts of Je1'ry made it obvious. To help alleviate
the situation, he ordered all supporting artillery be given
the 2d Battalion. Also K Oompany from the weary and battered
3d Battalion was ordered forward to the embattled position.
18
They were to be reinforced with all the possible men and mules
in Regimental Headquarters Company. The mules were to be
packed with ammunition, especially hand grenades, K rations
and additional medical supplies. At least one hundred SCR
300 radio batteries would be carried. The Battalion S-4 knew
that to attempt a full scale carry to battle positions was
futile. The A & P Platoon that attempted this on the previous
run had lost a great deal of their vital cargo to enemy mortar
fi~e. It was therefore planned that the mules would go as far
as the high knoll behind HILL 664~where they could not be ob
served, unload, and return for additional supplies. K Com
pany; and the Headquarters elements would hand carry as much
of this load forward as was possible, the rest would be guard
ed. The Headquarters Company men were to make an immediate
return trip carrying litter cases. By now the battalion had
received over one hundred and fifty casualties and the aid sta
tion was a bedlam of human suffering and frus~ration. The
wounded could not be properly cared for even though the bat
talion medics had worked unceasingly and tirelessly ever since
their arrival. Their determined efforts seemed to be beyond
all human physical capabilities. The call to the rear for aid
had not yet been fulfilled. The four miles to the Regimental
CP, where the wounded were being evacuated still presented a
grotesque and horrifying problem. The wounded all seemed to
fear and dread the torturous trip.
At 1930 hours, K Company arrived at the battle positions.
Ammunition was so badly needed that it was immediately distri
buted. A few individuals were sent back for the remainder that
* (See Map E )
19
had been left at HILL 664: Lt. Col. Williamson cammittedK,
Company in the G Company sector_ which was receiving the
heaviest poundings. Tnese reinforcements greatly relieved
the situation and morale seemed to perk up at the sight of
assistance. (21)
Shortly after the counterattack was repelled_ Captain
O'Hara, FO of the 338th Field Artillery Battalion ar-
rived. He immediately started firing concentrations in areas
which Lt. Vergot of the 337th could not cover. This, coupled
with some Corps artillery firing to expected assembly areas
well forward greatly enhanced the battalion's position.
Enemy artillery fire continued throughout the night of
28-29 September while the battalion and Company K worked at
improving their positions and evacuating the wounded.
THIRD DAY AND NIGHT ON MOUNT BATTAGLIA
Dawn approached with the sky enveloped in fog, heavy
clouds and a drizzling rain. At 0700 hours a terrific pre
paration of enemy artillery plastered the entire mountain.
It lasted for approximately thirty minutes and then ·the Ger
mans hit again. The force was estimated to be about a regi
ment in strength. This time they came up the steep north
western slope, aided conSiderably by the enshrouding fog.
By 0900 hours the attack had carried to the crest of the hill.
A rew Jerries actually reached the entrance of the castle_
before they were driven back by hand grenades. The attack
on this side caught the battalion a little off balance_ be
cause most of the artillery concentrations had been placed
(21) 1-9 20
to the front and the right of the mountain. However. the
FOIS and the batteries themselves. were aoolimated to the
situation by now and in short order an acourate and deadly
barrage was falling on the enemy attaoking from the new
direotion. • ~
The story of this attack was the gruesome proximity of
the entire affair. The last hour was all hanP to hand fight
ing. Atter it was over practically every soldier had German
blood dripping from the tip of his bayonet. It was in this
melee that Lt. V~rgot, the 337th Field Artillery Battalion
Fa was badly wounded and his radio operator killed. Regard
less, he refUsed to leave his post and in a hole up near the
oastle wall. he oontinued to direot artillery fire on enemy
oonoentrations. His undauntless oourage greatly aided in
beating off the relentles·s surge. The most vital saviour in
this attaok was the timely arrival of the ammunition brought
forward by K Company the previous day. (22)
Many eX8lllples of intrepid aotions were displayed in this
oounterattaok. Sgt. Leo Beddow. who was partially blinded by
a mortar shell, while manning a position in the oastle, was the
soldier most responsible for keeping the Germans out of the
stronghold. With blood streBllling down his face and his left
arm mangled, he plaoed himself behind a partially blo!O out
inner wall and every time a Kraut got to the door, he let him
have it. After the oounterattack was over, nine dead Germans
were found lying within fifteen yards of the oastle entrance.
