Statutory Construction Case Digests

Statutory Construction

Table of Contents

Statutory Construction1

Table of Contents2

I. Statutes4

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance4

Casco Phils. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez4

Lidasan vs. Commision on Elections4

People vs. Ferrer5

Tobias vs. Abalos5

Taada vs. Tuvera6

II. Construction and Interpretation7

*Federation of Free Farmers vs. Court of Appeals7

People vs. Nazario7

Kapisanan ng Manggagawa vs. Manila Railroad Company7

Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicholas7

Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc.8

Lapid vs. Court of Appeals8

People vs. Jabinal8

Co vs. Court of Appeals9

Benzonan vs. CA9

III. Aids to Construction11

City of Baguio vs. Marcos11

Ebarle vs. Sucaldito11

People vs. Purisima11

U.S. vs. Hart12

Matabuena vs. Cervantes12

People vs. Manantan12

Director of Lands vs. Abaya13

Salaysay vs. Castro13

Commissioner of Customs vs. CTA14

Gloria vs. CA15

Buenaseda vs. Flavier15

Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals16

Philippine Sugar Central vs. Collector of Customs16

IV. Adherence to, or Departure from Language18

National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC18

Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, et al.18

Santiago vs. Comelec19

Casela vs. Court of Appeals19

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court20

King vs. Hernandez20

U.S. vs. Toribio21

Commendador vs. De Villa21

Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. CTA22

People vs. Yu Hai22

Amatan vs. Aujero23

People vs. Purisima23

Salvacion vs. Central Bank23

Demafiles vs. Comelec24

Chua vs. Civil Service Commission24

V. Interpretation of Words and Phrases26

Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. NTC26

Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals26

Manila Herald vs. Ramos26

Claudio vs. COMELEC27

Garcia vs. COMELEC27

Liggett & Myers Tobacco vs. Collector of Internal Revenue28

Garvida vs. Sales28

Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos29

Carandang vs. Santiago29

People vs. Santiago30

Caltex Phils., Inc. vs. Palomar30

Mutuc vs. Comelec31

Vera vs. Cuevas31

Republic vs. Migrino32

U.S. vs. Santo Nino32

Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. SSC32

Lerum vs. Cruz33

Vera vs. Fernandez33

Manabat vs. De Aquino34

Escribano vs. Avila34

People vs. Tamani35

Fores vs. Miranda35

Manila Electric Company vs. Public Utilities Employees36

VI. Statute Construed as a Whole37

National Tobacco Adm. vs. Commission on Audit37

People vs. Garcia37

Republic vs. Court of Appeals38

Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals38

Paras vs. COMELEC39

Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. Court of Appeals39

C&C Commercial Corp. vs. NAWASA40

Butuan Sawmill, Inc. vs. City of Butuan40

Bagatsing vs. Ramirez41

City of Manila vs. Teotico42

VII. Strict or Liberal Construction43

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan43

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals43

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals44

Cena vs. Civil Service Commission44

Abella vs. NLRC45

VIII. Mandatory & Directory Statutes46

Chartered Bank vs. National Government Auditing Office46

McGee vs. Republic46

Fule vs. Court of Appeals47

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC47

Marcelino vs. Cruz47

Bersabal vs. Salvador48

IX. Prospective & Retroactive Statutes49

Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue49

Nilo vs. Court of Appeals49

People vs. Zeta50

Buyco vs. PNB50

Subido, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan51

Billones vs. CIR51

Corales vs. Employees Compensation Commission52

Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA52

X. Amendment, Revision, Codification and Repeal54

Case Name54

XI. Constitutional Construction55

Case Name55

I. StatutesTolentino vs. Secretary of Finance235 SCRA 630, G.R. No. 115873 & 11593125 August 1994Mendoza, J.

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. R.A. No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716.

Issues: Whether or not this amendment of 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute amends.

Ruling: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content. The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of R.A. No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of PALs own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption.

The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus expressed.

Casco Phils. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez7 SCRA 347, G.R. No. L-1793128 February 1963Concepcion, J.

Facts: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Phils. Chemical Co., Inc.

Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 2609, the Central Bank issued Circular No. 95 fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. As a result of which, petitioner paid the margin fees amounting to P33,765.42 and another P6,345.72.

Prior to the second payment of margin fees, petitioner sought the refund of its earlier payment relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the bank refused to pass and approve said vouchers on the ground that urea and formaldehyde is not covered within the exemptions provided for in Republic Act No. 2609.

Issues: Whether or not urea formaldehyde which appears in the provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde and therefore exempting the petitioner from payment of margin fees.

Ruling: When petitioners contended that the bill approved in Congress was intended to exempt the individual items urea and formaldehyde citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, the Supreme Court ruled that these statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the indent of the House of Representatives.

In construing the law, the Court ruled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde rather than urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.

Lidasan vs. Commision on Elections21 SCRA 496, G.R. no. L-2808925 October 1967Sanchez, J.

Facts: Republic Act. No. 4790 which is entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur was enacted into law. However, its constitutionality is being questioned as it also includes barrios located in another province: Cotabato.

In creation of the Municipality of Dianaton, twelve barrios in the province of Cotabato are transferred to Lanao del Sur which brings about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

Issues: Whether or not R.A. No. 4790 is constitutional on the ground that it does not conform to the mandate that No bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

Whether or not R.A. No 4790 may be salvaged by creating Dianaton through the barrios already included within the province of Lanao del Sur by merely nullifying those portions of the law which are repugnant to the Constitution and saving those not affected by the infirmity.

Ruling: In ruling upon the unconstitutionality of this law, the Supreme Court said that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such prevision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

Thus, the title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur is defective in that it projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected in the creation of Dianaton when it does, in fact, dismember two municipalities from the province of Cotabato. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law and did not inform the people in Cotabato that part of their territory was already being taken away.

Anent the second issue, the rule that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld, the Supreme Court stated that the exemption to this rule should apply. This exemption states that where parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then all the provisions which are dependent on the unconstitutional part must fall with it. This is buttressed by the fact that the bill was presented in Congress with the totality of the twenty-one barrios, not nine and that the seat of government will be in a municipality in Cotabato.

People vs. Ferrer48 SCRA 382, G.R. No. L-32613-1427 December 1972Castro, J.

Facts: A complaint for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act against Feliciano Co was filed. Judge Jose de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed prosecutors to file the corresponding information alleging that Co had become an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Co moved to quash the information on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Issues: Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder and thus void for being unconstitutional.

Ruling: In ruling in the negative, the Court upheld the Anti-Subversion Act by saying that when the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term Communist Party of the Philippines is used solely for definition purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to any other organization having the same purpose as their successors. Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

As to the claim that under the statute, organizational guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a dragnet device whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. But the statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the legal objectives of the Party.

