Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment · 2019. 10. 4. · Statement of Problem...

Public Comment No. 29-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Global Input ]

The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 88 be reviewed and correlated with FR 77 and89. This action will be considered as a public comment.These First Revisions must be reviewed for compliance with the NEC Style Manual, correlated andclarified. There are inconsistencies with respect to stored energy thresholds in Articles 350 and360. Clarification is needed on the application of new Informative Annex R and how to identify a“hazardous capacitor.” Sections R2.1 and R.2.2 in Informative Annex R must be reviewed toeliminate conflicting information.The Correlating Committee directs the NFPA 70E Chair to appoint a task group to submit commentswhere necessary.This action will be considered as a public comment.

Additional Proposed Changes

File Name Description Approved

70E_CN2_A2020.pdf 70E_CN2

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment

NOTE: This Public Comment appeared as CC Note No. 2 in the First Draft Report on First Revision No. 88.

The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 88 be reviewed and correlated with FR 77 and 89. This action will be considered as a public comment.These First Revisions must be reviewed for compliance with the NEC Style Manual, correlated and clarified. There are inconsistencies with respect to stored energy thresholds in Articles 350 and 360. Clarification is needed on the application of new Informative Annex R and how to identify a “hazardous capacitor.” Sections R2.1 and R.2.2 in Informative Annex R must be reviewed to eliminate conflicting information.The Correlating Committee directs the NFPA 70E Chair to appoint a task group to submit comments where necessary.This action will be considered as a public comment.

Related Item

• First Revision No. 88

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: CC on NEC-AAC

Organization: NEC Correlating Committee

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Tue Apr 09 14:43:31 EDT 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected but see related SR

Resolution: SR-36-NFPA 70E-2019 REPLY TO PC 97: The requirement for hearing protection above 400 voltswas not included because no technical substantiation was provided to relate acoustics with voltage.

National Fire Protection Association Report https://submittals.nfpa.org/TerraViewWeb/ContentFetcher?commentPar...

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Statement: Text is modified to clarify that Article 360 applies to capacitors that are considered hazardous evenwhen the voltage is less than 100 V. Arc flash risk assessment thresholds are revised to beconsistent with Chapter 1. The thresholds for a written procedure in 360.5(A) are specified to ensureusability. The steps for creating and verifying an electrically safe work condition are revised toharmonize with Article 120. Non-technical wording changes are made to correct grammar, complywith the NEC Style Manual, clarify the intent, or consistency with other parts of the standard.


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The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 89 be reviewed and correlated with FR 77 and88. This action will be considered as a public comment.These First Revisions must be reviewed for compliance with the NEC Style Manual, correlatedandclarified. There are inconsistencies with respect to stored energy thresholds in Articles 350 and360.Clarification is needed on the application of new Informative Annex R and how to identify a“hazardouscapacitor.” Sections R2.1 and R.2.2 in Informative Annex R must be reviewed toeliminate conflictinginformation.The Correlating Committee directs the NFPA 70E Chair to appoint a task group to submit commentswhere necessary.This action will be considered as a public comment.






The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 89 be reviewed and correlated with FR 77 and 88. This action will be considered as a public comment.These First Revisions must be reviewed for compliance with the NEC Style Manual, correlated and clarified. There are inconsistencies with respect to stored energy thresholds in Articles 350 and 360. Clarification is needed on the application of new Informative Annex R and how to identify a “hazardous capacitor.” Sections R2.1 and R.2.2 in Informative Annex R must be reviewed to eliminate conflicting information.The Correlating Committee directs the NFPA 70E Chair to appoint a task group to submit comments where necessary.This action will be considered as a public comment.

Related Item





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:


Resolution: SR-47-NFPA 70E-2019

Statement: Various editorial changes in Annex R provide additional clarity and usability.

The term “Hazardous” has been removed in the title to Annex R to respond to the Correlating


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Committee public comment.

Annex sections R.2.1 and R.2.2. have been revised to distinguish between unqualified andqualified persons and how these individuals are to safely interact with Capacitors.

Titles have been added to each paragraph section for better usability and to correlate with howother Annexes are put together.

Explanatory text and associated tables have been added to clarify the proper test instruments thatare needed to test for capacitor discharge and for the method to be used to safely discharge andground a capacitor.

Changes have been made to better correlate Annex R with Article 360 and to match critical energythresholds that apply to arc flash and shock hazards.


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Correlating Committee Note No. 3-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Global Input ]


Committee:

Submittal Date: Tue Dec 18 14:21:00 EST 2018

Committee Statement and Meeting Notes

CommitteeStatement:

The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 89 be reviewed and correlated with FR 77 and88. This action will be considered as a public comment.

These First Revisions must be reviewed for compliance with the NEC Style Manual, correlated andclarified. There are inconsistencies with respect to stored energy thresholds in Articles 350 and 360.Clarification is needed on the application of new Informative Annex R and how to identify a “hazardouscapacitor.” Sections R2.1 and R.2.2 in Informative Annex R must be reviewed to eliminate conflictinginformation.

The Correlating Committee directs the NFPA 70E Chair to appoint a task group to submit commentswhere necessary.

This action will be considered as a public comment.

First Revision No. 89-NFPA 70E-2018 [Global Input]

Ballot Results

This item has passed ballot

12 Eligible Voters

0 Not Returned

12 Affirmative All

0 Affirmative with Comments

0 Negative with Comments

0 Abstention

Affirmative All

Brunssen, James E.

Deike, Jr., Roland E.

Dressman, Kevin L.

Hickman, Palmer L.

Hittinger, David L.

Holub, Richard A.

Johnston, Michael J.

Kovacik, John R.

Manche, Alan

Pierce, James F.

Saporita, Vincent J.

Williams, David A.

National Fire Protection Association Report https://submittals.nfpa.org/TerraViewWeb/FormLaunch?id=/TerraView/...

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The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 90 be reviewed along with all references inthe standard to Article 110 for accuracy. This action will be considered as a public comment.






The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 90 be reviewed along with all references in the standard to Article 110 for accuracy. This action will be considered as a public comment.

Related Item





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: All incorrect references to Article 110 have been addressed by the second revisions in thefollowing sections: Section 110.6(A)(1)(a)(4)(d) Section 130.1 Table 130.5(C) Table 130.5(C)Informative Annex Q.6.2


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Correlating Committee Note No. 4-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Global Input ]


Committee:



CommitteeStatement:

The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 90 be reviewed along with allreferences in the standard to Article 110 for accuracy. This action will be considered as apublic comment.

First Revision No. 90-NFPA 70E-2018 [Global Input]

Ballot Results


12 Eligible Voters

0 Not Returned

12 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Affirmative All

Brunssen, James E.


Dressman, Kevin L.

Hickman, Palmer L.

Hittinger, David L.

Holub, Richard A.


Kovacik, John R.

Manche, Alan

Pierce, James F.


Williams, David A.


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The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 91 be reviewed to provide correlationbetween Annex I and the requirements of 110.5(I)(1). The use of the term “available short circuitcurrent” must be coordinated with the global revisions to “available fault current.” This action willbe considered as a public comment.






The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 91 be reviewed to provide correlation between Annex I and the requirements of 110.5(I)(1). The use of the term “available short circuit current” must be coordinated with the global revisions to “available fault current.”This action will be considered as a public comment.

Related Item





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: Annex I.2 is updated to include sections on energy source controls, work procedures and specialprecautions.

The term “Available short circuit current” is changed to “Available fault current” to correlate withproper terminology used throughout NFPA 70E as well as NFPA 70.


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Correlating Committee Note No. 5-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Detail ]


Committee:



CommitteeStatement:

The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 91 be reviewed to provide correlationbetween Annex I and the requirements of 110.5(I)(1). The use of the term “available shortcircuit current” must be coordinated with the global revisions to “available fault current.”This action will be considered as a public comment.

First Revision No. 91-NFPA 70E-2018 [Detail]

Ballot Results


12 Eligible Voters

0 Not Returned

12 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Affirmative All

Brunssen, James E.


Dressman, Kevin L.

Hickman, Palmer L.

Hittinger, David L.

Holub, Richard A.


Kovacik, John R.

Manche, Alan

Pierce, James F.


Williams, David A.


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Per FR 54

Change “leather protectors” to “protectors”. ASTM F2675 no longer exempts arc ra ng D120 or F696 gloves and

recent research indicates that many F696 protectors on the market contain a flammable mel ng cuff. OSHA calls

them “protectors” and does not directly require leather.. ASTM F2675 now allows arc ra ng of protector gloves

and this will eliminate those cuffs over me. This also leaves room for other “protector” gloves as the standards

are completed. A proposed ASTM AR protector standard could be completed before NFPA 70E 2021 is published.

This change will not preclude using the new standard gloves (which may or may not contain leather allowing more

dexterity or be er cut resistance and grip).

Addi onally the new statement that “Rubber insula ng gloves with leather protectors provide arc flash protec on

in addi on to shock protec on. Higher class rubber insula ng gloves with leather protectors, due to their

increased thickness, provide increased arc flash protec on.” Is a li le problema c.

I suggest the following as more accurate.

Rubber insula ng gloves with protectors (tradi onally leather) provide arc flash protec on in addi on to shock

protec on. Higher class rubber insula ng gloves with protectors, due to their increased thickness, can provide

increased arc flash protec on but these gloves can ignite, and different colors and different rubber formula ons

ignite at different levels. Rubber insula ng gloves and protector gloves can be arc rated per ASTM F2675.”


See comments in proposal

Related Item

• FR54


Submitter Full Name: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland

Organization: ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Fri May 03 11:37:28 EDT 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected but held

Resolution: This public comment introduces a concept that has not had public review by being included in arelated Public Input or First Revision as shown in the First Draft. The action taken on this publiccomment is “Reject but Hold” in accordance with the Regulations Governing the Development ofNFPA Standards section 4.4.8.3.1.


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Public Comment No. 26-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Definition: Barricade. ]

Barricade.

A physical obstruction Part of an alerting technique such as tapes a tape , cones cone , or A-frame-typewood or metal structures structure used in conjunction with safety signs that are intended to provide awarning and to limit access.


PI 233 was submitted to clarify the use of the terms "barrier" and "barricade" which had merit. These terms are often confused in the industry and this recommended revision to the term "barricade" would go a long way towards clarifying the use of the terms. Using the words "a physical obstruction" in both definitions adds to the confusion and is not necessary in the term "barricade" as the definition provides examples of what can be used as a barricade. Because barricades are part of alerting techniques, describing them as such in the definition adds clarity.

Related Item

• PI 233


Submitter Full Name: Mark Hilbert

Organization: MR Hilbert Electrical Inspections & Training

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Sun Mar 31 07:44:49 EDT 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The current definition adequately describes what a barricade is and its intended purpose. Theproposed revision does not provide additional clarity. The technical committee directs the submitterto the action and statement associated with SR-5 for information related to the defined term barrier.


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Public Comment No. 25-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Definition: Barrier. ]

Barrier.

A physical obstruction that is intended to prevent contact with equipment or energized electrical conductorsand circuit parts or to prevent unauthorized access to a work area .


The Technical Committee should reconsider the action taken on PI 233. While it is true the term generally is used in society to describe a physical obstacle that would prevent access, the term is used only within the body of NFPA 70E to describe a method to prevent inadvertent contact of energized parts or equipment. One reason a term is defined in Article 100 is to differentiate the unique manner it is used in NFPA 70E compared to common use. Since it is a defined term, it would improve the understanding of the standard if its usage was consistent and clearly different from "Barricade," a term that is used consistently to describe an obstruction to unauthorized entry. This lack of differentiation between the two terms may have led to the confusion in the 2018 modification to 130.7(D)(1)(I). Since it is not an extracted definition, the TC should continue to use it in a unique application to help users of the document understand the intent of rules where the term is applied. Modifying the definition would assist in that understanding.

Related Item

• PI 233


Submitter Full Name: Bobby Gray

Organization: Hoydar/buck, Inc.

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Wed Mar 13 10:01:04 EDT 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: This correlates the definition of the term barrier with its use in 130.7(D)(1)(f), 130.7(D)(1)(i) andother locations in the document. This revised definition does not prohibit the construction ofbarricades that obstruct access to a work area


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Public Comment No. 7-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Definition: Barrier. ]

Barrier.

A physical obstruction that is intended to prevent contact with equipment or energized electrical conductorsand circuit parts or to prevent unauthorized access to a work area .


The definitions of barrier and barricade have some overlap that will lead to confusion when reading the barrier requirements of Article 130.7(D)(1)(f) and (i). Barriers are installed between people and live parts (Article 130.7(D)(1)(i)), while barricades are used as an alerting technique to control area access (130.7(E)(2)). Differentiating these terms in the definitions will lend better clarity to the standard.

Related Item

• Public Input No. 233-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Definition: Barrier. ] • First Revision No. 67-NFPA 70E-2018


Submitter Full Name: Mark Scott

Organization: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Wed Feb 27 15:59:38 EST 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: This correlates the definition of the term barrier with its use in 130.7(D)(1)(f), 130.7(D)(1)(i) andother locations in the document. This revised definition does not prohibit the construction ofbarricades that obstruct access to a work area


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Public Comment No. 117-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Definition: Electrically Safe Work Condition.

]

Electrically Safe Work Condition.

A state in which an electrical conductor or circuit part has been disconnected from energized parts,locked/tagged in accordance with established standards, tested to verify the absence of voltage, and, ifnecessary, temporarily grounded for personnel protection.

Informational Note: An electrically safe work condition is not a procedure, it is a state wherein allhazardous electrical conductors or circuit parts to which a worker might be exposed are maintained

in a zero-energy state for the purpose of eliminating electrical hazards are are deenergized and

securely isolated to reduce the likelihood that the worker could be exposed to hazardous energy .



REDACTED_JacobsFieldTrialDecisionFinal_17-14021.pdfOSHA Review Commission Ruling - OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA

OSHA_SHP_Recommended_Practices.pdfOSHA Recommendations for Safety and Health Programs

PtD_Before_Risk_Assessment_-_A_Historical_Perspective.pdf

PtD Before Risk Assessment - A Historical Perspective (Zero Energy State comments highlighted)


The usae of the term "elimination" does not correelate with the OSHA definition of elimination and does not correlate with the December 2018 ruling of the federal OSHA Review Commission in the case of OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA.

It is incorrect to charaterize "Elimination" as a safe work practrice. In the context of the Hierarchy of Controls, Elimination, Substitution and Engineering Controls are design controls, and not safe work practices. The committee should review ands accept my original proposals 207, 208 and 209 in light of the December 2018 ruling of the federal OSHA Review Commission in the case of OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA. In this case, the Review Commission ruled that Jacobs practices were flawed in assuming an Electrical Safe Work Condition (ESWC) eliminated hazardous energy. I am providing the complete ruling for the technical committee to take into consideration. The following is a synopsis of the ruling.

This ruling in the case of OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA brings attention to the problem in how the term “Elimination” is used in the context of an Electrical Safe Work Condition (ESWC). The current language in NFPA 70E does not correlate with the OSHA Review Commission ruling and OSHA definition of Elimination and is misleading concerning the risk that remains after an ESWC is established.

OSHA cited Jacobs after an employee who was injured in an arc flash incident. Jacobs appealed the citation, claiming its procedures were compliant with NFPA 70E requirements for establishing an Electrical Safe Work Condition, eliminating exposure to hazardous energy, and that the injury was due to employee misconduct. The Review Commission ruled that Jacobs procedures were flawed in assuming that an ESWC eliminated exposure to hazardous energy. The ruling contradicts statements in NFPA 70E and related NFPA documents that claim or infer hazard and risk are eliminated when an ESWC is established.

Based on the ruling in OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA, statements in NFPA 70E and associated handbooks, training materials, and certification programs which claim or imply that establishing an ESWC eliminates exposure to hazardous energy are misleading and not aligned with OSHA.

Although defined in safety management standards and literature for more than 50 years, the definition of “Elimination” did not appear in OSHA documents until the October 2016 publication of OSHA Recommendations for Safety and Health Programs. Elimination of a hazard and associated risk is only achievable through design changes that permanently remove the hazard or alters the workplace in such a manner that a worker cannot be


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exposed to the hazard under any foreseeable circumstances. Elimination of hazardous energy in existing installations is very difficult and usually not achievable. Risk must be reduced to an acceptable level using other controls in the Hierarchy of Controls. Applying Administrative Controls that reduce the likelihood of exposure to as low as reasonably practicable is the focus of NFPA70E. Establishing an ESWC and safe work practices to keep workers inside the safe work zone are temporary Administrative Controls vulnerable to foreseeable employer and employee errors. Any statements that claim or infer that an ESWC eliminates hazards and risk is not aligned with the OSHA definition of “Elimination." This misalignment could mislead employers, employees and other stakeholders to underestimate the risk that may remain after establishing an ESWC. Failure to address remaining risk after creating an ESWC was the basis of the OSHA citation against Jacobs.

An ESWC is essential to controlling exposure to hazardous energy and reducing likelihood of electrical injury. Whether it is described as De-energization, Lockout/Tagout, ESWC, Zero Energy State, or some other term, the fact remains that safe work practices to keep workers in a safe work zone are vulnerable to management, supervision and worker error. Elimination of hazards and risk, as defined by OSHA cannot be achieved by safe work practices.

The term "zero energy state" is not used in OSHA regulatory language addressing control of hazardous energy for machine safety or electrical safety. Use of the term has been used in industry in the past, but better understanding of the risk of exposure to hazardous energy has shown that the concept does not eliminate hazardous energy, and use of the term has fallen out of favor by experts in safety and risk management. I am including the article “PtD before Risk Assessment – A Historical Perspective”, and highlighted text relating to Zero Energy State. The article uses examples in machine safety, however similar remaining risk exist in electrical safety, typically on the line side of isolation devices, and at engineering controls, such as shutters, doors, covers, enclosures and distance used to establish the boundary of the ESWC.

Related Public Comments for This Document

Related Comment Relationship

Public Comment No. 112-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. 110.1]

Public Comment No. 113-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. F.3]


Related Item

• 207, 208, 209


Submitter Full Name: H Floyd

Organization: Electrical Safety Group Inc

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Wed May 08 15:23:12 EDT 2019

Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:


Resolution: SR-1-NFPA 70E-2019 Response to PC-117: The term eliminate as used in the informational note tothe definition of "electrically safe work condition" is consistent with its use in NFPA 70E.

Statement: This second revision improves clarity in the informational note by replacing the undefined term “zeroenergy” with the defined term “de-energized”. In addition, language is added to clarify thatelimination is achieved by disconnecting and isolating from energy sources all electrical conductorsor circuit parts to which a worker might be exposed in the area where work is to take place.Additionally, it is clarified that this de-energization is a temporary state and exists only during theperiod for which the electrically safe work condition state is maintained. This informational notecorrelates with the purpose of NFPA 70E which is to provide a “practical” safe working area foremployees relative to the hazards arising from the use of electricity.


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 17-1402

Appearances:

Megan McGinnis, Esq., U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Kansas City, Missouri

For Complainant

Darren S. Harrington, Esq., Key Harrington Barnes, PC, Dallas, Texas

For Respondent

Before: Administrative Law Judge Brian A. Duncan

DECISION AND ORDER

Procedural History

After learning that an employee was hospitalized due to an arc flash on February 8, 2017,

OSHA dispatched Compliance Safety and Health Officer (“CSHO”) Brian Elmore to an ADM1

worksite in Columbus, Nebraska to conduct an inspection. (Tr. 231–32). After conducting his

investigation, CSHO Elmore concluded that Respondent had a work policy which permitted the

injured employee to remove portions of his personal protective equipment after he had determined

the load side (but not the line side) of an electrical disconnect box was de-energized. CSHO

1. ADM stands for Archer Daniels Midland. (Stip. No. 3).

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Complainant,

v.

JACOBS FIELD SERVICES, NORTH

AMERICA,

Respondent.

Some personal identifiers have been redacted for privacy purposes

2

Elmore found that this policy, as applied under the circumstances of this case, violated the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act).

Based on CSHO Elmore’s recommendations, Complainant issued a Citation and

Notification of Penalty, alleging Respondent committed a single, serious violation of 29 C.F.R. §

1910.335(a)(1)(i), and proposed a total penalty of $11,408. Respondent timely contested the

Citation, which brought the matter before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act.

The Chief Judge initially designated this matter for Simplified Proceedings pursuant to

Commission Rule 203(a); however, upon joint motion of the parties, the Court placed the matter

back in conventional status. (Tr. 9). See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.203(a). A trial was conducted in Omaha,

Nebraska on May 9–10, 2018. Seven witnesses testified at trial: (1) Brent Brabec, Respondent’s

electrical foreman; (2) Gerald Keller, Respondent’s electrical superintendent; (3) [redacted], the

injured employee; (4) Brian Elmore, Compliance Safety and Health Officer (CSHO); (5) Landis

Floyd, Complainant’s designated expert; (6) Michael Taubitz, Respondent’s designated expert;

and (7) Jason King, Respondent’s Director of Health, Safety, and Environment. Both parties

timely submitted post-trial briefs for the Court’s consideration.

Jurisdiction & Stipulations

The parties stipulated the Commission has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to

Section 10(c) of the Act and that, at all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was an

employer engaged in a business and industry affecting interstate commerce within the meaning of

Sections 3(3) and 3(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5). (Tr. 27–28). See Slingluff v. OSHRC, 425

F.3d 861 (10th Cir. 2005). The parties also stipulated to other factual matters, which were read

into the record. (Tr. 27–29).

3

Factual Background

Respondent is a large, national electrical contractor that provides on-site services to ADM,

which is also a large company that, at this particular facility, makes ethanol, fructose, starch, and

other corn byproducts. (Tr. 43). Respondent has multiple crews and foremen working at ADM’s

Columbus, Nebraska facility at any given time. One crew was tasked with connecting a new

subpanel in one of ADM’s fabrication shops to a 480-volt disconnect switch. (Tr. 46). During the

installation, one of the crew members was exposed to an arc flash, resulting in serious injuries to

his hands and face. (Tr. 44–45; Stip. No. 10).

Respondent’s employees at the ADM site were supervised by Gerald Keller, Respondent’s

on-site superintendent. (Stip. No. 8). Keller was responsible for overseeing each of the foreman,

who were, in turn, responsible for supervising their respective crews. (Tr. 42). The foreman who

supervised the injured employee was Brett Brabec, a licensed journeyman electrician with over 19

years of experience. (Tr. 41). Brabec supervised a crew of six employees, including [redacted],

the employee injured by the arc flash. (Tr. 42).

According to Brabec, he was responsible for assigning tasks, explaining those tasks,

reviewing job safety assessments (JSAs), and performing periodic checks of his employees. (Tr.

48–49, 71–73). Brabec testified that, once he assigned a task, he would “walk down”, or describe

in general terms, the steps necessary to accomplish the task. (Tr. 49). It was incumbent upon the

crew members to develop a JSA, which identified hazards and protective measures. (Tr. 72–73;

140–41). Brabec reviewed the JSAs to ensure that hazards were accounted for and appropriate

measures were taken to mitigate those hazards. (Tr. 73–74). Brabec testified he performed these

reviews during his trips around the worksite, which he did approximately 10 times per day. (Tr.

4

140). In addition, Brabec was responsible for performing daily and weekly comprehensive

inspections, which included a checklist for issues of concern. (Tr. 140–145; Ex. R-9, R-10).

On the day of the accident, Brabec directed [redacted] to “run conduit, pull wire and

terminate the load side” of a 480-volt disconnect, which was designed to provide power to a

subpanel in the maintenance pipe shop. (Tr. 48, 53–54). The disconnect was located, along with

other similarly situated disconnects, on a larger installation referred to as the “skid” (Tr. 46, 48;

Ex. C-13). According to Brabec, [redacted]’s task started by terminating, or attaching, the wires

at the subpanel in the pipe shop and moving backwards to the disconnect switch. (Tr. 66). Before

connecting those wires to the disconnect switch, however, [redacted] needed to confirm that the

load side2 of the disconnect was de-energized. Once de-energization was confirmed, [redacted]

was directed to terminate the three phases and neutral wire to their respective lugs on the bottom

half (load side) of the disconnect box. (Tr. 68–70; Ex. C-11). In this case, there were no existing

wires on the load side yet. (Tr. 63). Accordingly, Brabec referred to this as a new installation. (Tr.

48).

From the outside, a disconnect switch is an enclosed metal box with a lever on the outside,

indicating “ON” or “OFF”. (Ex. C-11). By turning the disconnect to the “OFF” position, the switch

removes a set of three blades from their cradles inside the disconnect box. (Tr. 113; Ex. C-11).

This severs the connection between the aforementioned “load” side at the bottom of the disconnect

and the “line” side at the top of the box. (Tr. 113–14, 185; Ex. C-11). As compared to the load

side, the line side is the location where incoming electricity is supplied to the disconnect. (Tr. 55).

Both the line and load side have three phases (A, B, and C) and a ground (or neutral) wire. (Tr.

2. As discussed more fully in the succeeding paragraph, the “load side” of a disconnect is also referred to as “secondary

voltage”. (Tr. 56). In either case, it refers to the bottom half of wires and lugs in the disconnect box that sends power

out to pieces of equipment and subpanels. (Tr. 56).

5

57–59; Ex. C-11). The wires on the load side terminate to the appropriate lug on the load side,

and the wires on the line side terminate to the appropriate lug on the line side; the blades of the

switch engages/severs the connection between the two sides. (Tr. 113–14; Ex. C-11). It should be

noted, however, that flipping the switch to OFF only severs the power running to the load side.

(Tr. 322–23). Unless power is cut off further upstream, there is still electricity running into the

line side top-half of the box. The dividing line between the two sides is marked by an arc shield,

which is a piece of plastic that is designed to guard against the possibility of an arc flash when

disengaging the blades and, to an extent, provide protection against incidental contact with line

side parts. (Tr. 267, 296–97; Ex. C-11). The arc shield cover was not complete; there were gaps

ranging from one-quarter inch to three inches along the sides and towards the rear of the box. (Tr.

154, 318; Ex. C-11).

On the day of the accident, Brabec reviewed and approved the JSA for [redacted]’s task,

which was filled out by his fellow crew member, Clayton Hoadley. (Tr. 49, 72, 140–41).

According to Brabec, the JSA identified all of the expected hazards and addressed those hazards

through various controls and PPE. (Tr. 72–80; Ex. C-23). Per the JSA, [redacted] set out a barrier

10 feet away from the disconnect, which would prevent otherwise unqualified or unaware

employees from wandering into the area, which is referred to as the arc flash boundary. (Tr. 69;

Ex. C-23). Under Brabec’s supervision, [redacted], who was wearing a 40-cal “hot suit”, which

provided head-to-toe electrical protection, switched off the disconnect and proceeded to verify that

the load side was de-energized. (Tr. 68–70, 81, 224). Verifying de-energization required

[redacted] to implement what Respondent referred to as its “test-test-test” procedure, a tripartite

examination that is designed to leave little doubt as to whether a circuit is energized. (Tr. 68–69).

6

Brabec confirmed [redacted] had properly de-energized the load side and proceeded to go about

his rounds. (Tr. 87).

Once [redacted] had de-energized the load side, Respondent considered it to be in an

electrically safe working condition (ESWC). (Tr. 115–16; Ex. C-32 at 22). This was so even

though he would be working within inches of live components on the line side, albeit at least

partially guarded by the arc shield. (Tr. 157; Ex. C-11). Nevertheless, pursuant to Respondent’s

policy, [redacted] was permitted to (and did) remove his shock-rated gloves and face shield. (Tr.

117–19). According to Brabec, those items were cumbersome, and their removal allowed

[redacted] to have more dexterity while working with the wires. (Tr. 117). [redacted] proceeded

to connect the A, B, and C phases to the load side lugs. (Tr. 211).

After connecting the phases and taping off the load-side neutral, [redacted] was informed

by Brabec that he had to bond the load-side neutral to the ground bar on the load side. (Tr. 213).

In [redacted]’s estimation, he did not have a lot of room to bond the load-side neutral on the ground

bar, which was located behind the A, B, and C phases. (Ex. C-11). So, [redacted] determined he

needed to remove the ground bar from the box to allow him enough room to attach the neutral.

(Tr. 213). The problem, however, is that the line-side ground wire ran from the top of the

disconnect, along the inside of the box, and attached to the same ground bar. (Tr. 100; Ex. C-11).

When [redacted] removed the ground bar, the rigid, uninsulated copper ground wire shifted and

contacted the line-side “A” phase, causing the arc flash that injured him. (Tr. 213).

Once Brabec was informed of the incident, he returned to the skid to find [redacted] with

his hands in the snow and his face badly burned. (Tr. 89). [redacted] was taken to the hospital,

where he stayed for several weeks. (Tr. 416; Ex. C-1). He ultimately returned to work, only to

7

leave Respondent’s employ shortly thereafter for reasons unrelated to the current case. (Tr. 47,

417).

Respondent notified Complainant of the employee hospitalization. (Tr. 231). While at the

ADM facility, CSHO Elmore inspected the location of the accident and conducted interviews of

employees and management. Based on what he learned, CSHO Elmore determined Respondent

failed to ensure its employees used appropriate PPE when exposed to energized circuits. (Tr. 236).

CSHO Elmore determined that this was not an isolated incident; rather, he learned of other

employees who were exposed in a manner similar to [redacted]. (Tr. 237). In his estimation,

Respondent’s work practice was a failure in two respects: (1) Respondent placed too much reliance

on the effectiveness of this arc shield as a guard against incidental contact with the line-side,

energized components; and (2) absent complete de-energization of the disconnect box (both line-

side and load-side), Respondent’s employees should not be allowed to remove PPE. (Tr. 238).

Complainant agreed with Elmore’s assessment and issued a Citation and Notification of Penalty

alleging a single violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.335(a)(1)(i), which is discussed below.

Discussion

Citation 1, Item 1

Complainant alleged a serious violation of the Act in Citation 1, Item 1 as follows:

29 CFR 1910.335(a)(1)(i): Employees working in areas where there were potential

electrical hazards were not using electrical protective equipment that was appropriate for

the specific parts of the body to be protected and for the work to be performed:

The employer failed to ensure that that [sic] a [sic] electrician apprentice was protected

from the hazard of arc flash. An employee was terminating a ground wire on the lower half

of a 480v, 200 Amp disconnect. The ground wire came into contact with an energized “A

Phase” at the top of the disconnect. An employee was not wearing the electrical protective

equipment at the time of the arc flash, resulting in burns to the employee’s face and left

hand. This most recently occurred on or about February 8, 2017 at 3000 8th Street,

Columbus, Nebraska 68601.

Citation and Notification of Penalty at 6.

8

The cited standard provides:

Employees working in areas where there are potential electrical hazards shall be

provided with, and shall use, electrical protective equipment that is appropriate for

the specific parts of the body to be protected and for the work to be performed.

29 C.F.R. § 1910.335(a)(1)(i).

The Standard Applies and Was Violated

The question of whether the standard applies is not in dispute. [redacted] was working in

an area where there were potential electrical hazards. The key issue is whether the PPE worn by

[redacted] was appropriate “for the specific parts of the body to be protected” and, as emphasized

by Respondent, “for the work to be performed.” Id. [redacted] may have been properly equipped

when he verified de-energization of the load side, but that changed when, consistent with company

policy and practice, he removed his gloves, face shield, and hood. As discussed below, the Court

finds Respondent’s policies regarding electrical hazard assessment and PPE unnecessarily exposed

[redacted] and similarly situated employees to electrical shock and arc flash hazards.

The cited electrical PPE standard is a performance standard. As such, whether Respondent

complied with its terms is interpreted in light of what is reasonable under the circumstances,

including “the knowledge of reasonable persons familiar with the industry.” See Siemens Energy

& Automation, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 2196 (No. 00-1052, 2005). However, the Court must be

mindful not to blindly rely upon industry custom and practice. According to the First Circuit:

[A]n appropriate test is whether a reasonably prudent man familiar with the

circumstances of the industry would have protected against the hazard. We would

expect, most often, that reference to industry custom and practice will establish the

standard of conduct. There may, however, be instances where industry practice fails

to take reasonable precautions against hazards generally known in the industry; in

such event it may not be unfair to hold the employer to a standard higher than that

of actual practice.

Cape &Vineyard Div. of New Bedford Gas v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1975).

9

As discussed above, [redacted] was fully equipped with PPE, inclusive of arc-rated gloves,

face shield, and suit when he verified the load side of the disconnect was de-energized. (Tr. 79;

Ex. C23). Once that was established, however, [redacted] removed the gloves and face shield.

According to all of Respondent’s witnesses, this was in accord with company policy, which

allowed removal of certain PPE once [redacted] had determined the disconnect was ESWC. (Tr.

87, 118, 121, 187–88, 422; Exs. R-3, C-27). ESWC is a term defined by NFPA 70E, which is an

industry-recognized set of standards governing work on electrical circuits. (Ex. C-32). According

to NFPA 70, ESWC means, “A state in which an electrical conductor or circuit part has been

disconnected from energized parts, locked/tagged in accordance with established standards, tested

to ensure the absence of voltage, and grounded if determined necessary.” (Ex. C-32 at 15). To

achieve this state, an electrician must follow a five-step process, which is also provided in NFPA

70E. (Ex. C-32 at 22). The parties dispute whether this state was achieved such that [redacted]’s

minimal PPE was appropriate for the work to be performed.

The problem for Respondent is that it attempted to apply a policy/practice in a one-size-

fits-all manner without considering any unique circumstances about the equipment being worked

on. According to Brabec, Respondent relied upon ADM’s Electrical Safety Program—which is

consistent with their own policies, and dictates their work on ADM’s worksite—to determine that

a disconnect was ESWC. (Tr. 164–65). The standard Brabec relied upon, identified in Comment

15.4.4.1, states that “480V MCC buckets on-site are considered to be in an electrical safe work

condition with breaker de-energized and no voltage condition is verified.” (Ex. R-3 at 41). Brabec

testified he relied on this policy because MCC3 buckets and disconnects “have the same potential

and same risk” and that he did not see much difference between them. (Tr. 163). The problem,

3. MCC stands for “motor control center”, which is an “assembly of one or more enclosed sections having a common

power bus and principally containing motor control units [or buckets].” (Ex. C-32 at 16).

10

though, as pointed out by Landis Floyd, is that there are fundamental differences between a

disconnect switch and an MCC bucket. (Tr. 299). Specifically, the MCC bucket can be fully

removed from the control center and worked on separately from the source of power. (Tr. 299).

Another significant difference is that line-side connections are not made by an electrician; they are

factory-installed and internal to the bucket. (Tr. 299). Comparatively, in a disconnect, the arc

shield must be removed before the line-side connections can be made by hand. (Tr. 299). Thus,

there are structural and functional differences between the disconnect at issue and MCC buckets

that made reliance upon the aforementioned practice at least somewhat questionable.

Notwithstanding any written policy or practice Brabec may have relied upon, he, and the

others testifying on Respondent’s behalf, testified that it was common in the industry to work on

the load side of a disconnect while leaving the line side energized. (Tr. 118–19, 363). Further,

they also testified the industry considers that set-up to be ESWC insofar as the work is limited to

the de-energized load side of the arc shield. (Tr. 159–60, 179). As such, it is important to

understand the exact orientation of the live, line-side parts vis-à-vis the de-energized, load-side

parts within the disconnect.

As described above, the line side and load side were separated by an arc shield that ran

across the middle of the disconnect box just above the fuses, which are located on the load side.4

(Tr. 45–46; Ex. C-11). As C-11 illustrates, there is a gap between the arc shield and the left-hand

side of the disconnect box. (Ex. C-11). According to Floyd, this side gap was roughly two inches

wide. (Tr. 318). Adjacent to that gap, just behind the shield, is the energized “A” phase that

ultimately contacted the ground wire and caused the arc flash. (Tr. 319). In addition, the arc shield

did not extend all the way to the back of the disconnect box. This was pointed out by Floyd, who

4. Exhibit C-11 shows a comparable disconnect switch on the same skid. As shown in Exhibit C-4, the disconnect

[redacted] was working on was badly marred by the arc flash, rendering it unhelpful as a demonstrative.

11

noted a three-inch gap between the back panel and the top of the arc shield. (Tr. 318; Ex. C-10).

Brabec also noted an unusual gap between the arc shield and termination lug on the line side, which

measured approximately one-quarter of an inch. (Tr. 152–55). Finally, it is important to note that

[redacted]’s work on the load side occurred approximately 8–10 inches away from the energized

line-side parts. (Tr. 156-157).

In support of its assessment that the disconnect was ESWC, and to justify [redacted]’s

removal of PPE, Respondent places significant emphasis on the arc shield as an adequate guard

against electrical shock and arc flash hazards. (Tr. 159–61). As the name suggests, the arc shield

is designed to prevent arc flashes. The materials for this particular model of disconnect also

indicate that the shield secondarily serves as a guard against incidental contact. (Ex. C-36).

According to Floyd, however, the arc shield was not everything that Respondent claims it

to be. First, while it is designed to prevent arc flashes, Floyd testified that an arc shield is

principally an equipment performance measure. (Tr. 298). To illustrate, Floyd discussed the

difference between a 240-volt and 480-volt (at issue here) switch. (Tr. 290). A 240-volt switch

does not arc when the switch is turned off, and the blades separate from their cradles. (Tr. 290).

As such, they are not equipped with arc shields, even though the potential for contact with

energized parts is quite real. (Tr. 296–97). A 480-volt switch, on the other hand, can create an arc

under certain load conditions, such as supplying electricity to a motor. (Tr. 291). Due to this

potential, Floyd testified that a suppression measure, such as an arc shield, is required to prevent

the destruction of equipment and potential injury to employees. (Tr. 291). Further, while Floyd

agreed that the likelihood of accidental contact was reduced by the presence of the arc shield, he

disagreed that the likelihood was so reduced as to justify [redacted]’s removal of gloves and face

shield. (Tr. 325–26, 332–34).

12

In support of his assessment of the arc shield, Floyd discussed his experience investigating

events that were otherwise unexpected, but nonetheless resulted in hazardous contact. Floyd

admitted that, from the front side, incidental contact with the live, line-side components was

unlikely; however, he also noted that the left side and top of the arc shield were “wide open”. (Tr.

292). Based on his experience with work of this type, Floyd discussed the possibility of tools

slipping through the gap and causing a short circuit between an energized phase and ground or that

cut wire strands would fly in unexpected ways after being cut to fit. (Tr. 295, 302–303). At bottom,

Floyd described Respondent’s position towards the arc shield as an “over-estimation of

effectiveness” and an “under-estimation of risk”. (Tr. 300). This was due, in no small part, to the

shield being “open on the sides and top in such a manner that I can actually put my fingers in and

touch energized conductors . . . .” (Tr. 300). In other words, [redacted] was working very close to

“a source of energy that can kill” guarded by an insufficient means to protect against inadvertent

contact. (Tr. 301).

Respondent, through its expert, Taubitz, asserted that the arc shield was sufficient to

prevent inadvertent contact. (Tr. 364). This argument is premised not on any logistical argument

about the difficulties of access, but on the idea that [redacted] exceeded the scope of his duties

when he detached the ground bar from the load side in order to bond the load-side neutral. (Tr.

367–68). Taubitz and Brabec spent a substantial amount of time pointing out that, had [redacted]

not removed the ground bar, the arc flash event would not have occurred and its assessment that

the disconnect was ESWC would remain intact. This argument is not persuasive for several

reasons. First, as will be discussed in more detail in the section on Respondent’s claim of

unpreventable employee misconduct, the Court is not convinced that [redacted] exceeded the scope

of his work. Second, the Court is unclear as to how the scope of [redacted]’s work served as a

13

control against inadvertent contact, given the relatively short distance from the point of his work

to the closest live wire (approx. 8 inches). Third, not all disconnects or MCC buckets are created

alike; some are more insulated against contact than others. (Tr. 298–300). The mere presence of

some type of an arc shield does not “remove the likelihood of approach to a point of danger or

contact by persons or objects.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.399 (definition of guard). While some

guards/arc shields may have this capacity, the evidence illustrates the arc shield on the #3

disconnect that [redacted] was working on did not. And fourth, whether a violation of a standard

occurred does not depend on the specific cause of a particular accident. Boeing Co., 5 BNA OSHC

2014 (No. 12879, 1977).

As noted by Brabec, Floyd, and Taubitz, the orientation of the disconnect’s inner

components was not standard. Brabec testified that the gap between the shield and the “A” phase

lug was unusual. (Tr. 155). Taubitz also noted the gap was “error-provocative”, though he

dismissed such concerns by relying on the previously mentioned “scope of task” argument. (Tr.

377). Similarly, Floyd highlighted the presence of multiple gaps, the size of which created the

potential for inadvertent contact. (Tr. 329–330). This problem was exacerbated by how close to

the live parts [redacted] had to work. Floyd also testified that the ground wire, which ran from

energized line side to de-energized load size, did not need to terminate on the load side. (Tr. 304).

While this set-up was not attributable to Respondent, it was, according to Floyd, “a pre-existing

situation that contributed to the likelihood that this incident could occur.” (Tr. 304). In other

words, there were multiple conditions within the disconnect enclosure that contributed to the

likelihood of inadvertent contact and should have been considered when performing the hazard

and PPE assessment, but were not.

14

Brabec said he did not look inside of the disconnect box prior to [redacted] performing

work inside of it. (Tr. 56). He also testified, however, that none of the above would have changed

his assessment of the task, because the hazards were mitigated if [redacted] had stayed within the

purported “scope” of his work. (Tr. 155–56). Based on this, Floyd believed that [redacted]’s and

Brabec’s faulty assessments were indicative of their being unqualified to perform such tasks,

because they were unable to see the potential for incidental, albeit hazardous, contact. (Tr. 329–

30). [redacted] and Brabec’s actions were a reflection of Respondent’s electrical safety policy,

which appears to adopt a relaxed interpretation of the NFPA 70E standards of industry conduct

and the subpart S standards at issue in this proceeding.

Subpart S indicates a preference for de-energizing live parts “to which an employee may

be exposed . . . before the employee works on or near them.” Id. § 1910.333(a)(1) (emphasis

added). This is an expansive concept of exposure that contemplates not just the parts that the

employee is directly working on, but also the energized parts to which an employee may be

exposed by virtue of working near them. See also Solares Electrical Svcs Inc., 26 BNA OSHC

1779, (No. 16-0605, 2017) (ALJ) (“To establish access under Commission precedent, the

Secretary must show either that Respondent’s employees were actually exposed to the violative

condition or that it is ‘reasonably predictable by operational necessity or otherwise (including

inadvertence), that employees have been, are, or will be in the zone of danger.’” (citing Fabricated

Metal Prods., 18 BNA OSHC 1072, 1074 (No. 93-1853, 1997))). The definition of exposure under

Subpart S, which comports with Commission case law on the topic as a general concern, reiterates

this expansive concept: “(As applied to live parts.) Capable of being inadvertently touched or

approached nearer than a safe distance by a person. It is applied to parts not suitably guarded,

isolated, or insulated.” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.399.

15

According to subpart S, ‘guarded’ means “[c]overed, shielded, fenced, enclosed, or

otherwise protected by means of suitable covers, casings, barriers, rails, screens, mats, or platforms

to remove the likelihood of approach to a point of danger or contact by persons or objects.” Id.5

The definition reiterates the expansive concept of exposure mentioned above—it is not enough to

remove the likelihood of contact, but any suitable guard must remove the likelihood of approach

to a point of danger. Id. Respondent seems to suggest that because it prevents some incidental

contact that the arc shield qualifies as something that “remove[s] the likelihood” of it. While it is

true that guards do not have to be (and often cannot be) capable of completely removing a hazard,

the Court finds the gaps in this particular arc shield allowed employees working on the load side

to come within inches of the point of danger. Floyd testified that some arc shields, can create such

a guard; however, the arc shield in the disconnect box at issue did not, thereby highlighting the

importance of assessing each task and piece of equipment on its own merits. (Tr. 299–300).

The definition of exposure introduces a previously undiscussed element, the so-called “safe

distance”, that is given meaning by NFPA 70E. According to NFPA 70E, there are a couple of

different safe distances, so to speak, that need to be observed during work on electrical circuits:

(1) the arc flash boundary, (2) the limited approach boundary, and (3) the restricted approach

boundary. The arc flash boundary is the outer limit and represents the “distance from which a

prospective arc source within which a person could receive a second degree burn if an electrical

arc flash were to occur.” (Ex. C-32 at 14). The limited access boundary and restricted access

boundary represent progressively closer distances to an exposed energized conductor, within

which the likelihood of electrical shock or arc-over is increased. (Ex. C-32 at 14). According to

Floyd, who contributed significantly to the development of NFPA 70E and associated literature,

5. The definitions of “guarded” and “exposed” are mirrored in NFPA 70E. (Ex. C-32 at 15).

16

the limited approach boundary does not just apply to equipment that an employee is planning to

touch. (Tr. 322). Contrary to Respondent’s argument that the limited access boundary is targeted

towards unqualified individuals (e.g., not electricians), Floyd testified, “[A]ny exposure within the

limited approach boundary needs to be placed in a likely [sic] safe work condition.” (Tr. 322).

According to Table 130.4(D)(a) of NFPA 70E, the limited approach boundary was 3 feet, 6 inches.

(Ex. C-32 at 29).

Perhaps the most persuasive element of the NFPA 70E standard, however, is the discussion

of arc flash hazards and the associated boundary and PPE assessments. (Ex. C-32 at 38–43). The

NFPA definition provides: “An arc flash hazard may exist when energized electrical conductors

or circuit parts are exposed or when they are within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition,

provided a person is interacting with the equipment in such a manner that could cause an electric

arc.” (Ex. C-32) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding Respondent’s arguments about the scope of

[redacted]’s work, the fact that an arc flash occurred in this case is a strong indication that an arc

flash hazard existed as part of [redacted]’s task. Within the same definition, the reader is directed

to Table 130.7(C)(15)(A)(a) for examples of activities that could pose an arc flash hazard,

including “Work on control circuits with exposed energized electrical conductors and circuit parts,

greater than 120V.” (Ex. C-32 at 39). According to the table, arc flash PPE is required any time

an employee works on a circuit with exposed conductors. (Id.). Further, the table also identifies

the boundaries associated with specific equipment and the appropriate arc flash PPE category. (Id.

at 41). Even at the lowest voltage levels listed on the table, [redacted] was working within the arc

flash boundary, which meant he should have been wearing, at a minimum, all the PPE he was

wearing while assessing the disconnect as ESWC. (Ex. C-32 at 43).

17

According to Floyd, there was only one way to properly assess this disconnect as ESWC:

shutting off the power main, which was just a few feet away from disconnect #3. (Tr. 322–23).

This was the only way to prevent [redacted] from approaching, let alone contacting, energized

electrical components. While Respondent argues shutting down the main power switch would have

been unreasonably disruptive, the Court finds Respondent failed to perform an adequate analysis

of the task and associated hazards such that its assessment warranted deference. Subpart S

provides a decisional matrix, of sorts, to allow an employer to determine whether work should be

performed on a live electrical component. As noted above, the default is complete de-energization,

unless the employer “can demonstrate that de-energizing introduces additional or increased

hazards or is infeasible due to equipment design or operational limitations.” 29 C.F.R. §

1910.333(a)(1). To clarify, the standard notes what constitutes “additional or increased hazards”

and “infeasibility”. See id. at n. 1–2. Those include: interruption of life support, deactivation of

alarm systems or ventilation equipment, removal of illumination from an area, and complete

shutdown of a continuous industrial process, such as at a chemical plant. Id. While Taubitz

testified regarding the potential impact of de-energizing the main switch on the skid, there is no

indication that any of the foregoing obstacles to complete de-energization were present, nor is it

clear that Respondent performed the sort of analysis envisioned by Subpart S.

In addition to the foregoing, Respondent argues that the plain language of the standard does

not compel it to ensure its employees wear proper PPE. Instead, Respondent argues, its only

obligation is to provide proper PPE; it is incumbent upon the individual employee to actually use

the PPE that has been provided. This is a strained reading of the standard and is inconsistent with

Commission case law on the topic of performance-based PPE standards. The plain language

provides that employees “shall be provided with, and shall use, electrical protective equipment . .

