MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2019ME82Docket: SRP-17-364Argued: September12,2018Decided: May30,2019Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.
STATEOFMAINEv.
ANTHONYLORDSAUFLEY,C.J.
[¶1]InJuly2015,AnthonyLordwentonamulti-hour,violentrampage
throughAroostookandPenobscotCounties. By the time thepolicearrested
him, Lord had killed two people and severely injured several others. He
eventuallypleadedguiltytotwomurders,see17-AM.R.S.§201(1)(A)(2018),
andadozenothercrimes.Atsentencing,thecourt(PenobscotandAroostook
Counties,A.Murray,J.)imposedalifesentenceforeachofthetwomurdersand
concurrent sentences of various terms of years for the other crimes. The
Sentence Review Panel accepted Lord’s petition to appeal from the life
sentences,bringingthismatterbeforeus.Statev.Lord,No.SRP-17-364(Me.
Sent.Rev.PanelNov.8,2017);see15M.R.S.§§2151-53(2018);M.R.App.P.19.
2
[¶2]Lordarguesthatthecourterredinenteringthetwolifesentences
because, in setting thebasic sentences, the court improperly considered the
othercrimesthathecommittedduring thosefatefulhours. Lordalsoargues
thatthecourtimproperly“double-counted”hiscriminalhistorybyconsidering
itboth(1)indeterminingthebasicsentenceand(2)asanaggravatingfactor
whendetermininghismaximumsentence.Weaffirmthesentencesenteredby
thecourt.
I.BACKGROUND
A. FactualHistory
[¶3] The following facts are drawn from the State’s summary of the
evidencethatitwouldhavepresentedhadLordnotpleadedguiltyandhadthe
mattergonetotrial.SeeM.R.U.Crim.P.11(b)(3),(e).AlthoughLorddisputed
orcorrectedcertainof thedetails in theState’s representations,hedoesnot
disputetheevidentiarysupportforanyofthefollowingfacts.
[¶4]InJuly2015,AnthonyLordwasthirty-fiveyearsold.Twomonths
priortotheeventsinissue,hissix-month-oldsonhaddiedasaresultofwhat
Lord considered tobe the intentional act of anotherman. Also prior to the
eventsinissue,Lord’sformergirlfriendhadreportedcriminalconductbyLord
towardher.
3
[¶5]Sometimebefore8:30p.m.onJuly16,2015,Lordsetfiretoabarn
onpropertyownedbythatyoungwoman’smotherinAroostookCounty.The
mother, who suffers from multiple sclerosis, was alerted to the fire by a
neighbor,afterwhichthemothercalledherdaughter.Asthefirewasraging,
theyoungwomanarrivedwiththemanshewasthendating,andtheystayed
with her mother after the fire department left. The fire burned intensely,
eventuallylevelingthebarn.
[¶6]Hourslater,atapproximately4:00a.m.,Lordknockedonthedoor
ofafriend’suncle,wholivedinAroostookCounty.Hetoldtheunclethatthe
carhewasdrivingwasoutofgasandhadbrokendown.Whentheunclecame
outside,Lordhithimintheheadwithahammer,orderedhiminside,tooktwo
guns—ashotgunanda.22caliberrevolver—andammunition,andbarricaded
theuncleinthebasementofthehouse.Lordnextdrovetotheresidenceofhis
ownbrotherandfiredthroughthewindowwiththerevolver.Hisbrotherwas
athomebutwasnotinjured.
[¶7]Lordthenwentbacktothepropertyoftheyoungwoman’smother.
Arriving at the home after all of the fire responders had left, Lord used the
revolver he had stolen to shoot through the door of the mother’s home,
woundinghisformergirlfriendinthearm.Hethenenteredthehomeandshot
4
eight bullets into the neck, chest, and pelvis of her boyfriend, who, after
attemptingtotalkwithhisownmotherbyphoneonelasttime,laterdiedofhis
wounds.Theyoungwomanrantothebathroomwherehermotherhelpedher
escapethroughthewindow.Lordshothermotherintheshoulder,theyoung
womansuccessfullyescaped,andLordreloadedhisgunandexitedthehouse.
[¶8]Astheyoungwomanfled,jumpingintothebedofapassingtruck,
Lordcameafterherandjumpedintothetruckbedwithher.Whenthedriver
responded to their unexpected presence in the truck bed and pulled into a
nearbydriveway,Lordshothimthreetimesintheneckandupperbackusing
therevolver. Both theyoungwomanandLord leaptoutof the truckatthat
point.Thedriversurvivedhisinjuries.
