State intervention and neoliberalism in the globalizing world

State intervention and neoliberalismin the globalizing world economylessons from Singaporersquos regionalization programme

Henry Wai-chung Yeung

Abstract The recent 1997- 98 Asian economic crisis has thrown Asiarsquosdivergent pathways to development into serious question Protagonists ofneoliberalism argue that their agenda is now becoming a global orthodoxywhen several ailing Asian economies have accepted IMF packages whichcome with neoliberal economic programmes Drawing on lessons fromSingaporersquos regionalization programme this article contends that it is fartoo early to conclude that Asian developmental states are giving up theirgovernance of domestic economies Instead there is evidence that theseAsian developmental states are re-regulating their domestic economies toride out of the economic crisis The article rst starts with the debate betweenneoliberalism and state developmentalism in our understanding of globalpolitical economy It then examines the political economy of Singaporersquosregionalization programme through which Singapore-based transnationalcorporations are strongly encouraged by the state to regionalize their operations followed by a critical discussion of the impact of the recent Asianeconomic crisis on the re-regulation of the regionalization programme bythe state in Singapore Some lessons for Asian emerging economies aresuggested in the concluding section

Keywords Globalization neoliberalism state intervention Singaporeforeign investment Asian economic crisis

The Pacic Review Vol 13 No 1 2000 133- 162

Henry Wai-chung Yeung is Assistant Professor at the Department of Geography NationalUniversity of Singapore He is the author of Transnational Corporations and BusinessNetworks (Routledge 1998) editor of The Globalisation of Business Firms from EmergingMarkets (2 vols) (Edward Elgar 1999) and co-editor of Globalisation and the Asia Pacic(Routledge 1999) and The Globalisation of Chinese Business Firms (Macmillan 2000) He has over thirty research papers published or forthcoming in internationally refereed journals

Address Department of Geography National University of Singapore 1 Arts LinkSingapore 117570 E-mail geoywcnusedusg

The Pacic ReviewISSN 0951- 2748 printISSN 1470- 1332 online copy 2000 Taylor amp Francis Ltd

Introduction

As the world economy becomes increasingly interconnected and inter-dependent both an enabling mechanism and an outcome of economic globalization the governance of capitalism in national economies is beingthrown into light as a rather thorny issue The crux of this lsquogovernanceproblemrsquo in an era of accelerated globalization is related to the role ofthe nation-state Should the state intervene in development processes Orshould it refrain from direct intervention and take a back seat as a lsquonight-watchmanrsquo leaving the optimal solutions of economic problems to AdamSmithrsquos lsquoinvisible handrsquo It has been argued by many scholars of globalpolitical economy that the latter approach to governance collectivelyknown as neoliberalism has emerged as the dominant political and econ-omic strategy in governing todayrsquos globalizing world economy Certainlyin America and Britain neoliberalism has been hailed as an institutionalx to resolve global- local tensions arising from the need for capital toglobalize its productive capacity and for labour to localize jobs andemployment (Jessop 1994 Tickell and Peck 1995) In contrast the devel-opmental state in Asia has long been experimenting with another formof institutional x to resolve these tensions of globalization According tothis lsquostatistrsquo view direct intervention is the key instrument deployed bythe developmental state in Asia to regulate its burgeoning domesticeconomy (Deyo 1987 Haggard 1990 Wade 1990 Appelbaum andHenderson 1992 Aoki et al 1997) This difference in capitalist economicorganization between Asia and AmericaEurope has created what isknown as different varieties of lsquocapitalismsrsquo (see Berger and Dore 1996Safarian and Dobson 1997 Hefner 1998 Whitley 1998)

The recent Asian economic crisis in 1997- 98 however has thrown thesedivergent pathways to economic development and governance into seriousquestion Protagonists of neoliberalism argue that their agenda is nowbecoming a global orthodoxy when several ailing Asian economies haveaccepted IMF packages which come with neoliberal economic programmes(Lim 1997 1998 Rosenberger 1997 Jomo 1998 Rao 1998 cf Bello 1998Haggard and MacIntyre 1998 Wade and Veneroso 1998) Other Asianstates have also faced tremendous pressure from global capital and inter-national organizations to carry out structural reforms through which strongstate intervention in national economies is fast becoming an historicalpast As Bello (1998 439) alluded lsquo[s]o dominant has free market ideologybecome in international elite discourse that even its opponents in govern-ment and business [in Asia] - with the singular exception of Prime MinisterMahathir of Malaysia - mouth its platitudes while opposing it in practicersquoThis neoliberal global orthodoxy is prescribed as a bitter lsquopillrsquo to be lsquoswal-lowedrsquo by troubled Asian states in order for them to regain their member-ship in the lsquoglobalization clubrsquo This logic of globalization as a universaland inevitable process impinged externally upon these Asian economies

134 The Pacic Review

is clearly questionable I would argue that in fact these Asian economiesare themselves key players in the global economy (see also Dicken andYeung 1999) To a large extent they are also important components ofglobalization As such globalization does not have a life of its own withoutthe role of nation-states as its constituency and supporters As a materialprocess of global economic interpenetration globalization contains certainillogic(s) (Jessop 1999) It is mystied and deployed through politicaldiscourses in particular neoliberalism to create its own conditions of exis-tence (Yeung 1998a Kelly 1999) Globalization is discursively constructedamidst the Asian economic crisis as an external lsquoobjectiversquo force to disci-pline lsquocorruptrsquo and lsquostatistrsquo economies in the region Are we then goingto observe a universal convergence in the mode of economic governanceat the national scale just because something at the global scale mystiedas globalization requires us to open up and liberalize our economies Arewe prepared to demolish national institutional structures and regulatorylsquoxesrsquo to succumb to the lsquofreersquo market forces in this neoliberal globaliza-tion discourse

Drawing upon lessons from Singaporersquos regionalization programme thisarticle contends that it is far too early to concede that Asian develop-mental states are giving up their institutional capacities in governingnational economies Instead there is evidence that these Asian develop-mental states are re-regulating their domestic economies to ride out ofthe ongoing economic crisis Instead of forcing states to reconcile with theneoliberal orthodoxy globalization indeed has created more tensions forresistance and re-regulation In the context of the Asian economic crisisI would argue that globalization and its crisis tendencies have activatedthe institutional capacities of developmental states to be more proactivein economic governance Certainly in the case of Singapore the staterecognized the role of the city-state in the global economy as early as itsindependence Since the mid-1980s it has been spearheading its region-alization programme In the midst of this Asian economic crisis the state continues to play a leading role in enhancing the competitiveness of national rms to gain a foothold in the global marketplace There ishowever a qualitative distinction in the nature of the statersquos role inSingaporersquos regionalization programme which needs to be drawn hereAfter a brief period of globalizing national rms during the late 1980sthe state in Singapore realized that these national rms lacked sufcientcompetitive advantages to succeed in the global marketplace The focusin the succeeding period during the 1990s was placed on regionalizationthrough which Singaporean rms were strongly encouraged to ventureinto the Asian region (Yeung 1998b 1999a)

I argue that the recent Asian economic crisis is likely to throw thisregionalization drive out of track as many host Asian economies havesuffered from severe economic recessions and will not recover within thenext ve years or so Instead of surrendering its institutional capacities to

Henry Wai-chung Yeung Singaporersquos regionalization programme 135

global tensions the state is qualitatively more involved in developingSingaporersquos external economy1 On the one hand it continues to strengthenthe competitive advantages and organizational capabilities of nationalrms through various state assistance programmes and the restructuringof government-linked companies (GLCs) This form of lsquoregulatingrsquo theemergence of Singapore-based transnational corporations (TNCs) doesnot differ much from the experiences of Japan and South Korea in theirearly phases of development (Yeung 1994 1999a) On the other hand thestate is steering a U-turn in the geographical focus of outward expansionof Singaporean rms from regionalization to globalization To ride out ofthe Asian economic crisis it becomes imperative for Singaporean rms toexpand into growth regions in America Europe South Asia and theMiddle East This globalization drive requires more developmental effortsby the state in Singapore

The article rst begins with the debate between neoliberalism and statedevelopmentalism in our understanding of global political economy Iargue that to transcend the intellectual impasse of the dichotomy betweenneoliberalism and statism so commonly found in the popular literatureand mass media we need to conceptualize the embedded relationshipbetween economy and state I then examine the political economy ofSingaporersquos regionalization programme through which Singapore-basedTNCs are strongly encouraged by the state to regionalize their operationsThe impact of the recent Asian economic crisis on Singaporersquos regional-ization programme is examined in the penultimate section Some lessonsfor Asian emerging economies are suggested in the concluding section

Contesting the globalizing world economy neoliberalismstate intervention or embedded states

The nature of ideal economic governance of national economies has alwaysbeen a subject of heated debates in studies of political economy The liter-ature seems to be polarized by the debate between the neoliberalist viewof market-led development and the statist view of intervention in devel-opment Added to this dualistic view of global political economy is therole of globalization as a universal process capable of eroding the capac-ities of nation-states and harmonizing national differences in economicgovernance (Ohmae 1990 1995 Horsman and Marshall 1994) It has beenargued that neoliberalism provides the social regulation after Fordismbecause the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s coincided withthe breakdown of Fordism and the apparently permanent collapse ofKeynesian social regulation in the US and the UK Neoliberalism is apolitical project that is lsquoprimarily concerned to promote a market-led tran-sition towards the new economic regimersquo (Jessop 1993 29) According toPeck and Tickell (1994 296) neoliberalism is capitalismrsquos lsquolaw of thejunglersquo which tends to break out when economic growth slows and social


compromises collapse It is based on the twin principles of exibility andsupply-side innovation manifested in the following ways (1) the liberal-ization of competitive market forces (2) the abandonment of demand-side intervention in favour of supply-side policy measures and (3) therejection of both social partnership and welfarism Some well-knownneoliberal projects are Thatcherism Reaganism Rogernomics andNakasoneism They are meant to provide an lsquoinstitutional xrsquo after thecollapse of Fordism- Keynesianism By the 1980s neoliberalism had effectively reigned in most parts of the global economy Internationalorganizations such as the World Bank the IMF and the GATT were bothpromoting and enforcing neoliberal policies throughout the capitalistworld (Taylor 1997)

Neoliberal economic strategy however has its own aws and contra-dictions (Tickell and Peck 1995)2 First there is a tendency towards socialpolarization with the possibility of either disruptive collective action orsocial breakdown Second it is unable to resolve growing social alienationfrom the Taylorist production process and the collapse of the social frame-work around which productivity gains could be shared Third it tends toexaggerate swings in the business cycle As a result macroeconomiccrashes and crises are a constant threat Finally there is a tendency inneoliberalism to exacerbate structural imbalances and deation as nation-states respond to global competition by adopting beggar-thy-neighboureconomic policies There is much evidence of neoliberal economicideology for example in the competition for Japanese investment amongdifferent European countries and different federal states in the US InAsia the deregulation of nancial markets during the early 1990s waspremature and ill-fated because much of the subsequent capital inowsseduced by the promise of much higher returns went into such unpro-ductive activities as speculation in stock markets property developmentand glorifying national projects Though this is only one culprit behind the recent Asian economic crisis it is clearly an important oneNeoliberalism as an economic ideology in favour of market mechanismsrepresents lsquoa regulatory hole one which has elements of market regula-tion but which represents the absence of a new institutional xrsquo (Tickelland Peck 1995 369 original italics) Neoliberalism is simply inadequatefor the task of regulating capitalism let alone solving its crisis It hasrather become part of the capitalist crisis and a regulatory problem (Sassen1996 Evans 1997 Weiss 1997) Neoliberalism thus represents an institu-tional vacuum and the search for an institutional x becomes importantin view of crisis tendencies in the global economy today