18

. .” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.335(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). This terminology is no different than that

found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a), which requires that “protective equipment . . . shall be provided,

used, and maintained . . . .” Id. § 1910.132(a). In both cases an employer’s obligation extends

beyond the mere providing of equipment to ensuring that it is, in fact, used. This was made clear

by the Commission in The Budd Company, wherein the panel found “subpart [1910.132](a) means

that where personal equipment is necessary, the employer shall insure that it is used. If he provides

such equipment, he is responsible for insuring that it is ‘provided, used, and maintained in a

sanitary and reliable condition.” 1 BNA OSHC 1548 (Nos. 199 & 215, 1974), aff’d 513 F.2d 201

(“The decision of the Commission in no way diminishes the employer’s obligation to ensure that

safety shoes are in fact worn when required.”). Accord Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc., 2

BNA OSHC 1620 (No. 2375, 1975) (“Respondent failed to comply with 29 CFR § 1910.132(a)

by not requiring that its dock workers and repair shop employees have toe protection.”). Thus,

given the substantial similarities between the mandates of 1910.132(a) and 1910.335(a)(1)(i), the

Court finds Respondent was obligated to both provide and ensure the use of electrical PPE.

Accordingly, Respondent’s suggestion that it is only required to provide electrical PPE under such

circumstances is rejected.

Finally, as the foregoing shows, the Court placed substantial weight on the testimony of

Floyd, Complainant’s expert, over that of Michael Taubitz, Respondent’s expert. This was the

case for many reasons. First, Floyd was an electrical engineer, who has written over 60 peer-

reviewed articles on the topic of electrical safety. (Tr. 279–280; Ex. C-37). His experience was

more specific to the issue at hand than Taubitz, whose experience is primarily in the area of

“control of hazardous energy”, which is more directly related to lock-out/tag-out than to shock and

arc flash hazards. (Tr. 347). Second, Floyd was able to articulate clear distinctions between the

19

various pieces of electrical equipment, like the MCC buckets and disconnect switches, to show

how Respondent’s policy or practice was either misapplied or wrong. He also used personal

experiences from his investigations to explain the various ways in which electricians can contact,

or be exposed to, energized electrical components while using “common practices”. (Tr. 298–300).

Third, and most importantly, Floyd’s evaluations of hazards and attendant risks were consistent

with the purpose of the Act—to prevent the first injury—and were premised on an intimate

knowledge of arc flash incidents and hazards. (Tr. 324–25). Taubitz, on the other hand, focused

on what is “common” practice in the industry, versus what is safe and compliant with the

regulations. Indeed, Taubitz relied almost entirely on the arc shield and the relatively elastic

concept of “scope of work” as a panacea for adequate protection against shock and arc flash

hazards. (Tr. 366–68). While Taubitz is clearly an expert in his field, the Court finds Floyd’s

testimony was far more persuasive based on the detail he provided in his explanations of the

electrical equipment at issue and his descriptions of the various ways in which electricians have

been injured based on their exposure to energized circuits, as [redacted] was here.

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court finds the standard applied and was violated.

[redacted] was Exposed to the Hazard Caused by the Violation

To establish exposure under Commission precedent, the Secretary must show

Respondent’s employees were actually exposed to the violative condition or that it is “reasonably

predictable by operational necessity or otherwise (including inadvertence), that employees have

been, are, or will be in the zone of danger.” Fabricated Metal Prods., 18 BNA OSHC 1072, 1074

(No. 93-1853, 1997). The dispute over whether [redacted] was exposed to the hazard caused by

the violation is a textured one. There is no question that [redacted] was exposed to a hazard—480

volt energized wiring, which resulted in an arc flash, causing serious injuries to his hands and face.

20

Rather, the operative question in this case is whether [redacted] was exposed to a hazard resulting

from the violation alleged by Complainant. See Oberdorfer Industries, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 1321

(“The zone of danger is determined by the hazards presented by the violative condition that

presents the danger to employees which the standard is designed to prevent.”). Notwithstanding

the fact that [redacted]’s hands and tools were within inches of unenclosed, energized circuit

components, Respondent contends [redacted] was not exposed to a hazard because he allegedly

committed misconduct when he removed the ground bar, which was purportedly outside the scope

of his assigned duties. The Court disagrees and finds [redacted] was exposed to a hazard because

he was not wearing PPE appropriate for his work environment.

Although dealt with in more detail below in the section on Respondent’s defense of

unpreventable employee misconduct, the facts illustrate [redacted]’s exposure was not the product

of him exceeding the scope of his assigned task. First and foremost, it was Respondent’s policy

that permitted this type of employee exposure in the first place. Whether a correct interpretation

of the ADM electrical policy or not, all of Respondent’s witnesses testified that [redacted] acted

consistently with Respondent’s own policy when he made the determination that the disconnect

box was ESWC and removed his gloves and hood. Second, the instructions given to [redacted]

were general and, according to Brabec, were not based on the particular set up of the phases and

wires inside this particular disconnect. (Tr. 56). [redacted]’s job was to connect phases and a

neutral wire to the load side of the disconnect, which also housed a ground wire that connected the

energized line side to a grounding bar on the de-energized load side. Because of the task he was

assigned, [redacted] necessarily had to perform his job within inches of the energized line-side

components. See Oberdorfer, 20 BNA OSHC 1321 (lathe operators hands coming within 3 to 8

inches from unguarded hazard constituted exposure). As testified to by Floyd, such activities

21

presented a distinct possibility of inadvertent exposure. That, in and of itself, is sufficient to

establish exposure to the hazard.

Respondent Had Knowledge of the Violation

To prove this element, Complainant must show Respondent knew or, with the exercise of

reasonable diligence, could have known of the violation. Dun-Par Engineered Form Co., 12 BNA

OSHC 1962, 1965 (No. 82-928, 1986). The key is whether Respondent was aware of the

conditions constituting a violation, not whether it understood the conditions violated the Act.

Phoenix Roofing, Inc., 17 BNA OSHC 1076, 1079–80 (No. 90-2148, 1995). Complainant can

prove knowledge of a corporate employer through the knowledge, actual or constructive, of its

supervisory employees. Dover Elevator Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1281, 1286 (No. 91-862, 1993). If a

supervisor is, or should be, aware of the noncomplying conduct of a subordinate, it is reasonable

to charge the employer with that knowledge. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. OSHRC, 623

F.2d 155, 158 (10th Cir. 1980).

Brabec, [redacted]’s foreman, was responsible for assigning the task, providing instruction

to [redacted] on that task, reviewing the JSA, and conducting periodic observations as part of his

daily rounds. He watched [redacted] perform the “test-test-test” procedure to verify de-

energization and was aware the line-side of the disconnect would remain energized as [redacted]

began to work on the load side without the full array of electrical PPE. Further, Brabec was aware

[redacted] would remove certain elements of his PPE once he verified the load side was de-

energized, which was consistent with company policy and what was identified as common practice

in the industry. (Tr. 117). Though the record is not clear whether he saw [redacted] remove his

PPE, Brabec’s testimony illustrates that he was aware [redacted] would remove his PPE. (Tr. 79–

22

88). Indeed, all of Respondent’s employees who testified made clear that it was company policy

to allow removal of electrical PPE items when the load side of a disconnect had been de-energized.

Thus, while the Court concludes Respondent had knowledge of the violative conditions

through the imputed knowledge of Brabec, whether actual or constructive, the Court also finds

Respondent itself was aware of the violative conditions. It was Respondent’s policy allowing

[redacted] to remove PPE, as well as its reliance on “industry practice” to assess the disconnect as

ESWC, that placed him in the zone of danger.6 Irrespective of whether this assessment was

consistent with common industry practice or represented a correct interpretation of company

policy (given that it explicitly referred to MCC buckets), the consensus was that [redacted] did not

violate company rules by removing his PPE. Because [redacted]’s act of removing his PPE after

he verified the load side was in a de-energized state was an accepted practice and part of written

policy, the Court finds Respondent was actually aware of the conditions constituting a violation.

Respondent Failed to Prove the Affirmative Defense of

Unpreventable Employee Misconduct

As noted above, however, Respondent claims it could not have foreseen that [redacted]

would exceed the scope of his duties by removing the ground bar and, thus, his subsequent

exposure to the arc flash was the product of unpreventable employee misconduct. This argument

disregards a fairly basic, and obvious, fact: [redacted] was permitted to remove his PPE

notwithstanding the fact that he was working within inches of 480 volt energized components that

were not adequately protected from inadvertent contact. For that and other reasons discussed

below, Respondent’s defense of unpreventable employee misconduct is rejected.

6. The Court places the term “industry practice” in quotes for a couple of reasons. First, it was not clear whether

Respondent’s industry practice argument referred to treating the entire disconnect box as ESWC, or whether it referred

to the removal of PPE, or both. Second, as pointed out by Floyd, merely because a practice is “common” does not

mean that it is compliant with safety regulations.

23

In order to prevail on a claim of unpreventable employee misconduct, Respondent must

show: (1) it has established work rules designed to prevent the violation; (2) it has adequately

communicated those rules to its employees; (3) it has taken steps to discover violations of the rules;

and (4) it must effectively enforce the rules when violations are detected. Am. Eng’g & Dev. Corp.,

23 BNA OSHC 2093, 2096–97 (No. 10-0359, 2012). In other words, it is incumbent upon

Respondent to “demonstrate that the actions of the employee were a departure from a uniformly

and effectively communicated and enforced workrule [sic].” Archer-Western Contractors Ltd., 15

BNA OSHC 1013 (No. 87-1067, 1991).

Prior to starting work on the disconnect, Brabec instructed [redacted] to “run conduit, pull

wire, and terminate the load side of the disconnect.” (Tr. 48). The JSA reflected these very basic

steps, which did not appear to take into account any of the “unusual” aspects of the disconnect

referenced by Floyd, Taubitz, CSHO Elmore, and even Brabec himself, who determined no shock

or arc flash hazards existed at the point of de-energization. (Tr. 67). These unusual aspects, such

as the aforementioned gaps and the uninsulated copper ground wire that connected the line side to

the load side, however, ended up being significant factors in the subsequent arc flash. (Ex. C-23 at

1). On the face of it, there was nothing implicit or explicit in Brabec’s instructions that leads the

Court to believe [redacted] violated a rule specific to the task assigned to him.

Nevertheless, Respondent contends that Brabec’s instructions were sufficiently specific to

prevent [redacted] from removing the ground bar to install the load-side neutral. The Court

disagrees. According to both [redacted] and Brabec, [redacted] was instructed to terminate the

load-side neutral to the load-side ground bar. There was no mention of the line-side, uninsulated

ground wire, which ran from the energized line side to the de-energized load side. This stands to

reason, because Brabec admitted he had not looked inside the disconnect box. [redacted] was

24

confronted with a problem of how to connect the neutral wire to the ground bar after he had

installed the A, B, and C phases, which served as an impediment to bonding the neutral. (Tr. 213).

As a solution, [redacted] determined he needed to manipulate the ground bar to properly bond the

neutral to one of the ground lugs. The Court fails to see how, when viewed objectively,

[redacted]’s actions exceeded the scope of his original mandate. Neither Brabec’s instructions nor

the JSA mentioned the line-side ground wire attaching to the load-side ground bar. Nor, for that

matter, do those instructions mention the arc shield gaps that were identified by all testifying

parties.

This case is similar to the situation presented in Secretary of Labor v. Capform, 19 BNA

OSHC 1374 (No. 99-0322, 2001). In that case, the employer provided oral instruction to two new

employees on how to remove jacks that were used to support recently poured concrete slabs, also

known as stripping. The two employees received instructions on how to remove the jacks under

normal circumstances, but their trainer apparently did not provide instructions on how to proceed

when immovable obstructions were present. Id. The Commission found Respondent failed to

provide adequate instruction because, if the trainer had inspected the work area ahead of time, he

would have noticed “it might not be possible for the employees to remove all of the posts . . . in

the manner in which he had instructed.” Id. (citing Automatic Sprinkler Corp., 8 BNA OSHC 1384,

1387 (No. 76-5089, 1980) (an employer “must make a reasonable effort to anticipate the particular

hazards to which its employees may be exposed in the course of their scheduled work.”)).

Although [redacted] was not a “new” employee and had performed similar tasks before,

he was still an apprentice electrician. It was incumbent upon his foreman, a journeyman with 19-

plus years of experience, to “make a reasonable effort to anticipate the particular hazards to which

[[redacted]] may be exposed” in the course of his assigned work. Id. Instead, Brabec disregarded,

25

or otherwise lent no credence to, the possibilities for inadvertent contact, including the way

[redacted] was actually injured in this case. Perhaps this was, as Floyd testified, an over-reliance

upon the arc shield as an engineering control, which led to an underestimation of the risk presented

by the unusual aspects about this particular disconnect switch. In either case, the Court finds that

Brabec’s instructions, which were premised on company policy, were insufficient to eliminate the

hazard of arc flash and incidental contact. Accordingly, the Court finds Respondent cannot prevail

on its claim of unpreventable employee misconduct as it relates to the purported “scope” of

[redacted]’s duties. See Archer-Western Contractors Ltd., 15 BNA OSHC 1013 (citing Brown &

Root, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC 1055, 1060 (No. 76-3492, 1980)) (holding employer cannot prevail on

the defense of unpreventable employee misconduct “where the employer’s instructions were

insufficient to eliminate the hazard even if the employee had complied with the instructions.”).

Respondent does not have an explicit work rule governing this situation, other than the one

which permitted [redacted] to remove his PPE and generalized instructions provided by Brabec

regarding the scope of [redacted]’s work. The former arguably placed [redacted] in the zone of

danger by permitting the removal of PPE while inches from energized components, while the latter

insufficiently addressed the hazard. Respondent also attempts to rely on a vague and undefined

“seek help” rule, whereby an employee who has reached the limits of their understanding or skill

is supposed to seek assistance. (Tr. 124–25). Such a “rule”, so called, is nothing more than an

admonition to “stay safe”, which has been repeatedly rejected as insufficient to support a claim of

employee misconduct. See, e.g., Packerland Packing Co. of Texas, Inc., 6 BNA OSHC 1126 (No.

13315, 1977) (holding generalized instructions to “work safely” is not sufficient to establish the

exercise of reasonable diligence to prevent violations (citing Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement

Co., 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975))); Arc Electrical Constr. Co., Inc., 7 BNA OSHC 1676 (No.

26

77-0091, 1979) (holding instructions to “be careful” or to “take every necessary precaution” were

inadequate and evidence a lack of an adequate safety program). Further, such a rule is particularly

unhelpful when it comes to inexperienced employees, or those still in training, because it places

the onus on the employee to account for what they know and do not know. See Otis Elevator v.

Marshall, 581 F.2d 1056 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Leaving the decision to the discretion of the employee

is not sufficient compliance with the regulation.”). At bottom, it is Respondent’s obligation to

make a reasonable effort to anticipate the hazards to which its employees may be exposed, not the

employee himself.

Ultimately, Respondent, through Brabec, applied a one-size-fits-all approach to a situation

that required a greater appreciation for the possibility of [redacted]’s exposure to a substantial, and

potentially fatal, hazard. Without consideration for the idiosyncrasies of the switch at issue,

Respondent relied upon policy and practice to justify [redacted]’s determination that the switch

was safe to work on, and that PPE deemed too cumbersome was allowed by the employer to be

removed. While this policy and practice may have been “common” under certain circumstances,

the Court finds their application to be inappropriate where, as here, the conditions of the disconnect

switch warranted the use of additional safeguards or PPE. [redacted] was not exposed to a

hazardous condition because he exceeded the scope of his duties; rather, it was Respondent’s

policies for determining when a circuit was ESWC and allowing removal of PPE that placed

[redacted] in the zone of danger. That [redacted] was injured while doing what he was told—

bonding the neutral to the ground bar—seems entirely foreseeable considering the general nature

of the instructions provided by Brabec and memorialized in the JSA, neither of which referenced

the uninsulated, copper ground wire running from line side to load side, adjacent to an unprotected,

27

energized phase lug. As such, Respondent’s claim of unpreventable employee misconduct is

rejected.

The Violation Was Serious

A violation is “serious” if there was a substantial probability that death or serious physical

harm could have resulted from the violative condition. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k). Complainant need not

show that there was a substantial probability that an accident would actually occur; he need only

show that if an accident occurred, serious physical harm could result. Phelps Dodge Corp. v.

OSHRC, 725 F.2d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). If the possible injury addressed by a regulation is

death or serious physical harm, a violation of the regulation is serious. Mosser Construction, 23

BNA OSHC 1044 (No. 08-0631, 2010); Dec-Tam Corp., 15 BNA OSHC 2072 (No. 88-0523,

1993).

According to Floyd, an arc flash is an uncontrolled electrical arc that can cause severe

damage to equipment, cause fires, and cause severe injury and death due to thermal burns and blast

pressure. (Tr. 284). The destructive nature and range of an arc flash involving 480 volts was

illustrated by the post-accident condition of the disconnect box, as well as the PPE that [redacted]

had removed and was sitting on the ground at the time of the flash. (Exs. C-2 to C-9). [redacted]

suffered serious injuries as a result of his exposure to the arc flash, including burns to the hands

and face. These injuries caused [redacted] to be hospitalized for weeks and miss work for a couple

of months. The violation was serious.

Penalty

In calculating appropriate penalties for affirmed violations, Section 17(j) of the Act

requires the Commission give due consideration to four criteria: (1) the size of the employer’s

business, (2) the gravity of the violation, (3) the good faith of the employer, and (4) the employer’s

28

prior history of violations. Gravity is the primary consideration and is determined by the number

of employees exposed, the duration of the exposure, the precautions taken against injury, and the

likelihood of an actual injury. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 15 BNA OSHC 2201 (No. 87-2059,

1993). It is well established that the Commission and its judges conduct de novo penalty

determinations and have full discretion to assess penalties based on the facts of each case and the

applicable statutory criteria. Valdak Corp., 17 BNA OSHC 1135 (No. 93-0239, 1995); Allied

Structural Steel, 2 BNA OSHC 1457 (No. 1681, 1975).

Complainant proposed a penalty of $11,408 because it determined there was a high

potential for serious injury or death. In calculating the proposed penalty, Complainant further

factored Respondent’s status as a large, national employer; afforded no good faith reduction do to

the occurrence of an accident; and afforded a ten percent penalty reduction based on Respondent’s

lack of OSHA violation history in the last five years. (Tr. 239-241). The Court sees no reason to

depart from Complainant’s penalty assessment. Respondent’s apprentice-level electrician was

exposed to shock and arc flash hazards based on Respondent’s policy of allowing the removal of

PPE even though there was still potential for contact with 480 volt energized wiring. Based on the

totality of the circumstances discussed above, Complainant’s proposed penalty of $11,408 is

appropriate and will be assessed.

Order

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED

that:

1. Citation 1, Item 1 is AFFIRMED as a serious violation, and a penalty of $11,408 is

ASSESSED.

29

/s/ Brian A. Duncan Date: December 11, 2018 Judge Brian A. Duncan

Denver, Colorado U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

Recommended Practices for

Safety and Health Programs

Worker Participation

Find and Fix Hazards

Management Leadership

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

www.osha.gov/shpguidelines

OSHA 3885 October 2016

https://www.osha.gov/shpguidelines

DISCLAIMERThese practices for safety and health programs are recommendations only. Employers are not required to have a safety and health program that complies with them and will not be cited for failing to have a safety and health program that complies with this document.

These recommended practices apply to employers, except in the construction industry, for whom there are separate Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs for the Construction Industry.

FOREWORD

FOREWORDEstablishing a safety and health program in your workplace is one of the most effective ways of protecting your most valuable asset: your workers. Losing workers to injury or illness, even for a short time, can cause significant disruption and cost—to you as well as the workers and their families. It can also damage workplace morale, productivity, turnover, and reputation.

Safety and health programs foster a proactive approach to “finding and fixing” workplace hazards before they can cause injury or illness. Rather than reacting to an incident, management and workers collaborate to identify and solve issues before they occur. This collaboration builds trust, enhances communication, and often leads to other business improvements. Employers who have implemented safety and health programs, including many who are in OSHA’s Voluntary Protection Programs (VPP) or the Safety and Health Achievement Recognition Program (SHARP) for small and medium-sized businesses, have also found that managing for safety results in higher-quality product or output and higher profits.

Thousands of responsible employers have used OSHA’s 1989 Safety and Health Program Management Guidelines as a blueprint for setting up an effective safety and health program.1

Much has changed, however, since those guidelines were published:

• The nature of work is evolving as the economy continues to shift from a manufacturing to a service base, and from a fixed to an often mobile workforce.

Resources and Tools to Support Implementation of These Recommended Practices

OSHA has created a dedicated Web page to support the implementation of these recommended practices at www.osha.gov/shpguidelines. The page includes the following:

• Additional resources. Articles and information sources related to each core element of the recommended practices, plus other topics discussed in the recommended practices.

• Tools. Downloadable templates, worksheets, and reference materials you can use as you develop your own safety and health program.

Please visit the recommended practices Web page and explore the resources available. OSHA will update the Web page and add resources and tools as they become available.

• Automation of work activities means that technology, computers, and robotics are being integrated into our workplaces, often introducing new and different hazards.

• Greater diversity in the workplace means that people from different backgrounds and cultures are working alongside each other, often speaking different languages.

1 54 FR 3904–16, January 26, 1989.

iwww.osha.gov/shpguidelines RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS






FOREWORD

• An aging workforce and the rise of sedentarywork and lifestyle means that someworkers are at higher risk for work-relatedmusculoskeletal disorders.

• There is greater recognition that workersin industries that some think of as safe(such as healthcare, lodging, retail, andtransportation) face significant hazards.

• Increased temporary and contractemployment, and the rise of the “gigeconomy” mean that traditional relationshipsbetween workers and employers are shifting,and changes in safety programs and policieswill be required to ensure the safety of allworkers at worksites characterized by thesenewer and more fluid relationships.

These new recommended practices reflect these changes. They also reflect what we have learned from best-in-class programs and what makes them effective. In particular, these recommended practices place greater emphasis on involving workers, and include a more robust program evaluation element to help drive continuous improvement. The recommended practices also stress the need for communication and coordination on worksites involving more than one employer.

In addition, the new recommended practices build on successful approaches and practices that have evolved under OSHA programs such VPP and SHARP. They also align with national and international consensus standards.2

2 A comparison of these recommended practices, the 1989 guidelines, OSHA voluntary programs, and other consensus standards is available on the Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs website.

ii RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS www.osha.gov/shpguidelines



INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 2

MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP .......................................................................................................................... 9

WORKER PARTICIPATION ................................................................................................................................11

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT........................................................................................15

HAZARD PREVENTION AND CONTROL ....................................................................................................20

EDUCATION AND TRAINING .........................................................................................................................24

PROGRAM EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT ....................................................................................... 27

COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION FOR HOST EMPLOYERS, CONTRACTORS, AND STAFFING AGENCIES .............................................................................................................................30

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................................. 34

GLOSSARY OF TERMS .................................................................................................................................... 34

CONTENTS

1www.osha.gov/shpguidelines RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS


INTRODUCTIONTHESE RECOMMENDED PRACTICES provide responsible employers, workers, and worker representatives3 with a sound, flexible framework for addressing safety and health issues in diverse workplaces. They may be used in any workplace, but will be particularly helpful in small and medium-sized workplaces. They can be applied equally well in traditional, fixed manufacturing workplaces and in the

service sector, healthcare, retail, and even mobile or office-based work environments. They also include information specifically aimed at temporary worker and multiemployer work situations. Separate recommended practices are available for the construction industry.

3 Worker participation is vital to the success of the program. In several places in this document, OSHA refers not just to workers but also to their representatives, such as labor unions or religious or community groups.

Source: Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (2011), Ohio 21(d) SHARP Program Performance Assessment.

INTRODUCTION

The recommended practices emphasize a proactive approach to managing workplace safety and health. Traditional approaches are often reactive—that is, actions are taken only after a worker is injured or becomes sick, a new standard or regulation is published, or an outside inspection finds a problem that must be corrected. Finding and fixing hazards before they cause injury or illness is a far more effective approach. Doing so avoids the direct and indirect costs of worker injuries and illnesses, and promotes a positive work environment.

The concept of continuous improvement is central to the recommended practices. As with any journey, the first step is often the most challenging. The idea is to begin with a basic program and grow from there. By initially focusing on achieving modest goals, monitoring performance, and evaluating outcomes, you can help your workplace progress, over time, along the path to higher levels of safety and health.

THE BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTING THESE RECOMMENDED PRACTICESResponsible employers know that the main goal of a safety and health program is to prevent workplace injuries, illnesses, and deaths, as well as the suffering and financial hardship these events can cause for workers, their families, and their employers.

Employers may find that implementing these recommended practices brings other benefits as well. The renewed or enhanced commitment to safety and health and the cooperative atmosphere between employers and workers have been linked to:

• Improvements in product, process, and service quality.

• Better workplace morale.

• Improved employee recruiting and retention.

• A more favorable image and reputation (among customers, suppliers, and the community).

(per million dollars of payroll)

A study of small employers in Ohio found that workers’ compensation claims fell dramatically after working with OSHA’s SHARP program to adopt programs similar to those described in these recommended practices.

averagenumber of claims cost per c laim claims

52%

+

DECREASED DECREASED

80% 88%DECREASED

average lost time per claim

87%DECREASED



HOW TO USE THE RECOMMENDED PRACTICESEach section of the recommended practices describes a core program element (see page 7), followed by several action items. Each action item is an example of steps that employers and workers can take to establish, implement, maintain, and improve your safety and health program. You can use the self-evaluation tool found on the recommended practices Web page to track your progress and assess how fully you

have implemented (or will implement) each action item.

Seven interrelated elementsThe seven core elements are interrelated and are best viewed as part of an integrated system. Actions taken under one core element can (and likely will) affect actions needed under one or more other elements. For example, workers must be trained in reporting procedures and hazard identification techniques in order to be effective

Source: Leigh, J.P. (2011), Economic Burden of Occupational Injury and Illness in the United States. Milbank Quarterly, 89:728-772.4

4 The 2.7 multiplier for indirect costs includes some social costs, such as workers’ compensation costs not covered by insurance.

INTRODUCTION

IMPLEMENTINGa safety & health program

can help employers avoid the

that resultfrom

due to work stoppages andinvestigations,

training and other costs associated with to material,

machinery and property.

and

such as

TIMELOST REPLACING

INJURED WORKERS

LOSS ORDAMAGE

INDIRECTCOSTS

These have been estimatedto be at least

2.7 times the

INDIRECTCOSTS

DIRECTCOSTS

WORKPLACEINCIDENTS

4 RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS www.osha.gov/shpguidelines



INTRODUCTION

10 EASY THINGS TO GET YOUR PROGRAM STARTEDIf these recommended practices appear challenging, here are some simple steps you can take to get started. Completing these steps will give you a solid base from which to take on some of the more structured actions presented in the recommended practices.

1. SET SAFETY AND HEALTH AS A TOP PRIORITYAlways set safety and health as the top priority. Tell

your workers that making sure they finish the day and

go home safely is the way you do business. Assure

them that you will work with them to find and fix any

hazards that could injure them or make them sick.

2. LEAD BY EXAMPLEPractice safe behaviors yourself and make safety part

of your daily conversations with workers.

3. IMPLEMENT A REPORTING SYSTEMDevelop and communicate a simple procedure for

workers to report any injuries, illnesses, incidents

(including near misses/close calls), hazards, or safety

and health concerns without fear of retaliation.

Include an option for reporting hazards or concerns

anonymously.

4. PROVIDE TRAININGTrain workers on how to identify and control hazards

using, for example, OSHA’s Hazard Identification

Training Tool.

5. CONDUCT INSPECTIONSInspect the workplace with workers and ask them to

identify any activity, piece of equipment, or material

that concerns them. Use checklists, such as those

included in OSHA’s Small Business Handbook, to help

identify problems.

6. COLLECT HAZARD CONTROL IDEASAsk workers for ideas on improvements and follow up

on their suggestions. Provide them time during work

hours, if necessary, to research solutions.

7. IMPLEMENT HAZARD CONTROLSAssign workers the task of choosing, implementing,

and evaluating the solutions they come up with.

8. ADDRESS EMERGENCIESIdentify foreseeable emergency scenarios and develop

instructions on what to do in each case. Meet to

discuss these procedures and post them in a visible

location in the workplace.

9. SEEK INPUT ON WORKPLACE CHANGESBefore making significant changes to the workplace,

work organization, equipment, or materials, consult

with workers to identify potential safety or health

issues.

10. MAKE IMPROVEMENTSSet aside a regular time to discuss safety and health

issues, with the goal of identifying ways to improve

the program.


https://www.osha.gov/hazfinder/


https://www.osha.gov/Publications/smallbusiness/small-business.pdf


participants. Thus, the “Education and Training” core element supports the “Worker Participation” core element. Similarly, setting goals (as described under “Management Leadership”) will be more effective if you routinely evaluate your progress in meeting those goals (see “Program Evaluation and Improvement”). Progress in each core element is important to achieve maximum benefit from the program.

One size does not fit allWhile the action items under each core element are specific, they are not prescriptive. The process described in these recommended practices can, and should, be tailored to the needs of each workplace. Likewise, your safety and health program can and should evolve. Experimentation, evaluation, and program modification are all part of the process. You may also experience setbacks from time to time. What is important is that you learn from setbacks, remain committed to finding out what works best for you, and continue to try different approaches.

Injuries and illnesses occur in all types of workplace settings, from manufacturing sites, to hospitals and healthcare facilities, to offices and service industries.5 Workers can even be injured or become ill outside physical facilities, such as when driving a vehicle as part of a sales or service job. The preventive approaches described in these recommended practices work equally well across all sectors of the economy; for all different kinds of hazards; in both mobile and fixed work environments; and for small, medium-sized, and large organizations. Small employers may find that they can best accomplish the actions outlined in these recommended practices using informal communications and procedures. Larger employers, who have more complex work processes and hazards, may require a more formal and detailed program. They may also wish

to integrate their safety and health program with other programs that they are using to manage production, quality control, and environmental protection or sustainability.

The importance of worker participationThroughout these recommended practices, OSHA emphasizes the importance of worker participation in the safety and health program. For a program to succeed, workers (and, if applicable, their representatives) must participate in developing and implementing every element of the safety and health program. This emphasis on worker participation is consistent with the OSH Act, OSHA standards, and OSHA enforcement policies and procedures, which recognize the rights and roles of workers and their representatives in matters of workplace safety and health. Several action items described in these recommended practices rely on perspectives, expertise, and input that can come only from workers and their representatives.

When more than one employer is involvedHost employers, contractors, staffing agencies, and their workers should pay particular attention to the “Communication and Coordination for Host Employers, Contractors, and Staffing Agencies” section. This section describes actions that host employers and contractors, subcontractors, and temporary staffing agencies (and their workers) should take to ensure protection of everyone on the worksite.

For tools and resources to help you implement these recommended practices, visit: www.osha.gov/shpguidelines

5 Please note: OSHA has developed a separate document of Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs for the Construction Industry.

INTRODUCTION




INTRODUCTION

CORE ELEMENTS OF THE SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP

• Top management demonstrates its commitment to continuous improvement in safety and health, communicates that commitment to workers, and sets program expectations and responsibilities.

• Managers at all levels make safety and health a core organizational value, establish safety and health goals and objectives, provide adequate resources and support for the program, and set a good example.

WORKER PARTICIPATION

• Workers and their representatives are involved in all aspects of the program—including setting goals, identifying and reporting hazards, investigating incidents, and tracking progress.

• All workers, including contractors and temporary workers, understand their roles and responsibilities under the program and what they need to do to effectively carry them out.

• Workers are encouraged and have means to communicate openly with management and to report safety and health concerns without fear of retaliation.

• Any potential barriers or obstacles to worker participation in the program (for example, language, lack of information, or disincentives) are removed or addressed.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION &

ASSESSMENT

• Procedures are put in place to continually identify workplace hazards and evaluate risks.

• Safety and health hazards from routine, nonroutine, and emergency situations are identified and assessed.

• An initial assessment of existing hazards, exposures, and control measures is followed by periodic inspections and reassessments, to identify new hazards.

• Any incidents are investigated with the goal of identifying the root causes.

• Identified hazards are prioritized for control.

HAZARD PREVENTION &

CONTROL

• Employers and workers cooperate to identify and select methods for eliminating, preventing, or controlling workplace hazards.

• Controls are selected according to a hierarchy that uses engineering solutions first, followed by safe work practices, administrative controls, and finally personal protective equipment (PPE).

• A plan is developed to ensure that controls are implemented, interim protection is provided, progress is tracked, and the effectiveness of controls is verified.

EDUCATION & TRAINING

• All workers are trained to understand how the program works and how to carry out the responsibilities assigned to them under the program.

• Employers, managers, and supervisors receive training on safety concepts and their responsibility for protecting workers’ rights and responding to workers’ reports and concerns.

• All workers are trained to recognize workplace hazards and to understand the control measures that have been implemented.

PROGRAM EVALUATION & IMPROVEMENT

• Control measures are periodically evaluated for effectiveness.

• Processes are established to monitor program performance, verify program implementation, and identify program shortcomings and opportunities for improvement.

• Necessary actions are taken to improve the program and overall safety and health performance.

COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION FOR

HOST EMPLOYERS, CONTRACTORS, AND STAFFING AGENCIES

• Host employers, contractors, and staffing agencies commit to providing the same level of safety and health protection to all employees.

• Host employers, contractors, and staffing agencies commmunicate the hazards present at the worksite and the hazards that work of contract workers may create on site.

• Host employers establish specifications and qualifications for contractors and staffing agencies.

• Before beginning work, host employers, contractors, and staffing agencies coordinate on work planning and scheduling to identify and resolve any conflicts that could affect safety or health.



INTRODUCTION

FOR MORE INFORMATIONFor more information about these recommended practices, tools to help you implement them, and related topics, see the recommended practices Web page. This page includes links to many tools and resources developed by OSHA and others that can help employers and workers implement these recommended practices. OSHA will continue to update and add to this resource list.

OSHA’s On-site Consultation Program offers free and confidential occupational safety and health services to small and medium-sized businesses in all states and several territories across the country, with priority given to high-hazard worksites.

On-site Consultation Program services are separate from enforcement and do not result in penalties or citations. Consultants from state agencies or universities work with employers to identify workplace hazards, provide advice on compliance with OSHA standards, and help them establish and improve their safety and health programs.

For free assistance, including help implementing your program, visit: www.osha.gov/dcsp/smallbusiness or call 1-800-321-6742 (OSHA)





MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIPMANAGEMENT PROVIDES the leadership, vision, and resources needed to implement an effective safety and health program. Management leadership means that business owners, managers, and supervisors:

• Make worker safety and health a core organizational value.

• Are fully committed to eliminating hazards, protecting workers, and continuously improving workplace safety and health.

• Provide sufficient resources to implement and maintain the safety and health program.

• Visibly demonstrate and communicate their safety and health commitment to workers and others.

• Set an example through their own actions.

Action item 1: Communicate your commitment to a safety and health programA clear, written policy helps you communicate that safety and health is a primary organizational value—as important as productivity, profitability, product or service quality, and customer satisfaction.

How to accomplish itEstablish a written policy signed by top management describing the organization’s commitment to safety and health, and pledging to establish and maintain a safety and health program for all workers.

• Communicate the policy to all workers and, at appropriate times and places, to relevant parties, including:

— Contractors, subcontractors, staffing agencies, and temporary workers at your worksite(s)

— Suppliers and vendors

— Other businesses in a multi-tenant building

— Visitors

— Customers

• Reinforce management commitment by considering safety and health in all business decisions, including contractor and vendor selection, purchasing, and facility design and modification.

• Be visible in operations and set an example by following the same safety procedures you expect workers to follow. Begin work meetings with a discussion or review of safety and health indicators and any outstanding safety items on a “to do” list.




Action item 2: Define program goals By establishing specific goals and objectives, management sets expectations for managers, supervisors, and workers, and for the program overall. The goals and objectives should focus on specific actions that will improve workplace safety and health.

How to accomplish it• Establish realistic, measurable goals for improving

safety and health. Goals emphasizing injury and illness prevention should be included, rather than focusing on injury and illness rates.

• Develop plans to achieve the goals by assigning tasks and responsibilities to particular people, setting timeframes, and determining resource needs.

Action item 3: Allocate resourcesManagement provides the resources needed to implement the safety and health program, pursue program goals, and address program shortcomings when they are identified.

How to accomplish it• Estimate the resources needed to establish

and implement the program.

• Allow time in workers’ schedules for them to fully participate in the program.

• Integrate safety and health into planning and budgeting processes, and align budgets with program needs.

• Provide and direct resources to operate and maintain the program, meet safety and health commitments, and pursue program goals.

Note: Resource needs will vary depending on your organization’s size, complexity, hazard types, and program maturity and development. Resource needs may include capital equipment and supplies, staff time, training, access to information and tools (e.g., vendor information, Safety Data Sheets, injury/illness data, checklists, online databases) and access to safety and health experts, including OSHA’s free and confidential On-site Consultation Program (see “For More Information” in the introduction to these recommended practices).

Action item 4: Expect performanceManagement leads the program effort by establishing roles and responsibilities and providing an open, positive environment that encourages communication about safety and health.

How to accomplish it• Identify a frontline person or persons

who will lead the safety program effort, make plans, coordinate activities, and track progress. Define and regularly communicate responsibilities and authorities for implementing and maintaining the program, and hold people accountable for performance.

• Provide positive recognition for meeting or exceeding safety and health goals aimed at preventing injury and illness (e.g., reporting close calls/near misses, attending training, conducting inspections).

• Establish ways for management and all workers to communicate freely and often about safety and health issues, without fear of retaliation.

Note: Maintaining a positive and encouraging tone is important. Successful programs reward, rather than discipline, workers who identify problems or concerns, much like successful quality programs. Disciplinary measures should be reserved for situations in which an individual manager or worker is uncooperative or becomes an impediment to progress.



WORKER PARTICIPATIONTO BE EFFECTIVE, any safety and health program needs the meaningful participation of workers and their representatives. Workers have much to gain from a successful program, and the most to lose if the program fails. They also often know the most about potential hazards associated with their jobs. Successful programs tap into this knowledge base.

Worker participation means that workers are involved in establishing, operating, evaluating, and improving the safety and health program. All workers at a worksite should participate, including those employed

by contractors, subcontractors, and temporary staffing agencies (see “Communication and Coordination for Host Employers, Contractors, and Staffing Agencies”).

RETALIATION AGAINST WORKERS IS ILLEGAL

Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for exercising a variety of rights guaranteed under the OSH Act, such as filing a safety and health complaint with OSHA, raising a health and safety concern with their employers, participating in an OSHA inspection, or reporting a work-related injury or illness. OSHA vigorously enforces the anti-retaliation protections provided under 11(c) of the OSH Act and other federal statutes. For more information, see www.whistleblowers.gov.

IN AN EFFECTIVE safety and health program, all workers:

• Are encouraged to participate in the program and feel comfortable providing input and reporting safety or health concerns.

• Have access to information they need to participate effectively in the program.

• Have opportunities to participate in all phases of program design and implementation.

• Do not experience retaliation when they raise safety and health concerns; report injuries, illnesses, and hazards; participate in the program; or exercise safety and health rights.

Note: Where workers are represented by a union, it is important that worker representatives also participate in the program, consistent with the rights provided to worker representatives under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the National Labor Relations Act.


http://www.whistleblowers.gov



Action item 1: Encourage workers to participate in the programBy encouraging workers to participate in the program, management signals that it values their input into safety and health decisions.

How to accomplish it• Give workers the necessary time and

resources to participate in the program.

• Acknowledge and provide positive reinforce-ment to those who participate in the program.

• Maintain an open door policy that invites workers to talk to managers about safety and health and to make suggestions.

Action item 2: Encourage workers to report safety and health concernsWorkers are often best positioned to identify safety and health concerns and program shortcomings, such as emerging workplace hazards, unsafe conditions, close calls/near misses, and actual incidents. By encouraging reporting and following up promptly on all reports, employers can address issues before someone gets hurt or becomes ill.

How to accomplish it• Establish a process for workers to report injuries,

illnesses, close calls/near misses, hazards, and other safety and health concerns, and respond to reports promptly. Include an option for anonymous reporting to reduce fear of reprisal.6

• Report back to workers routinely and frequently about action taken in response to their concerns and suggestions.

• Emphasize that management will use reported information only to improve

workplace safety and health, and that no worker will experience retaliation for bringing such information to management’s attention (see Action item 5).

• Empower all workers to initiate or request a temporary suspension or shutdown of any work activity or operation they believe to be unsafe.

• Involve workers in finding solutions to reported issues.

Action item 3: Give workers access to safety and health informationSharing relevant safety and health information with workers fosters trust and helps organizations make more informed safety and health decisions.

How to accomplish it• Give workers the information they need to

understand safety and health hazards and control measures in the workplace. Some OSHA standards require employers to make specific types of information available to workers, such as:

— Safety Data Sheets (SDSs)

— Injury and illness data (may need to be redacted and aggregated to eliminate personal identifiers)

6 Under OSHA’s injury and illness recordkeeping rule (29 CFR 1904), employers are required to establish a “reasonable” procedure for employees to report work-related injuries and illnesses promptly and accurately. A reasonable procedure is defined as one that would not deter or discourage a reasonable employee from accurately reporting a workplace injury or illness.




— Results of environmental exposure monitoring conducted in the workplace (prevent disclosure of sensitive and personal information as required)

• Other useful information for workers to review can include:

— Workplace job hazard analyses

— Chemical and equipment manufacturer safety recommendations

— Workplace inspection reports

— Incident investigation reports (prevent disclosure of sensitive and personal information as required)

Action item 4: Involve workers in all aspects of the programIncluding worker input at every step of program design and implementation improves your ability to identify the presence and causes of workplace hazards, creates a sense of program ownership among workers, enhances their understanding of how the program works, and helps sustain the program over time.

How to accomplish it• Provide opportunities for workers to

participate in all aspects of the program, including, but not limited to helping:

— Develop the program and set goals.

— Report hazards and develop solutions that improve safety and health.

— Analyze hazards in each step of routine and nonroutine jobs, tasks, and processes.

— Define and document safe work practices.

— Conduct site inspections.

— Develop and revise safety procedures.

— Participate in incident and close call/near miss investigations.

— Train current coworkers and new hires.

— Develop, implement, and evaluate training programs.

— Evaluate program performance and identify ways to improve it.

— Take part in exposure monitoring and medical surveillance associated with health hazards.




Action item 5: Remove barriers to participationTo participate meaningfully in the program, workers must feel that their input is welcome, their voices will be heard, and they can access reporting mechanisms. Participation will be suppressed if language, education, or skill levels in the workplace are not considered, or if workers fear retaliation or discrimination for speaking up (for example, if investigations focus on blaming individuals rather than the underlying conditions that led to the incident, or if reporting an incident or concern could jeopardize the award of incentive-based prizes, rewards, or bonuses).

How to accomplish it• Ensure that workers from all levels of the

organization can participate regardless of their skill level, education, or language.

• Provide frequent and regular feedback to show employees that their safety and health concerns are being heard and addressed.

• Authorize sufficient time and resources to facilitate worker participation; for example, hold safety and health meetings during regular working hours.

• Ensure that the program protects workers from being retaliated against for reporting injuries, illnesses, and hazards; participating in the program; or exercising their safety and health rights. Ensure that other policies and programs do not discourage worker participation.

• Post the 11(c) fact sheet (found at www.whistleblowers.gov) in the workplace or otherwise make it available for easy access by workers.

Note: Incentive programs (such as point systems, awards, and prizes) should be designed in a manner that does not discourage injury and illness reporting; otherwise, hazards may remain undetected. Although sometimes required by law or insurance providers, mandatory drug testing following injuries can also suppress reporting. Effective safety and health programs recognize positive safety and health activities, such as reporting hazardous conditions or suggesting safer work procedures. (See OSHA’s “Employer Safety Incentive and Disincentive Policies and Practices” memorandum, dated March 12, 2012: www.osha.gov/as/opa/whistleblowermemo.html.)




http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/whistleblowermemo.html


HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENTONE OF THE “root causes” of workplace injuries, illnesses, and incidents is the failure to identify or recognize hazards that are present, or that could have been anticipated. A critical element of any effective safety and health program is a proactive, ongoing process to identify and assess such hazards.

TO IDENTIFY AND ASSESS hazards, employers and workers:

• Collect and review information about the hazards present or likely to be present in the workplace.

• Conduct initial and periodic workplace inspections of the workplace to identify new or recurring hazards.

• Investigate injuries, illnesses, incidents, and close calls/near misses to determine the underlying hazards, their causes, and safety and health program shortcomings.

• Group similar incidents and identify trends in injuries, illnesses, and hazards reported.

• Consider hazards associated with emergency or nonroutine situations.

• For each hazard identified, determine the severity and likelihood of incidents that could result, and use this information to prioritize corrective actions.

Some hazards, such as housekeeping and tripping hazards, can and should be fixed as they are found. Fixing hazards on the spot emphasizes the importance of safety and health and takes advantage of a safety leadership opportunity. Fixing other hazards identified using the processes described here will be addressed in the next section, “Hazard Prevention and Control.”

Action item 1: Collect existing information about workplace hazardsInformation on workplace hazards may already be available to employers and workers from both internal and external sources.

How to accomplish it• Collect, organize, and review information with

workers to determine what types of hazards may be present and which workers may be exposed or potentially exposed.

• Information available in the workplace may include:

— Equipment and machinery operating manuals.



— SDSs provided by chemical manufacturers.

— Self-inspection reports and inspection reports from insurance carriers, government agencies, and consultants.

— Records of previous injuries and illnesses, such as OSHA 300 and 301 logs and reports of incident investigations.

— Workers’ compensation records and reports.

— Patterns of frequently occurring injuries and illnesses.

— Exposure monitoring results, industrial hygiene assessments, and medical records (appropriately redacted to ensure patient/worker privacy).

— Existing safety and health programs (lockout/tagout, confined spaces, process safety management, PPE, etc.).

— Input from workers, including surveys or minutes from safety and health committee meetings.

— Results of job hazard analyses (JHAs, also known as job safety analyses or JSAs).

• Information about hazards may be available from outside sources, such as:

— OSHA, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) websites, publications, and alerts.

— Trade associations.

— Labor unions, state and local occupational safety and health committees/coalitions (“COSH groups”), and worker advocacy groups.

— Safety and health consultants.

Action item 2: Inspect the workplace for safety hazardsHazards can be introduced over time as workstations and processes change, equipment or tools become worn, maintenance is neglected, or housekeeping practices decline. Setting aside time to regularly inspect the workplace for hazards can help identify shortcomings so that they can be addressed before an incident occurs.

How to accomplish it• Conduct regular inspections of all operations,

equipment, work areas, and facilities. Have workers participate on the inspection team, and talk to them about hazards that they see or report.

• Be sure to document inspections so you can later verify that hazardous conditions are corrected. Take photos or video of problem areas to facilitate later discussion and brainstorming about how to control them, and for use as learning aids.

• Include all areas and activities in these inspections, such as storage and warehousing, facility and equipment

maintenance, purchasing and office functions, and the activities of on-site contractors, subcontractors, and temporary employees.

• Regularly inspect both plant vehicles (e.g., forklifts, powered industrial trucks) and transportation vehicles (e.g., cars, trucks).

• Use checklists that highlight things to look for. Typical hazards fall into several major categories, such as those listed below; each workplace will have its own list:

— General housekeeping

— Slip, trip, and fall hazards

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT



— Electrical hazards

— Equipment operation

— Equipment maintenance

— Fire protection

— Work organization and process flow (including staffing and scheduling)

— Work practices

— Workplace violence

— Ergonomic problems

— Lack of emergency procedures

• Before changing operations, workstations, or workflow; making major organizational changes; or introducing new equipment, materials, or processes, seek the input of workers and evaluate the planned changes for potential hazards and related risks.

Note: Many hazards can be identified using common knowledge and available tools. For example, you can easily identify and correct hazards associated with broken stair rails and frayed electrical cords. Workers can be a very useful internal resource, especially if they are trained in how to identify and assess risks.