[¶9]Inapickuptruckstolenfromhisfriend’suncle,Lorddrovetoward
the Penobscot area with the young woman in the truck. Police found and
pursuedthetruck,andLordshotatoncomingtrafficandatlawenforcement
officers. Lordeventuallydrovetoawoodlotwhereheencounteredtwomen
whohadjustdroppedoffaloadofwood.Hedidnotknoweitherofthosemen.
Lordaskedforacigaretteandaphoneandthenaimedtherevolveratoneof
themen,whosaid,“No,no,noman.”Themantriedtorunaway,butLordshot
5
directlyathimandkilledhim.Astheothermanturnedtorun,Lordfiredand
hitthemanonce;hesurvived.
[¶10]Withtheyoungwomanstillwithhim,LordreturnedtoAroostook
Countyinatruckownedbyoneofthemenhehadshot;brokeintoanumberof
differentcampsandresidences;andstoleafour-wheeler,anotherfirearm,and
otheritems.Hewasfinallyarrestedaftermeetingwithafamilymember.
B. ProceduralHistory
[¶11] Theproceduralhistoryisnot indispute. InJuly2015,theState
filed two complaints charging Anthony Lord with murder, 17-A M.R.S.
§201(1)(A),andkidnapping(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§301(1)(B)(1)(2018), in
AroostookCountyandmurder,17-AM.R.S.§201(1)(A),inPenobscotCounty.
InAugustandSeptember,Lordwaschargedbyindictmentsfiledineachcounty
withthosecrimesandmultipleothers.1
1Thechargesincluded:
• Two counts of attemptedmurderwith a firearm (ClassA), 17-AM.R.S. §§201(1)(A),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5)(2018);
• Arson(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§802(1)(A)(2018);• Elevatedaggravatedassaultwiththeuseofadangerousweapon(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.
§§208-B(1)(A),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5)(2018);• Three counts of aggravated assault with the use of a dangerous weapon (Class B),
17-AM.R.S.§§208(1)(B),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5)(2018);
6
[¶12] Lord initiallypleadednotguilty toall charges. In late2016,he
movedtosuppressevidenceobtainedduringapoliceinterviewofhim.2InJune
2017,afterfindingLordcompetenttostandtrial,thecourtheldanevidentiary
hearingonLord’smotiontosuppress,receivinginevidencearecordingofthe
policeinterview.
• Two counts of theft by unauthorized taking of a firearm (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§353(1)(B)(2)(2018);• Fourcountsofrecklessconductwiththeuseofadangerousweapon(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.
§§211(1),1158-A(1)(B),1252(4),(5)(2018);and• Eludinganofficer(ClassC),29-AM.R.S.§2414(3)(2018).
2Monthspassedbetweenthefilingoftheindictmentandthefilingofthemotiontosuppressdue
toamotionforamentalexaminationandresultingreportfiledin2016;thewithdrawalofdefensecounselandassignmentofnewcounselin2016;anddiscoverymotionsfiledin2015and2016.
7
[¶13] Before the court could rule on the motion to suppress, Lord
decided to plead guilty to the twomurder charges and twelve of the other
chargedcrimes,3andtheStateagreedtodismissthethreeremainingcharges.4
C. TheGuiltyPleas
[¶14]ThecourtheldahearinginJuly2017atwhichitacceptedLord’s
guiltypleas.ThecourtheardtheState’ssummaryofthefactualbasisforthe
charges,and it thoroughlyandcarefully followedtherequirementsofM.R.U.
Crim.P.11toensurethatthepleawasmadeknowinglyandvoluntarily. See
M.R.U.Crim.P.11(b)-(e).
3Lordpleadedguiltytothetwomurderchargesandthefollowingothercrimes:
• Two counts of attemptedmurderwith a firearm (ClassA), 17-AM.R.S. §§201(1)(A),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5);
• Arson(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§802(1)(A);• Elevatedaggravatedassaultwiththeuseofadangerousweapon(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.
§§208-B(1)(A),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5);• Three counts of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon (Class B), 17-AM.R.S.
§§208(1)(B),1158-A(1)(B),1252(5);• Twocountsoftheftofafirearm(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§353(1)(B)(2);• Twocountsofrecklessconductwiththeuseofadangerousweapon(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.