Though not as a response to neoliberalism per se one such institutionalx widely adopted in Asia in the past three decades has been the lsquodevel-opmental statist modelrsquo of economic organization To date many theo-retical and empirical studies have been conducted to test Johnsonrsquos (1982)idea of lsquodevelopmental statersquo or the so-called lsquostatistrsquo interpretation of


Asian economic lsquomiraclersquo (Amsden 1989 Haggard 1990 Wade 1990Appelbaum and Henderson 1992 Douglass 1994 Bernard 1996 Brohman1996 Sung 1997 Yeung and Olds 1998) Even the World Bank (1993) hasimplicitly endorsed this state intervention in the economic developmentprocesses of Asia as good governance and market-friendly intervention(cf Kiely 1998) Why is it then that the same formula behind the lsquoAsianeconomic miraclersquo turned out to be its own undoing in the context of therecent economic crisis What has gone wrong with the developmentalstates of Asian economies To many neoliberal observers of recent events in Asia the evils of the Asian economic crisis are argued to becorruption and lsquocronyismrsquo which originated from the self-interested andutility-maximizing behaviour of state ofcials (eg Lim 1997 Rosenberger1997) Championed by the IMF the standard neoliberal prescription forthe Asian economic crisis is to get rid of state intervention altogether andliberalize near-bankrupt economies further to attract global capital inorder to reverse short-term capital outows This totalizing anti-stateprescription however is unlikely to be able to replace the role of thehigh-debt development model in Asia (see Wade and Veneroso 1998) Inthis IMF interpretation the state is clearly seen as a separate realm ofthe economy and can be unplugged from its involvement in economicgovernance Kiely (1998 75 original italics) noted that lsquo[t]he state is seenas the problem - it intervenes too heavily It is also seen as the solution- it must reform itself in order to allow for wealth creating activity Butif states are purely self-interested then why should state ofcials carryout the necessary reformsrsquo Neoliberalism in its essence is to blameeverything that does not work on the works of the state and to crediteverything that works to the lsquofreersquo market The greatest inconsistency inthis logic is that no matter how lsquofreersquo it is every market is an outcomeof state action

As such I will argue markets are always embedded in the state as wellas individual choice Neoliberalism ignores the inequality and unevendevelopment inherent within capitalist accumulation Markets are unableto address these structural imbalances precisely because they are inherentin the free-market system The role of the state then is to lsquointervenersquo selec-tively and become market lsquounfriendlyrsquo in that process This is exactly whatthe developmental states of several Asian economies did in the past threedecades lsquointervenersquo in the market in order to lsquobeatrsquo the market Thislsquoembedded statesrsquo view rejects a conceptual separation between economy(in which the market is located) and state The state thus has an indis-pensable role in promoting all spheres of market activities includingproduction circulation and consumption As such it is no longer a ques-tion of choosing between neoliberalism and state intervention because themeasurement of state role is not operationalized by its degree of inter-vention As Block (1994 696 original italics cited in OrsquoNeill 1997 294)conceptualizes this lsquoqualitative statersquo


The new state paradigm begins by rejecting the idea of state inter-vention in the economy It insists instead that state action alwaysplays a major role in constituting economies so that it is not usefulto posit states as lying outside of economic activity

There are four major tenets in Blockrsquos (1994) arguments for the lsquoqualita-tive statersquo First economy is necessarily a combination of markets stateaction and state regulations (see also Block 1990 1991) Second marketsare state-constrained and state-regulated thereby incapable of operatingin a neoliberal environment Third capital and the state have conictinggoals which cannot be achieved simultaneously nor independently Finallythe idea of economy originates from the dichotomy of markets and statesin classical economic thought This results in our ignorance of multipleforms and organizations of economy (cf political economy) Togetherthese tenets oppose strongly to the idea of a separate economy and anautonomous state in both neoliberal and statist perspectives Whereas theformer is guilty of idealizing a lsquopublic goods statersquo the latter constructsthe state as occupying an a priori position external to the economy

Dynamics of the developmental state in Asia the internationalization of capital and state

If the economy is embedded in the state and vice versa should we notreassess the role of the state in regulating and governing the economyAlthough a comprehensive theorization of the role of embedded states isimpossible in this article I would like to develop conceptually the role ofembedded states in the internationalization of domestic capital in thecontext of Asian economies I argue that the state has vested interests inthe internationalization of domestic capital (private and public) in bothmaterial and discursive terms In material terms the accumulation processof domestic capital may reach a saturation point when the domestic marketpotential is fully realized andor when the penetration of the global market through international trade is increasingly difcult because of tradebarriers and other structural constraints There is a strategic necessity forthe direct involvement of the state in the internationalization of domesticcapital in order to reproduce its legitimacy at home In discursive termsa state can export its domestic economic problems through the discoursesof globalization By relegating the legitimizing device discursively to theglobal scale a state is able to convince trade unions and labour organi-zations to cooperate so that the competitiveness of its domestic capitalcan be strengthened and the possibility of its successful internationaliza-tion can be enhanced (eg South Korean chaebols) The existence of TNCs(internationalized capital) thus is critically dependent on the action ofembedded states because it is in the interests of the latter if the formersucceeds in capital accumulation on a global scale


This framework focuses on the relative advantages of different institu-tional arrangements in explaining the actual or potential coexistence ofthe state and TNCs (see Pitelis 1991 1993 Yeung 1998a 1998b) Thismutual dependence and induced cooperation between the state and TNCsexist because they share the common objective of raising the global surplusof capital by exploiting the benets from the divisions of labour and teamwork The state- TNC relationship reects therefore their extent of collu-sion and rivalry and the strength of the state (measured by its efcacy inshaping political and economic action) Because its existence depends onits legitimating ability in terms of the exploitation and creation of nation-alism a weak nation-state needs foreign capital (eg foreign TNCs) tosustain domestic growth and development through continuous capitalaccumulation The state may collude with foreign capital to sustainnational competitive advantage in the global economy (eg Singapore) Ifit fails to attract investment from foreign capitalists the weak state willface a legitimacy crisis which may culminate in the eventual decline of itspower and hegemony If it wins the support and cooperation of foreigncapitalists the state may survive the erosion of its hegemonic powerSubject to its ability in resolving the legitimacy crisis the state may regainits power and authority through an appropriate conguration of collusionand partnership with global capitalist institutions (eg TNCs) Its compet-itive position vis-agrave-vis other states can also be enhanced through incor-porating transnational capital in its national development

A strong state on the other hand is not obliged to collude with inter-national capitalist institutions particularly when transnational capitalbegins to threaten its autonomy and hegemony Such a threat may arisefrom the demands of transnational capital to expose the conicting classnature of the state which contributes to the diminishing legitimizing abilityof the state The state may also face increasing demands from interestgroups from within the domestic economy The potential for rivalrybetween the state and foreign TNCs becomes real A strong state mayperceive foreign TNCs as rivals to its grip on political power and legiti-macy It may limit the participation of foreign rms in state-sponsoredcollaborative ventures (Reich 1991 Dicken 1994) Over time even a strongstate may face a legitimation crisis when its existing economic develop-ment strategies run out of steam in an era of accelerated globalizationand global competition It must search for an alternative lsquoinstitutional xrsquoto reproduce and sustain the capital accumulation process before it is toolate It is in this institutional context that Asian states have chosen alter-native development strategies to compete in the global economy throughnurturing their own lsquonational championsrsquo (Yeung 1994 2000) After threedecades of intensive industrialization effort and active participation ininternational trade Asian economies begin to experience the limits togrowth and turn to the global economy as their hinterland via foreigndirect investments for access to technology and markets and sites of


production The state seeks partnership with domestic capital to extendthe economy across national boundaries in order to legitimize further therole of a strong state in economic development Through strategic indus-trial policies and selective involvement the state provides the institutionalfoundation for the globalization of national rms so that lsquoa TNCrsquos domesticenvironment remains fundamentally important to how it operates notwith-standing the global extent of some rmsrsquo operationsrsquo (Dicken 1994 117)Emerging TNCs have very much become a product of their local embed-dedness in the institutional context of their home countries (Dicken andThrift 1992 Yeung 1994 1998c) The state in East and Southeast Asiancountries for example often gets directly involved in the international-ization of national rms What then is the experience of the Singaporeanstate in promoting the regionalization of domestic rms What is theimpact of the recent Asian economic crisis on the role of the state inSingaporersquos drive to develop an external economy These are the keyissues for the following sections

The political economy of Singaporersquos regionalizationprogramme

Economic development argued by Leftwich (1993 620 original italicscited in Kiely 1998 74) lsquois not simply a managerial question as the WorldBankrsquos literature on governance asserts but a political one For allprocesses of ldquodevelopmentrdquo express crucially the central core of politicsconict negotiation and co-operation over the use production and distri-bution of resourcesrsquo The key issue here is to understand the politics andpolitical economy of economic development not just the technicalities oflsquogood governancersquo in the eyes of neoliberal international institutions Kiely(1998 79) thus notes that lsquoit is not just a question of state policy per se(although this is important) but of the social context in which particularstates operatersquo In this section I examine the origins of Singaporersquos region-alization programme in the context of the politics of survival and thediscourses of globalization in recent years The impact of the recent Asianeconomic crisis on the regionalization drive is then assessed in the nextsection

Singapore as a major entrepocirct in Southeast Asia has relentlessly posi-tioned itself vis-agrave-vis the global spaces of ows (see Rodan 1989 Low etal 1993 Huff 1995 Perry et al 1997 Low 1998 Mahizhnan and Lee 1998)Since its independence in 1965 the PAP-led state has planned and imple-mented several national development strategies to create and sustainSingaporersquos competitiveness in the face of accelerated global competitionIn that sense the global economy has always been Singaporersquos lsquohinter-landrsquo and the city-state has always been a key player in the globalizationof economic activities While the state was able to pursue a labour-inten-sive export-oriented manufacturing platform for industrialization in the


1960s and 1970s the strategy met its favourable global conditions whenmajor American and European manufacturers were looking for alterna-tive low-cost production sites to relocate their labour-intensive operations(an early process of economic globalization) The competitiveness of theSingapore economy then was heavily based upon the statersquos ability toexercise labour control and discipline coupled with favourable politicalstability and geographical location By the late 1970s and early 1980sSingapore was no longer competitive in attracting low-cost manufacturingassembly investment because cheaper production locations could be foundthroughout the world notably in neighbouring Asian developing coun-tries The strategy of low labour cost pursued since independence had alsobackred when systematic distortions in the labour market resulted insevere labour shortage The lack of investment in indigenous technolog-ical capabilities also contributed to low value-added activities by domesticenterprises By the late 1970s Singapore faced a lsquocompetitiveness crunchrsquoin the changing international division of labour