Action item 3: Identify health hazards Identifying workers’ exposure to health hazards is typically more complex than identifying physical safety hazards. For example, gases and vapors may be invisible, often have no odor, and may not have an immediately noticeable harmful health effect. Health hazards include chemical hazards (solvents, adhesives, paints, toxic dusts, etc.), physical hazards (noise, radiation, heat, etc.), biological hazards (infectious diseases), and ergonomic risk factors (heavy lifting, repetitive motions, vibration). Reviewing workers’ medical records (appropriately redacted to ensure patient/worker privacy) can be useful in identifying health hazards associated with workplace exposures.

How to accomplish it• Identify chemical hazards—review SDSs and

product labels to identify chemicals in your workplace that have low exposure limits, are highly volatile, or are used in large quantities or in unventilated spaces. Identify activities that may result in skin exposure to chemicals.

• Identify physical hazards—identify any exposures to excessive noise (areas where you must raise your voice to be heard by others), elevated heat (indoor and outdoor), or sources of radiation (radioactive materials, X-rays, or radiofrequency radiation).




• Identify biological hazards—determine whether workers may be exposed to sources of infectious diseases, molds, toxic or poisonous plants, or animal materials (fur or scat) capable of causing allergic reactions or occupational asthma.

• Identify ergonomic risk factors—examine work activities that require heavy lifting,

work above shoulder height, repetitive motions, or tasks with significant vibration.

• Conduct quantitative exposure assessments, when possible, using air sampling or direct reading instruments.

• Review medical records to identify cases of musculoskeletal injuries, skin irritation or dermatitis, hearing loss, or lung disease that may be related to workplace exposures.

Note: Identifying and assessing health hazards may require specialized knowledge. Small businesses can obtain free and confidential occupational safety and health advice services, including help identifying and assessing workplace hazards, through OSHA’s On-site Consultation Program (see www.osha.gov/dcsp/smallbusiness/consult.html).

Action item 4: Conduct incident investigations Workplace incidents—including injuries, illnesses, close calls/near misses, and reports of other concerns—provide a clear indication of where hazards exist. By thoroughly investigating incidents and reports, you will identify hazards that are likely to cause future harm. The purpose of an investigation must always be to identify the root causes (and there is often more than one) of the incident or concern, in order to prevent future occurrences.

How to accomplish it• Develop a clear plan and procedure for

conducting incident investigations, so that an investigation can begin immediately when an incident occurs. The plan should cover items such as:

— Who will be involved

— Lines of communication

— Materials, equipment, and supplies needed

— Reporting forms and templates

• Train investigative teams on incident investigation techniques, emphasizing

objectivity and open-mindedness throughout the investigation process.

• Conduct investigations with a trained team that includes representatives of both management and workers.

• Investigate close calls/near misses.

• Identify and analyze root causes to address underlying program shortcomings that allowed the incidents to happen.

• Communicate the results of the investigation to managers, supervisors, and workers to prevent recurrence.

Note: OSHA has special reporting requirements for work-related incidents that lead to serious injury or a fatality (29 CFR 1904.39). OSHA must be notified within 8 hours of a work-related fatality, and within 24 hours of an amputation, loss of an eye, or inpatient hospitalization.

Note: Effective incident investigations do not stop at identifying a single factor that triggered an incident. They ask the questions “Why?” and “What led to the failure?” For example, if a piece of equipment fails, a good investigation asks: “Why did it fail?” “Was it maintained properly?” “Was it beyond its service life?” and “How could this failure have been prevented?” Similarly, a good incident investigation does not stop when it concludes that a worker made an error. It asks such questions as: “Was the worker provided with appropriate tools and time to do the work?” “Was the worker adequately trained?” and “Was the worker properly supervised?”



http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/smallbusiness/consult.html


Action item 5: Identify hazards associated with emergency and nonroutine situationsEmergencies present hazards that need to be recognized and understood. Nonroutine or infrequent tasks, including maintenance and startup/shutdown activities, also present potential hazards. Plans and procedures need to be developed for responding appropriately and safely to hazards associated with foreseeable emergency scenarios and nonroutine situations.

How to accomplish it• Identify foreseeable emergency scenarios

and nonroutine tasks, taking into account the types of material and equipment in use and the location within the facility. Scenarios such as the following may be foreseeable:

— Fires and explosions

— Chemical releases

— Hazardous material spills

— Startups after planned or unplanned equipment shutdowns

— Nonroutine tasks, such as infrequently performed maintenance activities

— Structural collapse

— Disease outbreaks

— Weather emergencies and natural disasters

— Medical emergencies


Action item 6: Characterize the nature of identified hazards, identify interim control measures, and prioritize the hazards for control The next step is to assess and understand the hazards identified and the types of incidents that could result from worker exposure to those hazards. This information can be used to develop interim controls and to prioritize hazards for permanent control (see “Hazard Prevention and Control”).

How to accomplish it• Evaluate each hazard by considering the

severity of potential outcomes, the likelihood that an event or exposure will occur, and the number of workers who might be exposed.

• Use interim control measures to protect workers until more permanent solutions can be implemented.

• Prioritize the hazards so that those presenting the greatest risk are addressed first. Note, however, that employers have an ongoing obligation to control all serious recognized hazards and to protect workers.

Note: “Risk” is the product of hazard and exposure. Thus, risk can be reduced by controlling or eliminating the hazard, or by reducing workers’ exposure to hazards. An assessment of risk helps employers understand hazards in the context of their own workplace, and prioritize hazards for permanent control.




HAZARD PREVENTION AND CONTROLEFFECTIVE CONTROLS protect workers from workplace hazards; help avoid injuries, illnesses, and incidents; minimize or eliminate safety and health risks; and help employers provide workers with safe and healthful working conditions. The processes described in this section will help employers prevent and control hazards identified in the previous section.

TO EFFECTIVELY CONTROL and prevent hazards, employers should:

• Involve workers, who often have the best understanding of the conditions that create hazards and insights into how they can be controlled.

• Identify and evaluate options for controlling hazards, using a “hierarchy of controls.”

• Use a hazard control plan to guide the selection and implementation of controls,

and implement controls according to the plan.

• Develop plans with measures to protect workers during emergencies and nonroutine activities.

• Evaluate the effectiveness of existing controls to determine whether they continue to provide protection, or whether different controls may be more effective. Review new technologies for their potential to be more protective, more reliable, or less costly.

Action item 1: Identify control options A wealth of information exists to help employers investigate options for controlling identified hazards. Before selecting any control options, it is essential to solicit workers’ input on their feasibility and effectiveness.

How to accomplish it• Review sources such as OSHA standards and

guidance, industry consensus standards, NIOSH publications, manufacturers’ literature, and engineering reports to identify potential control measures. Keep current on relevant information from trade or professional associations.

• Investigate control measures used in other workplaces and determine whether they would be effective at your workplace.



• Get input from workers who may be able to suggest and evaluate solutions based on their knowledge of the facility, equipment, and work processes.

• For complex hazards, consult with safety and health experts, including OSHA’s On-site Consultation Program.

Action item 2: Select controlsEmployers should select the controls that are the most feasible, effective, and permanent.

How to accomplish it• Eliminate or control all serious hazards

(hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm) immediately.

• Use interim controls while you develop and implement longer-term solutions.

• Select controls according to a hierarchy that emphasizes engineering solutions (including elimination or substitution) first, followed by safe work practices, administrative controls, and finally PPE.

• Avoid selecting controls that may directly or indirectly introduce new hazards. Examples include exhausting contaminated air into occupied work spaces or using hearing

protection that makes it difficult to hear backup alarms.

• Review and discuss control options with workers to ensure that controls are feasible and effective.

• Use a combination of control options when no single method fully protects workers.

Note: Whenever possible, select equipment, machinery, and materials that are inherently safer based on the application of “Prevention through Design” (PtD) principles. Apply PtD when making your own facility, equipment, or product design decisions. For more information, see the link to the NIOSH PtD initiative on the recommended practices Web page.

Action item 3: Develop and update a hazard control planA hazard control plan describes how the selected controls will be implemented. An effective plan will address serious hazards first. Interim controls may be necessary, but the overall goal is to ensure effective long-term control of hazards. It is important to track progress toward completing the control plan, and periodically (at least annually and when conditions, processes, or equipment change) verify that controls remain effective.

How to accomplish it• List the hazards needing controls in order of

priority.• Assign responsibility for installing or

implementing the controls to a specific person or persons with the power or ability to implement the controls.

Hierarchy of ControlsMosteffective

Change the waypeople work

Leasteffective

Physically removethe hazard

Replacethe hazard

Isolate peoplefrom the hazard

Protect the worker withPersonal Protective Equipment

AdministrativeControls

PPE

EngineeringControls

Substitution

Elimination

Source: NIOSH

HAZARD PREVENTION AND CONTROL




• Establish a target completion date.

• Plan how you will track progress toward completion.

• Plan how you will verify the effectiveness of controls after they are installed or implemented.

Action item 4: Select controls to protect workers during nonroutine operations and emergenciesThe hazard control plan should include provisions to protect workers during nonroutine operations and foreseeable emergencies. Depending on the workplace, these could include fires, explosions, chemical releases, hazardous material spills, unplanned equipment shutdowns, infrequent maintenance activities, natural and weather disasters, workplace violence, terrorist or criminal attacks, disease outbreaks (e.g., pandemic influenza), or medical emergencies. Nonroutine tasks, or tasks workers don’t normally do, should be approached with particular caution. Prior to initiating such work, review JSAs/JHAs with any workers involved and notify others about the nature of the work, work schedule, and any necessary precautions.

How to accomplish it• Develop procedures to control hazards that

may arise during nonroutine operations (e.g., removing machine guarding during maintenance and repair).

• Develop or modify plans to control hazards that may arise in emergency situations.

• Procure any equipment needed to control emergency-related hazards.

• Assign responsibilities for implementing the emergency plan.

• Conduct emergency drills to ensure that procedures and equipment provide adequate protection during emergency situations.

Note: Depending on your location, type of business, and materials stored or used on site, authorities including local fire and emergency response departments, state agencies, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and OSHA may have additional requirements for emergency plans. Ensure that your procedures comply with these requirements.

Action item 5: Implement selected controls in the workplaceOnce hazard prevention and control measures have been identified, they should be implemented according to the hazard control plan.

How to accomplish it• Implement hazard control measures

according to the priorities established in the hazard control plan.

• When resources are limited, implement measures on a “worst-first” basis, according to the hazard ranking priorities (risk) established during hazard identification and assessment. (Note, however, that regardless of limited resources, employers

have an obligation to protect workers from recognized, serious hazards.)

• Promptly implement any measures that are easy and inexpensive—such as general housekeeping, removal of obvious tripping hazards such as electrical cords, and basic lighting—regardless of the level of hazard they involve.




Action item 6: Follow up to confirm that controls are effectiveTo ensure that control measures are and remain effective, employers should track progress in implementing controls, inspect and evaluate controls once they are installed, and follow routine preventive maintenance practices.

How to accomplish it• Track progress and verify implementation by

asking the following questions:

— Have all control measures been implemented according to the hazard control plan?

— Have engineering controls been properly installed and tested?

— Have workers been appropriately trained so that they understand the controls, including how to operate engineering controls, safe work practices, and PPE use requirements?

— Are controls being used correctly and consistently?

• Conduct regular inspections (and industrial hygiene monitoring, if indicated) to confirm that engineering controls are operating as designed.

• Evaluate control measures to determine if they are effective or need to be modified. Involve workers in the evaluation of the controls. If controls are not effective, identify, select, and implement further control measures that will provide adequate protection.

• Confirm that work practices, administrative controls, and PPE use policies are being followed.

• Conduct routine preventive maintenance of equipment, facilities, and controls to help prevent incidents due to equipment failure.




EDUCATION AND TRAININGEDUCATION AND TRAINING are important tools for informing workers and managers about workplace hazards and controls so they can work more safely and be more productive. Another role of education and training, however, is to provide workers and managers with a greater understanding of the safety and health program itself, so that they can contribute to its development and implementation.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING provides employers, managers, supervisors, and workers with:

• Knowledge and skills needed to do their work safely and avoid creating hazards that could place themselves or others at risk.

• Awareness and understanding of workplace hazards and how to identify, report, and control them.

• Specialized training, when their work involves unique hazards.

Additional training may be needed depending on the roles assigned in the program. For example,

employers, managers, and supervisors may need specific training to ensure that they can fulfill their roles in providing leadership, direction, and resources for the safety and health program. Workers assigned specific roles in the program (e.g., incident investigation team members) may need training to ensure their full participation in those functions.

Effective training and education can be provided outside a formal classroom setting. Peer-to-peer training, on-the-job training, and worksite demonstrations can be effective in conveying safety concepts, ensuring understanding of hazards and their controls, and promoting good work practices.

Action item 1: Provide program awareness trainingManagers, supervisors, and workers all need to understand the program’s structure, plans, and procedures. Having this knowledge ensures that everyone can fully participate in developing, implementing, and improving the program.

How to accomplish it • Provide training to all managers; supervisors;

workers; and contractor, subcontractor, and temporary agency workers on:

— Safety and health policies, goals, and procedures

— Functions of the safety and health program

— Whom to contact with questions or concerns about the program (including contact information)



— How to report hazards, injuries, illnesses, and close calls/near misses

— What to do in an emergency

— The employer’s responsibilities under the program

— Workers’ rights under the OSH Act

• Provide information on the safety and health hazards of the workplace and the controls for those hazards.

• Ensure that training is provided in the language(s) and at a literacy level that all workers can understand.

• Emphasize that the program can only work when everyone is involved and feels comfortable discussing concerns; making suggestions; and reporting injuries, incidents, and hazards.

• Confirm, as part of the training, that all workers have the right to report injuries, incidents, hazards, and concerns and to fully participate in the program without fear of retaliation.

Action item 2: Train employers, managers, and supervisors on their roles in the program Employers, managers, and supervisors are responsible for workers’ safety, yet sometimes have little training on safety-related concepts and techniques. They might benefit from specific training that allows them to fulfill their leadership roles in the program.

How to accomplish it• Reinforce employers, managers,

and supervisors’ knowledge of their responsibilities under the OSH Act and the workers’ rights guaranteed by the Act.

• Train employers, managers, and supervisors on procedures for responding to workers’ reports of injuries, illnesses, and incidents, including ways to avoid discouraging reporting.

• Instruct employers, managers, and supervisors on fundamental concepts and techniques for recognizing hazards and methods of controlling them, including the hierarchy of controls (see “Hazard Prevention and Control”).

• Instruct employers, managers, and supervisors on incident investigation techniques, including root cause analysis.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING



Action item 3: Train workers on their specific roles in the safety and health programAdditional training may be needed to ensure that workers can incorporate any assigned safety and health responsibilities into their daily routines and activities.

How to accomplish it• Instruct workers on how to report injuries,

illnesses, incidents, and concerns. If a computerized reporting system is used, ensure that all employees have the basic computer skills and computer access sufficient to submit an effective report.

• Instruct workers assigned specific roles within the safety and health program on how they should carry out those responsibilities, including:

— Hazard recognition and controls (see Action item 4)

— Participation in incident investigations

— Program evaluation and improvement

• Provide opportunities for workers to ask questions and provide feedback during and after the training.

• As the program evolves, institute a more formal process for determining the training needs of workers responsible for developing, implementing, and maintaining the program.

Action item 4: Train workers on hazard identification and controlsProviding workers with an understanding of hazard recognition and control, and actively involving them in the process, can help to eliminate hazards before an incident occurs.

How to accomplish it• Train workers on techniques for identifying

hazards, such as job hazard analysis (see OSHA Publication 3071).

• Train workers so they understand and can recognize the hazards they may encounter in their own jobs, as well as more general work-related hazards.

• Instruct workers on concepts and techniques for controlling hazards, including the hierarchy of controls and its importance.

• Train workers on the proper use of work practice and administrative controls.

• Train workers on when and how to wear required PPE.

• Provide additional training, as necessary, when a change in facilities, equipment, processes, materials, or work organization

could increase hazards, and whenever a worker is assigned a new task.




PROGRAM EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENTONCE A SAFETY and health program is established, it should be evaluated initially to verify that it is being implemented as intended. After that, employers should periodically, and at least annually, step back and assess what is working and what is not, and whether the program is on track to achieve its goals. Whenever these assessments identify opportunities to improve the program, employers, managers, and supervisors—in coordination with workers—should make adjustments and monitor how well the program

performs as a result. Sharing the results of monitoring and evaluation within the workplace, and celebrating successes, will help drive further improvement.

PROGRAM EVALUATION and improvement includes:

• Establishing, reporting, and tracking goals and targets that indicate whether the program is making progress.

• Evaluating the program initially, and periodically thereafter, to identify shortcomings and opportunities for improvement.

• Providing ways for workers to participate in program evaluation and improvement.

Action item 1: Monitor performance and progressThe first step in monitoring is to define indicators that will help track performance and progress. Next, employers, managers, supervisors, and workers need to establish and follow procedures to collect, analyze, and review performance data.

Both lagging and leading indicators should be used. Lagging indicators generally track worker exposures and injuries that have already occurred. Leading indicators track how well various aspects of the program have been implemented and reflect steps taken to prevent injuries or illnesses before they occur.

How to accomplish it• Develop and track indicators of progress

toward established safety and health goals.

— Track lagging indicators, such as:

� Number and severity of injuries and illnesses

� Results of worker exposure monitoring that show that exposures are hazardous

� Workers’ compensation data, including claim counts, rates, and cost



— Track leading indicators, such as:

� Level of worker participation in program activities

� Number of employee safety suggestions

� Number of hazards, near misses, and first aid cases reported

� Amount of time taken to respond to reports

� Number and frequency of management walkthroughs

� Number and severity of hazards identified during inspections

� Number of workers who have completed required safety and health training

� Timely completion of corrective actions after a workplace hazard is identified or an incident occurs

� Timely completion of planned preventive maintenance activities

� Worker opinions about program effectiveness obtained from a safety climate or safety opinion survey

• Analyze performance indicators and evaluate progress over time.

• Share results with workers and invite their input on how to further improve performance.

• When opportunities arise, share your experience and compare your results to similar facilities within your organization, with other employers you know, or through business or trade associations.

Note: Indicators can be either quantitative or qualitative. Whenever possible, select indicators that are measurable (quantitative) and that will help you determine whether you have achieved your program goals. The number of reported hazards and near misses would be a quantitative indicator. A single worker expressing a favorable opinion about program participation would be a qualitative indicator.

Action item 2: Verify that the program is implemented and is operatingInitially and at least annually, employers need to evaluate the program to ensure that it is operating as intended, is effective in controlling identified hazards, and is making progress toward established safety and health goals and objectives. The scope and frequency of program evaluations will vary depending on changes in OSHA standards; the scope, complexity, and maturity of the program; and the types of hazards it must control.

How to accomplish it• Verify that the core elements of the program

have been fully implemented.

• Involve workers in all aspects of program evaluation, including reviewing information (such as incident reports and exposure monitoring results); establishing and tracking performance indicators; and identifying opportunities to improve the program.

• Verify that the following key processes are in place and operating as intended:

— Reporting injuries, illnesses, incidents, hazards, and concerns

— Conducting workplace inspections and incident investigations

— Tracking progress in controlling identified hazards and ensuring that hazard control measures remain effective

— Collecting and reporting any data needed to monitor progress and performance

PROGRAM EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT



• Review the results of any compliance audits to confirm that any program shortcomings

are being identified. Verify that actions are being taken that will prevent recurrence.

Action item 3: Correct program shortcomings and identify opportunities to improveWhenever a problem is identified in any part of the safety and health program, employers—in coordination with supervisors, managers, and workers—should take prompt action to correct the problem and prevent its recurrence.

How to accomplish it• If you discover program shortcomings, take

actions needed to correct them.

• Proactively seek input from managers, workers, supervisors, and other stakeholders on how you can improve the program.

• Determine whether changes in equipment, facilities, materials, key personnel, or work

practices trigger any need for changes in the program.

• Determine whether your performance indicators and goals are still relevant and, if not, how you could change them to more effectively drive improvements in workplace safety and health.

Note: The scope and frequency of program evaluations will depend on the scope, complexity, and maturity of the program and on the types of hazards it must control. Program evaluations should be conducted periodically (and at least annually) but might also be triggered by a change in process or equipment, or an incident such as a serious injury, significant property damage, or an increase in safety-related complaints.




COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION FOR HOST EMPLOYERS, CONTRACTORS, AND STAFFING AGENCIES

IN TODAY’S ECONOMY, an increasing number of workers are assigned by staffing agencies to work at specific “host” worksites under the direction and control of the host employer. Examples include seasonal workers, such as delivery drivers and warehouse workers, who help fill a temporary staffing need, as well as office and production workers who may be placed in both short- and long-term assignments. In these situations, it is important for the staffing agency and the host employer to communicate and coordinate to provide and maintain a safe work environment for their workers.

In other situations, some workers are employed by a host employer and others by a contractor or subcontractor. Examples include electrical or mechanical contractors working in a facility, a vendor installing or maintaining equipment, or long-term contractors providing building cleaning and maintenance. OSHA refers to these as “multiemployer” worksites. In these circumstances, it is important that each employer and contractor consider how its work and safety activities can affect the safety of other employers and workers at the site.

IN BOTH TEMPORARY WORKER and multiemployer situations, safety is enhanced if employers establish mechanisms to coordinate their efforts and communicate effectively to afford all workers equal protection against hazards. These mechanisms include measures to ensure that all workers on site (and their representatives) can participate in preventing injuries and illnesses. Failure to take these steps

may undermine safety programs. For example, if the different employers have inconsistent policies for when and where to wear PPE, workers may mistakenly believe that the equipment is not needed, leading to injury. Inconsistent safety policies may also cause workers to question the credibility of safety and health programs, resulting in less meaningful employee engagement and participation.



Effective communication and coordination among such employers means that:

• Before coming on site, contractors and staffing agencies and their workers are aware of:

— The types of hazards that may be present.

— The procedures or measures they need to use to avoid or control their exposure to these hazards.

— How to contact the host employer to report an injury, illness, or incident or if they have a safety concern.

• Host employers and their workers are aware of:

— The types of hazards that may arise from the work being done on site by workers employed by contractors or staffing agencies.

— The procedures or measures needed to avoid or control exposure to these hazards.

— How to contact the contract or staffing firm if they have a safety concern.

— What to do in case of an emergency.

Definitions

Host employer: An employer who has general supervisory authority over the worksite, including controlling the means and manner of work performed and having the power to correct safety and health hazards or require others to correct them.

Contractor: An individual or firm that agrees to furnish materials or perform services at a specified price, and controls the details of how the work will be performed and completed.

Staffing agency: A firm that provides temporary workers to host employers. A staffing agency hires its own employees and assigns them to support or supplement a client’s workforce in situations involving employee absences, temporary skill shortages, seasonal workloads, and special projects.

Temporary workers: Workers hired and paid by a staffing agency and assigned to work for a host employer, whether or not the job is actually temporary.




Action item 1: Establish effective communication Each host employer establishes and implements a procedure to ensure the exchange of information about hazards present on site and the hazard control measures in place. Thus, all workers on the site are aware of worksite hazards, and the methods and procedures needed to control exposures to them.

How to accomplish it• The host employer communicates with

contractors and staffing agencies to determine which among them will implement and maintain the various parts of the safety and health program, to ensure protection of all on-site workers before work begins. These determinations can be included in contract documents that define the relationships between the parties.

• The host employer establishes and implements procedures to exchange information with contractors and staffing agencies about hazards present in the workplace and the measures that have been implemented to prevent or control such hazards.

• The host employer gathers and disseminates information sufficient to enable each employer to assess hazards encountered by its workers and to avoid creating hazards that affect workers on the site.

• Contractors and staffing agencies regularly give the host employer any information about injuries, illnesses, hazards, or concerns reported by their workers and the results of any tracking or trend analysis they perform.

• Each contractor establishes and implements a procedure for providing the host employer with information about the hazards and control measures associated with the work being done by its workers, and the procedures it will use to protect workers on the site.

• The host employer gives contract employers and staffing agencies the right to conduct site visits and inspections and to access injury and illness records and other safety and health information.

• The host employer communicates with contractors and staffing agencies and their workers about nonroutine and emergency hazards and emergency procedures.

• Information is communicated before on-site work starts and, as needed, if conditions change.




Action item 2: Establish effective coordinationHost employers, contractors, and staffing agencies coordinate on work planning, scheduling, and resolving program differences to identify and work out any concerns or conflicts that could impact safety or health.

How to accomplish it• Host employers:

— Include in contracts and bid documents any safety-related specifications and qualifications and ensure that contractors and staffing agencies selected for the work meet those requirements.

— Identify issues that may arise during on-site work and include procedures to be used by the host employer and contractors and/or staffing agencies for resolving any conflicts before work starts.

• Host employers coordinate with contractors and staffing agencies to:

— Ensure that work is planned and scheduled to minimize impacts on safety.

— Ensure that staffing agency workers are adequately trained and equipped before arriving on the worksite.

— Harmonize their safety and health policies and procedures to resolve important differences, so that all workers at the site have the same protection and receive consistent safety information.

• Host employers and staffing agencies:

— Work together to deal with unexpected staffing needs by ensuring that enough trained and equipped workers are

available or that adequate lead time is provided to train and equip workers.

— Make sure that managers with decision-making authority are available and prepared to deal with day-to-day coordination issues.




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PPE personal protective equipment

PtD Prevention through Design

SDS Safety Data Sheet

SHARP Safety and Health Achievement Recognition Program

VPP Voluntary Protection Programs

GLOSSARY OF TERMS close call/near miss: An incident that could have, but did not, result in death, injury,

or illness. They signal that hazards are not being adequately controlled or that new hazards have arisen.

contractor: An individual or firm that agrees to furnish materials or perform services at a specified price.

elimination: A change in process or workplace condition that removes the hazard or ensures that no worker can be exposed to a hazard under any foreseeable circumstances.

hierarchy of controls: A system for selecting and implementing the most effective control solutions for workplace hazards that includes:

• Elimination.

• Substitution.

• Engineering controls.

• Administrative controls.

• Personal protective equipment.

This is known as the “hierarchy of controls” because they should be considered in the order presented. Controls at the top of the hierarchy are potentially more effective and more protective than those lower in the hierarchy.



host employer: An employer who has general supervisory authority over the worksite, including controlling the means and manner of work performed and having the power to correct safety and health hazards or require others to correct them.

industrial hygiene: The science of protecting and enhancing the health and safety of people at work and in their communities.

job hazard analysis: A technique that focuses on job tasks as a way to identify hazards before they occur. It focuses on the relationships among the worker, the task, the tools, and the work environment.

joint-employed worker: A worker hired and paid by a staffing agency and assigned to work for a host employer, whether or not the job is actually temporary.

lagging indicators: Measures of the occurrence and frequency of events in the past such as the number or rate of injuries, illnesses, and fatalities.

leading indicators: Measures intended to predict the occurrence of events in the future. Leading indicators are proactive, preventative, and predictive measures that provide information about the effective performance of safety and health program activities that can drive the control of workplace hazards.

metrics: Measures of performance.

multiemployer worksite: Any worksite where two or more employers are present. See OSHA’s Multiemployer Citation Policy.

nonroutine operations: Operations that do not occur frequently or that occur as a result of an emergency.

peer-to-peer training: A type of on-the-job training where workers exchange information about hazards, controls, reporting procedures, and work procedures that are relevant to the safety and health program.

Prevention through Design: A NIOSH national initiative to prevent or reduce occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities through the inclusion of prevention considerations in all designs that impact workers. PtD encompasses all of the efforts to anticipate and design out hazards to workers in facilities, work methods and operations, processes, equipment, tools, products, new technologies, and the organization of work.

quantitative exposure assessment: Techniques used to quantitatively measure workers’ exposure to hazards, particularly health hazards, such as sampling for chemicals, dusts, biological organisms, noise, radiation, or other assessments. The purpose of such assessments is to quantify the level of workers’ exposure to a hazard. Also known as exposure monitoring.

root cause analysis: A collective term that describes a wide range of approaches, tools, and techniques used to uncover causes of problems.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS


https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=DIRECTIVES&p_id=2024


Safety and Health Achievement An OSHA program that recognizes small business employers Recognition Program: who have used OSHA's On-site Consultation Program services and operate an exemplary injury and illness prevention program.

safety data sheet: Written or printed material used to communicate the hazards of substances and chemical products to employees prepared in accordance with paragraph (g) of OSHA’s Hazard Communication standard.

serious hazards: Hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm. See OSHA’s Field Operations Manual, Chapter 4.

shortcoming: A fault, deficiency, or gap that results in a failure to meet program design criteria.

staffing agency: A firm that provides temporary workers to host employers. A staffing agency hires its own employees and assigns them to support or supplement a client’s workforce in situations involving employee absences, temporary skill shortages, seasonal workloads, and special projects.

substitution: The replacement of toxic or hazardous materials (or the equipment or processes used with them) with ones that are less harmful.

Voluntary Protection Programs: An OSHA initiative that recognizes employers and workers in the private industry and federal agencies who have implemented effective safety and health management systems and maintain injury and illness rates below the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics averages for their respective industries.

work practices: A set of procedures for performing a specific work assignment safely.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS


https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/smallbusiness/consult.html

https://www.osha.gov/dsg/hazcom/standards.html


https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_02-00-159.pdf


Public Comment No. 118-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Definition: Electrically Safe Work Condition.

]



Informational Note: An electrically safe work condition is not a procedure, it is a state wherein allhazardous electrical conductors or circuit parts to which a worker might be exposed are maintainedin a zero-energy state for the purpose of eliminating electrical hazards .


Several dictionaries define "eliminate" as removal, "completely remove or get rid of (something)", or "to remove or take away someone or something". Hazard is defined as "A source of possible injury or damage to health" in NFPA 70E, Article 100. If a hazard is eliminated there should be no source of possible injury or damage to health.Exposed live parts at 50 volts or more are usually considered to be a hazard and protection from exposure is often provided by guarding, using approved enclosures. It can be argued that the hazard is not eliminated, the source still exists in the enclosure, but exposure is controlled or limited. This seems to correspond to the NEC purpose in 90.1, the practical safeguarding of persons and property from hazards arising from the use of electricity. It doesn't say eliminate or remove the hazards.For example, from an non electrical perspective, if a trip hazard is removed such as debris that has accumulated, that source of injury or damage to health has been eliminated. That hazard can only exist again if the situation is recreated or the item is brought back in.The title of 29 CFR 1910.147 is "The Control of Hazardous Energy (lockout/tagout)". If the hazardous energy was eliminated would there be a need to control it? In OSHA Publication 3885, Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs, October 2016 - CORE ELEMENTS OF THE SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMRECOMMENDED PRACTICES - HAZARD PREVENTION & CONTROL• Employers and workers cooperate to identify and select methods for eliminating, preventing, or controlling workplace hazards.• Controls are selected according to a hierarchy that uses engineering solutions first, followed by safe work practices, administrative controls, and finally personal protective equipment (PPE).• A plan is developed to ensure that controls are implemented, interim protection is provided, progress is tracked, and the effectiveness of controls is verified.Elimination: A change in process or workplace condition that removes the hazard or ensures that no worker can be exposed to a hazard under any foreseeable circumstances.In their Hierarchy of Controls Triangle, Source: NIOSH, Elimination --Physically remove the hazardWording commonly used is: "to eliminate OR control hazards", "reducing OR eliminating the hazard", "to prevent employee exposure to the potential hazard", (emphasis provided) etc. PPE is commonly used for various electrical tasks, often with other means of control, even though it is at the bottom of the hierarchy list.Establishing an electrically safe work condition (ESWC) is a very good process used to provide protection from electrical hazards. That process, considered an administrative control by some, is subject to human error during and after establishing an ESWC. Once that state has been achieved exposure to the electrical hazards have been controlled - if it is properly done. Faulty or miswired equipment, interlock operation, malfunctions and other situations can result in reenergization. There is still electrical energy at the other end of the wire. Industrial control panels, that are part of industrial machinery or used for building systems, often have a disconnecting means within the enclosure. Even with it in the open position and locked out, the line side is still energized unless an upstream disconnecting means is used to establish an ESWC. In certain situations, tagout can be used for establishing an electrical safe work condition. Eliminating electrical hazards is the place to start at the design stage but is likely not feasible while servicing or maintaining existing installations or even for many new ones. Having an understanding that reenergization is possible, even if unlikely during servicing or maintenance activities, would seem to enhance overall safety.

Related Item

• FR 9



13 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Submitter Full Name: Paul Dobrowsky

Organization: Innovative Technology Services

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: Replacement of the suggested phrase would not improve clarity for users of the document. Theterm eliminate as used in the informational note to the definition of "electrically safe work condition"is consistent with its use in NFPA 70E.Hazards are not controlled, risk is controlled.


14 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Public Comment No. 33-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Definition: Electrically Safe Work Condition. ]



Informational Note: An electrically safe work condition is not a procedure, it is a state wherein allhazardous electrical conductors or circuit parts to which a worker might be exposed are maintainedin a zero-energy state for the purpose of eliminating electrical hazards.






The Correlating Committee directs that further consideration be given to the comments expressed in voting on FR 9.

This first revision and the comments expressed in voting identify the incompatibility with “safety management system requirements and related concepts” (problems created in the application of the Hierarchy of Risk Control Methods and associated Informational Notes), and the scope of the standard, for which the Correlating Committee has responsibility. As noted in the Committee Scope statement on page 70E-6 in the 2018 edition of NFPA 70E, and in 90.2(A), this standard addresses electrical safety in the workplace. Where equipment does not contain an electrical source, NFPA 70E does not apply. The Correlating Committee has reviewed the work and determined that references to safety management standards significantly impacts the scope and application of NFPA 70E and accordingly the Correlating Committee has a responsibility to address this issue. Establishing an electrically safe work condition in accordance with NFPA 70E to eliminate electrical hazards for the period of time that state is maintained is the very reason NFPA 70E was created. NFPA 70E is not a safety management system and deals only with electrical hazards. The Correlating Committee directs that all references to safety management systems and safety management standards be removed from the body of NFPA 70E and relocated in an Informative Annex.


Related Item





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



15 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Resolution: SR-1-NFPA 70E-2019 Response to PC-117: The term eliminate as used in the informational note tothe definition of "electrically safe work condition" is consistent with its use in NFPA 70E.



16 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Correlating Committee Note No. 6-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Definition: Electrically Safe Work

Condition. ]


Committee:



CommitteeStatement:

The Correlating Committee directs that further consideration be given to the comments expressed invoting on FR 9.

This first revision and the comments expressed in voting identify the incompatibility with “safetymanagement system requirements and related concepts” (problems created in the application of theHierarchy of Risk Control Methods and associated Informational Notes), and the scope of the standard, forwhich the Correlating Committee has responsibility. As noted in the Committee Scope statement on page70E-6 in the 2018 edition of NFPA 70E, and in 90.2(A), this standard addresses electrical safety in theworkplace. Where equipment does not contain an electrical source, NFPA 70E does not apply. TheCorrelating Committee has reviewed the work and determined that references to safety managementstandards significantly impacts the scope and application of NFPA 70E and accordingly the CorrelatingCommittee has a responsibility to address this issue. Establishing an electrically safe work condition inaccordance with NFPA 70E to eliminate electrical hazards for the period of time that state is maintained isthe very reason NFPA 70E was created. NFPA 70E is not a safety management system and deals onlywith electrical hazards. The Correlating Committee directs that all references to safety managementsystems and safety management standards be removed from the body of NFPA 70E and relocated in anInformative Annex.


FR-9-NFPA 70E-2018

Ballot Results


12 Eligible Voters

0 Not Returned

11 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Affirmative All

Brunssen, James E.


Dressman, Kevin L.

Hickman, Palmer L.

Hittinger, David L.


Kovacik, John R.

Manche, Alan


1 of 2 4/9/2019, 2:12 PM

Pierce, James F.


Williams, David A.

Affirmative with Comment

Holub, Richard A.

While I can support moving the Hierarchy of Risk Control methods to the Annex, we must be careful to not "equate"Lockout/Tagout as required by 29 CFR 1910.147 with "Elimination" in the hierarchy of controls. "Elimination" is not onlydefined in ANSI Z10, it is also defined in OSHA as "A change in process or workplace condition that removes thehazard or ensures that no worker can be exposed to a hazard under any foreseeable circumstances." The "under anyforeseeable circumstances" is critical to this understanding. In a recent court filing in the case of OSHA v. Jacobs FieldServices N.A. (https://www.oshrc.gov/assets/1/18/REDACTED_JacobsFieldTrialDecisionFinal_17-14021.pdf?8263),the judge in the case made it clear that establishing an ESWC by locking out a disconnect switch did not protect theworker against inadvertent contact with the line side of the disconnect switch. The judge ruled "Subpart S indicates apreference for de-energizing live parts "to which an employee may be exposed...before the employee works on or nearthem." 29CFR1910.333(a)(1). This is an expansive concept of exposure that contemplates not just the parts that theemployee is directly working on, but also the energized parts to which an employee may be exposed by virtue ofworking near them." OSHA also promulgates the Hierarchy of Controls in their recommended practices for Safety andHealth Programs "Core Elements": (https://www.osha.gov/shpguidelines/hazard-prevention.html) (Action Item #2)


2 of 2 4/9/2019, 2:12 PM

Public Comment No. 42-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Definition: Electrically Safe Work Condition. ]



Informational Note: An electrically safe work condition is not a procedure, it is a state wherein allhazardous electrical conductors or circuit parts to which a worker might be exposed are maintainedin a zero-energy state for the purpose of eliminating controlling electrical hazards.


Calling an electrically safe work condition an "elimination" of the hazard is contrary to ANSI Z10, which specifies that elimination be done "by design". See ANSI Z10 Appendix G, Hierarchy of Controls, 1) Elimination.

Implementing an electrically safe work condition is instead a way to temporarily control hazardous electrical energy. It is by nature dependent on actions by the worker, must be repeated each time work is performed, and therefore is subject to human error. It requires training, vigilant supervision, double-checking, auditing and enforcement. That is why it is an administrative control, and does not qualify as elimination.

Also reference H. Landis Floyd's paper and presentation, ESW2016-23, "A Misunderstanding We Should Eliminate". Elimination means 100%, with no residual risk. If there were no residual risk with an electrically safe work condition, then there would be no need to retest after a job has been left unattended (Article 120.4(B)(6)(4)).



Public Comment No. 18-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. F.3]Similar reference to elimination of thehazard

Public Comment No. 43-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No.110.1]

Similar reference to elimination of thehazard


Public Comment No. 43-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No.110.1]

Related Item

• First Revision No. 16-NFPA 70E-2018




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected


17 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Resolution: Replacement of the suggested phrase would not improve clarity for users of the document. Theterm eliminate as used in the informational note to the definition of "electrically safe work condition"is consistent with its use in NFPA 70E.Hazards are not controlled, risk is controlled.


18 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Public Comment No. 93-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Definition: Working On (energized electrical

conductors or ... ]

Working On (energized electrical conductors or circuit parts).

Intentionally coming in contact with energized electrical conductors or circuit parts with the hands, feet, orother body parts, with tools, probes, or with test equipment, regardless of the personal protective equipment(PPE) a person is wearing. There are two categories of “working on”: Diagnostic (testing) is taking readingsor measurements of electrical equipment, conductors, or circuit parts with approved test equipment thatdoes not require making any physical change to the equipment, circuit parts, or conductors ; repair is anyphysical alteration of electrical equipment, circuit parts, or conductors (such as making or tighteningconnections, removing or replacing components, etc.).


The term "Working On" includes the parenthetical phrase "energized electrical conductors or circuit parts". Yet the second part of the definition does not include this phrase and uses the the term "equipment". The first part of the definition includes the phrase "electrical conductors or circuit parts" and the second part of the definition includes the word "equipment". Adding the phrase "electrical conductors or circuit parts" after the word "equipment" in the description of the two categories makes the two parts of the definition consistent with not only the parenthetical phrase after term "Working on" but also the parenthetical phrase at the end of the definition. Neither parenthetical phrase includes the word "equipment".This addition will help make clear when a person needs to use an Energized Electrical Work Permit, i.e., whenever equipment or electrical conductors, or circuit parts that are energized are physically altered.

Related Item

• 149-NFPA 70E-2018


Submitter Full Name: Alvin Havens

Organization: E Hazard Mgmt Llc

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Mon May 06 16:20:08 EDT 2019

Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: This second revision adds the phrase "conductors or circuit parts" to clarify that either diagnostictasks or repair tasks may include not only the equipment but also its internal conductors or circuitparts. The word “electrical” is added to differentiate the electrical equipment from the testequipment.


19 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Public Comment No. 112-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 110.1 ]

110.1 Priority.

Hazard elimination

Establishing an electrically safe work condition shall be the first priority in the implementation ofsafety-related work practices.

Informational Note No. 1: Elimination is the risk control method listed first in the hierarchy of riskcontrol identified in 110.5(H) (3). See Annex F for examples of hazard elimination.

Informational Note No. 2: An electrically safe work condition is a state wherein all hazardouselectrical conductors or circuit parts to which a worker might be exposed are placed and maintainedin a zero-energy state, eliminating electrical hazards. See Article 120 for requirements to establishan electrically safe work condition. See Informative Annex F for information regarding the hierarchyof risk control and hazard elimination.



REDACTED_JacobsFieldTrialDecisionFinal_17-14021.pdfThis file provided to support justification of my comments

OSHA_SHP_Recommended_Practices.pdfThis file provided to support justification of my comments


It is incorrect to charaterize "Elimination" as a safe work practrice. In the context of the Hierarchy of Controls, Elimination, Substitution and Engineering Controls are design controls, and not safe work practices. The committee should review ands accept my original proposals 207, 208 and 209 in light of the December 2018 ruling of the federal OSHA Review Commission in the case of OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA. In this case, the Review Commission ruled that Jacobs practices were flawed in assuming an Electrical Safe Work Condition eliminated hazardous energy. I am providing the complete ruling for the technical committee to take into consideration. The following is a synopsis of the ruling.

This ruling in the case of OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA brings attention to the problem in how the term “Elimination” is used in the context of an Electrical Safe Work Condition (ESWC). The current language in NFPA 70E does not correlate with the OSHA Review Commission ruling and OSHA definition of Elimination and is misleading concerning the risk that remains after an ESWC is established.

OSHA cited Jacobs after an employee who was injured in an arc flash incident. Jacobs appealed the citation, claiming its procedures were compliant with NFPA 70E requirements for establishing an Electrical Safe Work Condition, eliminating exposure to hazardous energy, and that the injury was due to employee misconduct. The Review Commission ruled that Jacobs procedures were flawed in assuming that an ESWC eliminated exposure to hazardous energy. The ruling contradicts statements in NFPA 70E and related NFPA documents that claim or infer hazard and risk are eliminated when an ESWC is established.

Based on the ruling in OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA, statements in NFPA 70E and associated handbooks, training materials, and certification programs which claim or imply that establishing an ESWC eliminates exposure to hazardous energy are misleading and not aligned with OSHA.

Although defined in safety management standards and literature for more than 50 years, the definition of “Elimination” did not appear in OSHA documents until the October 2016 publication of OSHA Recommendations for Safety and Health Programs. Elimination of a hazard and associated risk is only achievable through design changes that permanently remove the hazard or alters the workplace in such a manner that a worker cannot be exposed to the hazard under any foreseeable circumstances. Elimination of hazardous energy in existing installations is very difficult and usually not achievable. Risk must be reduced to an acceptable level using other controls in the Hierarchy of Controls. Applying Administrative Controls that reduce the likelihood of exposure to as low as reasonably practicable is the focus of NFPA70E. Establishing an ESWC and safe work practices to keep workers inside the safe work zone are temporary Administrative Controls vulnerable to foreseeable employer and


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employee errors. Any statements that claim or infer that an ESWC eliminates hazards and risk is not aligned with the OSHA definition of “Elimination." This misalignment could mislead employers, employees and other stakeholders to underestimate the risk that may remain after establishing an ESWC. Failure to address remaining risk after creating an ESWC was the basis of the OSHA citation against Jacobs.

It does not matter if the safe work practice is called De-energization, Lockout/Tagout, ESWC, Zero Energy State, or some other term, the fact remains that safe work practices to keep workers in a safe work zone are vulnerable to management, supervision and worker error. Elimination of hazards and risk, as defined by OSHA, cannot be achieved by safe work practices. This does not change the fact that an ESWC is essential to reducing risk of exposure to hazardous energy.




Public Comment No. 117-NFPA 70E-2019 [Definition: Electrically Safe Work Condition.]


Related Item

• Proposals 207, 208, 209




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Tue May 07 14:39:01 EDT 2019

Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: Replacement of the suggested phrase would not improve clarity for users of the document. Theterm eliminate as used in the informational note to the definition of "electrically safe work condition"is consistent with its use in NFPA 70E. Hazards are not controlled, risk is controlled. Section 110.1was not deleted to retain language stating that hazard elimination is the first priority in theimplementation of safety-related work practices.


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 17-1402

Appearances:

Megan McGinnis, Esq., U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Kansas City, Missouri

For Complainant

Darren S. Harrington, Esq., Key Harrington Barnes, PC, Dallas, Texas

For Respondent

Before: Administrative Law Judge Brian A. Duncan

DECISION AND ORDER

Procedural History

After learning that an employee was hospitalized due to an arc flash on February 8, 2017,

OSHA dispatched Compliance Safety and Health Officer (“CSHO”) Brian Elmore to an ADM1

worksite in Columbus, Nebraska to conduct an inspection. (Tr. 231–32). After conducting his

investigation, CSHO Elmore concluded that Respondent had a work policy which permitted the

injured employee to remove portions of his personal protective equipment after he had determined

the load side (but not the line side) of an electrical disconnect box was de-energized. CSHO

1. ADM stands for Archer Daniels Midland. (Stip. No. 3).

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Complainant,

v.

JACOBS FIELD SERVICES, NORTH

AMERICA,

Respondent.

Some personal identifiers have been redacted for privacy purposes

2

Elmore found that this policy, as applied under the circumstances of this case, violated the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act).

Based on CSHO Elmore’s recommendations, Complainant issued a Citation and

Notification of Penalty, alleging Respondent committed a single, serious violation of 29 C.F.R. §

1910.335(a)(1)(i), and proposed a total penalty of $11,408. Respondent timely contested the

Citation, which brought the matter before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act.

The Chief Judge initially designated this matter for Simplified Proceedings pursuant to

Commission Rule 203(a); however, upon joint motion of the parties, the Court placed the matter

back in conventional status. (Tr. 9). See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.203(a). A trial was conducted in Omaha,

Nebraska on May 9–10, 2018. Seven witnesses testified at trial: (1) Brent Brabec, Respondent’s

electrical foreman; (2) Gerald Keller, Respondent’s electrical superintendent; (3) [redacted], the

injured employee; (4) Brian Elmore, Compliance Safety and Health Officer (CSHO); (5) Landis

Floyd, Complainant’s designated expert; (6) Michael Taubitz, Respondent’s designated expert;

and (7) Jason King, Respondent’s Director of Health, Safety, and Environment. Both parties

timely submitted post-trial briefs for the Court’s consideration.

Jurisdiction & Stipulations

The parties stipulated the Commission has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to

Section 10(c) of the Act and that, at all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was an

employer engaged in a business and industry affecting interstate commerce within the meaning of

Sections 3(3) and 3(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5). (Tr. 27–28). See Slingluff v. OSHRC, 425

F.3d 861 (10th Cir. 2005). The parties also stipulated to other factual matters, which were read

into the record. (Tr. 27–29).

3

Factual Background

Respondent is a large, national electrical contractor that provides on-site services to ADM,

which is also a large company that, at this particular facility, makes ethanol, fructose, starch, and

other corn byproducts. (Tr. 43). Respondent has multiple crews and foremen working at ADM’s

Columbus, Nebraska facility at any given time. One crew was tasked with connecting a new

subpanel in one of ADM’s fabrication shops to a 480-volt disconnect switch. (Tr. 46). During the

installation, one of the crew members was exposed to an arc flash, resulting in serious injuries to

his hands and face. (Tr. 44–45; Stip. No. 10).

