Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents. Gamboa & Hofileña Law Office for petitioners. ALAMPAY, J.:Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3, 1986. Said law provides:

SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte. SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less. SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz. SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the Philippines shall appoint the first officials of the province. SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds. SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-24) Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that— See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are:

SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.

The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. (Rollo, p. 6)

Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during which the Court was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition, a supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring therein that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as scheduled but that there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court. The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Nrte, namely: the Cities of Silay, �Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change the prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional issues which they have raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution.'"At the same time, they asked that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on the very fundamental and far-reaching questions that petitioners have brought out. Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered moot the prayer in their initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined, petitioners plead, nevertheless, that-

... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent Commission on Elections to desist from issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986. Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte to be not in accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate, at the same time making pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect, being a patent legal nullity; And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent Provincial Treasurer, to desist from ordering the release of any local funds to answer for expenses incurred in the holding of such plebiscite until ordered by the Court. (Rollo pp. 9-10). Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance the issuance of any official proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite.

During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as amicus curiae in this case (dated December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court on January 2, 1986) was submitted by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla. Said motion was granted in Our resolution of January 2, 1986. Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with prayer for restraining order, the Court, on January 7, 1986 resolved, without giving due course to the same, to require respondents to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss. Complying with said resolution, public respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, on January 14, 1986, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that the said law is not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents state that the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question. They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with. Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte. Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, de not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 61), particularly the pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:

1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression 'unit or units affected'. It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain Barangays are separated

from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive, however, to contend as respondents do that the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite. 2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. ... 3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are indications that the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice-their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari materia.

Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with force in the case at bar. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would be lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot and academic considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it; and because "the affirmative votes cast represented a majority of the total votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall be known as "Negros del Norte". Thus, respondents stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del Norte province, the appointments of the officials of said province created were announced. On these considerations, respondents urge that this case should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the creation of the new province is now a "fait accompli." In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear to be agreed to by the parties herein or stand unchallenged. Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Negros Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public funds in connection with the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the Comment to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37). Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be directed by this Court to desist from ordering the release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should not longer deserve further consideration. Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, the following:

SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the South and the natural boundaries of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, containing an area of 285,656 hectares more or less. (Emphasis supplied).

However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new Province of Negros del Norte were defined therein and its boundaries then stated to be as follows:

SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Toboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the Province of Negros Occidental and constituted into a new province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte. SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.

Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by Provincial Treasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental, dated July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as follows:

xxx xxx xxxThis is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental have the land area as indicated hereunder based on the Special Report No. 3, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila. Land Area (Sq. Km.) 1. Silay City ...................................................................214.82. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3 3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9 4. Manapla......................................................................112.9 5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5 6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6 7. Escalante ....................................................................124.08. Toboso.......................................................................123.4 9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5 10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3 11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available)This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever purpose it may serve him. (SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZProvincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).

Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact that the area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the component units of the new province, was derived from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added thereto was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of Murcia, Negros Occidental. It is significant to note the uncontroverted submission of petitioners that the total land area of the entire municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D", Rollo, p. 91). One-fourth of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the portions derived from the land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) would constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers. This area of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square kilometers, representing the total land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz and the Municipalities of E.R. Magalona, Victorias, Manapla, Sagay, Escalante, Taboso and Calatrava, will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers using as basis the Special Report, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 of the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90). No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of petitioners that the original provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, reads:

SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President shall appoint the first officials of the new province.

However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant change in the above provision. The statute, as modified, provides that the requisite plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and towns which would comprise the new province that is assailed by the petitioners as violative of the provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit that Sec. 3, ART XI thereof, contemplates a plebiscite that would be held in the unit or units affected by the creation of the new province as a result of the consequent division of and substantial alteration of the boundaries of the existing province. In this instance, the voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to participate in the questioned plebiscite. Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli. In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to the unusually rapid creation of the instant province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and discourage the commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our fundamental law, done by whatever branch of our government. This Court gives notice that it will not look with favor upon those who may be hereafter inclined to ram through all sorts of legislative measures and then implement the same with indecent haste, even if such acts would violate the Constitution and the prevailing statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that this Tribunal be blind and deaf to protests on the ground that what is already done is done. To such untenable argument the reply would be that, be this so, the Court, nevertheless, still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought to its attention. On the merits of the case. Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of Negros del Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We again quote:

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal

precept that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein. We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper subject of judicial inquiry. Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to say the least, are most enlightening and provoking but are factual issues the Court cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by petitioners of the unexplained changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and surreptitious manner of passage and approval of said law; the abrupt scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news articles regarding the questionable conduct of the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986; all serve as interesting reading but are not the decisive matters which should be reckoned in the resolution of this case. What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by this Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to a plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that would constitute the new municipality. This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is, however, highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating that said case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or units affected." The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly interpreted. The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected." It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which We hereunder quote:

2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or an of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.

This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the— forerunner of the ruling which We now consider applicable to the case at bar, In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he therein assailed as suffering from a constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum was intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline in the instant case. Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the present Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein were formerly considered acceptable because of the views then taken that local autonomy would be better promoted However, even this consideration no longer retains persuasive value. The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter under consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was a division of a barangay which is the smallest political unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser problems are involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit

contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein. It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution. We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected. In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving phrase that the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners. Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary. As contended by petitioners,—

Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to each other. A Province maybe created where an existing province is divided or two provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially altered. It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all the voters in the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true.

It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this case can depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored.

It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned. In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate and that this Court make a pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist. Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new province of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the officials thereof, must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the complications currently attending to its creation. As has been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been impleaded as the defendant in a suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the immediate allocation, distribution and transfer of funds by the parent province to the new province, in an amount claimed to be at least P10,000,000.00. The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code, as earlier discussed. It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion is made to negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometers because its land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking into account government statistics relative to the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local Government Code speaks of the territory of the province to be created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area but also the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even the submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect, and fallacious. The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).