§§211(1),1158-A(1)(B),1252(4),(5);and• Eludinganofficer(ClassC),29-AM.R.S.§2414(3).
4 The State agreed to the dismissal of the charge of kidnapping (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§301(1)(B)(1) (2018), and two chargesof reckless conductwith adangerousweapon(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.§§211(1),1158-A(1)(B),1252(4),(5).
8
[¶15] AftertheStatepresenteditssummaryoftheavailableevidence,
thecourtaffordedLordtheopportunitytocorrectthefacts,andhecorrected
orclarifiedcertaindetailsbutdidnotdisputethathehadcommittedanyofthe
crimesdescribed.Hedidagreethattherewasafactualbasisforeachcharge.
SeeM.R.U.Crim.P. 11(b)(3), (e). Thecourt thenreviewedthedetailsof the
majorcrimeswithLordandallowedhim finally toclarifyanydiscrepancies.
There isnoquestion from the record thatLordunderstoodall of theState’s
evidence against him and that, once clarified, he agreed with the State’s
recitation.ItwasultimatelyclearthatLordchoseofhisownvolitiontoenter
theguiltypleas.5Hedoesnotchallengethatprocessorthecourt’sacceptance
ofhispleasofguilty.
D. TheSentencingHearing
[¶16]Thecourtheldasentencinghearingtwoweekslater.Lordandthe
StateagreedthatthecourtcouldconsiderthevideorecordingoftheJuly17,
2015, police interview of Lord that had earlier been admitted at the
suppression hearing. The State summarized the facts of the horrifying and
lethalcriminalactivityinwhichLordhadengagedandarguedforabasicand
5 Defensecounselalsotookpainstomaketherecordclearthatthechoicetopleadguiltywas
entirelyLord’s.Herepresentedthatheandco-counselhadnotpressuredLord,andtheyhadbeenpreparedtotrythecase.
9
maximumsentenceoflifeimprisonmentforeachofthemurders.Insupportof
itsrecommendationofbasicsentencesoflifeimprisonment,theStateargued
thatLordhadinfactpremeditatedatleastoneofthekillings;hadintentionally
causedmultipledeaths;hadusedafirearm,which,asafelon,hewasprohibited
frompossessing;hadkilledthefirstmurdervictiminwhatshouldhavebeen
thesafetyofaresidence;andhadkilledthesecondmurdervictimasarandom
act of violence. The State further argued for themaximum sentence of life
imprisonment because, despite the mitigating factor of Lord accepting
responsibility for the murders, his actions had a devastating impact on the
victimsandtheirfamilies;hehadnotbeenundertheinfluenceofanysubstance
and was aware of what he was doing; he had multiple prior convictions,
includingassaultandunlawfulsexualcontact;andhehadviolatedthetermsof
hisprobationbypossessingafirearm.
[¶17] The State presented victim impact statements from the young
womanwhowastheobjectofLord’spursuit,hermother,thedriverwhomLord
shotfromthetruckbed,andfamilymembersofthosekilledorinjuredbyLord.
[¶18] Lord addressed the court, the victims, and their families and
apologizedforhisactions.Lord,hismother,andanumberofLord’srelatives
eachtestifiedthathesufferedfrommentalillnessandthathehadbeenlosing
10
controlsincehissix-month-oldsondied.6Lordacknowledgedthathissentence
shouldexceedtheminimumsentencebutaskedthattherebesome“daylightat
theend.” Lordreasoned thata termof fortyyearswouldbea justsentence
under the circumstances because he went peacefully into police custody
followingtherampage,confessedtopolicetruthfully,andhadshownremorse
sincetheeventsatissue.
E. TheSentence
[¶19] The court considered the informationoffered at the sentencing
hearing, including the videoof thepolice interviewand the summaryof the
evidencefromtheRule11hearing,indeterminingLord’ssentence.Insetting
thebasicsentence,thecourtconsideredthecrimes“inthecontextoftheentire
courseofMr.Lord’sconduct,”includinghisburningofthebarn;hisassaultand
barricadingofhisfriend’suncle;theshotshefiredintohisbrother’shome;the
shootingsandmurderat theresidenceofhis formergirlfriend’smother;his
pursuitofthatyoungwomanintothebedofapassingtruck;hisshootingofthe
truck’s driver; the shots he fired at police officers and other vehicles; his
shootingofthetwomeninthewoodlot,causingthedeathofoneofthem;and
6Asmentionedearlier,Lordbelievedthathisinfantsonhadbeenmurdered.