Respondent’s employees at the ADM site were supervised by Gerald Keller, Respondent’s

on-site superintendent. (Stip. No. 8). Keller was responsible for overseeing each of the foreman,

who were, in turn, responsible for supervising their respective crews. (Tr. 42). The foreman who

supervised the injured employee was Brett Brabec, a licensed journeyman electrician with over 19

years of experience. (Tr. 41). Brabec supervised a crew of six employees, including [redacted],

the employee injured by the arc flash. (Tr. 42).

According to Brabec, he was responsible for assigning tasks, explaining those tasks,

reviewing job safety assessments (JSAs), and performing periodic checks of his employees. (Tr.

48–49, 71–73). Brabec testified that, once he assigned a task, he would “walk down”, or describe

in general terms, the steps necessary to accomplish the task. (Tr. 49). It was incumbent upon the

crew members to develop a JSA, which identified hazards and protective measures. (Tr. 72–73;

140–41). Brabec reviewed the JSAs to ensure that hazards were accounted for and appropriate

measures were taken to mitigate those hazards. (Tr. 73–74). Brabec testified he performed these

reviews during his trips around the worksite, which he did approximately 10 times per day. (Tr.

4

140). In addition, Brabec was responsible for performing daily and weekly comprehensive

inspections, which included a checklist for issues of concern. (Tr. 140–145; Ex. R-9, R-10).

On the day of the accident, Brabec directed [redacted] to “run conduit, pull wire and

terminate the load side” of a 480-volt disconnect, which was designed to provide power to a

subpanel in the maintenance pipe shop. (Tr. 48, 53–54). The disconnect was located, along with

other similarly situated disconnects, on a larger installation referred to as the “skid” (Tr. 46, 48;

Ex. C-13). According to Brabec, [redacted]’s task started by terminating, or attaching, the wires

at the subpanel in the pipe shop and moving backwards to the disconnect switch. (Tr. 66). Before

connecting those wires to the disconnect switch, however, [redacted] needed to confirm that the

load side2 of the disconnect was de-energized. Once de-energization was confirmed, [redacted]

was directed to terminate the three phases and neutral wire to their respective lugs on the bottom

half (load side) of the disconnect box. (Tr. 68–70; Ex. C-11). In this case, there were no existing

wires on the load side yet. (Tr. 63). Accordingly, Brabec referred to this as a new installation. (Tr.

48).

From the outside, a disconnect switch is an enclosed metal box with a lever on the outside,

indicating “ON” or “OFF”. (Ex. C-11). By turning the disconnect to the “OFF” position, the switch

removes a set of three blades from their cradles inside the disconnect box. (Tr. 113; Ex. C-11).

This severs the connection between the aforementioned “load” side at the bottom of the disconnect

and the “line” side at the top of the box. (Tr. 113–14, 185; Ex. C-11). As compared to the load

side, the line side is the location where incoming electricity is supplied to the disconnect. (Tr. 55).

Both the line and load side have three phases (A, B, and C) and a ground (or neutral) wire. (Tr.

2. As discussed more fully in the succeeding paragraph, the “load side” of a disconnect is also referred to as “secondary

voltage”. (Tr. 56). In either case, it refers to the bottom half of wires and lugs in the disconnect box that sends power

out to pieces of equipment and subpanels. (Tr. 56).

5

57–59; Ex. C-11). The wires on the load side terminate to the appropriate lug on the load side,

and the wires on the line side terminate to the appropriate lug on the line side; the blades of the

switch engages/severs the connection between the two sides. (Tr. 113–14; Ex. C-11). It should be

noted, however, that flipping the switch to OFF only severs the power running to the load side.

(Tr. 322–23). Unless power is cut off further upstream, there is still electricity running into the

line side top-half of the box. The dividing line between the two sides is marked by an arc shield,

which is a piece of plastic that is designed to guard against the possibility of an arc flash when

disengaging the blades and, to an extent, provide protection against incidental contact with line

side parts. (Tr. 267, 296–97; Ex. C-11). The arc shield cover was not complete; there were gaps

ranging from one-quarter inch to three inches along the sides and towards the rear of the box. (Tr.

154, 318; Ex. C-11).

On the day of the accident, Brabec reviewed and approved the JSA for [redacted]’s task,

which was filled out by his fellow crew member, Clayton Hoadley. (Tr. 49, 72, 140–41).

According to Brabec, the JSA identified all of the expected hazards and addressed those hazards

through various controls and PPE. (Tr. 72–80; Ex. C-23). Per the JSA, [redacted] set out a barrier

10 feet away from the disconnect, which would prevent otherwise unqualified or unaware

employees from wandering into the area, which is referred to as the arc flash boundary. (Tr. 69;

Ex. C-23). Under Brabec’s supervision, [redacted], who was wearing a 40-cal “hot suit”, which

provided head-to-toe electrical protection, switched off the disconnect and proceeded to verify that

the load side was de-energized. (Tr. 68–70, 81, 224). Verifying de-energization required

[redacted] to implement what Respondent referred to as its “test-test-test” procedure, a tripartite

examination that is designed to leave little doubt as to whether a circuit is energized. (Tr. 68–69).

6

Brabec confirmed [redacted] had properly de-energized the load side and proceeded to go about

his rounds. (Tr. 87).

Once [redacted] had de-energized the load side, Respondent considered it to be in an

electrically safe working condition (ESWC). (Tr. 115–16; Ex. C-32 at 22). This was so even

though he would be working within inches of live components on the line side, albeit at least

partially guarded by the arc shield. (Tr. 157; Ex. C-11). Nevertheless, pursuant to Respondent’s

policy, [redacted] was permitted to (and did) remove his shock-rated gloves and face shield. (Tr.

117–19). According to Brabec, those items were cumbersome, and their removal allowed

[redacted] to have more dexterity while working with the wires. (Tr. 117). [redacted] proceeded

to connect the A, B, and C phases to the load side lugs. (Tr. 211).

After connecting the phases and taping off the load-side neutral, [redacted] was informed

by Brabec that he had to bond the load-side neutral to the ground bar on the load side. (Tr. 213).

In [redacted]’s estimation, he did not have a lot of room to bond the load-side neutral on the ground

bar, which was located behind the A, B, and C phases. (Ex. C-11). So, [redacted] determined he

needed to remove the ground bar from the box to allow him enough room to attach the neutral.

(Tr. 213). The problem, however, is that the line-side ground wire ran from the top of the

disconnect, along the inside of the box, and attached to the same ground bar. (Tr. 100; Ex. C-11).

When [redacted] removed the ground bar, the rigid, uninsulated copper ground wire shifted and

contacted the line-side “A” phase, causing the arc flash that injured him. (Tr. 213).

Once Brabec was informed of the incident, he returned to the skid to find [redacted] with

his hands in the snow and his face badly burned. (Tr. 89). [redacted] was taken to the hospital,

where he stayed for several weeks. (Tr. 416; Ex. C-1). He ultimately returned to work, only to

7

leave Respondent’s employ shortly thereafter for reasons unrelated to the current case. (Tr. 47,

417).

Respondent notified Complainant of the employee hospitalization. (Tr. 231). While at the

ADM facility, CSHO Elmore inspected the location of the accident and conducted interviews of

employees and management. Based on what he learned, CSHO Elmore determined Respondent

failed to ensure its employees used appropriate PPE when exposed to energized circuits. (Tr. 236).

CSHO Elmore determined that this was not an isolated incident; rather, he learned of other

employees who were exposed in a manner similar to [redacted]. (Tr. 237). In his estimation,

Respondent’s work practice was a failure in two respects: (1) Respondent placed too much reliance

on the effectiveness of this arc shield as a guard against incidental contact with the line-side,

energized components; and (2) absent complete de-energization of the disconnect box (both line-

side and load-side), Respondent’s employees should not be allowed to remove PPE. (Tr. 238).

Complainant agreed with Elmore’s assessment and issued a Citation and Notification of Penalty

alleging a single violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.335(a)(1)(i), which is discussed below.

Discussion

Citation 1, Item 1

Complainant alleged a serious violation of the Act in Citation 1, Item 1 as follows:

29 CFR 1910.335(a)(1)(i): Employees working in areas where there were potential

electrical hazards were not using electrical protective equipment that was appropriate for

the specific parts of the body to be protected and for the work to be performed:

The employer failed to ensure that that [sic] a [sic] electrician apprentice was protected

from the hazard of arc flash. An employee was terminating a ground wire on the lower half

of a 480v, 200 Amp disconnect. The ground wire came into contact with an energized “A

Phase” at the top of the disconnect. An employee was not wearing the electrical protective

equipment at the time of the arc flash, resulting in burns to the employee’s face and left

hand. This most recently occurred on or about February 8, 2017 at 3000 8th Street,

Columbus, Nebraska 68601.

Citation and Notification of Penalty at 6.

8

The cited standard provides:

Employees working in areas where there are potential electrical hazards shall be

provided with, and shall use, electrical protective equipment that is appropriate for

the specific parts of the body to be protected and for the work to be performed.

29 C.F.R. § 1910.335(a)(1)(i).

The Standard Applies and Was Violated

The question of whether the standard applies is not in dispute. [redacted] was working in

an area where there were potential electrical hazards. The key issue is whether the PPE worn by

[redacted] was appropriate “for the specific parts of the body to be protected” and, as emphasized

by Respondent, “for the work to be performed.” Id. [redacted] may have been properly equipped

when he verified de-energization of the load side, but that changed when, consistent with company

policy and practice, he removed his gloves, face shield, and hood. As discussed below, the Court

finds Respondent’s policies regarding electrical hazard assessment and PPE unnecessarily exposed

[redacted] and similarly situated employees to electrical shock and arc flash hazards.

The cited electrical PPE standard is a performance standard. As such, whether Respondent

complied with its terms is interpreted in light of what is reasonable under the circumstances,

including “the knowledge of reasonable persons familiar with the industry.” See Siemens Energy

& Automation, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 2196 (No. 00-1052, 2005). However, the Court must be

mindful not to blindly rely upon industry custom and practice. According to the First Circuit:

[A]n appropriate test is whether a reasonably prudent man familiar with the

circumstances of the industry would have protected against the hazard. We would

expect, most often, that reference to industry custom and practice will establish the

standard of conduct. There may, however, be instances where industry practice fails

to take reasonable precautions against hazards generally known in the industry; in

such event it may not be unfair to hold the employer to a standard higher than that

of actual practice.

Cape &Vineyard Div. of New Bedford Gas v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1975).

9

As discussed above, [redacted] was fully equipped with PPE, inclusive of arc-rated gloves,

face shield, and suit when he verified the load side of the disconnect was de-energized. (Tr. 79;

Ex. C23). Once that was established, however, [redacted] removed the gloves and face shield.

According to all of Respondent’s witnesses, this was in accord with company policy, which

allowed removal of certain PPE once [redacted] had determined the disconnect was ESWC. (Tr.

87, 118, 121, 187–88, 422; Exs. R-3, C-27). ESWC is a term defined by NFPA 70E, which is an

industry-recognized set of standards governing work on electrical circuits. (Ex. C-32). According

to NFPA 70, ESWC means, “A state in which an electrical conductor or circuit part has been

disconnected from energized parts, locked/tagged in accordance with established standards, tested

to ensure the absence of voltage, and grounded if determined necessary.” (Ex. C-32 at 15). To

achieve this state, an electrician must follow a five-step process, which is also provided in NFPA

70E. (Ex. C-32 at 22). The parties dispute whether this state was achieved such that [redacted]’s

minimal PPE was appropriate for the work to be performed.

The problem for Respondent is that it attempted to apply a policy/practice in a one-size-

fits-all manner without considering any unique circumstances about the equipment being worked

on. According to Brabec, Respondent relied upon ADM’s Electrical Safety Program—which is

consistent with their own policies, and dictates their work on ADM’s worksite—to determine that

a disconnect was ESWC. (Tr. 164–65). The standard Brabec relied upon, identified in Comment

15.4.4.1, states that “480V MCC buckets on-site are considered to be in an electrical safe work

condition with breaker de-energized and no voltage condition is verified.” (Ex. R-3 at 41). Brabec

testified he relied on this policy because MCC3 buckets and disconnects “have the same potential

and same risk” and that he did not see much difference between them. (Tr. 163). The problem,

3. MCC stands for “motor control center”, which is an “assembly of one or more enclosed sections having a common

power bus and principally containing motor control units [or buckets].” (Ex. C-32 at 16).

10

though, as pointed out by Landis Floyd, is that there are fundamental differences between a

disconnect switch and an MCC bucket. (Tr. 299). Specifically, the MCC bucket can be fully

removed from the control center and worked on separately from the source of power. (Tr. 299).

Another significant difference is that line-side connections are not made by an electrician; they are

factory-installed and internal to the bucket. (Tr. 299). Comparatively, in a disconnect, the arc

shield must be removed before the line-side connections can be made by hand. (Tr. 299). Thus,

there are structural and functional differences between the disconnect at issue and MCC buckets

that made reliance upon the aforementioned practice at least somewhat questionable.

Notwithstanding any written policy or practice Brabec may have relied upon, he, and the

others testifying on Respondent’s behalf, testified that it was common in the industry to work on

the load side of a disconnect while leaving the line side energized. (Tr. 118–19, 363). Further,

they also testified the industry considers that set-up to be ESWC insofar as the work is limited to

the de-energized load side of the arc shield. (Tr. 159–60, 179). As such, it is important to

understand the exact orientation of the live, line-side parts vis-à-vis the de-energized, load-side

parts within the disconnect.

As described above, the line side and load side were separated by an arc shield that ran

across the middle of the disconnect box just above the fuses, which are located on the load side.4

(Tr. 45–46; Ex. C-11). As C-11 illustrates, there is a gap between the arc shield and the left-hand

side of the disconnect box. (Ex. C-11). According to Floyd, this side gap was roughly two inches

wide. (Tr. 318). Adjacent to that gap, just behind the shield, is the energized “A” phase that

ultimately contacted the ground wire and caused the arc flash. (Tr. 319). In addition, the arc shield

did not extend all the way to the back of the disconnect box. This was pointed out by Floyd, who

4. Exhibit C-11 shows a comparable disconnect switch on the same skid. As shown in Exhibit C-4, the disconnect

[redacted] was working on was badly marred by the arc flash, rendering it unhelpful as a demonstrative.

11

noted a three-inch gap between the back panel and the top of the arc shield. (Tr. 318; Ex. C-10).

Brabec also noted an unusual gap between the arc shield and termination lug on the line side, which

measured approximately one-quarter of an inch. (Tr. 152–55). Finally, it is important to note that

[redacted]’s work on the load side occurred approximately 8–10 inches away from the energized

line-side parts. (Tr. 156-157).

In support of its assessment that the disconnect was ESWC, and to justify [redacted]’s

removal of PPE, Respondent places significant emphasis on the arc shield as an adequate guard

against electrical shock and arc flash hazards. (Tr. 159–61). As the name suggests, the arc shield

is designed to prevent arc flashes. The materials for this particular model of disconnect also

indicate that the shield secondarily serves as a guard against incidental contact. (Ex. C-36).

According to Floyd, however, the arc shield was not everything that Respondent claims it

to be. First, while it is designed to prevent arc flashes, Floyd testified that an arc shield is

principally an equipment performance measure. (Tr. 298). To illustrate, Floyd discussed the

difference between a 240-volt and 480-volt (at issue here) switch. (Tr. 290). A 240-volt switch

does not arc when the switch is turned off, and the blades separate from their cradles. (Tr. 290).

As such, they are not equipped with arc shields, even though the potential for contact with

energized parts is quite real. (Tr. 296–97). A 480-volt switch, on the other hand, can create an arc

under certain load conditions, such as supplying electricity to a motor. (Tr. 291). Due to this

potential, Floyd testified that a suppression measure, such as an arc shield, is required to prevent

the destruction of equipment and potential injury to employees. (Tr. 291). Further, while Floyd

agreed that the likelihood of accidental contact was reduced by the presence of the arc shield, he

disagreed that the likelihood was so reduced as to justify [redacted]’s removal of gloves and face

shield. (Tr. 325–26, 332–34).

12

In support of his assessment of the arc shield, Floyd discussed his experience investigating

events that were otherwise unexpected, but nonetheless resulted in hazardous contact. Floyd

admitted that, from the front side, incidental contact with the live, line-side components was

unlikely; however, he also noted that the left side and top of the arc shield were “wide open”. (Tr.

292). Based on his experience with work of this type, Floyd discussed the possibility of tools

slipping through the gap and causing a short circuit between an energized phase and ground or that

cut wire strands would fly in unexpected ways after being cut to fit. (Tr. 295, 302–303). At bottom,

Floyd described Respondent’s position towards the arc shield as an “over-estimation of

effectiveness” and an “under-estimation of risk”. (Tr. 300). This was due, in no small part, to the

shield being “open on the sides and top in such a manner that I can actually put my fingers in and

touch energized conductors . . . .” (Tr. 300). In other words, [redacted] was working very close to

“a source of energy that can kill” guarded by an insufficient means to protect against inadvertent

contact. (Tr. 301).

Respondent, through its expert, Taubitz, asserted that the arc shield was sufficient to

prevent inadvertent contact. (Tr. 364). This argument is premised not on any logistical argument

about the difficulties of access, but on the idea that [redacted] exceeded the scope of his duties

when he detached the ground bar from the load side in order to bond the load-side neutral. (Tr.

367–68). Taubitz and Brabec spent a substantial amount of time pointing out that, had [redacted]

not removed the ground bar, the arc flash event would not have occurred and its assessment that

the disconnect was ESWC would remain intact. This argument is not persuasive for several

reasons. First, as will be discussed in more detail in the section on Respondent’s claim of

unpreventable employee misconduct, the Court is not convinced that [redacted] exceeded the scope

of his work. Second, the Court is unclear as to how the scope of [redacted]’s work served as a

13

control against inadvertent contact, given the relatively short distance from the point of his work

to the closest live wire (approx. 8 inches). Third, not all disconnects or MCC buckets are created

alike; some are more insulated against contact than others. (Tr. 298–300). The mere presence of

some type of an arc shield does not “remove the likelihood of approach to a point of danger or

contact by persons or objects.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.399 (definition of guard). While some

guards/arc shields may have this capacity, the evidence illustrates the arc shield on the #3

disconnect that [redacted] was working on did not. And fourth, whether a violation of a standard

occurred does not depend on the specific cause of a particular accident. Boeing Co., 5 BNA OSHC

2014 (No. 12879, 1977).

As noted by Brabec, Floyd, and Taubitz, the orientation of the disconnect’s inner

components was not standard. Brabec testified that the gap between the shield and the “A” phase

lug was unusual. (Tr. 155). Taubitz also noted the gap was “error-provocative”, though he

dismissed such concerns by relying on the previously mentioned “scope of task” argument. (Tr.

377). Similarly, Floyd highlighted the presence of multiple gaps, the size of which created the

potential for inadvertent contact. (Tr. 329–330). This problem was exacerbated by how close to

the live parts [redacted] had to work. Floyd also testified that the ground wire, which ran from

energized line side to de-energized load size, did not need to terminate on the load side. (Tr. 304).

While this set-up was not attributable to Respondent, it was, according to Floyd, “a pre-existing

situation that contributed to the likelihood that this incident could occur.” (Tr. 304). In other

words, there were multiple conditions within the disconnect enclosure that contributed to the

likelihood of inadvertent contact and should have been considered when performing the hazard

and PPE assessment, but were not.

14

Brabec said he did not look inside of the disconnect box prior to [redacted] performing

work inside of it. (Tr. 56). He also testified, however, that none of the above would have changed

his assessment of the task, because the hazards were mitigated if [redacted] had stayed within the

purported “scope” of his work. (Tr. 155–56). Based on this, Floyd believed that [redacted]’s and

Brabec’s faulty assessments were indicative of their being unqualified to perform such tasks,

because they were unable to see the potential for incidental, albeit hazardous, contact. (Tr. 329–

30). [redacted] and Brabec’s actions were a reflection of Respondent’s electrical safety policy,

which appears to adopt a relaxed interpretation of the NFPA 70E standards of industry conduct

and the subpart S standards at issue in this proceeding.

Subpart S indicates a preference for de-energizing live parts “to which an employee may

be exposed . . . before the employee works on or near them.” Id. § 1910.333(a)(1) (emphasis

added). This is an expansive concept of exposure that contemplates not just the parts that the

employee is directly working on, but also the energized parts to which an employee may be

exposed by virtue of working near them. See also Solares Electrical Svcs Inc., 26 BNA OSHC

1779, (No. 16-0605, 2017) (ALJ) (“To establish access under Commission precedent, the

Secretary must show either that Respondent’s employees were actually exposed to the violative

condition or that it is ‘reasonably predictable by operational necessity or otherwise (including

inadvertence), that employees have been, are, or will be in the zone of danger.’” (citing Fabricated

Metal Prods., 18 BNA OSHC 1072, 1074 (No. 93-1853, 1997))). The definition of exposure under

Subpart S, which comports with Commission case law on the topic as a general concern, reiterates

this expansive concept: “(As applied to live parts.) Capable of being inadvertently touched or

approached nearer than a safe distance by a person. It is applied to parts not suitably guarded,

isolated, or insulated.” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.399.

15

According to subpart S, ‘guarded’ means “[c]overed, shielded, fenced, enclosed, or

otherwise protected by means of suitable covers, casings, barriers, rails, screens, mats, or platforms

to remove the likelihood of approach to a point of danger or contact by persons or objects.” Id.5

The definition reiterates the expansive concept of exposure mentioned above—it is not enough to

remove the likelihood of contact, but any suitable guard must remove the likelihood of approach

to a point of danger. Id. Respondent seems to suggest that because it prevents some incidental

contact that the arc shield qualifies as something that “remove[s] the likelihood” of it. While it is

true that guards do not have to be (and often cannot be) capable of completely removing a hazard,

the Court finds the gaps in this particular arc shield allowed employees working on the load side

to come within inches of the point of danger. Floyd testified that some arc shields, can create such

a guard; however, the arc shield in the disconnect box at issue did not, thereby highlighting the

importance of assessing each task and piece of equipment on its own merits. (Tr. 299–300).

The definition of exposure introduces a previously undiscussed element, the so-called “safe

distance”, that is given meaning by NFPA 70E. According to NFPA 70E, there are a couple of

different safe distances, so to speak, that need to be observed during work on electrical circuits:

(1) the arc flash boundary, (2) the limited approach boundary, and (3) the restricted approach

boundary. The arc flash boundary is the outer limit and represents the “distance from which a

prospective arc source within which a person could receive a second degree burn if an electrical

arc flash were to occur.” (Ex. C-32 at 14). The limited access boundary and restricted access

boundary represent progressively closer distances to an exposed energized conductor, within

which the likelihood of electrical shock or arc-over is increased. (Ex. C-32 at 14). According to

Floyd, who contributed significantly to the development of NFPA 70E and associated literature,

5. The definitions of “guarded” and “exposed” are mirrored in NFPA 70E. (Ex. C-32 at 15).

16

the limited approach boundary does not just apply to equipment that an employee is planning to

touch. (Tr. 322). Contrary to Respondent’s argument that the limited access boundary is targeted

towards unqualified individuals (e.g., not electricians), Floyd testified, “[A]ny exposure within the

limited approach boundary needs to be placed in a likely [sic] safe work condition.” (Tr. 322).

According to Table 130.4(D)(a) of NFPA 70E, the limited approach boundary was 3 feet, 6 inches.

(Ex. C-32 at 29).

Perhaps the most persuasive element of the NFPA 70E standard, however, is the discussion

of arc flash hazards and the associated boundary and PPE assessments. (Ex. C-32 at 38–43). The

NFPA definition provides: “An arc flash hazard may exist when energized electrical conductors

or circuit parts are exposed or when they are within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition,

provided a person is interacting with the equipment in such a manner that could cause an electric

arc.” (Ex. C-32) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding Respondent’s arguments about the scope of

[redacted]’s work, the fact that an arc flash occurred in this case is a strong indication that an arc

flash hazard existed as part of [redacted]’s task. Within the same definition, the reader is directed

to Table 130.7(C)(15)(A)(a) for examples of activities that could pose an arc flash hazard,

including “Work on control circuits with exposed energized electrical conductors and circuit parts,

greater than 120V.” (Ex. C-32 at 39). According to the table, arc flash PPE is required any time

an employee works on a circuit with exposed conductors. (Id.). Further, the table also identifies

the boundaries associated with specific equipment and the appropriate arc flash PPE category. (Id.

at 41). Even at the lowest voltage levels listed on the table, [redacted] was working within the arc

flash boundary, which meant he should have been wearing, at a minimum, all the PPE he was

wearing while assessing the disconnect as ESWC. (Ex. C-32 at 43).

17

According to Floyd, there was only one way to properly assess this disconnect as ESWC:

shutting off the power main, which was just a few feet away from disconnect #3. (Tr. 322–23).

This was the only way to prevent [redacted] from approaching, let alone contacting, energized

electrical components. While Respondent argues shutting down the main power switch would have

been unreasonably disruptive, the Court finds Respondent failed to perform an adequate analysis

of the task and associated hazards such that its assessment warranted deference. Subpart S

provides a decisional matrix, of sorts, to allow an employer to determine whether work should be

performed on a live electrical component. As noted above, the default is complete de-energization,

unless the employer “can demonstrate that de-energizing introduces additional or increased

hazards or is infeasible due to equipment design or operational limitations.” 29 C.F.R. §

1910.333(a)(1). To clarify, the standard notes what constitutes “additional or increased hazards”

and “infeasibility”. See id. at n. 1–2. Those include: interruption of life support, deactivation of

alarm systems or ventilation equipment, removal of illumination from an area, and complete

shutdown of a continuous industrial process, such as at a chemical plant. Id. While Taubitz

testified regarding the potential impact of de-energizing the main switch on the skid, there is no

indication that any of the foregoing obstacles to complete de-energization were present, nor is it

clear that Respondent performed the sort of analysis envisioned by Subpart S.

In addition to the foregoing, Respondent argues that the plain language of the standard does

not compel it to ensure its employees wear proper PPE. Instead, Respondent argues, its only

obligation is to provide proper PPE; it is incumbent upon the individual employee to actually use

the PPE that has been provided. This is a strained reading of the standard and is inconsistent with

Commission case law on the topic of performance-based PPE standards. The plain language

provides that employees “shall be provided with, and shall use, electrical protective equipment . .

18

. .” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.335(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). This terminology is no different than that

found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a), which requires that “protective equipment . . . shall be provided,

used, and maintained . . . .” Id. § 1910.132(a). In both cases an employer’s obligation extends

beyond the mere providing of equipment to ensuring that it is, in fact, used. This was made clear

by the Commission in The Budd Company, wherein the panel found “subpart [1910.132](a) means

that where personal equipment is necessary, the employer shall insure that it is used. If he provides

such equipment, he is responsible for insuring that it is ‘provided, used, and maintained in a

sanitary and reliable condition.” 1 BNA OSHC 1548 (Nos. 199 & 215, 1974), aff’d 513 F.2d 201

(“The decision of the Commission in no way diminishes the employer’s obligation to ensure that

safety shoes are in fact worn when required.”). Accord Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc., 2

BNA OSHC 1620 (No. 2375, 1975) (“Respondent failed to comply with 29 CFR § 1910.132(a)

by not requiring that its dock workers and repair shop employees have toe protection.”). Thus,

given the substantial similarities between the mandates of 1910.132(a) and 1910.335(a)(1)(i), the

Court finds Respondent was obligated to both provide and ensure the use of electrical PPE.

Accordingly, Respondent’s suggestion that it is only required to provide electrical PPE under such

circumstances is rejected.

Finally, as the foregoing shows, the Court placed substantial weight on the testimony of

Floyd, Complainant’s expert, over that of Michael Taubitz, Respondent’s expert. This was the

case for many reasons. First, Floyd was an electrical engineer, who has written over 60 peer-

reviewed articles on the topic of electrical safety. (Tr. 279–280; Ex. C-37). His experience was

more specific to the issue at hand than Taubitz, whose experience is primarily in the area of

“control of hazardous energy”, which is more directly related to lock-out/tag-out than to shock and

arc flash hazards. (Tr. 347). Second, Floyd was able to articulate clear distinctions between the

19

various pieces of electrical equipment, like the MCC buckets and disconnect switches, to show

how Respondent’s policy or practice was either misapplied or wrong. He also used personal

experiences from his investigations to explain the various ways in which electricians can contact,

or be exposed to, energized electrical components while using “common practices”. (Tr. 298–300).

Third, and most importantly, Floyd’s evaluations of hazards and attendant risks were consistent

with the purpose of the Act—to prevent the first injury—and were premised on an intimate

knowledge of arc flash incidents and hazards. (Tr. 324–25). Taubitz, on the other hand, focused

on what is “common” practice in the industry, versus what is safe and compliant with the

regulations. Indeed, Taubitz relied almost entirely on the arc shield and the relatively elastic

concept of “scope of work” as a panacea for adequate protection against shock and arc flash

hazards. (Tr. 366–68). While Taubitz is clearly an expert in his field, the Court finds Floyd’s

testimony was far more persuasive based on the detail he provided in his explanations of the

electrical equipment at issue and his descriptions of the various ways in which electricians have

been injured based on their exposure to energized circuits, as [redacted] was here.

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court finds the standard applied and was violated.

[redacted] was Exposed to the Hazard Caused by the Violation

To establish exposure under Commission precedent, the Secretary must show

Respondent’s employees were actually exposed to the violative condition or that it is “reasonably

predictable by operational necessity or otherwise (including inadvertence), that employees have

been, are, or will be in the zone of danger.” Fabricated Metal Prods., 18 BNA OSHC 1072, 1074

(No. 93-1853, 1997). The dispute over whether [redacted] was exposed to the hazard caused by

the violation is a textured one. There is no question that [redacted] was exposed to a hazard—480

volt energized wiring, which resulted in an arc flash, causing serious injuries to his hands and face.

20

Rather, the operative question in this case is whether [redacted] was exposed to a hazard resulting

from the violation alleged by Complainant. See Oberdorfer Industries, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 1321

(“The zone of danger is determined by the hazards presented by the violative condition that

presents the danger to employees which the standard is designed to prevent.”). Notwithstanding

the fact that [redacted]’s hands and tools were within inches of unenclosed, energized circuit

components, Respondent contends [redacted] was not exposed to a hazard because he allegedly

committed misconduct when he removed the ground bar, which was purportedly outside the scope

of his assigned duties. The Court disagrees and finds [redacted] was exposed to a hazard because

he was not wearing PPE appropriate for his work environment.

Although dealt with in more detail below in the section on Respondent’s defense of

unpreventable employee misconduct, the facts illustrate [redacted]’s exposure was not the product

of him exceeding the scope of his assigned task. First and foremost, it was Respondent’s policy

that permitted this type of employee exposure in the first place. Whether a correct interpretation

of the ADM electrical policy or not, all of Respondent’s witnesses testified that [redacted] acted

consistently with Respondent’s own policy when he made the determination that the disconnect

box was ESWC and removed his gloves and hood. Second, the instructions given to [redacted]

were general and, according to Brabec, were not based on the particular set up of the phases and

wires inside this particular disconnect. (Tr. 56). [redacted]’s job was to connect phases and a

neutral wire to the load side of the disconnect, which also housed a ground wire that connected the

energized line side to a grounding bar on the de-energized load side. Because of the task he was

assigned, [redacted] necessarily had to perform his job within inches of the energized line-side

components. See Oberdorfer, 20 BNA OSHC 1321 (lathe operators hands coming within 3 to 8

inches from unguarded hazard constituted exposure). As testified to by Floyd, such activities

21

presented a distinct possibility of inadvertent exposure. That, in and of itself, is sufficient to

establish exposure to the hazard.

Respondent Had Knowledge of the Violation

To prove this element, Complainant must show Respondent knew or, with the exercise of

reasonable diligence, could have known of the violation. Dun-Par Engineered Form Co., 12 BNA

OSHC 1962, 1965 (No. 82-928, 1986). The key is whether Respondent was aware of the

conditions constituting a violation, not whether it understood the conditions violated the Act.

Phoenix Roofing, Inc., 17 BNA OSHC 1076, 1079–80 (No. 90-2148, 1995). Complainant can

prove knowledge of a corporate employer through the knowledge, actual or constructive, of its

supervisory employees. Dover Elevator Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1281, 1286 (No. 91-862, 1993). If a

supervisor is, or should be, aware of the noncomplying conduct of a subordinate, it is reasonable

to charge the employer with that knowledge. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. OSHRC, 623

F.2d 155, 158 (10th Cir. 1980).

Brabec, [redacted]’s foreman, was responsible for assigning the task, providing instruction

to [redacted] on that task, reviewing the JSA, and conducting periodic observations as part of his

daily rounds. He watched [redacted] perform the “test-test-test” procedure to verify de-

energization and was aware the line-side of the disconnect would remain energized as [redacted]

began to work on the load side without the full array of electrical PPE. Further, Brabec was aware

[redacted] would remove certain elements of his PPE once he verified the load side was de-

energized, which was consistent with company policy and what was identified as common practice

in the industry. (Tr. 117). Though the record is not clear whether he saw [redacted] remove his

PPE, Brabec’s testimony illustrates that he was aware [redacted] would remove his PPE. (Tr. 79–

22

88). Indeed, all of Respondent’s employees who testified made clear that it was company policy

to allow removal of electrical PPE items when the load side of a disconnect had been de-energized.

Thus, while the Court concludes Respondent had knowledge of the violative conditions

through the imputed knowledge of Brabec, whether actual or constructive, the Court also finds

Respondent itself was aware of the violative conditions. It was Respondent’s policy allowing

[redacted] to remove PPE, as well as its reliance on “industry practice” to assess the disconnect as

ESWC, that placed him in the zone of danger.6 Irrespective of whether this assessment was

consistent with common industry practice or represented a correct interpretation of company

policy (given that it explicitly referred to MCC buckets), the consensus was that [redacted] did not

violate company rules by removing his PPE. Because [redacted]’s act of removing his PPE after

he verified the load side was in a de-energized state was an accepted practice and part of written

policy, the Court finds Respondent was actually aware of the conditions constituting a violation.

Respondent Failed to Prove the Affirmative Defense of

Unpreventable Employee Misconduct

As noted above, however, Respondent claims it could not have foreseen that [redacted]

would exceed the scope of his duties by removing the ground bar and, thus, his subsequent

exposure to the arc flash was the product of unpreventable employee misconduct. This argument

disregards a fairly basic, and obvious, fact: [redacted] was permitted to remove his PPE

notwithstanding the fact that he was working within inches of 480 volt energized components that

were not adequately protected from inadvertent contact. For that and other reasons discussed

below, Respondent’s defense of unpreventable employee misconduct is rejected.

6. The Court places the term “industry practice” in quotes for a couple of reasons. First, it was not clear whether

Respondent’s industry practice argument referred to treating the entire disconnect box as ESWC, or whether it referred

to the removal of PPE, or both. Second, as pointed out by Floyd, merely because a practice is “common” does not

mean that it is compliant with safety regulations.

23

In order to prevail on a claim of unpreventable employee misconduct, Respondent must

show: (1) it has established work rules designed to prevent the violation; (2) it has adequately

communicated those rules to its employees; (3) it has taken steps to discover violations of the rules;

and (4) it must effectively enforce the rules when violations are detected. Am. Eng’g & Dev. Corp.,

23 BNA OSHC 2093, 2096–97 (No. 10-0359, 2012). In other words, it is incumbent upon

Respondent to “demonstrate that the actions of the employee were a departure from a uniformly

and effectively communicated and enforced workrule [sic].” Archer-Western Contractors Ltd., 15

BNA OSHC 1013 (No. 87-1067, 1991).

Prior to starting work on the disconnect, Brabec instructed [redacted] to “run conduit, pull

wire, and terminate the load side of the disconnect.” (Tr. 48). The JSA reflected these very basic

steps, which did not appear to take into account any of the “unusual” aspects of the disconnect

referenced by Floyd, Taubitz, CSHO Elmore, and even Brabec himself, who determined no shock

or arc flash hazards existed at the point of de-energization. (Tr. 67). These unusual aspects, such

as the aforementioned gaps and the uninsulated copper ground wire that connected the line side to

the load side, however, ended up being significant factors in the subsequent arc flash. (Ex. C-23 at

1). On the face of it, there was nothing implicit or explicit in Brabec’s instructions that leads the

Court to believe [redacted] violated a rule specific to the task assigned to him.

Nevertheless, Respondent contends that Brabec’s instructions were sufficiently specific to

prevent [redacted] from removing the ground bar to install the load-side neutral. The Court

disagrees. According to both [redacted] and Brabec, [redacted] was instructed to terminate the

load-side neutral to the load-side ground bar. There was no mention of the line-side, uninsulated

ground wire, which ran from the energized line side to the de-energized load side. This stands to

reason, because Brabec admitted he had not looked inside the disconnect box. [redacted] was

24

confronted with a problem of how to connect the neutral wire to the ground bar after he had

installed the A, B, and C phases, which served as an impediment to bonding the neutral. (Tr. 213).

As a solution, [redacted] determined he needed to manipulate the ground bar to properly bond the

neutral to one of the ground lugs. The Court fails to see how, when viewed objectively,

[redacted]’s actions exceeded the scope of his original mandate. Neither Brabec’s instructions nor

the JSA mentioned the line-side ground wire attaching to the load-side ground bar. Nor, for that

matter, do those instructions mention the arc shield gaps that were identified by all testifying

parties.

This case is similar to the situation presented in Secretary of Labor v. Capform, 19 BNA

OSHC 1374 (No. 99-0322, 2001). In that case, the employer provided oral instruction to two new

employees on how to remove jacks that were used to support recently poured concrete slabs, also

known as stripping. The two employees received instructions on how to remove the jacks under

normal circumstances, but their trainer apparently did not provide instructions on how to proceed

when immovable obstructions were present. Id. The Commission found Respondent failed to

provide adequate instruction because, if the trainer had inspected the work area ahead of time, he

would have noticed “it might not be possible for the employees to remove all of the posts . . . in

the manner in which he had instructed.” Id. (citing Automatic Sprinkler Corp., 8 BNA OSHC 1384,

1387 (No. 76-5089, 1980) (an employer “must make a reasonable effort to anticipate the particular

hazards to which its employees may be exposed in the course of their scheduled work.”)).

Although [redacted] was not a “new” employee and had performed similar tasks before,

he was still an apprentice electrician. It was incumbent upon his foreman, a journeyman with 19-

plus years of experience, to “make a reasonable effort to anticipate the particular hazards to which

[[redacted]] may be exposed” in the course of his assigned work. Id. Instead, Brabec disregarded,

25

or otherwise lent no credence to, the possibilities for inadvertent contact, including the way

[redacted] was actually injured in this case. Perhaps this was, as Floyd testified, an over-reliance

upon the arc shield as an engineering control, which led to an underestimation of the risk presented

by the unusual aspects about this particular disconnect switch. In either case, the Court finds that

Brabec’s instructions, which were premised on company policy, were insufficient to eliminate the

hazard of arc flash and incidental contact. Accordingly, the Court finds Respondent cannot prevail

on its claim of unpreventable employee misconduct as it relates to the purported “scope” of

[redacted]’s duties. See Archer-Western Contractors Ltd., 15 BNA OSHC 1013 (citing Brown &

Root, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC 1055, 1060 (No. 76-3492, 1980)) (holding employer cannot prevail on

the defense of unpreventable employee misconduct “where the employer’s instructions were

insufficient to eliminate the hazard even if the employee had complied with the instructions.”).

Respondent does not have an explicit work rule governing this situation, other than the one

which permitted [redacted] to remove his PPE and generalized instructions provided by Brabec

regarding the scope of [redacted]’s work. The former arguably placed [redacted] in the zone of

danger by permitting the removal of PPE while inches from energized components, while the latter

insufficiently addressed the hazard. Respondent also attempts to rely on a vague and undefined

“seek help” rule, whereby an employee who has reached the limits of their understanding or skill

is supposed to seek assistance. (Tr. 124–25). Such a “rule”, so called, is nothing more than an

admonition to “stay safe”, which has been repeatedly rejected as insufficient to support a claim of

employee misconduct. See, e.g., Packerland Packing Co. of Texas, Inc., 6 BNA OSHC 1126 (No.

13315, 1977) (holding generalized instructions to “work safely” is not sufficient to establish the

exercise of reasonable diligence to prevent violations (citing Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement

Co., 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975))); Arc Electrical Constr. Co., Inc., 7 BNA OSHC 1676 (No.

26

77-0091, 1979) (holding instructions to “be careful” or to “take every necessary precaution” were

inadequate and evidence a lack of an adequate safety program). Further, such a rule is particularly

unhelpful when it comes to inexperienced employees, or those still in training, because it places

the onus on the employee to account for what they know and do not know. See Otis Elevator v.

Marshall, 581 F.2d 1056 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Leaving the decision to the discretion of the employee

is not sufficient compliance with the regulation.”). At bottom, it is Respondent’s obligation to

make a reasonable effort to anticipate the hazards to which its employees may be exposed, not the

employee himself.

Ultimately, Respondent, through Brabec, applied a one-size-fits-all approach to a situation

that required a greater appreciation for the possibility of [redacted]’s exposure to a substantial, and

potentially fatal, hazard. Without consideration for the idiosyncrasies of the switch at issue,

Respondent relied upon policy and practice to justify [redacted]’s determination that the switch

was safe to work on, and that PPE deemed too cumbersome was allowed by the employer to be

removed. While this policy and practice may have been “common” under certain circumstances,

the Court finds their application to be inappropriate where, as here, the conditions of the disconnect

switch warranted the use of additional safeguards or PPE. [redacted] was not exposed to a

hazardous condition because he exceeded the scope of his duties; rather, it was Respondent’s

policies for determining when a circuit was ESWC and allowing removal of PPE that placed

[redacted] in the zone of danger. That [redacted] was injured while doing what he was told—

bonding the neutral to the ground bar—seems entirely foreseeable considering the general nature

of the instructions provided by Brabec and memorialized in the JSA, neither of which referenced

the uninsulated, copper ground wire running from line side to load side, adjacent to an unprotected,

27

energized phase lug. As such, Respondent’s claim of unpreventable employee misconduct is

rejected.

The Violation Was Serious

A violation is “serious” if there was a substantial probability that death or serious physical

harm could have resulted from the violative condition. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k). Complainant need not

show that there was a substantial probability that an accident would actually occur; he need only

show that if an accident occurred, serious physical harm could result. Phelps Dodge Corp. v.

OSHRC, 725 F.2d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). If the possible injury addressed by a regulation is

death or serious physical harm, a violation of the regulation is serious. Mosser Construction, 23

BNA OSHC 1044 (No. 08-0631, 2010); Dec-Tam Corp., 15 BNA OSHC 2072 (No. 88-0523,

1993).

According to Floyd, an arc flash is an uncontrolled electrical arc that can cause severe

damage to equipment, cause fires, and cause severe injury and death due to thermal burns and blast

pressure. (Tr. 284). The destructive nature and range of an arc flash involving 480 volts was

illustrated by the post-accident condition of the disconnect box, as well as the PPE that [redacted]

had removed and was sitting on the ground at the time of the flash. (Exs. C-2 to C-9). [redacted]

suffered serious injuries as a result of his exposure to the arc flash, including burns to the hands

and face. These injuries caused [redacted] to be hospitalized for weeks and miss work for a couple

of months. The violation was serious.

Penalty

In calculating appropriate penalties for affirmed violations, Section 17(j) of the Act

requires the Commission give due consideration to four criteria: (1) the size of the employer’s

business, (2) the gravity of the violation, (3) the good faith of the employer, and (4) the employer’s

28

prior history of violations. Gravity is the primary consideration and is determined by the number

of employees exposed, the duration of the exposure, the precautions taken against injury, and the

likelihood of an actual injury. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 15 BNA OSHC 2201 (No. 87-2059,

1993). It is well established that the Commission and its judges conduct de novo penalty

determinations and have full discretion to assess penalties based on the facts of each case and the

applicable statutory criteria. Valdak Corp., 17 BNA OSHC 1135 (No. 93-0239, 1995); Allied

Structural Steel, 2 BNA OSHC 1457 (No. 1681, 1975).

Complainant proposed a penalty of $11,408 because it determined there was a high

potential for serious injury or death. In calculating the proposed penalty, Complainant further

factored Respondent’s status as a large, national employer; afforded no good faith reduction do to

the occurrence of an accident; and afforded a ten percent penalty reduction based on Respondent’s

lack of OSHA violation history in the last five years. (Tr. 239-241). The Court sees no reason to

depart from Complainant’s penalty assessment. Respondent’s apprentice-level electrician was

exposed to shock and arc flash hazards based on Respondent’s policy of allowing the removal of

PPE even though there was still potential for contact with 480 volt energized wiring. Based on the

totality of the circumstances discussed above, Complainant’s proposed penalty of $11,408 is

appropriate and will be assessed.

Order

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED

that:

1. Citation 1, Item 1 is AFFIRMED as a serious violation, and a penalty of $11,408 is

ASSESSED.

29

/s/ Brian A. Duncan Date: December 11, 2018 Judge Brian A. Duncan

Denver, Colorado U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

Recommended Practices for

Safety and Health Programs

Worker Participation

Find and Fix Hazards

Management Leadership

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

www.osha.gov/shpguidelines

OSHA 3885 October 2016


DISCLAIMERThese practices for safety and health programs are recommendations only. Employers are not required to have a safety and health program that complies with them and will not be cited for failing to have a safety and health program that complies with this document.

These recommended practices apply to employers, except in the construction industry, for whom there are separate Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs for the Construction Industry.

FOREWORD

FOREWORDEstablishing a safety and health program in your workplace is one of the most effective ways of protecting your most valuable asset: your workers. Losing workers to injury or illness, even for a short time, can cause significant disruption and cost—to you as well as the workers and their families. It can also damage workplace morale, productivity, turnover, and reputation.

Safety and health programs foster a proactive approach to “finding and fixing” workplace hazards before they can cause injury or illness. Rather than reacting to an incident, management and workers collaborate to identify and solve issues before they occur. This collaboration builds trust, enhances communication, and often leads to other business improvements. Employers who have implemented safety and health programs, including many who are in OSHA’s Voluntary Protection Programs (VPP) or the Safety and Health Achievement Recognition Program (SHARP) for small and medium-sized businesses, have also found that managing for safety results in higher-quality product or output and higher profits.

Thousands of responsible employers have used OSHA’s 1989 Safety and Health Program Management Guidelines as a blueprint for setting up an effective safety and health program.1

Much has changed, however, since those guidelines were published:

• The nature of work is evolving as the economy continues to shift from a manufacturing to a service base, and from a fixed to an often mobile workforce.

Resources and Tools to Support Implementation of These Recommended Practices

OSHA has created a dedicated Web page to support the implementation of these recommended practices at www.osha.gov/shpguidelines. The page includes the following:

• Additional resources. Articles and information sources related to each core element of the recommended practices, plus other topics discussed in the recommended practices.

• Tools. Downloadable templates, worksheets, and reference materials you can use as you develop your own safety and health program.

Please visit the recommended practices Web page and explore the resources available. OSHA will update the Web page and add resources and tools as they become available.

• Automation of work activities means that technology, computers, and robotics are being integrated into our workplaces, often introducing new and different hazards.

• Greater diversity in the workplace means that people from different backgrounds and cultures are working alongside each other, often speaking different languages.

1 54 FR 3904–16, January 26, 1989.

iwww.osha.gov/shpguidelines RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS






FOREWORD

• An aging workforce and the rise of sedentarywork and lifestyle means that someworkers are at higher risk for work-relatedmusculoskeletal disorders.

• There is greater recognition that workersin industries that some think of as safe(such as healthcare, lodging, retail, andtransportation) face significant hazards.

• Increased temporary and contractemployment, and the rise of the “gigeconomy” mean that traditional relationshipsbetween workers and employers are shifting,and changes in safety programs and policieswill be required to ensure the safety of allworkers at worksites characterized by thesenewer and more fluid relationships.

These new recommended practices reflect these changes. They also reflect what we have learned from best-in-class programs and what makes them effective. In particular, these recommended practices place greater emphasis on involving workers, and include a more robust program evaluation element to help drive continuous improvement. The recommended practices also stress the need for communication and coordination on worksites involving more than one employer.