The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p. 909). It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but which has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned. Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was marred by "dirty tricks", in the introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve "pure and simple gerrymandering; "that recent happenings more than amply demonstrate that far from guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has become the fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied). It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of this case can be resolved without need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the making of the questioned law. No proper challenge on those grounds can also be made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the motives or wisdom in the exercise of legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions taken by tools of a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a vigilant people. Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to preserve the continued existence of their historic province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to our Constitution which they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our people there would be exemplary citizens such as the petitioners herein. WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void. SO ORDERED. Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

TAN vs. COMELECG.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of LocalGovernmentCodeFacts: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An ActCreating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos andthe municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscitefor January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contendingthat the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the LocalGovernment Code because:• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those livingwithin the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included inthe plebiscite.• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would onlybe about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than theminimumarea prescribed by thegoverning statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.Issue:WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of theConsititution, which states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barriomay be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially alteredexcept in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government

Code,and subject to the approval by a majority of thevotesin a plebiscite in the unit orunits affected”? NO.Held:Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantialalteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite inthe unit or units affected” must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed newprovince of Negros del Norte will necessarilyresultin the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundarieswould be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposedprovince of Negros del Norte.Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal orcompelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos isapplicable, to wit:“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of thepeople of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case atbar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.” The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. Thesubstantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention theadverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argues the points raised by the petitioners.”SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaFIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55230 November 8, 1988HON. RICHARD J. GORDON, in his capacity as City Mayor of Olongapo, petitioner, vs.JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II and Spouses EDUARDO and ROSALINDA YAMBAO, respondents. CRUZ, J.:The issue before the Court is the conflict between the Food and Drug Administration and the mayor of Olongapo City over the power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drug stores in the said city. While conceding that the FDA possesses such power, the mayor claims he may nevertheless, in the exercise of his own power, prevent the operation of drug stores previously permitted by the former. There are two drug stores involved in this dispute, to wit, the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store, both owned by private respondent Rosalinda Yambao. 1 They are located a few meters from each other in the same building on Hospital Road, Olongapo City. 2 They were covered by Mayor's Permits Nos. 1954 and 1955, respectively, issued for the year 1980, 3 and licenses to operate issued by the FDA for the same year. 4 This case arose when on March 21, 1980, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a joint team composed of agents from the FDA and narcotics agents from the Philippine Constabulary conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian Drug Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium 10 mg. worth P410.00 without a doctor's prescription.. 5 A report on the operation was submitted to the petitioner, as mayor of Olongapo City, on April 9, 1980. 6 On April 17, 1980, he issued a letter summarily revoking Mayor's Permit No. 1954, effective April 18, 1980, "for rampant violation of R.A. 5921, otherwise known as the Pharmacy Law and R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." 7 Later, when the petitioner went to Singapore, Vice-Mayor Alfredo T. de Perio, Jr. caused the posting of a signboard at the San Sebastian Drug Store announcing its permanent closure. 8 Acting on the same investigation report of the "test-buy," and after hearing, FDA Administrator Arsenio Regala, on April 25, 1980, directed the closure of the drug store for three days and its payment of a P100.00 fine for violation of R.A. No. 3720. He also issued a stern warning to Yambao against a repetition of the infraction. 9 On April 29, 1980, the FDA lifted its closure order after noting that the penalties imposed had already been discharged and allowed the drug store to resume operations. 10

On April 30, 1980, Yambao, through her counsel, wrote a letter to the petitioner seeking reconsideration of the revoca tion of Mayor's Permit No. 1954. 11 On May 7, 1980, having received no reply, she and her husband filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a complaint for mandamus and damages, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, against the petitioner and Vice-Mayor de Perio. 12On the same date, Yambao requested permission from the FDA to exchange the locations of the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store for reasons of "business preference." 13 The request was granted. 14 But when informed of this action, the petitioner, in a letter to the private respondent dated May 13, 1980, disapproved the transfers and suspended Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the Olongapo City Drug Store. 15The Yambaos then filed on May 15, 1980, a supplemental complaint questioning the said suspension and praying for the issuance of a preliminary writ of prohibitory injunction. 16 On the same day, the respondent judge issued an order directing the maintenance of the status quo with respect to the Olongapo City Drug Store pending resolution of the issues. 17 On May 21, 1980, the petitioner wrote the FDA requesting reconsideration of its order of April 29, 1980, allowing resumption of the operation of the San Sebastian Drug Store. 18 The request was denied by the FDA in its reply dated May 27, 1980. 19A motion for reconsideration of the status quo order had earlier been filed on May 1, 1980 by the petitioner. After a joint hearing and an exchange of memoranda thereon, the respondent judge issued an order on July 16, 1980, 20 the dispositive portion of which read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the defendants' motion for reconsideration of the status quo order dated May 15, 1980, is hereby DENIED and the letter of the defendant city mayor dated April 17, 1980, for the revocation of Mayor's Permit No. 1954 for the San Sebastian Drug Store is declared null and void. Accordingly, a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction is heretofore issued enjoining defendants from doing acts directed towards the closure of the San Sebastian Drug Store and the suspension of the Olongapo City Drug Store both situated at Hospital Road, Olongapo City. Further, the signboard posted at San Sebastian Drug Store by the defendants is ordered removed in order that the said drug store will resume its normal business operation.The hearing of the main petition for damages is set on August 14, 1980, at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

The petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above stated order was denied in an order dated September 4, 1980. 21 The petitioner thereupon came to this Court in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary, injunction, to challenge the aforesaid orders. We issued a temporary restraining order against the respondent judge on October 2 7, 1980, 22 but lifted it on December 10, 1980, for failure of the petitioner to file his comment on the private respondents' motion to lift the said order and/or for issuance of a counter restraining order. 23First, let us compare the bases of the powers and functions respectively claimed by the FDA and the petitioner as mayor of Olongapo City. The task of drug inspection was originally lodged with the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners pursuant to Act 2762, as amended by Act 4162. By virtue of Executive Order No. 392 dated January 1, 1951 (mandating reorganization of various departments and agencies), this was assumed by the Department of Health and exercised through an office in the Bureau of Health known as the Drug Inspection Section. This section was empowered "to authorize the opening of pharmacies, drug stores and dispensaries, and similar establishments after inspection by persons authorized by law." The Food and Drug Administration was created under R.A. No. 3720 (otherwise known as the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act), approved on June 22, 1963, and vested with all drug inspection functions in line with "the policy of the State to insure safe and good quality supply of food, drug and cosmetics, and to regulate the production, sale and traffic of the same to protect the health of the people." Section 5 of this Act specifically empowers it:

(e) to issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of license and spotcheck for compliance with regulations regarding operation of food, drug and cosmetic manufacturers and establishments.