Tobias vs. Abalos239 SCRA 106, G.R. No. 1147838 December 1994Bidin, J.

Facts: Before the enactment of R.A. No. 7675, an Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Mandaluyong, San Juan and Mandaluyong belonged to a single legislative district. The act was signed into law on February 9, 1994. Subsequently, a plebiscite was held wherein the people of Mandaluyong ratified the law pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991.

The petitioners now question the constitutionality of said law as taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong.

Issues: Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 is constitutional for contravening the one subject-one bill rule. Petitioners contend that the division of the congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate districts is violative of this rule.

Ruling: R.A. 7675 is constitutional. The Supreme Court held that the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized treaty and is thus contemplated in the title.

A liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule has been adopted by the Court so as not to cripple or impede legislation, that such should be given a practical rather than a technical construction.

Taada vs. Tuvera146 SCRA 446, G.R. no. L-6391529 December 1986Cruz, J.

Facts: The petitioners move for a clarification on the Courts previous decision (Taada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27). They have sought to clarify the meaning of the clause, unless it is otherwise provided and the word law as they were used in Article 2 of the Civil Code. In line with this, petitioners also asked the court to shed light on the requirements of publication.

Issues: Whether or not the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the variability of the date of effectivity or to the requirement of publication.

Ruling: The clause refers to the variability of the date of effectivity and not the requirement of publication. This is evidenced by the sentence This code shall take effect one year after publication. Thus, publication is mandatory for a laws effectivity.

II. Construction and Interpretation*Federation of Free Farmers vs. Court of Appeals107 SCRA 352, G.R. No. L-44161, 41222, 43153 & 4336910 September 1981Barredo, J.

Facts: blah

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Issues: blah

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Ruling: blah

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People vs. Nazario165 SCRA 186, G.R. No. L-4414331 August 1988Sarmiento, J.

Facts: Accused Nazario was charged with the violation of a Municipal Ordinance by failing to pay municipal taxes incurred as the owner fishpond business. Accused thus questions the constitutionality of the ordinance and, assuming its constitutionality, its non-application to him.

Issues: Whether or not the Municipal Ordinance is vague and therefore unconstitutional.

Whether or not accused is under the purview of the law, Nazario claiming that he is the owner, and not the manager which the law has identified.

Ruling: The ordinances in question are not vague. He is clearly, as the actual operator of the fishponds, within the term manager which is among those people sanctioned by the law.

The Supreme Court had occasion to define vagueness as when a law lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. It went on to say that a law must be utterly vague on its face and cannot be clarified by a saving clause or construction.

The Court also differentiated vague statues from those which are merely ambiguous, the latter remaining constitutional and subject merely to interpretation whereas in the former, one is totally devoid of any means to ascertain the meaning of the law and what acts it seeks to enforce or prevent.

Kapisanan ng Manggagawa vs. Manila Railroad Company88 SCRA 616, G.R. No. L-2531628 February 1979Fernando, J.

Facts: This is a mandamus petition wherein the petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of a lower courts dismissal based on R.A. No. 2023 62. This stems from the petitioners contention that under R.A. No. 2023, the loans granted by credit unions to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondents employees wages and salaries.

Issues: What power does the judiciary have in terms of interpretation of the law when there is absence of doubt as to the scope of operation of the law.

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts decision which, in turn, said that there is nothing in the provision of the said law that provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees wages and salaries. The only effect of R.A. No. 2023 is to compel the employer to make deduction of the employees debt from the latters salary and turn this over to the employees credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit unions credit into a first priority credit.

Where the law is clear and there is absence of doubt as to its application, the courts have no other recourse but to enforce them as they are worded. Dura lex sed lex.

Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicholas159 SCRA 369, G.R. No. L-3456828 March 1988Padilla, J.

Facts: The spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition to adopt the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. A hearing was set and notices were served to the public. The petitioners, however, filed an opposition to said adoption claiming that the spouses Agonoy had a legitimate daughter, oppositors mother, and were therefore disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

Issues: Whether or not the spouses Agonoy are disqualified to adopt based on Art. 335 of the Civil Code, the opposition basing their claim that it would produce a foreign element into the family unit and result in the reduction of their legitimes.

Ruling: The spouses are not disqualified to adopt their grandchildren, the law being clear and unambiguous as regards the persons who may not adopt. The statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted and must thus be applied. Only those statutes that are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may be the subject of construction.

Also, it must be said that the enumeration is exclusive, and therefore excludes those items not included. In this case, the rule expression unius est exclusio alterius applies in that grandchildren has not been among those prohibited by the law to be susceptible of adoption.

Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc.93 SCRA 696, G.R. No. L-6355-5631 August 1953Montemayor, J.

Facts: R.A. No. 590 was enacted and directed the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue to collect income tax on the salary of judicial officers, specifically petitioner Endencia.

Issues: Whether or not R.A. No. 590 is unconstitutional, the petitioner basing its argument on the fact that such a collection of income tax is a diminution of compensation fixed by law and thus repugnant to Art VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution.

Ruling: Following the Courts decision in Perfecto vs. Meer, the Supreme Court reiterated that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries because the collection thereof would be tantamount to a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office.

The law being repugnant to the Constitution, its validity must fail and thus be declared unconstitutional, as it has exceeded its legislative authority.

Lapid vs. Court of Appeals334 SCRA 738, G.R. No. 14226129 June 2000Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

Facts: A complaint was filed charging Gov. Manuel Lapid of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The Ombudsman subsequently issued an order suspending Lapid for 6 months pursuant to R.A. 6770.

On November 22, 1999, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the case finding the petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and thus suspending him from office. The petitioner then filed for a petition for review with the Court of Appeals and prayed for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned decision.

Hence, this appeal.

Issues: Whether or not decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in R.A. 6770 27 are final, unappealable, and immediately executory.

Whether or not the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code should be applied suppletorily to the Ombudsman Act (R.A. 6770).

Ruling: The rule inclusion unius est exclusio alterius applies in this case since suspension without pay for one month is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence immediately executory. Since express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included, all those decisions which impose penalties found in Section 27 of R.A. 6770 are not final, unappealable, and immediately executory, it will stay the immediate execution of the Ombudsmans decision.

Anent the second issue, the lack of any provision providing for the suppletory application of the Administrative Code and the Local Government Code to the Ombudsman Act, the two former laws cannot be applied suppletorily to the latter for that will enlarge the scope of the law beyond that contemplated by the legislature when the latter law was enacted.

People vs. Jabinal55 SCRA 607, G.R. no. L-3006127 February 1974Antonio, J.

Facts: Accused Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. During the time he was caught, the prevailing doctrine was that on Macarandang and Lucero.