In addition, the new recommended practices build on successful approaches and practices that have evolved under OSHA programs such VPP and SHARP. They also align with national and international consensus standards.2

2 A comparison of these recommended practices, the 1989 guidelines, OSHA voluntary programs, and other consensus standards is available on the Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs website.

ii RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS www.osha.gov/shpguidelines



INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 2

MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP .......................................................................................................................... 9

WORKER PARTICIPATION ................................................................................................................................11

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT........................................................................................15

HAZARD PREVENTION AND CONTROL ....................................................................................................20

EDUCATION AND TRAINING .........................................................................................................................24

PROGRAM EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT ....................................................................................... 27

COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION FOR HOST EMPLOYERS, CONTRACTORS, AND STAFFING AGENCIES .............................................................................................................................30

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................................. 34

GLOSSARY OF TERMS .................................................................................................................................... 34

CONTENTS



INTRODUCTIONTHESE RECOMMENDED PRACTICES provide responsible employers, workers, and worker representatives3 with a sound, flexible framework for addressing safety and health issues in diverse workplaces. They may be used in any workplace, but will be particularly helpful in small and medium-sized workplaces. They can be applied equally well in traditional, fixed manufacturing workplaces and in the

service sector, healthcare, retail, and even mobile or office-based work environments. They also include information specifically aimed at temporary worker and multiemployer work situations. Separate recommended practices are available for the construction industry.

3 Worker participation is vital to the success of the program. In several places in this document, OSHA refers not just to workers but also to their representatives, such as labor unions or religious or community groups.

Source: Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (2011), Ohio 21(d) SHARP Program Performance Assessment.

INTRODUCTION

The recommended practices emphasize a proactive approach to managing workplace safety and health. Traditional approaches are often reactive—that is, actions are taken only after a worker is injured or becomes sick, a new standard or regulation is published, or an outside inspection finds a problem that must be corrected. Finding and fixing hazards before they cause injury or illness is a far more effective approach. Doing so avoids the direct and indirect costs of worker injuries and illnesses, and promotes a positive work environment.

The concept of continuous improvement is central to the recommended practices. As with any journey, the first step is often the most challenging. The idea is to begin with a basic program and grow from there. By initially focusing on achieving modest goals, monitoring performance, and evaluating outcomes, you can help your workplace progress, over time, along the path to higher levels of safety and health.

THE BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTING THESE RECOMMENDED PRACTICESResponsible employers know that the main goal of a safety and health program is to prevent workplace injuries, illnesses, and deaths, as well as the suffering and financial hardship these events can cause for workers, their families, and their employers.

Employers may find that implementing these recommended practices brings other benefits as well. The renewed or enhanced commitment to safety and health and the cooperative atmosphere between employers and workers have been linked to:

• Improvements in product, process, and service quality.

• Better workplace morale.

• Improved employee recruiting and retention.

• A more favorable image and reputation (among customers, suppliers, and the community).

(per million dollars of payroll)

A study of small employers in Ohio found that workers’ compensation claims fell dramatically after working with OSHA’s SHARP program to adopt programs similar to those described in these recommended practices.

averagenumber of claims cost per c laim claims

52%

+

DECREASED DECREASED

80% 88%DECREASED

average lost time per claim

87%DECREASED



HOW TO USE THE RECOMMENDED PRACTICESEach section of the recommended practices describes a core program element (see page 7), followed by several action items. Each action item is an example of steps that employers and workers can take to establish, implement, maintain, and improve your safety and health program. You can use the self-evaluation tool found on the recommended practices Web page to track your progress and assess how fully you

have implemented (or will implement) each action item.

Seven interrelated elementsThe seven core elements are interrelated and are best viewed as part of an integrated system. Actions taken under one core element can (and likely will) affect actions needed under one or more other elements. For example, workers must be trained in reporting procedures and hazard identification techniques in order to be effective

Source: Leigh, J.P. (2011), Economic Burden of Occupational Injury and Illness in the United States. Milbank Quarterly, 89:728-772.4

4 The 2.7 multiplier for indirect costs includes some social costs, such as workers’ compensation costs not covered by insurance.

INTRODUCTION

IMPLEMENTINGa safety & health program

can help employers avoid the

that resultfrom

due to work stoppages andinvestigations,

training and other costs associated with to material,

machinery and property.

and

such as

TIMELOST REPLACING

INJURED WORKERS

LOSS ORDAMAGE

INDIRECTCOSTS

These have been estimatedto be at least

2.7 times the

INDIRECTCOSTS

DIRECTCOSTS

WORKPLACEINCIDENTS




INTRODUCTION

10 EASY THINGS TO GET YOUR PROGRAM STARTEDIf these recommended practices appear challenging, here are some simple steps you can take to get started. Completing these steps will give you a solid base from which to take on some of the more structured actions presented in the recommended practices.

1. SET SAFETY AND HEALTH AS A TOP PRIORITYAlways set safety and health as the top priority. Tell

your workers that making sure they finish the day and

go home safely is the way you do business. Assure

them that you will work with them to find and fix any

hazards that could injure them or make them sick.

2. LEAD BY EXAMPLEPractice safe behaviors yourself and make safety part

of your daily conversations with workers.

3. IMPLEMENT A REPORTING SYSTEMDevelop and communicate a simple procedure for

workers to report any injuries, illnesses, incidents

(including near misses/close calls), hazards, or safety

and health concerns without fear of retaliation.

Include an option for reporting hazards or concerns

anonymously.

4. PROVIDE TRAININGTrain workers on how to identify and control hazards

using, for example, OSHA’s Hazard Identification

Training Tool.

5. CONDUCT INSPECTIONSInspect the workplace with workers and ask them to

identify any activity, piece of equipment, or material

that concerns them. Use checklists, such as those

included in OSHA’s Small Business Handbook, to help

identify problems.

6. COLLECT HAZARD CONTROL IDEASAsk workers for ideas on improvements and follow up

on their suggestions. Provide them time during work

hours, if necessary, to research solutions.

7. IMPLEMENT HAZARD CONTROLSAssign workers the task of choosing, implementing,

and evaluating the solutions they come up with.

8. ADDRESS EMERGENCIESIdentify foreseeable emergency scenarios and develop

instructions on what to do in each case. Meet to

discuss these procedures and post them in a visible

location in the workplace.

9. SEEK INPUT ON WORKPLACE CHANGESBefore making significant changes to the workplace,

work organization, equipment, or materials, consult

with workers to identify potential safety or health

issues.

10. MAKE IMPROVEMENTSSet aside a regular time to discuss safety and health

issues, with the goal of identifying ways to improve

the program.




https://www.osha.gov/Publications/smallbusiness/small-business.pdf


participants. Thus, the “Education and Training” core element supports the “Worker Participation” core element. Similarly, setting goals (as described under “Management Leadership”) will be more effective if you routinely evaluate your progress in meeting those goals (see “Program Evaluation and Improvement”). Progress in each core element is important to achieve maximum benefit from the program.

One size does not fit allWhile the action items under each core element are specific, they are not prescriptive. The process described in these recommended practices can, and should, be tailored to the needs of each workplace. Likewise, your safety and health program can and should evolve. Experimentation, evaluation, and program modification are all part of the process. You may also experience setbacks from time to time. What is important is that you learn from setbacks, remain committed to finding out what works best for you, and continue to try different approaches.

Injuries and illnesses occur in all types of workplace settings, from manufacturing sites, to hospitals and healthcare facilities, to offices and service industries.5 Workers can even be injured or become ill outside physical facilities, such as when driving a vehicle as part of a sales or service job. The preventive approaches described in these recommended practices work equally well across all sectors of the economy; for all different kinds of hazards; in both mobile and fixed work environments; and for small, medium-sized, and large organizations. Small employers may find that they can best accomplish the actions outlined in these recommended practices using informal communications and procedures. Larger employers, who have more complex work processes and hazards, may require a more formal and detailed program. They may also wish

to integrate their safety and health program with other programs that they are using to manage production, quality control, and environmental protection or sustainability.

The importance of worker participationThroughout these recommended practices, OSHA emphasizes the importance of worker participation in the safety and health program. For a program to succeed, workers (and, if applicable, their representatives) must participate in developing and implementing every element of the safety and health program. This emphasis on worker participation is consistent with the OSH Act, OSHA standards, and OSHA enforcement policies and procedures, which recognize the rights and roles of workers and their representatives in matters of workplace safety and health. Several action items described in these recommended practices rely on perspectives, expertise, and input that can come only from workers and their representatives.

When more than one employer is involvedHost employers, contractors, staffing agencies, and their workers should pay particular attention to the “Communication and Coordination for Host Employers, Contractors, and Staffing Agencies” section. This section describes actions that host employers and contractors, subcontractors, and temporary staffing agencies (and their workers) should take to ensure protection of everyone on the worksite.

For tools and resources to help you implement these recommended practices, visit: www.osha.gov/shpguidelines

5 Please note: OSHA has developed a separate document of Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs for the Construction Industry.

INTRODUCTION




INTRODUCTION

CORE ELEMENTS OF THE SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM RECOMMENDED PRACTICES


• Top management demonstrates its commitment to continuous improvement in safety and health, communicates that commitment to workers, and sets program expectations and responsibilities.

• Managers at all levels make safety and health a core organizational value, establish safety and health goals and objectives, provide adequate resources and support for the program, and set a good example.


• Workers and their representatives are involved in all aspects of the program—including setting goals, identifying and reporting hazards, investigating incidents, and tracking progress.

• All workers, including contractors and temporary workers, understand their roles and responsibilities under the program and what they need to do to effectively carry them out.

• Workers are encouraged and have means to communicate openly with management and to report safety and health concerns without fear of retaliation.

• Any potential barriers or obstacles to worker participation in the program (for example, language, lack of information, or disincentives) are removed or addressed.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION &

ASSESSMENT

• Procedures are put in place to continually identify workplace hazards and evaluate risks.

• Safety and health hazards from routine, nonroutine, and emergency situations are identified and assessed.

• An initial assessment of existing hazards, exposures, and control measures is followed by periodic inspections and reassessments, to identify new hazards.

• Any incidents are investigated with the goal of identifying the root causes.

• Identified hazards are prioritized for control.

HAZARD PREVENTION &

CONTROL

• Employers and workers cooperate to identify and select methods for eliminating, preventing, or controlling workplace hazards.

• Controls are selected according to a hierarchy that uses engineering solutions first, followed by safe work practices, administrative controls, and finally personal protective equipment (PPE).

• A plan is developed to ensure that controls are implemented, interim protection is provided, progress is tracked, and the effectiveness of controls is verified.

EDUCATION & TRAINING

• All workers are trained to understand how the program works and how to carry out the responsibilities assigned to them under the program.

• Employers, managers, and supervisors receive training on safety concepts and their responsibility for protecting workers’ rights and responding to workers’ reports and concerns.

• All workers are trained to recognize workplace hazards and to understand the control measures that have been implemented.

PROGRAM EVALUATION & IMPROVEMENT

• Control measures are periodically evaluated for effectiveness.

• Processes are established to monitor program performance, verify program implementation, and identify program shortcomings and opportunities for improvement.

• Necessary actions are taken to improve the program and overall safety and health performance.

COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION FOR

HOST EMPLOYERS, CONTRACTORS, AND STAFFING AGENCIES

• Host employers, contractors, and staffing agencies commit to providing the same level of safety and health protection to all employees.

• Host employers, contractors, and staffing agencies commmunicate the hazards present at the worksite and the hazards that work of contract workers may create on site.

• Host employers establish specifications and qualifications for contractors and staffing agencies.

• Before beginning work, host employers, contractors, and staffing agencies coordinate on work planning and scheduling to identify and resolve any conflicts that could affect safety or health.



INTRODUCTION

FOR MORE INFORMATIONFor more information about these recommended practices, tools to help you implement them, and related topics, see the recommended practices Web page. This page includes links to many tools and resources developed by OSHA and others that can help employers and workers implement these recommended practices. OSHA will continue to update and add to this resource list.

OSHA’s On-site Consultation Program offers free and confidential occupational safety and health services to small and medium-sized businesses in all states and several territories across the country, with priority given to high-hazard worksites.

On-site Consultation Program services are separate from enforcement and do not result in penalties or citations. Consultants from state agencies or universities work with employers to identify workplace hazards, provide advice on compliance with OSHA standards, and help them establish and improve their safety and health programs.

For free assistance, including help implementing your program, visit: www.osha.gov/dcsp/smallbusiness or call 1-800-321-6742 (OSHA)





MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIPMANAGEMENT PROVIDES the leadership, vision, and resources needed to implement an effective safety and health program. Management leadership means that business owners, managers, and supervisors:

• Make worker safety and health a core organizational value.

• Are fully committed to eliminating hazards, protecting workers, and continuously improving workplace safety and health.

• Provide sufficient resources to implement and maintain the safety and health program.

• Visibly demonstrate and communicate their safety and health commitment to workers and others.

• Set an example through their own actions.

Action item 1: Communicate your commitment to a safety and health programA clear, written policy helps you communicate that safety and health is a primary organizational value—as important as productivity, profitability, product or service quality, and customer satisfaction.

How to accomplish itEstablish a written policy signed by top management describing the organization’s commitment to safety and health, and pledging to establish and maintain a safety and health program for all workers.

• Communicate the policy to all workers and, at appropriate times and places, to relevant parties, including:

— Contractors, subcontractors, staffing agencies, and temporary workers at your worksite(s)

— Suppliers and vendors

— Other businesses in a multi-tenant building

— Visitors

— Customers

• Reinforce management commitment by considering safety and health in all business decisions, including contractor and vendor selection, purchasing, and facility design and modification.

• Be visible in operations and set an example by following the same safety procedures you expect workers to follow. Begin work meetings with a discussion or review of safety and health indicators and any outstanding safety items on a “to do” list.




Action item 2: Define program goals By establishing specific goals and objectives, management sets expectations for managers, supervisors, and workers, and for the program overall. The goals and objectives should focus on specific actions that will improve workplace safety and health.

How to accomplish it• Establish realistic, measurable goals for improving

safety and health. Goals emphasizing injury and illness prevention should be included, rather than focusing on injury and illness rates.

• Develop plans to achieve the goals by assigning tasks and responsibilities to particular people, setting timeframes, and determining resource needs.

Action item 3: Allocate resourcesManagement provides the resources needed to implement the safety and health program, pursue program goals, and address program shortcomings when they are identified.

How to accomplish it• Estimate the resources needed to establish

and implement the program.

• Allow time in workers’ schedules for them to fully participate in the program.

• Integrate safety and health into planning and budgeting processes, and align budgets with program needs.

• Provide and direct resources to operate and maintain the program, meet safety and health commitments, and pursue program goals.

Note: Resource needs will vary depending on your organization’s size, complexity, hazard types, and program maturity and development. Resource needs may include capital equipment and supplies, staff time, training, access to information and tools (e.g., vendor information, Safety Data Sheets, injury/illness data, checklists, online databases) and access to safety and health experts, including OSHA’s free and confidential On-site Consultation Program (see “For More Information” in the introduction to these recommended practices).

Action item 4: Expect performanceManagement leads the program effort by establishing roles and responsibilities and providing an open, positive environment that encourages communication about safety and health.

How to accomplish it• Identify a frontline person or persons

who will lead the safety program effort, make plans, coordinate activities, and track progress. Define and regularly communicate responsibilities and authorities for implementing and maintaining the program, and hold people accountable for performance.

• Provide positive recognition for meeting or exceeding safety and health goals aimed at preventing injury and illness (e.g., reporting close calls/near misses, attending training, conducting inspections).

• Establish ways for management and all workers to communicate freely and often about safety and health issues, without fear of retaliation.

Note: Maintaining a positive and encouraging tone is important. Successful programs reward, rather than discipline, workers who identify problems or concerns, much like successful quality programs. Disciplinary measures should be reserved for situations in which an individual manager or worker is uncooperative or becomes an impediment to progress.



WORKER PARTICIPATIONTO BE EFFECTIVE, any safety and health program needs the meaningful participation of workers and their representatives. Workers have much to gain from a successful program, and the most to lose if the program fails. They also often know the most about potential hazards associated with their jobs. Successful programs tap into this knowledge base.

Worker participation means that workers are involved in establishing, operating, evaluating, and improving the safety and health program. All workers at a worksite should participate, including those employed

by contractors, subcontractors, and temporary staffing agencies (see “Communication and Coordination for Host Employers, Contractors, and Staffing Agencies”).

RETALIATION AGAINST WORKERS IS ILLEGAL

Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for exercising a variety of rights guaranteed under the OSH Act, such as filing a safety and health complaint with OSHA, raising a health and safety concern with their employers, participating in an OSHA inspection, or reporting a work-related injury or illness. OSHA vigorously enforces the anti-retaliation protections provided under 11(c) of the OSH Act and other federal statutes. For more information, see www.whistleblowers.gov.

IN AN EFFECTIVE safety and health program, all workers:

• Are encouraged to participate in the program and feel comfortable providing input and reporting safety or health concerns.

• Have access to information they need to participate effectively in the program.

• Have opportunities to participate in all phases of program design and implementation.

• Do not experience retaliation when they raise safety and health concerns; report injuries, illnesses, and hazards; participate in the program; or exercise safety and health rights.

Note: Where workers are represented by a union, it is important that worker representatives also participate in the program, consistent with the rights provided to worker representatives under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the National Labor Relations Act.





Action item 1: Encourage workers to participate in the programBy encouraging workers to participate in the program, management signals that it values their input into safety and health decisions.

How to accomplish it• Give workers the necessary time and

resources to participate in the program.

• Acknowledge and provide positive reinforce-ment to those who participate in the program.

• Maintain an open door policy that invites workers to talk to managers about safety and health and to make suggestions.

Action item 2: Encourage workers to report safety and health concernsWorkers are often best positioned to identify safety and health concerns and program shortcomings, such as emerging workplace hazards, unsafe conditions, close calls/near misses, and actual incidents. By encouraging reporting and following up promptly on all reports, employers can address issues before someone gets hurt or becomes ill.

How to accomplish it• Establish a process for workers to report injuries,

illnesses, close calls/near misses, hazards, and other safety and health concerns, and respond to reports promptly. Include an option for anonymous reporting to reduce fear of reprisal.6

• Report back to workers routinely and frequently about action taken in response to their concerns and suggestions.

• Emphasize that management will use reported information only to improve

workplace safety and health, and that no worker will experience retaliation for bringing such information to management’s attention (see Action item 5).

• Empower all workers to initiate or request a temporary suspension or shutdown of any work activity or operation they believe to be unsafe.

• Involve workers in finding solutions to reported issues.

Action item 3: Give workers access to safety and health informationSharing relevant safety and health information with workers fosters trust and helps organizations make more informed safety and health decisions.

How to accomplish it• Give workers the information they need to

understand safety and health hazards and control measures in the workplace. Some OSHA standards require employers to make specific types of information available to workers, such as:

— Safety Data Sheets (SDSs)

— Injury and illness data (may need to be redacted and aggregated to eliminate personal identifiers)

6 Under OSHA’s injury and illness recordkeeping rule (29 CFR 1904), employers are required to establish a “reasonable” procedure for employees to report work-related injuries and illnesses promptly and accurately. A reasonable procedure is defined as one that would not deter or discourage a reasonable employee from accurately reporting a workplace injury or illness.




— Results of environmental exposure monitoring conducted in the workplace (prevent disclosure of sensitive and personal information as required)

• Other useful information for workers to review can include:

— Workplace job hazard analyses

— Chemical and equipment manufacturer safety recommendations

— Workplace inspection reports

— Incident investigation reports (prevent disclosure of sensitive and personal information as required)

Action item 4: Involve workers in all aspects of the programIncluding worker input at every step of program design and implementation improves your ability to identify the presence and causes of workplace hazards, creates a sense of program ownership among workers, enhances their understanding of how the program works, and helps sustain the program over time.

How to accomplish it• Provide opportunities for workers to

participate in all aspects of the program, including, but not limited to helping:

— Develop the program and set goals.

— Report hazards and develop solutions that improve safety and health.

— Analyze hazards in each step of routine and nonroutine jobs, tasks, and processes.

— Define and document safe work practices.

— Conduct site inspections.

— Develop and revise safety procedures.

— Participate in incident and close call/near miss investigations.

— Train current coworkers and new hires.

— Develop, implement, and evaluate training programs.

— Evaluate program performance and identify ways to improve it.

— Take part in exposure monitoring and medical surveillance associated with health hazards.




Action item 5: Remove barriers to participationTo participate meaningfully in the program, workers must feel that their input is welcome, their voices will be heard, and they can access reporting mechanisms. Participation will be suppressed if language, education, or skill levels in the workplace are not considered, or if workers fear retaliation or discrimination for speaking up (for example, if investigations focus on blaming individuals rather than the underlying conditions that led to the incident, or if reporting an incident or concern could jeopardize the award of incentive-based prizes, rewards, or bonuses).

How to accomplish it• Ensure that workers from all levels of the

organization can participate regardless of their skill level, education, or language.

• Provide frequent and regular feedback to show employees that their safety and health concerns are being heard and addressed.

• Authorize sufficient time and resources to facilitate worker participation; for example, hold safety and health meetings during regular working hours.

• Ensure that the program protects workers from being retaliated against for reporting injuries, illnesses, and hazards; participating in the program; or exercising their safety and health rights. Ensure that other policies and programs do not discourage worker participation.

• Post the 11(c) fact sheet (found at www.whistleblowers.gov) in the workplace or otherwise make it available for easy access by workers.

Note: Incentive programs (such as point systems, awards, and prizes) should be designed in a manner that does not discourage injury and illness reporting; otherwise, hazards may remain undetected. Although sometimes required by law or insurance providers, mandatory drug testing following injuries can also suppress reporting. Effective safety and health programs recognize positive safety and health activities, such as reporting hazardous conditions or suggesting safer work procedures. (See OSHA’s “Employer Safety Incentive and Disincentive Policies and Practices” memorandum, dated March 12, 2012: www.osha.gov/as/opa/whistleblowermemo.html.)




http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/whistleblowermemo.html


HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENTONE OF THE “root causes” of workplace injuries, illnesses, and incidents is the failure to identify or recognize hazards that are present, or that could have been anticipated. A critical element of any effective safety and health program is a proactive, ongoing process to identify and assess such hazards.

TO IDENTIFY AND ASSESS hazards, employers and workers:

• Collect and review information about the hazards present or likely to be present in the workplace.

• Conduct initial and periodic workplace inspections of the workplace to identify new or recurring hazards.

• Investigate injuries, illnesses, incidents, and close calls/near misses to determine the underlying hazards, their causes, and safety and health program shortcomings.

• Group similar incidents and identify trends in injuries, illnesses, and hazards reported.

• Consider hazards associated with emergency or nonroutine situations.

• For each hazard identified, determine the severity and likelihood of incidents that could result, and use this information to prioritize corrective actions.

Some hazards, such as housekeeping and tripping hazards, can and should be fixed as they are found. Fixing hazards on the spot emphasizes the importance of safety and health and takes advantage of a safety leadership opportunity. Fixing other hazards identified using the processes described here will be addressed in the next section, “Hazard Prevention and Control.”

Action item 1: Collect existing information about workplace hazardsInformation on workplace hazards may already be available to employers and workers from both internal and external sources.

How to accomplish it• Collect, organize, and review information with

workers to determine what types of hazards may be present and which workers may be exposed or potentially exposed.

• Information available in the workplace may include:

— Equipment and machinery operating manuals.



— SDSs provided by chemical manufacturers.

— Self-inspection reports and inspection reports from insurance carriers, government agencies, and consultants.

— Records of previous injuries and illnesses, such as OSHA 300 and 301 logs and reports of incident investigations.

— Workers’ compensation records and reports.

— Patterns of frequently occurring injuries and illnesses.

— Exposure monitoring results, industrial hygiene assessments, and medical records (appropriately redacted to ensure patient/worker privacy).

— Existing safety and health programs (lockout/tagout, confined spaces, process safety management, PPE, etc.).

— Input from workers, including surveys or minutes from safety and health committee meetings.

— Results of job hazard analyses (JHAs, also known as job safety analyses or JSAs).

• Information about hazards may be available from outside sources, such as:

— OSHA, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) websites, publications, and alerts.

— Trade associations.

— Labor unions, state and local occupational safety and health committees/coalitions (“COSH groups”), and worker advocacy groups.

— Safety and health consultants.

Action item 2: Inspect the workplace for safety hazardsHazards can be introduced over time as workstations and processes change, equipment or tools become worn, maintenance is neglected, or housekeeping practices decline. Setting aside time to regularly inspect the workplace for hazards can help identify shortcomings so that they can be addressed before an incident occurs.

How to accomplish it• Conduct regular inspections of all operations,

equipment, work areas, and facilities. Have workers participate on the inspection team, and talk to them about hazards that they see or report.

• Be sure to document inspections so you can later verify that hazardous conditions are corrected. Take photos or video of problem areas to facilitate later discussion and brainstorming about how to control them, and for use as learning aids.

• Include all areas and activities in these inspections, such as storage and warehousing, facility and equipment

maintenance, purchasing and office functions, and the activities of on-site contractors, subcontractors, and temporary employees.

• Regularly inspect both plant vehicles (e.g., forklifts, powered industrial trucks) and transportation vehicles (e.g., cars, trucks).

• Use checklists that highlight things to look for. Typical hazards fall into several major categories, such as those listed below; each workplace will have its own list:

— General housekeeping

— Slip, trip, and fall hazards




— Electrical hazards

— Equipment operation

— Equipment maintenance

— Fire protection

— Work organization and process flow (including staffing and scheduling)

— Work practices


— Ergonomic problems

— Lack of emergency procedures

• Before changing operations, workstations, or workflow; making major organizational changes; or introducing new equipment, materials, or processes, seek the input of workers and evaluate the planned changes for potential hazards and related risks.

Note: Many hazards can be identified using common knowledge and available tools. For example, you can easily identify and correct hazards associated with broken stair rails and frayed electrical cords. Workers can be a very useful internal resource, especially if they are trained in how to identify and assess risks.

Action item 3: Identify health hazards Identifying workers’ exposure to health hazards is typically more complex than identifying physical safety hazards. For example, gases and vapors may be invisible, often have no odor, and may not have an immediately noticeable harmful health effect. Health hazards include chemical hazards (solvents, adhesives, paints, toxic dusts, etc.), physical hazards (noise, radiation, heat, etc.), biological hazards (infectious diseases), and ergonomic risk factors (heavy lifting, repetitive motions, vibration). Reviewing workers’ medical records (appropriately redacted to ensure patient/worker privacy) can be useful in identifying health hazards associated with workplace exposures.

How to accomplish it• Identify chemical hazards—review SDSs and

product labels to identify chemicals in your workplace that have low exposure limits, are highly volatile, or are used in large quantities or in unventilated spaces. Identify activities that may result in skin exposure to chemicals.

• Identify physical hazards—identify any exposures to excessive noise (areas where you must raise your voice to be heard by others), elevated heat (indoor and outdoor), or sources of radiation (radioactive materials, X-rays, or radiofrequency radiation).




• Identify biological hazards—determine whether workers may be exposed to sources of infectious diseases, molds, toxic or poisonous plants, or animal materials (fur or scat) capable of causing allergic reactions or occupational asthma.

• Identify ergonomic risk factors—examine work activities that require heavy lifting,

work above shoulder height, repetitive motions, or tasks with significant vibration.

• Conduct quantitative exposure assessments, when possible, using air sampling or direct reading instruments.

• Review medical records to identify cases of musculoskeletal injuries, skin irritation or dermatitis, hearing loss, or lung disease that may be related to workplace exposures.

Note: Identifying and assessing health hazards may require specialized knowledge. Small businesses can obtain free and confidential occupational safety and health advice services, including help identifying and assessing workplace hazards, through OSHA’s On-site Consultation Program (see www.osha.gov/dcsp/smallbusiness/consult.html).

Action item 4: Conduct incident investigations Workplace incidents—including injuries, illnesses, close calls/near misses, and reports of other concerns—provide a clear indication of where hazards exist. By thoroughly investigating incidents and reports, you will identify hazards that are likely to cause future harm. The purpose of an investigation must always be to identify the root causes (and there is often more than one) of the incident or concern, in order to prevent future occurrences.

How to accomplish it• Develop a clear plan and procedure for

conducting incident investigations, so that an investigation can begin immediately when an incident occurs. The plan should cover items such as:

— Who will be involved

— Lines of communication

— Materials, equipment, and supplies needed

— Reporting forms and templates

• Train investigative teams on incident investigation techniques, emphasizing

objectivity and open-mindedness throughout the investigation process.

• Conduct investigations with a trained team that includes representatives of both management and workers.

• Investigate close calls/near misses.

• Identify and analyze root causes to address underlying program shortcomings that allowed the incidents to happen.

• Communicate the results of the investigation to managers, supervisors, and workers to prevent recurrence.

Note: OSHA has special reporting requirements for work-related incidents that lead to serious injury or a fatality (29 CFR 1904.39). OSHA must be notified within 8 hours of a work-related fatality, and within 24 hours of an amputation, loss of an eye, or inpatient hospitalization.

Note: Effective incident investigations do not stop at identifying a single factor that triggered an incident. They ask the questions “Why?” and “What led to the failure?” For example, if a piece of equipment fails, a good investigation asks: “Why did it fail?” “Was it maintained properly?” “Was it beyond its service life?” and “How could this failure have been prevented?” Similarly, a good incident investigation does not stop when it concludes that a worker made an error. It asks such questions as: “Was the worker provided with appropriate tools and time to do the work?” “Was the worker adequately trained?” and “Was the worker properly supervised?”



http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/smallbusiness/consult.html


Action item 5: Identify hazards associated with emergency and nonroutine situationsEmergencies present hazards that need to be recognized and understood. Nonroutine or infrequent tasks, including maintenance and startup/shutdown activities, also present potential hazards. Plans and procedures need to be developed for responding appropriately and safely to hazards associated with foreseeable emergency scenarios and nonroutine situations.

How to accomplish it• Identify foreseeable emergency scenarios

and nonroutine tasks, taking into account the types of material and equipment in use and the location within the facility. Scenarios such as the following may be foreseeable:

— Fires and explosions

— Chemical releases

— Hazardous material spills

— Startups after planned or unplanned equipment shutdowns

— Nonroutine tasks, such as infrequently performed maintenance activities

— Structural collapse

— Disease outbreaks

— Weather emergencies and natural disasters

— Medical emergencies


Action item 6: Characterize the nature of identified hazards, identify interim control measures, and prioritize the hazards for control The next step is to assess and understand the hazards identified and the types of incidents that could result from worker exposure to those hazards. This information can be used to develop interim controls and to prioritize hazards for permanent control (see “Hazard Prevention and Control”).

How to accomplish it• Evaluate each hazard by considering the

severity of potential outcomes, the likelihood that an event or exposure will occur, and the number of workers who might be exposed.

• Use interim control measures to protect workers until more permanent solutions can be implemented.

• Prioritize the hazards so that those presenting the greatest risk are addressed first. Note, however, that employers have an ongoing obligation to control all serious recognized hazards and to protect workers.

Note: “Risk” is the product of hazard and exposure. Thus, risk can be reduced by controlling or eliminating the hazard, or by reducing workers’ exposure to hazards. An assessment of risk helps employers understand hazards in the context of their own workplace, and prioritize hazards for permanent control.




HAZARD PREVENTION AND CONTROLEFFECTIVE CONTROLS protect workers from workplace hazards; help avoid injuries, illnesses, and incidents; minimize or eliminate safety and health risks; and help employers provide workers with safe and healthful working conditions. The processes described in this section will help employers prevent and control hazards identified in the previous section.

TO EFFECTIVELY CONTROL and prevent hazards, employers should:

• Involve workers, who often have the best understanding of the conditions that create hazards and insights into how they can be controlled.

• Identify and evaluate options for controlling hazards, using a “hierarchy of controls.”

• Use a hazard control plan to guide the selection and implementation of controls,

and implement controls according to the plan.

• Develop plans with measures to protect workers during emergencies and nonroutine activities.

• Evaluate the effectiveness of existing controls to determine whether they continue to provide protection, or whether different controls may be more effective. Review new technologies for their potential to be more protective, more reliable, or less costly.

Action item 1: Identify control options A wealth of information exists to help employers investigate options for controlling identified hazards. Before selecting any control options, it is essential to solicit workers’ input on their feasibility and effectiveness.

How to accomplish it• Review sources such as OSHA standards and

guidance, industry consensus standards, NIOSH publications, manufacturers’ literature, and engineering reports to identify potential control measures. Keep current on relevant information from trade or professional associations.

• Investigate control measures used in other workplaces and determine whether they would be effective at your workplace.



• Get input from workers who may be able to suggest and evaluate solutions based on their knowledge of the facility, equipment, and work processes.

• For complex hazards, consult with safety and health experts, including OSHA’s On-site Consultation Program.

Action item 2: Select controlsEmployers should select the controls that are the most feasible, effective, and permanent.

How to accomplish it• Eliminate or control all serious hazards

(hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm) immediately.

• Use interim controls while you develop and implement longer-term solutions.

• Select controls according to a hierarchy that emphasizes engineering solutions (including elimination or substitution) first, followed by safe work practices, administrative controls, and finally PPE.

• Avoid selecting controls that may directly or indirectly introduce new hazards. Examples include exhausting contaminated air into occupied work spaces or using hearing

protection that makes it difficult to hear backup alarms.

• Review and discuss control options with workers to ensure that controls are feasible and effective.

• Use a combination of control options when no single method fully protects workers.

Note: Whenever possible, select equipment, machinery, and materials that are inherently safer based on the application of “Prevention through Design” (PtD) principles. Apply PtD when making your own facility, equipment, or product design decisions. For more information, see the link to the NIOSH PtD initiative on the recommended practices Web page.

Action item 3: Develop and update a hazard control planA hazard control plan describes how the selected controls will be implemented. An effective plan will address serious hazards first. Interim controls may be necessary, but the overall goal is to ensure effective long-term control of hazards. It is important to track progress toward completing the control plan, and periodically (at least annually and when conditions, processes, or equipment change) verify that controls remain effective.

How to accomplish it• List the hazards needing controls in order of

priority.• Assign responsibility for installing or

implementing the controls to a specific person or persons with the power or ability to implement the controls.

Hierarchy of ControlsMosteffective

Change the waypeople work

Leasteffective

Physically removethe hazard

Replacethe hazard

Isolate peoplefrom the hazard

Protect the worker withPersonal Protective Equipment

AdministrativeControls

PPE

EngineeringControls

Substitution

Elimination

Source: NIOSH





• Establish a target completion date.

• Plan how you will track progress toward completion.

• Plan how you will verify the effectiveness of controls after they are installed or implemented.

Action item 4: Select controls to protect workers during nonroutine operations and emergenciesThe hazard control plan should include provisions to protect workers during nonroutine operations and foreseeable emergencies. Depending on the workplace, these could include fires, explosions, chemical releases, hazardous material spills, unplanned equipment shutdowns, infrequent maintenance activities, natural and weather disasters, workplace violence, terrorist or criminal attacks, disease outbreaks (e.g., pandemic influenza), or medical emergencies. Nonroutine tasks, or tasks workers don’t normally do, should be approached with particular caution. Prior to initiating such work, review JSAs/JHAs with any workers involved and notify others about the nature of the work, work schedule, and any necessary precautions.

How to accomplish it• Develop procedures to control hazards that

may arise during nonroutine operations (e.g., removing machine guarding during maintenance and repair).

• Develop or modify plans to control hazards that may arise in emergency situations.

• Procure any equipment needed to control emergency-related hazards.

• Assign responsibilities for implementing the emergency plan.

• Conduct emergency drills to ensure that procedures and equipment provide adequate protection during emergency situations.

Note: Depending on your location, type of business, and materials stored or used on site, authorities including local fire and emergency response departments, state agencies, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and OSHA may have additional requirements for emergency plans. Ensure that your procedures comply with these requirements.

Action item 5: Implement selected controls in the workplaceOnce hazard prevention and control measures have been identified, they should be implemented according to the hazard control plan.

How to accomplish it• Implement hazard control measures

according to the priorities established in the hazard control plan.

• When resources are limited, implement measures on a “worst-first” basis, according to the hazard ranking priorities (risk) established during hazard identification and assessment. (Note, however, that regardless of limited resources, employers

have an obligation to protect workers from recognized, serious hazards.)

• Promptly implement any measures that are easy and inexpensive—such as general housekeeping, removal of obvious tripping hazards such as electrical cords, and basic lighting—regardless of the level of hazard they involve.




Action item 6: Follow up to confirm that controls are effectiveTo ensure that control measures are and remain effective, employers should track progress in implementing controls, inspect and evaluate controls once they are installed, and follow routine preventive maintenance practices.

How to accomplish it• Track progress and verify implementation by

asking the following questions:

— Have all control measures been implemented according to the hazard control plan?

— Have engineering controls been properly installed and tested?

— Have workers been appropriately trained so that they understand the controls, including how to operate engineering controls, safe work practices, and PPE use requirements?

— Are controls being used correctly and consistently?

• Conduct regular inspections (and industrial hygiene monitoring, if indicated) to confirm that engineering controls are operating as designed.

• Evaluate control measures to determine if they are effective or need to be modified. Involve workers in the evaluation of the controls. If controls are not effective, identify, select, and implement further control measures that will provide adequate protection.

• Confirm that work practices, administrative controls, and PPE use policies are being followed.

• Conduct routine preventive maintenance of equipment, facilities, and controls to help prevent incidents due to equipment failure.




EDUCATION AND TRAININGEDUCATION AND TRAINING are important tools for informing workers and managers about workplace hazards and controls so they can work more safely and be more productive. Another role of education and training, however, is to provide workers and managers with a greater understanding of the safety and health program itself, so that they can contribute to its development and implementation.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING provides employers, managers, supervisors, and workers with:

• Knowledge and skills needed to do their work safely and avoid creating hazards that could place themselves or others at risk.

• Awareness and understanding of workplace hazards and how to identify, report, and control them.

• Specialized training, when their work involves unique hazards.

Additional training may be needed depending on the roles assigned in the program. For example,

employers, managers, and supervisors may need specific training to ensure that they can fulfill their roles in providing leadership, direction, and resources for the safety and health program. Workers assigned specific roles in the program (e.g., incident investigation team members) may need training to ensure their full participation in those functions.

Effective training and education can be provided outside a formal classroom setting. Peer-to-peer training, on-the-job training, and worksite demonstrations can be effective in conveying safety concepts, ensuring understanding of hazards and their controls, and promoting good work practices.

Action item 1: Provide program awareness trainingManagers, supervisors, and workers all need to understand the program’s structure, plans, and procedures. Having this knowledge ensures that everyone can fully participate in developing, implementing, and improving the program.

How to accomplish it • Provide training to all managers; supervisors;

workers; and contractor, subcontractor, and temporary agency workers on:

— Safety and health policies, goals, and procedures

— Functions of the safety and health program

— Whom to contact with questions or concerns about the program (including contact information)



— How to report hazards, injuries, illnesses, and close calls/near misses

— What to do in an emergency

— The employer’s responsibilities under the program

— Workers’ rights under the OSH Act

• Provide information on the safety and health hazards of the workplace and the controls for those hazards.

• Ensure that training is provided in the language(s) and at a literacy level that all workers can understand.

• Emphasize that the program can only work when everyone is involved and feels comfortable discussing concerns; making suggestions; and reporting injuries, incidents, and hazards.

• Confirm, as part of the training, that all workers have the right to report injuries, incidents, hazards, and concerns and to fully participate in the program without fear of retaliation.

Action item 2: Train employers, managers, and supervisors on their roles in the program Employers, managers, and supervisors are responsible for workers’ safety, yet sometimes have little training on safety-related concepts and techniques. They might benefit from specific training that allows them to fulfill their leadership roles in the program.

How to accomplish it• Reinforce employers, managers,

and supervisors’ knowledge of their responsibilities under the OSH Act and the workers’ rights guaranteed by the Act.

• Train employers, managers, and supervisors on procedures for responding to workers’ reports of injuries, illnesses, and incidents, including ways to avoid discouraging reporting.

• Instruct employers, managers, and supervisors on fundamental concepts and techniques for recognizing hazards and methods of controlling them, including the hierarchy of controls (see “Hazard Prevention and Control”).

• Instruct employers, managers, and supervisors on incident investigation techniques, including root cause analysis.




Action item 3: Train workers on their specific roles in the safety and health programAdditional training may be needed to ensure that workers can incorporate any assigned safety and health responsibilities into their daily routines and activities.

How to accomplish it• Instruct workers on how to report injuries,

illnesses, incidents, and concerns. If a computerized reporting system is used, ensure that all employees have the basic computer skills and computer access sufficient to submit an effective report.

• Instruct workers assigned specific roles within the safety and health program on how they should carry out those responsibilities, including:

— Hazard recognition and controls (see Action item 4)

— Participation in incident investigations

— Program evaluation and improvement

• Provide opportunities for workers to ask questions and provide feedback during and after the training.

• As the program evolves, institute a more formal process for determining the training needs of workers responsible for developing, implementing, and maintaining the program.

Action item 4: Train workers on hazard identification and controlsProviding workers with an understanding of hazard recognition and control, and actively involving them in the process, can help to eliminate hazards before an incident occurs.

How to accomplish it• Train workers on techniques for identifying

hazards, such as job hazard analysis (see OSHA Publication 3071).

• Train workers so they understand and can recognize the hazards they may encounter in their own jobs, as well as more general work-related hazards.

• Instruct workers on concepts and techniques for controlling hazards, including the hierarchy of controls and its importance.

• Train workers on the proper use of work practice and administrative controls.

• Train workers on when and how to wear required PPE.

• Provide additional training, as necessary, when a change in facilities, equipment, processes, materials, or work organization

could increase hazards, and whenever a worker is assigned a new task.




PROGRAM EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENTONCE A SAFETY and health program is established, it should be evaluated initially to verify that it is being implemented as intended. After that, employers should periodically, and at least annually, step back and assess what is working and what is not, and whether the program is on track to achieve its goals. Whenever these assessments identify opportunities to improve the program, employers, managers, and supervisors—in coordination with workers—should make adjustments and monitor how well the program

performs as a result. Sharing the results of monitoring and evaluation within the workplace, and celebrating successes, will help drive further improvement.

PROGRAM EVALUATION and improvement includes:

• Establishing, reporting, and tracking goals and targets that indicate whether the program is making progress.

• Evaluating the program initially, and periodically thereafter, to identify shortcomings and opportunities for improvement.

• Providing ways for workers to participate in program evaluation and improvement.

Action item 1: Monitor performance and progressThe first step in monitoring is to define indicators that will help track performance and progress. Next, employers, managers, supervisors, and workers need to establish and follow procedures to collect, analyze, and review performance data.

Both lagging and leading indicators should be used. Lagging indicators generally track worker exposures and injuries that have already occurred. Leading indicators track how well various aspects of the program have been implemented and reflect steps taken to prevent injuries or illnesses before they occur.

How to accomplish it• Develop and track indicators of progress

toward established safety and health goals.

— Track lagging indicators, such as:

� Number and severity of injuries and illnesses

� Results of worker exposure monitoring that show that exposures are hazardous

� Workers’ compensation data, including claim counts, rates, and cost



— Track leading indicators, such as:

� Level of worker participation in program activities

� Number of employee safety suggestions

� Number of hazards, near misses, and first aid cases reported

� Amount of time taken to respond to reports

� Number and frequency of management walkthroughs

� Number and severity of hazards identified during inspections

� Number of workers who have completed required safety and health training

� Timely completion of corrective actions after a workplace hazard is identified or an incident occurs

� Timely completion of planned preventive maintenance activities

� Worker opinions about program effectiveness obtained from a safety climate or safety opinion survey

• Analyze performance indicators and evaluate progress over time.

• Share results with workers and invite their input on how to further improve performance.

• When opportunities arise, share your experience and compare your results to similar facilities within your organization, with other employers you know, or through business or trade associations.

Note: Indicators can be either quantitative or qualitative. Whenever possible, select indicators that are measurable (quantitative) and that will help you determine whether you have achieved your program goals. The number of reported hazards and near misses would be a quantitative indicator. A single worker expressing a favorable opinion about program participation would be a qualitative indicator.

Action item 2: Verify that the program is implemented and is operatingInitially and at least annually, employers need to evaluate the program to ensure that it is operating as intended, is effective in controlling identified hazards, and is making progress toward established safety and health goals and objectives. The scope and frequency of program evaluations will vary depending on changes in OSHA standards; the scope, complexity, and maturity of the program; and the types of hazards it must control.

How to accomplish it• Verify that the core elements of the program

have been fully implemented.

• Involve workers in all aspects of program evaluation, including reviewing information (such as incident reports and exposure monitoring results); establishing and tracking performance indicators; and identifying opportunities to improve the program.

• Verify that the following key processes are in place and operating as intended:

— Reporting injuries, illnesses, incidents, hazards, and concerns

— Conducting workplace inspections and incident investigations

— Tracking progress in controlling identified hazards and ensuring that hazard control measures remain effective

— Collecting and reporting any data needed to monitor progress and performance




• Review the results of any compliance audits to confirm that any program shortcomings

are being identified. Verify that actions are being taken that will prevent recurrence.

Action item 3: Correct program shortcomings and identify opportunities to improveWhenever a problem is identified in any part of the safety and health program, employers—in coordination with supervisors, managers, and workers—should take prompt action to correct the problem and prevent its recurrence.

How to accomplish it• If you discover program shortcomings, take

actions needed to correct them.

• Proactively seek input from managers, workers, supervisors, and other stakeholders on how you can improve the program.

• Determine whether changes in equipment, facilities, materials, key personnel, or work

practices trigger any need for changes in the program.

• Determine whether your performance indicators and goals are still relevant and, if not, how you could change them to more effectively drive improvements in workplace safety and health.

Note: The scope and frequency of program evaluations will depend on the scope, complexity, and maturity of the program and on the types of hazards it must control. Program evaluations should be conducted periodically (and at least annually) but might also be triggered by a change in process or equipment, or an incident such as a serious injury, significant property damage, or an increase in safety-related complaints.





IN TODAY’S ECONOMY, an increasing number of workers are assigned by staffing agencies to work at specific “host” worksites under the direction and control of the host employer. Examples include seasonal workers, such as delivery drivers and warehouse workers, who help fill a temporary staffing need, as well as office and production workers who may be placed in both short- and long-term assignments. In these situations, it is important for the staffing agency and the host employer to communicate and coordinate to provide and maintain a safe work environment for their workers.

In other situations, some workers are employed by a host employer and others by a contractor or subcontractor. Examples include electrical or mechanical contractors working in a facility, a vendor installing or maintaining equipment, or long-term contractors providing building cleaning and maintenance. OSHA refers to these as “multiemployer” worksites. In these circumstances, it is important that each employer and contractor consider how its work and safety activities can affect the safety of other employers and workers at the site.

IN BOTH TEMPORARY WORKER and multiemployer situations, safety is enhanced if employers establish mechanisms to coordinate their efforts and communicate effectively to afford all workers equal protection against hazards. These mechanisms include measures to ensure that all workers on site (and their representatives) can participate in preventing injuries and illnesses. Failure to take these steps

may undermine safety programs. For example, if the different employers have inconsistent policies for when and where to wear PPE, workers may mistakenly believe that the equipment is not needed, leading to injury. Inconsistent safety policies may also cause workers to question the credibility of safety and health programs, resulting in less meaningful employee engagement and participation.



Effective communication and coordination among such employers means that:

• Before coming on site, contractors and staffing agencies and their workers are aware of:

— The types of hazards that may be present.

— The procedures or measures they need to use to avoid or control their exposure to these hazards.

— How to contact the host employer to report an injury, illness, or incident or if they have a safety concern.

• Host employers and their workers are aware of:

— The types of hazards that may arise from the work being done on site by workers employed by contractors or staffing agencies.

— The procedures or measures needed to avoid or control exposure to these hazards.

— How to contact the contract or staffing firm if they have a safety concern.

— What to do in case of an emergency.