11
his theft of vehicles andof firearms,which, as a convicted felon,hewasnot
allowedtopossess.See17-AM.R.S.§1252-C(1)(2018).
[¶20]Indeterminingthebasicsentence,thecourtfoundtwoaggravating
considerations that made it appropriate to set a basic sentence of life
imprisonment:(1)Lordintendedmultipledeathsand(2)thedeathsoccurred
duringacriminalrampagethatincludednumerousactsofviolencebyafelon
whocommittedarsonandstolemotorvehiclesandguns.Thecourtfoundthat
Lordhadengagedinthemostseriousmeansofcommittingmurderanddidnot
findothercaseswithsimilarfacts.Itultimatelyconcludedthatabasicsentence
oflifeinprisonwaswarranted.
[¶21]Thecourtthenconsideredtheaggravatingandmitigatingfactors
separatefromthemeansofcommittingthecrimetodeterminethemaximum
sentence. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2) (2018). The aggravating factors
identifiedweretheconscioussufferingoftheyoungwoman’sboyfriendbefore
hedied; theawarenesson thepartof themanwhodied in thewoodlot that
Lordwasabouttoshoothim;thedevastatingeffectonthevictims’families;and
Lord’scriminalhistorygoingbackto1999,includinganassaultandunlawful
sexualcontactin2005and,mostrecently,adomesticviolenceassaultin2015,
forwhich hewas on probation at the time of the murders. The court also
12
consideredthathewentonthisrampagedespitehavingsupportfromfamily
andfriends.ThemitigatingfactorswereLord’spost-traumaticstressafterthe
deathofhisson,themutuallovebetweenLordandmembersofhisfamily,and
hisacceptanceofresponsibilityandexpressionsofremorse.
[¶22]Concludingthattheaggravatingfactorsoutweighedthemitigating
factors,thecourtenteredajudgmentofconvictionandsentencedLordtotwo
concurrentlifesentencesforthemurders.ThecourtalsosentencedLordon
theremainingconvictions,withalltobeservedconcurrently:
• Twentyyearseachforo Twocountsofattemptedmurderwithuseofafirearm,o Elevatedaggravatedassaultwithuseofadangerousweapon,ando Aggravatedassaultwithuseofadangerousweapon;
• Fifteenyearsforarson;
• Sevenyearseachforo Twocountsofaggravatedassaultwithuseofadangerousweapon,and
o Twocountsoftheftofafirearm;and
• Fiveyearseachforo Twocountsofrecklessconductwithuseofadangerousweapon,and
o Eludinganofficer.
Given the life sentences and Lord’s demonstrated lack of success with
probation,thecourtdidnotsuspendanyportionofthesentencesthatwerefor
atermofyearsororderanyprobation. See17-AM.R.S.§1252-C(3)(2018).
13
ThecourtorderedLordtopaycourtfinesof$490andrestitutionof$38,046.75
toreimbursetheVictims’CompensationFundforamountspaidtothevictims’
families.7See17-AM.R.S.§1301(2018).
[¶23]LordappliedtotheSentenceReviewPanelseekingtoappealfrom
his sentence, and the Panel granted his application. State v. Lord,
No.SRP-17-364(Me.Sent.Rev.PanelNov.8,2017);see15M.R.S.§§2151-53;
M.R.App.P.19.Hefocuseshisappealentirelyonthelifesentencesimposedon
themurderconvictions.
II.DISCUSSION
A. Two-StepSentencingProcedureforaMurderConviction
[¶24]Whenadefendantistobesentencedformurder,thecourtemploys
atwo-stepprocess.See17-AM.R.S.§1252-C(2018)(settingoutthethree-step
procedure for establishing sentences); 17-A M.R.S. § 1201(1)(A) (2018)
(providing that aperson sentenced formurdermay notbe considered for a
periodofprobation,thuseliminatingthethirdstepofthesentencingprocess);
Statev.Hayden,2014ME31,¶17,86A.3d1221.“Inthefirststep,thecourt
7Atthesentencinghearing,thecourtorderedLordtoreimbursetheVictim’sCompensationFund
$38,046.75, but the court’s judgment and commitment ordered Lord to pay $600more, totaling$38,646.75.Itislikelyatypographicalerror.AlthoughLorddoesnotraisethisissueonappeal,thedocket should be corrected to be consistent with the court’s oral order to reflect the orderedrestitutionof$38,046.75.