To regain its competitiveness in the global space of ows the staterevised its national strategies in favour of promoting high-tech and highvalue-added manufacturing and business services The state rstly initi-ated a major industrial restructuring the so-called lsquoSecond IndustrialRevolutionrsquo in 1979 through which labour wages were increased substan-tially to drive out labour-intensive manufacturing activities and labourproductivity and skills were upgraded to attract world-class high-techmanufacturing investments This strategy worked well during the 1980swhen Singapore was an attractive location for global corporations incomputer and chemical industries Second the state introduced in the mid-1980s through its various statutory boards competitive packages of incen-tives to attract global corporations to locate their regional ofces andorregional headquarters in Singapore The idea of promoting control andcoordination functions of global corporations ts well into world cityformation when Singapore aims to be a major international business hubof the region The state now boosted Singaporersquos hub capabilities in world-class infrastructure a highly skilful labour force and excellent businessservices Third after a major recession in the mid-1980s the state recognized the vulnerability of Singaporersquos economy because of its over-dependence on foreign capital and the lack of indigenous entrepre-neurship In December 1989 the Singapore- Indonesia- Malaysia GrowthTriangle idea was proposed by the then Deputy Prime Minister Goh ChokTong in response to drastic industrial restructuring within Singapore andperceived complementarity among the three countries (Perry 1991Parsonage 1992 1994 Ho 1994 Ho and So 1997)

By the early 1990s Singapore had been transformed into a regional coor-dination centre capable of signicant RampD activities and managementfunctions (Perry et al 1998a 1998b Perry and Tan 1998 Mathews 1999)Although it had secured a niche in the competitive global economy the


Singapore economy was still very much dependent on global capital andits major markets in North America and Western Europe To consolidatefurther its national competitiveness and to enable the expansion of domes-tic capital the state has initiated a regionalization programme throughwhich Singaporean companies are encouraged to venture abroad By build-ing up its external wing the state believes that Singapore not only can tapinto the opportunities of the regional economy but also can ride out ofeconomic crisis in the domestic economy The Department of Statistics(1991) estimates that at the end of 1976 FDI from Singapore was slightlyabove S$1 billion As shown in Table 1 this gure had grown to S$17 bil-lion by 1981 S$26 billion by 1986 and S$368 billion by 1995 In fact pri-vate capital in Singapore has a much longer history of regionalizationparticularly in Malaysia (see Yeung 1998d) The statersquos explicit encourage-ment of outward investment started immediately after the recession of themid-1980s (Kanai 1993) These investment measures however initiallyemphasized the globalization of Singaporean rms into Europe and NorthAmerica in order to promote a shift to higher value-added activities Theywere ineffective because few Singaporean rms were capable of securinga marketplace in these advanced industrialized countries For example bothYeo Hiap Seng Ltd (a major local food manufacturer) and SingaporeTechnologies (a state-owned enterprise) had bitter experience in the US inthe early 1990s (see Kanai 1993 Far Eastern Economic Review 25 April1996 59) It was not until 1993 that the focus of the state was shifted toregionalization instead of globalization (see Table 1)

Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew announced in January 1993 that thestate was taking new initiatives to generate a bigger pool of local entre-preneurs and to building up the lsquoexternal wingrsquo of the Singapore economyThis national strategic thrust is known as Singaporersquos lsquoRegionalization2000rsquo SM Lee proposed that

We can change our orientation We can alter our social climate tobecome more encouraging and supportive of enterprise and inno-vation We can enthuse a younger generation with the thrill and therewards of building an external dimension to Singapore We can andwe will spread our wings into the region and then into the widerworld

(Quoted in EDB 1993)

SM Lee mooted this idea because most advanced industrialized countrieshad globalized their national rms to tap into resources talents andmarkets in the global economy The idea is to develop Singapore into aglobal city with total business capabilities so that Singapore can be notonly an attractive manufacturing investment location for global TNCs butalso an ideal springboard to the Asia-Pacic region for these TNCs wishingto venture into the region (EDB 1995) The Prime Minister Goh Chok


Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

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quit

y in

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arie

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eld

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apor

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irec

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uity

inv

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ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

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plus

the

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erve

s of

the

ove

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s su

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nd a

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iate

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leto

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se c

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nies

Fo

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hes

the

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ount

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the

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rent

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pani

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t

Tong made it clear that lsquo[g]oing regional is part of our long-term strategyto stay ahead It is to make our national economy bigger our companiesstronger and some of them multi-nationalrsquo (reprinted in SpeechesMay- June 1993 15) I have examined elsewhere different aspects of thestatersquos involvement in the social regulation3 of the regionalizationprogramme (Yeung 1998b 1999a) (1) the regionalization of GLCs andcompanies set up by statutory boards and (2) lsquopolitical entrepreneurshiprsquothrough which the state opens up overseas business opportunities forprivate capitalists and negotiates the institutional framework for suchopportunities to be tapped by these Singaporean rms Today the publicsector and GLCs account for about 60 per cent of Singaporersquos GDP(Ministry of Finance 1993 39 see also Singh and Ang 1998) These GLCshave become one of the primary instruments through which the statepursues the regionalization drive The state has also tried to lead theregionalization drive by taking a direct equity stake in large infrastruc-tural development projects in the region and by employing interstate rela-tionships to raise the prole and image of its investment projects Thislatter approach to regionalization is termed lsquopolitical entrepreneurshiprsquowhich refers to the involvement of key politicians in opening up businessopportunities for state-owned and private enterprises

To a certain extent Singaporersquos fortune is always intertwined with theglobal economy But one distinctive feature of Singaporersquos national com-petitiveness is that it is very much a city (in a territorial sense) coupled witha strong state (in an institutional sense) a state with powers far beyond thoseof any local state Unparalleled in the Asian region this city-state has reliedheavily upon developmentalism to legitimize its political power and controlThe statersquos choice to pursue the strategy of global reach has been relativelyuncontested in part because the state has generated a political discourse ofsurvivalism and ruthless competition a discourse currently propagated inassociation with most discourses on globalization (Yeung 1998a Kelly1999) The state has constructed a view of geographical space which impliesthe deferral of political options to the global scale In effect the (contested)discourse of globalization lsquoitself has become a political force helping to cre-ate the institutional realities it purportedly merely describesrsquo (Piven 1995108) A recent example taken from the annual budget statement by DrRichard Hu Finance Minister makes the point well

we have no choice but to be open and to compete in the worldmarket to survive and prosper We can grow faster by taking advan-tage of global markets and advanced technology our opennessexposes us inevitably to the uctuations of global business anddemand cycles Adapting nimbly to changes in the environmentand staying relevant to global demand remains fundamental toSingaporersquos survival

(10 July 1997 my emphasis)


This discourse of survivalism and competition has sustained Singaporersquoscompetitiveness in the face of global competition thereby legitimizing thestatersquos control over most aspects of social life It has also enabled thePAP-led bureaucracy to bypass the local politics typical in many Westerncountries (cf Cox 1993 1998 Brenner 1998)

The impact of the Asian economic crisis on Singaporersquosregionalization programme the enduring role of theembedded state

To a large extent the success of Singapore in plugging itself into the globalspaces of ows results from the material embeddedness of the state ineconomic processes and the discursive mobilization of legitimacy by thestate apparatus All these happen within the context of accelerated glob-alization at the global scale and cooperative harmony at the regional scaleSince July 1997 however the Asian region has been battling with themost serious economic crisis since the Second World War4 What then isthe impact of the Asian economic crisis on well-established capabilitiesof the state in Singapore to govern and regulate its regionalizationprogramme What is or will be the statersquos response to these challengesof neoliberal globalization manifested in its crisis tendencies Whileneoliberalists are quick to blame Asia economies for the crisis their IMF-inspired prescriptions - mainly in the form of further economic liberal-ization and nancial deregulation - may not necessarily work for Asianeconomies in which the embedded state used to rely on the high-debtgrowth model (Wade and Veneroso 1998) This is because many Asianeconomies achieved remarkable growth rates in the past three decadesprecisely because of their strong embedded states The dismantling of suchwell-established state apparatus and the unconditional opening of domesticeconomies to foreign competition under the current IMF guidelines is tantamount to destroying the very foundation of their success - theembedded relationships between economy and state in these countriesThe consequence can be extremely serious ranging from social unrest (egIndonesia) to extreme nationalism and xenophobia (eg Malaysia)

Given the embedded relationships between economy and state the solu-tion of the crisis is not to separate further the state from its involvement inthe economy Instead the state needs to be strengthened to put its house inorder After all even neoliberal reforms require the state to execute In thecase of Singapore I argue that the Asian economic crisis tends to strengthenrather than weaken the capabilities of the state in economic governance andthe social regulation of the economy This in turn guarantees the enduring ifnot enhanced role of the state in Singaporersquos regionalization programmeFirst in material terms Singapore is least affected by the crisis among theSoutheast Asian countries Singaporersquos economic growth has already sloweddown sharply from 78 per cent in 1997 to about 38 per cent for the rst half


of 1998 (The Straits Times 30 June 1998) The growth rate for the year 1998was 13 per cent This slowdown in Singaporersquos growth is largely attributed toits exposure to the regional economies than to its internal economic lsquofunda-mentalsrsquo As shown in Table 1 some 58 per cent of Singaporersquos FDI went toAsia and 34 per cent to ASEAN countries alone in 1995 As a regional busi-ness hub Singaporersquos economic fortune is closely intertwined with theSoutheast Asian economies This interdependence however does not negatethe embedded role of the Singaporersquos state in regulating its domestic econ-omy In fact had the state not exercised stricter control on bank credits andloans in the early 1990s and implemented the property speculation curb mea-sures in May 1996 Singapore would have suffered much more from its lsquobub-blersquo tendencies When the entire Asian region was experiencing tremendousgrowth during the 1990s the state in Singapore had the foresight to realize by1996 that the rapid increase in property prices since the late 1980s wouldeventually lead to major economic crashes These politically-unfriendly mea-sures to lsquocoolrsquo the property market indicated not only the foresight of the state in economic governance but also its capabilities to regulate thedomestic economy The results are encouraging so far Singapore banks donot suffer from huge domestic loans in non-productive sectors and propertyprices in Singapore do not collapse overnight under the current Asian economic crisis5