(23)
The battalion situation was so serious now. General
(22) A-9 (23) A-9
21
Kendall ordered Colonel Fry to move the entire regiment onto
BATTAGLIA. To protect the right flank and the established
supply route on the ridge line from OARNEVALE an ~ored in
fantry unit of the CGA was ordered forward by the Oorps Com
mander. Two days prior to this Oolonel Fry had made arrange
ments to move his command post to BATTAGLIA. Shortly after
noon on the 29th, he arrived and found Lt. Col. Williamson in
a defiladed area on the west side of the mountain. The tiny
command post group was a sight to behold, several days growth
of beard was on their faces, eyes were sunken, uniforms soaked . .
with mud and blood, spirits down-trodden and nearly broken.
Few words were spoken; the ghastly surroundings told the en
tire story. Lt. Col. Williamson, a very brave and able sol
dier, was obvious glad to have the responsibility of this try
ing ordeal shared with his immediate superior.
Colonel Fry, after a hasty estimate, ordered the 1st Bat
talion and the remaining elements of the 3d Battalion to the
mountain. He radioed regimental command post rear and in
formed the executive officer to move the oommand post forward
to OARNEVALE and to send every available man from Cannon Com
pany, Anti-tank Oompany, Service Company and Regimental Head
quarters Company forward to the battle position with supplies.
They were to bring small arms ammunition, grenades, plasma,
bandages, drugs, dry socks, blankets. shelter halves, and
flame throwers. The movement forward was to be expedited and
controlled by the 2d Battalion S-4, who kneW the route for
ward. The Regimental S-4 was direoted to contact J)ivi·sion
0-4 for immediate resupply of all these critical items. (24)
(24) A-7, p. 6 22
About 1300 hours another concentration of mortar fire
rained steadily on all position areas. It ceased as suddenly
as it had started. This was the same old signal of death; the
defenders knew the Germans would soon materialize out ot the
smoke and tog as soon as the shelling stopped. MUddy~ dis
heveled. determined soldiers rushed trom the cover of the
rocks and scrub-brush on the battalion side ot the hill to
beat the Germans to the crest and start tiring trom positions
along the ridge. . OUr men laid a deadly barrage ot small arms
tire to the tront~ which evidently broke the spirit of the at
tackers tor they quickly withdrew. The battalions fire
4windled as human targets disappeared, to conserve precious
ammuni tion. Miraculously now the sun came out and in less than
fitteen minutes an artillery liaison plane appeared close
overhead. The observer looked dawn into the enemy positions
and promptly adjusted our artillery fire on these areas close
within the enemy lines. our men in their holes could sense
how exposed the Jerries must teel.
In a very short time the fire from their lines ceased.
This was the weakest charge made by the enemy up to date and
the men began to feel that maybe the enemy1s will had been
partially broken. Clear skies allowed the liaison plane to
stay up until dark. The artillery worked with such thorough
ness that any immediate attack by the enemy was considered
very improbable. All during the night Becky~ Susie, Mary
and Daisy were fired intermittently.
Elements 6fthe 1st and 3d Battalions arrived in the bat
tle positions late in the afternoon and were assigned sectors
23
within the already dUg in positions. A Company~ under the
leadership of Lt. Scott was placed in the center of G Com
pany1s sector to give badly needed strength to that point.
Throughout the night things were rather quiet. Haras-.
aing artillery was all that either side could offer.
FOURTH DAY AND NIGHT ON MOUNT BATTAGLIA
At dawn the Germans struck again. This time, with the
aid of a flame thrower a few Germans made it to the castle
but were unable to hold their advantage. In this attempt
both sides took their toll. Colonel Fry~ the Regimental Oom
mander was Wounded, another key artillery observer was killed
and three more company officers were seriously wounded. A
flame thrower that gr~atly aided the German attack was
neutralized by Sgt. Lewis Hamm~ about forty yards from the
castle. He let the operator get close enough to inflict
severe facial burns, but he stuck it out long enough to kill
the operator and his.assistant. After receiving two critical
small arms wounds, he somehow managed to kill the three flame
'thrower protectors. An~ther legendary hero was Sgt. Manuel
Mendoza~ in this encounter he ran to the ridge with his old
reliable tommy gun and as 200 Krauts came charging up the for
Ward slope he raised up in full view of the attackers and
fired point blank into their midst. Ten were killed out
right, about fifteen more wounded~ but the wave came on.