For a more effective exercise of this function, the Department of Health issued on March 5, 1968, Administrative Order No. 60, series of 1968, laying down the requirements for the application to be filed with the FDA for authorization to operate or establish a drug establishment. The order provides that upon approval of the

application, the FDA shall issue to the owner or administrator of the drug store or similar establishment a "License to Operate" which "shall be renewed within the first 3 months of each year upon payment of the required fees." This license contains the following reservation:

However, should during the period of issue, a violation of any provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and/or the regulations issued thereunder be committed, this License shall be subject to suspension or revocation.

When the drug addiction problem continued to aggravate, P.D. No. 280 was promulgated on August 27, 1973, to give more teeth to the powers of the FDA, thus:

Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Food and Drug Administrator is hereby authorized to order the closure, or suspend or revoke the license of any drug establishment which after administrative investigation is found guilty of selling or dispensing drugs medicines and other similar substances in violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, or other laws regulating the sale or dispensation of drugs, or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto. Sec. 2. The administrative investigation shall be summary in character. The owner of the drug store shall be given an opportunity to be heard. (P.D. 280, emphasis supplied.)

For his part, the petitioner, traces his authority to the charter of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645, which inter alia empowers the city mayor under Section 10 thereof:

k. to grant or refuse municipal licenses to operate or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or city ordinances are being committed under protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other good reason of general interest.

The charter also provides, in connection with the powers of the city health officer, that: Sec. 6 (k). He and his representatives shall have the power to arrest violators of health laws, ordinances, rules and regulations and to recommend the revocation or suspension of the permits of the different establishments to the City Mayor for violation of health laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)

An application to establish a drug store in Olongapo City must be filed with the Office of the Mayor and must show that the applicant has complied with the existing ordinances on health and sanitation, location or zoning, fire or building, and other local requirements. If the application is approved, the applicant is granted what is denominated a "Mayor's Permit" providing inter alia that it "is valid only at the place stated above and until (date), unless sooner revoked for cause." 24Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government. It is this policy the Court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws above-cited and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.A study of the said laws will show that the authorization to operate issued by the FDA is a condition precedent to the grant of a mayor's permit to the drug store seeking to operate within the limits of the city. This requirement is imperative. The power to determine if the opening of the drug store is conformable to the national policy and the laws on the regulation of drug sales belongs to the FDA. Hence, a permit issued by the mayor to a drug store not previously cleared with and licensed by the said agency will be a nullity. This is not to say, however, that the issuance of the mayor's permit is mandatory once it is shown that the FDA has licensed the operation of the applicant drug store. This is not a necessary consequence. For while it may appear that the applicant has complied with the pertinent national laws and policies, this fact alone will not signify compliance with the particular conditions laid down by the local authorities like zoning, building, health, sanitation, and safety regulations, and other municipal ordinances enacted under the general welfare clause. This compliance still has to be ascertained by the mayor if the permit is to be issued by his office. Should he find that the local requirements have not been observed, the mayor must then, in the exercise of his own authority under the charter, refuse to grant the permit sought.

The power to approve a license includes by implication,. even if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant the license, from which it is derived in the first place. Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its finding that the applicant drug store has complied with the requirements of the general laws and the implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their violation that the FDA may revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon his ascertainment that the conditions thereof as applied particularly to Olongapo City have been complied with, it is only for the violation of such conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit. Conversely, the mayor may not revoke his own permit on the ground that the compliance with the conditions laid down and found satisfactory by the FDA when it issued its license is in his own view not acceptable. This very same principle also operates on the FDA. The FDA may not revoke its license on the ground that the conditions laid down in the mayor's permit have been violated notwithstanding that no such finding has been made by the mayor. In the present case, the closure of the San Sebastian Drug Store was ordered by the FDA for violation of its own conditions, which it certainly had the primary power to enforce. By revoking the mayor's permit on the same ground for which the San Sebastian Drug Store had already been penalized by the FDA, the mayor was in effect reversing the derision of the latter on a matter that came under its jurisdiction. As the infraction involved the pharmacy and drug laws which the FDA had the direct responsibility to execute, the mayor had no authority to interpose his own findings on the matter and substitute them for the decision already made by the FDA. It would have been different if the offense condoned by the FDA was a violation of, say, a city ordinance requiring buildings to be provided with safety devices or equipment, like fire extinguishers. The city executive may ignore such condonation and revoke the mayor's permit just the same. In this situation, he would be acting properly because the enforcement of the city ordinance is his own prerogative. In the present case, however, the condition allegedly violated related to a national law, not to a matter of merely local concern, and so came under the 'jurisdiction of the FDA. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of administrative authorities are accorded great respect because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. 25 Even the courts of justice, including this Court, are concluded by such findings in the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which is not present in the case at bar. For all his experience in the enforcement of city ordinances, the petitioner cannot claim the superior aptitudes of the FDA in the enforcement of the pharmacy and drug addiction laws. He should therefore also be prepared, like the courts of justice themselves, to accept its decisions on this matter. The petitioner magnifies the infraction committed by the San Sebastian Drug Store but the FDA minimizes it. According to the FDA Administrator, Valium is not even a prohibited drug, which is why the penalty imposed was only a 3-day closure of the drug store and a fine of P100.00. 26 Notably, the criminal charges filed against the private respondent for the questioned transaction were dismissed by the fiscal's office. 27 It is also worth noting that the San Sebastian Drug Store was penalized by the FDA only after a hearing held on April 25, 1980, at which private respondent Yambao, assisted by her lawyer-husband, appeared and testified. 28 By contrast, the revocation of the mayor's permit was communicated to her in a letter 29 reading simply as follows:

