MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME128Docket: Cum-19-399Argued September15,2020Decided: November3,2020Revised: December1,2020Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,HORTON,andCONNORS,JJ.

STATEOFMAINE

v.

JOHND.WILLIAMSHUMPHREY,J.

[¶1] On an April night in 2018, a deputy sheriff attempted to arrest

JohnD.WilliamsondrugchargesoutsideahomeinNorridgewock.Earlythe

followingmorning, the deputy sheriff’s bodywas found on the lawn of that

home.Williamsnowappealsfromthejudgmentofconvictionenteredbythe

court (Cumberland County, Mullen, J.) after a jury found him guilty of

intentional or knowing murder of the deputy sheriff. See 17-A M.R.S.

§201(1)(A)(2020).Williamsraisesthreeissuesinthisappealchallengingthe

court’sadmissionofin-courtdemonstrationsofthepossiblecircumstancesof

theshooting,thecourt’spartialdenialofamotiontosuppressstatementshe

made to detectives after his arrest, and, finally, the court’s sentencing

2

proceedingsandthelengthofthesentenceitimposed.Weaffirmthejudgment

andthesentence.

I.BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[¶2] Viewingtheevidence inthelightmostfavorabletotheState,the

juryrationallycouldhavefoundthefollowingfactsbeyondareasonabledoubt.

SeeStatev.Ouellette,2019ME75,¶11,208A.3d399.

[¶3]OnApril21,2018,SomersetCountyDeputySheriffCorporalEugene

ColeandanotherdeputystoppedWilliams’scarbecausetheysawthatitwas

being driven by his girlfriend, whose driving privileges they knew were

suspended.Williamswasapassengerinthevehicle.Williams’sgirlfriendwas

arrestedforoperatingavehiclewhileherlicensewassuspended.Thedeputies

determinedthatWilliamscouldnotdrivethevehiclefromthescenebecausehe

appeared tobeunder the influenceofdrugsand thevehicle’s insurancehad

lapsed.Williamsleftthescenewithafriendwhoarrivedtopickhimup.

[¶4]Arrangementsweremadeforthecartobetowedfromthescene.

When illegal drugswere found during a subsequent search of the vehicle, a

supervising officer authorized Corporal Cole and the other deputy to arrest

Williamsondrugcharges.

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[¶5]OnthenightofApril24,2018,Williamswasusingdrugsatafriend’s

housewhenheaskedanotherfriendtodrivehimtoahomeinNorridgewock

wherehehad lived foraperiodof timewhenhewasgrowingup. Williams

wanted to borrow the homeowner’s car to transport some of his guns to a

location in Old Town because he had to be in court in Massachusetts the

followingdayandhewantedtomakesurehisweaponsweresafe.Thefriend

agreedtodriveWilliamstoNorridgewock.

[¶6]WhileparkedatthehomeinNorridgewock,Williamsandhisfriend

sawCorporalCole’spolicetruckslowdownasitpassedthehouse.Williams

removedaduffelbagcontaininghisgunsfromthetrunkofhisfriend’scarand

placedthemnexttothevehicleheplannedtoborrow.Thefriendthenleft.

[¶7]Williamsclimbedthefrontstepsofthehomeandtriedtoenter,but

thedoorwaslocked. Atthatpoint,CorporalColeapproachedWilliamsfrom

behind and asked if he was John Williams. Once Williams confirmed his

identity,CorporalColetoldWilliamsthathewasunderarrestandattemptedto

grabhiswristtotakehimintocustody.Williamspulledawayanddrewa9mm

pistolfromhiswaistband.CorporalColesteppedbackandthenslippedandfell

onagrassyslope.WilliamsshotCorporalColeonceintherightsideoftheneck

atcloserange.

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[¶8]WilliamsfledinCorporalCole’spolicetruckanddrovetoanearby

Cumberland Farms store,where he stole a bottle ofwater, cigarettes, and a

lighter.Thestoreclerkcalled9-1-1,andthedispatchernotifiedanotherdeputy

torespondtothestore.

[¶9]AfterWilliamsleftthestore,hecalledafriendandtoldhimthathe

hadshotCorporalCole.WilliamsthenaskedhisfriendtomeethimonMartin

StreamRoad,whereWilliamshidthepolicetruckbehindahouse.Asthefriend

wasdrivingtomeetWilliams,hesawadeputysheriffatthenearbyCumberland

FarmsstoreandpulledovertotellhimthatthepersonwhoshotCorporalCole

wasonMartinStreamRoad.ThefriendthencontinuedontomeetWilliams.

[¶10] Whenthe friendarrived,Williamsasked ifhecouldusehiscar.

Thefriendrefused,andWilliamsaskedtoborrowhiscellphone,sayingthathe

wasgoingtogointothewoods,usethephonetomakeaconfession,andthen

killhimself.ThefriendletWilliamstakehisphoneandthendroppedhimoff

nearsometraintracksaboutahalf-mileawayonMartinStreamRoad.

[¶11]TheStatePoliceTacticalTeamwascalledintolocatebothCorporal

Cole and Williams. Based on the information that Williams’s friend had

provided, team members located Corporal Cole’s police truck. Law

enforcementalsosetupacommandpostatafirestationinNorridgewock.The

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firestationwasacrossthestreetfromthehousewhereCorporalColehadbeen

shot.