Second not only does the Asian economic crisis not affect Singaporeseriously in material terms it also offers further discursive legitimacy tothe embedded state to re-regulate the domestic economy By naturalizingthe processes of economic globalization and its negative impact on thoseeconomies with weak and lsquocorruptedrsquo states the state in Singapore is ableto rally support from labour and capital6 In other words by relegatingthe Asian economic crisis to the regional and global scales the state isable to legitimize its strengthened role in domestic governance Such astance which naturalizes the processes of globalization can be found inrecent statements by various ministers of the Singapore government Arecent address by Mr Lee Yock Suan Minister for Trade and Industryfor example noted that

the problems in the [Southeast Asian] region will not be solvedby turning away from globalization In this increasingly border-less world of trade and commerce countries which try to hide behindnational barriers will nd themselves progressively marginalised Globalization is an inevitable process Those who embrace it canharness its benets However appropriate domestic policy measuresand frameworks to strengthen the regulatory regime and nancialinstitutions must be put in place rst In addition parallel measuresneed to be taken to improve the competitiveness of domestic enter-prises as well as develop the skills of the workforce



This statement clearly demonstrates that for Singapore and its enterprisesto compete effectively in the global economy the state needs to imple-ment appropriate policies without having to shut these local enterprisesout from external competition or to rely on subsidies from the govern-ment The political legitimacy of a strong state in domestic governanceapparently is secured through a discursive construction of an inevitableexternal world of globalization in which Singapore either survives withgood state governance or falls with a free-for-all neoliberal approach toeconomic governance There are clearly some contradictions in this polit-ical discourse of globalization and the Asian economic crisis On the onehand the state subscribes to the IMF-style neoliberalism and attempts toliberalize the Singapore economy to lsquoembracersquo globalization and to attractglobal capital On the other hand the state wants to regulate two impor-tant foundations of the economy - domestic labour and national rmsMr Lee further indicated that Singaporersquos commitment to active pursuitof outward-oriented economic policies including its regionalizationprogramme has remained unchanged What then are these policyresponses which presumably enhance the competitiveness of Singaporeanrms and their opportunities to venture into the Asian region and beyond

Policy responses of the embedded state to Asian economic crisis

Two such policy responses have already become apparent (1) encouragingor staging more mergers and acquisitions among GLCs to form formi-dable lsquonational championsrsquo and (2) replacing regionalization with global-ization These responses represent a qualitative change in the role of the embedded state towards re-regulating Singaporersquos drive to develop astrong external economy First the state has already spearheaded majoracquisitions and mergers even before the Asian economic crisis to consol-idate further some key GLCs in order for them to compete effectively inthe global economy (see Table 2)7 In early 1997 Neptune Orient Lines(NOL) Singaporersquos national shipping line and a GLC acquired the almost150-year-old US shipping group American President Lines (APL) forUS$825 million (S$12 billion) in the largest foreign acquisition by anySingapore rm (The Straits Times 15 April 1997 19 April 1997 21 April1997) The role played by the state was that NOL could easily dwarf theS$824 million that Temasek Holdings and the Government of SingaporeInvestment Corporation both major vehicles of the statersquos involvementin regionalizationglobalization cashed out of their investments in NewZealand in 1991 The acquisition was also waived by the Stock Exchangeof Singapore to obtain shareholdersrsquo approval It enabled NOL to becomea major global player in the transportation and logistics sector a clearsignal of NOL globalization drive to operate beyond the Asian region Italso allowed NOL to achieve better economies of scale to compete with


other global shipping lines As its chairman Mr Herman Hochstadt notedlsquo[w]e feel that the two companies have a lot of synergy that we can putto workrsquo (quoted in The Straits Times 15 April 1997) Although it reporteda worst-ever loss of S$241 million (about US$144 million) for the six months ended 30 June 1998 NOL could have saved costs of up toUS$80 million as a result of the merger with APL (The Straits Times 30September 1998) Mergers and acquisitions have also become the norm


Table 2 Recent acquisitions and mergers by government-linked corporations inSingapore

Name of Date of Amount Consequence Role of the statecompany announce- of capital

ment

1 NOL 14 April S$12 l NOL as the second l S$824 million fund(Singapore) 1997 billion largest local listed from Temasek acquired company Holdings and the GICAPL (US) l NOL as one of the l Special waiver

worldrsquos biggest eets granted by the Stockwith 113 vessels Exchange of Singapore

2 STIC 1 June S$33 l SCI as the largest l SCI chaired by(Singapore) 1998 billion civil engineering and chairman of EDBmerged construction company l SCI 591 directlywith in Southeast Asia and indirectly held bySembawang l SCI as one of the Temasek Holdings(Singapore) largest diversied

conglomerates from Southeast Asia

3 DBS 24 July S$94 l DBS as largest local l Approval of mergerBank 1998 billion bank and one of the by the Ministry of(Singapore) largest Asian banks Finance which ownsmerged l DBS ranked 65th the POSBank awith POSB largest bank in the national savings bank(Singapore) world l DBS chaired by

l Access to much former chairman of more deposit for Temasek Holdingsinvestment

4 ST Pte 9 Sept S$330- l Vickers Ballas l ST Pte Ltd as oneLtd 1998 400 Holdings Ltd as of the most powerful(Singapore) million one of the largest GLCsacquired nancial services Vickers rms in AsiaBallas (Singapore)

Source The Straits Times various issues

in the shipping industry because of excessive over-capacity and globalcompetition Commenting on the merger of two of Europersquos largestcontainer carriers PampO (UK) and Nedlloyd (the Netherlands) in 1996Mr Hochstadt said that the merger lsquogave a very clear signal that this isthe way that major operators will have to go if you want to stay in thebusinessrsquo (quoted in The Straits Times 15 April 1997)

In the midst of the Asian economic crisis two major mergers and onereverse takeover among GLCs in Singapore helped to consolidate themarket positions of the respective merged entities and their rm-specicadvantages to compete effectively in the regional and global economy8

On 1 June 1998 two listed GLCs Singapore Technologies IndustrialCorporation (STIC) and Sembawang Corporation announced that theywill merge to form SembCorp Industries (SCI) a diversied Asianconglomerate with ambitions to become a dominant force in the region(The Straits Times 2 June 1998) The deal will create the largest civil engi-neering and building construction company in Southeast Asia with acombined order book of S$24 billion over a three-year period Based ontheir 1997 results the new group would have had sales of S$33 billionnet prot of S$95 million and assets worth S$65 billion at the end of 1997SCI aims to achieve S$1 billion in pre-tax prot and S$10- 12 billion stakeswithin ten years After the merger the Singapore government will continueto hold a majority-shareholding position with 14 per cent of SCI sharesheld by Temasek Holdings and 45 per cent by its wholly-owned subsidiarySingapore Technologies Pte Ltd Mr Philip Yeo the chairman of EconomicDevelopment Board will become the chairman of SCI Its president andCEO-designate Mr Wong Kok Siew said that lsquothe merger means that wewill be big enough to compete with big players like the Fluror Daniels ofthe worldrsquo (quoted in The Straits Times 2 June 1998) US-based FlurorDaniels is known for its global position in the energy petroleum chemi-cals infrastructure and construction industries The proposed mergerwould also strengthen SCIrsquos position as a world leader in the industrialpark business with more than S$12 billion already committed to veparks in the Asian region

In the banking and nancial services industries the proposed mergerbetween Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) and Post Ofce ofSingapore Bank (POSB) announced on 24 July 1998 implies that DBSBank will now be able to tap into deposit-rich POSBank to become ahuge and possibly dominant force in the regional banking industry (TheStraits Times 25 July 1998) In fact DBS was already a net lender in theinterbank market even before the proposed merger The former chairmanand CEO Mr Ngiam Tong Dow declared that lsquoour aim is to become aregional bank with a global reachrsquo (quoted in The Straits Times 20 April1998) It was on the prowl for more acquisitions in the Asia-Pacic regionThe proposed merger came not long after the former chairman of TemasekHoldings Mr S Dhanabalan took over as DBS chairman from 9 May


1998 Since the beginning of the Asian economic crisis DBS had acquiredan 85 per cent interest in an Indonesia bank increased its stake to 503per cent in Thai Danu Bank and taken a 60 per cent stake in PhilippinesrsquoBank of Southeast Asia and a 65 per cent stake in Hong Kongrsquos KwongOn Bank (The Straits Times 17 December 1998) Together these acquisi-tions cost DBS more than S$330 million After the proposed merger DBSBank is expected to have total deposits of S$593 billion shareholdersrsquofunds of S$94 billion and total assets of S$934 billion enabling it toextend its global reach into the region and beyond Referring to the globalplayer HSBC Holdings a nancial analyst said that the proposed mergerbasically is lsquothe Governmentrsquos way of forcing the pace on the privatesector to recapitalise and full its wish for a HSBC here [in Singapore]rsquo(quoted in The Straits Times 25 July 1998) More recently on 9 September1998 Singapore Technologies Pte Ltd (STPL) a wholly-owned subsidiaryof Temasek Holdings staged a reverse takeover of local stockbroking rmVickers Ballas Holdings that will create an enlarged entity with assets ofS$2 billion and shareholdersrsquo funds of S$800 million The deal was a resultof the repositioning of ST Capital a 708 per cent-owned subsidiary ofSTPL into a lsquopan-Asian diversied nancial services rm that is skills-and knowledge-based with Singapore as its anchorrsquo (quoted in The StraitsTimes 9 September 1998)

Second the state has recognized the importance of participating in theglobalization of its national rms since the mid-1990s This U-turn in thegeographical focus of outward expansion of Singaporean rms resultedfrom the relative lack of success in Singaporersquos regionalization programmeThis diversication strategy has recently been conrmed by the Committeeon Singaporersquos Competitiveness which noted that

One key lesson from the economic crisis is the need for diversica-tion We need to maintain a judicious balance between the regionaland global dependencies of our economy and diversify our range ofeconomic activities so as to cushion the impact of a slowdown in anyparticular region

(Ministry of Trade and Industry 1998 60)

Geographically Malaysia was the traditional destination for mostlyprivate-sector-driven FDI from Singapore (see Yeung 1998d) Since theofcial launch of Singaporersquos regionalization programme in 1993 the focusof FDI by Singaporean rms in particular GLCs has been China andIndonesia because they were seen as emerging markets with strong poten-tial for growth (see Table 1) During the 1993- 95 period Singaporersquos FDIin China grew over vefold from S$444 million to S$24 billion andSingaporersquos FDI in Indonesia rose more than sixfold from S$517 millionto S$34 billion Even before the onset of the Asian economic crisisSingaporersquos investment in China was generally not very successful (Yeung


1999c) In the midst of the crisis Singaporersquos FDI in China dipped 42 percent to US$15 billion for the rst six months of 1998 (The Straits Times28 July 1998)

Indonesia and Malaysia two major recipients of Singaporersquos outwardinvestment have suffered badly from the Asian economic crisis Bothcountries no longer offer much attraction to Singaporean rms as poten-tial investment destinations With almost 80 per cent depreciation of therupiah the resignation of the former authoritarian president Suharto andrecurrent social unrest Indonesia has been stripped of its three decadesof achievements within several months in 1998 (see The Straits Times 2 July 1998) Facing tumbling stock markets and domestic currenciesMalaysia has gone inward-looking in its economic and foreign policiesThe Mahathir-led government not only refused to accept IMF bailing-outpackages but also shut itself from the global economy by imposing capitalcontrols on 1 October 1998 (see The Straits Times 2 September 1998)Diplomatically Malaysia has engaged in a lsquoSingapore-bashingrsquo discoursewhich seriously undermines the condence of Singaporean investors inMalaysia To ride out of the Asian economic crisis it becomes even moreimperative for Singaporean rms whether GLCs or non-GLCs to expandinto growth regions in America and Europe This globalization driverequires a more developmental role of the state in Singapore