The accused, on trial, admitted that he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described without license or permit. However, he claims that though he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander and said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess the firearm in question.

Issues: Whether or not Jabinal is to be found guilty owing to his reliance on the doctrines set forth in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero.

Ruling: In deciding, the Court brought up the case of People vs. Macarandang wherein the accused in the case was acquitted because of his appointment as a Secret Agent. In said case, unlicensed firearms were allowed by the Revised Administrative Code by exempting peace officers from said requirement. It further provided that Macarandangs appointment as a Secret Agent was contemplated in the category of a peace officer.

In People vs. Lucero, the Court held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the battalion commander and must be deemed incident to or necessarily included in the duty and power of said military commander.

However, in People vs. Mapa, the Court abandoned the doctrine in Macarandang and sustained conviction that Secret Agents are not contemplated within the exemptions that law has provided for.

In this case, the accused was acquitted on the basis that considering his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent pursuant to the prevailing doctrines in Macarandang and Lucero, he may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held to be punishable.

Co vs. Court of Appeals227 SCRA 444, G.R. No. 10077628 October 1993Narvasa, C.J.

Facts: In an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel, petitioner Albino Co paid a salvaging firm a check on September 1, 1983. The check was dishonoured and a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner based on P.D. 22, of which he was found guilty.

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals where he contended that because the RTC erroneously based his conviction on the case of Que vs. People (which penalized the mere issuance of a bouncing check) which was dated September 21, 1987 whereas he issued the dishonored check on September 1, 1983. Petitioners contention was rejected by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues: Whether or not judicial decisions of the Supreme Court are to be applied retroactively.

Ruling: The Court ruled that Court decisions must be given prospective application. It can be made to retroact only so far as it is favorable to the accused.

Benzonan vs. CA205 SCRA 515, G.R. No. 9799827 January 1992Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts: Respondent Benito Salvani Pe is a businessman based in General Santos City who acquired through free patents and miscellaneous sales from the Bureau of Lands a 26,064 m2 parcel of land. Barely three months after he acquired said land, Mr. Pe mortgaged it together with another lot and some chattels to secure a commercial loan from the DBP. The lot was developed into a commercial-industrial complex with rice mill and warehouse facilities, a solar drier, an office and residential building, roadway, garden, depository, and dumping grounds for various materials.

Mr. Pe, however, failed to pay his loan after more than seven years and DBP foreclosed the mortgage. After the foreclosure, respondent Pe leased the lot and its improvements from DBP. When respondent, in turn failed to redeem the property within the one year period, DBMP sold the lot to petitioners for P1,650,000.00 payable in quarterly amortizations over a five year period. The petitioners occupied the purchased lot and introduced further improvements worth P970,000.00.

Claiming that he was acting within the legal period given to him to repurchase, respondent Pe offered in writing to repurchase the lot for P327,995.00. DBP countered saying that over P3 million has already been incurred in the preservation, maintenance, and introduction of improvements.

Respondent filed a complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 with the RTC of General Santos City. Said RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered the DBP to reimburse petitioners, and give preference to respondents ability to repurchase the said lots.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with modification. A motion for reconsideration with the same court was denied and the case was thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues: Whether or not respondents use of the land was in keeping with Commonwealth Act. No. 141 119.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that respondent has never shown the intention of utilizing the land given to him for free by the Government for agricultural purposes. He was not the kind of poor farmer for whom homesteads and free patents were intended by the law.

Respondent cannot therefore repurchase the land he had lost due to nonpayment of debts since such a repurchase of property does not fall within the purpose, spirit, and meaning of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it.

III. Aids to ConstructionCity of Baguio vs. Marcos27 SCRA 342, G.R. No. 2610028 Feburary 1969Sanchez, J.

Facts: The Director of Lands, seeking to reopen cadastral proceedings, instituted a Civil Reservation case. It is not disputed that the lands involved were amongst those declared public lands by final decision in the case decided on November 13, 1922.

On July 25, 1961, respondent Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation case as to the parcel of land he owns. Private petitioners and the City of Baguio registered opposition to the reopening, the former basing their claim on the premise that they are tree farm lessees of the said lands.

On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners opposition to the reopening. A motion for reconsideration was also rejected thereafter. All the petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the petitioners were not bound by the declaratory relief heretofore stated. Nevertheless, the private petitioners as lessees had no right to oppose the cadastral case.

Petitioners now seek redress from this Court.

Issues: Whether or not he forty-year period to file a petition for reopening cadastral proceedings hsoudl be counted from the date the proceeding was originally filed in court or when the decision became final.

Ruling: The Court held that since the title of R.A. No. 931 is An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court under certain conditions of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of the judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, there is an apparent inconsistency between the body and title of R.A. No. 931. The Court ruled that the forty-year period starts from the date the final decision was rendered by enunciating that the Acts title belongs to that type of title which should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions expressly stated in the body.

Ebarle vs. Sucaldito156 SCRA 803, G.R. No. L-3362829 December 1987Sarmiento, J.

Facts: The petitioner seeks injunctive relief to enjoin further proceedings in three criminal cases all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and provisions on the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner moved to dismiss the preliminary investigations but was denied. He went to the respondent court on prohibition and mandamus praying that a writ of preliminary injunction and to have the restraining order lifted. Two challenged orders were handed and a series of criminal prosecutions were filed.

Petitioner now challenges these prosecutions for failure to comply with E.O. 264.

Issues: Whether or not E.O. No. 264 applies to criminal actions to the end that no preliminary investigations thereof can be undertaken or information filed in court unless there is compliance with said Executive Order.

Ruling: The Court held that E.O. No. 264 applies only to administrative and not criminal complaints since its title, Outlining the procedure by which complaints charging government officials and employees with commission of irregularities should be guided, speaks only of irregularities rather than offenses or crimes

People vs. Purisima86 SCRA 542, G.R. No. L-42050-6620 November 1978Muoz-Palma, J.

Facts: The accused were charged with violation of P.D. No. 9 or illegal possession of a deadly weapon, specifically carrying outside ones residence any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for livelihood. The defense bases its contention that the accused should be carrying such weapons for the furtherance or in relation to subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

Issues: Whether or not the law requires the elements that the possession of a deadly firearm be for the purposes or the furtherance of those aims stated above in order that the accused be convicted.

Ruling: The Court ruled that pursuant to the preamble of P.D. No. 9, the spirit and intent of the decree is to require the motivation mentioned in the preamble as an indispensable element of the crime. Where, as in this case, there exists ambiguity in the scope of the law, its preamble may be referred to in order to determine legislative intent.

U.S. vs. Hart26 Phil 149, G.R. No. 884821 November 1913Trent, J.