[¶12] In the morning hours of April 25, 2018, the owner of the

Norridgewockhousewentoutsideandsawabodyonherlawn.Shescreamed

andcalledforhelp,attractingtheattentionofofficersatthefirestation,who

cameoverandsawCorporalCole’sbody,withanapparentgunshotwoundto

theneck. MembersoftheStatePoliceEvidenceResponseTeamarrivedand

foundabulletandcasingonthelawnandabulletproofvest,shotgun,holster,

andabackpackcontainingammunitioninacarontheproperty.

[¶13] CorporalCole’sbodywas taken to theStateMedicalExaminer’s

Office. An autopsy concluded that the cause of death was a close-contact

gunshotwoundtotherightsideoftheneckbelowtheear“whichperforated

thecervicalspinalcord.”

[¶14]Meanwhile,amanhuntforWilliamswasunderway.OnApril28,

2018,officerscameuponaremotecampintheareaofBearMountainRoadand

setupaperimeter.TheofficersheardabangingnoiseandsawWilliamscome

outofthecampshirtless,carryingaclearplastictote,andwearingonlyapair

of long johns. Officers quickly surroundedWilliams. He was taken to the

groundandplacedunderarrest.

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[¶15]WhileplacinghandcuffsonWilliams,oneoftheofficerspunched

Williamsinthehead“twoorthreetimes”whenitappearedthathewasrefusing

tomovehisrighthand.1OneofficerpulleddownWilliams’slongjohnstomake

surehedidnothaveaguninhiswaistbandand,observingthatWilliamshad

defecated, removed the long johns. A photo was taken showing an officer

pullingWilliams’sheadupbyhishairwhilehewaslyingonhisstomach.The

officersthenreportedtothecommandpostthattheyhadWilliamsincustody.

[¶16]Afterapproximatelytwentyminutes,atacticalteamarrivedand

walkedWilliamsoutof thewoods.2 Williams remainednaked andbarefoot

whilewaitingforthetacticalteamtoarriveandformostoftheten-minutewalk,

buthewaswrappedinablanketbeforeexitingthewoods.TwoMajorCrimes

UnitdetectiveswhometWilliamsneartheedgeofthewoodssaidtheywould

liketospeakwithhim,andWilliamsagreed.Thedetectives—whohadnotbeen

involvedinthearrest—tookcustodyofWilliamsfromthearrestingofficersand

walkedhimtotheircruiser.

1Williamsmayhavebeenunabletophysicallycomplywiththeofficer’srequestbecauseanother

officerwasstandingonWilliams’srighthand.

2 While Williamswas being escorted out of the woods, Evidence Response Team memberssearchedthecampandfounda9mmRugerhandgun,amachinepistol,andammunition.Althoughtesting of the bullets recovered from the crime scene was inconclusive, the casing found nearCorporalCole’sbodymatchedtheRugerrecoveredfromthecabin.

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[¶17] The detectives drove Williams to the Waterville Police

Department.Hewasalertandresponsivetothedetective’squestionsabouthis

physicalcondition,reportingthatwhilehewasnotinjured,3hewascoldand

hungry,andhishandshurt.

[¶18]ThedetectivesbroughtWilliamstoaninterrogationroomatthe

policedepartment,wherehewasexaminedbyemergencymedicalpersonnel

andmedicallycleared.ThedetectivestheninterviewedWilliamsandgavehim

food,water,fruitpunch,andclothing.Thedetectivesbegantheinterviewby

readingWilliamshisMirandarightsandconfirmedthatheunderstoodthem.

Approximately nine minutes after waiving his Miranda rights, Williams

confessedtokillingCorporalCole.Later,approximatelyninetyminutesintothe

interview, Williams described and participated in a reenactment of the

shootingwiththedetectivesandotherofficers.

B. ProceduralHistory

[¶19] On April 25, 2018, Williams was charged by complaint with

intentionalorknowingmurder,17-AM.R.S.§201(1)(A),andwiththeconsent

of theparties, thecourtordered that thecasebe transferred fromSomerset

3Atonepointduringthedrivetothepolicedepartment,Williamsstated,“Theydidanumberon

me,”anapparentreferencetotheofficerswhoarrestedhimattheremotecampsite.

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County to Cumberland County on April 30, 2018. M.R.U. Crim. P. 21(b)(2).

Later, on June7, 2018, theCumberlandCountyGrand Juryhandeddownan

indictmentchargingWilliamswithintentionalorknowingmurder,17-AM.R.S.

§201(1)(A).Williamspleadednotguilty.

[¶20] OnAugust27,2018,Williamsmovedtosuppresshisconfession

and other statements to the detectives, including the reenactment of the

shooting,arguingthattheywerenotvoluntarilygivenbecausehewasfatigued,

hungry,sufferingfromdrugwithdrawal,andfearfulforhissafetybecausehe

hadbeen“beat[en]andpummeled”byofficersduringhisarrest.Thecourtheld

hearings on Williams’s motion to suppress on February 28, March 1, and

April8, 2019. The court granted the motion in part, suppressing only

(1)statements made by Williams later in the interview, (2) Williams’s

participation in the reenactment of the shooting at the police station, and

(3)thestatementsWilliamsmadeduringthatreenactmentandafterward.4

[¶21]Asix-dayjurytrialtookplaceinJune2019.Duringthetrial,the

courtallowedtheStatetointroduceexperttestimonyfromInvestigatorLarry

4Specifically,thecourtsuppressedthereenactmentandallstatementsmadeafterthe1:28:47

markofthevideoadmittedatthesuppressionhearingasState’sExhibit2,butdeniedthemotiontosuppressastoWilliams’sstatementsmadeuptothe1:28:46mark.State’sExhibit84,admittedattrial,istheportionofthevideothatwasnotsuppressed.