Even before the Asian economic crisis the state in Singapore wasactively involved in exploring linkages with Europe through the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Asia- Europe Forum (ASEF) How farthe inclusion of investment relations within such political fora will actu-ally affect real investment decisions by rms is open to question It doeshowever raise the political visibility of investment issues and embeds themmore explicitly in an institutional framework (Yeung and Dicken 1998see also Chia and Tan 1997) Asia has not been an especially signicantdestination (in aggregate terms) for European investment According toUNCTAD (1996 xiv) Europe has not been a major destination foroutward FDI from Asia (other than Japan) As shown in Table 1 Europeaccounted for only 10 per cent of Singaporersquos FDI in 1995 But the 1993- 95period experienced a tremendous increase in Singaporersquos FDI in the UKup more than sixfold from S$361 million in 1993 to S$24 billion in 1995Indeed most of these large investments were in property hotels and nan-cial sectors The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC)and Temasek Holdings have been in the UK for many years through acombined 30 per cent stake in Thistle Hotels which was formerly knownas Mount Charlotte Investments (The Straits Times 16 September 1997)A large proportion of this rise in Singaporersquos FDI in the UK was accountedfor by Mr Kwek Leng Bengrsquos the celebrated Singapore entrepreneurCDL Hotels International which had invested over S$530 million forBritainrsquos Copthorne chain of seventeen hotels in 1995 (Yeung 1999d) Infact Mr Kwek bought his rst London hotel The Gloucester in 1992 He


was once quoted as saying lsquoIrsquoll take Londonrsquo (The Straits Times 16September 1997) His early move was subsequently followed by a stringof other Singaporean acquisitions of European hotels Halkin and TheMetropolitan by HPL Singapore Paragon Hotel by Teo Lay Swee HolidayInn Kensington and Green Park Hotel by Lum Changrsquos LC Hotels andBrownrsquos Hotel by DBS Land

Since the Asian economic crisis the state has been actively promotingnon-Asian destinations for potential private and public investors fromSingapore Various trade and investment mission trips are organized bythe Trade Development Board (TDB) to Africa Central Asia the MiddleEast Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America (The Straits Times8 August 1998) Table 3 provides details of the role of TDB in promotingSingaporersquos trade and investments with various host regions outside AsiaIn particular the state is convinced that Singaporean companies cancompete effectively against European companies in Africa the MiddleEast and Central and Eastern Europe In Latin America BrazilArgentina Chile and Mexico have been Singaporersquos four top trading part-ners in the region The membership of Mexico in the North AmericanFree Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also facilitates its use by SingaporeanTNCs as an important base of operations for electronics investors plan-ning to export to the US NAFTA membership also allows SingaporeanTNCs in Mexico to enjoy tariff benets and more importantly directaccess to the huge American market Since Prime Minister Goh ChokTongrsquos visit to Mexico in September 1997 Singaporersquos FDI in Mexico hasincreased from US$19 million to US$87 million in August 1998 (The StraitsTimes 8 August 1998) PM Gohrsquos lsquopolitical entrepreneurshiprsquo also enabledthe establishment of a wholly-owned manufacturing plant in Mexico byNatsteel Electronics Ltd a leading electronics GLC from Singapore whichis ranked the worldrsquos sixth largest contract manufacturer (The StraitsTimes 2 May 1998 also 14 April 1997 11 July 1997 12 October 1998)As a truly global manufacturer from Singapore Natsteel has manufac-turing facilities in China Hungary Indonesia Malaysia Mexico Thailandand the US Amongst its main clients are Apple Compaq HewlettPackard IBM and Seagate In another example ST Engineering a GLCwith Temasek Holdings recently acquired a 20 per cent stake in SolectriaCorp a leading US electric vehicle rm (The Straits Times 29 September1998) The acquisition would enable ST Auto another subsidiary underthe Singapore Technologies group to distribute Solectriarsquos products in theAsia-Pacic region

Conclusion beyond neoliberalism and state intervention

The debate between neoliberalism and statism in the global politicaleconomy and development studies literature is futile since the econ-omy encompasses the state and the state is embedded in the economy


Table 3 Recent activities by the Trade Development Board to promoteSingaporersquos trade and investments outside Asia

Host Priority markets Activitiesregions

Africa l Tourism manufacturing l Mission to western Africa ininfrastructure development and March 1998resource-mining industries l Business Opportunitiesl furniture trade with South Africa Conference on Africa in

November 1998

Central l Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan l Two infrastructure fairs in Asia political stability and no foreign Azerbaijan in 1999

exchange control l Taking part in Aspat 98 (foodl Trading in foodstuffs fair) and InterFood Kazakhstancommodities consumer electronics in late 1998and household goodsl Real-estate boom building material supplies furniture and xtures

Middle l United Arab Emirates l Several food infrastructure East redistribution hub of the Middle East and building materials missions

l Saudi Arabia Singaporersquos plannedbiggest trading partner for the regionl Lebanon reconstruction and building materials industriesl Iran and Turkey sources for building materials

Central l Russia consumer electronics l Two trips to the Baltics sinceand food and beverages January 1998Eastern l Czech Republic Hungary Poland l Trade promotion with RussiaEurope and Slovenia electronics food and the European Union

industry and property developmentl Contract manufacturing and outsourcing for the IT industry

Latin l Brazil Argentina Chile and l Three electronics missions toAmerica Mexico top trading partners with Mexico and two business semi-

Singapore in the region nars there since September 1997l Growing consumer markets l A multi-sectoral mission tolower tariffs and privatization Brazil Argentina and Chile in

April 1997 companies from consumer products food and beverage textile and timber sectorsl Two more missions to be held by end 1998

Source Collated from The Straits Times 8 August 1998 p 17


To separate the economy from the state or vice versa in our understandingof global economic change is to commit the fallacy of composition Insteadwe should conceptualize the state- economy relationship as a dialecticalprocess of interdependence and interconnectedness In the midst of therecent Asian economic crisis and the rapid ascendancy of globalizationdiscourses blaming all economic problems on state intervention is notonly conceptually wrong but also detrimental to appropriate policyresponses Using the words of IMF neoliberalists I believe that crisistendencies in capitalism will encourage more state lsquointerventionrsquo to lsquoliber-alizersquo the market a seemingly contradictory state behaviour Interventionand liberalization have always been the processes through which theeconomy is embedded in the state and vice versa In particular the statecan be directly involved in economic action through re-regulating theeconomy Of course specic policies pursued by states will vary accordingto the political and social contexts of the countries concerned The statecan also inuence economic action and justify its legitimacy throughengaging in political discourses which defer domestic economic issues fromthe national scale to the global scale This is known as the scale politicsof globalization discourses (see Cox 1997 Dicken et al 1997 Yeung 1998aKelly 1999)

In Singapore the state has always been actively involved in domesticeconomic processes When its domestic economic engine had run out ofsteam by the 1980s the state started to search for an alternative lsquoinstitu-tional xrsquo to give a new life to the economy which was dependent so muchon foreign capital In that process the state took a lead to develop widerregional linkages through which Singaporean companies both private andGLCs could expand their business horizons and investment opportunitiesbeyond the limited domestic market Beginning with the lsquogrowth trianglersquoconcept in 1989 the state has relentlessly promoted the building of anexternal economy which not only supplements Singaporersquos domesticeconomy but more importantly serves as a springboard to establishSingapore Inc Though unprecedented in nature the recent Asian econ-omic crisis is unlikely to dismantle this state- economy embeddednessInstead I argue that the crisis has given the state more material and discur-sive power to re-regulate the economy Paradoxically the crisis hasenhanced the discursive and institutional capacities of the state ingoverning the economy I have suggested two specic and yet qualita-tively different directions through which such enhanced state governanceis made possible First more state-driven mergers and acquisitions ofGLCs will enable these national rms to become competitive both in theshort term and the long term Second the geographic scope of Singaporersquosoutward investment will be shifted from the regional scale to the globalscale This is because existing regional investments are neither verysuccessful nor likely to be successful in view of the Asian economic crisisAs a result it is likely that the world not just Asia is Singaporersquos lsquooysterrsquo


What lessons do we learn from Singaporersquos regionalization programmewhich may be relevant to Asia The central message of this article is thatwe need to recognize the importance of re-regulation at both national andglobal scales This may not be such a novel suggestion as a similar pleafor more coordinated global action and a new lsquoarchitecturersquo for the globaleconomic order to lsquocurersquo the Asian lsquoursquo has already been suggested bypeople ranging from politicians (eg Dr Mahathir Mohamad) to nanciersand bankers (eg George Soros and Joseph Stiglitz) and academics (egJagdish Bhagwati Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Krugman) For Asian emergingeconomies the urgent task is not to liberalize blindly but to consolidatethe institutional capacities of the state in order to re-regulate the ailingdomestic economies in particular the capital and nancial markets (Wadeand Veneroso 1998) Malaysia has already taken steps to impose unprece-dented controls on short-term inward and outward capital ows This stateaction in Malaysia however was taken in the context of a lsquoglobalizationbacklashrsquo manifested in rising nationalism a move towards lsquoilliberal solu-tionsrsquo with recourse to strong leaders and the politics of populism (TheStraits Times 19 September 1998)

For other Asian economies the state should recognize that it is not aquestion of lsquoretreatingrsquo from participating in globalization but also a ques-tion of how to re-regulate the national economies to make the most outof globalization Moreover the global economy still offers both opportu-nities and constraints for ailing Asian economies The prospect forsuccessful late capitalist development as in the case of Singapore throughits state-driven regionalization programme appears to be a policy of beinglsquoin and against the (global) marketrsquo As concluded by Kiely (1998 83original italics) lsquo[s]uccessful late developers will be in the world marketin that they attempt to draw on its opportunities but will be against it inthat the state will play a crucial role in removing its constraintsrsquo This ideais based on the recognition that important reforms and opportunities canbe gained from being in the capitalist state but that these are alwayscompromised or constrained by the dominance of capitalist social rela-tions and the role of the state in securing this dominance There is thusa need to be simultaneously against the state through more participatorycitizenship civic consciousness and democratic institutions (see Bello1998) The state while embedded in and regulating the economy needsto be regulated by social actors their institutions and relations

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Conference onlsquoBeyond Liberalisation Making Economic Policy in Europe and the AsiaPacic - Comparisons Regions Linkages and Lessonsrsquo EuropeanUniversity Institute Florence Italy 15- 16 October 1998 I am very gratefulto Richard Higgott and Martin Rhodes for their kind invitation Comments


from the conference participants have been very useful in my revisionsPhilip Kelly and Jim Parsonage have also provided insightful discussionsand comments The materials used in this article originate from an ongoingresearch project on lsquoSingaporersquos Global Reachrsquo funded by the NUSAcademic Research Grant (No RP970013) All errors and mistakeshowever are my own responsibility