Facts: Appellants Hart, Miller, and Natividad were arraigned and found guilty of vagrancy under Act No. 519. Prosecution based its argument on the evidences presented showing that Hart pleaded guilty and was convicted of gambling two or three weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge.

Defense showed that Hart and Dunn operated a hotel and saloon in Angeles which did business of P96,000 during its 19 months before the trial. Hart was also the proprietor of a saloon in Tacondo, raised imported hogs which he sold to the Army garrison, and had other businesses.

Act 519 divides section 1 into seven clauses separated by semi-colons, each clause enumerating a certain class of persons who, within the meaning of the statue can be considered as vagrants.

Issues: Whether or not the legislative intended to limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no visible means of support

Ruling: The prosecution relies on the argument that visible means of support does not apply to every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses. In order for the clause without visible means of support to qualify the fist clause, either the comma after gambling houses would have been omitted, or else the comma after country would have been inserted.

The Court held that if the punctuation gives the statue a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of a statute as thus punctuated. However, an argument based on punctuation alone is not conclusive on the court by itself and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation as necessary. To say that there are two classes of vagrants defined in par. 2, sec. 1 of Act 519 implies a lack of logical classification which the Court is not inclined to uphold. The accused are thus acquitted, they having shown that they have visible means of support.

Matabuena vs. Cervantes38 SCRA 284, G.R. No. L-2877131 March 1971Fernando, J.

Facts: Cornelia Matabuena assails the validity of a donation made by her brother, the deceased Felix Matabuena to the latters common-law wife, Petronilla Cervantes.

The facts show that Felix Matabuena owned the property in question, donated it to the defendant on Feb. 20, 1956, and was accepted by the latter, and that this donation took place during the common-law relationship of the deceased and defendant.

Issues: Whether or not he donation between Felix Matabuena and Petronilla Cervantes is valid owing to the construction of Art. 133 of the Civil Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the assailed donation is void. In ruling thus, the Court overruled the lower courts decision basing donations void between spouses but that between Matabuena and Cervantes as valid because theirs was not a valid marriage but a common-law one.

The Court based its own decision by applying the spirit of the law, its policy rather than mere words. It stated that the policy behind Art. 133 is to prevent donations in favor of the other consort because of ear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor. Moreover, it was said by the Court that the laws policy of what is just and right would be nullified if such an irregular relationship were to be visited with benefits instead of disabilities.

People vs. Manantan115 Phil 657, G.R. No. L-1412931 July 1962Regala, J.

Facts: Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code which provides that no justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province x x x shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in any election or to take part therein, except to vote x x x.

Manantan argues that he, a justice of the peace, is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in the law. He further contends that a perusal of the history of the Revised Election Code will show that since Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code which governed such an infraction included justice of the peace in its enumeration while omitted in the Revised Election Code shows the intention of the Legislature to exclude justice of the peace from its operation.

Issues: Whether a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition contained in Section 54 of the old Revised Election Code.

Ruling: The Court ruled that Manantans argument is untenable in that it overlooks the fundamental fact that under the Revised Administrative Code qualifies the word judge by the phrase of First Instance while the Revised Election Code does not. Justices of the peace were expressly included in the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified whereas the Revised Election Code makes no such distinction. Also, an examination of the history of these laws show that whenever the word judge was qualified by the phrase of the first instance, the word justice of the peace would follow. However, if the law simply said judge, the words justice of the peace were omitted.

The defendant likewise invokes the statutory construction rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est or that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally, was declared by the Supreme Court as inapplicable to the case at bar. The rule can only be made to apply where the omission has been clearly establish, the fact of which is belied by the fact that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities but rather merely called it by another name.

Its is for these reasons that the dismissal by the trial court is set aside and remanded for trial on the merits.

Director of Lands vs. Abaya63 SCRA 559, G.R. No. 4213421 October 1936Laurel, J.

Facts: This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance denying the motion of the appellants to set aside the motion of the appellants to set aside the decision of that court declaring a certain piece of land as public and to reopen the case in accordance with Act No. 4043.

On July 12, 1919, the Assistant Director of Lands filed a petition in the Court of First Instance praying that the titles with respect to a tract of land be settled and adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act. Such tract of land was subsequently declared public land because no one appeared to claim it.

On January 25, 1934, a motion was filed by Ramon de Arruza and Mario Luzuriaga praying that this aforementioned decision of the lower court be set aside and that they be allowed to present their claim in a new trial in accordance with Act. No. 4043.

The Fiscal of Negros Occidental contended that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to reopen the case because the motion was not filed within the time limit prescribed by Act No. 4043. Said Act involved allowed the filing, within ten years, of a claim to lands that have been, or are about to be, declared lands of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted in cadastral cases.

The judge of the said court denied the motion of the appellants. Hence, this appeal.

Issues: Whether or not the ten-year period as contemplated in Act No. 2259 or the Cadastral Act is to be counted from the date the decision was rendered or from the date judicial proceedings were instituted in the cadastral case.

Ruling: The Supreme Court perused the history of the prior laws on the subject and noted that of the four laws on the subject, two refer in their titles to lands that have been declared public land by virtue of judicial decisions rendered while the other two fail to make any such allusion.

However, the text of all four laws speak of lands that have been or about to be declared land of public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted. The explanatory note likewise showed that the intention was to authorize filing of the claim to lots that have been declared public lands by virtue of judicial decisions but such was not adopted when the legislature made no alteration in the language of the statute to reflect such intention.

The legislative intent, therefore, is to start counting ten years from the date of the institution of the judicial proceeding and not from the date of judgment therein as rendered.

Salaysay vs. Castro98 Phil 264, G.R. No. L-966931 January 1956Montemayor, J.

Facts: Engracio Santos is the duly-elected Municipal Mayor and petitioner Nicanor Salaysay is the duly-elected Vice Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal.

On September 1955, Santos was held under suspension due to administrative charges. Salaysay then had to act as mayor in accordance with Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. Shortly thereafter, he filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor.

In view of filing for candidacy, the Office of the President designated Sto. Domingo acting municipal vice mayor to replace petitioner pursuant to Section 27 of the Revised Election Code which provides that any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one he is currently holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Petitioner refused to turn over the office to Sto. Domingo and brought the instant action of prohibition with preliminary injunction against Castro, Pascual, and Sto. Domingo to declare invalid, illegal and unauthorized the designation of Sto. Domingo as acting Vice-Mayor.

Issues: Whether a vice mayor who temporarily took over the functions of the mayor following the latters suspension from office, be deemed automatically resigned as acting mayor upon filing his certificate of candidacy for mayor.