9

MorrilloftheOfficeoftheStateFireMarshaldescribinghowtheshootingmay

haveoccurred.BasedonMorrill’stestimony,thecourtpermittedtheStateto

conduct a courtroom reenactment of the shooting. Before the reenactment

began, the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury stating that the

reenactmentonlyrepresents“theState’sversionoftheevents,”thatitshould

notbeseenas“anactualre-creationofthecrime,”andthatthejuryisfreeto

acceptorrejectit“inwholeorinpart.”

[¶22]Thejuryreturnedaverdictofguiltyonthesolecountofintentional

orknowingmurder.Thecourtimposedasentenceoflifeimprisonmentaftera

sentencing hearing and entered a judgment of conviction on September 12,

2019.

[¶23] Williams timely appealed from the judgment of conviction,

15M.R.S.§2115(2020);M.R.App.P.2B(b)(1),andalsoapplied for leave to

appeal his sentence, 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151, 2153 (2020); M.R. App. P. 20. The

SentenceReviewPanelgrantedWilliams’sapplicationfor leavetoappealhis

sentenceonNovember19,2019.Statev.Williams,No.SRP-19-398(Me.Sent.

Rev.PanelNov.19,2019);seealso15M.R.S.§2152(2020);M.R.App.P.20(g),

(h).

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II.DISCUSSION

A. In-CourtDemonstration

[¶24] Williams first argues that the court abused its discretion in

permittingtheStatetointroduceanin-courtphysicalreenactmentofhowthe

shootingmayhaveoccurredbasedonthetestimonyofInvestigatorMorrill.He

contends that Morrill was not qualified as an expert to give an opinion on

shooting reconstruction or bloodstain pattern analysis and that the opinion

itselfwasnotrelevant.SeeM.R.Evid.702,401.

1. ExpertOpinionandRelevance

[¶25]Wereview“acourt’sfoundationalfindingthatexperttestimonyis

sufficiently reliable for clear error” and its ultimate decision on the

admissibilityofexpertopiniontestimonyforanabuseofdiscretion. Statev.

Maine,2017ME25,¶16,155A.3d871(quotationmarksomitted).MaineRule

of Evidence 702 provides: “A witness who is qualified as an expert by

knowledge,skill,experience,training,oreducationmaytestifyintheformofan

opinionorotherwiseifsuchtestimonywillhelpthetrieroffacttounderstand

theevidenceortodetermineafactinissue.”TobeadmissibleunderRule702,

expert testimony must be relevant and must “assist the trier of fact in

11

understandingtheevidenceordeterminingafactatissue.”Statev.Burbank,

2019ME37,¶8,204A.3d851(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶26] Expert testimony is relevant if the proponent, among other

requirements, “has presented a sufficient demonstration of reliability.” Id.

Commonindiciaofreliabilityinclude“whetheranexpert’sconclusionhasbeen

tailored to the facts of the case,” “whether any other experts attest to the

reliability of the testimony,” and “the nature of the expert’s qualifications.”

Maine,2017ME25,¶17,155A.3d871.

[¶27]InvestigatorMorrilltestifiedingreatdetailabouthisspecialized

training and experience in shooting reconstruction, trajectory analysis, and

bloodstain pattern analysis. He then testified as to his opinion of how the

shootingmayhaveoccurredandthoroughlyexplainedwhathedidatthescene

andthebasisforhisopinion.Hisconclusionsweredrawnfromthefactsofthis

case,andhisworkwaspeer-reviewedbylongstandingexpertsinthefield.See

id.Onthisrecord,weconcludethatthecourtdidnotclearlyerrinfindingthat

InvestigatorMorrill’squalificationsinshootingreconstructionweresufficient

forhimtotestifyonthematterandthathistestimonywassufficientlyreliable

andwouldbehelpfultothejury“tounderstandtheevidenceortodeterminea

factinissue.”M.R.Evid.702.Further,thecourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionin

12

admittingInvestigatorMorrill’stestimonyafterfindingitreliable.SeeMaine,

2017 ME 25, ¶¶ 16-17, 155 A.3d 871. Finally, there can be no doubt that

InvestigatorMorrill’sopinionwasrelevant.M.R.Evid.401.

2. UnfairSurprise

[¶28] Williams next argues that he was unfairly surprised, meaning

prejudiced,by the in-court reenactmentof the shootingbecausehewasnot

shown the actual demonstration until the voir dire of Investigator Morrill

duringtrial.SeeM.R.Evid.403.And,inlinewiththisargument,hecontends

that the trialcourtabused itsdiscretion indenyinghismotion foramistrial

basedonthatunfairsurprise.

[¶29] Wereviewatrialcourt’sadmissionofevidenceoveraRule403

objectionforanabuseofdiscretion.Statev.Michaud,2017ME170,¶8,168

A.3d802.Rule403providesthatevenrelevantevidencemaybeexcluded“if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair

prejudice,confusingtheissues,misleadingthejury,unduedelay,wastingtime,

orneedlesslypresentingcumulativeevidence.”M.R.Evid.403.

