of 29
8/13/2019 Starbucks. v. Wolfes Borough Coffee
1/29
12364cv
StarbucksCorp.v.WolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.
UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS1
FORTHESECONDCIRCUIT2
3
4
AugustTerm,20125
6
(Argued:January9,2013 Decided:November15,2013)7
8
DocketNo.12364cv9
10
X11
12
STARBUCKSCORPORATION,aWashingtoncorporation,13
STARBUCKSU.S.BRANDSLLC,14
15
PlaintiffsCounterDefendantsAppellants,16
17
v.18
19
WOLFESBOROUGH
COFFEE,
INC.,
a
New
Hampshire20
corporation,d/b/aBLACKBEARMICROROASTERY,21
22
DefendantCounterClaimantAppellee.23
24
X25
26
Before:KATZMANN,ChiefJudge,KEARSEandLOHIER,CircuitJudges.2728
This
is
an
appeal
by
the
plaintiffs
from
a
decision
of
the
United
States29
DistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(Swain,J.)followinga30
secondremandfromthisCourt. TheDistrictCourtconcludedthatplaintiffshave31
failedtoprovethatdefendantsuseofitsMisterCharbucksandCharbucks32
BlendmarksislikelytodiluteplaintiffsfamousStarbucksmarks,anddenied33
injunctiverelief. WeholdthattheDistrictCourtdidnotclearlyerrinanyofits34
factualdeterminations,includingitsevaluationofthesixnonexclusivefactors35
bearingonwhetheramarkislikelytocausedilutionbyblurring,enumeratedin36
theFederalTrademarkDilutionActof1995,asamendedbytheTrademark37
8/13/2019 Starbucks. v. Wolfes Borough Coffee
2/29
DilutionRevisionActof2006. See15U.S.C.1125(c)(2)(B)(i)(vi). Balancing1
thosefactorsdenovo,weagreewiththeDistrictCourtthatplaintiffshavefailed2
todemonstratealikelihoodofdilutionbyblurring. Accordingly,weAFFIRM.34
DAVIDE.SIPIORA,MatthewChristian5Holohan,
Kilpatrick
Townsend
&
Stockton6
LLP,Denver,CO,forPlaintiffsCounter7DefendantsAppellants.8
9
JOHNMARKTURNER,ChristopherCole,10Sheehan,Phinney,Bass+Green,P.A.,11Manchester,NH,forDefendantCounter12ClaimantAppellee.13
14
LOHIER,CircuitJudge:15
StarbucksCorporationandStarbucksU.S.BrandsLLC(together,16
Starbucks)appealfromajudgmentoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe17
SouthernDistrictofNewYork(Swain,J.)denyingStarbucksrequestforan18
injunctionpursuanttotheFederalTrademarkDilutionActof1995(FTDA),1519
U.S.C.1125(c),prohibitingWolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.,doingbusinessas20
BlackBear
Micro
Roastery
(Black
Bear),
from
using
Black
Bears
Mister21
Charbucks,Mr.Charbucks,andCharbucksBlendmarks(theCharbucks22
Marks). Afterabenchtrialfollowedbyadditionalbriefingfromtheparties23
uponremandfromthisCourt,theDistrictCourtconcludedthatStarbucksfailed24
toprovethattheCharbucksMarksarelikelytodiluteStarbucksfamous25
Starbucksmarks(theStarbucksMarks)anddeniedStarbucksrequestforan26
injunction.27
Onappeal,StarbucksarguesthattheDistrictCourterredinfindingonly28
minimalsimilarityandweakevidenceofactualassociationbetweenthe29
CharbucksMarksandtheStarbucksMarks. Starbucksalsocontendsthatthe30
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DistrictCourterredinbalancingthestatutorydilutionfactorsbygivingno1
weightatalltothreeofthefactorsthestrongdistinctiveness,exclusiveuse,and2
highdegreeofrecognitionoftheStarbucksMarksandplacingundueweighton3
theminimalsimilaritybetweenthemarks.4
Forthefollowingreasons,weconcludethattheDistrictCourtdidnoterr5
initsfactualfindings,and,balancingthestatutoryfactorsdenovo,weagreewith6
theDistrictCourtthatStarbucksfailedtoprovealikelihoodofdilution. We7
thereforeaffirm.8
BACKGROUND9
Weassumefamiliaritywiththeunderlyingfactsandlongprocedural10
historyofthecase,whicharesetforthinourpreviousopinions,StarbucksCorp.11
v.WolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.,477F.3d765(2dCir.2007)(StarbucksII),and12
StarbucksCorp.v.WolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.,588F.3d97(2dCir.2009)13
(StarbucksIV). Werecountthemhereonlyasnecessarytoexplainour14
dispositionofthisappeal.115
Asof2005,whenthebenchtrialoccurred,Starbuckshadgrownfroma16
singlecoffeeshopinSeattlein1971toasingularlyprominentglobalpurveyorof17
specialtycoffeeandcoffeeproducts,with8,700retaillocationsworldwideand18
revenuesof$5.3billionforfiscalyear2004. StarbucksU.S.Brandsistheowner,19
andStarbucks
Corporation
a
licensee,
of
at
least
56
valid
United
States
trademark20
registrationsthatincludetheStarbucksMarks. TheStarbucksMarksare21
1ThefollowingfactualrecitationreflectsthepartiespresentationtotheDistrict
Court.
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displayedonsignsandatmultiplelocationsineachStarbucksstore,aswellason1
theStarbuckswebsite.2
Starbuckshasdevotedsubstantialtime,effort,andmoneytoadvertising3
andpromotingtheStarbucksMarks. Fromfiscalyear2000to2003,Starbucks4
spentover$136milliononadvertising,promotion,andrelatedmarketing5
activities,essentiallyallofwhichfeaturedtheStarbucksMarks. Starbucks6
activelypolicestheStarbucksMarks,demandingthatinfringingusesbe7
terminatedand,wherenecessary,commencinglitigation.2 WellbeforeBlackBear8
usedthe
term
Charbucks
as
part
of
any
product
name,
the
Starbucks
Marks9
werefamouswithinthemeaningoftheFTDA. See15U.S.C.1125(c)(2)(A).10
BlackBearmanufacturesandsellsroastedcoffeebeansandrelatedgoods11
viamailandinternetorder,atalimitednumberofNewEnglandsupermarkets,12
andatasingleNewHampshireretailoutlet. In1997BlackBeardevelopeda13
coffeeblendnamedCharbucksBlend;itnowsellsadarkroastcoffeecalled14
MisterCharbucksorMr.Charbucks. WhenBlackBearbeganmanufacturing15
coffeeusingtheCharbucksMarks,itwasawareoftheStarbucksMarks. Oneof16
2ThreeweeksafteroralargumentbeforethisCourt,BlackBearmovedforleave
tofileasupplementalstatementconcerninginjunctiverelief. Thestatement
representedthatBlackBearscounselhadlearnedthatStarbuckshadpermitted
anothercoffeeroastertomarketaCharbuckscoffee. BlackBearnotedthatthis
newinformation
would
bear
on
whether
injunctive
relief
should
be
granted,
werewetoreversetheDistrictCourt. Starbucksopposedthemotion,statingthat
theletterindicatingthatStarbuckswouldpermittheotherroastertomarket
Charbuckscoffeewassentinerrorandthat,afterBlackBearfileditsmotion,
Starbuckshadsentaceaseanddesistlettertotheotherroaster. Becausewe
affirmthejudgmentoftheDistrictCourt,wedenyBlackBearsmotionforleave
tofileasmootandacceptthestipulatedfactthatStarbuckspolicesitsmarks.