Ruling: In interpreting the phrase actually holding in a provision which sates that any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of filing his certificate of candidacy, the Court examined the legislative history of the provision in order to ascertain the legislative intent. It noted that it was Commonwealth Act No. 666 which originally provided for virtually the same provision. Since the rule of hold-over was not in force when said law was still effective, President Roxas appointed many local officials to continue in office even after filing their certificates of candidacy.

To enable many local officials to continue in office, the legislature amended Commonwealth Act No. 666 by replacing the phrase for which he has been lastly elected with the phrase which he is actually holding.

It cannot thus be said that a vice mayor merely acting as mayor because of the disability of the latter comes under the provision and exception as he acts as mayor only in a temporary, provisional capacity.

Commissioner of Customs vs. CTA224 SCRA 665, G.R. Nos. 48886-8821 July 1993Melo, J.

Facts: The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan were constructed and improved and are operated and maintained solely by and at the expense of Iligan Express Corporation, a private corporation.

On various dates, the berthing facilities of the said company were used by the vessels of the Litonjua Shipping Company and were assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Customs. Private respondent, Litonjua Shipping Company filed a case before the Bureau of Customs claiming for a refund of said berthing fees on the premise that the latters ships berthed at a privately owned wharf or pier and is thus not liable to the payment of the berthing charges under Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended by P.D. No. 34.

The Commissioner of Customs, on the other hand, contends that the government has the authority to impose and collect berthing fees whether a vessel berths at a private pier or at a national port or that the port in Kiwalan is a national port, it being under the jurisdiction of the collection district and territorial limits of the national port of Iligan City. Private petitioner opposes this contention saying that the Kiwalan port is absent from the list of national ports mentioned in Executive Order No. 72, series of 1936.

Issues: Whether nor not a vessel which berths at a privately owned wharf or pier, is liable for the payment of the berthing charge under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which, as amended by P.D. No. 34 states that a vessel berthing at any national port shall pay berthing fees.

Ruling: In ruling upon the issue, the Supreme Court looked into the history of the Tariff and Customs Code. Prior to its amendment, the said law provided that berthing fees were to be collected from any vessel berthing at any port.

The Court noted that the word national before the word port was inserted in the amendment. Such a change in the phraseology by the amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had and held that such an insertion is an indication to change the meaning of Section 2901 from its original meaning.

Thus, only vessels berthing at national ports are liable for berthing fees. The petitioner must refund the berthing fees paid by the private respondent.

Gloria vs. CA306 SCRA 287, G.R. No. 13101221 April 1999Mendoza, J.

Facts: Private respondents are public school teachers who, on various dates in September and October 1990, did not report for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged and placed under preventive suspension.

An investigation was conducted and private respondents were found guilty as charged. On appeal to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB), they were also found guilty. They appealed to the Civil Service Commission which only affirmed the decision of the MSPB as to private respondent Margallo but found the other three private respondents guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the decision of the CSC as to the three private respondents while Margallos suspension was lifted. They filed for a reconsideration of the case. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision but ruled that the respondents were entitled to their salary during the suspension. Petitioner Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, Ricardo Gloria, moved for a reconsideration of the ordered payment of back salaries to the private respondents.

Issues: Whether or not a public officer or employee, who has been preventively suspended pending investigation of the administrative charges against him, is entitled to his salary and other benefits during such preventive suspension.

Ruling: The Supreme Court, ruling in the negative, held that the private respondent teachers are thus not entitled to their respective salary and other benefits beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension or, in other words, no compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending investigation but only for the period of preventive suspending pending appeal in the event the employee is exonerated.

The Civil Service act of 1959 provided for salaries in case of exoneration. However, when it was revised in 1975, the provision on the payment of salaries was deleted. Likewise, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that preventive suspension shall be without pay.

The rule applicable is that when an amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not have made the deletion had the intention been not in effect a change in its meaning. In the case at bar, the purpose is that the amendment is to disallow the payment of salaries for the period of suspension.

Buenaseda vs. Flavier226 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 10671921 September 1993Quiason, J.

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to nullify the order of the ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of the petitioners in connection to the administrative complaint filed by the private respondents against the petitioners for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents invoke Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 6770 which provides in part that the ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation. Respondents contend that the authority extends not only to those within the Ombudsmans office but also those in other departments or offices of the government.

It is claimed by the petitioners, however, that under this provision, the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases who are employed in his office, and not those who are employees in other departments or offices of the government, in view of the phrase any officer or employee under his authority.

Issues: Whether or not the Ombudsmans power to recommend the suspension of a public official or employee refers to penalties in administrative cases.

Whether or not the ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases who are employed in his office, and not those who are employees in other departments or offices of the government.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word suspension should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated, that where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, the correct one may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated. Thus, suspension bears the meaning of a punitive measure since the words association with it refer to penalties in administrative cases.

Anent the second issue, the Court, in determining the legislative intent, traced the history of Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 6770.

Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code authorized the chief of a bureau or office to suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation.

Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which superseded the above provision authorized the chief of a bureau or office to suspend any subordinate officer or employee, in his bureau or under his authority

In the Civil Service Law of 1975, however, the phrase subordinate officer and employee in his bureau was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase under his authority. Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper disciplining authority may suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation.x x x

The Ombudsman law deleted the words subordinate and in his bureau leaving the phrase to read suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation x x x The conclusion thus stands that Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed in his office or in other offices of the government.

Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals203 SCRA 504, G.R. No. 8673813 November 1991Feliciano, J.

Facts: Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital stock of Nestle Phils. Inc., was increased. Nestle underwent the necessary procedures and filings to secure the approval of the Board, stockholders, and the SEC, the latter approving the increase. In accordance with the Schedule of Fees and Charges implemented by the SEC, Nestle paid the amount of P50,000.

On December 16, 1983, the board of directors and stockholders of Nestle approved resolutions authorizing the issuance of 344,500 shares of the previously authorized but unissued capital stock of Nestle to San Miguel Corporation and to Nestle S.A.

On March 25, 1985, the petitioners filed a letter to the SEC seeking exemption of its proposed issuances of additional shares to its existing principal shareholders from the registration requirements of Section 4 of the Revised Security Act and from payment of fee referred to in Section 6 (c) of the same Act on the basis of the provisions of Section 6 (a) (4) of the Revised Security Act which uses the terms issuance of additional stock and increased capital stock as a criteria for the non-application of exemption but was denied. An appeal to the Court of Appeals failed, the CA having affirmed the SECs ruling and interpretation on the matter.

Hence this petition.

Issues: Whether or not Section 6 (a) (4) of the Revised Securities Act exempts company from the requirement of registration and payment of fees based on the premise that the term increased capital stock should be interpreted to refer to additional capital stock or equity participation of the existing stockholders as a consequence of either an increase of the authorized capital stock or the issuance of unissued capital stock.