[¶30]In-courtdemonstrativeevidenceisespeciallypersuasive,andwe

have held that a trial court should “carefully” exercise its discretion before

allowing such evidence because it “may convey an impression of objective

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realitytothetrier[offact].”Statev.Philbrick,436A.2d844,859-60(Me.1981).

In Philbrick, we noted the dangers that demonstrative evidence, especially

evidencethatdoesnothaveaproperscientificfoundation,mayposetoajury:

Suchexperimentaldemonstrative evidence in the eyesof jurors,because of its asserted foundation in scientific principle ortechnique,carrie[s]suchaninherentobjectiveimpactthatitcouldundulyinfluencethejuryinitsfindingsoftheunderlyingnecessaryfacts at issue,without adequatebasic facts to sustain a scientificconclusion....

Id.at860.There,weconcludedthatthecourterroneouslyadmittedanalleged

expert’sdemonstrationoftheshootingbecauseithadnotbeenshownthatthe

demonstrationwas substantially similar to the actual eventsof the shooting

anditwasbasedonunreliablescientificmethods.Id.at859-60.

[¶31] Here, the court determined that the demonstration was not

unfairlyprejudicialanddidnotwaste timeorconfuse the issues. M.R.Evid.

403.Tothecontrary,thecourtreasonedthatInvestigatorMorrill’stestimony

andthedemonstrationhelpedclarifyandtietogetherthetestimonyofprevious

witnesses. Thecourtalso found thatunlike inPhilbrick, InvestigatorMorrill

wasqualifiedtopresenthisopinionandthereporthepreparedthatservedas

thebasisforthedemonstrationwasverifiableandscientificallyaccurate.

[¶32]Mostimportantly,beforeallowingthedemonstrationtoproceed,

thecourtinstructedthejurythatitrepresented“onlyare-creationoftheState’s

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versionoftheevents”that“shouldinnowaybeviewedasanactualre-creation

of the crime” and could “be accepted or rejected inwhole or in [p]art.” In

craftingthisinstruction,thecourtlookedtolanguagefoundinHarrisv.State,

13P.3d489,496(Okla.Crim.App.2000),which in turn, reliedona limiting

instructioncreatedinClarkv.Cantrell,529S.E.2d528,537(S.C.2000).

[¶33] We commend the court’suseof this language. With respect to

demonstrative or reenactment evidence, the court’s limiting instruction

addressed the major concern we expressed in Philbrick, namely that such

evidencetendstobehighlyprejudicialtoajuryby“convey[ing]animpression

of objective reality to the trier [of fact].” 436 A.2d at 859. The court’s

instruction alleviated this danger bymaking it clear that the demonstration

only represented theState’s versionof events and shouldnotbe seenas an

actualre-creationofthecrimeasitoccurred.Therefore,weconcludethatthe

trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the demonstration to be

presentedtothejuryoverWilliams’sRule403objection.

3. MotionforaMistrial

[¶34] Next,Williams contends—also based on his claim that he was

unfairly surprised by the State’s in-court demonstration because he had no

notice, until the fourth day of trial, that the State would be re-creating the

15

shooting—that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a

mistrial.5 We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of

discretion and “will overrule the denial of a mistrial only in the event of

exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith.” State v.

Logan,2014ME92,¶14,97A.3d121(quotationmarksomitted).“Amotion

foramistrialshouldbedeniedexceptintherarecircumstancethatthetrialis

unable to continue with a fair result and only a new trial will satisfy the

interestsofjustice.”Statev.Poblete,2010ME37,¶26,993A.2d1104(quoting

Statev.Bridges,2004ME102,¶11,854A.2d855).

[¶35]NotwithstandingWilliams’scontention,therecordindicatesthat,

althoughWilliamssawtheState’sphysicaldemonstrationoftheshootingfor

the first time on the fourth day of the trial, he had received a copy of

Investigator Morrill’s report approximately five months before trial. That

reportconcluded that therewere twopossiblescenariosorexplanations for

CorporalCole’spositioningatthetimehewasshot,whichwasconsistentwith

InvestigatorMorrill’stestimony6attrialandwiththedemonstrationitself.The

5 Williams’smotionforamistrialwaspromptedbyanovernightconversationthatWilliams’s

attorneyhadwithanexpertbetweenthefourthandfifthdaysoftrial.Duringthatconversation,theexpertpurportedlysaidthathebelievedthattheState’sdemonstrationwasinaccurate.Bythattime,WilliamshadbeeninpossessionofInvestigatorMorrill’sreportandconclusionsforfivemonths.

6 Inadditiontobeingconsistentwithhispretrial report, InvestigatorMorrill’stestimonywasconsistentwith,andtiedtogether,thealreadyoverwhelmingevidenceagainstWilliams,including

16

recordalso suggests thatbefore trial, theStatehad informedWilliamsof its

intenttopresentanin-courtphysicaldemonstrationofInvestigatorMorrill’s

conclusionsregardingthepositionsoftheshooterandthevictim.

[¶36]Further,ifWilliamswantedtoofferexperttestimonytochallenge

the accuracy of the State’s demonstration, the State offered to join with

WilliamsinarequestthatthecourtholdtheevidenceopentoallowWilliams

to retain the expert with whom he had consulted after the State’s

demonstration. Williams declined this offer for strategic reasons, however,

becausealthoughWilliams’sexpertapparentlydisagreedwithportionsofthe

in-courtdemonstration,theexpertagreedwithmanyofInvestigatorMorrill’s

conclusions regarding the proximity of the gun to Corporal Cole’s neck and

CorporalCole’spositionontheground.