Notes

1 lsquoExternal economyrsquo here refers to the totality of foreign operations of value-added manufacturing and services controlled by Singapore-based companies

2 See Yeung (1999b) for a case study of neoliberalist contradictions in HongKongrsquos economy

3 The term lsquosocial regulationrsquo is taken from the regulationist perspective rstdeveloped by French radical political economists in an attempt to explainchanges in capitalism by reference to the overall social structure (Aglietta1976 Lipietz 1987 Boyer 1990) Peck and Tickell (1995) argued that the adop-tion of the theory in the Anglo-Saxon world has led to some confusion overterminology because the original French word reacutegulation conveys a wider setof social processes rather than direct intervention by the state as understoodin the English version of the word For a recent study of the social sustain-ability of Singaporersquos regionalization drive see Willis and Yeoh (1998)

4 See a comprehensive twelve-page special report on the Asian economic meltdown in The Straits Times 2 July 1998 It is beyond the scope of thisarticle to debate on the causes of the crisis and the prescriptions for affectedeconomies For a sample of some very different views see Rosenberger (1997)Garnaut (1998) Haggard and MacIntyre (1998) Jomo (1998) McLeod andGarnaut (1998) and Wade and Veneroso (1998)

5 There is a possibility however that the regional exposure of these Singaporebanks has not been fully revealed

6 This institutional capacity of the state in Singapore is clearly evident in uncon-tested implementation of the recently announced S$10 billion cost-cuttingpackages in which wages of Singaporersquos workforce were reduced by 5- 8 percent and the employersrsquo contributions to the Central Provident Fund werereduced from 20 per cent of gross salaries to 10 per cent (The Straits Times12 November 1998)

7 For a recent study of the strategies and performance of these GLCs see Singhand Ang (1998)

8 Some nancial analysts however saw those mergers and acquisitions in themidst of the crisis as a form of the state bailing out ailing GLCs The recentreport by the Committee on Singaporersquos Competitiveness (Ministry of Tradeand Industry 1998) however viewed these restructuring activities of GLCs asa process of building world-class companies as another complementary sourceof economic growth in Singapore

ReferencesAglietta Michel (1976) A Theory of Capitalist Regulation London New Left

BooksAmsden Alice (1989) Asiarsquos Next Giant South Korea and Late Industrialization

New York Oxford University Press


Aoki Masahiko Kim Hyung-Ki and Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro (eds) (1997) TheRole of Government in East Asian Economic Development ComparativeInstitutional Analysis Oxford Clarendon Press

Appelbaum Richard P and Henderson Jeffrey (eds) (1992) States andDevelopment in the Asian Pacic Rim Newbury Park CA Sage

Bello Walder (1998) lsquoEast Asia on the eve of the great transformationrsquo Reviewof International Political Economy 5 424- 44

Berger Suzanne and Dore Ronald (eds) (1996) National Diversity and GlobalCapitalism Ithaca NY Cornell University Press

Bernard Mitchell (1996) lsquoStates social forces and regions in historical time towarda critical political economy of Eastern Asiarsquo Third World Quarterly 17649- 65

Block Fred (1990) lsquoPolitical choice and the multiple ldquologicsrdquo of capitalrsquo in SharonZukin and Paul DiMaggio (eds) Structures of Capital The SocialOrganisation of the Economy Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 293- 309

mdashmdash (1991) Post Industrial Possibilities A Critique of Economic DiscourseBerkeley CA University of California Press

mdashmdash (1994) lsquoThe roles of the state in the economyrsquo in Neil J Smelser and RichardSwedberg (eds) The Handbook of Economic Sociology Princeton NJPrinceton University Press pp 691- 710

Boyer Robert (1990) The Regulation School A Critical Introduction New YorkColumbia University Press

Brenner Neil (1998) lsquoGlobal cities glocal statesrsquo global city formation and stateterritorial restructuring in contemporary Europersquo Review of InternationalPolitical Economy 5 1- 37

Brohman John (1996) lsquoPostwar development in the Asian NICs does the neo-liberal model t realityrsquo Economic Geography 72 107- 30

BT Online website 7 July 1998Chia Siow Yue and Tan Joseph L H (eds) (1997) ASEAN and the EU Forging

New Linkages and Strategic Alliances Singapore Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies

Cox Kevin R (1993) lsquoThe local and the global in the new urban politics a crit-ical viewrsquo Environment and Planning D Society and Space 11 433- 48

mdashmdash (ed) (1997) Spaces of Globalization Reasserting the Power of the Local NewYork Guilford

mdashmdash (1998) lsquoSpaces of dependence spaces of engagement and the politics of scaleor looking for local politicsrsquo Political Geography 17 1- 23

Department of Statistics (1991) Singaporersquos Investment Abroad 1976- 1989Singapore DOS

mdashmdash (1996) Singaporersquos Investment Abroad 1990- 1993 Singapore DOS mdashmdash (1997) Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 1996 Singapore DOSDeyo Frederic C (ed) (1987) The Political Economy of the New Asian

Industrialism Ithaca NY Cornell University PressDicken Peter (1994) lsquoGlobal- local tensions rms and states in the global space-

economyrsquo Economic Geography 70 101- 28mdashmdash and Thrift Nigel (1992) lsquoThe organization of production and the production

of organization why business enterprises matter in the study of geograph-ical industrializationrsquo Transactions Institute of British Geographer 17279- 91

mdashmdash and Yeung Henry Wai-chung (1999) lsquoInvesting in the future East andSoutheast Asian rms in the global economyrsquo in Kris Olds Peter DickenPhilip Kelly Lily Kong and Henry Wai-chung Yeung (eds) Globalisation andthe Asia-Pacic Contested Territories London Routledge pp 107- 28


mdashmdash Peck Jamie and Tickell Adam (1997) lsquoUnpacking the globalrsquo in Roger Lee and Jane Wills (eds) Geographies of Economies London Arnold pp 158- 66

Douglass Mike (1994) lsquoThe ldquodevelopmental staterdquo and the NIEs of AsiarsquoEnvironment and Planning A 26 543- 66

Economic Development Board (1993) Growing with Enterprise A National ReportSingapore EDB

mdashmdash (1995) Regionalisation 2000 Singapore Unlimited Singapore EDBEvans Peter (1997) lsquoThe eclipse of the state Reections on stateness in an era

of globalizationrsquo World Politics 50 62- 87Far Eastern Economic Review 25 April 1996Garnaut Ross (1998) lsquoThe nancial crisis a watershed in economic thought about

East Asia Asian-Pacic Economic Literature 12 1- 11Haggard Stephen (1990) Pathways from the Periphery The Politics of Growth in

the Newly Industrializing Countries Ithaca NY Cornell University Pressmdashmdash and MacIntyre Andrew (1998) lsquoThe political economy of the Asian econ-

omic crisisrsquo Review of International Political Economy 5 381- 92Hefner Robert W (ed) (1998) Market Cultures Society and Values in the New

Asian Capitalisms Singapore Institute of Southeast Asian StudiesHill Michael and Lian Kwen Fee (1995) The Politics of Nation Building and

Citizenship in Singapore London RoutledgeHo Kong Chong (1994) lsquoIndustrial restructuring the Singapore city-state and the

regional division of labourrsquo Environment and Planning A 26 33- 51mdashmdash and So Alvin (1997) lsquoSemi-periphery and borderland integration Singapore

and Hong Kong experiencesrsquo Political Geography 16 241- 59Horsman Mathew and Marshall Andrew (1994) After the Nation State Citizens

Tribalism and the New World Disorder London HarperCollinsHsing You-tien (1998) Making Capitalism in China The Taiwan Connection New

York Oxford University PressHuff W G (1995) lsquoThe developmental state government and Singaporersquos econ-

omic development since 1960rsquo World Development 23 1421- 38Jessop Bob (1993) lsquoTowards a Schumpeterian workfare state Preliminary remarks

on post-Fordist political economyrsquo Studies in Political Economy 40 7- 39mdashmdash (1994) lsquoPost-Fordism and the statersquo in Ash Amin (ed) Post-Fordism A

Reader Oxford Blackwell pp 251- 79mdashmdash (1999) lsquoSome critical reections on globalization and its illogic(s)rsquo in Kris

Olds Peter Dicken Philip Kelly Lily Kong and Henry Wai-chung Yeung(eds) Globalisation and the Asia Pacic Contested Territories LondonRoutledge pp 19- 38

Johnson Chalmer (1982) MITI and the Japanese Economic Miracle StanfordStanford University Press

Jomo Kwame Sundaram (ed) (1998) Tigers in Trouble Financial GovernanceLiberalisation and Crises in East Asia London Zed Books

Kanai Takao (1993) lsquoSingaporersquos new focus on regional business expansionrsquo NRIQuarterly 2 18- 41

Kelly Philip F (1999) lsquoThe geographies and politics of globalizationrsquo Progress inHuman Geography 23 379- 400

Kiely Ray (1998) lsquoNeo liberalism revised A critical account of World Bankconcepts of good governance and market friendly interventionrsquo Capital ampClass 64 63- 88

Leftwich A (1993) lsquoGovernance democracy and development in the Third WorldrsquoThird World Quarterly 14 605- 24

Lim Linda Y C (1997) lsquoThe Southeast Asian currency crisis and its aftermathrsquoJournal of Asian Business 13 65- 83


mdashmdash (1998) lsquoWhose ldquomodelrdquo failed Implications of the Asian economic crisisrsquoWashington Quarterly 21 25- 36

Lipietz Alain (1987) Mirages and Miracles Problems of Third WorldIndustrialisation London Verso

Low Linda (1998) The Political Economy of a City-State Government-MadeSingapore Singapore Oxford University Press

mdashmdash Toh Mun Heng Soon Teck Wong Tan Kong Yam and Hughes Helen(1993) Challenge and Response Thirty Years of the Economic DevelopmentBoard Singapore Times Academic Press

McLeod Ross H and Garnaut Ross (eds) (1998) East Asia in Crisis From Beinga Miracle to Needing One London Routledge

Mahizhnan Arun and Lee Tsao Yuan (eds) (1998) Singapore Re-EngineeringSuccess Singapore Oxford University Press

Mathews John A (1999) lsquoA silicon island of the east creating a semiconductorindustry in Singaporersquo California Management Review 41 55- 78

Ministry of Finance (1993) Interim Report of the Committee to Promote EnterpriseOverseas Singapore MOF

Ministry of Trade and Industry (1998) Committee on Singaporersquos CompetitivenessSingapore MTI

OrsquoNeill Phillip M (1997) lsquoBringing the qualitative state into economic geographyrsquo in Roger Lee and Jane Wills (eds) Geographies of Economies LondonArnold pp 290- 301

Ohmae Kenichi (1990) The Borderless World Power and Strategy in the InterlinkedEconomy London Collins

mdashmdash (1995) The End of the Nation State The Rise of Regional Economies LondonHarperCollins