Ruling: In upholding the construction of the SEC and CA, the Supreme Court had reason to accord great respect to the interpretation given by the former administrative agency for it would permit greater opportunity for the SEC to implement the statutory objective of protecting the investing public by requiring proposed issuers of capital stock to inform such public of the true financial conditions and prospects of the corporation.

In giving greater credence to the interpretation of the SEC, the court had reason to state that: [i]t is a principle too well established to require extensive documentation that the construction given to a statute by an administrative agency charged with the interpretation and application of that statute is entitled to great respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly to be in sharp conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution and other laws.

Philippine Sugar Central vs. Collector of Customs51 Phil 143, G.R. No. 277616 December 1927Del Rosario, J.

Facts: On May 1926, when plaintiff loaded the steamship Hannover at Palupandan with over 5 million kilos of sugar, a collector of customs assessed and collected P10,248.84 as wharfage dues.

The plaintiff now protests that it is not liable to pay such wharfage dues since the wharf used by the plaintiff for shipping said goods did not belong to the Government as required by the current customs laws.

Issues: Whether or not the Government can legally collect duties as a charge for wharfage upon all articles exported through privately-owned wharves.

Ruling: In ruling upon the issue, the Supreme Court had occasion to look upon older legislative enactments in order to determine legislative intent as regards the phrase as a charge for wharfage. The Court determined that in order to determine such, the history, relative situation and the conditions existing at the time the law was enacted must be taken into consideration.

When original Customs Tariff of 1901 was enacted by the Philippine Commission, the government did not own or operate a pier or wharf anywhere within the Philippine Islands. It must also be considered that the tax in question has been paid without any protest or objection since the time of its enactment except when its constitutionality was assailed in Compaia General Tobacos vs. Collector of Customs and its validity was subsequently sustained.

The Supreme Court resolved that the tax in question has at all times for twenty-six years been levied and collected by the government before it owned or operated any wharf, and that it has spent millions in the construction of wharves in its principal ports of entries and that the determination of the issue in this case would have far reaching effects on the governments finances.

The Court cites the case of Kelley vs. Multnomah County which stated that: where those whose duty it is to execute a law have uniformly given it a particular construction, and that construction has been acquiesced in and acted upon for a long time, it is a contemporary exposition of the statute, which always commands the attention of the courts, and will be followed unless it clearly and manifestly appears to be wrong.

Taking all these into consideration, the Supreme Court ruled that the purpose of the law was to authorize the Government of the Philippine Islands to levy a duty of $1 per gross ton as a charge for wharfage. The long and continuous construction which has been placed upon it by government officials tasked with the execution of the laws are not to be easily overruled, and the very fact that Congress has not seen fit to repeal or change the law is a very potent argument in favor of sustaining such a construction.

IV. Adherence to, or Departure from LanguageNational Federation of Labor vs. NLRC327 SCRA 158, G.R. No. 1277182 March 2000De Leon, Jr., J.

Facts: Petitioners are members of the National Federation of Labor, a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. The petitioners were employed by Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general manager and owner, respectively, of the Patalon Coconut Estate in Zamboanga, a business engaged in growing agricultural products and in raising livestock.

In 1988, Congress enacted R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which mandated the compulsory acquisition of all covered agricultural lands for distribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries. Pursuant to said law, the Patalon Coconut Estate was awarded to the Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform Association, of which petitioners are members and co-owners.

As a result of this acquisition, private respondents shut down the operation of the Patalon Coconut Estate and the employment of the petitioners were terminated. Petitioners did not receive any separation pay. Being beneficiaries of the Patalon Coconut Estate, the petitioners became part-owners of the land.

Petitioners then filed a complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch in Zamboanga praying for reinstatement with full backwages on the ground of illegal dismissal but such was dismissed. Appeal to the NLRC was also dismissed. Hence, this petition.

Issues: Whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease its operation because of the compulsory acquisition by the government of its land for purposes of agrarian reform, is liable to pay separation pay to its affected employees.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that even if the situation was the closure of business of the Patalon Coconut Estate, the petitioners are still not entitled to such separation pay. Art. 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment and reduction of personnel. However, the case at bar involves neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel. The Estate was closed because it was acquired by DAR pursuant to R.A. 6657. Hence, it is not applicable to the case at bar.

The closure contemplated under Art. 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral and voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment as may be gleaned from the wording of the said legal provision that the employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the use of the word may in a statute, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only.

The statutory construction rule of verba legis finds application in this case. It states that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

Art. 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the employees.

Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, et al.207 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 8424025 March 1992Paras, J.

Facts: Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973, without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children, and was survived, among others by acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased: Oliva Pascual and Hermes Pascual.

Adela Pascual, spouse of the deceased, filed a Special Proceeding for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Later, she filed a Supplemental Petition where she expressly stated that Olivia and Hermes Pascual are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual. Again, she filed an affidavit to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband, to belie the statement made by the oppositors.

The above-mentioned heirs entered into a compromise agreement on October 16, 1985 despite the manifestation/motion of the petitioners stating their hereditary rights in the estate of their uncle.

On September 30, 1987, they filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights which was thereafter denied. The Court of appeals also denied and dismissed their petition and motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners contend that they do not fall within the purview of Art. 992 because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception. Otherwise, they say that the term illegitimate must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children.

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the petitioners are within the prohibition of Art. 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC.

Issues: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code can be interpreted as to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased and therefore bar petitioners from inheriting from the deceased.

Ruling: The Court, in citing Diaz v. IAC, said that Art. 992 of the civil code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Clearly, the term illegitimate refers to both natural and spurious children.

The Court furthermore elucidated that though Eligio Pascual is, indeed, a legitimate child, petitioners are illegitimate children of Eligio and thus cannot represent their father Eligio in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual.

When the law is clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. Dura lex sed lex.

Santiago vs. Comelec270 SCRA 107, G.R. No. 12732519 March 1997Davide, Jr., J.

Facts: On December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative Sen. Roco filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not initiatory petition properly cognizable the COMELEC.

On December 18, 1996 petitioners Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition raising an argument that R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the constitution was left to some future law.

On January 2, 1997, private respondents, through Atty. Quadra, filed their comment on the petition arguing that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of peoples initiative to propose amendments to the constitution. On that same day, private respondent Delfin also filed in his own behalf a comment arguing that R.A. No. 6735 is the law that governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws. Also on that same day COMELEC filed a comment contending that R.A. No. 6735 deals with peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Sec. 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power and its Sec. 3 includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution.

On January 17, 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitutsyon and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. filed a motion for intervention arguing that R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Issues: Whether or not R.A. No. 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Art XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. It further said that such law cannot be used as a basis to implement the right of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.