[¶37] In short, on this record, there is no evidence of “exceptionally

prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith” that would provide

grounds foroverruling thecourt’sdenialofWilliams’smotion for amistrial.

Logan,2014ME92,¶14,97A.3d121(quotationmarksomitted). Although

Williamsdidnotseethephysicaldemonstrationoftheshootinguntilthefourth

thephysicalevidenceandWilliams’sownconfession.Itisthereforeunlikelythattheverdictwouldhavebeendifferentifthedemonstrationhadbeenexcluded.

17

day of trial, the State had informed Williams of its intent to re-create the

shootingduringtrial,andthedemonstrationitselfcloselytrackedInvestigator

Morrill’stestimonyaswellashisreport.

[¶38] Under these circumstances, the State’s demonstration did not

undulyprejudiceWilliamsorpreventhimfromreceivingafairandjusttrial.

SeeBridges,2004ME102,¶10,854A.2d855(“Thecourt'sdeterminationof

whether exposure to potentially prejudicial extraneous evidence would

incurably taint the jury verdict or whether a curative instruction would

adequatelyprotect against considerationof thematter standsunless clearly

erroneous.”(quotationmarksomitted));seealsoStatev.Frisbee,2016ME83,

¶ 29, 140 A.3d 1230 (“Ultimately, the decision on whether to grant a

defendant'smotionforamistrialcomesbacktothecoreprinciplesoffairness

andjustice;therelevantquestionforthetrialcourtiswhetherthetrialcourtis

confidentthatthetrialcanproceedtoafairandjustverdictinthecontextof

theproceedingsbeforeit.”).Weconcludethatthetrialcourtdidnotabuseits

discretionindenyingWilliams’smotionforamistrial.

B. MotiontoSuppress

[¶39] The court concluded that all of Williams’s statements to the

interviewingdetectivesuptothe1:28:46markontheinterrogationvideowere

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voluntaryanddeniedthemotiontosuppresshisstatementsuptothatpoint.

The court granted the motion to suppress his statements made after the

1:28:46markalongwithWilliams’ssubsequentreenactmentoftheshooting.

[¶40]Williamscontendsthatallofhisstatementstothedetectiveswere

involuntary and should have been excluded. Williams’s voluntariness

argumentisintwoparts:First,hecontendsthatthecourt“completelyignored

and dodged [his] argument regarding his reasonable fear based on his

interactionswiththearrestandtransportteams.”Morespecifically,heargues

thathistreatmentbythearrestingofficerscausedhimtofearforhissafetyand

led him to believe that if he did not cooperate with police, including the

detectives,hewouldfacephysicalretaliation.Second,Williamscontendsthat

hisfatigue,hunger,anddrugwithdrawalaffectedhisabilitytoknowinglyand

voluntarilywaivehisrighttoremainsilentorprovidevoluntarystatements.

[¶41]“Wereviewthedenialofamotiontosuppressforclearerrorasto

factualissuesanddenovoastoissuesoflaw,andwillupholdthecourt’sdenial

ofamotiontosuppressifanyreasonableviewoftheevidencesupportsthetrial

court’sdecision.” Statev.Ormsby, 2013ME88,¶9,81A.3d336 (quotation

marksomitted).

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[¶42] “A confession is admissible in evidence only if it was given

voluntarily, and the State has the burden to prove voluntariness beyond a

reasonabledoubt.”Statev.Wiley,2013ME30,¶15,61A.3d750;seealsoState

v.Rees,2000ME55,¶6,748A.2d976.“Thevoluntarinessrequirementgives

effecttothreeoverlappingbutconceptuallydistinctvalues:(1)itdiscourages

objectionable police practices; (2) it protects the mental freedom of the

individual;and(3)itpreservesaqualityoffundamentalfairnessinthecriminal

justicesystem.”Wiley,2013ME30,¶16,61A.3d750(quotingStatev.Sawyer,

2001ME88,¶8,772A.2d1173).

[¶43]Avoluntaryconfessionisonethat“resultsfromthefreechoiceof

arationalmind,ifitisnotaproductofcoercivepoliceconduct,andifunderall

ofthecircumstancesitsadmissionwouldbefundamentallyfair.”Wiley,2013

ME30,¶16,61A.3d750(quotationmarksomitted).Indeterminingwhether

aconfessionisvoluntary,weexaminethetotalityofthecircumstances,which

includesbothexternalandinternalfactors,suchas

the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation;location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation wascustodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number ofofficers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery;threats,promisesorinducementsmadetothedefendant;andthedefendant’s age, physical andmental health, emotional stability,andconduct.

20

Statev.Sawyer,2001ME88,¶9,772A.2d1173;see,e.g.,Statev.Mikulewicz,

462A.2d497,501(Me.1983).

[¶44]Williamsfirstarguesthathisconfessionwasnotvoluntarybecause

theuseof forceby thearrestingofficerscausedhimtobe in “fearof further

beating”ifhedidnotcooperatewiththedetectiveswhentheyinterviewedhim.

ThecourtfoundthatWilliamshadbeenpunchedbyanarrestingofficer“ata

timewhenhewashandcuffedandofferingnosignificantresistance,”7andthat

he had been held down, naked, on the ground for approximately twenty

minutes before being escorted out of the woods.8 Nevertheless, the court,

informedbyLeonv.State,410So.2d201(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982),andLyonsv.