April 17, 1980 Rosalinda Yambaoc/o San Sebastian Drug StoreHospital Road, Olongapo City Madame: Based on a report submitted by PC Major Virtus V. Gil, Chief 3 RFO, Dis. B, Task Force "Bagong Buhay," "you are rampantly violating the provisions of Republic Act 5921 otherwise known as the 'Pharmacy Law." Aside from this, there is evidence that you are dispensing regulated drugs contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.In view of the above, Mayors Permit No. 1954 heretofore issued in your name for the operation of a drug store (San Sebastian) at the Annex Building of the Fil-Am (IYC), along Hospital Road, this City, is REVOKED effective April 18, 1980. PLEASE BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) RICHARD J. GORDONCity Mayor

If only for the violation of due process which is manifest from this letter, the mayor's arbitrary action can be annulled.The indefinite suspension of the mayor's permit for Olongapo City Drug Store was based on the transfer thereof to the site of the San Sebastian Drug Store as approved by the FDA but without permission from the petitioner. On this matter, the Court believes that the final decision rested with the mayor. The condition violated related more to the location in Olongapo City of business establishments in general than to the regulation of drug stores in particular. It therefore came under the petitioner's jurisdiction. The FDA would have the right to disapprove the site of the drug store only if it would impair the health or other interests of the customers in contravention of the national laws or policies, as where the drug store is located in an unsanitary site. But the local executive would have reason to object to the location, even if approved by the FDA, where it does not conform to, say, a zoning ordinance intended to promote the comfort and convenience of the city residents. The reason given by the petitioner in disapproving the transfer was violation of Mayor's Permit No. 1955, which by its terms was valid only at the place stated therein. In the letter of May 13, 1980 30 the private respondent was clearly informed that for violation of the condition of Mayor's Permit No. 1955 granting her the of operating the Olongapo City Drug Store at No. 1-B Fil-Am Bldg., Hospital Road, the said permit was "hereby suspended." We find that that reason was valid enough. The permit clearly allowed the drug store to operate in the address given and not elsewhere. No hearing was necessary because the transfer without the mayor's permission is not disputed and was in fact impliedly admitted by the private respondent. If the private respondent wanted to transfer her drug store, what she should have done was to secure the approval not only of the FDA but also, and especially, of the mayor. Merely notifying the petitioner of the change in the location of her drug stores as allowed by the FDA was not enough. The FDA had no authority to revoke that particular condition of the mayor's permits indicating the sites of the two drug stores as approved by the mayor in the light of the needs of the city. Only the mayor could. We assume that Mayor's Permit No. 1954 could also have been validly suspended for the same reason (as the sites of the two drug stores were exchanged without amendment of their respective permits) were it not for the fact that such permit was revoked by the petitioner on the more serious ground of violation of the Pharmacy Law and the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. It is understood, however, that the suspension should be deemed valid only as the two drug stores have not returned to their original sites as specified in their respective permits. Indefinite suspension will amount to a permanent revocation, which will not be a commensurate penalty with the degree of the violation being penalized. The Court adds that denial of the request for transfer, if properly made by the private respondents, may not be validly denied by the judge in the absence of a clear showing that the transfer sought will prejudice the residents of the city. As the two drug stores are only a few meters from each other, and in the same building, there would seem to be no reason why the mere exchange of their locations should not be permitted. Notably, the location of the two drug stores had previously been approved in Mayor's Permit Nos. 1954 and 1955. Our holding is that the petitioner acted invalidly in revoking Mayor's Permit No. 1954 after the FDA had authorized the resumption of operations of the San Sebastian Drug Store following the enforcement of the penalties imposed upon it. However, it was competent for the petitioner to suspend Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the transfer of the Olongapo City Drug Store in violation of the said permit. Such suspension should nevertheless be effective only pending the return of the drug store to its authorized original site or the eventual approval by the mayor of the requested transfer if found to be warranted. The petitioner is to be commended for his zeal in the promotion of the campaign against drug addiction, which has sapped the vigor and blighted the future of many of our people, especially the youth. The legal presumption is that he acted in good faith and was motivated only by his concern for the residents of Olongapo City when he directed

the closure of the first drug store and the suspension of the permit of the other drug store. It appears, though, that he may have overreacted and was for this reason properly restrained by the respondent judge. WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders of July 6, 1980 and September 4, 1980, are MODIFIED in the sense that the suspension of Mayor's Permit No. 1955 shall be considered valid but only until the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store return to their original sites as specified in the FDA licenses and the mayor's permits or until the request for transfer, if made by the private respondents, is approved by the petitioner. The rest of the said Orders are AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