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thereasonsBlackBearusedthetermCharbuckswasthepublicperceptionthat1
Starbucksroasteditsbeansunusuallydarkly.2
SoonafterBlackBearbegantosellCharbucksBlend,Starbucksdemanded3
thatitceaseusingtheCharbucksMarks. BlackBearneverthelesscontinuedto4
sellcoffeeundertheCharbucksMarks,andin2001Starbucksstartedthisaction5
claiming,amongotherthings,trademarkdilutioninviolationof15U.S.C.6
1125(c),1127.37
TheDistrictCourtheldatwodaybenchtrialinMarch2005. Attrial,two8
mattersof
significance
to
this
appeal
occurred.
First,
Black
Bears
founder,
James9
O.ClarkIII,testifiedthatthenameCharbuckshadpreviouslybeenused10
duringthecoffeewarsinBostonbetweenStarbucksandtheCoffee11
Connection,aBostonbasedcompany.4 Second,Starbucksintroducedthe12
testimonyofWarrenJ.Mitofsky,ascientistinthefieldofconsumerresearchand13
polling. Mitofskyexplainedtheresultsofatelephonesurveyhehadconducted14
ofsixhundredparticipants,designedtoberepresentativeoftheUnitedStates15
3Starbucksalsoassertedclaimsoftrademarkinfringementinviolationof15
U.S.C.1114(1);unfaircompetitioninviolationof15U.S.C.1125(a);trademark
dilutioninviolationofNewYorkGeneralBusinessLaw360l;deceptiveacts
andbusinesspracticesandfalseadvertisinginviolationofNewYorkGeneral
BusinessLaw349,350;andunfaircompetitioninviolationofNewYork
commonlaw. Alloftheseclaimsweredismissedduringthecourseofthissuit
andare
not
the
subject
of
this
appeal.
4TheCoffeeConnectionapparentlynolongerexistsasanindependentcompany.
SeeStarbucksPlanstoAcquireCoffeeConnection,NewYorkTimes(March16,
1994),availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/16/business/companynewsstarbucksplansto
acquirecoffeeconnection.html.
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population. Thesurveyfoundthatwhenasked,Whatisthefirstthingthat1
comestoyourmindwhenyouhearthenameCharbucks,spelledCHARBU2
CKS?,30.5percentofparticipantsansweredStarbucks,while9percent3
answeredcoffee.5 Whentheparticipantswereasked,Canyounameany4
companyorstorethatyouthinkmightofferaproductcalledCharbucks?,3.15
percentrespondedStarbucks,andanother1.3percentrespondedcoffee6
house.6 Mitofskyconcludedthat[t]henumberoneassociationofthename7
CharbucksinthemindsofconsumersiswiththebrandStarbucks.8
Commentingon
the
scope
of
his
survey,
Mitofsky
also
stated:
[I]f
you
want
to9
knowthereactiontothenameCharbucks,thenthetelephoneisperfectly10
adequate. Ifyouwanttomeasurethereactionorthefamiliaritywithothervisual11
cues,thenitsnottherightmethod. StarbucksIV,588F.3dat104.12
InDecember2005theDistrictCourtruledinfavorofBlackBearand13
dismissedStarbuckscomplaint. SeeStarbucksCorp.v.WolfesBoroughCoffee,14
Inc.,No.01Civ.5981,2005WL3527126(S.D.N.Y.Dec.23,2005)(StarbucksI).15
TheDistrictCourtdeterminedthattherewasneitheractualdilution,which16
5Othercommonresponsesincludedbarbequeorcharcoal(7.9percent);
restaurantor
grill
(7.5
percent);
meat,
steak,
or
hamburger
(4.6
percent);andmoney(3.9percent).
6Morepopularresponsestothissecondquestionincluded:grocerystore(18.3
percent);discountstore(16.9percent);restaurant(7.0percent);department
store(4.8percent);andhardwarestoreorhomeimprovementstore(3.7
percent).
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wouldestablishaviolationoffederaltrademarklaw,7noralikelihoodof1
dilution,whichwouldestablishaviolationofNewYorktrademarklaw.2
Starbucksappealed. Whiletheappealwaspending,Congresspassedthe3
TrademarkDilutionRevisionActof2006(TDRA),whichamendedtheFTDA4
toclarifythattheownerofafamousmarkseekinganinjunctionneedproveonly5
thatthedefendantsmarkislikelytocausedilution...ofthefamousmark,6
regardlessofthepresenceorabsenceofactualorlikelyconfusion,ofcompetition,7
orofactualeconomicinjury. 15U.S.C.1125(c)(1). TheTDRAfurther8
redefineddilution
by
blurring
as
association
arising
from
the
similarity9
betweenamarkortradenameandafamousmarkthatimpairsthe10
distinctivenessofthefamousmark. Id.1125(c)(2)(B). Thestatuteprovidesthe11
followingdirectiontocourts:12
Indeterminingwhetheramarkortradenameislikely13tocausedilutionbyblurring,thecourtmayconsiderall14relevantfactors,includingthefollowing:15
16
(i)Thedegreeofsimilaritybetweenthemarkor17tradenameandthefamousmark.18
19
(ii)Thedegreeofinherentoracquired20distinctivenessofthefamousmark.21
22
(iii)Theextenttowhichtheownerofthefamous23markisengaginginsubstantiallyexclusiveuseof24themark.25
26
7Atthetime,federallawprovided:Theownerofafamousmarkshallbe
entitled...toaninjunctionagainstanotherpersonscommercialusein
commerceofamarkortradename,ifsuchusebeginsafterthemarkhasbecome
famousandcausesdilutionofthedistinctivequalityofthemark.... 15U.S.C.