Oklahoma,322U.S.596(1944),determinedthattheeffectonWilliamsofthe

“initialimproprietybylawenforcement”inthewoodsdidnotrenderhislater

confessioninvoluntary.

[¶45]InLyons,policeobtainedaninitial,involuntaryconfessionfroma

defendantusingcoerciveinterrogationtechniquesbeforeobtainingasecond,

7AlthoughWilliamssuggeststhathedefecatedonhimselfbecauseofthepunchesinflictedonhim

duringhisarrest,hisownexpertwitnesstestifiedthatitwasnotplausiblethatfearandstresscausedhimtodefecate;rather,theexperttestified,itwasfarmorelikelythathedidsobecauseofopiatewithdrawalandgastrointestinalsymptoms.

8 The court also rejectedtheassertionbyanarrestingofficerthatpullingWilliams’sheadupbyhishairhadbeennecessarytoconfirmhisidentity.

21

voluntaryconfessionfromthedefendantlaterintheday.322U.S.at598-601.

The Court stated that “[t]he question of whether those confessions

subsequentlygivenarethemselvesvoluntarydependsontheinferencesasto

thecontinuingeffectofthecoercivepracticeswhichmayfairlybedrawnfrom

thesurroundingcircumstances.”Id.at602.Despitetheinitialimpropriety,the

Courtaffirmedthevoluntarinessofthedefendant’ssecondconfession. Id.at

605. Inreaching thatconclusion, theCourtnoted that twelvehourselapsed

between the two confessions and that the second confession was given to

individualswhohadnot engaged in the initial, coercive interrogation. Id.at

604-05.

[¶46]Similarly,inLeon,theDistrictCourtofAppealofFloridaconcluded

that“underappropriatecircumstances,theeffectofaninitialimpropriety,even

acoerciveone,insecuringaconfessionmayberemovedbyinterveningevents,

with the result that a subsequent statement is rendered freeof the primary

taint and thus admissible into evidence as the expression of a free and

voluntaryact.”Leon,410So.2dat203(quotationmarksomitted).Underthe

Floridacourt’sreasoning,themostsignificantfactorinitsanalysiswaswhether

forcewasorwasnotinflictedinordertosecurethedefendant’sconfession.Id.

22

[¶47] Here, the court found that the arresting officers’ treatment of

Williamswasnotforthepurposeofobtaininghisconfession.Seeid.(collecting

cases).Williamswasnotaskedanyquestionsaboutthecrimeduringhisarrest

andtransportoutofthewoods,theinterrogationitselfwasconductedbytwo

detectiveswhowerenotpresentinthewoodsduringthearrest,thearresting

officershadnofurtherinteractionwithWilliamsafterhewashandedofftothe

detectives, and they were not present during the interrogation, which took

placeattheWatervillePoliceDepartmentawayfromthesceneofthearrest.

Further,theinterrogatingdetectivesdidnotthreaten,makeanypromises,or

offeranyinducementstoWilliams,seeWiley,2013ME30,¶¶18-30,61A.3d

750,andtheygaveWilliamsMirandawarningsbeforequestioninghim.

[¶48]Thus,weconcludethatthetrialcourtdidnoterrindetermining

that under the totality of the circumstances, the inappropriate force used

duringWilliams’s arrestdidnot render involuntaryhis later confession and

otherstatementstothedetectives.SeeSawyer,2001ME88,¶9,772A.2d1173;

People v. Richardson, 917 N.E.2d 501, 516-17 (Ill. 2009) (stating that in

determining whether incidental use of physical force renders a confession

involuntary,“[c]ourtslooktofactorssuchasgapsintimebetweentheuseof

force and the confession, changed interrogators or location, and renewed

23

Mirandawarnings”);seealsoLyons,322U.S.at602-05;UnitedStatesv.Denton,

246F.3d784,786-88(6thCir.2001).ButseeUnitedStatesv.Jenkins,938F.2d

934, 939-40 (9th Cir. 1991);United States v. Gonzalez, 719 F. Supp. 2d 167,

181-83(D.Mass.2010).

[¶49] Turning toWilliams’s second contention regarding his physical

condition at the time of the interrogation, the court did not clearly err in

determiningthat,atleastuptothe1:28:46markonthevideo,Williams’sprior

druguseorwithdrawaldidnotactuallyimpairhisphysicalormentalcondition.

Weandothercourtshaveheld thataddiction to,useof,orwithdrawal from

drugs does not automatically render an otherwise voluntary confession

involuntary.SeeStatev.Ashe,425A.2d191,193-94(Me.1981);seealsoUnited

Statesv.Palmer,203F.3d55,61-62(1stCir.2000);Peoplev.Johnson,168Misc.

2d 81, 89 (N.Y. 1995). Rather, as we stated in Ashe, “[t]he particular

circumstances of each case must be evaluated to determine whether a

defendant’sdrug-relatedconditionmadehimincapableofactingvoluntarily,

knowinglyandintelligently.”425A.2dat194.