GORDON VS. VERIDIANO II167 SCRA 51CRUZ; November 8, 1988FACTS- T h e S a n S e b a s t i a n D r u g S t o r e ( S S D S ) a n d t h e Olongapo City Drug Store (OCDS), both owned byrespondent Rosalinda Yambao, are located a few m e t e r s f r o m e a c h o t h e r i n t h e s a m e b u i l d i n g i n Olongapo City. They were covered by Mayor's Permitsi s s u e d f o r t h e y e a r 1 9 8 0 a n d l i c e n s e s t o o p e r a t e issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) forthe same year.- In 1980, a joint team of agents from the FDA andnarcotics agents from the Phil ippine Constabularyconducted a " test buy" at SSDS and was sold 200 t a b l e t s o f V a l i u m 1 0 m g . w o r t h P 4 1 0 w i t h o u t a doctor 's prescription. A report on the operat ion was submitted to Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City.He issued a let ter summarily revoking the store’s Mayor's Permit of SSDS "for rampant violation of thePharmacy Law and the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."- Acting on the same investigation report of the "test-buy," and after hearing, FDA Adminis trator ArsenioRegala directed the closure of the drug store for 3days and i ts payment of a P100 fine for violation of  R.A. 3720. He also issued a stern warning to Yambaoagainst a repetition of the infraction. Later, the FDAlifted its closure order after noting that the penaltiesimposed had already been discharged and allowed thed r u g s t o r e t o r e s u m e o p e r a t i o n s . V a l i u m i s n o t a prohibited drug, which is why the penal ty imposed was only a 3-day closure and a fine of P100.- Yambao wrote a let ter to Mayor Gordon seekingr e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e r e v o c a t i o n o f t h e M a y o r ' s Permit . Having received no reply, she f i led with the RTC of Olongapo City a complaint for mandamus andd a m a g e s , w i t h a p r a y e r f o r a w r i t o f p r e l i m i n a r y injunction, against Mayor Gordon. On the same day,  Y a m b a o r e q u e s t e d p e r m i s s i o n f r o m t h e F D A t o exchange the locations of the two stores for reasonsof "business preference." The request was granted butM a y o r G o r d o n d i s a p p r o v e d t h e t r a n s f e r s a n d suspended the Mayor's Permit for the OCDS. The CFIissued a wri t of prel iminary prohibitory injunctionagainst Mayor Gordon.ISSUEWON Mayor Gordon may, in the exercise of his power,prevent the operation of the drug s tores previouslypermitted by the FDA.HELDNO (SSDS) and YES (OCDS).RatioThe power to approve a l icense includes by implication, even if not expressly granted, the powerto revoke i t . By extension, the power to revoke is l imited by the authority to grant the l icense, fromwhich it is derived in the first place.ReasoningIf the FDA grants a license upon its findingthat the appl icant drug store has complied with ther e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e g e n e r a l l a w s a n d t h e implementing administrative rules and regulations, itis only for their violation that the FDA may revoke thesaid license. By the same token, having granted thepermit upon his ascertainment that the conditions asa p p l i e d p a r t i c u l a r l y t o O l o n g a p o C i t y h a v e b e e n c o m p l i e d w i t h , i t i s o n l y f o r t h e v i o l a t i o n o f s u c h conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit.  L o c G o v A 2 0 1 0- In this case, the closure of the San Sebastian Drug Store was ordered by the FDA for violation of its ownconditions, which it had the primary power to enforce.By revoking the mayor's permit on the same groundfor which the SSDS had already been penalized by theFDA, the mayor was in effect reversing the decision of the latter

on a matter that came under its jurisdiction.As the infraction involved the pharmacy and drug lawswhich the FDA had the direct responsibility to execute,t h e m a y o r h a d n o a u t h o r i t y t o i n t e r p o s e h i s o w n findings on the matter and substi tute them for the decision already made by the FDA.- It would have been different if the offense condonedby the FDA was a violation of a city ordinance. The cityexecutive may ignore such condonation and revoke the mayor's permit just the same. In this situation, hewould be acting properly because the enforcement of the city ordinance is his own prerogative. In this case,the condition allegedly violated related to a nationallaw, not to a mat ter of merely local concern, and so came under the ‘jurisdiction’ of the FDA.- Factual f indings of adminis trat ive authorit ies are a c c o r d e d g r e a t r e s p e c t b e c a u s e o f t h e i r acknowledged expertise in the fields of specializationto which they are assigned. Even the courts of justice,including this Court, are concluded by such findings inthe absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of  discretion, which is not present in the case at bar. Fora l l h i s e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f c i t y ordinances, Mayor Gordon cannot claim the superiora p t i t u d e s o f t h e F D A i n t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e p h a r m a c y a n d d r u g a d d i c t i o n l a w s . H e s h o u l d therefore also be prepared, like the courts of justicethemselves, to accept its decisions on this matter.- I t is also worth noting that the San Sebastian Drug Store was penalized by the FDA only after a hearing atwhich Yambao appeared and testified. By contrast, ther e v o c a t i o n o f t h e m a y o r ' s p e r m i t w a s m e r e l y communicated to her in a letter without any hearing. If only for the violation of due process , the mayor 's arbitrary action can be annulled.- The indefinite suspension of the mayor's permit forOlongapo City Drug Store was based on its transfer tot h e s i t e o f t h e S S D S a s a p p r o v e d b y t h e F D A b u t without permission from the mayor. On this matter , the Court believes that the final decision rested withthe mayor. The condition violated related more to thelocation in Olongapo City of business establishmentsin general than to the regulat ion of drug stores inpart icular . I t therefore came under Mayor Gordon's  jurisdiction.- The reason for disapproving the transfer was theviolation of the Mayor's Permit which by its terms wasvalid only at the place stated therein. We f ind that that reason was valid enough. The permit clearly allowed the drug store to operate in the address givenand not elsewhere. No hearing was necessary becausethe transfer without the mayor 's permission is notd i s p u t e d a n d w a s i n f a c t i m p l i e d l y a d m i t t e d b y  Yambao. The Mayor's Permit for SSDS could also havebeen validly suspended for the same reason were itnot for the fact that such permit was revoked on themore serious ground of violation of the Pharmacy Lawand the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.- I t i s u n d e r s t o o d , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e s u s p e n s i o n should be deemed valid only as the two drug storeshave not returned to their original sites as specified intheir respective permits. Indefinite suspension will amount to a permanent revocation, which will not be ac o m m e n s u r a t e p e n a l t y w i t h t h e d e g r e e o f t h e violation being penalized. The Court adds that therequest for transfer , i f properly made, may not be validly denied in the absence of a clear showing thatthe transfer sought will prejudice the residents of thecity . As the two drug s tores are only a few meters f r o m e a c h o t h e r , a n d i n t h e s a m e b u i l d i n g , t h e r e would seem to be no reason why the mere exchangeof their locations should not be permitted.Dispositive Orders of the CFI MODIFIED in the senset h a t s u s p e n s i o n o f M a y o r ' s P e r m i t f o r O C D S considered valid but only unt i l the two drug storesreturn to their original s i tes as specif ied in the FDAlicenses and the mayor's permits or until the requestfor t ransfer , i f made, is approved by the peti t ioner .  The rest of the said Orders are AFFIRMED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-23305 June 30, 1966BENEDICTO C. LAGMAN, doing business under the firm name and style "MARCO TRANSIT", petitioner, vs.CITY OF MANILA, its officers and/or agents, respondents.