14
determinesthebasicperiodofincarceration,andinthesecond,themaximum
period of incarceration.” Hayden, 2014 ME 31, ¶ 17, 86 A.3d 1221. On a
discretionary appeal from a sentence, we review the “‘determination of the
basic sentence de novo for misapplication of legal principles and [the]
determinationofthemaximumsentenceforabuseofdiscretion.’”Id.(quoting
Statev.Waterman,2010ME45,¶42,995A.2d243).
1. StepOne
[¶25] In order to determine the basic sentence for any crime, the
sentencingcourtmustfirstidentifytherangewithinwhichalawfulsentence
maybeimposedforthecrimeatissue.SeeStatev.Sweet,2000ME14,¶11n.3,
745A.2d368(holdingthatinstepone,thesentencingcourtmustbeawareof
factorsthatwouldeitherincreaseordecreasetheclassofthecrime).Whenthe
convictionisformurder,thebasicsentencerangeisasfollows:“imprisonment
forlifeorforanytermofyearsthatisnotlessthan25.”17-AM.R.S.§1251(1)
(2018).
[¶26]“Imprisonmentforlife”—alifetimeinprison,withnopotentialfor
release—isinherentlydifferentthanasentenceforatermofyearsevenwhen
thetermofyears is lengthy. See,e.g.,Sweet,2000ME14,¶8,745A.2d368
(affirmingtheimpositionofasixty-fiveyearsentenceandaforty-yearsentence
15
forindividualsagedthirty-twoandforty-seven,respectively);seealsoStatev.
Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145, 149 (Me. 1990). Even when a defendant is
sentencedtoalongtermofyears,thedefendantmayaccumulategoodtimeand
othercreditsandmayeventuallybereleasedfromprison,sometimesearlier
thantheorderedtermofyears.Seegenerally17-AM.R.S.§1253(2018).Alife
sentenceprovidesnosuchoption. Anindividualsentencedtoimprisonment
forlifewillneverbereleased.Accordingly,itisnecessaryforasentencingcourt
settingthebasicsentencetodistinguishbetweenapotentiallifesentenceand
asentenceforatermofyearsasthepotential longestsentence. SeeHayden,
2014ME31,¶18,86A.3d1221.
[¶27] Ifacourt isconsideringimposinga lifesentenceformurder,the
courtmustconsider—inthefirststepofthesection1252-Canalysis—whether
thereare“aggravatingcircumstances”relatingtothenatureandseriousnessof
themurder. Shortsleeves, 580A.2d at 150; see17-AM.R.S. § 1252-C(1). In
contrast,whenconsideringatermofyears,thecourtmustaddressthenature
and seriousness of the offense, but it will ordinarily defer concepts of
aggravationtothesecondphaseoftheanalysis.SeeShortsleeves,580A.2dat
149-50.
16
[¶28] The “aggravating circumstances” applicable at the first stage
requirethecourttoconsiderwhetherthemurderwascommittedinawaythat
includedanynumberofcircumstancesfromwhichsocietywouldexpectthat
themurdererwillneverreturntofreedom.Id.Theaggravatingcircumstances
werefirstaddressedinStatev.AndersonandSabatino,No.78-37,78-40at7-8
(Me.App.Div.1980),andlatersummarizedinShortsleeves,580A.2dat149-50.
[¶29]ThelistcontainedinShortsleeves,however,is“‘neitherexhaustive
nor all-inclusive.’”8 Hayden, 2014 ME 31, ¶ 18, 86 A.3d 1221 (quoting
Waterman, 2010ME 45, ¶ 44, 995 A.2d 243). Since Shortsleeves, we have
affirmedtheimpositionofsentenceswhere,insettingthebasicsentence,the
sentencing court considered aggravating circumstances that we did not
enumerateinShortsleeves.See,e.g.,Statev.Downs,2009ME3,¶20,962A.2d
950 (affirming the court’s consideration in step one of the fact that the
foundationalcrimewaspartofaspreeofcrimescommitted,reasoningthatthis
factbore“onthenatureandseriousnessofthecrime”);cf.Sweet,2000ME14,
¶ 17, 745 A.2d 368 (affirming the court’s consideration in step one of the
8TheaggravatingcircumstanceslistedinShortsleevesare:premeditation-in-fact;multipledeaths;
murderinvolvingapersonwhohasbeenpreviouslyconvictedofahomicideoracrimeinvolvingtheuseofdeadlyforce;murderaccompaniedbytorture,sexualabuse,orextremecrueltytothevictim;murder committed in a penal institution by an inmate of that institution; murder of a lawenforcementofficerwhile inperformanceofhisorherduties;andmurderofahostage. State v.Shortsleeves,580A.2d145,149-50(Me.1990).