Parsonage James (1992) lsquoSoutheast Asiarsquos ldquogrowth trianglerdquo a subregionalresponse to global transformationrsquo International Journal of Urban andRegional Research 16 307- 17

mdashmdash (1994) lsquoThe state and globalisation Singaporersquos growth triangle strategyrsquoWorking Paper No 23 Asia Research Centre Murdoch UniversityAustralia

Peck Jamie A and Tickell Adam T (1994) lsquoSearching for a new institutional xthe after-Fordist crisis and the global- local disorderrsquo in Ash Amin (ed)Post-Fordism A Reader Oxford Blackwell pp 280- 315

mdashmdash and Tickell Adam T (1995) lsquoThe social regulation of uneven developmentldquoregulatory decitrdquo Englandrsquos South East and the collapse of ThatcherismrsquoEnvironment and Planning A 27 15- 40

Perry Martin (1991) lsquoThe Singapore growth triangle state capital and labour ata new frontier in the world economyrsquo Singapore Journal of TropicalGeography 12 138- 51

mdashmdash and Tan Boon Hui (1998) lsquoGlobal manufacturing and local linkage inSingaporersquo Environment and Planning A 30 1603- 24

mdashmdash Kong Lily and Yeoh Brenda (1997) Singapore A Developmental City StateLondon Wiley

mdashmdash Poon Jessie and Yeung Henry (1998a) lsquoRegional ofces in Singapore spatialand strategic inuences in the location of corporate controlrsquo Review ofUrban and Regional Development Studies 10 42- 59

mdashmdash Yeung Henry and Poon Jessie (1998b) lsquoRegional ofce mobility the caseof corporate control in Singapore and Hong Kongrsquo Geoforum 29 237- 55

Pitelis Christo N (1991) lsquoBeyond the nation-state The transnational rm and thenation-statersquo Capital amp Class 43 131- 52

mdashmdash (1993) lsquoTransnationals international organization and deindustrializationrsquoOrganization Studies 14 527- 48


Piven Frances Fox (1995) lsquoIs it global economics or neo-laissez-fairersquo New LeftReview 213 107- 14

Rao V V Bhanoji (1998) lsquoEast Asian economies the crisis of 1997- 98rsquo Economicand Political Weekly 6 June pp 1397- 416

Reich Robert B (1991) The Work of Nations Preparing Ourselves for 21st CenturyCapitalism New York Vintage Books

Rodan Garry (1989) The Political Economy of Singaporersquos IndustrializationNational State and International Capital London Macmillan

Rosenberger Leif Roderick (1997) lsquoSoutheast Asiarsquos currency crisis a diagnosisand prescriptionrsquo Contemporary Southeast Asia 19 223- 51

Safarian A E and Dobson Wendy (eds) (1997) East Asian Capitalism Diversityand Dynamism Toronto University of Toronto Press

Sassen Saskia (1996) Losing Control Sovereignty in an Age of GlobalizationNew York Columbia University Press

Singh Kulwant and Ang Siah Hwee (1998) lsquoThe strategies and success of govern-ment linked corporations in Singaporersquo Research Paper Series No 98-06Faculty of Business Administration National University of SingaporeSingapore

Speeches Singapore May- June 1993Sung Gul Hong (1997) The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in East Asia

The Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan and South Korea Cheltenham ElgarTan Chwee Huat (1995) Venturing Overseas Singaporersquos External Wing Singapore

McGraw-HillTaylor Lance (1997) lsquoThe revival of the liberal creed - the IMF and the World

Bank in a globalized economyrsquo World Development 25 145- 52The Straits Times Singapore various issuesTickell Adam T and Peck Jamie A (1995) lsquoSocial regulation after-Fordism regu-

lation theory neo-liberalism and the global- local nexusrsquo Economy andSociety 24 357- 86

UNCTAD (1996) Sharing Asiarsquos Dynamism Asian Direct Investment in theEuropean Union New York United Nations

Wade Robert (1990) Governing the Market Economic Theory and the Role ofGovernment in East Asian Industrialization Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

mdashmdash and Veneroso Frank (1998) lsquoThe Asian crisis the high debt model versusthe Wall Street- Treasury- IMF complexrsquo New Left Review 228 3- 23

Weiss Linda (1997) lsquoGlobalization and the myth of the powerless statersquo New LeftReview 225 3- 27

Whitley Richard (1998) lsquoInternationalization and varieties of capitalism thelimited effects of cross-national coordination of economic activities on thenature of business systemsrsquo Review of International Political Economy 5445- 81

Willis Katie D and Yeoh Brenda (1998) lsquoThe social sustainability of Singaporersquosregionalisation driversquo Third World Planning Review 20 203- 21

World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle Oxford Oxford University PressYeung Henry Wai-chung (1994) lsquoTransnational corporations from Asian devel-

oping countries their characteristics and competitive edgersquo Journal of AsianBusiness 10 17- 58

mdashmdash (1998a) lsquoCapital state and space contesting the borderless worldrsquoTransactions of the Institute of British Geographers 23 291- 309

mdashmdash (1998b) lsquoThe political economy of transnational corporations a study of theregionalisation of Singaporean rmsrsquo Political Geography 17 389- 416

mdashmdash (1998c) lsquoThe social- spatial constitution of business organisations a geograph-ical perspectiversquo Organization 5 101- 28


mdashmdash (1998d) lsquoTransnational economic synergy and business networks the case oftwo-way investment between Malaysia and Singaporersquo Regional Studies 32687- 706

mdashmdash (1999a) lsquoRegulating investment abroad The political economy of the region-alisation of Singaporean rmsrsquo Antipode 31 245- 73

mdashmdash (1999b) lsquoNeo-liberalism laissez-faire capitalism and economic crisis the polit-ical economy of deindustrialisation in Hong Kongrsquo Competition and Change4 1- 49

mdashmdash (1999c) lsquoThe political economy of Singaporean investments in Chinarsquo Paperpresented at the East Asia Institute Seminar National University ofSingapore 19 March

mdashmdash (1999d) lsquoThe internationalization of ethnic Chinese business rms fromSoutheast Asia strategies processes and competitive advantagersquo International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23 103- 27

mdashmdash (ed) (2000) The Globalisation of Business Firms from Emerging Economies2 vols Cheltenham Elgar

mdashmdash and Dicken Peter (1998) lsquoAsian rms in a globalizing economy some implications for Europersquo Paper presented at the lsquoConference on Two BigChallenges in Asia- Europe Relations European FDI in Asia and SingleEuropean Currencyrsquo Macau Institute of European Studies 2- 4 April

mdashmdash and Olds Kris (1998) lsquoSingaporersquos global reach situating the city-state in theglobal economyrsquo International Journal of Urban Sciences 2 24- 47


Introduction

As the world economy becomes increasingly interconnected and inter-dependent both an enabling mechanism and an outcome of economic globalization the governance of capitalism in national economies is beingthrown into light as a rather thorny issue The crux of this lsquogovernanceproblemrsquo in an era of accelerated globalization is related to the role ofthe nation-state Should the state intervene in development processes Orshould it refrain from direct intervention and take a back seat as a lsquonight-watchmanrsquo leaving the optimal solutions of economic problems to AdamSmithrsquos lsquoinvisible handrsquo It has been argued by many scholars of globalpolitical economy that the latter approach to governance collectivelyknown as neoliberalism has emerged as the dominant political and econ-omic strategy in governing todayrsquos globalizing world economy Certainlyin America and Britain neoliberalism has been hailed as an institutionalx to resolve global- local tensions arising from the need for capital toglobalize its productive capacity and for labour to localize jobs andemployment (Jessop 1994 Tickell and Peck 1995) In contrast the devel-opmental state in Asia has long been experimenting with another formof institutional x to resolve these tensions of globalization According tothis lsquostatistrsquo view direct intervention is the key instrument deployed bythe developmental state in Asia to regulate its burgeoning domesticeconomy (Deyo 1987 Haggard 1990 Wade 1990 Appelbaum andHenderson 1992 Aoki et al 1997) This difference in capitalist economicorganization between Asia and AmericaEurope has created what isknown as different varieties of lsquocapitalismsrsquo (see Berger and Dore 1996Safarian and Dobson 1997 Hefner 1998 Whitley 1998)

The recent Asian economic crisis in 1997- 98 however has thrown thesedivergent pathways to economic development and governance into seriousquestion Protagonists of neoliberalism argue that their agenda is nowbecoming a global orthodoxy when several ailing Asian economies haveaccepted IMF packages which come with neoliberal economic programmes(Lim 1997 1998 Rosenberger 1997 Jomo 1998 Rao 1998 cf Bello 1998Haggard and MacIntyre 1998 Wade and Veneroso 1998) Other Asianstates have also faced tremendous pressure from global capital and inter-national organizations to carry out structural reforms through which strongstate intervention in national economies is fast becoming an historicalpast As Bello (1998 439) alluded lsquo[s]o dominant has free market ideologybecome in international elite discourse that even its opponents in govern-ment and business [in Asia] - with the singular exception of Prime MinisterMahathir of Malaysia - mouth its platitudes while opposing it in practicersquoThis neoliberal global orthodoxy is prescribed as a bitter lsquopillrsquo to be lsquoswal-lowedrsquo by troubled Asian states in order for them to regain their member-ship in the lsquoglobalization clubrsquo This logic of globalization as a universaland inevitable process impinged externally upon these Asian economies









