Definitions

Host employer: An employer who has general supervisory authority over the worksite, including controlling the means and manner of work performed and having the power to correct safety and health hazards or require others to correct them.

Contractor: An individual or firm that agrees to furnish materials or perform services at a specified price, and controls the details of how the work will be performed and completed.

Staffing agency: A firm that provides temporary workers to host employers. A staffing agency hires its own employees and assigns them to support or supplement a client’s workforce in situations involving employee absences, temporary skill shortages, seasonal workloads, and special projects.

Temporary workers: Workers hired and paid by a staffing agency and assigned to work for a host employer, whether or not the job is actually temporary.




Action item 1: Establish effective communication Each host employer establishes and implements a procedure to ensure the exchange of information about hazards present on site and the hazard control measures in place. Thus, all workers on the site are aware of worksite hazards, and the methods and procedures needed to control exposures to them.

How to accomplish it• The host employer communicates with

contractors and staffing agencies to determine which among them will implement and maintain the various parts of the safety and health program, to ensure protection of all on-site workers before work begins. These determinations can be included in contract documents that define the relationships between the parties.

• The host employer establishes and implements procedures to exchange information with contractors and staffing agencies about hazards present in the workplace and the measures that have been implemented to prevent or control such hazards.

• The host employer gathers and disseminates information sufficient to enable each employer to assess hazards encountered by its workers and to avoid creating hazards that affect workers on the site.

• Contractors and staffing agencies regularly give the host employer any information about injuries, illnesses, hazards, or concerns reported by their workers and the results of any tracking or trend analysis they perform.

• Each contractor establishes and implements a procedure for providing the host employer with information about the hazards and control measures associated with the work being done by its workers, and the procedures it will use to protect workers on the site.

• The host employer gives contract employers and staffing agencies the right to conduct site visits and inspections and to access injury and illness records and other safety and health information.

• The host employer communicates with contractors and staffing agencies and their workers about nonroutine and emergency hazards and emergency procedures.

• Information is communicated before on-site work starts and, as needed, if conditions change.




Action item 2: Establish effective coordinationHost employers, contractors, and staffing agencies coordinate on work planning, scheduling, and resolving program differences to identify and work out any concerns or conflicts that could impact safety or health.

How to accomplish it• Host employers:

— Include in contracts and bid documents any safety-related specifications and qualifications and ensure that contractors and staffing agencies selected for the work meet those requirements.

— Identify issues that may arise during on-site work and include procedures to be used by the host employer and contractors and/or staffing agencies for resolving any conflicts before work starts.

• Host employers coordinate with contractors and staffing agencies to:

— Ensure that work is planned and scheduled to minimize impacts on safety.

— Ensure that staffing agency workers are adequately trained and equipped before arriving on the worksite.

— Harmonize their safety and health policies and procedures to resolve important differences, so that all workers at the site have the same protection and receive consistent safety information.

• Host employers and staffing agencies:

— Work together to deal with unexpected staffing needs by ensuring that enough trained and equipped workers are

available or that adequate lead time is provided to train and equip workers.

— Make sure that managers with decision-making authority are available and prepared to deal with day-to-day coordination issues.




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PPE personal protective equipment

PtD Prevention through Design

SDS Safety Data Sheet

SHARP Safety and Health Achievement Recognition Program

VPP Voluntary Protection Programs

GLOSSARY OF TERMS close call/near miss: An incident that could have, but did not, result in death, injury,

or illness. They signal that hazards are not being adequately controlled or that new hazards have arisen.

contractor: An individual or firm that agrees to furnish materials or perform services at a specified price.

elimination: A change in process or workplace condition that removes the hazard or ensures that no worker can be exposed to a hazard under any foreseeable circumstances.

hierarchy of controls: A system for selecting and implementing the most effective control solutions for workplace hazards that includes:

• Elimination.

• Substitution.

• Engineering controls.

• Administrative controls.

• Personal protective equipment.

This is known as the “hierarchy of controls” because they should be considered in the order presented. Controls at the top of the hierarchy are potentially more effective and more protective than those lower in the hierarchy.



host employer: An employer who has general supervisory authority over the worksite, including controlling the means and manner of work performed and having the power to correct safety and health hazards or require others to correct them.

industrial hygiene: The science of protecting and enhancing the health and safety of people at work and in their communities.

job hazard analysis: A technique that focuses on job tasks as a way to identify hazards before they occur. It focuses on the relationships among the worker, the task, the tools, and the work environment.

joint-employed worker: A worker hired and paid by a staffing agency and assigned to work for a host employer, whether or not the job is actually temporary.

lagging indicators: Measures of the occurrence and frequency of events in the past such as the number or rate of injuries, illnesses, and fatalities.

leading indicators: Measures intended to predict the occurrence of events in the future. Leading indicators are proactive, preventative, and predictive measures that provide information about the effective performance of safety and health program activities that can drive the control of workplace hazards.

metrics: Measures of performance.

multiemployer worksite: Any worksite where two or more employers are present. See OSHA’s Multiemployer Citation Policy.

nonroutine operations: Operations that do not occur frequently or that occur as a result of an emergency.

peer-to-peer training: A type of on-the-job training where workers exchange information about hazards, controls, reporting procedures, and work procedures that are relevant to the safety and health program.

Prevention through Design: A NIOSH national initiative to prevent or reduce occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities through the inclusion of prevention considerations in all designs that impact workers. PtD encompasses all of the efforts to anticipate and design out hazards to workers in facilities, work methods and operations, processes, equipment, tools, products, new technologies, and the organization of work.

quantitative exposure assessment: Techniques used to quantitatively measure workers’ exposure to hazards, particularly health hazards, such as sampling for chemicals, dusts, biological organisms, noise, radiation, or other assessments. The purpose of such assessments is to quantify the level of workers’ exposure to a hazard. Also known as exposure monitoring.

root cause analysis: A collective term that describes a wide range of approaches, tools, and techniques used to uncover causes of problems.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS


https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=DIRECTIVES&p_id=2024


Safety and Health Achievement An OSHA program that recognizes small business employers Recognition Program: who have used OSHA's On-site Consultation Program services and operate an exemplary injury and illness prevention program.

safety data sheet: Written or printed material used to communicate the hazards of substances and chemical products to employees prepared in accordance with paragraph (g) of OSHA’s Hazard Communication standard.

serious hazards: Hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm. See OSHA’s Field Operations Manual, Chapter 4.

shortcoming: A fault, deficiency, or gap that results in a failure to meet program design criteria.

staffing agency: A firm that provides temporary workers to host employers. A staffing agency hires its own employees and assigns them to support or supplement a client’s workforce in situations involving employee absences, temporary skill shortages, seasonal workloads, and special projects.

substitution: The replacement of toxic or hazardous materials (or the equipment or processes used with them) with ones that are less harmful.

Voluntary Protection Programs: An OSHA initiative that recognizes employers and workers in the private industry and federal agencies who have implemented effective safety and health management systems and maintain injury and illness rates below the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics averages for their respective industries.

work practices: A set of procedures for performing a specific work assignment safely.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS


https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/smallbusiness/consult.html



https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_02-00-159.pdf



110.1 Priority.

Hazard elimination shall be the first priority in the implementation of safety-related work practices.

Informational Note No. 1: Elimination is the risk control method listed first in the hierarchy of riskcontrol identified in 110.5(H) (3). See Annex F for examples of hazard elimination.



Delete proposed 110.1. Eliminating electrical hazards is the place to start at the design stage but is likely not feasible while servicing or maintaining existing installations or even for many new ones.Also consider relocating the proposed sections 110.2, 110.3 and 110.4 to within proposed 110.5 and make it 110.1. The electrical safety program should be the framework of the electrical safety rules for the employer. Emphasizing these items is very important but they should be part of the electrical safety program, not isolated requirements.

Related Item

• FR 16




Street Address:

City:

State:

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Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected



22 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM


110.1 Priority.


Informational Note No. 1: Elimination is the risk control method listed first in the hierarchy of riskcontrol identified in 110.5(H)(3). See Annex F for examples of hazard elimination.







The Correlating Committee advises that article scope statements are the responsibility of the Correlating Committee and the Correlating Committee accepts the committee action. The Correlating Committee directs that further consideration be given to the comments expressed in voting on FR 16. This first revision and the comments expressed in voting identify the incompatibility with “safety management system requirements and related concepts” (problems created in the application of the Hierarchy of Risk Control Methods and associated Informational Notes), and the scope of the standard, for which the Correlating Committee has responsibility. As noted in the Committee Scope statement on page 70E-6 in the 2018 edition of NFPA 70E, and in 90.2(A), this standard addresses electrical safety in the workplace. Where equipment does not contain an electrical source, NFPA 70E does not apply. The Correlating Committee has reviewed the work and determined that references to safety management standards significantly impacts the scope and application of NFPA 70E and accordingly the Correlating Committee has a responsibility to address this issue. Establishing an electrically safe work condition in accordance with NFPA 70E to eliminate electrical hazards for the period of time that state is maintained is the very reason NFPA 70E was created. NFPA 70E is not a safety management system and deals only with electrical hazards. The Correlating Committee directs that all references to safety management systems and safety management standards be removed from the body of NFPA 70E and relocated in an Informative Annex.


Related Item





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement


23 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

CommitteeAction:





24 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Correlating Committee Note No. 7-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Section No. 110.1 ]


Committee:



CommitteeStatement:

The Correlating Committee advises that article scope statements are the responsibility of the CorrelatingCommittee and the Correlating Committee accepts the committee action.

The Correlating Committee directs that further consideration be given to the comments expressed invoting on FR 16.

This first revision and the comments expressed in voting identify the incompatibility with “safetymanagement system requirements and related concepts” (problems created in the application of theHierarchy of Risk Control Methods and associated Informational Notes), and the scope of the standard, forwhich the Correlating Committee has responsibility. As noted in the Committee Scope statement on page70E-6 in the 2018 edition of NFPA 70E, and in 90.2(A), this standard addresses electrical safety in theworkplace. Where equipment does not contain an electrical source, NFPA 70E does not apply. TheCorrelating Committee has reviewed the work and determined that references to safety managementstandards significantly impacts the scope and application of NFPA 70E and accordingly the CorrelatingCommittee has a responsibility to address this issue. Establishing an electrically safe work condition inaccordance with NFPA 70E to eliminate electrical hazards for the period of time that state is maintained isthe very reason NFPA 70E was created. NFPA 70E is not a safety management system and deals onlywith electrical hazards. The Correlating Committee directs that all references to safety managementsystems and safety management standards be removed from the body of NFPA 70E and relocated in anInformative Annex.


FR-16-NFPA 70E-2018

Ballot Results


12 Eligible Voters

0 Not Returned

11 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Affirmative All

Brunssen, James E.


Dressman, Kevin L.

Hickman, Palmer L.

Hittinger, David L.


Kovacik, John R.


1 of 2 4/9/2019, 2:12 PM

Manche, Alan

Pierce, James F.


Williams, David A.

Affirmative with Comment

Holub, Richard A.

While I can support moving the Hierarchy of Risk Control methods to the Annex, we must be careful to not "equate"Lockout/Tagout as required by 29 CFR 1910.147 with "Elimination" in the hierarchy of controls. "Elimination" is not onlydefined in ANSI Z10, it is also defined in OSHA as "A change in process or workplace condition that removes thehazard or ensures that no worker can be exposed to a hazard under any foreseeable circumstances." The "under anyforeseeable circumstances" is critical to this understanding. In a recent court filing in the case of OSHA v. Jacobs FieldServices N.A. (https://www.oshrc.gov/assets/1/18/REDACTED_JacobsFieldTrialDecisionFinal_17-14021.pdf?8263),the judge in the case made it clear that establishing an ESWC by locking out a disconnect switch did not protect theworker against inadvertent contact with the line side of the disconnect switch. The judge ruled "Subpart S indicates apreference for de-energizing live parts "to which an employee may be exposed...before the employee works on or nearthem." 29CFR1910.333(a)(1). This is an expansive concept of exposure that contemplates not just the parts that theemployee is directly working on, but also the energized parts to which an employee may be exposed by virtue ofworking near them." OSHA also promulgates the Hierarchy of Controls in their recommended practices for Safety andHealth Programs "Core Elements": (https://www.osha.gov/shpguidelines/hazard-prevention.html) (Action Item #2)


2 of 2 4/9/2019, 2:12 PM


110.1 Priority.


Informational Note No. 1: Elimination is the risk control method listed first in the hierarchy of riskcontrol identified in 110.5(H)(3). See Annex F for examples of hazard elimination.

Informational Note No. 2: An electrically safe work condition is a state wherein all hazardouselectrical conductors or circuit parts to which a worker might be exposed are placed and maintainedin a zero-energy state, eliminating controlling electrical hazards. It is an administrative control anddoes not eliminate the hazard. See Article 120 for requirements to establish an electrically safe workcondition. See Informative Annex F for information regarding the hierarchy of risk control and hazardelimination.







Public Comment No. 42-NFPA 70E-2019 [Definition: ElectricallySafe Work Condition.]

Similar reference to elimination of thehazard.

Public Comment No. 18-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. F.3]Similar reference to elimination of thehazard.


Public Comment No. 42-NFPA 70E-2019 [Definition: ElectricallySafe Work Condition.]

Related Item





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement


25 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

CommitteeAction:

Rejected



26 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM


110.2 General.

Electrical conductors and circuit parts shall not be considered to be in an electrically safe work conditionuntil all of the requirements of Article 120 have been met.

Safe work practices applicable to the circuit voltage and energy level shall be used in accordance withArticle 110 and Article 130 until such time that electrical conductors and circuit parts are in an electricallysafe work condition.

Electrical conductors and circuit parts shall not be considered to be in an electrically safe work conditionuntil all of the requirements of Article 120 have been met. The word "defibrilator" as used in this section, forinstance in 110.2(C)(2)(c), shall have the same meaning as the word defibrillator.

Informational Note: See 120.5 for the steps to establish and verify an electrically safe work condition.


Defibrilator is not a defined word but is used in 110.2. Maybe it is a misspelling?

Related Item

• First Revision No. 17-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Section No. 120.2(A) ]


Submitter Full Name: Peter Walsh

Organization: Teaticket Technical Associates

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The proposed revision is unnecessary as the training requirement related to defibrillators wasrelocated to 110.6(C)(2). The spelling of defibrillator will be editorially corrected in 110.6(C)(2).


27 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM


110.2 General.




Informational Note: See 120.5 for the steps to establish and verify an electrically safe work condition.


Relocate the proposed sections 110.2, 110.3 and 110.4 to within proposed 110.5. The electrical safety program should be the framework of the electrical safety rules for the employer. Emphasizing these items is very important but they should be part of the electrical safety program, not isolated requirements.

Related Item

• FR 17




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The requirements in 110.2 through 110.4 are general in nature and should preface therequirement for an electrical safety program identified in 110.5.


28 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM


110.2 General.




Informational Note: See 120.5 for the steps to establish and verify an electrically safe workcondition.






The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 17 be reviewed to remove redundant text. The content of the first and third paragraphs must be reviewed and correlated.


Related Item





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

Committee Action: Rejected but see related SR


Statement: The third sentence is deleted as it is identical to the first sentence.


29 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Correlating Committee Note No. 8-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Section No. 110.2 ]


Committee:



CommitteeStatement:

The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 17 be reviewed to removeredundant text. The content of the first and third paragraphs must be reviewed andcorrelated.


FR-17-NFPA 70E-2018

Ballot Results


12 Eligible Voters

0 Not Returned

12 Affirmative All



0 Abstention

Affirmative All

Brunssen, James E.


Dressman, Kevin L.

Hickman, Palmer L.

Hittinger, David L.

Holub, Richard A.


Kovacik, John R.

Manche, Alan

Pierce, James F.


Williams, David A.


1 of 1 4/9/2019, 2:21 PM


110.2 General.






Errata: The first sentence "Electrical conductors…" is repeated at the end of the Section. Delete the second occurrence (i.e. the third sentence). Note: TerraView also underlined the informational note. The only proposed revision is noted above.

Related Item

• FR-17


Submitter Full Name: Daniel Roberts

Organization: Schneider Electric

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Thu May 02 14:15:45 EDT 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement





30 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM


110.2 General.






The duplicate statement is redundant and not needed.

Related Item

• FR-17


Submitter Full Name: Agnieszka Golriz

Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement





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110.3 Electrically Safe Work Condition.

Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at voltages equal to or greater than 50 volts shallbe put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee performs work if any of the followingconditions exist:

(1) The employee is within the limited approach boundary.

(2) The employee interacts with equipment where conductors or circuit parts are not exposed but anincreased likelihood of injury from an exposure to an arc flash hazard exists.


Whether a person is considered to be working or not is not the issue, are they exposed to a hazard. The term work is understood differently by many, some state it is when someone is being paid, others believe it is only when they are physically doing something. A person observing or watching a task is not necessarily considered to be working by everyone. This was 130.2 in the 2018 edition

Related Item

• PI 351




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The proposed revision is unnecessary because the requirement to establish an electrically safework condition is applicable only when an employee is performing work. In accordance with the titleand intent 110.3 and 110.4, the requirements are applicable to to establishing an electrically safe“work” condition, or to permit energized “work”.


32 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Public Comment No. 124-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Sections 110.3, 110.4 ]

Sections 110.3, 110.4

110.3 Electrically Safe Work Condition.

Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at voltages equal to or greater than 50 volts shallbe put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee performs work if any of the followingconditions exist:

(1) The employee is within the limited approach boundary.

(2) The employee interacts with equipment where conductors or circuit parts are not exposed but anincreased likelihood of injury from an exposure to an arc flash hazard exists.

110.4 Energized Work.

(A) Additional Hazards or Increased Risk.

Energized work shall be permitted where the employer can demonstrate that de-energizing introducesadditional hazards or increased risk.

Informational Note: Examples of additional hazards or increased risk include, but are not limited to,interruption of life-support equipment, deactivation of emergency alarm systems, and shutdown ofhazardous location ventilation equipment.

(B) Infeasibility.

Energized work shall be permitted where the employer can demonstrate that the task to be performed isinfeasible in a de-energized state due to equipment design or operational limitations.

Informational Note: Examples of work that might be performed within the limited approach boundaryof exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts because of infeasibility due to equipmentdesign or operational limitations include performing diagnostics and testing (for example, start-up ortroubleshooting) of electric circuits that can only be performed with the circuit energized and work oncircuits that form an integral part of a continuous process that would otherwise need to be completelyshut down in order to permit work on one circuit or piece of equipment.

(C) Equipment Operating at Less Than 50 Volts.

Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts that operate at less than 50 volts shall not be required tobe de-energized where the capacity of the source and any overcurrent protection between the energysource and the worker are considered and it is determined that there will be no increased exposure toelectrical burns or to explosion due to electric arcs.

(D) Normal Operating Condition.

Normal operation of electric equipment shall be permitted where a normal operating condition exists. Anormal operating condition exists when all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The equipment is properly installed.

(2) The equipment is properly maintained.

(3) The equipment is used in accordance with instructions included in the listing and labeling and inaccordance with manufacturer’s instructions.

(4) The equipment doors are closed and secured.

(5) All equipment covers are in place and secured.

(6) There is no evidence of impending failure.

Informational Note: The phrase properly installed means that the equipment is installed inaccordance with applicable industry codes and standards and the manufacturer’s recommendations.The phrase properly maintained means that the equipment has been maintained in accordance withthe manufacturer’s recommendations and applicable industry codes and standards. The phraseevidence of impending failure means that there is evidence such as arcing, overheating, loose orbound equipment parts, visible damage, or deterioration.



33 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Relocate the proposed sections 110.2, 110.3 and 110.4 to within proposed 110.5. The electrical safety program should be the framework of the electrical safety rules for the employer. Emphasizing these items is very important but they should be part of the electrical safety program, not isolated requirements.

Related Item

• FR 93 Detail




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The requirements in 110.2 through 110.4 are general in nature and should preface therequirement for an electrical safety program identified in 110.5.


34 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Public Comment No. 110-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 110.5(A) ]

(A) General.

The employer shall implement and document an overall electrical safety program that directs activityappropriate to the risk associated with electrical hazards. The electrical safety program shall beimplemented as part of the employer’s overall occupational health and safety management system, whenone exists.

Informational Note No. 1: Safety-related work practices such as verification of proper maintenanceand installation, alerting techniques, auditing requirements, and training requirements provided inthis standard are administrative controls and part of an overall electrical safety program.

Informational Note No. 2: ANSI/AIHA Z10, American National Standard for Occupational Health andSafety Management Systems , provides a framework for establishing a comprehensive SeeInformative Annex P for guidance on implementing an electrical safety program as a componentpart of an the employer’s overall occupational safety and health program health and safetymanagement system .

Informational Note No. 3: IEEE 3007.1, Recommended Practice for the Operation and Managementof Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, provides additional guidance for the implementation ofthe electrical safety program.

Informational Note No. 4: IEEE 3007.3, Recommended Practice for Electrical Safety in Industrial andCommercial Power Systems, provides additional guidance for electrical safety in the workplace.


ANSI Z10 was published in 2012, and although it was a fairly good document for its time, it uses out of date risk assessment terminology and addresses safety management system concepts more from a process industry viewpoint. More current safety management system standards such as ISO 45001-2018 and CSA Z1000-2014 do not have these drawbacks.See related Public Comment to revise Annex P and replace all references to ANSI Z10 with ISO 45001.

DO NOT DELETE THE SECOND SENTENCE IN 110.5(A).The comment expressed in voting that NFPA 70E “is not a safety management system” non-germane as it has no bearing on the requirements found in either NFPA 70E-2018 or the First Draft. The comment expressed in voting regarding the incompatibility of the Scope of NFPA 70E with “safety management system requirements and related concepts” is inaccurate.

NFPA 70E-2018, 110.1(A) [See 110.5(A) in the First Draft] clearly states: “The employer shall implement and document an overall electrical safety program that directs activity appropriate to the risk associated with electrical hazards. The electrical safety program shall be implemented as part of the employer’s overall occupational health and safety management system, when one exists.”

The second sentence in 110.1(A) does not make 70E a safety management system. Rather, it emphasizes that the best method to comply with the requirement in the first sentence is by means of the iterative management system cycle of ‘Plan – Do – Check – Act.’ If an employer is going to successfully manage the risk associated with any workplace hazard (electrical, chemical, confined space, etc.) they need to:1) Plan: Create and document an electrical safety program per 110.1 using the best available knowledge and document the plan (NFPA 70E and industry best practices);2) Do: Implement the program by training employees per 110.2, procuring resources, etc.; 3) Check: Perform program and field work audits per 110.1(K) to review the effectiveness of the program and training and to compare with any new knowledge or developments;4) Act: Revise the program or training accordingly per 110.1(K).

As shown, each of the management system Plan – Do – Check – Act steps align with and are already addressed in 70E, and have been for quite some time.

The real issue was identified in the voting comment by Mr. Gallo: the “misapplication of the hierarchy of control.”

Just because some are of the opinion that elimination of a hazard can be achieved only during the design of equipment does not make it so.


35 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Further, the assertion that ANSI Z10 indicates that elimination of a hazard can be achieved only during the design of equipment is inaccurate. It does not. ANSI Z10 simply states in an informational note that elimination “is best accomplished in the concept and design phases of any project” (ANSI Z10 Note E5.1.2). This is true. However, nowhere does ANSI Z10 expressly rule out using the risk control method of elimination at other times. Each risk control method identified in NFPA 70E can be applied at any time, including during electrical safety-related work practices (See the Preface in CSA Z1002 Occupational health and safety — Hazard identification and elimination and risk assessment and control).



Public Comment No. 111-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. P.1]

Public Comment No. 111-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. P.1]

Related Item

• FR-9 and Correlating Committee Public Comment




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: As directed by the Correlating Committee all references to safety management systems andsafety management standards have been removed from this section of NFPA 70E and relocated inan informative annex.

Informational Note 2 is updated to include a reference to Annex P which provides information onaligning implementation of this standard with occupational health and safety managementstandards.


36 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM


(A) General.



Informational Note No.

2: ANSI/AIHA Z10, American National Standard for Occupational Health and Safety ManagementSystems , provides a framework for establishing a comprehensive electrical safety program as acomponent of an employer’s occupational safety and health program.Informational Note No.

3: IEEE 3007.1, Recommended Practice for the Operation and Management of Industrialand Commercial Power Systems , provides additional guidance for the implementation of theelectrical safety program.

Informational Note No. 4: IEEE 3007.3, Recommended Practice for Electrical Safety inIndustrial and Commercial Power Systems , provides additional guidance for electrical safetyin the workplace.


This public comment is submitted to facilitate the direction of the NEC Correlating Committee. The direction from the NEC CC is seen in Correlating Committee Note No. 1 placed with FR 9 which added a new Informational Note to follow the definition of “Electrically Safe Work Condition. The direction from the NEC CC is as follows:

“The Correlating Committee directs that all references to safety management systems and safety management standards be removed from the body of NFPA 70E and relocated in an Informative Annex.”

The NEC CC also notes that there is: “…incompatibility with “safety management system requirements and related concepts” (problems created in the application of the Hierarchy of Risk Control Methods and associated Informational Notes), and the scope of the standard…”“NFPA 70E is not a safety management system and deals only with electrical hazards.”“Establishing an electrically safe work condition in accordance with NFPA 70E to eliminate electrical hazards for the period of time that state is maintained is the very reason NFPA 70E was created.”

This standard addresses electrical safety in the workplace. Where equipment does not contain an electrical source, NFPA 70E does not apply.

The NEC CC direction is necessary to eliminate serious scope issues. NFPA 70E is not a design document. NFPA 70E has no jurisdiction over equipment that does not contain a voltage source.

Related Item

• FR 9, CN 1


Submitter Full Name: James Dollard

Organization: IBEW Local Union 98

Street Address:

City:


37 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:




Informational Note 2 is updated to include a reference to Annex P which provides information onaligning implementation of this standard with occupational health and safety managementstandards.


38 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM


(A) General.



Informational Note No. 2: ANSI/AIHA Z10, American National Standard for Occupational Healthand Safety Management Systems , provides a framework for establishing a comprehensiveelectrical safety program as a component of an employer’s occupational safety and healthprogram. Informational Note No. 3: IEEE 3007.1, Recommended Practice for the Operation andManagement of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, provides additional guidance for theimplementation of the electrical safety program.

Informational Note No. 4: IEEE 3007.3, Recommended Practice for Electrical Safety in Industrial andCommercial Power Systems, provides additional guidance for electrical safety in the workplace.


This public input is in reference to first draft ballot comments and correlating committee notes referencing safety management systems. NECA supports the correlating committee direction to remove references to safety management systems and safety management standards in the NFPA 70E Standard. The fundamentals of safety management, including the hierarchy of controls, cannot be applied in a manner which is consistent with the intent of NFPA 70E. This is evident in establishing an electrical safe work condition to eliminate electrical hazards. A safety management system may not consider electrical safe work conditions as elimination as intended by NFPA 70E. This fundamental difference justifies the removal of safety management systems and such references from the NFPA 70E standard and into an informational annex.

Related Item

• FR-93



Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:




Informational Note 2 is updated to include a reference to Annex P which provides information on


39 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

aligning implementation of this standard with occupational health and safety managementstandards.


40 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Public Comment No. 115-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 110.5(H)(1) ]

(1) Elements of a Risk Assessment Procedure.

The risk assessment procedure shall address employee exposure to electrical hazards and shall identifythe process to be used before work is started to carry out the following:

(1) Identify hazards

(2) Assess risks

(3) Implement risk control according to the hierarchy of risk control methods

Informational Note No. 1: The risk assessment procedure could include identifying when a second

person could be required and the training and equipment that person should have. In conjunctionwith the specific training and equipment set out in this standard for a qualified person and emphasison a proficiency in risk assessment, evidence of the commissioning of an electrical system under theauspices of NFPA 78 - Guide on Electrical Inspections and electrical inspections completed within theperformance of NFPA 1078 – Standard for Electrical Inspector Professional Qualification wouldbenefit in the risk judgement process.Informational Note No. 2: For more information regarding risk assessment and the hierarchy of riskcontrol, see Informative Annex F.


Including the recommended text would provide additional safety towards emphasizing the point that accurately commissioned electrical system should not be neglected in the requirements for establishing the Elements of a Risk Assessment Procedure as well as when the lack of an authority have jurisdiction and qualified electrical inspection. The existing code language is positive in that it offers the Elements of a Risk Assessment Procedure but is silent regarding the additional elements necessary to complete the entire procedure. Including the knowledge of this standard and guide (NFPA 1078 & 78) in the risk assessment practice would increase the overall hazard discovery process.

Related Item

• FR-20 PI 79 PI 140 PI 213


Submitter Full Name: Gary Jones

Organization: City of Aledo, Texas

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

Committee Action: Rejected

Resolution: The NFPA 78 document is not published and therefore cannot be referenced.


41 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM


(3) Hierarchy of Risk Control Methods.

The risk assessment procedure shall require that preventive and protective risk control methods beimplemented in accordance with the following hierarchy:

(1) Elimination

(2) Substitution

(3) Engineering controls

(4) Awareness

(5) Administrative controls

(6) PPE

Informational Note No. 1: Elimination, substitution, and engineering controls are the most effectivemethods to reduce risk as they are usually applied at the source of possible injury or damage tohealth and they are less likely to be affected by human error. Awareness, administrative controls,and PPE are the least effective methods to reduce risk as they are not applied at the source andthey are more likely to be affected by human error.

Informational Note No. 2: See Informative Annex F and ANSI/AIHA Z10, American NationalStandard for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems , for more information regardingthe hierarchy of risk control methods and examples of those methods.


This public comment is submitted to facilitate the direction of the NEC Correlating Committee. The direction from the NEC CC is seen in Correlating Committee Note No. 1 placed with FR 9 which added a new Informational Note to follow the definition of “Electrically Safe Work Condition. The direction from the NEC CC is as follows:

“The Correlating Committee directs that all references to safety management systems and safety management standards be removed from the body of NFPA 70E and relocated in an Informative Annex.”

The NEC CC also notes that there is: “…incompatibility with “safety management system requirements and related concepts” (problems created in the application of the Hierarchy of Risk Control Methods and associated Informational Notes), and the scope of the standard…”“NFPA 70E is not a safety management system and deals only with electrical hazards.”“Establishing an electrically safe work condition in accordance with NFPA 70E to eliminate electrical hazards for the period of time that state is maintained is the very reason NFPA 70E was created.”

This standard addresses electrical safety in the workplace. Where equipment does not contain an electrical source, NFPA 70E does not apply.

The NEC CC direction is necessary to eliminate serious scope issues. NFPA 70E is not a design document. NFPA 70E has no jurisdiction over equipment that does not contain a voltage source.

Related Item

• FR 9, CN 1


Submitter Full Name: James Dollard

Organization: IBEW Local Union 98

Street Address:

City:


42 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: The reference to ANSI/AIHA Z10 is deleted as directed by the Correlating Committee and to clarifythat it is only one example of many standards that provide information regarding the hierarchy ofrisk control methods.


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(3) Hierarchy of Risk Control Methods.

The risk assessment procedure shall require that preventive and protective risk control methods beimplemented in accordance with the following hierarchy:

(1) Elimination

(2) Substitution

(3) Engineering controls

(4) Awareness

(5) Administrative controls

(6) PPE

Informational Note No. 1: Elimination, substitution, and engineering controls are the most effectivemethods to reduce risk as they are usually applied at the source of possible injury or damage tohealth and they are less likely to be affected by human error. Awareness, administrative controls,and PPE are the least effective methods to reduce risk as they are not applied at the source andthey are more likely to be affected by human error.

Informational Note No. 2: See Informative Annex F and ANSI/AIHA Z10, American NationalStandard for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems , for more information regardingthe hierarchy of risk control methods and examples of those methods.


This public input is in reference to first draft ballot comments and correlating committee notes referencing safety management systems. NECA supports the correlating committee direction to remove references to safety management systems and safety management standards in the NFPA 70E Standard. The fundamentals of safety management, including the hierarchy of controls, cannot be applied in a manner which is consistent with the intent of NFPA 70E. This is evident in establishing an electrical safe work condition to eliminate electrical hazards. A safety management system may not consider electrical safe work conditions as elimination as intended by NFPA 70E. This fundamental difference justifies the removal of safety management systems and such references from the NFPA 70E standard and into an informational annex

Related Item

• FR-21



Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:




44 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Statement: The reference to ANSI/AIHA Z10 is deleted as directed by the Correlating Committee and to clarifythat it is only one example of many standards that provide information regarding the hierarchy ofrisk control methods.


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Public Comment No. 100-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 110.5(I)(3) ]

(3) Change in Scope.

Additional job safety planning and job briefings shall be held if changes occur during the course of the workthat might affect the safety of employees.

Informational Note: For an example of a job briefing form checklist, see Figure I.1.


A "job briefing form checklist" is redundant. The modified phrase should be "job briefing checklist" to match the Annex.

Related Item

• FR-79


Submitter Full Name: Louis Barrios

Organization: Shell Global Solutions

Affiliation: American Petroleum Institute

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: The word “form” is deleted in the informational note to modify the phrase to "job briefingchecklist" to correlate with the title in Infromative Annex I.


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Public Comment No. 101-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 110.5(L) ]

(L) Lockout/Tagout Program.

The electrical safety program shall include the information a written lockout/tagout program as required by120.1(A).


The committee may have oversimplified the original public input. The proposed wording adds clarity to the statement, and makes it similar to the other sections in 110.5.

Related Item

• FR-24





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: Where an employer has documented the requirements of 120.1(A) in a separate lockout/tagoutprogram, it is redundant to require that those requirements be repeated in the employer’s electricalsafety program.

This revision clarifies that an employer can include the lockout/tagout program requirements of120.1(A) in their Electrical Safety Program, or document those requirements in a separatelockout/tagout program that is referenced by the employer’s Electrical Safety Program.

The either/or options regarding where the employer documents the lockout/tagout requirementsare separated into list items and list item one is editorially revised for clarity.


47 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Public Comment No. 54-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 110.5(L) ]

(L) Lockout/Tagout Program.

The electrical safety program shall include:

(1) the information required by 120.1(A), or

(2) a reference to the employer’s Lockout/Tagout Program established in accordance with 120 . 1(A) .


Requiring an employer that has a Lockout/Tagout Program established in accordance with 120.1(A) to duplicate the information in their Electrical Safety Program is unnecessary redundancy that does not enhance worker safety. In such instances it is sufficient to require the Electrical Safety Program to refer to the employer's Lockout/Tagout Program.

Related Item

• FR-24




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: Where an employer has documented the requirements of 120.1(A) in a separate lockout/tagoutprogram, it is redundant to require that those requirements be repeated in the employer’s electricalsafety program.

This revision clarifies that an employer can include the lockout/tagout program requirements of120.1(A) in their Electrical Safety Program, or document those requirements in a separatelockout/tagout program that is referenced by the employer’s Electrical Safety Program.

The either/or options regarding where the employer documents the lockout/tagout requirementsare separated into list items and list item one is editorially revised for clarity.


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Public Comment No. 15-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 110.5(M)(2) ]

(2) Field Work Audit.

Field work shall be audited to verify that the requirements contained in the procedures of the electricalsafety program are being followed. When the auditing determines that the principles and procedures of theelectrical safety program are not being followed, the appropriate revisions to the training program orrevisions to the procedures shall be made. Audits shall be performed for each qualified person at intervalsnot to exceed 1 year.

Exception: For qualified persons who are under regular supervision of another qualified person, field workauditing may be performed for a sample instead of each person.


In deleting the text in 110.6(A)(1)(e), the change eliminated the requirement for auditing of each worker. This was not addressed in the change justification. Annual auditing of work practices for each individual is necessary to ensure continued understanding and application of the requirements.

This comment reinstates the requirement for auditing each worker in the Field Audit section, and reinstates the exception for persons regularly supervised.



Public Comment No. 41-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. 110.6(A)(3)] Coordinated requirements

Public Comment No. 41-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. 110.6(A)(3)]

Related Item





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Thu Feb 28 12:54:19 EST 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: Item (4)(D): The section reference to the hierarchy of risk control methods is editorially revised foraccuracy.

New Item (F): The employer shall determine through regular supervision or through inspectionsconducted on at least an annual basis that each employee is complying with the safety-relatedwork practices required by this standard.


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Public Comment No. 55-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 110.6(A)(1) ]

(1) Qualified Person.

A qualified person shall be trained and knowledgeable in the construction and operation of equipment or aspecific work method and be trained to identify and avoid the electrical hazards that might be present withrespect to that equipment or work method.

(a) Such persons shall also be familiar with the proper use of the special precautionary techniques,applicable electrical policies and procedures, PPE, insulating and shielding materials, and insulated toolsand test equipment.

(b) A person can be considered qualified with respect to certain equipment and tasks but still beunqualified for others.

(c) Such persons permitted to work within the limited approach boundary shall, at a minimum, beadditionally trained in all of the following:

(4) Skills and techniques necessary to distinguish exposed energized electrical conductors and circuitparts from other parts of electrical equipment

(5) Skills and techniques necessary to determine the nominal voltage of exposed energized electricalconductors and circuit parts

(6) Approach distances specified in Table 130.4(E)(a) and Table 130.4(E)(b) and the correspondingvoltages to which the qualified person will be exposed

(7) Decision-making process necessary to be able to do the following:

(8) Perform the job safety planning

(9) Identify electrical hazards

(10) Assess the associated risk

(11) Select the appropriate risk control methods from the hierarchy of controls identified in 110.5(

G

(1)

a. H ) (3) , including PPE

(l) An employee who is undergoing on-the-job training for the purpose of obtaining the skills andknowledge necessary to be considered a qualified person, and who in the course of such trainingdemonstrates an ability to perform specific duties safely at his or her level of training, and who is under thedirect supervision of a qualified person shall be considered to be a qualified person for the performance ofthose specific duties.

(m) Employees shall be trained to select an appropriate test instrument and shall demonstrate how touse a device to verify the absence of voltage, including interpreting indications provided by the device. Thetraining shall include information that enables the employee to understand all limitations of each testinstrument that might be used.


Errata: 110.6(A)(1)(a)(4)d: Reference to Hierarchy of risk control should be 110.5(H)(3), not 110.5(G).Note: TerraView underlined half of Section 110.6(A) and added another list item. The only recommended revision is in 110.6(A)(1)(a)(4)d as noted above.

Related Item

• FR-25


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Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: Item (4)(D): The section reference to the hierarchy of risk control methods is editorially revised foraccuracy.

New Item (F): The employer shall determine through regular supervision or through inspectionsconducted on at least an annual basis that each employee is complying with the safety-relatedwork practices required by this standard.


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(3) Additional Training and Retraining.

Additional training and retraining in safety-related work practices and applicable changes in this standardshall be performed at intervals not to exceed 3 years. An employee shall receive additional training orretraining if any of the following conditions exists:

(1) The Regular supervision or annual inspections indicate the employee is not complying with fieldwork audits indicate the employee lacks knowledge or understanding of the safety-related workpractices.

(2) New technology, new types of equipment, or changes in procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices different from those that the employee would normally use.

(3) The employee needs to review tasks that are performed less often than once per year.

(4) The employee needs to review safety-related work practices not normally used by the employeeduring regular job duties.

(5) The employee’s job duties change.


FR-25 deleted the requirement for regular supervision or annual inspection of work practices, and moved it to the field work audit section 110.5(M) instead. This proposal realigns the retraining requirement to 110.5(M), and is coordinated with PC-15, so as not to lose the annual audit requirement for persons that are not regularly supervised.

In addition, a lack of compliance does not always necessitate re-training. Re-training should only occur if the lack of compliance is caused by a misunderstanding of the requirements. Willful non-compliance is addressed by other means. Further, this requirement should be re-evaluated based on the human performance modes and associated errors of Annex Q.4. Retraining should be targeted to the type of error that was demonstrated (knowledge, rules, or skills)



Public Comment No. 15-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. 110.5(M)(2)] Coordinated requirements

Public Comment No. 15-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. 110.5(M)(2)]

Related Item





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected


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Resolution: See Committee action on Second Revision SR-10 that restored 110.6(A)(1)(f) that was deletedby First Revision No. 31.


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Public Comment No. 50-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 110.7(C) ]

(C) Documentation.

Where the host employer has knowledge of hazards covered by this standard that are related to thecontract employer’s work, there shall be a documented meeting between the host employer and thecontract employer.

Informational Note: On multi-employer work sites (in all industry sectors), more than one employercan be responsible for identifying hazardous conditions and creating safe work practices.


Informational notes should be used to add clarity to a requirement. This informational note is not related to whether a documented meeting between the host employer and contract employer is required and therefore should be deleted.

Related Item

• FR 32


Submitter Full Name: Palmer Hickman

Organization: Electrical Training Alliance

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Thu Apr 25 16:00:24 EDT 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: Although the informational note is located after 110.7(C), it applies to all of 110.7, not just110.7(C). This revision provides clarity.


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110.12 Equipment Use.

Equipment shall be used in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.


Continue to accept FR 37 as created in the first draft. In general, equipment use within the scope of NFPA 70E, should not be used in a manner that is contradictory to the manufacturer's instructions. If no instructions are provided then the AHJ can determine if the equipment is used appropriately. For the vast majority of employment places, the employer is the AHJ for following NFPA 70E. The use of equipment goes on well after installations are approved by the municipality AHJ at most employers' sites. If there are special circumstances or situations, they can be dealt with on an individual basis.

Related Item

• FR 37




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: A second revision is unnecessary as the public comment did not propose any modifications to110.12 created by First Revision FR-37.


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(A) Employee Involvement.

Each person who could be exposed directly or indirectly to a source of electrical energy shall be involved inthe lockout/tagout process procedures .

Informational Note: An example of direct exposure is the qualified electrician who works on the motorstarter control, the power circuits, or the motor. An example of indirect exposure is the person who workson the coupling between the motor and compressor.


The word "process" should be replaced with some term such as "procedures." Section 120.2(B) requires, in part, that each person who could be exposed...be involved in the lockout/tagout process. There is no lockout/tagout process mentioned in Article 120. The only other mention of "process" in Article 120 is not related to lockout/tagout. "Process" is only mentioned in the title to 120.5. However, "process" is not mentioned in 120.5 except for in the title and this is to "establish and verify and electrically safe work condition" and is not related to a lockout/tagout process. The Technical Committee should note that the title to 120.2 is "Lockout/Tagout Principles. However, 120.2(C) addresses "Procedure" per its title. It seems like terms are being used without careful consideration to their use and where they are located. For example, 120.4 addresses "Procedures" per its title.

Related Item

• FR-17




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: The term “process” was replaced with “procedure” as each person that can be exposed must bepart of the lockout/tagout procedure.


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Public Comment No. 5-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 120.2(B) ]

(B) Lockout/Tagout Procedure.

A lockout/tagout procedure shall be developed on the basis of the existing electrical equipment and systemand , shall use suitable documentation including up-to-date drawings and diagrams, and meet therequirements of federal lockout/tagout and control of hazardous energy requirements .


This additional text is necessary to assure that any Article 120-compliant lockout/tagout process must at least meet OSHA's lockout/tagout and control of hazardous energy requirements such as 1910.147 and 1910.333(b)(2) since Public Input 59 that sought to relocate Article 120, including 120.2(B), to a (non-mandatory) Informative Annex.

Related Item

• PI-59




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: The revision requires that any Article 120-compliant lockout/tagout procedure meet applicablerequirements and regulations.


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Public Comment No. 27-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 120.4(B)(2) ]

(2) Stored Energy.

The procedure shall include requirements for releasing stored electric or mechanical energy that mightendanger personnel. All capacitors shall be discharged, and high-capacitance elements shall also be short-circuited and grounded before that exceed the hazard thresholds of 360.3 shall be placed in an electricallysafe work condition per 360.5 before the associated equipment is touched or worked on. Springs shall bereleased or physical restraint shall be applied when necessary to immobilize mechanical equipment andpneumatic and hydraulic pressure reservoirs. Other sources of stored energy shall be blocked or otherwiserelieved.

Informational Note No. 1: For more information on methods and procedures to place hazardous capacitorsin an electrically safe work condition, see Annex R, Working Safely with Capacitors.


This proposed change aligns the requirement for stored in energy in Article 120 with the new Article 360 and Annex R for working with capacitors.

The reference “All capacitors shall be discharged, and high-capacitance elements shall short-circuited and grounded..." is not descriptive enough. Capacitor stored energy hazards are based primarily on stored energy and voltage, not "high capacitance". Annex R provides the necessary information to appropriately assess the hazards and establish suitable controls.

Related Item

• Global FR-88 • Global FR-89




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:


Resolution: SR-15-NFPA 70E-2019 PC 27: Placing the references to 360.3 and 360.5 is more appropriate inan informational note.

Statement: An informational note was added to direct users of the document to Article 360 and InformativeAnnex R for additional guidance for establishing an electrically safe work condition when there arehazards associated with capacitors.


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Public Comment No. 121-NFPA 70E-2019 [ New Section after 120.5 ]

TITLE OF NEW CONTENT - Add exception No.3 to Section 120.5.7

Exception No. 3 to 120.5.7 - Allow the use of an external (at the front door of the elactrical panel),permanenetly mounted test device as test point to verify absence of voltage


This will allow qualified personnel to perform the absence of voltage testing safer, e.g., without exposing the person to higher electrical hazard.

Related Item

• Public Input No. 306-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Section No. 120.5 ]


Submitter Full Name: Sonny Dela

Organization: Nestle Usa

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The present text does not prohibit the use of permanently mounted accessories that are listed andlabeled in accordance with UL 61010 for voltage testing in conjunction with portable testinstruments. Permanently mounted absence of voltage testers must be listed and labeled inaccordance with UL 1436.


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120.5 Process for Establishing and Verifying an Electrically Safe Work Condition.


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Establishing and verifying an electrically safe work condition shall include all of the following steps, whichshall be performed in the order presented, if feasible:

(1) Determine all possible sources of electrical supply to the specific equipment. Check applicable up-to-date drawings, diagrams, and identification tags.

(2) After properly interrupting the load current, open the disconnecting device(s) for each source.

(3) Wherever possible, visually verify that all blades of the disconnecting devices are fully open or thatdrawout-type circuit breakers are withdrawn to the test or fully disconnected position.

(4) Release stored electrical energy.

(5) Release or block stored mechanical energy. Block or relieve stored non-electrical energy in devicesthat could re-energize electric circuit parts to the extent that the circuit parts could not be accidentallyenergized by the device.

(6) Apply lockout/tagout devices in accordance with a documented and established procedure.

(7) Use an adequately rated portable test instrument to test each phase conductor or circuit part to verify itis de-energized. Test each phase conductor or circuit part both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground.Before and after each test, determine that the test instrument is operating satisfactorily throughverification on any known voltage source.

Exception No. 1: An adequately rated permanently mounted test device shall be permitted to beused to verify the absence of voltage of the conductors or circuit parts at the work location, providedit meets the all following requirements: (1) It is permanently mounted and installed in accordancewith the manufacturer’s instructions and tests the conductors and circuit parts at the point of work;(2) It is listed and labeled for the purpose of verifying the absence of voltage; (3) It tests each phaseconductor or circuit part both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground; (4) The test device is verified asoperating satisfactorily on any known voltage source before and after verifying the absence ofvoltage.

Exception No. 2: On electrical systems over 1000 volts, noncontact test instruments shall bepermitted to be used to test each phase conductor.

Informational Note No. 1: See UL 61010-1, Safety Requirements for Electrical Equipment forMeasurement, Control, and Laboratory Use, Part 1: General Requirements , for rating,overvoltage category, and design requirements for voltage measurement and test instrumentsintended for use on electrical systems 1000 volts and below.

Informational No. 2: For additional information on rating and design requirements for absenceof voltage testers, refer to UL 1436, Outlet Circuit Testers and Other Similar IndicatingDevices .

Informational Note No. 3: For additional information on rating and design requirements forvoltage detectors, refer to IEC 61243-1, Live Working — Voltage Detectors — Part 1:Capacitive type to be used for voltages exceeding 1kV a.c. , or IEC 61243-2, Live Working —Voltage Detectors — Part 2: Resistive type to be used for voltages of 1kV to 36 kV a.c. , or IEC61243-3, Live Working — Voltage Detectors — Part 3: Two-pole low voltage type .