Mendoza grabbed a. dead comrades carbine, emptied two clips in
to their ranks and as a name thrower licked at him, he killed
the operator with a pistol shot. Running slightly to his right
24
rear, he jumped into a machine gun dugout and pushing aside
the dead gunner, sprayed the surviving attackers until the
guns jammed. He then threw hand grenades until the enemy
withdrew from his position. He Was credited with killing at
least thirty Germans before he was seriously wounded and
evacuated. (25)
By 0945 hours, after fighting at ranges so close that
supporting artillery could give little aid, the Germans were
again beaten back. For the remainder of the day they pro
ceeded to plaster the regimental position with little fear of
artillery retaliation, because of continuous fog and rain.
our FOIS could not see 200 yards and sound echos were too un-
reliable for counterbattery. Our' men still held the moun-
tain, but only at great cost of American lives. Enemy high
angle fire took ~ts toll one by one. At 1000 hours a Company
with only thirty five men left had to be relieved by A Com-
pany. Gases of exhaustion were becoming alarmingly numerous.
The only gratifying factor was a good supply 'of ammunition
and 0 rations that were now plentiful thanks to the tireless I
efforts of those operating the supply lines. The real ad
ministrative problem was the evacuation of the wounded. The
enemy were still shelling the ridge route to the rear and one
litter party of fifteen wounded was caught in a barrage just
100 yards from HILL 664, which Was out of enemy range. Ten
of the wounded managed to crawl to cover but the other five
were killed outright. (26) Litter stations were set up by
the night of the 29th and hauls stretched from two to ten
miles. (27) Somehow the medics kept going, they were as de-
(25) (26) (27)
A-7, p.' 7 A-9 A-7, p. 8
25
terroined as their comrades on the hill and with little help
from higher units they delivered their precious burdens to
the rear stations, ambulance points and hospitals.
LAST DAY OF FIGHTING ON MOUNT BATTAGLIA
The last major counterattack on I October came as all
the others had, right on the heels of a heavy preparation, and
early ·in the morning, so the attackers would be protected ~
the heavy fog and the semidarkness of the early hours. This
a;ppeared to be a final effort for in the attack were Grena
diers, Armored Infantry, and newly arrived paratroopers.
Their success was premature and of very short duration. Some
of the paratroopers managed to get near the castle, but those
who did, never lived to tell how, for" they were all killed
in their last fanatic rush. The intensity of this assault
waned rapidly and in less than an hour JerI7 realized that
his attack had failed. His artillery and mortar fire dropped
on the hill to cover the withdrawal of his few remaining
survivors. With clear skies in the afternoon our artilleI7
really pounded the German positions and for the first time
our threat of counterbattery fire reduced the volume of enemy
shelling to nil.
Now that the 1st and 5d Battalions were fi~y in posi
tion and with the British moving up to protect the right
flank, the Germans realized that to recapture this prize ter
rain feature which they so unwisely failed to defend, would
be an impossibility.
A few minor encounters occurred the following day, but
26
the big news was the fact the Cold Stream Guards of a British
Brigade were on their way to relieve the regiment. By after
noon of 3 October, the 2d Battalion was relieved and on its
way to the rear for its first hot meal in seven days.
To sum up the results of this battle: The 2d Battalion,
350th Infantry through surprise, speed and determined effort
captured a very critical terrain feature without the loss of
a single man. It's importance was very significant in that it
forced the Germans to reshuffle their entire front and in so
dOing weakened other strong points along their defensive line.
On 2 October, the 350thrnfantry was able to positively
identify elements of the 334th Grenadier Division brought over
from the 34th Division front, the 44th Grenadiers from op
posite 10th Corps, elements of the 715th and 305th Grenadier
Divisions from the 13th Corps, one large unit of the 98th
Grenadier Division from the ADRIATIC coast, plus paratroopers
who were brought forward from positions deep in enemy ter
ritory.
The Germans fully realized the importance of keeping us
off the last heights before BOLOGNA and the PO VALLEY. To lose
them might mean a mass break through that could never be stop
ped. OUr own Army and Corps Headquarters watched the 350th
spearhead with anxiety. for all felt the fate of the APENNINE
drive depended on this success. Everyone realized the impor
tance of holding BATTAGLIA.