17
offenders’criminalhistory).Accordingly,becausetheintentionalorknowing
takingofahumanlifewillrarelyoccurinanotherwiseneutralsetting,andthe
rangeofhumanbehavioranddecisionsthatleadtomurderarecomplex,the
potentiallyaggravatingcircumstances thatmay justifya lifesentencewillbe
equallydiverse.Thus,theso-called“Shortsleeves”frameworkisintendedtobe
usedasa“guidetodistinguishbetweenthetwotypesofsentences,”Hayden,
2014ME31,¶18,86A.3d1221,andit“providesaframeworkforthepotential
identificationofother[circumstances]thatcouldwarranttheimpositionofa
lifesentence,”Waterman,2010ME45,¶44,995A.2d243.SeegenerallySweet,
2000ME14,¶11,745A.2d368.
[¶30] Ultimately, in order to promote public understanding of
sentencingdecisionsand,whereappropriate,toallowappellatereviewofthe
sentence, the role of the sentencing court in the first step of sentencing a
defendantformurderistoidentifywithclarityanyaggravatingcircumstance
foundtoexistinacasewherethecourtintendstoconsiderimposingasentence
oflifeinprison.Asisnotedbelow,thecourtinthematterbeforeusdidjust
that.
2. StepTwo
18
[¶31] After establishing thebasic sentence, the courtmustdetermine
“themaximumperiodofimprisonmenttobeimposedbyconsideringallother
relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating andmitigating, appropriate to
thatcase.”17-AM.R.S.§1252-C(2).“Thesesentencingfactorsinclude,butare
notlimitedto,thecharacteroftheoffenderandtheoffender’scriminalhistory,
theeffectoftheoffenseonthevictimandtheprotectionofthepublicinterest.”
Id. Whenthecrimeat issueismurder, conduct leadingtocontemporaneous
convictions that may have been identified in the first step as aggravating
circumstancesmaybeseparatelyaddressedfortheirsubjectivevictimimpact
inthesecondstep.SeeDowns,2009ME3,¶20,962A.2d950.
[¶32]Inessence,becausethefactssurroundingaconvictionformurder
do not sort neatly into separately identifiable characteristics, there will
inevitablybe timeswhen an “aggravating”Shortsleevescircumstancewill be
considered inboth the impositionof a life sentence in steponeof amurder
sentencinganalysisandasanaggravatingfactorthatmustbeaddressedinstep
two.However,thewayinwhichthecourtconsidersthefactwillbedistinctat
thetwosteps.
19
B. ReviewofLord’sSentences
1. StepOneApplication
[¶33] The court’s sentencing analysis here demonstrates that it
understoodtheframeworkinwhichthesentencesmustbecalculated,andit
correctlyidentifiedtherequirementthatatleastoneaggravatingcircumstance
mustbepresent inordertoestablishtheoutersentenceasa lifesentencein
stepone.Inaddressingthefactsconstitutingthoseaggravatingcircumstances,
thecourtnotedthepresenceofoneoftheShortsleevecircumstances—multiple
deaths—as well as the presence of other facts not explicitly identified in
Shortsleeves—thatthemurderswerepartofacrimespreeandthatLordused
a firearm in the commission ofmany of these crimes,which, as a convicted
felon, he was prohibited from possessing. The court graphically described
Lord’sconductasaseriesofpotentiallyfatalandpersistentlyviolentactsthat
lefttwopeopledeadandthreeothersinjured:
Asaresultof[Lord’s]criminalrampage,twopeoplearedead.Onewas a completely and random act of violence with nocomprehensiblemotive.Threemorepeoplewereshotbutlived....TheseshotswerefiredwhileMr.Lordwasaconvictedfelon.Theywereshotwithgunsandammunitionthathadbeenstolenortakenshortlybeforehand.Onepersonwashitontheheadwithahammerandinjured.Onelivingroomwindowwasshot.Twomovingcarswereshotandhit.AllbyMr.Lord.Therewereshotsfiredatlawenforcement. Therewas an arson and therewas theft ofmotorvehiclesandtheguns,and[Lord]wasonprobationatthetime.