[¶50]Here,asthetrialcourtfound,Williams“appear[ed]toberational

andrespondedtoquestionswithappropriateanswers,”hedid“notdiscloseany

bizarre,psychotic,ordrug-inducedbehavior,”andhedidnot“exhibitanyfear

24

orresistancetospeaking.”LikethedefendantinAshe,Williams“appearedlucid

andrational,abletorespondcoherentlytoquestions,andabletoengageina

narrative account of the events in question” while being questioned by the

detectives.Seeid.Priortoquestioningatthepolicestation,Williamshadbeen

examined by emergency medical personnel who concluded that he was

“medicallyclear,”andWilliamsdeclinedtheiroffertobecheckedoutfurther.

[¶51] During the questioning, detectives provided Williams with a

blanket,clothing, food,water,and,atWilliams’sspecificrequest, fruitpunch,

because hewas cold, hungry, and thirsty. Cf. State v. Blank, 955 So. 2d 90,

106-08 (La. 2007); but seePeople v. Anderson, 364 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (N.Y.

1977). Williams confessed early in the interview, and the unsuppressed

portionoftheinterviewwasnotparticularlylengthy,lastinglessthanninety

minutes.Cf.Berghuisv.Thompkins,560U.S.370,386-87(2010)(“Itistruethat

apparentlyhewas inastraight-backedchair for threehours,but there isno

authorityforthepropositionthataninterrogationofthislengthisinherently

coercive.”);Blank,955So.2dat105-06;Commonwealthv.Tucker,335A.2d704,

708 (Pa. 1975). The detectives treated Williams well and were calm and

respectful of him throughout the interview, which Williams himself

acknowledged.SeeBlank,955So.2dat106-08.

25

[¶52]Finally,upuntilthe1:28:46mark,whenherepeatedlyrequested

anap,Williamsdidnotasktostoptheinterviewatanypoint. Seeid.at107.

Williams did not tell the officers that he was tired or needed a nap until

approximately one hour and twenty-seven minutes into the interview. See

Statev.Timmendequas,737A.2d55,110(N.J.1999)(notingthatthe“defendant

neverindicatedtoofficersthathewastootiredorhungrytocontinue”). Up

until thatpoint,“therewasnoevidencethatauthoritiesexploitedanyslowly

mounting fatigue resulting fromprolonged questioning, or that such fatigue

occurred or played any role in defendant’s decision to confess.” People v.

Williams,233P.3d1000,1031(Cal.2010)(quotationmarksomitted).Butcf.

Spanov.NewYork,360U.S.315,321-24(1959)(concludingthatthesuspect’s

will was overborne by “slowly mounting fatigue” during an eight-hour

interrogation involving fifteen different questioners, during which the

questionerspersistedinthefaceofthesuspect’srefusaltoanswerontheadvice

ofhis attorneyand refusedhis requests to contacthis attorney). The court

correctly found, however, that after the one-hour-and-twenty-minute mark,

Williams’sfatigueandweaknessreachedapointwherehisstatementswereno

longervoluntary.SeeStatev.Kierstead,2015ME45,¶¶16-17,114A.3d984.

26

[¶53]Consideringthetotalityofthecircumstances,weconcludethatthe

trial court did not err in denying Williams’s motion to suppress as to his

confessionandotherstatementsmadeupuntilthe1:28:46markonthevideo.

Ormsby,2013ME88,¶29,81A.3d336;Sawyer,2001ME88,¶9,772A.2d

1173.

C. Sentencing

[¶54] Williams argues that “the sentencing courthadpre-determined

[his] sentence in this matter[] before the sentencing hearing” and that “the

[c]ourtdidnotconsideranyof[his]sentencingargumentsstronglymitigating

againstalifesentence,sincethe[c]ourthadclearlyalreadymadeitsdecision

beforethepartiesevenpresentedtheirarguments.”

[¶55] In sentencing a defendant after a conviction for murder, the

sentencingcourtemploysatwo-stepsentencingprocess.17-AM.R.S.§1602(2)

(2020). First, the court must “determine a basic term of imprisonment by

consideringtheparticularnatureandseriousnessoftheoffenseascommitted.”

17-AM.R.S.§1602(1)(A).Then,thecourtmust“determinethemaximumterm

of imprisonment tobe imposedby consideringall other relevant sentencing

27

factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to the case.” Id.

§1602(1)(B).

[¶56]We“reviewthecourt’sdeterminationofthebasicsentenceonthe

firststepoftheanalysisdenovoformisapplicationof law.” Statev.Holland,

2012 ME 2, ¶ 38, 34 A.3d 1130. We also review “the sentencing court’s

determination of the basic period of incarceration for misapplication of

sentencingprinciples”and“foranabuseofthecourt’ssentencingpower.”State

v.Nichols,2013ME71,¶13,72A.3d503.Themaximumsentencesetbythe

court isreviewedforanabuseofdiscretion. SeeStatev.Sweet,2000ME14,

¶15,745A.2d368.Finally,wereviewthesentenceimposedfor“disregardof

therelevantsentencingfactorsorabuseofthecourt’ssentencingpower.”State

v.Koehler,2012ME93,¶32,46A.3d1134.

[¶57]“Apersonconvictedofthecrimeofmurdermustbesentencedto

imprisonmentforlifeorforanytermsofyearsthatisnotlessthan25.”17-A

M.R.S.§1603(1)(2020).Themurderofalawenforcementofficerwhileinthe

performanceofhisorherdutiesisanaggravatingcircumstancethatmayjustify

theimpositionofa lifesentence. Statev.Shortsleeves,580A.2d145,149-50

(Me.1990).