The majority of the Court adopted and strict and literal rather than a liberal construction of the law, which is not in keeping with the maxim, interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat or that interpretation as will give the thing efficacy is to be adopted, as well as the rule that provisions on initiative should be liberal construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not to hamper the exercise by voters of the rights granted thereby.

Casela vs. Court of Appeals35 SCRA 279, G.R. No. 2675416 October 1970Castro, J.

Facts: The Court of Agrarian Relations ordered defendant Mateo Casela ejected in a case against him by Exequiel Magsaysay. However, he refused to vacate and the court issued two more writs.

Instead of obeying, Casela instituted a civil case asking the respondent to pay him the value of his house, improvements and damages thereto. Against this, Magsaysay filed for a writ of execution pending the final outcome of the civil case. Casela filed a countermotion to declare defendant and the sheriff in contempt of court. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Magsaysay and said that the issue should have been brought before the Agrarian Court instead of the Court of First Instance.

Magsaysay then filed a motion of an alias writ of execution to the Agrarian Court but was denied holding that the first decision as to ejecting Casela was beyond the five year reglamentary period. He moved for reconsideration which was granted. Hence, this appeal by Casela.

Issues: Whether or not Magsaysays motion for execution of December 11, 1963 was filed beyond the five-year reglamentary period and thus prescribed.

Ruling: From the date when the decision in question became final and executory (December 17, 1956) until December 11, 1963 when Magsaysays motion for execution was filed, a period of six years, eleven months, and twenty-four days had elapsed. From this period must be subtracted the time during which the writs of execution could not be served due to reasons of acts or causes not of Magsaysays own making or a period of three years, nine months and twenty five days. Consequently, only three years, one month and twenty nine days can be charged against the five year reglamentary period.

Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of statutes. The courts are not hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of the statute; the spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. This rule will especially be applicable where adherence to the letter of the statute would result in absurdity and injustice.

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court150 SCRA 259, G.R. No. L-7287328 May 1987Cruz, J.

Facts: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents under the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. On March 15, 1963, Celestino Padua transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. On April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees.

Petitioners occupied two fifths of the said lot and subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with the Paduas consent, they built a semi-concrete house on part of the enclosed area.

Mariano Padua sought to redeem the area but his case was dismissed. Tecla Padua, another co-heir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption by her brother. The trial court dismissed the complaint saying that it was dropped for not being filed within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963.

Issues: Whether or not the interpretation and application of Article 1088 is invoked correctly.

Ruling: It is a cardinal rule in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the law maker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice. Thus, we interpret the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice re inseparable and keep them so. For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much as within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.

King vs. Hernandez114 Phil 731, G.R. No. L-1485931 March 1962Bautista Angelo, J.

Facts: On January 1, 1957, Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen, became the owner of the business establishment known as Import Meat and Produce a grocery wholesale and retail business, previously owned by the Philippine Cold Stores, Inc. In the business were 12 Filipinos and 3 Chinese, the latter being employees of the old owner, Philippine Cold Stores, Inc.

Three weeks after King had acquired the business as aforesaid, he sought permission from the President of the Philippines to retain the services of the three Chinese employees pursuant to Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act 108, coursing his letter through the Secretary of Commerce and Industry.

This official recommended the disapproval of Kings request on the ground that aliens may not be appointed to operate or administer a retail business under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1180 which requires capital to be wholly owned by Filipino citizens with the exception to the technical personnel which may be allowed by the authorization from the President. The president approved the recommendation and stated that purchasers and salesmen are not technical positions within the meaning of Section 2-A of C.A. 108 as amended by R.A. No. 134.

It is contended by the petitioner that this provision does not prohibit employment of aliens in non-control positions because they do not, as such, intervene in the management, operation, administration or control of the retail establishment.

Issues: Whether or not a Chinese may be employed in a non-control position in a retail establishment, a wholly nationalized business under R.A. No. 1180, otherwise known as the Retail Trade law.

Ruling: In rejecting the petitioners argument, the Supreme Court ruled that when the law says that you cannot employ an alien in any position pertaining to the management, operation, administration and control whether as an officer, employee, or laborer therein, it only means one thing: the employment of a person who is not a Filipino citizen even in a minor or clerical or non-control position. The reason is obvious: to plug any loophole or close any avenue that an unscrupulous alien may resort to flout the law or defeat its purpose, for no one can deny that while one may be employed in a non-control position who apparently is harmless he may turn out to be a mere tool to further the evil designs of the employer. It is imperative that the law be interpreted in a manner that would stave off any attempt at circumvention of the legislative purpose.

U.S. vs. Toribio15 Phil 85, G.R. No. 506025 January 1910Carson, J.

Facts: The appellant was charged for slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption, carabaos without a permit from the municipal treasurer wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of Section 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147.

It appears that in the town where the animal was slaughtered, there is no municipal slaughterhouse and appellant thus contends that under such circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 cannot apply.

Issues: Whether or not the slaughter of large cattle outside of the municipal slaughterhouse without a permit by the municipal treasurer is prohibited under Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147 which provides that no large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasurer and any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption any large cattle except upon permit secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished x x x.

Ruling: The Court said that the language of these sections fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase, at the municipal slaughterhouse may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word slaughtered and the words killed for food in section 30, and the words slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption and the words killing for food in section 33; and the other whereby the phrase at the municipal slaughterhouse may be taken as limiting and restricting merely the words killed for food and killing for food

The Court ruled that considering the whole act and keeping in mind the manifest purpose and object of the enactmentto protect large cattle against theft and to make easy recovery and return of such cattle to their owners, when lost, strayed or stolenthe latter construction should be adopted. It concluded that to adopt the first interpretation would abort the provisions for registry and record of brands and marks of identification of large cattle, since thieves in possession of such cattle could evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside the municipal slaughterhouse and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing. Such construction should be avoided which would bring such result and defeat the object of the law.

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted. Literal import must yield to intent.

Commendador vs. De Villa200 SCRA 81, G.R. No. 931772 August 1991Cruz, J.

Facts: Petitioners are officers of the AFP facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup detat. Charges against them are in violation of the Articles of War: mutiny, conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman, various crimes and Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder. Petitioner challenged the proceedings on various grounds through a motion for summary dismissal but was denied by the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. The Petitioners then manifested their right to raise peremptory challenges and invoked Art. 18 of CA No. 408. However, the Court Martial ruled that C.A. No. 408 was already terminated due to P.D. No. 39

Issues: Whether P.D. No. 39, which withdrew the right to peremptorily challenge members of a military tribunal, had been rendered inoperative by Proclamation No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of a state of martial law.

Ruling: In answering in the affirmative, the Court ruled, applying the principle of cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, that with the termination of martial law and the dissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically and the decree itself ceased.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.

Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. CTA100 Phil 851, G.R. No. L-92741 February 1957Montemayor, J.

Facts: Lopez and Sons imported hexagonal wire from Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties in the importation on the basis of consular and supplier invoice. The collector, however, reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight of said wire netting and as a result, additional customs duties were levied upon petitioners.

They appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals but such was dismissed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125.

Said law, creating the Court of Tax Appeals, provides in Section 7 thereof that the Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the commission or customs x x x. However, Section 11 of said law states that persons adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the x x x collector of customs x x x may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after receipt of such decision or ruling.

Issues: Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over the case owing to the discrepancy in Sections 7 and 11 of R.A. No. 1125.

Ruling: There is a discrepancy between Sections 7 and 11. Taken literally, Section 7 would be empty, meaningless and unenforceable because, while it grants the Court of Tax Appeals jurisdiction to review decisions of the commissioner of customs, under Section 11, no person affected by the commissioner of customs may appeal to the tax court.

The Court changed the phrase collector of customs to commissioner of customs to correct an obvious mistake in the law. It is more reasonable and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the legislature meant and intended to say, commissioner of customs, instead of collector of customs in the first paragraph of said Section.

It further said that the Courts are not indulging in judicial legislation. They are merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clerical error in the wording of a statute in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the legislature.

People vs. Yu Hai99 Phil 725, G.R. No. L-959815 August 1956Reyes, J.B.L., J.

Facts: Respondent Yu Hai was accused of violating Article 195 (2) of the Revised Penal Code for having allegedly permitted the game of Panching or Paikiu, a game of hazard, and having acted as maintainer thereof. The accused moved to quash on the ground that it charged more than one offense and that the criminal action or liability had already been extinguished.

On December 24, 1954, the court sustained respondents motion to quash on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense under Article 90 of the RPC which prescribes in two months. However, it is argued by the petitioner that the crime prescribes in ten years because the crime may be punished by a maximum fine of 200 peso, which is correctional under Art. 26 and therefore prescribes in ten years in accordance with Art. 90. The provincial appealed to the CFI of Caloocan which order the dismissal of the information.

Hence, this petition.

Issues: When does a crime punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos prescribe?

Ruling: Article 90 provides that crimes punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor; which shall prescribe in five years; libel prescribes in one year; and light offenses prescribe in two months. Article 9 defines light offenses as those for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both is provided. Fine, on the other hand, is classified under Art. 26 into afflictive, correctional and light; and a fine not exceeding 6,000 pesos but not less than 200 pesos is correctional; light if it be less than 200 pesos.

In rejecting such argument, the Court said: Article 90 could not have intended that light offenses as defined by Art. 9 would have two prescriptive periodstwo months if they are penalized by arresto menor and/or a fine of less than P200. The difference of only one peso in the imposable fine would mean the difference of nine years and ten months in the prescriptive period of the offense. And what is worse, the proper prescriptive period could not be ascertained until and unless the court decided which of the alternative penalties should be imposed, which the court could not properly do if the offense had prescribed, for then it could no longer be prosecuted.

These absurd results the lawmaker could not have wittingly intended especially since more serious offenses as those punishable by arresto mayor prescribe also under Article 90 in five years while other less grave offenses like libel and oral defamation and slander prescribe in even shorter periods of time: one year and six months, respectively.

Amatan vs. Aujero248 SCRA 511, A.M. No. RTJ-93-95627 September 1995Kapunan, J.

Facts: A criminal complaint for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against Rodrigo Umpad for shooting Genaro Tagsip, causing the latters death. The crime of homicide was filed by the provincial fiscal after preliminary investigation. Upon arraignment, the offended party and the public prosecutor entered into a plea bargain agreement with the approval of the judge and thus the information was amended to attempted homicide to which the accused pleaded guilty thereto. The agreement was entered into and approved by the judge pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which allows the accused to plead guilty to a lesser felony.

The deceaseds brother-in-law, herein complainant, wrote a letter-complaint to the Chief Justice for respondent judge Aujeros gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. In reply, Aujero based his reliance on the aforementioned rule and that the plea bargain was pursuant to that rule and with the consent of the deceaseds wife.

Issues: Whether or not Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law because of his interpretation of Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Ruling: In holding the judge administratively liable for gross ignorance, the Court ruled that the fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lesser offence of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.

It further went on to say that where literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice for to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justicia, ruat coelum.

People vs. Purisima86 SCRA 542, G.R. No. L-42050-6620 November 1978Muoz-Palma, J.

Facts: The accused were charged with violation of P.D. No. 9 or illegal possession of a deadly weapon, specifically carrying outside ones residence any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for livelihood. The defense bases its contention that the accused should be carrying such weapons for the furtherance or in relation to subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

Issues: Whether or not the law requires the elements that the possession of a deadly firearm be for the purposes or the furtherance of those aims stated above in order that the accused be convicted.

Ruling: The Court ruled that pursuant to the preamble of P.D. No. 9, the spirit and intent of the decree is to require the motivation mentioned in the preamble as an indispensable element of the crim.

Where, as in this case, there exists ambiguity in the scope of the law, tis preamble may be referred to in order to determine legislative intent

Salvacion vs. Central Bank278 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 9472321 August 1997Torres, Jr., J.

Facts: Greg Bartelli, American tourist, lured and detained petitioner Karen Salvacion and was able to rape the latter several times. Bartelli was eventually arrested and criminal cases for serious illegal detention and four counts of rape were filed against him. A civil case for damages with preliminary attachments were also filed.

On the day for Bartellis petition for bail hearing, the latter escaped from jail. Hence, the criminal cases were archived but the civil proceedings continued and later granted moral and exemplary damages to the petitioner through a writ of attachment on Bartellis dollar deposits.

The Philippine bank and the Central Bank refused to honor the writ of attachment, invoking Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426, as amended, which provides in part that foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.

Issues: Whether or not the dollar bank deposit in a Philippine bank of a foreign tourist can be attached to satisfy the moral damages awarded in favor of the latters 12-year-old rape victim.

Ruling: In rejecting the contention of the banks and holding that the peculiar circumstances obtaining make the law not applicable to the case of the 12-year old rape victim and that the banks should comply with the writ of execution and release the dollar deposit in favor of the victim, the Court applied the principles of right and justice to prevail over the strict and literal words of the statute.

The questioned law would, therefore, make the favorable judgment futile. The intention of the questioned law may have been good when it was enacted which is a time when the economy was in shambles. However, the law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dao de otro. When the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.

Demafiles vs. Comelec21 SCRA 1463, G.R. No. L-2839629 December 1967Castro, J.

Facts: The new municipality of Sebaste held its first election of