Enemy losses were unknown, but it was estimated that at
least a thousand were killed and two thousand wounded. our losses. in the defense, were extremely high. Seven company
27
grade officers were killed, twelve were wounded seriously
and three others were psycho cases. The toll of enlisted
men was about three hundred killed and five hundred wounded
during the eight da7 occupation. These losses were nearly
as large as the entire II Corps for this period. Ammunition
expenditures included 6uOO hand grenades, 15,000 rounds of
artillery., 3000 rounds of 60mm mortar,· use of three flame
throwers, and about 1,000,000 rounds of small arms. (30)
It was now the "Battle Mountain" Regiment. (English
. translation of the Italian "MOUNT BATTAGLIA") This hard-won
and well-earned nickname will ever be proudly worn by the
outfit that stormed the portals of the PO RIVER VALLEY.
For its gallant and historic stand the 2nd Battalion,
350th Infantry was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation by
General Mark W.Clark, Commanding General of the Fifth Army,
on 17 January 1945.
ANAYLSIS AND CRITICISM
1. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION
The greatest difficulty in holding BATTAGLIA was ·the
poor facilities available for s~pply and evacuation. Mules
were the only means of transport and due to enemy fire on the
only trail forward, it was necessary to hand carryall supplies
approximately two miles. Advance plans could not be made be-
()o) A-6, G-4 Log
28
,
cause enemy and terrain information was practically non
existent. Had it been known in advance that the enemy did
not occupy, CARNEVALE and BATTAGLIA. in foooe, a large supplyJ i
train could have been sent forward with the leading echelons
on the f~rst day. 81 mm mortar fire which would have been
very helpful, could never be used because ammunition was
never aVailable. The ammunition supply was so critical be
fore K Company's arrival on the night of the 28th, that had
the Germans been able to launch one more counterattack the 2d
Battalion would probably have been thrown off the mountain.
Previously every dead or wounded man was stripped of every
available weapon and round of ammunition. Had it been pos
sible, airplane drops would have been the ideal thing for
supply; however, fog, rain and cloudy weather would have limit
ed this type of operation. Water and food in sufficient quan
tities was neVer adequate, this greatly reduced the fighting
efficiency of all ,the men. Evacuation could not possibly keep
pace with casualties. Few of the dead could be removed from
the forward area. Many died because there was inadequate
personnel and means to properly care for them. 'fhe dead had
to be piled along the trail for future evacuation, which had
a very definite effect on the morale of the troops. Many of
the walking wounded were lost trying to reach the rear. Nor
mal collecting pOints could not be established. The medics
available did save many lives, but only through inhuman ef
forts of all concerned. The Battalion Medical Officer, Cap
tain Stoner worked steadily without sleep for four consecu
tive days and nights.
29
2 •• FAILURE OF ADJACENT UNITS TO ADVANCE
The failure of the unit on the right, the XIII Corps,
to keep abreast of the battalion, caused a long-nosed salient.
On this point, all aVailable enemy artllle17 and mortar fire
was placed without fear. of counterbatte17 or observation.
The enemy was looking into our position from three sides.
Shifting of their fires was hardly necessQ17 because all our
troops were concentrated in such a small area. Nothing inter
fered with their fire, observation, maneuverability or com
munication. In addition to receiving this deadly fire from
the adjacent sectors, the troops that were initially intended
for units on our right and left were moved into our area to
assault the battalion's position.
Had adjacent units stayed abreast of the 2d Battalion,
the enemy never could have concentrated these fires. However,
these movements and Shifts of enemy personnel and weapons,
materially weakened other sectors of the enemy line and
caused a noticeable strain on his fighting efficiency.
3. CONDUCT OF THE BATTALION DEFENSE
Factors that are universally accepted as necessary in .
prepared defensive positions, did not exist. Covering forces,
reconnaissance elements, flexibility of fires, deception,
mobility and combined secrecy, were an impossibility. !his
was a fault of higher headquarters. They continually ordered
this unit forward, never tully realizing its limitations or
capabilities. Only the courageous tenacity of the occupying
troops and the flexibility of the supporting arti1le17, kept
the Germans off the MOUNTAIN. Fire support of regimental
30
weapons was nonexistant. The troops ne.ver had adequate
tools or engineering equipment to organize their pOSitions
for a defense. Foxholes were very difficult to dig due to
the rocky ground. Explosives would have been a great aid
in this task.