David G. Nitafan for petitioner.Antonio J. Villegas for respondents.REYES, J.B.L., J.:Petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman originally filed, on 6 August 1964, with this Court a petition for declaratory relief seeking a declaration of his rights under the so-called "provincial bus ban" ordinance (No. 4986, approved on 13 July 1964 by the City Mayor) of respondent City of Manila, with prayer for writs of preliminary and permanent injunctions to restrain and enjoin said respondent, its officers and/or agents, from enforcing and implementing said ordinance. At first, this Court, in its resolution dated 11 August 1964, dismissed said petition without prejudice to action, if any, in the lower court; but, upon herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration and supplemental petition to convert said petition into one for prohibition, on the ground, among others, that respondents have been actually enforcing said ordinance effective 17 August 1964, this Court reconsidered its first resolution, gave due course to the petition and required respondents to answer. This Court did not, however, issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.As disclosed by the record, the facts are: Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Service Commission (by a decision, dated 20 March 1963, in PSC Case No. 61-7383) to operate for public service fifteen (15) auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight, on the line Bocaue (Bulacan) — Parañaque (Rizal) via Meycauayan, Marilao, Obando, Polo, Malabon, Rizal, Grace Park, Rizal Avenue, Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz Bridge, Taft Avenue, Libertad, Pasay City and Baclaran, and vice versa. Within Manila, the line passes thru Rizal Avenue, Plaza Goiti, McArthur Bridge, Plaza Lawton, P. Burgos, Taft Avenue and Taft Avenue Extension. Pursuant to said certificate, petitioner, who is doing business under the firm name and style of "Marco Transit", began operating twelve (12) passenger buses along his authorized line.On 17 June 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in pursuance to Section 18, paragraph hh, of Republic Act No. 409, as amended (otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila), that reads:

The Municipal board shall have the following legislative powers: x x x x x x x x x

(hh) To establish and regulate the size, speed, and operation of motor and other public vehicles within the city; to establish bus stops and terminals; and prohibit and regulate the entrance of provincial utility vehicles into the city, except those passing thru the city."

x x x x x x x x x enacted Ordinance No. 4986, entitled "An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic On Roads and Streets Within The City of Manila, and For Other Purposes", which the City Mayor approved, on 13 July 1964, effective upon approval thereof. The pertinent provisions of said ordinance, insofar as it affect the certificate of public convenience of petitioner, are quoted below, to wit:

SECTION 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical traffic congestion in the City of Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best interest of public welfare and convenience, the following traffic rules and regulations are hereby Promulgated:

RULE 1. DEFINITIONSA. Definition of Terms. — When used in this ordinance and in subsequent ordinance having reference thereto, unless the context indicates otherwise:

(a) The terms "provincial passenger buses" and provincial passenger jeepneys' shall be understood to mean those whose route (or origin-destination) lines come from or going to points beyond Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Quezon City, Caloocan City and Navotas.

x x x x x x x x xRULE II. ENTRY POINTS AND ROUTES OF PROVINCIAL PASSENGER BUSES AND JEEPNEYS

1. Provincial passenger buses and jeepneys (PUB and PUJ) shall be allowed to enter Manila, but only through the following entry points and routes, from 6:30 A.M. to 8:30 P.M. every day except Sundays and Holidays:

(a) Those coming from the north shall enter the city through Rizal Avenue; turn right to Mt. Samat; right to Dinalupihan right to J. Abad Santos; left to Rizal Avenue towards Caloocan City;

x x x x x x x x x

(n) Those coming from the south through Taft Avenue shall turn left at Vito Cruz; turn right to Dakota; turn right to Harrison Boulevard; turn right to Taft Avenue; thence proceed towards Pasay City;

x x x x x x x x xRULE III. FLEXIBLE SHUTTLE BUS SERVICE

1. In order that provincial commuters shall not be unduly inconvenienced as a result of the implementation of these essential traffic control regulations, operators of provincial passenger buses shall be allowed to provide buses to shuttle their passengers from their respective entry control points, under the following conditions:

(a) Each provincial bus company or firm Shall be allowed such number of shuttle buses proportionate to the number of units authorized it, the ratio to be determined by the Chief, Traffic Control Bureau, based on his observations as to the actual needs of commuters and traffic volume; in no case shall the allocation be more than one shuttle bus for every 10 authorized units, or fraction thereof.(b) No shuttle bus shall enter Manila unless the same shall have been provided with identification stickers as required under Rule IV hereof, which shall be furnished and allocated by the Chief, Traffic Control Bureau to each provincial bus company or firm.1äwphï1.ñët(c) All such shuttle buses are not permitted to load or unload or to pick and/or drop passengers along the way but must do so only in the following places:

(1) North(a) J. Abad Santos corner Rizal Avenue, or vicinities

x x x x x x x x x(3) South

(a) Harrison Boulevard, between Dakota and Taft Avenuex x x x x x x x x

GENERAL PROVISIONSSEC. 4. Any violation of the provisions of this ordinance and of any other ordinance regulating traffic in the city, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P20.00, nor more than P200.00, or by imprisonment for not less than five (5) days nor more than six (6) months, or both such fine or imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