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

to

dire

ct e

quit

y in

vest

men

t D

irec

t in

vest

men

t ab

road

ref

ers

to t

he a

mou

nt o

f pa

id-u

p sh

ares

of

over

seas

sub

sidi

arie

s an

d as

soci

-at

es h

eld

by c

ompa

nies

in

Sing

apor

e D

irec

t eq

uity

inv

estm

ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

estm

ent

plus

the

res

erve

s of

the

ove

rsea

s su

bsid

iari

es a

nd a

ssoc

iate

s at

trib

utab

leto

the

se c

ompa

nies

Fo

r ov

erse

as b

ranc

hes

the

net

am

ount

due

to

the

loca

l pa

rent

com

pani

es i

s ta

ken

as a

n ap

prox

imat

ion

of t

he m

agni

tude

of

dire

ct i

nves

tmen

t
























ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes































































































































































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

to

dire

ct e

quit

y in

vest

men

t D

irec

t in

vest

men

t ab

road

ref

ers

to t

he a

mou

nt o

f pa

id-u

p sh

ares

of

over

seas

sub

sidi

arie

s an

d as

soci

-at

es h

eld

by c

ompa

nies

in

Sing

apor

e D

irec

t eq

uity

inv

estm

ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

estm

ent

plus

the

res

erve

s of

the

ove

rsea

s su

bsid

iari

es a

nd a

ssoc

iate

s at

trib

utab

leto

the

se c

ompa

nies

Fo

r ov

erse

as b

ranc

hes

the

net

am

ount

due

to

the

loca

l pa

rent

com

pani

es i

s ta

ken

as a

n ap

prox

imat

ion

of t

he m

agni

tude

of

dire

ct i

nves

tmen

t
























ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes



























































































































































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

to

dire

ct e

quit

y in

vest

men

t D

irec

t in

vest

men

t ab

road

ref

ers

to t

he a

mou

nt o

f pa

id-u

p sh

ares

of

over

seas

sub

sidi

arie

s an

d as

soci

-at

es h

eld

by c

ompa

nies

in

Sing

apor

e D

irec

t eq

uity

inv

estm

ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

estm

ent

plus

the

res

erve

s of

the

ove

rsea

s su

bsid

iari

es a

nd a

ssoc

iate

s at

trib

utab

leto

the

se c

ompa

nies

Fo

r ov

erse

as b

ranc

hes

the

net

am

ount

due

to

the

loca

l pa

rent

com

pani

es i

s ta

ken

as a

n ap

prox

imat

ion

of t

he m

agni

tude

of

dire

ct i

nves

tmen

t
























ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes






















































































































































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

to

dire

ct e

quit

y in

vest

men

t D

irec

t in

vest

men

t ab

road

ref

ers

to t

he a

mou

nt o

f pa

id-u

p sh

ares

of

over

seas

sub

sidi

arie

s an

d as

soci

-at

es h

eld

by c

ompa

nies

in

Sing

apor

e D

irec

t eq

uity

inv

estm

ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

estm

ent

plus

the

res

erve

s of

the

ove

rsea

s su

bsid

iari

es a

nd a

ssoc

iate

s at

trib

utab

leto

the

se c

ompa

nies

Fo

r ov

erse

as b

ranc

hes

the

net

am

ount

due

to

the

loca

l pa

rent

com

pani

es i

s ta

ken

as a

n ap

prox

imat

ion

of t

he m

agni

tude

of

dire

ct i

nves

tmen

t
























ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes


















































































































































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

to

dire

ct e

quit

y in

vest

men

t D

irec

t in

vest

men

t ab

road

ref

ers

to t

he a

mou

nt o

f pa

id-u

p sh

ares

of

over

seas

sub

sidi

arie

s an

d as

soci

-at

es h

eld

by c

ompa

nies

in

Sing

apor

e D

irec

t eq

uity

inv

estm

ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

estm

ent

plus

the

res

erve

s of

the

ove

rsea

s su

bsid

iari

es a

nd a

ssoc

iate

s at

trib

utab

leto

the

se c

ompa

nies

Fo

r ov

erse

as b

ranc

hes

the

net

am

ount

due

to

the

loca

l pa

rent

com

pani

es i

s ta

ken

as a

n ap

prox

imat

ion

of t

he m

agni

tude

of

dire

ct i

nves

tmen

t
























ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes















































































































































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

to

dire

ct e

quit

y in

vest

men

t D

irec

t in

vest

men

t ab

road

ref

ers

to t

he a

mou

nt o

f pa

id-u

p sh

ares

of

over

seas

sub

sidi

arie

s an

d as

soci

-at

es h

eld

by c

ompa

nies

in

Sing

apor

e D

irec

t eq

uity

inv

estm

ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

estm

ent

plus

the

res

erve

s of

the

ove

rsea

s su

bsid

iari

es a

nd a

ssoc

iate

s at

trib

utab

leto

the

se c

ompa

nies

Fo

r ov

erse

as b

ranc

hes

the

net

am

ount

due

to

the

loca

l pa

rent

com

pani

es i

s ta

ken

as a

n ap

prox

imat

ion

of t

he m

agni

tude

of

dire

ct i

nves

tmen

t
























ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes










































































































































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

to

dire

ct e

quit

y in

vest

men

t D

irec

t in

vest

men

t ab

road

ref

ers

to t

he a

mou

nt o

f pa

id-u

p sh

ares

of

over

seas

sub

sidi

arie

s an

d as

soci

-at

es h

eld

by c

ompa

nies

in

Sing

apor

e D

irec

t eq

uity

inv

estm

ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

estm

ent

plus

the

res

erve

s of

the

ove

rsea

s su

bsid

iari

es a

nd a

ssoc

iate

s at

trib

utab

leto

the

se c

ompa

nies

Fo

r ov

erse

as b

ranc

hes

the

net

am

ount

due

to

the

loca

l pa

rent

com

pani

es i

s ta

ken

as a

n ap

prox

imat

ion

of t

he m

agni

tude

of

dire

ct i

nves

tmen

t
























ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes







































































































































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

to

dire

ct e

quit

y in

vest

men

t D

irec

t in

vest

men

t ab

road

ref

ers

to t

he a

mou

nt o

f pa

id-u

p sh

ares

of

over

seas

sub

sidi

arie

s an

d as

soci

-at

es h

eld

by c

ompa

nies

in

Sing

apor

e D

irec

t eq

uity

inv

estm

ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

estm

ent

plus

the

res

erve

s of

the

ove

rsea

s su

bsid

iari

es a

nd a

ssoc

iate

s at

trib

utab

leto

the

se c

ompa

nies

Fo

r ov

erse

as b

ranc

hes

the

net

am

ount

due

to

the

loca

l pa

rent

com

pani

es i

s ta

ken

as a

n ap

prox

imat

ion

of t

he m

agni

tude

of

dire

ct i

nves

tmen

t
























ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes


































































































































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

to

dire

ct e

quit

y in

vest

men

t D

irec

t in

vest

men

t ab

road

ref

ers

to t

he a

mou

nt o

f pa

id-u

p sh

ares

of

over

seas

sub

sidi

arie

s an

d as

soci

-at

es h

eld

by c

ompa

nies

in

Sing

apor

e D

irec

t eq

uity

inv

estm

ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

estm

ent

plus

the

res

erve

s of

the

ove

rsea

s su

bsid

iari

es a

nd a

ssoc

iate

s at

trib

utab

leto

the

se c

ompa

nies

Fo

r ov

erse

as b

ranc

hes

the

net

am

ount

due

to

the

loca

l pa

rent

com

pani

es i

s ta

ken

as a

n ap

prox

imat

ion

of t

he m

agni

tude

of

dire

ct i

nves

tmen

t
























ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes






























































































































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

tist

ics

Sing

apo

re

1996

Si

ngap

ore

DO

S

Not

es

Dat

a fr

om 1

990-

93 r

efer

to

dire

ct e

quit

y in

vest

men

t D

irec

t in

vest

men

t ab

road

ref

ers

to t

he a

mou

nt o

f pa

id-u

p sh

ares

of

over

seas

sub

sidi

arie

s an

d as

soci

-at

es h

eld

by c

ompa

nies

in

Sing

apor

e D

irec

t eq

uity

inv

estm

ent

refe

rs t

o di

rect

inv

estm

ent

plus

the

res

erve

s of

the

ove

rsea

s su

bsid

iari

es a

nd a

ssoc

iate

s at

trib

utab

leto

the

se c

ompa

nies

Fo

r ov

erse

as b

ranc

hes

the

net

am

ount

due

to

the

loca

l pa

rent

com

pani

es i

s ta

ken

as a

n ap

prox

imat

ion

of t

he m

agni

tude

of

dire

ct i

nves

tmen

t
























ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes
























































































































Tab

le 1

Out

war

d di

rect

inv

estm

ent

from

Sin

gapo

re b

y co

untr

y 1

981-

95 (

in S

$ m

illio

n)

Cou

ntry

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Asi

an c

ount

ries

128

99

158

67

166

24

180

52

172

14

183

65

190

85

196

36

196

84

701

33

740

15

920

93

114

800

173

580

215

110

ASE

AN

107

85

123

37

124

17

134

14

113

33

115

58

118

05

121

60

113

84

356

71

399

56

489

67

593

38

968

00

124

670

Bru

nei

37

60

90

491

529

500

542

574

566

662

694

885

912

770

370

Indo

nesi

a39

539

744

456

365

067

758

659

853

322

48

267

332

81

517

31

997

03

448

0M

alay

sia

100

69

116

23

116

26

120

91

971

898

56

100

84

103

08

971

62

790

13

121

13

916

54

656

76

500

07

305

0P

hilip

pine

s18

416

117

617

622

422

514

322

522

897

789

710

63

230

638

20

521

0T

haila

nd10

09

68

19

321

230

045

045

534

138

84

448

145

74

438

172

30

860

0H

ong

Kon

g18

18

316

735

74

391

346

07

497

953

99

545

258

14

226

62

236

86

305

11

402

56

494

00

508

90

Japa

n0

30

40

60

75

06

016

116

733

951

873

575

810

94

171

038

20

Chi

na-

--

-57

693

810

14

791

474

239

722

00

282

644

41

1533

024

450

Sout

h K

orea

--

--

--

-14

815

9-

--

--

-Ta

iwan

129

148

249

271

329

378

260

543

860

494

828

70

349

535

45

496

053

00

Oth

ers

162

211

378

447

319

452

446

375

654

393

745

67

553

661

27

103

40

112

80

Eur

opea

n co

untr

ies

507

580

577

715

893

167

235

82

303

420

34

109

54

139

76

148

02

154

97

220

00

384

40

Net

herl

ands

08

08

122

106

120

138

165

411

14

-94

365

63

549

652

55

467

145

30

456

0U

nite

d K

ingd

om49

757

243

143

945

981

848

349

350

430

04

322

335

10

360

693

00

243

50

Ger

man

y-

--

--

-8

68

623

4-

--

--

-O

ther

s0

2-

24

170

314

716

135

913

41

223

913

86

525

860

37

722

081

80

953

0

Aus

tral

ia62

690

612

14

132

017

69

175

621

78

166

113

83

530

557

00

636

537

41

999

01

116

0N

ew Z

eala

nd-

--

--

--

--

135

85

138

73

133

26

149

38

--

Can

ada

--

115

115

176

176

176

290

734

--

--

--

Uni

ted

Stat

es31

844

347

554

466

165

469

310

77

160

068

97

130

39

158

95

175

51

168

10

203

60

Oth

er c

ount

ries

ne

c

242

930

73

332

632

47

185

933

54

390

142

41

400

22

934

33

123

63

493

14

587

47

527

08

359

0

Tota

l1

677

72

086

92

233

12

399

32

257

22

597

72

961

52

993

92

943

713

621

715

183

817

741

321

240

229

765

036

866

0

Sou

rces

D

epar

tmen

t of S

tati

stic

s (1

991)

Sin

gapo

rersquos

Inv

estm

ent A

broa

d 1

976-

1989

Sin

gapo

re D

OS

Dep

artm

ent o

f Sta

tist

ics

(199

6) S

inga

pore

rsquos I

nve

stm

ent A

broa

d19

90-1

993

Sin

gapo

re

DO

S D

epar

tmen

t of

Sta

tist

ics

(199

7)

Yea

rboo

k of

Sta

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ment
































November 1998

















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November 1998

















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November 1998

















Acknowledgements




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ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes
































































































































ment
































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes




























































































































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November 1998

















Acknowledgements




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November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes










































































































































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes




































































































































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes
































































































































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes



























































































































November 1998

















Acknowledgements




Notes





























































































































Acknowledgements




Notes


























































































































Acknowledgements




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State intervention and neoliberalism in the globalizing world

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