(8) Where the possibility of induced voltages or stored electrical energy exists, ground all circuitconductors and circuit parts before touching them. Where it could be reasonably anticipated that theconductors or circuit parts being de-energized could contact other exposed energized conductors orcircuit parts, apply temporary protective grounding equipment in accordance with the following:

(9) Placement. Temporary protective grounding equipment shall be placed at such locations andarranged in such a manner as to prevent each employee from being exposed to a shock hazard(i.e., hazardous differences in electrical potential). The location, sizing, and application oftemporary protective grounding equipment shall be identified as part of the employer’s jobplanning.

(10) Capacity. Temporary protective grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting the

maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear thefault.

Informational Note: ASTM F855, Standard Specification for Temporary Protective Groundsto be Used on De-energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment , is an example of astandard that contains information on capacity of temporary protective groundingequipment.


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(11) Impedance. Temporary protective grounding equipment and connections shall have animpedance low enough to cause immediate operation of protective devices in case ofunintentional energizing of the electric conductors or circuit parts.


The changes to 120.5(5) by FR-40 appeared to have resulted in redundant text. The proposed deletion of the first statement in 120.5(5) eliminates the redundant text.

Related Item

• FR-40





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:


Resolution: SR-16-NFPA 70E-2019 Response to PC 16: The requirement to have the grounding steps in120.5(8) completed in order to use Exception No. 2 was not accepted as it would promote unsafework practices. Safety protective grounding should not be applied prior to performing an absence ofvoltage test. Additionally, the application of protective safety grounding is adequately covered in120.5(8).

Statement: 120.5(5): The text was revised to eliminate redundancy and to add clarity. The term “accidentally”was changed to “unintentionally” to be consistent with use of terminology.

120.5(7) : The text of the mandatory requirement and the exceptions were revised for consistent useof the terms “verified,” “deenergized” and “absence of voltage.” The use of the term “verified” will besuch that it is only associated with determining if a test instrument or device is operating properly.This change also correlates with how it is used elsewhere within the 70E Standard. This revisionalso included replacing the term “verified” with “testing for” where it was used with the absence ofvoltage testing. In the opening sentence of the main requirement the action of “verifying” theconductors or circuit parts are “deenergized” was changed to “testing for the absence of voltage.”This change is consistent with how the action is stated in the rest of this section, including theexceptions, and within the industry.

Exceptions No. 1 and 2: The numbering was revised by adding a reference to List Item (7) to complythe NEC Style Manual and to clarify they only apply to that list item.

Exception No. 1 to (7): The term “test device” was changed to “absence of voltage tester” to beconsistent with the product standard.

Exception No. 2 to (7): The term “noncontact test instrument” was changed to “noncontact capacitivetest instrument”” as that is the term that is used in the product standards and therefore is the properterm for the device. The term capacitive is consistent with the technical reference to the device.


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(7) Use an adequately rated portable test instrument to test verify the absence of voltage either inside the cabinet

or outside the cabinet using a permanently mounted device rated for the application. Where a permanently

mounted device is installed, it shall be connected to the point of work and installed in accordance with the

manufacturer’s instructions. The permanently mounted device shall be listed and labeled for the purpose of

voltage measurement testing. Test each phase conductor or circuit part to verify it is de-

energized deenergized . Test each phase conductor or circuit part both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground.

Before and after each test, determine that the test instrument is operating satisfactorily through verification on

any known voltage source . )

(8) Exception No. 1: An adequately rated permanently mounted test device shall be permitted to be usedto verify the absence of voltage of the conductors or circuit parts at the work location, provided itmeets the all following requirements: (1) It is permanently mounted and installed in accordance withthe manufacturer’s instructions and tests the conductors and circuit parts at the point of work; (2) It islisted and labeled for the purpose of verifying the absence of voltage; (3) It tests each phase conductoror circuit part both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground; (4) The test device is verified as operatingsatisfactorily on any known voltage source before and after verifying the absence of voltage.

(9)






(11) Placement. Temporary protective grounding equipment shall be placed at such locations andarranged in such a manner as to prevent each employee from being exposed to a shock hazard

(i.e., hazardous differences in electrical potential). The location, sizing, and application oftemporary protective grounding equipment shall be identified as part of the employer’s jobplanning.

(12) Capacity. Temporary protective grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting themaximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear thefault.

Informational Note: ASTM F855, Standard Specification for Temporary Protective Grounds


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to be Used on De-energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment , is an example of astandard that contains information on capacity of temporary protective groundingequipment.




Article_120.5_Step_7_Rev_05_07.docx Article 120.5 Step Suggested Revision and Justification


There is at least one new listed and labeled product on the market rated for this type of application. These devices are installed on the outside of cabinets and their conductors are connected to the source of electrical energy (point of work). The new device permitted as part of the Article 120.5 Step (7) Exception 1 does not necessarily account for worker qualification and training requirements when performing the absence of voltage test through a push of a button. There is a greater probability that the worker who is performing the push-to-test function to verify the absence of voltage with the use of the UL 1436 listed device"may or may not" be a qualified person as defined in NFPA 70E. In the situations where the worker is not qualified, this exposes the worker to a higher risk in the event of device malfunction or a false negative indication may prompt the worker to open the panel door in energized condition assuming it is de-energized. These new provisions need to be added to the Step 7 main text because a person still has to use an adequately rated portable test instrument to test each phase conductor or circuit part to verify it is de-energized. The same test is performed outside the door when the doors are closed and secured. This further ensures that the person performing test is a qualified person per NFPA 70E definitions and he/she knows what steps to be taken in the event they were unable to validate the absence of voltage from outside the door based on their electrical safety training and following the PPE requirements.

Related Item

• PI 101, 119, 144, and 145


Submitter Full Name: Bhanu Srilla

Organization: Grace Engineered Products

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected



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Article 120.5 Step. 7 Suggested Revisions

(7) Use an adequately rated portable test instrument to verify the absence of voltage either inside

the cabinet or outside the cabinet using a permanently mounted device rated for the application.

Where a permanently mounted device is installed, it shall be connected to the point of work and

installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions. The permanently mounted device

shall be listed and labeled for the purpose of voltage measurement testing. Test each phase

conductor or circuit part to verify it is deenergized. Test each phase conductor or circuit part both

phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground. Before and after each test, determine that the test

instrument is operating satisfactorily through verification on any known voltage source

Justification:

There is at least one new listed and labeled product on the market rated for this type of

application. These devices are installed on the outside of cabinets and their conductors are

connected to the source of electrical energy (point of work). Because of these new devices,

testing for the absence of voltage can be performed outside the cabinet with the cabinet door(s)

closed. People need to know it is permissible to install and use these type of devices that can

make the workplace safer. These new provisions need to be part of the main text because a

person still has to use an adequately rated portable test instrument to test each phase conductor or

circuit part to verify it is deenergized.



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"Change the indentation to reflect the exception applies to Step 7 ONLY " Exception No. 1: Anadequately rated permanently mounted test device shall be permitted to be used to verify theabsence of voltage of the conductors or circuit parts at the work location, provided it meets the allfollowing requirements: (1) It is permanently mounted and installed in accordance with themanufacturer’s instructions and tests the conductors and circuit parts at the point of work; (2) It islisted and labeled for the purpose of verifying the absence of voltage; (3) It tests each phaseconductor or circuit part both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground; (4) The test device is verified asoperating satisfactorily on any known voltage source before and after verifying the absence ofvoltage.








Informational Note: ASTM F855, Standard Specification for Temporary Protective Groundsto be Used on De-energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment , is an example of astandard that contains information on capacity of temporary protective grounding

equipment.


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Article120.5_7_Indentation_snip.JPG Article 120.5 (7) New Exception 1_Indentation snip


The way the New Exception No.1, in Article 120.5 Step 7 is currently indented in the standard body is very misleading to the reader as it implies the New Exception No. 1 can be applied to all the steps in the Article 120.5 from (1) through (7). Need to re-indent the New Exception No. 1 outward (or) make a specific call that explicitly states the new exception applies to Step.7 only.

Related Item

• PI 144 and 145, PI 285




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:








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(4) Release and Verify the dissipation of stored electrical energy.















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It is critical to verify the dissipation of stored electrical energy with the extensive use of capacitive systems and variable frequency drives in the industry.

Related Item

• PI 101 & PI 193




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The primary requirement of the subdivision is to release or block stored energy. Where thepossibility of induced voltage or stored energy exists the grounding requirements of 120.5(8)assure dissipation. Verification alone does not ensure continuous dissipation.


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(7) Use an adequately rated portable test instrument to test either at the source of electrical energy inside thecabinet or outside the cabinet through a permanently mounted device rated for the application. Where apermanently mounted device is installed, it shall be installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructionsand the leads shall be connected to the conductors and circuit parts at the point of work. The permanentlymounted device shall be listed and labeled for the purpose of voltage measurement testing. Test each phaseconductor or circuit part to verify it is de-energized deenergized . Test each phase conductor or circuit partboth phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground. Before and after each test, determine that the test instrument isoperating satisfactorily through verification on any known voltage source.












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The language allows for the use of a permanently mounted listed and labeled test point for the purpose of absence of voltage testing from outside of the panel door with an adequately rated portable test instrument. At a minimum, the listing should require the following:• A CAT IV overvoltage rating.• Impedance protection to limit current through the device to less than 6.0mA in L1, L2, L3, & GRD.• Suitable environmental ratings. • Installation validation procedure as part of the manufacturer’s instructions.With these new provisions added to 120.5 Step 7, a QEW still has to use an adequately rated portable test instrument to test each phase conductor or circuit part to verify it is de-energized, with limited retraining. The same test is performed outside the door when the doors are closed and secured. This further ensures that the person performing test is a qualified person per NFPA 70E definitions and he/she knows what steps to be taken in the event they were unable to validate the absence of voltage from outside the door based on their electrical safety training and following the PPE requirements.

Related Item

• PI101 • PI119 • PI144 • PI145


Submitter Full Name: Philip Allen


Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected



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(7) Use an adequately rated portable test instrument to test each phase conductor or circuit part to verifyit is de-energized the absence of voltage . Test each phase conductor or circuit part both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground. Before and after each test, determine that the test instrument is operatingsatisfactorily through verification on any known voltage source.

Exception No. 1: An adequately rated permanently mounted test device shall be permitted to beused

to verify

to test for the absence of voltage of the conductors or circuit parts at the work location, provided itmeets the all following requirements: (1) It is permanently mounted and installed in accordance withthe manufacturer’s instructions and tests the conductors and circuit parts at the point of work; (2) It islisted and labeled for the purpose

of verifying

of testing for the absence of voltage; (3) It tests each phase conductor or circuit part both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground; (4) The test device is verified as operating satisfactorily on any knownvoltage source before and

after verifying

after testing for the absence of voltage.









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As the committee statement for the resolution of PI 383 states the term "de-energized is defined, it is in Article 100 of NFPA 70E but that is not the point. The intent of the PI was to provide consistency in using the terms "test" and "verify" (verified) as explained in the PI substantiation. They are presently used somewhat inconsistently; do we test for the absence of voltage or do we test the test instrument for proper operation? Either use could work but it seems that a test instrument should be used for testing and its proper operation verified. That would also be more consistent with how the word verify (verified) is used elsewhere in NFPA 70E. It also provides consistency with the use of the phrase "absence of voltage" used in other parts of NFPA 70E. In 110.4(E) [110.8(E) in first draft] the word "testing" is used to describe a test for the absence of voltage. The word "verified" is used to describe confirming the test instrument is operating properly. In 120.5(7) the word "verify" is used in the same sentence with the word "test" for testing for the absence of voltage. Then in the last sentence the word "verification" is used for proper operation.

Related Item

• PI 383




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:




120.5(7) : The text of the mandatory requirement and the exceptions were revised for consistent useof the terms “verified,” “deenergized” and “absence of voltage.” The use of the term “verified” will besuch that it is only associated with determining if a test instrument or device is operating properly.This change also correlates with how it is used elsewhere within the 70E Standard. This revisionalso included replacing the term “verified” with “testing for” where it was used with the absence ofvoltage testing. In the opening sentence of the main requirement the action of “verifying” theconductors or circuit parts are “deenergized” was changed to “testing for the absence of voltage.”


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This change is consistent with how the action is stated in the rest of this section, including theexceptions, and within the industry.





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Exception No. 2: On electrical systems over 1000 volts,

noncontact

capacitive test instruments shall be permitted to be used to test each phase conductor , providedthat the grounding requirements of (8) are completed .





(9) Placement. Temporary protective grounding equipment shall be placed at such locations andarranged in such a manner as to prevent each employee from being exposed to a shock hazard(i.e., hazardous differences in electrical potential). The location, sizing, and application oftemporary protective grounding equipment shall be identified as part of the employer’s job

planning.




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equipment.



Exception no. 2 should use the proper terms in order to avoid dangerous confusion.

The term "non-contact" is not defined in product safety standards and is just a colloquial reference to detectors similar to the Salisbury 4x44 Voltage Detector Tester. "Non-contact" or "proximity" testers are properly called "capacitive testers" as they operate through capacitive coupling to an AC electric field. They have the same limitations as a standard low voltage "prox tester", like the Fluke VoltAlert 1AC-A II, which is also a capacitive tester. They will not detect a residual DC charge from stored energy on the lines, and cannot detect voltage on shielded cables. They can, however, detect voltage through bus insulation and on capacitive test buttons on load break elbow connectors.

While all non-contact detector are capacitive, however, some high voltage detectors are capacitive and direct contact. An example of such a detector is the Bierer VD 1000, (https://www.bierermeters.com/shop/product-detail/vd1000). A quick phone call with the manufacturer confirmed that this type of detector also cannot detect DC voltage.

Only a resistive type detector can detect residual DC charge on a line. It requires direct contact and a ground connection and operates on the same principle as a two-pole high impedance digital voltmeter. It should be noted that a true phase-to-phase absence of voltage test above 1000 V can only be performed by a resistive type, direct-contact phasing tester. Allowing a non-contact (therefore capacitive) tester above 1000 V has the same validity and limitations as allowing a proximity tester for 480 VAC. So if a qualified person relies on a capacitive type tester (non-contact or contact, doesn't matter), then grounding should be mandatory.

By retaining the term "non-contact", persons may think that a direct contact capacitive tester has the same validity as a direct contact resistive type detector, and falsely believe there is no potential for residual stored energy. This can be fatal if grounding is not performed to discharge stored energy. About 1000 feet of Okinite 15 kV - 500 kcmil medium voltage insulated cable can have enough capacitance (126 pF/foot per manufacturer's datasheet) for greater than 10 Joules of stored energy.

See the definitions in the standards listed in Informational Note 2: - IEC 61243-1, Live Working — Voltage Detectors — Part 1: Capacitive type to be used for voltages exceeding 1kV a.c.- IEC 61243-2, Live Working — Voltage Detectors — Part 2: Resistive type to be used for voltages of 1kV to 36 kV a.c.- IEC 61243-3, Live Working — Voltage Detectors — Part 3: Two-pole low voltage type.

See also: - ASTM F1796 − 09(r14), Standard Specification for High Voltage Detectors—Part 1 Capacitive Type to be Used for Voltages Exceeding 600 Volts AC, and - ASTM F2939 − 13, Standard Specification for High Voltage Phasing Testers, (distinguishes between Type 1, resistive, and Type 2, capacitive).

Related Item

• Public Input No. 224-NFPA 70E-2018




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


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Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:









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equipment.


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2019_NFPA_70E_Recommended_change.docx 2019 NFPA 70E Recommended change


2019 NFPA 70E Article 120.5120.5(6) needs to be placed in front of:120.5(4) & (5)

By placing a lock on the equipment, it will make it safer to perform the task of releasing stored energy and releasing or blocking mechanical energy.Our personnel are not authorized to enter a piece of equipment unless a lock is placed on the isolation devices. This way it is impossible for them to forget to place a lock on the equipment prior to removing guards to perform releasing stored energy or releasing/blocking mechanical energy.

Related Item

• OSHA 10190.147


Submitter Full Name: James Kostura

Organization: Waupaca Foundry Inc Plant 4

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Mon Mar 11 13:31:53 EDT 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: Having “if feasible” in the opening paragraph allows the user to change the order asnecessary.


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2019 NFPA 70E Article 120.5

120.5(6) needs to be placed in front of:

120.5(4) & (5)

By placing a lock on the equipment, it will make it safer to perform the task of releasing stored energy and releasing or blocking mechanical energy.

Our personnel are not authorized to enter a piece of equipment unless a lock is placed on the isolation devices. This way it is impossible for them to forget to place a lock on the equipment prior to removing guards to perform releasing stored energy or releasing/blocking mechanical energy.



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Electrical conductors and circuit parts shall not be considered to be in an electrically safe work conditionuntil all of the requirements of Article 120 have been met. Establishing and verifying an electrically safework condition shall also include all of the following steps, which shall be performed in the order presented,if feasible:

















equipment.


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The requirement "Electrical conductors and circuit parts shall not be considered to be in an electrically safe work condition until all of the requirements of Article 120 have been met." was removed from 120.2(A) by the action of FR-17. There was also an Informational Note reference to 120.5. This essential clarification must not be lost. It is logically relocated where it applies in 120.5.

Related Item

• FR-17




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The requirement is already established in Article 110 and including it in 120.5 would beredundant.


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(7) Use an adequately rated portable test instrument to test each phase conductor or circuit part to verify itis de-energized. Perform this test either inside the cabinet or outside the cabinet through a permanently

mounted device rated for the application. Where a permanently mounted device is installed, it shall be installed

in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and the leads shall be connected to the conductors and circuit

parts at the point of work. The permanently mounted device shall be listed and labeled for the purpose of

voltage measurement testing. Test each phase conductor or circuit part both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground. Before and after each test, determine that the test instrument is operating satisfactorilythrough verification on any known voltage source.












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There is at least one new listed and labeled product on the market rated for this type of application. These devices are installed on the outside of cabinets and their conductors are connected to the source of electrical energy (point of work). Because of these new devices, testing for the absence of voltage can be performed outside the cabinet with the cabinet door(s) closed. People need to know it is permissible to install and use these type of devices that can make the workplace safer. These new provisions need to be part of the main text because a person still has to use an adequately rated portable test instrument to test each phase conductor or circuit part to verify it is deenergized.

Related Item

• Public Input No. 101 and Public Input No. 119


Submitter Full Name: Charles Miller

Organization: Lighthouse Educational Service

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected



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(5) Release or block stored mechanical energy. Block or relieve stored non-electrical energy in devicesthat could re-energize electric circuit parts to the extent that the electric circuit parts could not beaccidentally inadvertently re- energized by the device such devices .














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The intention of Public Input No. 193 was to revise the 120.5(5) requirement to block or relieve stored energy to be consistent with OSHA 1910.333(b)(2)(ii)(D). As written, 120.5(5) now contains redundancy and inconsistency (i.e. “release (relieve) or block” is mentioned three times). Further, the Technical Committee purposely replaced all occurrences of word “accident” with “incident” and “accidental” with “inadvertent” or “unintentional” in the 2018 edition to be consistent with current safety terminology.The proposed revision seeks to:• Retain the objective of PI-193 and remove the redundancy and inconsistency created by FR-40 • Replace “accidental” with “inadvertent” to be consistent with previous actions by the Technical Committee

For reference purposes, OSHA 1910.333(b)(2)(ii)(D) states: “Stored non-electrical energy in devices that could re-energize electric circuit parts shall be blocked or relieved to the extent that the circuit parts could not be inadvertently energized by the device.”

Note: TerraView also underlined almost half of 120.5. The only proposed revision is to replace 120.5(5) with the following: (5) Block or relieve stored non-electrical energy in devices to the extent that electric circuit parts could be inadvertently re-energized by such devices.

Related Item

• FR-40




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:






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Exception No. 1: An adequately rated permanently mounted

test device

absence of voltage tester shall be permitted to be used to verify the absence of voltage of theconductors or circuit parts at the work location, provided it meets the all following requirements: (1) Itis permanently mounted and installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and teststhe conductors and circuit parts at the point of work; (2) It is listed and labeled for the purpose ofverifying the absence of voltage; (3) It tests each phase conductor or circuit part both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground; (4) The test device is verified as operating satisfactorily on any knownvoltage source before and after verifying the absence of voltage.



Informational Note No. 2: For additional information on rating and design requirements forpermanently mounted absence of voltage testers, refer to UL 1436, Outlet Circuit Testers andOther Similar Indicating Devices .






equipment.


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The terminology used in Exception No. 1 and Informational Note No. 2 is inconsistent. Suggest using "permanently mounted absence of voltage tester" in both Exception 1 and Informational Note No. 2 for clarity.

The 6th Edition of UL 1436 (published September 6, 2016) added requirements for Absence of Voltage Testers (AVTs). In UL 1436 AVTs are defined as, "a permanently-mounted test device that is used to verify that a circuit is de-energized prior to opening an electrical enclosure that contains energized electrical conductors and circuit parts. An AVT is provided with a test circuit with active indications to verify the absence of phase-to-phase voltage and phase-to-ground voltage. AVTs are provided with a test circuit and visual indicators to confirm that the tester is functioning properly before and after the process of determining that voltage is absence."

Adding the term "absence of voltage tester" to Exception 1 uses an industry-defined term and helps bring clarity to the type of permanently mounted devices described in this Exception, avoiding confusion with LED style voltage indicators, or impedance protected test leads which are also permanently installed but do not test for absence of voltage.

Adding the term "permanently mounted" to Informational Note 2 clarifies that the AVT listing requirements are applicable to Exception 1.

Related Item

• FR-40, PI-285


Submitter Full Name: Rachel Bugaris

Organization: Panduit Corp.

Affiliation: Panduit Corp.

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:




120.5(7) : The text of the mandatory requirement and the exceptions were revised for consistent useof the terms “verified,” “deenergized” and “absence of voltage.” The use of the term “verified” will besuch that it is only associated with determining if a test instrument or device is operating properly.This change also correlates with how it is used elsewhere within the 70E Standard. This revisionalso included replacing the term “verified” with “testing for” where it was used with the absence ofvoltage testing. In the opening sentence of the main requirement the action of “verifying” theconductors or circuit parts are “deenergized” was changed to “testing for the absence of voltage.”


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This change is consistent with how the action is stated in the rest of this section, including theexceptions, and within the industry.





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Informational

No. 2: For additional information on rating and design requirements for absence of voltagetesters, refer to UL 1436, Outlet Circuit Testers and Other Similar IndicatingDevices .Informational

Note No. 3: For additional information on rating and design requirements forvoltage detectors, refer to IEC 61243-1, Live Working — Voltage Detectors —Part 1: Capacitive type to be used for voltages exceeding 1kV a.c. , or IEC 61243-2,Live Working — Voltage Detectors — Part 2: Resistive type to be used for voltagesof 1kV to 36 kV a.c. , or IEC 61243-3, Live Working — Voltage Detectors — Part 3:Two-pole low voltage type .


(9) Placement. Temporary protective grounding equipment shall be placed at such locations andarranged in such a manner as to prevent each employee from being exposed to a shock hazard(i.e., hazardous differences in electrical potential). The location, sizing, and application oftemporary protective grounding equipment shall be identified as part of the employer’s job

planning.




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equipment.



Should NFPA 70E wait until the next revision cycle to reference UL-1436 in informational note and give it more time to mature?

Consensus standards play a vital role in the creation of safer products. The inclusion of new exception no.1 in Article 120.5 (7) in the 2018 edition and the development of the UL 1436 standard sets the stage for the long process of developing absence of voltage tester products with unsurpassed reliability, especially for those whose lives will depend on an AVT. The GFCI outlet serves as a good example of a world class lifesaving electrical safety device, which took over 4 decades and five major revisions to the UL-943 to reach this goal. Likewise, UL-61010-1 is on its 3rd major edition.

The first draft of the UL 1436 Section 12 Absence of Tester (9/6/2016) specification sets forth the product design features, definitions, and certification standards that UL required for AVTs to function reliably and safely in every commercial and industrial power distribution systems. Even though informational notes are “for information only”, the inclusion of the Informational note 2 (referring to UL 1436) for the 120.5 (7) New Exception no.1 text should be postponed until UL-1436 has gone through several revision cycles similar to other product standards such as UL943 & UL 6101 and the resultant AVT products have a proven record in the field.

Related Item

• PI285


Submitter Full Name: Philip Allen

Organization: Grace Engineered Products, Inc.

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:




120.5(7) : The text of the mandatory requirement and the exceptions were revised for consistent useof the terms “verified,” “deenergized” and “absence of voltage.” The use of the term “verified” will besuch that it is only associated with determining if a test instrument or device is operating properly.This change also correlates with how it is used elsewhere within the 70E Standard. This revisionalso included replacing the term “verified” with “testing for” where it was used with the absence ofvoltage testing. In the opening sentence of the main requirement the action of “verifying” theconductors or circuit parts are “deenergized” was changed to “testing for the absence of voltage.”This change is consistent with how the action is stated in the rest of this section, including the


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exceptions, and within the industry.





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130.1 General.

Article 130 covers requirements for work involving electrical hazards such as the electrical safety-relatedwork practices, assessments, precautions, and procedures when an electrically safe work condition cannotbe established.

Safety-related work practices shall be used to safeguard employees from injury while they are exposed toelectrical hazards from electrical conductors or circuit parts that are or can become energized.

When energized electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at voltages equal to or greater than 50volts are not put into an electrically safe work condition, and work is performed as permitted in accordancewith 110.6, all of the following requirements shall apply:

(1) Only qualified persons shall be permitted to work on electrical conductors or circuit parts that have notbeen put into an electrically safe work condition.

(2) An energized electrical work permit shall be completed as required by 110 130 .3 2 .

(3) A shock risk assessment shall be performed as required by 130.4.

(4) An arc flash risk assessment shall be performed as required by 130.5.

All requirements of Article 130 shall apply whether an incident energy analysis is completed or if Table130.7(C)(15)(a), Table 130.7(C)(15)(b), and Table 130.7(C)(15)(c) are used in lieu of an incident energyanalysis.


Errata: The reference to the work permit requirement should be 130.2, not 110.3.

Related Item

• FR-93




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement



Statement: Editorially correct the reference in 130.1(2) from 110.3 to 130.2 and from 110.6 to 110.4


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130.1 General.

Article 130 covers requirements for work involving electrical hazards such as the electrical safety-relatedwork practices, assessments, precautions, and procedures when an electrically safe work condition cannotbe established.

Safety-related work practices shall be used to safeguard employees from injury while they are exposed toelectrical hazards from electrical conductors or circuit parts that are or can become energized.

When energized electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at voltages equal to or greater than 50volts are not put into an electrically safe work condition, and work is performed as permitted in accordancewith 110.6, all of the following requirements shall apply:

(1) Only qualified persons shall be permitted to work on electrical conductors or circuit parts that have notbeen put into an electrically safe work condition.

(2) An energized electrical work permit shall be completed as required by 110 130 .3 . 2

(3) A shock risk assessment shall be performed as required by 130.4.

(4) An arc flash risk assessment shall be performed as required by 130.5.

All requirements of Article 130 shall apply whether an incident energy analysis is completed or if Table130.7(C)(15)(a), Table 130.7(C)(15)(b), and Table 130.7(C)(15)(c) are used in lieu of an incident energyanalysis.


Revise section number to correctly identify section 130.2 Energized Electrical Work Permit.

Related Item

• FR-41



Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement



Statement: Editorially correct the reference in 130.1(2) from 110.3 to 130.2 and from 110.6 to 110.4


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Public Comment No. 103-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 130.4(F)(3) ]

(3) Entering the Limited Approach Boundary.

Where there is a need for an unqualified person(s) to cross the limited approach boundary, a qualifiedperson shall advise the unqualified person(s) of the possible hazards and continuously escort theunqualified person(s) while inside the limited approach boundary. The qualified person escorting theunqualified person(s) shall have no unrelated duties. Under no circumstance shall unqualified person(s)be permitted to cross the restricted approach boundary.


The text added to 130.4(F)(3) introduces the phrase "unrelated duties". This is quite vague and will generate more questions than answers. The proposed change strikes out the new sentence added by FR-44 until "unrelated duties" is better defined.

Related Item

• FR-44





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement



Statement: This eliminates the ambiguity of the phrase "unrelated duties".


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(C) Additional Protective Measures.


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If additional protective measures are required they shall be selected and implemented according to thehierarchy of risk control identified in 110.5(H)(3). When the additional protective measures include the useof PPE, the following shall be determined:

(1) Appropriate safety-related work practices

(2) The arc flash boundary

(3) The PPE to be used within the arc flash boundary

Table 130.5(C) shall be permitted to be used to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of an arc flash eventto determine if additional protective measures are required.

Table 130.5(C) Estimate of the Likelihood of Occurrence of an Arc Flash Incident for ac and dc Systems

TaskEquipmentCondition

Likelihood ofOccurrence*

Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch.

Any No

Performing infrared thermography and other non-contactinspections outside the restricted approach boundary. Thisactivity does not include opening of doors or covers.

Working on control circuits with exposed energized electricalconductors and circuit parts, nominal 125 volts ac or dc, orbelow without any other exposed energized equipment overnominal 125 volts ac or dc, including opening of hinged coversto gain access.

Examination of insulated cable with no manipulation of cable.

For dc systems, maintenance on a single cell of a batterysystem or multi-cell units in an open rack.

For ac systems, work on energized electrical conductors andcircuit parts, including electrical testing.

Any Yes

Operation of a CB or switch the first time after installation orcompletion of maintenance in the equipment.

For dc systems, working on energized electrical conductors andcircuit parts of series-connected battery cells, including electricaltesting.

Removal or installation of CBs or switches.

Opening hinged door(s) or cover(s) or removal of bolted covers(to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuitparts). For dc systems, this includes bolted covers, such asbattery terminal covers.

Application of temporary protective grounding equipment, aftervoltage test.

Working on control circuits with exposed energized electricalconductors and circuit parts, greater than 120 volts.

Insertion or removal of individual starter buckets from motorcontrol center (MCC).

Insertion or removal (racking) of circuit breakers (CBs) orstarters from cubicles, doors open or closed.

Insertion or removal of plug-in devices into or from busways.

Examination of insulated cable with manipulation of cable.

Working on exposed energized electrical conductors and circuitparts of equipment directly supplied by a panelboard or motorcontrol center.

Insertion or removal of revenue meters (kW-hour, at primaryvoltage and current).

Insertion or removal of covers for battery intercell connector(s).

For dc systems, working on exposed energized electricalconductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment directlysupplied by a dc source.


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Opening voltage transformer or control power transformercompartments.

Operation of outdoor disconnect switch (hookstick operated) at 1kV through 15 kV.

Operation of outdoor disconnect switch (gang-operated, fromgrade) at 1 kV through 15 kV.

Operation of a CB, switch, contactor, or starter. Normal No

Voltage testing on individual battery cells or individual multi-cellunits.

Abnormal Yes

Removal or installation of covers for equipment such aswireways, junction boxes, and cable trays that does not exposebare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts.

Opening a panelboard hinged door or cover to access deadfront overcurrent devices.

Removal of battery nonconductive intercell connector covers.

Maintenance and testing on individual battery cells or individualmulti-cell units in an open rack

Insertion or removal of individual cells or multi-cell units of abattery system in an open rack.

Arc-resistant equipment with the DOORS CLOSED andSECURED, and where the available fault current and faultclearing time does not exceed that of the arc-resistant rating ofthe equipment.

Insertion or removal of individual starter buckets.

Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles;

Insertion or removal (racking) of ground and test device; or

Insertion or removal (racking) of voltage transformers on or offthe bus.

Equipment is considered to be in a “normal operating condition”if all of the conditions in 130 in 110 . 2 3 ( A D ) (4) are satisfied.

*As defined in this standard, the two components of risk are the likelihood of occurrence of injury ordamage to health and the severity of injury or damage to health that results from a hazard. Riskassessment is an overall process that involves estimating both the likelihood of occurrence and severity todetermine if additional protective measures are required. The estimate of the likelihood of occurrencecontained in this table does not cover every possible condition or situation, nor does it address severity ofinjury or damage to health. Where this table identifies “No” as an estimate of likelihood of occurrence, itmeans that an arc flash incident is not likely to occur. Where this table identifies “Yes” as an estimate oflikelihood of occurrence, it means an arc flash incident should be considered likely to occur. The likelihoodof occurrence must be combined with the potential severity of the arcing incident to determine if additionalprotective measures are required to be selected and implemented according to the hierarchy of risk controlidentified in 110. 1 5 (H)(3) .

An example of a standard that provides information for arc-resistant equipment referred to in Table 130.5(C)is IEEE C37.20.7, Guide for Testing Switchgear Rated Up to 52 kV for Internal Arcing Faults.

Improper or inadequate maintenance can result in increased fault clearing time of the overcurrent protectivedevice, thus increasing the incident energy. Where equipment is not properly installed or maintained, PPEselection based on incident energy analysis or the PPE category method might not provide adequateprotection from arc flash hazards.

Both larger and smaller available fault currents could result in higher incident energy. If the available faultcurrent increases without a decrease in the fault clearing time of the overcurrent protective device, theincident energy will increase. If the available fault current decreases, resulting in a longer fault clearing timefor the overcurrent protective device, incident energy could also increase.

The occurrence of an arcing fault inside an enclosure produces a variety of physical phenomena verydifferent from a bolted fault. For example, the arc energy resulting from an arc developed in the air willcause a sudden pressure increase and localized overheating. Equipment and design practices areavailable to minimize the energy levels and the number of procedures that could expose an employee to


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high levels of incident energy. Proven designs such as arc-resistant switchgear, remote racking (insertion orremoval), remote opening and closing of switching devices, high-resistance grounding of low-voltage and5000-volt (nominal) systems, current limitation, and specification of covered bus or covered conductorswithin equipment are available to reduce the risk associated with an arc flash incident. See InformativeAnnex O for safety-related design requirements.

For additional direction for performing maintenance on overcurrent protective devices, see Chapter 2,Safety-Related Maintenance Requirements.

See IEEE 1584, Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations, for more information regardingincident energy and the arc flash boundary for three-phase systems.


Errata:1. Table 130.5(C) in the arc-resistant section: The reference "normal operating condition" should be 110.3(D), not 130.2(A)(4) 2. Asterisk note, first paragraph, last sentence: The reference to the hierarchy of risk control should be 110.5(H)(3), not 110.1(H)(3).

Related Item

• FR-45




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: The four tasks related to arc resistant equipment are editorially revised into list items to indicatethat they only apply to that type of equipment.

The “normal operating condition” note is relocated from the table to the notes below the table as itis not a task. This requires identification in the title of the Table with a superscript a for equipmentcondition and a superscript b for likelihood of occurrence.

The section reference to the hierarchy of risk control methods is editorially revised.


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(C) Additional Protective Measures.


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If additional protective measures are required they shall be selected and implemented according to thehierarchy of risk control identified in 110.5(H)(3). When the additional protective measures include the useof PPE, the following shall be determined:

(1) Appropriate safety-related work practices

(2) The arc flash boundary

(3) The PPE to be used within the arc flash boundary

Table 130.5(C) shall be permitted to be used to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of an arc flash eventto determine if additional protective measures are required. Equipment is considered to be in a “normaloperating condition” if all of the conditions in 130.2(A)(4) are satisfied.

Table 130.5(C) Estimate of the Likelihood of Occurrence of an Arc Flash Incident for ac and dc Systems



Reading a panel meter while operating ameter switch.

Any No

Performing infrared thermography andother non-contact inspections outside therestricted approach boundary. This activitydoes not include opening of doors orcovers.

Working on control circuits with exposedenergized electrical conductors and circuitparts, nominal 125 volts ac or dc, or belowwithout any other exposed energizedequipment over nominal 125 volts ac or dc,including opening of hinged covers to gainaccess.

Examination of insulated cable with nomanipulation of cable.

For dc systems, maintenance on a singlecell of a battery system or multi-cell units inan open rack.

For ac systems, work on energizedelectrical conductors and circuit parts,including electrical testing.

Any Yes

Operation of a CB or switch the first timeafter installation or completion ofmaintenance in the equipment.

For dc systems, working on energizedelectrical conductors and circuit parts ofseries-connected battery cells, includingelectrical testing.

Removal or installation of CBs or switches.

Opening hinged door(s) or cover(s) orremoval of bolted covers (to expose bare,energized electrical conductors and circuitparts). For dc systems, this includes boltedcovers, such as battery terminal covers.

Application of temporary protectivegrounding equipment, after voltage test.

Working on control circuits with exposedenergized electrical conductors and circuitparts, greater than 120 volts.

Insertion or removal of individual starterbuckets from motor control center (MCC).


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Insertion or removal (racking) of circuitbreakers (CBs) or starters from cubicles,doors open or closed.

Insertion or removal of plug-in devices intoor from busways.

Examination of insulated cable withmanipulation of cable.

Working on exposed energized electricalconductors and circuit parts of equipmentdirectly supplied by a panelboard or motorcontrol center.

Insertion or removal of revenue meters(kW-hour, at primary voltage and current).

Insertion or removal of covers for batteryintercell connector(s).

For dc systems, working on exposedenergized electrical conductors and circuitparts of utilization equipment directlysupplied by a dc source.

Opening voltage transformer or controlpower transformer compartments.

Operation of outdoor disconnect switch(hookstick operated) at 1 kV through 15 kV.

Operation of outdoor disconnect switch(gang-operated, from grade) at 1 kVthrough 15 kV.

Operation of a CB, switch, contactor, orstarter.

Normal No

Voltage testing on individual battery cells orindividual multi-cell units.

Abnormal Yes

Removal or installation of covers forequipment such as wireways, junctionboxes, and cable trays that does notexpose bare, energized electricalconductors and circuit parts.

Opening a panelboard hinged door or coverto access dead front overcurrent devices.

Removal of battery nonconductive intercellconnector covers.

Maintenance and testing on individualbattery cells or individual multi-cell units inan open rack

Insertion or removal of individual cells ormulti-cell units of a battery system in anopen rack.

Arc-resistant equipment with the DOORSCLOSED and SECURED, and where theavailable fault current and fault clearingtime does not exceed that of the arc-resistant rating of the equipment. :

Insertion Insertionor removal ofindividual starterbuckets.

Insertion Insertionor removal (racking)of CBs from


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cubicles;

Insertion Insertionor removal (racking)of ground and testdevice; or

Insertion Insertionor removal (racking)of voltagetransformers on oroff the bus.

Equipment is considered to be in a “normaloperating condition” if all of the conditionsin 130.2(A)(4) are satisfied.

*As defined in this standard, the two components of risk are the likelihood of occurrence of injury ordamage to health and the severity of injury or damage to health that results from a hazard. Riskassessment is an overall process that involves estimating both the likelihood of occurrence and severity todetermine if additional protective measures are required. The estimate of the likelihood of occurrencecontained in this table does not cover every possible condition or situation, nor does it address severity ofinjury or damage to health. Where this table identifies “No” as an estimate of likelihood of occurrence, itmeans that an arc flash incident is not likely to occur. Where this table identifies “Yes” as an estimate oflikelihood of occurrence, it means an arc flash incident should be considered likely to occur. The likelihoodof occurrence must be combined with the potential severity of the arcing incident to determine if additionalprotective measures are required to be selected and implemented according to the hierarchy of risk controlidentified in 110.1(H)(3).

An example of a standard that provides information for arc-resistant equipment referred to in Table 130.5(C)is IEEE C37.20.7, Guide for Testing Switchgear Rated Up to 52 kV for Internal Arcing Faults.

Improper or inadequate maintenance can result in increased fault clearing time of the overcurrent protectivedevice, thus increasing the incident energy. Where equipment is not properly installed or maintained, PPEselection based on incident energy analysis or the PPE category method might not provide adequateprotection from arc flash hazards.

Both larger and smaller available fault currents could result in higher incident energy. If the available faultcurrent increases without a decrease in the fault clearing time of the overcurrent protective device, theincident energy will increase. If the available fault current decreases, resulting in a longer fault clearing timefor the overcurrent protective device, incident energy could also increase.

The occurrence of an arcing fault inside an enclosure produces a variety of physical phenomena verydifferent from a bolted fault. For example, the arc energy resulting from an arc developed in the air willcause a sudden pressure increase and localized overheating. Equipment and design practices areavailable to minimize the energy levels and the number of procedures that could expose an employee tohigh levels of incident energy. Proven designs such as arc-resistant switchgear, remote racking (insertion orremoval), remote opening and closing of switching devices, high-resistance grounding of low-voltage and5000-volt (nominal) systems, current limitation, and specification of covered bus or covered conductorswithin equipment are available to reduce the risk associated with an arc flash incident. See InformativeAnnex O for safety-related design requirements.

For additional direction for performing maintenance on overcurrent protective devices, see Chapter 2,Safety-Related Maintenance Requirements.

See IEEE 1584, Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations, for more information regardingincident energy and the arc flash boundary for three-phase systems.


The tasks listed under arc-resistant switchgear are not readily distinguishable as such. Consider indenting these items to increase clarity of the table. The last item, "Equipment is considered to be in a “normal operating condition” if all of the conditions in 130.2(A)(4) are satisfied.", is not a task, and should be moved to either the main body of the text or to an informational note, or otherwise differentiated from the list of tasks in the table.

Related Item

• FR-45-NFPA 70E-2018


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Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: The four tasks related to arc resistant equipment are editorially revised into list items to indicatethat they only apply to that type of equipment.

The “normal operating condition” note is relocated from the table to the notes below the table as itis not a task. This requires identification in the title of the Table with a superscript a for equipmentcondition and a superscript b for likelihood of occurrence.

The section reference to the hierarchy of risk control methods is editorially revised.


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Public Comment No. 125-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 130.5(G) ]


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(G) Incident Energy Analysis Method.


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The incident energy exposure level shall be based on the working distance of the employee’s face andchest areas from a prospective arc source for the specific task to be performed. Arc-rated clothing andother PPE shall be used by the employee based on the incident energy exposure associated with thespecific task. Recognizing that incident energy increases as the distance from the arc flash decreases,additional PPE shall be used for any parts of the body that are closer than the working distance at whichthe incident energy was determined.

The incident energy analysis shall take into consideration the characteristics of the overcurrent protectivedevice and its fault clearing time, including its condition of maintenance.

The incident energy analysis shall be updated when changes occur in the electrical distribution system thatcould affect the results of the analysis. The incident energy analysis shall also be reviewed for accuracy atintervals not to exceed 5 years.

Table 130.5(G) identifies the arc-rated clothing and other PPE requirements of Article 130 and shall bepermitted to be used with the incident energy analysis method of selecting arc flash PPE.

Informational Note: For information on estimating the incident energy, see Informative Annex D. Forinformation on selection of arc-rated clothing and other PPE, see Informative Annex H.

Table 130.5(G) Selection of Arc-Rated Clothing and Other PPE When the Incident Energy AnalysisMethod Is Used

Incident energy exposures equal to 1.2 cal/cm2 up to and including 12 cal/cm2

Arc-rated clothing with an arc rating equal to or greater than the estimated incident energya

Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt and pants or arc-rated coverall or arc flash suit (SR)

Arc-rated face shield and arc-rated balaclava or arc flash suit hood (SR)b

Arc-rated outerwear (e.g., jacket, parka, rainwear, hard hat liner, high-visibility safety apparel) (AN)

Heavy-duty leather gloves, arc-rated gloves, or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (SR)c

Hard hat

Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR)

Hearing protection

Leather footweard

Incident energy exposures greater than 12 cal/cm2

Arc-rated clothing with an arc rating equal to or greater than the estimated incident energya

Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt and pants or arc-rated coverall or arc flash suit (SR)

Arc-rated arc flash suit hood

Arc-rated outerwear (e.g., jacket, parka, rainwear, hard hat liner, high-visibility safety apparel) (AN)

Arc-rated gloves or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (SR)c

Hard hat


Hearing protection

Leather footweard

SR: Selection of one in group is required.

AN: As needed.

aArc ratings can be for a single layer, such as an arc-rated shirt and pants or a coverall, or for an arc flashsuit or a multi-layer system if tested as a combination consisting of an arc-rated shirt and pants, coverall,and arc flash suit.

bFace shields with a wrap-around guarding to protect the face, chin, forehead, ears, and neck area arerequired by 130.7(C)(10)(c). Where the back of the head is inside the arc flash boundary, a balaclava or anarc flash hood shall be required for full head and neck protection.

cRubber insulating gloves with leather protectors provide arc flash protection in addition to shockprotection. Higher class rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors, due to their increased materialthickness, provide increased arc flash protection.

dFootwear other than leather or dielectric shall be permitted to be used provided it has been tested todemonstrate no ignition, melting, or dripping at the estimated incident energy exposure.


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e, Outwear shall not be required to have a rating that is equal to or greater than the incident energy

exposure, but shall be arc rated, if the system rating below the outwear is sufficient for the exposure.


Outwear such as high visibility safety apparel might not be available that has an arc rating to be suitable for the exposure. If it is worn over other arc rated PPE that has sufficient arc rating that should be acceptable.

Related Item

• FR 46




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: The phrase “high-visibility safety apparel” is revised to “high-visibility apparel” as the word “safety” isnot necessary. This revision correlates with the reference to “high-visibility apparel” in Table 130.7(C)(15)(c).

A new note (e) was added to outerwear to clarify that the rating of outerwear that is worn over arc-rated PPE, not as part of a layered system, but as protection from the elements or for other safetypurposes is not required to be equal to or greater than the estimated incident energy exposure.When outerwear is worn over arc-rated PPE that has an arc rating equal to or greater than theestimated incident energy exposure, the arc rating of the outerwear is primarily for the purposes ofensuring it has flame resistant properties if it is exposed to electrical arc discharge energy.


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Public Comment No. 59-NFPA 70E-2019 [ New Section after 130.5(H) ]

IN: Less than 5% an sta c conduc ve fibers in flame resistant clothing are included in many fabrics for sta c

dissipa on. These fibers have been tested and found to be less conduc ve than sweat and do not pose a hazard

or arc flash or shock.


The statements about "conductive" apparel have been improperly used to discriminate against fabrics which indicate that they use a "conductive" fiber. Many synthetic materials properly indicate that they contain a "conductive" fiber. These are for static dissipation and add NO shock hazard. These are quite common in materials like Nomex, Protera, Kermel and others and are arc rated. This note will clarify while also placing a limit unlike my last rejected comment.

Related Item

• PI 242




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: This suggestion was included in public input 242 which was rejected due to a lack of technicalsubstantiation. This public comment is rejected for the same lack of technical substantiation. Nodata was provided to support any amount of antistatic material in arc rated clothing with respect toincreased shock or arc flash exposure.


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Public Comment No. 131-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 130.7(C)(1) ]

(1) General.

When an employee is working within the restricted approach boundary, the worker shall wear PPE inaccordance with 130.4. When an employee is working within the arc flash boundary, he or she shall wearprotective clothing and other PPE in accordance with 130.5. All parts of the body inside the arc flashboundary shall be protected.

Exception: For the purpose of testing for the absence of voltage, PPE with an arc rating at least half of the

incident energy can be used under the following conditions to significantly reduce the risk of equipment

being energized:

(1) arc rated PPE commercially available at the incident energy of the exposure

(2) electrical field sensing instruments (non-contact proximity testers) are used to sense there is no voltage

prior to testing for the absence of voltage

(2) if equipment design allows, observe visible gaps between the equipment and electrical source(s) such

as in cutouts

Informational Note: Although PPE is required for all parts of the body within the arc flash boundary,similar PPE can be used for parts of the body outside the arc flash boundary to reduce the likelihoodof injury due to sound or the expulsion of burning particles or other projectiles.


The committee statement for resolved PI 359 does not address the problem. It is not just about using additional measures to reduce risk; it is about not being able to wear or use PPE that is rated for the incident energy. Presently employees must wear PPE that is rated for the exposure while establishing an electrically safe work condition including testing for the absence of voltage. What if there is no arc rated PPE available such as for a 200 cal/cm2 incident energy level at 3 ft. How can testing be done for an existing installation. Employers desiring to create an electrically safe work condition can not comply with the required PPE because it does not exist. There is no substantiation for half rating of the PPE so it can be changed or removed if desired. Arc Flash suits are available rated at 100 cal/cm2 and more which would provide some protection for a 200 cal/cm2 exposure with a very low risk of being energized. Possibly there is a better location for this exception elsewhere in the standard.