20
[¶34] The court concluded in step one that the convicted felon’s
seeminglyunendingreignofviolence,bothtargetedandrandom,constituted
anaggravatingcircumstance,andwefindnofaultwiththatdetermination.The
court did notmisapply legal principles in considering the nature of the two
murdersaspartofaviolentrampagedirectedtowardspecificindividualsand
toward the public at large when determining that a basic sentence of life
imprisonmentwasappropriate.SeeHayden,2014ME31,¶17,86A.3d1221;
Shortsleeves,580A.2dat150-51.NordidthecourterrinconsideringLord’s
prohibitedpossessionofafirearm.SeeWaterman,2010ME45,¶¶25,45,995
A.2d 243. The court properly considered the conduct that surrounded the
murdersindeterminingthenatureandseriousnessofeachmurder.SeeDowns,
2009ME3,¶20,962A.2d950(affirmingtheconsiderationofothercriminal
conductinsettingabasicsentencewhenthatconductprovidedevidenceofthe
motiveforthecrimebeingsentenced).
2. StepTwoApplication
[¶35]Thecourtdidnotrepeatitsconsiderationoftheobjectiveaspects
of Lord’s criminal history in step two of the analysis. See 17-A M.R.S.
§1252-C(1)-(2).Instepone,thecourtconsideredthatLordwasnotallowed
topossessafirearmasaconditionofhisprobation.Althoughthisprohibition
21
arosefromLord’scriminalhistory,thecourtconsideredit inawaythatwas
distinctfromthefactthatLordhasacriminalhistory. Lord’sviolationofhis
probation was appropriately considered in step one as an aggravating
circumstance regarding the “nature and seriousness” of the offenses
committed.Separately,thecourtwasnotprecludedfromconsideringinstep
twothefactthatLordalsohadasignificantcriminalhistory.
[¶36] We also note that the court appropriately considered as an
aggravatingfactorinsteptwotheprofoundeffectofthecrimesonthefamilies
ofthemurdervictims.SeeSweet,2000ME14,¶18,745A.2d368(considering
theeffectofthecrimesonthevictims).Itaddressedthefirstmurdervictim’s
consciousnessofhisimpendingdemiseashetriedtotalktohismotherandthe
horrorthatthesecondmurdervictimundoubtedlyfeltasLord“brandishedthe
gun”andshothimatpointblankrange.Considerationofthedevastatingeffect
onthemurdervictims’lovedonesleftbehindandtheknowledgeoftheviolence
abouttodescendareproperandclassicaspectsofthesteptwoanalysis.
[¶37]Finally,contrarytoLord’sargument,thecourtdidnotoverlookthe
mitigatingfactors,includingLord’sgenuineloveforhisson,hispost-traumatic
stressfollowinghisson’sdeath,thesupportofhisfamily,andthefactthathe
tookfullresponsibilityforhisactionsinpleadingguilty.Thecourtcommitted
22
noerrorinconcludingthatthosemitigatingfactorssimplywerenotenoughto
reducethemurdersentencesfromlifeinprison.
III.CONCLUSION
[¶38]Thecourtengagedintheproperconsiderationsateachstepofthe
sentencing analysis, and it thoughtfully considered whether a life sentence
shouldultimatelybe imposed. The court’s recognitionofLord’s violent and
persistentlydangerousconductatthetimeofthemurdersconstitutedneither
amisapplication of legal principles nor an abuse of discretion. SeeHayden,
2014ME31,¶17,86A.3d1221.
Theentryis:
Judgmentaffirmed.9 Andrea S. Manthorne, Esq. (orally), Roach, Hewitt, Ruprecht, Sanchez &Bischoff,Portland,forappellantAnthonyLordJanetT.Mills,AttorneyGeneral,DonaldW.Macomber,Asst.Atty.Gen.(orally),andAbaigealM.Ridge,Stud.Atty.,OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeStateofMaineAroostookCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2015-30062PenobscotUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2015-2550FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY
9Thedocketentryfortheamountofrestitutionshallbecorrectedasorderedinfootnote7.