1125(c)(1)(1999)(amended2006)(emphasisadded).
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(iv)Thedegreeofrecognitionofthefamous1mark.2
3
(v)Whethertheuserofthemarkortradename4intendedtocreateanassociationwiththefamous5
mark.67
(vi)Anyactualassociationbetweenthemarkor8tradenameandthefamousmark.9
10
Id. Inlightofthischangeinthegoverninglaw,wevacatedthejudgmentofthe11
DistrictCourtandremandedforfurtherproceedings. StarbucksII,477F.3dat12
766.13
Onremand,
after
further
briefing,
the
District
Court
again
ruled
in
Black14
Bearsfavorforsubstantiallythesamereasonssetforthinitsearlieropinion,but15
italsoanalyzedthefederaldilutionclaiminlightoftheTDRA. SeeStarbucks16
Corp.v.WolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.,559F.Supp.2d472,47579(S.D.N.Y.2008)17
(StarbucksIII). Inparticular,theDistrictCourtconsideredthesixnon18
exclusivefactorslistedinthestatuteandmadethefollowingfindings: (1)the19
markswereminimallysimilar,whichthecourtdeemedalonesufficienttodefeat20
Starbucksclaim;(2)(a)thedistinctivenessoftheStarbucksMarks,(b)the21
exclusivityoftheirusebyStarbucks,and(c)theirhighdegreeofrecognition,all22
weighedinfavorofStarbucks;(3)theintentfactorweighedinBlackBearsfavor23
becauseBlackBearsintenttocreateanassociationwiththeStarbucksMarksdid24
notconstitute
bad
faith;
and
(4)
evidence
from
Mitofskys
survey
was25
insufficienttomaketheactualconfusionfactorweighin[Starbucks]favorto26
anysignificantdegree. Id.at47778(quotationmarksomitted). Balancingall27
sixfactors,theDistrictCourtheldthattherecordwasinsufficientto28
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demonstratetherequisitelikelihoodthattheassociationarisingfromthe1
similarityofthecoretermsislikelytoimpairthedistinctivenessofStarbucks2
mark,andPlaintiffisnotentitledtoinjunctivereliefunderthatstatute. Id.at3
478.4
Starbucksappealedagain,arguingthattheDistrictCourterredinfinding5
thattheCharbucksMarksarenotlikelytodilutetheStarbucksMarks. In6
StarbucksIV,weexaminedtheDistrictCourtsfindingsastothefirst,fifth,and7
sixthfactors,aswellasitsbalancingofthestatutoryfactorsthatbearonthe8
likelihoodof
dilution
by
blurring.
We
held
that
the
District
Court
did
not9
clearlyerrinfindingthattheCharbucksMarkswereminimallysimilartothe10
StarbucksMarks,588F.3dat106,becausethecontextoftheCharbucksMarks11
(onBlackBearspackaging,onitswebsite,andinthephrasesCharbucksBlend12
andMisterCharbucks)differentiatedthemfromthefamousmarks. We13
concluded,however,thattheDistrictCourterredtotheextentitrequired14
substantialsimilaritybetweenthemarks,id.at107,andwesuggestedthatthe15
DistrictCourthadoveremphasizedthesimilarityfactor. Inparticular,westated16
thattheinclusionofthedegreeofsimilarityasonlyoneofsixfactorsinthe17
revisedstatuteindicatesthatevenalowdegreeofsimilaritywouldnot18
categoricallybaradilutionbyblurringclaim. Id.at108.19
Turningto
the
fifth
and
sixth
factorsintent
to
associate
and
actual20
associationweheldthattheDistrictCourthaderredbyrequiringbadfaithto21
findthattheintenttoassociatefactorfavoredStarbucks. Id.at109(quotation22
marksomitted). Notingthesurveyresults,whichdemonstratedsomedegreeof23
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associationbetweenCharbucksandStarbucks,wealsoheldthattheDistrict1
Courterredbyrelyingonevidencesupportingtheabsenceofactualconfusion2
toconcludethattheactualassociationfactordidnotweighinStarbucksfavor3
toanysignificantdegree. Id.(quotationmarksomitted). Theabsenceofactual4
orlikelyconfusion,wereasoned,doesnotbeardirectlyonwhetherdilutionis5
likely. Id.6
Emphasizingthattheanalysisofadilutionbyblurringclaimmust7
ultimatelyfocusonwhetheranassociation,arisingfromthesimilaritybetween8
thesubject
marks,
impairs
the
distinctiveness
of
the
famous
mark,
id.
(quoting9
15U.S.C.1125(c)(2)(B)),wevacatedthejudgmentoftheDistrictCourtand10
remandedforreconsiderationoftheclaiminlightofourdiscussionsofthefirst,11
fifth,andsixthstatutoryfactors,id.at10910.12
Initsopinionandorderfollowingthatremand,seeStarbucksCorp.v.13
WolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.,No.01Civ.5981,2011WL6747431(S.D.N.Y.Dec.14
23,2011)(StarbucksV),theDistrictCourtrecognizedthatthesecondthrough15
fifthstatutoryfactors8favoredStarbucks. Id.at*3(citingStarbucksIV,588F.3d16
at10610). Butthecourtagainfoundthatthefirstfactor(thesimilarityofthe17
marks)favoredBlackBearbecausethemarkswereonlyminimallysimilarwhen18
presentedincommercethatis,whentheCharbucksMarksareviewedonthe19
8Forconvenience,werepeatthosefactorshere:(ii)thedistinctivenessofthe
StarbucksMarks;(iii)theexclusivityofStarbucksuseofitsmarks;(iv)thehigh
degreeofrecognitionoftheStarbucksMarks;and(v)BlackBearsintentto
associatetheCharbucksMarkswiththeStarbucksMarks.