On 17 August 1964, the Mayor of respondent City of Manila, through its police agencies, began actual enforcement of said ordinance and prevented petitioner from operating his buses, except two (2) "Shuttle" buses, along the line specified in his certificate of public convenience.Petitioner Lagman claims in his original and supplemental petitions that the enactment and enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. Thus, he contends that the routes within Manila through which he has been authorized to operate his buses are national roads or streets, and the regulation and control relating to the use of and traffic of which (roads) are vested, under Commonwealth Act No. 548, in the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; but, since said ordinance was not proposed nor approved by the executive officials mentioned in said Act, its enactment and enforcement is a usurpation of the latter officials' functions, and said ordinance is, therefore, unauthorized and illegal.He also contends that the power conferred upon respondent City of Manila, under said Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, does not include the right to enact an ordinance such as the one in question, which has the effect of amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted by the Public Service Commission because any amendment or modification of said certificate is solely vested by law in the latter governmental agency, and only after notice and hearing (Sec. 16[m], Public Service Act); but since this procedure was not adopted or followed by respondents in enacting the disputed ordinance, the same is likewise illegal and null and void.He further contends that the enforcement of said ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable because the city streets from which he had been prevented to operate his buses are the cream of his business.He finally contends that, even assuming that Ordinance No. 4986 is valid, it is only the Public Service Commission which can require compliance with its provisions (Sec. 17[j], Public Service Act), but since its implementation is without the sanction or approval of the Commission, its enforcement is also unauthorized and illegal.

In his memorandum, petitioner adds as contention therefor that although his buses fall within the definition of the term "provincial passenger buses" under the disputed ordinance — his route line having terminal outside the City of Manila and its immediate suburbs — they merely "pass thru the city"; hence, its operation is covered within the saving clause of the above-quoted Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, and he should not have been prevented from operating his buses within the city streets specified in his certificate of public convenience.On the other hand, respondent City of Manila, in its answer to the original and supplemental petitions, maintains that its power to "prohibit and regulate the entrance of provincial public utility vehicles into the City, except those passing thru the City", as provided in its charter, is an explicit delegation of police power which is paramount and superior both with respect to the administrative power of the Director of Public Works, under Commonwealth Act No. 548, to regulate and control the use of, and traffic on, national roads or streets and to the administrative authority of the Public Service Commission, under Section 16 (m), of the Public Service Act, to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public convenience.It also maintains that the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 have been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 917; and, even assuming that the former has not been so repealed by the latter, Ordinance No. 4968 does not contravene Commonwealth Act No. 548 because, even assuming that a repugnancy or conflict exists between this Act and Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, the latter provisions prevails over the former. Republic Act No. 409 being a special law and of later enactment. Neither does Republic Act No. 409 contravene Section 16 (m) of the Public Service Act, Section 17(j) of the latter Act having imposed a duty in the Public Service Commission to require any public service to comply with any ordinance relating thereto.Lastly, respondent, in its reply memorandum, maintains that since petitioner admittedly engages in business within the city limits by picking up passengers therein, his buses do not merely pass thru the city; and they are not, therefore, covered within the saving clause of Section 18 (hh), of Republic Act No. 409, as amended.In our opinion, the present petition for prohibition should be denied.First, as correctly maintained by respondents, Republic Act No. 409, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, is a special law and of later enactment than Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended), so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the latter acts, Republic Act No. 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts Nos. 548 and 146. In Cassion vs. Banco Nacional Filipino, 89 Phil. 560, 561, this Court said:

for with or without an express enactment it is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage.

It is to be noted that Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority upon the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on national roads or streets. This being the case, section 18 (hh) of the Manila Charter is deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548.

It is a well settled principle that, because repeals by implication are not favored, a special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. (Baga vs. Philippine National Bank, 52 O.G. 6140).Where a special act is repugnant to or inconsistent with a prior general act, a partial repeal of the latter act will be implied or exception grafted upon the general act. (City of Geneses vs. Illinois Northern Utility Co., 39 NE 2d, p. 26)

Second, the same situation holds true with respect to the provisions of the Public Service Act. Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under its Section 16 (m), to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, yet there is no provision, specific or otherwise, which can be found in this statute (Commonwealth Act No. 146) vesting power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate, or control the streets of respondent City or suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this right or authority, as hereinabove concluded, is conferred upon respondent City of Manila. The power vested in the Public Service Commission under Section 16 (m) is, therefore, subordinate to the authority granted to respondent City, under said section 18 (hh). As held in an American case:

Ordinances designating the streets within a municipality upon which buses may operate, or prohibiting their operation in certain streets do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission over motorbus common carriers, so long as the ordinances do not prevent or unreasonably interfere with

the utility's operation under the certificate or franchise granted by that Commission. (Stuck vs. Town of Beech Grove, 163 N.E. 483; 166 N.E. 153).

That the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic, in the streets subject to their control, is made evident by section 17 (j) of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) that provides as follows:

SEC. 17. Proceedings of Commission without previous hearing. — The Commission shall have power, without previous hearing, subject to established limitations and exceptions, and saving provisions to the contrary:

x x x x x x x x x(j) To require any public service to comply with the laws of the Philippines, and with any provincial resolution or municipal ordinance relating thereto, and to conform to the duties imposed upon it thereby, or by the provisions of its own charter, whether obtained under any general or special law of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner's contention that, under this section, the respective ordinances of the City can only be enforced by the Commission alone is obviously unsound. Subsection (j) refers not only to ordinances but also to "the laws of the Philippines", and it is plainly absurd to assume that even laws relating to public services are to remain a dead letter without the placet of the Commission; and the section makes no distinction whatever between enforcement of laws and that of municipal ordinances.The very fact, furthermore, that the Commission is empowered, but not required, to demand compliance with apposite laws and ordinances proves that the Commission's powers are merely supplementary to those of state organs, such as the police, upon which the enforcement of laws primarily rests.Third, the implementation of the ordinance in question cannot be validly assailed as arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Aside from the fact that there is no evidence to substantiate this charge, it is not disputed that petitioner has not been totally banned or prohibited from operating all his buses, he having allowed to operate two (2) "shuttle" buses within the city limits.And finally, respondents correctly maintain that petitioner cannot avail of the saving clause of said section 18 (hh), he having admitted that his buses engaged in business within the city limits by picking up passengers therein; hence, they do not merely "pass thru the city".Wherefore, the instant petition for prohibition should be as it is hereby, dismissed. With cost against petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs.GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.CONCEPCION, C.J.: Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus

injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00. As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,

At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at the University of the East. He held responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00. On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of the said office, which is charged with the duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available.