There Was no such thing as a Final Protective Line. It
Was a question of who would survive the high angle fire bar
rage and then be able to man his weapons and fire it effective
ly. Reserves were only a term. Every available man filled a
front line position.
4. SUPPORTING WEAPONS
Supporting weapons are absolutely necessary in mountain
fighting. Mortar. artillery and grenades are needed to keep
the enemy out of a battle position. The sharp relief of
mountains affords the enemy protection from small arms fire
and in most cases allows them to approach in large numbers
wi thin very close distances before making an assault. Horse
or mule artillery would be a great addition to any mountain
fighting unit. The howitzer is the best. for the 75mm and
l05mm used by the 337th and 338th Field Artillery Battalions
were indespensable. Effectiveness of enemy counterbattery
is diminished, due to the difficulty of locating batteries.
Lack of 4.2, 8lmm and 60mm mortar fire in this operation cost
the ,battalion many lives and much anxiety.
Observation posts must. be manned immediately and where
practicable concentrations registered in advance.
5. !HE BATTALION OBJECTIVE
For unknown reasons the Germans never occupied MOUNT
31
BATTAGLIA. Had they done so, with a reinforced company, the
battalion never could have taken it. Under normal circum
stances it was not too large for a battalion to hold. The
fact that a~jacent units on both flanks and the front were
free to fire all their weapons on this point was the main
reason for its vulnerability. Its steep slopes and lone ridge
line made approach very difficult. If the battalion had been
at full strength and had the use of its supporting weapons,
the situation would never have been so critical. The regi
ment was such a protruding salient all elements should have
been kept close together. MUtual support is imperative.
Therefore assigned objectives should be more l1m1ted. Be
cause our units were so scattered, the Germans could have
worn down the 2d Battalion by artillery and mortar fire, and
then, by means of a coordinated attack plan, cut the ridge
trail, which was the only life line to the rear, and eventual
ly annihilate the entire occupying force.
Had the 3d Battalion been able to move to the assistance
of the 2d Battalion on the first day all around security could
have been built up and forward patrols could have been sent
forward to keep in touch with the enemy. This would have been
invaluable in knowing when and where he would counterattack.
6. ENEMY ASSAULTS
Enemy positions around BATTAGLIA were constantly chang
ing. Assembly areas were usually made on the bottom of the
eastern slope in heavily wooded sectors. Assaults always
followed the heavy barrages and most of the attacks were made
up the eastern side. This slope was more gradual and seemed
32
to afford greater ease of movement and control. Coordinated
attacks were tried on two occasions but lack of necessary
planning or preparation caused them to fail. Their fine ob-
servation points all around the battalions position made
their high angle fire very accurate. Practically every round
fell in the battle position.
Assaults were made in waves of thirty to forty men at a
time. This piece meal method was never changed. It was an
asset to our defense because once the enemy gained the rear
slops our fields of fire were limited and ejecting is more
difficult than stopping.
7. ENEMY INFORMATION
Lack of enemy and terrain information, caused this bat-
talion considerable uneasiness, surprise, awilmlnerability
to enemy attack. Determined aggressiveness by higher head-
quarters is understandable, but adequate information should
be furnished front line troops, especially that regarding
enemy strength and disposition. The 2d Battalion was ordered
forward by commanders who were uninformed of the capabilities
or limitations of the enemy or their own attacking force.
In mountain warfare essential elements of information should
be gathered well in advance and given to the attacking troops
before any operation.
LESSONS
1. Logistic support for attacking units, especially in
mountainous terrain, must be adequate, well planned and flex-
ible.
33
2. Where possible, air support should be given to all
attacking units to aid in supply, fire power and observation.
3. Speed and surprise are the most vital and essential
elements in an attack.
4. Reverse. slope defense is desirable in mountain
areas, because it denies the enemy observation; it protects
troops from small arms fire; it is easier to control units;
and it allows greater freedom of movement.
5. Mutual support should be afforded front line attack-
ing units, especially along the flanks.
6. Pack artillery is needed in mountain warfare.
7. All front line units should be supplied with up-to-
date accurate maps.
8. Radio is adequate communication if sufficient sets
and batteries are on hand..
34