28

[¶58] In determining the basic sentence at step one, the court was

mindful of itsduty to “consider theparticularnature and seriousnessof the

crime,”weighing“theconvictedperson’sconductagainstothermoreheinous

and less heinous possible ways of committing the crime.” The court also

articulatedthepurposesandgoalsofsentencingthatitconsideredappropriate

to the case. Finally, the court observed that the authorized range was

imprisonmentfortwenty-fiveyearstolife.Statev.Lord,2019ME82,¶25,208

A.3d781.Asforthenatureandseriousnessofthecrime,thecourtnotedthat

this was the murder of a police officer in the line of duty, an aggravating

circumstanceaccordingtoourprecedent,seeid.¶¶27-28,30,32;Shortsleeves,

580A.2dat149-50,andthatWilliamsdecidedto“eliminate”thedeputysheriff

andthenshotCorporalColeintheneckatcloserange.Afterlookingtothelaws

ofMaineandmanyotherjurisdictionstoaidinitsefforttoplacethiscrimein

contextand fashionabasicsentenceconsistentwith those imposed inother

jurisdictions,thecourtdeterminedthatthebasicsentenceshouldbesixty-five

years’imprisonment.9

[¶59]Thecourtthenproceededtosteptwoandconsideredaggravating

and mitigating factors to determine the maximum sentence. 17-A M.R.S.

9Williamsdoesnotarguethatthecourterredinsettingthebasicsentenceatsixty-fiveyears.

29

§1602(1)(B);Lord,2019ME82,¶¶31-32,208A.3d781.Thecourtconsidered

Williams’schildhoodupbringinganddrugabusebutdidnotfindthesetobe

significant mitigating factors. The court found that the aggravating factors

included theeffect onCorporalCole’s family and the community;Williams’s

criminal history; the need to protect the public;Williams’s “relative lack of

remorse”;andhisfailuretotakeresponsibilityandownershipforhisactions.

The court concluded that “the aggravating factors greatly outweigh any

mitigating factors”and“that the appropriatesentence in thiscaseshouldbe

andislifeinprison.”

[¶60]ContrarytoWilliams’scontention,nothingintherecordsuggests

that the court had pre-determined that Williams’s sentence would be life

imprisonment.Thecourtstatedthat“thequestionIhavegrappledwithsince

theverdictwaswhetheralifesentencewascalledforhere,”suggestingthatthe

courtdidnot imposea lifesentencelightlyandarrivedatthatsentenceonly

afterweighing the appropriate factors. AlthoughWilliams suggests that the

courtfailedto“listentoargumentsandstatementsfromwitnessesregarding

mitigatingcircumstances,”thecourtdid,infact,considertheinformationand

30

statements from Williams, his mother, and his aunt.10 There is simply no

supportintherecordforWilliams’scontentionthatthecourtdisregardedhis

argumentsinmitigation.11

[¶61]Thecourtobjectivelyconsideredandrationallyweighedallofthe

information and arguments and determined that in Williams’s case, the

aggravatingfactorsgreatlyoutweighedthoseinmitigation.SeeStatev.Basu,

2005ME74,¶24,875A.2d686(observingthatasentencingcourtisinabetter

positionforevaluatingtheoffender’scircumstancesandhaswidediscretionto

weighaggravatingandmitigatingfactors).Weconcludethatthecourtdidnot

abuseitsdiscretioninimposingasentenceoflifeimprisonment.12Sweet,2000

ME14, ¶ 15, 745A.2d 368 (stating that “the sentencing court is in a better

10 Thecourtstatedthatithadreviewedthesentencingmemorandaandstatementssubmitted

beforethehearingmorethanonce.

11Williamsappearstobelievethatthecourt’srejectionofhisargumentsinmitigationisthesameasfailingtoconsiderhisargumentsatall.

12 ThemostcloselyanalogousMainecasethatthecourtconsideredaspartofitsanalysiswasStatev.Burdick,2001ME143,¶¶1-2,6,782A.2d319,inwhichweupheldasentenceoffortyyears’imprisonmentforadefendantchargedwiththeattemptedmurderofapoliceofficer.Althoughtheforty-yearsentenceinBurdickissignificantlyshorterthanthelifesentenceimposedhere,Burdickwas fifty years old at the time of sentencing, rendering the forty-year sentence a “de facto lifesentence,”id.¶25,andalthoughheshotalawenforcementofficertwiceinthechestatcloserange,theofficerwaswearingabulletproofvestandsustainedonlyminorinjuries,id.¶6.Here,thevictimdiedastheresultofanactdescribedbythecourtasWilliams’sdecisionto“executeCorporalCole.”Takentogetherwithotheraggravating factors identifiedby thecourt, thecourtdidnotabuse itsdiscretioninimposingalifesentenceinsteadofasentenceforatermofyearsasinBurdick. SeeSweet,2000ME14,¶15,745A.2d368.

31

position to review aggravating andmitigating factors”); State v. Hewey, 622

A.2d1151,1155(Me.1993)(statingthatwe“accordgreaterdeferencetothe

weightandeffectgivenby thecourt to those factorspeculiar toaparticular

offender in its determination of the offender’s maximum period of

incarceration”).

Theentryis: Judgmentaffirmed. VerneE.Paradie,Jr.,Esq.(orally),Paradie&Rabasco,Lewiston,forappellantJohnD.WilliamsAaronM. Frey, AttorneyGeneral, andDonaldW.Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen.(orally),OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeStateofMaineCumberlandCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2018-2275FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY