STATEMENTBY .

H.E. MR. TRIYONO WIBOWO,PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA

TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONSIN VIENNA

AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2010REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-

PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

VIENNA, 30 April - 11 May 2007

Mr. Chairman,

Let me first of all, on behalf of my delegation,to congratulateyou and Ambassadorof Ukraine on your election as the Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively of thisimportant meeting We are confident that you will steward us effectively in thedeliberations. We assure you of our full support in making the outcome of this criticalMeetingmeaningful and result-oriented.

My delegation fully as-soclatesitself with the statement of the Group of the NonAligned Movement.

Non-proliferation and international securitY

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is in deep crisis, and faces unprecedentedchallenges. The failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference makes it clear that the non-proliferation regime needs to be fixed. Since we are at the start of a new NPT reviewcycle,. it is the opportune time that the States parties should do their utmost for therealizationof the noble objectivesand principlesof the Treaty.

Despite the inequities in the Treaty, the vast majority of States parties continue tobelieve in and support it. The Treaty has been an important symbol and a corner stone ofthe global aspiration for a nuclear-free-world. Its preamble. and provisions' are theessential sfarting point for a renewed effort to curb proliferation and to disarm nuclearweapons.

As an example of the above illustration, Dr. El Baredei said (/ quote) "If we wish toescape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collectiveconscience and no role in our security." (unquote) In the same vein, the WMD'Commission in its report underscored that the nuclear weapons must never again beused-by State or by terrorists, and the only way to do that is to get rid of them beforesomeone,somewhere, is tempted to use them: Thus, in the next five years, we must payheed to these words.

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Mr. Chairman,

Disarmament and security assurances

It is most unfortunate that upon entering the eighth review cycle of the NPT, theworld continues to face a grave threat posed by the existence of thousands of nuclearweapons, both in stockpiles and high-alert status. Even worse, more sophisticated ofthese deadly weapons are being developed. Therefore, it would be difficult for somecountries to renounce their nuclear options, if the existing nuclear-weapon-states(NWS)upgrade their nuclear capability.

We underline that the existing stock of nuclearweapons should be outlawed, andeliminated in a systematic and progressive manner. The total elimination of nuclearweapons is not a utopian dream. It is very much possible and realistic if there is aleadership on part of the NWS. As highlighted by the four prominent Americans in theWall Street Journal of January 2007, "The United States leadership will be required totake the world to the next stage-a world free of nuclearweapons."

It is clear to most of us that the major obstacles in making progress on Article VI liein the hands of the US and Russia, the two possessorsof more than three-quarter of thenuclear arsenals. Leadership for peace and disarmament needs to happen throughexample. We witnessed this on the signing of Moscow Treaty in 2002, in which the USand Russia agreed to reduce their nuclearwarheads significantlyby 2012.

Unfortunately, the Moscow Treaty was made without considering the principles ofverification, irreversibility,and transparency. Consequently,other NWS seem reluctant tofully implement their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitment under Article VI,and the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 ReviewConferences.

Instead of pursuing progressive efforts for nuclear disarmament, some NWS aretaking efforts to advance and modemi~e their nuclear arsenals. That is why we will notpause to urge the NWS, to take the necessary steps for progressing further on nucleardisarmament, in a verifiable and irreversiblemanner.

Until nuclear disarmament is achieved, the NWS should provide securityassurance that the non-nuclear-weapon-states(NNWS)will not be threatened by the useof nuclear weapons. The security assurances by NWS should be translated into auniversal, unconditionaland legally binding treaty. At the same time, NWS should committhat there would be no 'ne~ and usable' weapons that could trigger a new nuclear armsrace.

Safeguards

. The IAEA's safeguards system is essential in the global nuclear non-proliferationregime and my delegation reaffirms the importance of the Agency as the sole competentauthority for nuclear verification within the framework of the Agency's safeguards system.We appreciatethe extensive efforts made by the Agency in strengthening the safeguards

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and verification system, and we are convincedthat the IAEA has the ability to effectivelyface up to challenges on issuesof safeguardsand verificationbefore us.

. Indonesiahadsignedand ratifiedthe NPT,concludescomprehensivesafeguardsagreement and Additional Protocolwith the Agency, and is particularly pleased that theconclusion has been drawn for nuclear material and activities in Indonesia. Let me alsoreaffirm our commitment to the adherenceto the Additional Protocolsas these constitutethe centerpiece of the Agency's response in strengthening and improving theeffectiveness of the safeguards system as a contribution to global non-proliferationobjectives, especially needed to derive credibleassuranceregardingthe non-diversionofnuclear materials and the absence of undeclarednuclearmaterials and activities.We aremost welcomed by the developments on the increasingly application of SafeguardsAgreements and Additional Protocols,and in this regard call upon all States that has notyet done so, to concludethe NPT SafeguardsAgreementand Additional Protocolwith theAgency.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Indonesia believes that the inalienable rights of all States Parties to the peacefuluses of nuclear energy in accordancewith the Article IV of the NPT constitutes one of thefundamental objectives of the NPT, and nothing'in the Treaty shall be interpreted asaffecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research,production and use of nuclearenergy for peaceful purposeswithout discriminationand inconformitywith Articles I, 11,and III of the Treaty.We reiteratethat each country's choicesand decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respectedwithoutjeopardizing its policies or international co-operation agreements and arrangements forpeaceful uses of nuclearenergy and its fuel- cycle policies.

Formany NNWS, the option to pursue nuclear energy is considered crucial to theachievementof energy security and energy independence.Although many states believethat access to du.al-use technology should be further restricted and more closelymonitored,we have to be cautioned that excessive controls on access to the full nuclearfuel cycle may unfairlydeprive developingcountriesof nuclear energy and technology.

. We share the growing concern over the challenges in ensuring the non-proliferationand all safeguards issues, and note the initiatives and proposals put forwardin this regard.Various initiatives have been undertaken by several Member States of the.IAEA in the areasof uranium enrichment,nuclear fuel cycle services, spent fuel cycle andreproce~ing. This represents efforts by Member States in helping the IAEA to facechallenges in the field of nuclear power. Indonesian delegation believes that suchproposals should be addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal,comprehensive and non-discriminatorymanner under the auspice'sof the IAEA, takinginto account all aspects associated with it. Moreover, the proposals should ensure thatthey do not impose restrictionson access to material, equipment,and the developmentofnuclear technology and know-how for peaceful purposes required by Member States,particularlythose of developing countriesfor their.continueddevelopment. .

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In this regard, the proposal of the Group of Expert, entrusted by the DirectorGeneral of the IAEA in 2005, to explore the possibility to develop a regional-basedmultinational facility has its own merit and deserves further consideration by MemberStates in meeting their prevailing concern regarding assurances of supply and non-proliferation. .

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East

There is a fundamentaldevelopment in the security and political landscape of theMiddle East. The prolonged conflict in Iraq, the issue of Iranian nuclear programme,andthe Israel's admittance of possessingnuclear weapons, could directly or indirectly affectregional stability.

A mixture of these situations would be reason enough to revisit the need ofestablishing a nuclear-weapon-free-zonein the Middle East. It is high time to m~vetangibly for realising the UN Security Council resolutions487 and 687 as well as the 1995resolution on the Middle East,which advocatedthe establishmentof such a zone.

Article X and compliance

Since the inception of NPT,Article X has recognisedthe possibility of a State partyto withdraw from the NPT, if an extraordinaryevent has jeopardised its supreme interestand security. But, in accordancewith Article 70 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, such withdrawal does not forgive a State party from performing the obligationsthat accumulated prior to the valid exerciseof the right to withdraw.

As in all Treaties, the States parties have obligations to fully comply with allprovisions of the NPT. But, full compliance does not only mean the declaration of goodintent. Instead it includes actual performance. This constitutes an equilibrium in theobligations and commitments both of the NWS and NNWS, in a non-discriminatory andnon-selective manner.

Therefore, it would be unfair to insist the NNWS on their compliancewith their non-proliferation obligations, when the NWS have"failed to live up to their disarmamentobligations and commitments.The application of 'double standard' in the implementationof NPT would only underminefurther the integrity and the validity of the Treaty.

Mr Chairman,"-

Approaches and measures

As we are entering a new cycle towards the 2010-Revcon, there is a pressingneed to build a "newconsensus on the gravity of nuclear dangers, and the necessity torevive disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Given deep differences on how toresolve the challenges facing the Treaty today, it is crucial for all States parties toconsider newways and approachesto regain confidence in the Treaty's core bargains.

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What we need is not only ways to deal with the current threat, but it is a balanced'plan of action' to implement all provisions of the Treaty. The States parties shouldexercise restraint to address and focus only one pillar of the NPT bargains, be it nucleardisarmament, non-proliferation,or peacefuluses of nuclearenergy.

Indeed, the NWS should honour their nuclear disarmament obligations andcommitment. If not, we must all prepare to face a continuing erosion of the non-proliferation regime, and to live with the emergenceof new NWS, be it big or small. If weare serious about non-proliferation,the NWS must create a conducive atmosphere fordisarmament, to reduce the incentivefor others to possessnuclearweapons.

We remain concerned that some NWS have been providing nuclear material andtechnology through a deal to non-statesparties to the NPT. What will be the impact ofsuch a deal on the integrity of the NPT?Article I of the NPT states that each NWS agreesnot to transfer or to assist any NNWS to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons,because such transfer or assistanceto NNWS is prohibitedunder the Treaty, let alone tothe non-state party to the NPT.

On the other hand, the NNWS should commit themselves not to acquire or seekassistancefor nuclear programmes,except those only for peaceful purposes. It would beunacceptable, if the inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purpose isusedasa pretextto buildnuclearweapons. -

Mr. Chairman,

Conclusion

We believe that this Prepcom provides yet another important opportunity for theStates parties to engage actively with a view to achieving results on the proceduralarrangements and substantive recommendations reflecting the views of all States. Wemust focus on achievable and practicaloutcomes, and should not appear to reinterpretorreduce existingobligations and undertakingsunderthe NPT.

The NPT States parties should seek to build bridges among themselves tostrengthen the Treaty's core bargains as they did in 1995 and 2000. To achieve this,visionary' leadership, strong political will, and constructive approach are fundamentalrequirements.

Thank you.

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