After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs. On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila. The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:

The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines. The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation;

but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith. As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:

Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: x x x x x x x x x

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.

This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts." Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so ordered.1äwphï1.ñët

22 SCRA 267

Torts and Damages – Liability of municipal corporations in certain cases

In January 1958, at about 8pm, Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole. This caused injuries upon him. Thereafter he sued for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. The CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident happened in national highway.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable in the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law; that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city from negligence of its officers in general. There is no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities, and municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason of the “…defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision.”

The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised for the first time in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the City’s

control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s roads, P. Burgos included.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent. FERNANDO, J.:The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision.In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech." 1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." 3It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent.This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on

Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately executory." 4

1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." 8

The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. 9 2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures. 10 3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although independent of the President — to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the

Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.

MUTUC VS COMELEC Case Digest

MUTUC VS COMELEC G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

FACTS:

Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). His candidacy was given due course by the COMELEC but he was prohibited from playing his campaign jingle on his mobile units because this is an apparent violation of COMELEC’s band “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was COMELEC’s contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material (falling under and the like’s category), under the above COMELEC statute subject to confiscation.

HELD:

1. By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any enumeration must be of the same class as those specifically referred to. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.” For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

2. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution prohibits the abridgment of the freedom of speechThe intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge and consent.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992

BLO UMPAR ADIONG, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —It is unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxxThe statutory provisions sought to be enforced by COMELEC are Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code on lawful election propaganda which provides:

Lawful election propaganda. — Lawful election propaganda shall include:(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size not more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular candidate;(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding two feet by three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may not be displayed except one week before the date of the meeting or rally and that it shall be removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the authorization has been granted. (Section 37, 1978 EC)

and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 which provides:Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether private, or public, except in the common poster areas and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's own residence, or at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided, Further, That at the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2)

and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.There are various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom. (Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 89 L. Ed. 430 [1945]; Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228 [1970])This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]; Salonga v. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 686 [1964]; cited in the concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Babst v. National Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]) Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a citizen of his basic freedoms in order to promote fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always a difficult and delicate task. The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.We recognize the fact that under the Constitution, the COMELEC during the election period is granted regulatory powers vis-a-vis the conduct and manner of elections, to wit:

Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forms among candidates in connection with the object of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. (Article IX(c) section 4)

The variety of opinions expressed by the members of this Court in the recent case of National Press Club v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1991) and its companion cases underscores how difficult it is to draw a dividing line between permissible regulation of election campaign activities and indefensible repression committed in the name of free and honest elections. In the National Press Club, case, the Court had occasion to reiterate the preferred status of freedom of expression even as it validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through political advertisements. The gray area is rather wide and we have to go on a case to case basis.There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of legitimate campaign activity is fairly limited and, in the opinion of some, too short, it becomes obvious that unduly restrictive regulations may prove unfair to affected parties and the electorate.For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements which they deem inequitable or oppressive, a court case may prove to be a hollow remedy. The judicial process, by its very nature, requires time for rebuttal, analysis and reflection. We cannot act instantly on knee-jerk impulse. By the time we revoke an unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time which is of the essence to a candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable opportunities may have been lost.When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.There were a variety of opinions expressed in the National Press Club v. Commission on Elections (supra) case but all of us were unanimous that regulation of election activity has its limits. We examine the limits of regulation and not the limits of free speech. The carefully worded opinion of the Court, through Mr. Justice Feliciano, shows that regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.Even as the Court sustained the regulation of political advertisements, with some rather strong dissents, in National Press Club, we find the regulation in the present case of a different category. The promotion of a substantial Government interest is not clearly shown.

A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984])

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled:

The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedom secured by the first Amendment . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice . . .For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only

the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]). (Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." (Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).

In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444, 82 L ed 949, 58 S Ct 666, the Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting all distribution of literature at any time or place in Griffin, Georgia, without a license, pointing out that so broad an interference was unnecessary to accomplish legitimate municipal aims. In Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147, 84 L ed 155, 60 S Ct. 146, the Court dealt with ordinances of four different municipalities which either banned or imposed prior restraints upon the distribution of handbills. In holding the ordinances invalid, the court noted that where legislative abridgment of fundamental personal rights and liberties is asserted, "the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions," 308 US, at 161. In Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 84 L ed 1213, 60 S Ct. 900, 128 ALR 1352, the Court said that "[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society," but pointed out that in each case "the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." (310 US at 304) (Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479 [1960]

The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law:

Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential attributes.Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1 Cooley's Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917])

As earlier stated, we have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information:

Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The danger of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas." (Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141; 87 L. ed. 1313 [1943])

The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in the common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own front door or on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no limits to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or regulation, may do.The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom. This is delegation running riot. As stated by Justice Cardozo in his concurrence in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (293 U.S. 388; 79 L. Ed. 446 [1935), "The delegated power is unconfined and vagrant . . . This is delegation running riot. No such plentitude of power is susceptible of transfer."Third — the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.Under section 26 Article II of the Constitution, "The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, . . . while under section 1, Article XIII thereof "The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." (Emphasis supplied)It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:

. . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, either substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the

coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical. corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)

The unusual circumstances of this year's national and local elections call for a more liberal interpretation of the freedom to speak and the right to know. It is not alone the widest possible dissemination of information on platforms and programs which concern us. Nor are we limiting ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about political change. (Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra) The big number of candidates and elective positions involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where almost all voters cannot name half or even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public does not know who are aspiring to be elected to public office.There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas. Our review of the validity of the challenged regulation includes its effects in today's particular circumstances. We are constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.SO ORDERED.

Adiong Vs. Comelec Case Digest Adiong Vs. Comelec 207 SCRA 712G.R. No. 103956March 31, 1992

Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.

Issue: Whether or Not the COMELEC’s prohibition unconstitutional.

Held: The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so

substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship.

Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.

Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner

resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.