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packaging,whichincludesthephrasesCharbucksBlendorMister1
Charbucks. Id.2
Asforthesixthfactor(actualassociation),theDistrictCourtacknowledged3
thattheresultsoftheMitofskysurveyconstituteevidenceofactualassociation,4
id.at*4,butitthensignificantlydiscountedthoseresultsonthegroundthatthe5
surveyinquiredintoassociationsonlywiththeisolatedwordCharbucksand6
failedtopresenttheCharbucksMarksinfullcontext,id. Thecourtalso7
comparedthesurveyresultsinthiscasewiththoseinothercases. Here,itnoted,8
only30.5
percent
of
respondents
associated
Charbucks
with
Starbucks,
while9
inothertradedilutioncases70percentto90percentofsurveyrespondents10
associatedtherelevantmarks. Id. TheDistrictCourtalsocomparedthe3.111
percentofrespondentswhothoughtaproductcalledCharbuckswouldbe12
madebyStarbuckstothe28percentofrespondentswhomadeasimilarorigin13
associationinaNinthCircuittrademarkdilutioncase. Id.(citingJadaToys,Inc.14
v.Mattel,Inc.,518F.3d628,636(9thCir.2008)). Withthebenefitofthese15
comparisons,theDistrictCourtfoundthattheactualassociationfactorweighs16
nomorethanminimallyinStarbucksfavor. Id.17
Inevaluatingthelikelihoodofdilution,theDistrictCourtemphasizedthe18
associationandsimilarityfactors. CitingtheTDRAsdefinitionofdilution19
byblurring
as
association
arising
from
the
similarity
between
a
mark
or
trade20
nameandafamousmarkthatimpairsthedistinctivenessofthefamousmark,21
theDistrictCourtexplainedthat[t]hestatutorylanguageleavesnodoubtthat22
thesetwofactorsareobviouslyimportant. Id.at*5(quoting15U.S.C.23
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1125(c)(2)(B)). Afterbalancingallsixfactors,theDistrictCourtheldthat1
Starbuckshadfailedtomeetitsburdenofshowingthatitwasentitledto2
injunctiverelief:3
[T]heCharbucksmarksareonlyweaklyassociatedwiththe4minimallysimilarStarbucksmarksand,thus,arenotlikelytoimpair5thedistinctivenessofthefamousStarbucksmarks.Inotherwords,6[Starbucks]hasfailedtocarryitsburdenofprovingthat[Black7Bears]useofitsmarks,asevidencedontherecordbeforetheCourt,8islikelytocausedilutionbyblurring.9
10
Id.at*6.11
Onappeal,Starbuckschallengesboththefactualfindingsofminimal12
similarityandweakassociationandtheconclusionthatitfailedtodemonstratea13
likelihoodofdilution.14
DISCUSSION15
A. HistoryofFederalTrademarkDilutionLaw16
Federallawallowstheownerofafamousmarktoenjoinapersonfrom17
usinga
mark
or
trade
name
in
commerce
that
is
likely
to
cause
dilution
by18
blurringordilutionbytarnishmentofthefamousmark. Tiffany(NJ)Inc.v.19
eBayInc.,600F.3d93,11011(2dCir.2010)(quoting15U.S.C.1125(c)(1)).20
Dilutionbyblurringisthewhittlingawayoftheestablishedtrademarksselling21
powerandvaluethroughitsunauthorizedusebyothers. Id.at111(alteration22
andquotationmarksomitted).23
DilutionbyblurringasacauseofactionwaschampionedinitiallybyFrank24
Schechterina1927lawjournalarticle. SeeFrankI.Schechter,TheRationalBasis25
ofTrademarkProtection,40Harv.L.Rev.813(1927). Schechterarguedthata26
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markbothsymbolizesexistinggoodwillandcangenerategoodwill. Id.at8191
(Themarkactuallysellsthegoods. And,selfevidently,themoredistinctivethe2
mark,themoreeffectiveisitssellingpower.). Socalled[t]rademarkpirates,3
Schechterexplained,stoppedshortofinfringingmarksinfavorofusingmarks4
similartowellknownmarksonnoncompetinggoods,suchasKodakbicycles,5
RollsRoyceradiotubes,andBeechNutcigarettes. Id.at825. Schechter6
describedtheinjuryinthesecasesas7
thegradualwhittlingawayordispersionoftheidentity8andholduponthepublicmindofthemarkornameby9
itsuse
upon
non
competing
goods.
The
more10
distinctiveoruniquethemark,thedeeperisitsimpress11uponthepublicconsciousness,andthegreateritsneed12forprotectionagainstvitiationordissociationfromthe13particularproductinconnectionwithwhichithasbeen14used.15
16
Id. Somewhatmorevividlyinlatercongressionaltestimony,Schechterwarned17
thatifyouallowRollsRoycerestaurantsandRollsRoycecafeterias,andRolls18
Roycepants,
and
Rolls
Royce
candy,
in
10
years
you
will
not
have
the
Rolls19
Roycemarkanymore. TradeMarks:HearingsHeldBeforetheH.Comm.on20
Patents,72dCong.15(1932)(statementofFrankI.Schechter),quotedinWalterJ.21
Derenberg,TheProblemofTrademarkDilutionandtheAntidilutionStatutes,4422
Cal.L.Rev.439,449(1956).23
HeedingSchechterswarning,someStatespassedantidilutionstatutes.24
See4J.ThomasMcCarthy,McCarthyonTrademarksandUnfairCompetition25
24:77(4thed.2012)(McCarthy);Derenberg,supra,at45261. Forexample,the26
legislativehistoryofNewYorksantidilutionstatutedisclosedaneedfor27
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legislationtopreventsuchhypotheticalanomaliesasDupontshoes,Buick1
aspirintablets,Schlitzvarnish,Kodakpianos,Bulovagowns,andsoforth.2
MeadDataCent.,Inc.v.ToyotaMotorSales,U.S.A.,Inc.,875F.2d1026,1031(2d3
Cir.1989)(quoting1954N.Y.Legis.Ann.4950). Butthepredictableresultof4
thesedesultoryeffortsbyvariousStatestopassantidilutionlawswasanuneven5
regulatorypatchworkofprotection. SeeS.Rep.No.100515,at7(1988),6
reprintedin1988U.S.C.C.A.N.5577,5583. Congressfirstaddressedthatproblem7
in1996,whenitenactedtheFTDA,whichentitledanyownerofafamousmark8
toan
injunction
against
another
persons
commercial
use
in
commerce
of
a
mark9
ortradename,ifsuchusebeginsafterthemarkhasbecomefamousandcauses10
dilutionofthedistinctivequalityofthemark.... 15U.S.C.1125(c)(1)(1996).911
In2003,however,theSupremeCourtdecidedMoseleyv.VSecret12
Catalogue,Inc.,537U.S.418(2003),whichheldthattheFTDArequiredaplaintiff13
toproveactualdilution,notsimplyalikelihoodofdilution,inorderto14
establishatrademarkdilutionclaim. Id.at433. Inresponse,theInternational15
TrademarkAssociation(INTA),aprimaryadvocatefortheFTDA,supporteda16
congressionalamendmenttoabrogateMoseley. Theproposedamendment,17
9ThelegislativehistoryofafailedearlierversionoftheFTDAstronglysuggests
thatthelawwasspecificallyintendedtocomeintoplaywherethe
unauthorizeduse
by
others,
on
dissimilar
products
for
which
the
trademark
is
notregistered,dilutesthedistinctivenessof[a]famouswork. Sen.Judiciary
Comm.Rep.onS.1883,S.Rep.No.100515,at7(citingexamplesofKodak
pianosandBuickaspirin);seeMcCarthy24:96([T]otheextentthatthe
languageisthesame,theSenateJudiciaryReportof1988provide[s]useful
legislativehistoryforinterpretingthe[FTDA]aswellaspartsofitssuccessor,the
[TDRA]).
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whicheventuallybecametheTDRA,providedthatplaintiffsneedproveonlya1
likelihoodofdilutionand,thus,allowedfamousmarkownerstoprevent2
dilutionatitsincipiencyandnotforcethemtowaituntiltheharmhas3
advancedsofarthat...therecognitionofthemark...ispermanentlyimpaired4
inordertosue. CommitteePrinttoAmendtheFederalTrademarkDilutionAct:5
HearingBeforetheH.Subcomm.onCourts,theInternet,andIntellectual6
PropertyoftheH.Comm.ontheJudiciary,108thCong.10(2004)(20047
Hearing)(statementofJacquelineA.Leimer,INTA);seeMcCarthy24:96. At8
congressionalhearings
in
2004
and
2005,
witnesses
criticized
the
Moseley9
decisionasessentiallysa[ying]youhavegottowaituntilthehorseisgone,and10
thentheonlythingyoucandoisclosethebarndoor. TrademarkDilution11
RevisionActof2005:HearingonH.R.683BeforetheH.Subcomm.onCourts,the12
Internet,andIntellectualPropertyoftheH.Comm.ontheJudiciary,109thCong.13
18(2005)(2005Hearing)(statementofMarkA.Lemley,WilliamH.Neukom14
Prof.ofLaw,StanfordUniv.);seealso2004Hearing,at44,4647(statementof15
DavidC.Stimson,ChiefTrademarkCounsel,EastmanKodakCompany).16
Althoughanumberofwitnessestestifiedatthehearings,thehearing17
statementsofAnneGundelfinger,thenPresidentoftheINTA,areconsidereda18
primarysourceofthelegislativehistoryoftheTDRA. SeeMcCarthy24:96.19
Duringher
testimony,
Gundelfinger
explained
that
the
association
between20
marksneededonlytobelikelytoimpairthedistinctivenessofthefamousmark21
inthemarketplace. 2005Hearing,at12. Gundelfingeralsoproposedalistofsix22
factorsthatwouldgotothequestionofwhetherthefamousmarks23
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distinctivenessinthemarketplacewillbeblurredbythejunioruse. Id.at14.1
Sheexplainedthatcourtswillneedtobalanceallofthesefactors,aswellasany2
othersrelevanttothequestionofblurring,inordertomakeadeterminationasto3
whetherthereisalikelihoodofdilutionbyblurring. Id.4
PresidentBushsignedtheTDRAintolawin2006.5
B. StandardofReview6
Afterabenchtrialonaclaimfortrademarkdilutionbyblurring,wherethe7
districtcourtevaluatesandbalancesthefactorslistedintheTDRA,wereview8
thecourts
determinations
as
to
each
factor
for
clear
error
and
its
balancing
of9
thosefactorsdenovo. SeeTiffany,600F.3dat101;StarbucksIV,588F.3dat105.1010
Accordingly,theDistrictCourtsfactualfindingsregardingeachfactorbearing11
onthelikelihoodoftrademarkdilutionbyblurringwillnotbedisturbedunless12
ontheentireevidence[weare]leftwiththedefiniteandfirmconvictionthata13
mistakehasbeencommitted, UnitedStatesv.Oehne,698F.3d119,121(2dCir.14
2012)(quotationmarksomitted),whilethebalancingofthosefactorsto15
determinethelikelihoodofdilutionisalegalexercisesubjecttodenovoreview.16
10Weemploythesamestandardherethatweuseinthecontextoftrademark
infringement,whereadistrictcourtevaluatesandthenbalancestheeightfactors
setforth
in
Polaroid
Corp.
v.
Polarad
Electronics
Corp.,
287
F.2d
492,
495
(2d
Cir.
1961),todeterminewhetherthereisalikelihoodofconfusion. See,e.g.,Star
Indus.v.Bacardi&Co.,412F.3d373,384(2dCir.2005). Thestatutoryfactors
enumeratedin1125(c)(2)(B)aresimilarinkindtothePolaroidfactors. For
example,bothlistsincludethesimilaritybetweenthetwomarks;strengthof
themarkinPolaroidisakintodistinctivenessin1125;andactualconfusion
inPolaroidmirrorsactualassociationin1125. SeePolaroid,287F.2dat495.
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Todeterminehowtoconductthebalancing,welookfirsttothelanguageofthe1
statute. SeeTownsendv.BenjaminEnters.,Inc.,679F.3d41,48(2dCir.2012).2
Under1125(c)(1),theplaintiffmustshowthedefendantsuseofamark3
...incommercethatislikelytocausedilutionbyblurring...ofthefamous4
mark,regardlessofthepresenceorabsenceofactualorlikelyconfusion,of5
competition,orofactualeconomicinjury. Section1125(c)(2)(B)defines6
dilutionbyblurringasassociationarisingfromthesimilaritybetweenamark7
...andafamousmarkthatimpairsthedistinctivenessofthefamousmark. The8
statutethen
instructs
that,
[i]n
determining
whether
a
mark
...is
likely
to
cause9
dilutionbyblurring,thecourtmayconsiderallrelevantfactors,includingthe10
sixenumeratedfactors.11
Wepreviouslyhavedeclinedtotreatthefactorspertinenttoatrademark12
dilutionanalysisasaninflexible,mechanicaltest,suggestinginsteadthatthe13
importanceofeachfactorwillvarywiththefacts. Nabisco,Inc.v.PFBrands,14
Inc.,191F.3d208,22728(2dCir.1999),abrogatedonothergroundsbyMoseley,15
537U.S.at433. Accordingly,weneednotconsiderallsixstatutoryfactorslisted16
in15U.S.C.1125(c)(2)(B)(i)(vi)ifsomeareirrelevanttotheultimatequestion;17
norarewelimitedtothosesixfactors. SeeLouisVuittonMalletierS.A.v.Haute18
DiggityDog,LLC,507F.3d252,266(4thCir.2007)(Noteveryfactorwillbe19
relevantin
every
case,
and
not
every
blurring
claim
will
require
extensive20
discussionofthefactors.). Instead,weemployacautiousandgradual21
approach,whichfavorsthedevelopmentofanonexclusivelistoftrademark22
dilutionfactorsovertime. Nabisco,191F.3dat217.23
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C. FactualFindings:TheStatutoryFactors1
Onappeal,StarbuckschallengestwooftheDistrictCourtsfindings:(1)2
thatthereisonlyaminimaldegreeofsimilaritybetweentheStarbucksMarks3
andtheCharbucksMarks;and(2)thatStarbucksdemonstratedonlyaweak4
associationbetweenthemarks. TheDistrictCourtdidnotclearlyerrwithregard5
toeitherfinding.6
1. DegreeofSimilarity7
InStarbucksIVweheldthat[w]ithrespecttothefirstfactorthedegree8
ofsimilarity
between
the
marksthe
District
Court
did
not
clearly
err
in
finding9
thattheCharbucksMarkswereminimallysimilartotheStarbucksMarks. 58810
F.3dat106. WehighlightedthedifferencebetweentheStarbucksMarksand11
CharbucksMarkswhenthelatterareplacedinthecontextofBlackBears12
packagingandthewordCharbucksisincorporatedintothephrases13
CharbucksBlendandMisterCharbucks. Id. Thelawofthecaseordinarily14
foreclosesrelitigationofissuesexpresslyorimpliedlydecidedbytheappellate15
court. UnitedStatesv.Quintieri,306F.3d1217,1229(2dCir.2002)(quotation16
marksomitted). Althoughnotbinding,thedoctrinecounselsacourtagainst17
revisitingitspriorrulingsinsubsequentstagesofthesamecaseabsentcogent18
andcompellingreasonssuchasaninterveningchangeofcontrollinglaw,the19
availabilityof
new
evidence,
or
the
need
to
correct
a
clear
error
or
prevent20
manifestinjustice. Aliv.Mukasey,529F.3d478,490(2dCir.2008)(quoting21
UnitedStatesv.Tenzer,213F.3d34,39(2dCir.2000)). Starbucksadvancesno22
compellingreasonforustorevisitourrulingontheissueofsimilarity. Iturges23
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thattheholdinginStarbucksIVappliedonlytoourlikelihoodofconfusion1
analysis,andthattheDistrictCourterredbyconsideringthecontextsinwhich2
consumersencountertheCharbucksMarks.11 Werejectsuchacrabbedviewof3
theholdingandadheretoourpriorrulingthattheDistrictCourtdidnotclearly4
errinfindingminimalsimilarity.5
2. ActualAssociation6
StarbucksnextcontendsthattheDistrictCourtsfindingthatactual7
associationweighsnomorethanminimallyinStarbucksfavor,StarbucksV,8
2011WL
6747431,
at
*4,
was
error
for
two
reasons.
First,
Starbucks
argues,
Black9
Bearsadmittedintenttocreateanassociationthefifthstatutoryfactorraisesa10
presumptionofassociation,oratleastisstrongevidenceofactual11
associationthesixthstatutoryfactor. Second,itarguesthattheDistrictCourt12
improperlydiscountedtheMitofskysurveyevidence,which,inStarbucksview,13
provesahighdegreeofactualassociation. Werejectbotharguments.14
a. IntenttoCreateanAssociation15
Asaninitialmatter,anintenttocreateanassociationisaseparatefactor16
undertheTDRAanddoesnotconstituteperseevidencethattheactual17
associationfactorweighsinfavoroftheownerofthefamousmark.12 Insupport18
11Atoralargument,Starbuckscounselconcededthatourearlierdecisionon
minimalsimilarity
is
the
law
of
the
case.
Oral
Arg.
Tr.
10:15
19.
12BlackBearcontendsthatthisargumentwaswaivedbelow. Wedisagree.
Starbuckssufficientlypreservedtheargument. SeeJointAppx162122
(StarbucksOpeningBriefonSecondRemand)([W]here,ashere,therehasbeen
ajudicialdeterminationofanintenttoassociate,thelogicalconclusionisthat
defendantsintendedresultwasachieved(e.g.,thatactualassociationhas
occurred).).
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ofitsargumenttothecontrary,StarbucksquotesMcCarthystreatise,which1
states,Ifthejunior[user]intendedtocreateanassociation,thelawmayassume2
thatitsucceeded. McCarthy24:119. StarbuckssimilarlyreliesonFederal3
ExpressCorp.v.FederalEspresso,Inc.,201F.3d168(2dCir.2000),adilutioncase4
inwhichwestatedthatthetrieroffactmaywellfindthatthemarksareof5
sufficientsimilaritysothat,inthemindoftheconsumer,thejuniormarkwill6
conjureanassociationwiththesenior,especiallyinlightofthetestimonyof7
[FederalEspressosfounder]thatshechosethenameFederalEspresso,inpart,8
preciselybecause
it
would
call
to
mind
Federal
Express.
Id.
at
177
(quotation9
marksomitted).10
BothFederalEspressoandMcCarthystreatiseacknowledgethe11
importanceoftheintentfactorindetermininglikelihoodofdilution. Thismakes12
sense,asdistrictcourtsmustevaluatewhetherajuniormarkislikelytocause13
associationarisingfromthesimilaritybetweenthemarksthatimpairsthe14
distinctivenessofthefamousmark,15U.S.C.1125(c)(1),(c)(2)(B),andthe15
intenttoassociatemaybeardirectlyonthelikelihoodthatthejuniormarkwill16
causesuchanassociation.17
Thatsaid,weinterpretstatutestogiveeffect,ifpossible,toeveryclause18
andwordandtoavoidstatutoryinterpretationsthatrenderprovisions19
superfluous.
UnitedStates
v.
Al
Kassar,
660
F.3d
108,
12425
(2d
Cir.
2011)20
(quotationmarksomitted). AdoptingStarbuckspresumptionargumentwould21
effectivelymergetheintenttoassociateandtheactualassociationfactors,by22
makingtheformerdeterminativeofthelatter,ratherthantreatingthemas23
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8/13/2019 Starbucks. v. Wolfes Borough Coffee
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distinctbutrelatedconsiderations. WethereforeconcludethattheDistrictCourt1
didnotclearlyerrinfindingthatClarkstestimonyconcerningtheoriginofthe2
CharbucksMarkswasnotanadmissionofactualassociationandthathis3
intentionswerenotdefinitiveproofofanactualassociationbetweenthemarks.4
b. MitofskySurvey5
NordidtheDistrictCourterrwhenitdiscountedtheMitofskysurvey6
evidencebecausethesurveymeasuredonlyhowrespondentsreactedtothe7
isolatedwordCharbucks,ratherthantotheCharbucksMarksincontext,and8
becausethe
share
of
respondents
who
indicated
an
association
between
the9
markswasrelativelysmall. StarbucksV,2011WL6747431,at*4. Wearriveat10
thisconclusionfortworeasons.11
First,itcohereswithourdecisioninStarbucksIV,inwhichwediscerned12
noclearerrorintheDistrictCourtsconsiderationofcontextincludingthe13
additionofMisterorBlendtoCharbucksandBlackBearspackagingin14
assessingthemarkssimilarity,asconsumersarelikelytoexperiencetheproduct15
onlyinthecontextofthosefullphrasesandBlackBearspackagingorwebsite.16
StarbucksIV,588F.3dat106. InouranalysisofStarbucksinfringementclaim,17
wesimilarlydeterminedthattheDistrictCourtdidnotclearlyerrwhenitfound18
(1)thatthesurveyfailedtodemonstratesignificantactualconfusion,19
[p]articularlyin
light
of
the
fact
that
the
survey
was
administered
by
telephone20
anddidnotpresentthetermCharbucksinthecontextinwhichBlackBearused21
it,id.at117,and(2)thatthesurveyshouldhaveexaminedtheeffectsofa22
hypotheticalcoffeenamedeitherMisterCharbucksorCharbucksBlendon23
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8/13/2019 Starbucks. v. Wolfes Borough Coffee
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therespondentsimpressionsofStarbuckscoffeeasameasureofdilutionby1
tarnishment,id.at110.2
Second,ourconclusionalsocomportswithourpriorprecedentsandother3
casesunrelatedtoStarbucks. InPlaytexProducts,Inc.v.GeorgiaPacificCorp.,4
390F.3d158(2dCir.2004),acaseinterpretingtheprerevisionFTDA,weheld5
thattheresultsofaconsumersurveyshowinganassociationbetweenthemarks6
MoistOnesandWetOneswereinadmissibleasevidenceofactualdilution7
becausethedefendantsproductwaspresentedandpackagedasQuilted8
NorthernMoist
Ones.
Id.
at
168
(emphasis
added).
District
courts
within
our9
Circuithaveappliedthesamereasoninginevaluatingsurveysinthe10
infringementcontext. See,e.g.,THOIPv.WaltDisneyCo.,690F.Supp.2d218,11
23540(S.D.N.Y.2010);JuicyCouture,Inc.v.LOrealUSA,Inc.,No.04Civ.7203,12
2006WL1012939,at*2527(S.D.N.Y.Apr.19,2006);WEMedia,Inc.v.Gen.Elec.13
Co.,218F.Supp.2d463,474(S.D.N.Y.2002)(Germanesurveyevidenceshould14
makesomeefforttocomparetheimpressionsthemarkshaveonpotential15
customersundermarketplaceconditions.). Inthedilutioncontext,thelanguage16
oftheFTDA,whichrequiresaplaintifftoshowthedefendantsuseofamark17
...incommercethatislikelytocausedilutionbyblurring...,15U.S.C.18
1125(c)(1)(emphasisadded),clarifiesthatthewaythedefendantsmarkisused19
incommerce
is
central
to
the
dilution
inquiry.
As
in
Playtex,
the
District
Court20
waswithinitsrightstoconcludethattheMitofskysurveyhadlimitedprobative21
valuebecausethedefendantsmarkswerenotpresentedtosurveyrespondents22
astheyareactuallypresentedandpackagedincommerce.23
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CitingourdecisioninNabisco,Starbucksneverthelessarguesthat1
consumersarelikelytohearandviewthetermCharbucksoutsidethecontext2
ofBlackBearspackagingandwithoutthefullphrasesMisterCharbucksand3
CharbucksBlend. Nabisco,191F.3dat218(rejectinganargumentunderthe4
prerevisionFTDAthatpackagingmadetwomarksdissimilar,becausemany5
consumerswouldseethemarksoutsideofthepackaging). ButStarbucks6
presentednorecordevidencethatCharbucksiseverreadorheardin7
isolation,13andintheabsenceofsuchevidence,wearenotpersuadedbythe8
argument.
Tothe
contrary,
as
we
noted
in
Starbucks
IV,
it
is
unlikely
that9
Charbuckswillappeartoconsumersoutsidethecontextofitsnormaluse,58810
F.3dat106,anditwasnotclearlyerroneousfortheDistrictCourttofindthat11
theMisterprefixorBlendsuffixlessenedthesimilaritybetweenthe[marks],12
id.at107.13
StarbucksalsochallengestheDistrictCourtsfindingthattheassociation14
betweenCharbucksandStarbuckswasrelativelysmall. Itcontendsthatthe15
Mitofskysurveyinfactprovidedevidenceofsubstantialactualassociation. We16
disagree.17
ItistruethatinresponsetoMitofskysquestionmostprobativeofactual18
associationWhatistheFIRSTTHINGthatcomestoyourmindwhenyouhear19
thename
Charbucks,
spelled
C
H
A
R
B
U
C
K
S?30.5
percent
of20
respondentssaidStarbucks,and9percentsaidcoffee. Bothofthese21
13AlthoughthenameMr.Charbucksispresentedinplaintextonatleastone
pageofBlackBearswebsite, allotherrecordusesoftheCharbucksMarks
situatetheminBlackBearsdistinctcolorscheme,font,andlayout.
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responsessuggestanassociationbetweenCharbucksandtheStarbucksMarks.1
InJadaToys,518F.3dat636,forexample,theNinthCircuitheldthatasurvey2
demonstratedactualassociationbecauseitshowedthat28percentof3
respondentsthoughtJadasproductwasmadebyMattelwhenaskedwhothey4
thoughtproducedtheitem. Here,however,theequivalentquestionin5
Mitofskyssurveywas:Canyounameanycompanyorstorethatyouthink6
mightofferaproductcalledCharbucks?14 Inresponsetothatquestion7
concerningsourceontheMitofskysurvey,however,only3.1percentof8
respondentsanswered
Starbucks
and
1.3
percent
answered
coffee
house.
9
ThesepercentagesarefarbelowthatfortheequivalentquestioninJadaToysand10
failtodemonstrateanythingmorethanminimalactualassociation.15 See11
StarbucksV,2011WL6747431,at*4.12
Ultimately,onthisfactor,weconsideronlywhethertheDistrictCourt13
clearlyerredwhenitfoundthattheMitofskysurveytiltstheactualassociation14
factornomorethanminimallyin[Starbucks]favor. Id. HadtheMitofsky15
14BoththatquestionandthequestiondiscussedinJadaToystestnotmerely
associationbutalsosourceconfusion. Sourceconfusionmaybeprobativeof
association,becausetoconfuseCharbuckswithStarbucks,thewordCharbucks
mustcallStarbuckstomind. SeeNabisco,191F.3dat221(Confusionlessens
distinction.).
15Althoughsomeotherrespondentsgaveanswersconsistentwithanassociation
withStarbucks18.3percentansweredgrocerystore,16.9percentanswered
discountstore,7percentansweredrestaurant,and4.8percentanswered
departmentstoretheseresponsesarealsoconsistentwithotherviewsof
whatCharbuckscouldbe,includingmeatoracharcoalgrillingproduct,as38.5
percentofrespondentssuggested.
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surveypresentedtheCharbucksMarksastheyappearincommerce,wemight1
wellconcludethattheDistrictCourterred. ButthewordCharbuckswas2
presentedoutsideofitsmarketplacecontext,andStarbucks,whichbearsthe3
burdenofproof,seeJadaToys,518F.3dat634,failedtoshowthatthisflawdid4
notmateriallyimpactthesurveyresults. Wethereforeconcludethattherecord5
supportstheDistrictCourtsdecisiontodiscountthesurveyandconsiderthe6
actualassociationfactorasweighingonlyminimallyinStarbucksfavor.7
D. Balancing8
Wenext
balance
the
factors
enumerated
in
1125(c)(2)(B),
along
with
any9
otherfactorsthatbearonalikelihoodofdilution,denovo.16 Inbalancingthese10
factors,weareagainmindfulthatthetestisnotaninflexibleone,andthatthe11
ultimatequestioniswhethertheCharbucksMarksarelikelytocausean12
associationarisingfromtheirsimilaritytotheStarbucksMarks,whichimpairs13
theStarbucksMarkstendencytoidentifythesourceofStarbucksproductsina14
uniqueway.15
WehavealreadyaffirmedtheDistrictCourtsfindingofminimalsimilarity16
betweentheCharbucksMarksandtheStarbucksMarks. Thatfindingweighs17
heavilyinBlackBearsfavor. Certainly,aplaintiffmayshowalikelihoodof18
dilutionnotwithstandingonlyminimalsimilarity. Buthere,minimalsimilarity19
stronglysuggests
a
relatively
low
likelihood
of
an
association
diluting
the
senior20
mark. Thestatuteitselfemphasizesthesimilarityofmarks. See1125(c)(2)(B)21
16Seesupra,PartB(discussingtheapplicablestandardofreview). Atoral
argument,bothpartiesconcededthatwemayconductthisbalancingourselves.
SeeOralArg.Tr.4:2123(Starbucks);OralArg.Tr.14:1922(BlackBear).
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Althoughthethreefactorsofdistinctiveness,recognition,andexclusivity1
favorStarbucksandbeartosomedegreeonourassessmentofthelikelihoodof2
dilutionbyblurring,themoreimportantfactorsinthecontextofthiscasearethe3
similarityofthemarksandactualassociation. WeagreewiththeDistrictCourt4
thatthedistinctiveness,recognition,andexclusiveuseoftheStarbucksMarksdo5
notovercometheweakevidenceofactualassociationbetweentheCharbucks6
andStarbucksmarks. Tothecontrary,viewedinlightofStarbucksfame,both7
globallyandamongtheMitofskysurveyparticipantsmoreparticularly,thefact8
thatmore
survey
participants
did
not
think
of
Starbucks
upon
hearing9
CharbucksreinforcestheDistrictCourtsfindingthatthemarksareonly10
minimallysimilar,andthereforeunlikelytopromptanassociationthatimpairs11
theStarbucksMarks. Likewise,althoughthedistinctivenessandexclusiveuseof12
theStarbucksMarkshelpStarbucksprovesusceptibilitytodilutionby13
associationarisingfromsimilaritybetweentheCharbucksandStarbucksmarks,14
theydonotdemonstratethatsuchanassociationislikelytoarise,asStarbucks15
neededtoshowtoobtainaninjunction. Accordingly,thesefactorsweighonly16
weaklyinStarbucksfavor.17
Inthiscase,weattributeamoderateamountofsignificancetothefifth18
factor,intenttocreateanassociation. ClarkstestimonyindicatedthatBlackBear19
wascapitalizing
on
an
historic
connection
between
the
word
Charbucks
and20
Starbucks,whicharoseoutofthesocalledcoffeewarsinBoston,21
Massachusetts,seeStarbucksIV,588F.3dat111, andthathemeanttoevokean22
imageofdarkroastedcoffeeofthetypeofferedbyStarbucks,StarbucksV,201123
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WL6747431,at*5. [W]here,ashere,theallegedlydilutingmarkwascreated1
withanintenttoassociatewiththefamousmark,StarbucksIV,588F.3dat109,2
weagreewiththeDistrictCourtthatthisfactorfavorsafindingofalikelihoodof3
dilution,seeStarbucksV,2011WL6747431,at*3,5.4
Thefinal,disputedfactor,actualassociation,ishighlyrelevantto5
likelihoodofassociation. Intheanalogouscontextofdeterminingthelikelihood6
ofconfusionfortrademarkinfringementclaims,wehavenotedthat[t]herecan7
benomorepositiveorsubstantialproofofthelikelihoodofconfusionthanproof8
ofactual
confusion,
even
though
a
showing
of
actual
confusion
is
not
necessary9
toprevailonsuchaclaim. SavinCorp.v.SavinGrp.,391F.3d439,459(2dCir.10
2004)(quotingWorldCarpets,Inc.v.DickLittrellsNewWorldCarpets,438F.2d11
482,489(5thCir.1971)). Thesameprincipleobtainswithrespecttoproofof12
actualassociationindilutionclaims. Andasnoted,theMitofskysurvey13
demonstratedweakactualassociation,atbest.14
Weighingthefactorsabovedenovo,weagreewiththeDistrictCourtthat15
Starbucksdidnotdemonstratealikelihoodofdilutionbyblurring. Ultimately16
whattipsthebalanceinthiscaseisthatStarbucksboretheburdenofshowing17
thatitwasentitledtoinjunctivereliefonthisrecord. BecauseStarbucks18
principalevidenceofassociation,theMitofskysurvey,wasfundamentally19
flawed,and
because
there
was
minimal
similarity
between
the
marks
at
issue,
we20
agreewiththeDistrictCourtthatStarbucksfailedtoshowthatBlackBearsuse21
ofitsCharbucksMarksincommerceislikelytodilutetheStarbucksMarks.22
23
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CONCLUSION1
WehaveconsideredallofStarbuckscontentionsonthisappealandhave2
concludedthattheyarewithoutmerit. Fortheforegoingreasons,weAFFIRM3
thejudgmentoftheDistrictCourt.4
5
6
7