Related Item

• PI 359




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:




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Statement: The addition of the informational note (during the First Draft stage) to suggest the use of similar PPEwhen outside the arc flash boundary is unnecessary and has the potential of blurring the shock andarc flash boundaries. One can always be more conservative than the Standard.

A new informational note has been added to provide guidance for specific high incident energyinstances where commercially available PPE is not available to comply with the requirements ofSection 130.5. By applying one or more of the suggested risk reduction methods, the likelihood ofan arcing event occurring, and the severity of injury may be reduced when incident energy at theworking distance exceeds the available arc rated of commercially available PPE.


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(1) General.


Informational Note: Although arc rated PPE is required for all parts of the body within the arc flashboundary, similar PPE can may have to be used worn for parts of the body outside the arc flashboundary to reduce the likelihood of injury due to sound or the expulsion of burning particles or otherprojectiles.


The informational note could lead users to interpret similar PPE as optional. Article 130.7(C)(3) & (4) require hardhats and safety glasses for protection against expulsion of burning particles or other projectiles, independent of the arc flash hazard and arc flash boundary.The proposed change keeps mandatory language out of the information note but informs the user that PPE is required outside the arc flash boundary in some instances.

Related Item

• FR-47



Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The proposed revision does not add clarity or usability. See the action of SR-26 which deletesthe informational note.


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(1) General.


Informational Note: Although PPE is required for all parts of the body within the arc flash boundary,similar PPE can be used for parts of the body outside the arc flash boundary to reduce the likelihoodof injury due to sound or the expulsion of burning particles or other projectiles.


The new informational note added by FR-47 should be deleted. The addition of the informational note to suggest the use of similar PPE when outside the arc flash boundary is unnecessary and has the potential of blurring the shock and arc flash boundaries. One can always be more conservative than the Standard. When the Standard begins to add statements such as these suggesting where additional PPE may be worn, overall clarity of the requirements is lost.

Related Item

• FR-47





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: The addition of the informational note (during the First Draft stage) to suggest the use of similar PPEwhen outside the arc flash boundary is unnecessary and has the potential of blurring the shock andarc flash boundaries. One can always be more conservative than the Standard.

A new informational note has been added to provide guidance for specific high incident energyinstances where commercially available PPE is not available to comply with the requirements ofSection 130.5. By applying one or more of the suggested risk reduction methods, the likelihood ofan arcing event occurring, and the severity of injury may be reduced when incident energy at theworking distance exceeds the available arc rated of commercially available PPE.


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(7) Hand and Arm Protection.

Hand and arm protection shall be provided in accordance with 130.7(C)(7)(a), (C)(7)(b), and (C)(7)(c).

(a) Shock Protection. Employees shall wear rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors wherethere is a danger of hand injury from electric shock due to contact with exposed energized electricalconductors or circuit parts. Employees shall wear rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors and rubberinsulating sleeves where there is a danger of hand and arm injury from electric shock due to contact withexposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. Rubber insulating gloves shall be rated for thevoltage for which the gloves will be exposed. Rubber insulating gloves shall be permitted to be used withoutleather protectors, under the following conditions:

(2) There shall be no activity performed that risks cutting or damaging the glove.

(3) The rubber insulating gloves shall be electrically retested before reuse.

(4) The voltage rating of the rubber insulating gloves shall be reduced by 50 percent for class 00 and byone whole class for classes 0 through 4.

(e) Arc Flash Protection. Hand and arm protection shall be worn where there is possible exposure toarc flash burn. The apparel described in 130.7(C)(10)(d) shall be required for protection of hands fromburns. Arm protection shall be accomplished by the apparel described in 130.7(C)(6).

(f) Maintenance and Use. Electrical protective equipment shall be maintained in a safe, reliablecondition. Insulating equipment shall be inspected for damage before each day’s use and immediatelyfollowing any incident that can reasonably be suspected of having caused damage. Insulating gloves shallbe given an air test, along with the inspection. Maximum use voltages for rubber insulating gloves shall notexceed that specified in Table 130.7(C)(7)(a). The top of the cuff of the protector glove shall be shorter thanthe rolled top of the cuff of the insulating glove by at least the distance specified in Table 130.7(C)(7)(a).

(g) Periodic Electrical Tests. Rubber insulating equipment shall be subjected to periodic electricaltests. Test voltages shall be in accordance with applicable state, federal, or local codes and standards. Themaximum intervals between tests shall not exceed that specified in Table 130.7(C)(7)(b).

Informational Note: See OSHA 29 CFR 1910.137; ASTM F478, Standard Specification for In-ServiceCare of Insulating Line Hose and Covers; ASTM F479, Standard Specification for In-Service Care ofInsulating Blankets; and ASTM F496, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Glovesand Sleeves, which contain information related to in-service and testing requirements for rubberinsulating equipment.

Table 130.7(C)(7)(a) Maximum Use Voltage for Rubber Insulating Gloves

Class Designation ofGlove or Sleeve

Maximum ac UseVoltage rms, volts

Maximum dc UseVoltage avg, volts

Distances BetweenGauntlet and Cuff,

minimum

00 500 750 13 mm (0.5 in.)

0 1,000 1,500 13 mm (0.5 in.)

1 7,500 11,250 25 mm (1 in.)

2 17,000 25,500 51 mm (2 in.)

3 26,500 39,750 76 mm (3 in.)

4 36,000 54,000 102 mm (4 in.)

Table 130.7(C)(7)(b) Rubber Insulating Equipment, Maximum Test Intervals

Rubber Insulating Equipment When to Test

Blankets Before first issue; every 12 months thereafter*

Covers If insulating value is suspect

Gloves Before first issue; every 6 months thereafter*

Line hose If insulating value is suspect

Sleeves Before first issue; every 12 months thereafter*

*New insulating equipment is not permitted to be placed into service unless it has been electrically testedwithin the previous 12 months. Insulating equipment that has been issued for service is not new and isrequired to be retested in accordance with the intervals in this table.


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Errata:The two references in Section 130.7(C)(7)(c) should be to Table 130.7(C)(7)(a), not Section 130.7(C)(7)(a).Note: TerraView also underlined list items (1) to (3) in 130.7(C)(7)(a). The only proposed revision is noted above.

Related Item

• FR-49




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement



Statement: The reference to 130.7(C)(7)(a) is editorially corrected to Table 130.7(C)(7)(a)


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(14) Standards for PPE.


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(a) General. PPE shall conform to applicable state, federal, or local codes and standards.

Informational Note No. 1: The standards listed in Table 130.7(C)(14), which is part of thisInformational Note, are examples of standards that contain information on the care, inspection,testing, and manufacturing of PPE.

Informational Note No. 2: Non-arc-rated or flammable fabrics are not covered by any of thestandards in Table 130.7(C)(14), Informational Note. See 130.7(C)(11) and 130.7(C)(12).

(b) Conformity Assessment. All suppliers or manufacturers of PPE shall demonstrate conformity withan appropriate product standard by one of the following methods:

(3) Self-declaration with a Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity

(4) Self-declaration under a registered quality management system and product testing by an accreditedlaboratory and a Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity

(5) Certification by an accredited independent third-party certification organization

Informational Note No. 1: Examples of a process for conformity assessment to an appropriateproduct standard can be found in ANSI/ISEA 125, American National Standard for ConformityAssessment of Safety and Personal Protective Equipment . See H.4

Informational Note No. 2: An example of a process to accredit independent third-partycertification organizations is ISO 17065, Conformity assessment — Requirements for bodiescertifying products, processes and services .

(f) Marking. All suppliers or manufacturers of PPE shall provide the following information on the PPE,on the smallest unit container, or contained within the manufacturer’s instructions:

(7) Name of manufacturer

(8) Product performance standards to which the product conforms

(9) Arc rating where appropriate for the equipment

(10) One or more identifiers such as model, serial number, lot number, or traceability code

(11) Care instructions

Table 130.7(C)(14) Informational Note: Standards for PPE

Subject Document Title Document Number

Clothing —Arc Rated

Standard PerformanceSpecification for Flame Resistantand Electric Arc Rated ProtectiveClothing Worn by WorkersExposed to Flames and ElectricArc

ASTM F1506

Standard Guide for Industrial Laundering ofFlame, Thermal, and Arc Resistant Clothing

ASTMF1449

Standard Guide for HomeLaundering Care andMaintenance of Flame, Thermaland Arc Resistant Clothing

Live working - Protective clothingagainst the thermal hazards ofan electric arc - Part 1-1: Testmethods - Method 1:Determination of the arc rating(ATPV or EBT50) of flameresistant materials for clothing

Live working - Protective clothingagainst the thermal hazards of

ASTM F2757

IEC 61482-1-1

IEC 61482-2


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an electric arc - Part 2:Requirements

Aprons —Insulating

Standard Specification forElectrically Insulating Aprons

ASTM F2677

Eye andFaceProtection— General

American National Standard forOccupational and EducationalProfessional Eye and FaceProtection

ANSI/ISEA Z87.1

Face — ArcRated

Standard Test Method forDetermining the Arc Rating andStandard Specification forPersonal Eye or Face ProtectiveProducts

ASTM F2178

FallProtection

Standard Specification forPersonal Climbing Equipment

ASTM F887

Footwear —DielectricSpecification

Standard Specification forDielectric Footwear

ASTM F1117

Footwear —DielectricTest Method

Standard Test Method forDetermining Dielectric Strengthof Dielectric Footwear

ASTM F1116

Footwear —StandardPerformanceSpecification

Standard Specification forPerformance Requirements forProtective (Safety) Toe CapFootwear

ASTM F2413

Footwear —StandardTest Method

Standard Test Methods for FootProtections

ASTM F2412

Gloves —Arc Rated

Standard Test Method forDetermining Arc Ratings of HandProtective Products Developedand Used for Electrical Arc FlashProtection

ASTM F2675/F2675M

Gloves —LeatherProtectors

Standard Specification forLeather Protectors for RubberInsulating Gloves and Mittens

ASTM F696

Gloves —RubberInsulating

Standard Specification forRubber Insulating Gloves

ASTM D120

Gloves andSleeves —In-ServiceCare

Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Glovesand Sleeves

ASTM F496

HeadProtection— HardHats

HighVisibility

Apparel 1

American National Standard forHead Protection

High Visibility Apparel American

Na onal Standard for High‐Visibility

Safety Apparel and Accessories

ANSI/ISEA Z89.1

ANSI/ISEA 107

Rainwear —Arc Rated

Standard Specification for Arcand Flame Resistant Rainwear

ASTM F1891

RubberProtectiveProducts —VisualInspection

Standard Guide for VisualInspection of Electrical ProtectiveRubber Products

ASTM F1236


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Sleeves —Insulating

Standard Specification forRubber Insulating Sleeves

ASTM D1051

1 Vests, rainwear or other garments used for increased worker visibility in a workzone which contains riskof arc flash or flames are required by ANSI/ISEA 107 ASTM F1506 or for rainwear ASTM F1891 or theother appropriate arc flash standard.


Adding IEC 61482-1-1 and -2 per PI 258 makes the standard truly international in arc flash. The test method is the same and gives an arc rating just as required in ASTM F1506.

There are several IEC standards mentioned in Annex A for voltage detectors, we should make this more international. The two above standards are equivalent to our F1959 and F1506 and would allow US multinationals and other countries which use NFPA 70E and the NEC to easily pick PPE certified to common standards.

Adding ANSI/ISEA 203 per PI 255 provides guidance for non-melting additional wear for possible chemical exposures. I have seen several incidents when workers were wearing melting contamination suits which caused severe injury in arc flash while also exposed to PCB oil. ANSI/ISEA 203 garments will not allow this additional injury while also being non-contributory. If a company wants to arc rate them as extra protection, it is possible to do with ANSI/ISEA 203 garments.

Related Item

• FR 46, PI 258




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: References to IEC 61482-1-1 and IEC 61482-2 are added. The test methods are similar to theircorresponding ASTM standards.


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Public Comment No. 6-NFPA 70E-2019 [ New Section after 130.7(C)(15) ]

Assign 690V to an Arc Flash PPE Category

There are utility scale wind farms that were constructed in the late 1990s and early 2000s that are still inoperation today. Many of these turbines operate on 400/690VAC, so this type of power has been around forquite a while in the USA. Technicians commonly work inside control panels that could contain this voltage(electrically safing a panel during LOTO for example). As far as I know, the turbines I have worked on werenot evaluated using the incident energy analysis method. At least there's no documentation available orlabels in place on power panels to inform the technician. That leaves the technician to determine Arc Flashboundaries and proper PPE using the tables in NFPA 70E. Table 130.7(C)(150)(a) Arc Flash PPECategories does not list this voltage in any arc flash PPE categories. Since it is higher than 600V, the nextcategories is 1 kV - 15kV. There is quite a jump from PPE category 2 and an Arc Flash boundary of 5 feetfor 600V to PPE Category 4 and an Arc Flash boundary of 40 feet for "other equipment 1kV through 15kV."

I am recommending that the NFPA 70E incorporate 690V into Table 130.7(C)(15)(a).


Clarifying the requirements for Arc Flash PPE for Wind Energy Technicians exposed to 690V systems.

Related Item

• Arc Flash PPE Category


Submitter Full Name: Stephen Hrkach

Organization: Laramie County Comm College

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Fri Feb 22 10:46:16 EST 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: Table 130.7(C )(15)(a) was created based on common nominal voltages such as 600V. Adding avoltage threshold of 690V in some sections of the table requires technical substantiation tocorroborate the adequacy of the PPE specified by the PPE Category Method at such a voltage dueto increased incident energy that may occur.


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(15) Arc Flash PPE Category Method.


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The requirements of 130.7(C)(15) shall apply when the arc flash PPE category method is used for theselection of arc flash PPE.

(a) Alternating Current (ac) Equipment. When the arc flash risk assessment performed in accordancewith 130.5 indicates that arc flash PPE is required and the arc flash PPE category method is used for theselection of PPE for ac systems in lieu of the incident energy analysis of 130.5(G), Table 130.7(C)(15)(a)shall be used to determine the arc flash PPE category. The estimated maximum available fault current,maximum fault-clearing times, and minimum working distances for various ac equipment types orclassifications are listed in Table 130.7(C)(15)(a). An incident energy analysis shall be required inaccordance with 130.5(G) for the following:

(2) Power systems with greater than the estimated maximum available fault current

(3) Power systems with longer than the maximum fault clearing times

(4) Less than the minimum working distance

(e) Direct Current (dc) Equipment. When the arc flash risk assessment performed in accordance with130.5(G) indicates that arc flash PPE is required and the arc flash PPE category method is used for theselection of PPE for dc systems in lieu of the incident energy analysis of 130.5(G), Table 130.7(C)(15)(b)shall be used to determine the arc flash PPE category. The estimated maximum available fault current,maximum arc duration, and working distances for dc equipment are listed in 130.7(C)(15)(b). An incidentenergy analysis shall be required in accordance with 130.5(G) for the following:


(7) Power systems with longer than the maximum arc duration


Informational Note No.1: The arc flash PPE category of the protective clothing and equipment isgenerally based on determination of the estimated exposure level.

Informational Note No.2: In most cases, closed doors do not provide enough protection toeliminate the need for PPE in situations in which the state of the equipment is known to readilychange (e.g., doors open or closed, rack in or rack out).

(i) Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Once the arc flash PPE categoryhas been identified from Table 130.7(C)(15)(a) or Table 130.7(C)(15)(b), Table 130.7(C)(15)(c) shall be usedto determine the required PPE. Table 130.7(C)(15)(c) lists the requirements for PPE based on arc flash PPEcategories 1 through 4. This clothing and equipment shall be used when working within the arc flashboundary. The use of PPE other than or in addition to that listed shall be permitted provided it meets130.7(C)(7).

Informational Note No. 1: See Informative Annex H for a suggested simplified approach toensure adequate PPE for electrical workers within facilities with large and diverse electrical systems.

Informational Note No. 2: The PPE requirements of this section are intended to protect a personfrom arc flash hazards. While some situations could result in burns to the skin even with theprotection described in Table 130.7(C)(15)(c), burn injury should be reduced and survivable. Due tothe explosive effect of some arc events, physical trauma injuries could occur. The PPE requirementsof this section do not address protection against physical trauma other than exposure to the thermaleffects of an arc flash.

Informational Note No. 3: The arc rating for a particular clothing system can be obtained from thearc-rated clothing manufacturer.

Table 130.7(C)(15)(a) Arc Flash PPE Categories for Alternating Current (ac) Systems

Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary

Panelboards or other equipmentrated 240 volts and below

1 485 mm


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Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary

Parameters: Maximum of 25 kAavailable fault current; maximum of0.03 sec (2 cycles) fault clearingtime; minimum working distance455 mm (18 in.)

(19 in.)

Panelboards or other equipmentrated greater than 240 volts and upto 600 volts

2 900 mm


(3 ft)

600-volt class motor control centers(MCCs)

2 1.5 m


(5 ft)

600-volt class MCCs 4 4.3 m


(14 ft)

600-volt class switchgear (withpower circuit breakers or fusedswitches) and 600-volt classswitchboards

4 6 m

Parameters: Maximum of 35 kAavailable fault current; maximum ofup to 0.5 sec (30 cycles) faultclearing time; minimum workingdistance 455 mm (18 in.)

(20 ft)

Other 600-volt class (277 voltsthrough 600 volts, nominal)equipment

2 1.5 m


(5 ft)

NEMA E2 (fused contactor) motorstarters, 2.3 kV through 7.2 kV

4 12 m


(40 ft)

Metal-clad switchgear, 1 kVthrough 15 kV

4 12 m

Parameters: Maximum of 35 kAavailable fault current; maximum ofup to 0.24 sec (15 cycles) faultclearing time; minimum working

(40 ft)


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Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary

distance 910 mm (36 in.)

Metal enclosed interrupterswitchgear, fused or unfused typeconstruction, 1 kV through 15 kV

412 m (40ft)


Other equipment 1 kV through 15kV

412 m(40 ft)


Arc-resistant equipment up to 600-volt class

N/A N/AParameters: DOORS CLOSED andSECURED; with an available faultcurrent and a fault clearing timethat does not exceed the arc-resistant rating of the equipment*

Arc-resistant equipment 1 kVthrough 15 kV


N/A: Not applicable

Note:

For equipment rated 600 volts and below and protected by upstream current-limiting fuses or current-limiting molded case circuit breakers sized at 200 amperes or less, the arc flash PPE category can bereduced by one number but not below arc flash PPE category 1.

*For DOORS OPEN refer to the corresponding non-arc-resistant equipment section of this table.

Informational Note No. 1 to Table 130.7(C)(15)(a): The following are typical fault clearing times ofovercurrent protective devices:

(1) 0.5 cycle fault clearing time is typical for current-limiting fuses and current-limiting molded casecircuit breakers when the fault current is within the current limiting range.

(2) 1.5 cycle fault clearing time is typical for molded case circuit breakers rated less than 1000 voltswith an instantaneous integral trip.

(3) 3.0 cycle fault clearing time is typical for insulated case circuit breakers rated less than 1000 voltswith an instantaneous integral trip or relay operated trip.

(4) 5.0 cycle fault clearing time is typical for relay operated circuit breakers rated 1 kV to 35 kV whenthe relay operates in the instantaneous range (i.e., “no intentional delay”).

(5) 20 cycle fault clearing time is typical for low-voltage power and insulated case circuit breakerswith a short time fault clearing delay for motor inrush.

(6) 30 cycle fault clearing time is typical for low-voltage power and insulated case circuit breakerswith a short time fault clearing delay without instantaneous trip.

Informational Note No. 2 to Table 130.7(C)(15)(a): See Table 1 of IEEE 1584, Guide for PerformingArc Flash Hazard Calculations, for further information regarding list items (2) through (4) in


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Informational Note No. 1.

Informational Note No. 3 to Table 130.7(C)(15)(a): An example of a standard that providesinformation for arc-resistant equipment referred to in Table 130.7(C)(15)(a) is IEEE C37.20.7, Guidefor Testing Switchgear Rated Up to 52 kV for Internal Arcing Faults.

Informational Note No. 4 to Table 130.7(C)(15)(a): See O.2.4(9) for information on arc-resistantequipment.

Table 130.7(C)(15)(b) Arc Flash PPE Categories for dc Systems

Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary

Storage batteries, dcswitchboards, and other dcsupply sources

Parameters: Greater than orequal to 100 volts and lessthan or equal to 250 volts

Maximum arc duration andminimum working distance:2 sec @ 455 mm (18 in.)

Available fault current lessthan 4 kA

2 900 mm

(3 ft)

Available fault current greaterthan or equal to 4 kA and lessthan 7 kA

2 1.2 m

(4 ft)


3 1.8 m

(6 ft)


Parameters: Greater than250 volts and less than orequal to 600 volts


Available fault current lessthan 1.5 kA

2 900 mm

(3 ft)

Available fault current greaterthan or equal to 1.5 kA andless than 3 kA

2 1.2 m

(4 ft)


3 1.8 m

(6 ft.)


4 2.5 m

(8 ft)


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Notes:

(1) Apparel that can be expected to be exposed to electrolyte must meet both of the following conditions:

(a) Be evaluated for electrolyte protection

Informational Note: ASTM F1296, Standard Guide for Evaluating Chemical Protective Clothing,contains information on evaluating apparel for protection from electrolyte.

(b) Be arc rated

Informational Note: ASTM F1891, Standard Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant Rainwear,contains information on evaluating arc-rated apparel.

(2) A two-second arc duration is assumed if there is no overcurrent protective device (OCPD) or if the faultclearing time is not known. If the fault clearing time is known and is less than 2 seconds, an incident energyanalysis could provide a more representative result.

Informational Note No. 1: When determining available fault current, the effects of cables and anyother impedances in the circuit should be included. Power system modeling is the best method todetermine the available short-circuit current at the point of the arc. Battery cell short-circuit currentcan be obtained from the battery manufacturer. See D.5 for the basis for table values and alternativemethods to determine dc incident energy. Methods should be used with good engineering judgment.

Informational Note No. 2: The methods for estimating the dc arc flash incident energy that were usedto determine the categories for this table are based on open-air incident energy calculations. Open-air calculations were used because many battery systems and other dc process systems are in openareas or rooms. If the specific task is within an enclosure, it would be prudent to consider additionalPPE protection beyond the value shown in this table.

Table 130.7(C)(15)(c) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Arc-FlashPPE

CategoryPPE

1Arc-Rated Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 4

cal/cm2 (16.75 J/cm2)a

Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt and pantsor arc-rated coverall

Arc-rated face shieldb or arc flashsuit hood

Arc-rated jacket, parka, high-visibilityapparel, rainwear, or hard hat liner(AN)

Protective Equipment

Hard hat

Safety glasses or safety goggles(SR)

Hearing protection (ear canal

inserts)c

Heavy-duty leather gloves, arc-ratedgloves, or rubber insulating gloves

with leather protectors (SR)d

Leather footweare (AN)




Arc-rated flash suit hood or arc-rated

face shieldb and arc-rated balaclava



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Arc-FlashPPE

CategoryPPE


Hard hat



inserts)c



Leather footweare

3

Arc-Rated Clothing Selected so That theSystem Arc Rating Meets the Required

Minimum Arc Rating of 25 cal/cm2

(104.7 J/cm2)a

Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (AR)

Arc-rated pants (AR)

Arc-rated coverall (AR)

Arc-rated arc flash suit jacket (AR)

Arc-rated arc flash suit pants (AR)


Arc-rated gloves or rubber insulating

gloves with leather protectors (SR)d



Hard hat



inserts)c

Leather footweare

4



(167.5 J/cm2)a











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Arc-FlashPPE

CategoryPPE


Hard hat



inserts)c

Leather footweare

AN: As needed (optional). AR: As required. SR: Selection required.

aArc rating is defined in Article 100.

bFace shields are to have wrap-around guarding to protect not only the face but also the forehead, ears,and neck, or, alternatively, an arc-rated arc flash suit hood is required to be worn.

cOther types of hearing protection are permitted to be used in lieu of or in addition to ear canal insertsprovided they are worn under an arc-rated arc flash suit hood.

dRubber insulating gloves with leather protectors provide arc flash protection in addition to shockprotection. Higher class rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors, due to their increased materialthickness, provide increased arc flash protection.

eFootwear other than leather or dielectric shall be permitted to be used provided it has been tested todemonstrate no ignition, melting or dripping at the minimum arc rating for the respective arc flash PPEcategory.

f Outerwear shall not be required to have a rating that is equal to or greater than the incident energy

exposure, but shall be arc rated, if the system rating below the outwear is sufficient for the exposure.


Outwear such as high visibility safety apparel might not be available that has an arc rating to be suitable for the exposure. If it is worn over other arc rated PPE that has sufficient arc rating that should be acceptable.

Related Item

• FR 54




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:





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A new note (e) was added to outerwear to clarify that the rating of outerwear that is worn over arc-rated PPE, not as part of a layered system, but as protection from the elements or for other safetypurposes is not required to be equal to or greater than the estimated incident energy exposure.When outerwear is worn over arc-rated PPE that has an arc rating equal to or greater than theestimated incident energy exposure, the arc rating of the outerwear is primarily for the purposes ofensuring it has flame resistant properties if it is exposed to electrical arc discharge energy.


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EquipmentArc Flash PPE

CategoryArc FlashBoundary

Panelboards or other equipment rated 240 volts and below 1 485 mm

Parameters: Maximum of 25 kA available fault current;maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycles) fault clearing time; minimumworking distance 455 mm (18 in.)


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(19 in.)

Panelboards or other equipment rated greater than 240 volts and up to 600 volts 2 900 mm

Parameters: Maximum of 25 kA available fault current; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycles)fault clearing time; minimum working distance 455 mm (18 in.)

(3 ft)

600-volt class motor control centers (MCCs) 2 1.5 m

Parameters: Maximum of 65 kA available fault current; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycles) faultclearing time; minimum working distance 455 mm (18 in.)

(5 ft)



(14 ft)

600-volt class switchgear (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) and 600-volt classswitchboards

4 6 m

Parameters: Maximum of 35 kA available fault current; maximum of up to 0.5 sec (30 cycles)fault clearing time; minimum working distance 455 mm (18 in.)

(20 ft)

Other 600-volt class (277 volts through 600 volts, nominal) equipment 2 1.5 m


(5 ft)

NEMA E2 (fused contactor) motor starters, 2.3 kV through 7.2 kV 4 12 m

Parameters: Maximum of 35 kA available fault current; maximum of up to 0.24 sec (15 cycles)fault clearing time; minimum working distance 910 mm (36 in.)

(40 ft)

Metal-clad switchgear, 1 kV through 15 kV 4 12 m

Parameters: Maximum of 35 kA available fault current; maximum of up to 0.24 sec (15cycles) fault clearing time; minimum working distance 910 mm (36 in.)

(40 ft)

Metal enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused type construction, 1 kV through15 kV

412 m(40 ft)Parameters: Maximum of 35 kA available fault current; maximum of 0.24 sec (15 cycles)

fault clearing time; minimum working distance 910 mm (36 in.)

Other equipment 1 kV through 15 kV4

12 m(40 ft)Parameters: Maximum of 35 kA available fault current; maximum of up to 0.24 sec (15

cycles) fault clearing time; minimum working distance 910 mm (36 in.)

Arc-resistant equipment up to 600-volt classN/A N/AParameters: DOORS CLOSED and SECURED; with an available fault current and a fault

clearing time that does not exceed the arc-resistant rating of the equipment*

Arc-resistant equipment 1 kV through 15 kVN/A N/AParameters: DOORS CLOSED and SECURED; with an available fault current and a fault

clearing time that does not exceed the arc-resistant rating of the equipment*


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N/A: Not applicable

Note:


Comment/Additional Information: For Public Input No. 92 proposed text, "omitting arc-rated headprotection" should have been, "omitting an arc-rated balaclava." Otherwise, this note at the bottom ofTable 130.7(C)(15)(a) permits a reduction to PPE Category 1 plus a balaclava. The balaclava is requiredaccording to the last sentence of 130.1 and 130.7(C)(10)(b)(1).









Informational Note No. 2 to Table 130.7(C)(15)(a): See Table 1 of IEEE 1584, Guide for PerformingArc Flash Hazard Calculations, for further information regarding list items (2) through (4) inInformational Note No. 1.




EquipmentArc Flash PPE

CategoryArc Flash Boundary

Storage batteries, dc switchboards, and other dcsupply sources

Parameters: Greater than or equal to 100 volts and less than or equal to 250 volts

Maximum arc duration and minimum working distance: 2 sec @ 455 mm (18 in.)

Available fault current less than 4 kA 2 900 mm

(3 ft)

Available fault current greater than or equal to 4 kA and less than 7 kA 2 1.2 m

(4 ft)


(6 ft)


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Storage batteries, dc switchboards, and other dc supply sources

Parameters: Greater than 250 volts and less than or equal to 600 volts

Maximum arc duration and minimum working distance: 2 sec @ 455 mm (18 in.)

Available fault current less than 1.5 kA 2 900 mm

(3 ft)

Available fault current greater than or equal to 1.5 kA and less than 3 kA 2 1.2 m

(4 ft)


(6 ft.)


(8 ft)

Notes:




(b) Be arc rated






Arc-Flash PPE Category PPE

1 Arc-Rated Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 4 cal/cm 2 (16.75 J/cm 2 ) a

Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt and pants or arc-rated coverall

Arc-rated face shield b or arc flash suit hood

Arc-rated jacket, parka, high-visibility apparel, rainwear, or hard hat liner (AN)


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Hard hat


Hearing protection (ear canal inserts) c

Heavy-duty leather gloves, arc-rated gloves, or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (SR) d

Leather footwear e (AN)

2 Arc-Rated Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 8 cal/cm 2 (33.5 J/cm 2 ) a

Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt and pants or arc-rated coverall

Arc-rated flash suit hood or arc-rated face shield b and arc-rated balaclava



Hard hat



Heavy-duty leather gloves, arc-rated gloves, or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (SR) d

Leather footwear e

3Arc-Rated Clothing Selected so That the System Arc Rating Meets the Required Minimum Arc

Rating of 25 cal/cm 2 (104.7 J/cm 2 ) a








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Arc-rated gloves or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (SR) d



Hard hat



Leather footwear e

4Arc-Rated Clothing Selected so That the System Arc Rating Meets the Required Minimum Arc

Rating of 40 cal/cm 2 (167.5 J/cm 2 ) a







Arc-rated gloves or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (SR) d



Hard hat



Leather footwear e




cOther types of hearing protection are permitted to be used in lieu of or in addition to ear canal inserts


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provided they are worn under an arc-rated arc flash suit hood.




Public input No. 92-NFPA, Section No. 130.7(C)(15) was written incorrectly. The intention, if deemed applicable, is to clarify that a balaclava is optional when there is a reduction to PPE Category 1. My choice of words caused a misunderstanding. The intention was not to remove the requirement for an arc-rated face shield but to present what might be an oversight.

Related Item

• P1-92


Submitter Full Name: Dave McDonald

Organization: Cates Control Systems Inc

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement


Resolution: The intent of the submitter is met in the present text of the standard.


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Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary


1 485 mm


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Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary


(19 in.)


2 900 mm


(3 ft)

600-volt class motor controlcenters ( MCCs)

2 1.5 m


(5 ft)



(14 ft)


4 6 m


(20 ft)


2 1.5 m


(5 ft)


4 12 m


(40 ft)


4 12 m


(40 ft)


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Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary



412 m (40ft)



412 m(40 ft)






N/A: Not applicable

Note:












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Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary





2 900 mm

(3 ft)


2 1.2 m

(4 ft)


3 1.8 m

(6 ft)





2 900 mm

(3 ft)


2 1.2 m

(4 ft)


3 1.8 m

(6 ft.)


4 2.5 m

(8 ft)


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Notes:




(b) Be arc rated






Arc-FlashPPE

CategoryPPE







Hard hat



inserts)c











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Arc-FlashPPE

CategoryPPE


Hard hat



inserts)c



Leather footweare

3



(104.7 J/cm2)a











Hard hat



inserts)c

Leather footweare

4



(167.5 J/cm2)a











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Arc-FlashPPE

CategoryPPE


Hard hat



inserts)c

Leather footweare








Errata:In Table 130.7(C)(15)(a); 600-volt class motor control centers (MCCs) Section: The phrase "motor control centers" is struck through in the second of two occurrences, but not in the first. The full term "Motor Control Center" parenthetically followed by the acronym "MCC" first appears in Article 100 and does not need to be repeated in Article 130.Note: TerraView underlined several things. The only propose revision is the deletion of “motor control centers” and the parenthesis.

Related Item

• FR-54




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:




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Statement: The phrase “motor control centers” is editorially added to the second reference to “MCCs” in Table130.7(C)(15)(a) to be consistent with the first reference.

A new note (f) to Table 130.7(C)(15)(c) was added to outerwear to clarify that the rating of outerwearthat is worn over arc-rated PPE, not as part of a layered system, but as protection from the elementsor for other safety purposes is not required to be equal to or greater than the estimated incidentenergy exposure. When outerwear is worn over arc-rated PPE that has an arc rating equal to orgreater than the estimated incident energy exposure, the arc rating of the outerwear is primarily forthe purposes of ensuring it has flame resistant properties if it is exposed to electrical arc dischargeenergy. This second revision correlates with second revisions in Tables 130.5(G) and 130.7(C)(9)(b).


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Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary


1 485 mm


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Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary


(19 in.)


2 900 mm


(3 ft)

600-volt class motor control centers(MCCs)

2 1.5 m


(5 ft)



(14 ft)


4 6 m


(20 ft)


2 1.5 m


(5 ft)


4 12 m


(40 ft)


4 12 m


(40 ft)


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Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary



412 m (40ft)



412 m(40 ft)






N/A: Not applicable

Note:












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Equipment

ArcFlashPPE

Category

Arc FlashBoundary





2 900 mm

(3 ft)


2 1.2 m

(4 ft)


3 1.8 m

(6 ft)





2 900 mm

(3 ft)


2 1.2 m

(4 ft)


3 1.8 m

(6 ft.)


4 2.5 m

(8 ft)


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Notes:




(b) Be arc rated






Arc-FlashPPE

CategoryPPE





Arc-rated jacket, parka, high-visibilitysafety apparel, rainwear, or hard hatliner (AN)


Hard hat



inserts)c











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Arc-FlashPPE

CategoryPPE


Hard hat



inserts)c



Leather footweare

3



(104.7 J/cm2)a











Hard hat



inserts)c

Leather footweare

4



(167.5 J/cm2)a











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Arc-FlashPPE

CategoryPPE


Hard hat



inserts)c

Leather footweare








Table 130.5(G) and Article 130.9(b) both state “high-visibility safety apparel”. Adding the word safety Table 130.7(C)(15)(c) brings consistency between both tables and the article.

Related Item

• FR-54



Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:




A new note (e) was added to outerwear to clarify that the rating of outerwear that is worn over arc-rated PPE, not as part of a layered system, but as protection from the elements or for other safety


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purposes is not required to be equal to or greater than the estimated incident energy exposure.When outerwear is worn over arc-rated PPE that has an arc rating equal to or greater than theestimated incident energy exposure, the arc rating of the outerwear is primarily for the purposes ofensuring it has flame resistant properties if it is exposed to electrical arc discharge energy.


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Public Comment No. 127-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 130.7(D) ]

(D) Other Protective Equipment.


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(1) Insulated Tools and Equipment.

Tools and handling equipment used within the restricted approach boundary shall be insulated. Insulatedtools shall be protected from damage to the insulating material.

Informational Note: See 130.4(E), Shock Protection Boundaries.

(a) Requirements for Insulated Tools. The following requirements shall apply to insulated tools:

(1) Insulated tools shall be rated for the voltages on which they are used.

(2) Insulated tools shall be designed and constructed for the environment to which they are exposed andthe manner in which they are used.

(3) Insulated tools and equipment shall be inspected prior to each use. The inspection shall look fordamage to the insulation or damage that can limit the tool from performing its intended function orcould increase the potential for an incident (e.g., damaged tip on a screwdriver).

(b) Fuse or Fuseholder Handling Equipment. Fuse or fuseholder handling equipment, insulated forthe circuit voltage, shall be used to remove or install a fuse if the fuse terminals are energized.

(c) Ropes and Handlines. Ropes and handlines used within the limited approach boundary shall benonconductive.

(d) Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic Rods. Fiberglass-reinforced plastic rod and tube used for live-linetools shall meet the requirements of applicable portions of electrical codes and standards dealing withelectrical installation requirements.

Informational Note: For further information concerning electrical codes and standards dealingwith installation requirements, refer to ASTM F711, Standard Specification for Fiberglass-ReinforcedPlastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools.

(e) Portable Ladders. Portable ladders shall have nonconductive side rails when used within thelimited approach boundary or where the employee or ladder could contact exposed energized electricalconductors or circuit parts. Nonconductive ladders shall meet the requirements of applicable state, federal,or local codes and standards.

Informational Note: The standards listed in Table 130.7(G), Informational Note are examples ofstandards that contain information on portable ladders.

(f) Barriers. Exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or moreshall be guarded by a barrier in accordance with 130.7(D)(1)(g) through 130.7(D)(1)(i) while an employeeis working within the restricted approach boundary of those conductors or circuit parts. Barriers shall besupported to remain in place and shall prevent contact by a person, tool, or equipment.

(g) Rubber Insulating Equipment. Rubber insulating equipment used for protection from unintentionalcontact with energized conductors or circuit parts shall be rated for the voltage and shall meet therequirements of applicable state, federal, or local codes and standards.

Informational Note: The standards listed in Table 130.7(G), Informational Note are examples ofstandards that contain information on rubber insulating equipment.

(h) Voltage-Rated Plastic Guard Equipment. Plastic guard equipment for protection of employeesfrom unintentional contact with energized conductors or circuit parts, or for protection of employees orenergized equipment or material from contact with ground, shall be rated for the voltage and shall meet therequirements of applicable state, federal, or local codes and standards.

Informational Note: The standards listed in Table 130.7(G), Informational Note are examples ofstandards that contain information on voltage-rated plastic guard equipment.

(i) Physical or Mechanical Barriers. Physical or mechanical (field-fabricated) barriers shall beinstalled no closer than the restricted approach boundary distance given in Table 130.4(E)(a) and Table130.4(E)(b). While the barrier is being installed, the restricted approach boundary distance specified inTable 130.4(E)(a) and Table 130.4(E)(b) shall be maintained, or the energized conductors or circuit partsshall be placed in an electrically safe work condition.



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PC_130.7_D_.docx Reformat 130.7(D)


As stated in my affirmative ballot statement to FR 67, the Level 1 to Section 130.7 contains only one Level 2 item. The proposed format change organizes 130.7(D) logically into two Level 2 items. It does not propose any technical changes to the final FR 67 language.

Related Item

• FR 67



Organization: Hoydar/Buck, Inc.

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:


Resolution: SR-48-NFPA 70E-2019 RESPONSE TO PC 22: The phrase "50 V or more" was not changedto"which present an electrical hazard" as the requirements of the sentence apply specifically "whilean employee is working within the restricted approach boundary.”

Statement: Third level subdivision 130.7(D)(1)(f) Barriers was changed to Second level subdivision130.7(D)(2) Barriers, and third level subdivisions 130.7(D)(1)(g) through (i) are renumbered as130.7(D)(2)(a) through (c) in accordance with the NEC style manual.

The phrase "to prevent unintentional contact" and associated revisions were added to clarify thatthe barrier is to prevent inadvertent contact of adjacent parts not being worked upon.


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(D) Other Protective Equipment.

(1) Insulated Tools and Equipment. Insulated tools shall be protected from damage to the insulating

material.

Informational Note: See 130.4(D), Shock Protection Boundaries.



(2) Insulated tools shall be designed and constructed for the environment to which they are exposed and

the manner in which they are used.

(3) Insulated tools and equipment shall be inspected prior to each use. The inspection shall look for

damage to the insulation or damage that can limit the tool from performing its intended function or could

increase the potential for an incident (e.g., damaged tip on a screwdriver).

(b) Fuse or Fuseholder Handling Equipment. Fuse or fuseholder handling equipment, insulated for the

circuit voltage, shall be used to remove or install a fuse if the fuse terminals are energized.

(c) Ropes and Handlines. Ropes and handlines used within the limited approach boundary shall be

nonconductive.

(d) Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic Rods. Fiberglass-reinforced plastic rod and tube used for live-line tools

shall meet the requirements of applicable portions of electrical codes and standards dealing with electrical

installation requirements.

Informational Note: For further information concerning electrical codes and standards dealing with

installation requirements, refer to ASTM F711, Standard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic

(FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools.

(e) Portable Ladders. Portable ladders shall have nonconductive side rails when used within the limited

approach boundary or where the employee or ladder could contact exposed energized electrical

conductors or circuit parts. Nonconductive ladders shall meet the requirements of applicable state,

federal, or local codes and standards.

Informational Note: The standards listed in Table 130.7(G), Informational Note are examples of standards

that contain information on portable ladders.

(gf) Rubber Insulating Equipment. Rubber insulating equipment used for protection from unintentional

contact with energized conductors or circuit parts shall be rated for the voltage and shall meet the

requirements of applicable state, federal, or local codes and standards.


that contain information on rubber insulating equipment.

(2) Barriers and Guards. Barriers and guards applied as control(s) for identified hazards shall be used in

a manner that will minimize the risk of contact with energized exposed parts.

(fa) Barriers. Exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 V or more shall be

guarded by a barrier in accordance with 130.7(D)(1)(g) through 130.7(D)(1)(i) while an employee is

working within the restricted approach boundary of those conductors or circuit parts.

Barriers shall be supported to remain in place and shall prevent contact by a person, tool or equipment.

Electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 V or more shall be placed in an electrically safe work

condition while barriers are installed or removed.

(g) Rubber Insulating Equipment. Rubber insulating equipment used for protection from unintentional

contact with energized conductors or circuit parts shall be rated for the voltage and shall meet the

requirements of applicable state, federal, or local codes and standards.


that contain information on rubber insulating equipment.

(hb) Voltage-Rated Plastic Guard Equipment. Plastic guard equipment for protection of employees from

unintentional contact with energized conductors or circuit parts, or for protection of employees or

energized equipment or material from contact with ground, shall be rated for the voltage and shall meet

the requirements of applicable state, federal, or local codes and standards.


that contain information on voltage-rated plastic guard equipment.

(ic) Physical or Mechanical Barriers. Physical or mechanical (field-fabricated) barriers shall be installed no

closer than the restricted approach boundary distance given in Table 130.4(D)(a) and Table 130.4(D)(b).

While the barrier is being installed, the restricted approach boundary distance specified in Table

130.4(D)(a) and Table 130.4(D)(b) shall be maintained, or the energized conductors or circuit parts shall

be placed in an electrically safe work condition.

Public Comment No. 130-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 130.7(D)(1) ]


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(e) Fuse or Fuseholder Handling Equipment. Fuse or fuseholder handling equipment, insulated for thecircuit voltage, shall be used to remove or install a fuse if the fuse terminals are energized.

(f) Ropes and Handlines. Ropes and handlines used within the limited approach boundary shall benonconductive.

(g) Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic Rods. Fiberglass-reinforced plastic rod and tube used for live-linetools shall meet the requirements of applicable portions of electrical codes and standards dealing withelectrical installation requirements.


(h) Portable Ladders. Portable ladders shall have nonconductive side rails when used within thelimited approach boundary or where the employee or ladder could contact exposed energized electricalconductors or circuit parts. Nonconductive ladders shall meet the requirements of applicable state, federal,or local codes and standards.


(i) Barriers. Exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or moreshall be guarded by a barrier in accordance with 130.7(D)(1)(g) through 130.7(D)(1)(i) while an employee isworking within the restricted approach boundary of those conductors or circuit parts. Barriers shall besupported to remain in place and shall prevent contact by a person, tool, or equipment.

(j) Rubber Insulating Equipment. Rubber insulating equipment used for protection from unintentionalcontact with energized conductors or circuit parts shall be rated for the voltage and shall meet therequirements of applicable state, federal, or local codes and standards.


(k) Voltage-Rated Plastic Guard Equipment. Plastic guard equipment for protection of employees fromunintentional contact with energized conductors or circuit parts, or for protection of employees or energizedequipment or material from contact with ground, shall be rated for the voltage and shall meet therequirements of applicable state, federal, or local codes and standards.


(l) Physical or Mechanical Barriers. Physical or mechanical (field-fabricated) barriers shall be installedno closer than the restricted approach boundary distance given in Table 130.4(E)(a) and Table 130.4(E)(b).While the barrier is being installed, the restricted approach boundary distance specified requirements inTable 130. 4(E)(a) and Table 130.4(E)(b) shall be maintained, or the energized conductors or circuit partsshall be placed in an electrically safe work condition 2 shall be met .


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As stated in my affirmative ballot statement to FR 67, the current language should have been revised to resolve a conflict with 130.2. As currently stated, the rule allows energized work inside the limited approach boundary without justification, requiring an electrically safe work condition only before crossing the restricted approach boundary.

Related Item

• FR 67



Organization: Hoydar/Buck, Inc.

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement


Resolution: The proposed revision does not add clarity. There is no conflict with section 130.2.


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(i) Barriers. Exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or moreshall be which present an electrical hazard and may be unintentionally contacted shall be guarded by abarrier in accordance with 130.7(D)(1)(g) through 130.7(D)(1)(i) while an employee is working within therestricted approach boundary of those conductors or circuit parts. Barriers shall be supported to remain inplace and shall prevent contact by a person, tool, or equipment.





(l) Physical or Mechanical Barriers. Physical or mechanical (field-fabricated) barriers shall be installedno closer than the restricted approach boundary distance given in Table 130.4(E)(a) and Table 130.4(E)(b).While the barrier is being installed, the restricted approach boundary distance specified in Table 130.4(E)(a)and Table 130.4(E)(b) shall be maintained, or the energized conductors or circuit parts shall be placed in anelectrically safe work condition.


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As currently stated, the first draft language would require a guard or barrier even when direct contact for testing or troubleshooting is necessary. This comment clarifies that the barrier is to prevent inadvertent contact on adjacent parts not being worked upon.

The change to refer to electrical hazards instead of just "operating at 50 volts or more" broadens the scope to include the previous language of the 2018 version, "where dangerous electric heating or arcing might occur".

Related Item

• Public Input No. 260-NFPA 70E-2018 • First Revision No. 67-NFPA 70E-2018




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Sat Mar 09 10:05:55 EST 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:






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(i) Barriers. Exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or moreshall be guarded by a barrier in accordance with 130.7(D)(1)(g) through 130.7(D)(1)(i) while an employee isworking within the restricted approach boundary of those conductors or circuit parts. Barriers shall be If abarrier is removed to gain access to energized conductors additional protective measures shall be used toprotect the qualified employee. Barriers shall be supported to remain in place and shall prevent contact by aperson, tool, or equipment.





(l) Physical or Mechanical Barriers. Physical or mechanical (field-fabricated) barriers shall be installedno closer than the restricted approach boundary distance given in Table 130.4(E)(a) and Table 130.4(E)(b).While the barrier is being installed, the restricted approach boundary distance specified in Table 130.4(E)(a)and Table 130.4(E)(b) shall be maintained, or the energized conductors or circuit parts shall be placed in anelectrically safe work condition.


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The additional text takes into consideration when a qualified employee needs to remove a barrier to gain access to energized circuit parts.

Related Item

• FR-67



Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:






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Public Comment No. 68-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 130.7(G) ]


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(G) Standards for Other Protective Equipment.


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Other protective equipment required in 130.7(D) shall conform to the applicable state, federal, or localcodes and standards.

Informational Note: The standards listed in Table 130.7(G), which is part of this Informational Note,are examples of standards that contain information on other protective equipment.

Table 130.7(G) Informational Note: Standards on Other Protective Equipment

Subject DocumentDocument

Number

Arc Protective BlanketsStandard Test Method for Determining theProtective Performance of an Arc ProtectiveBlanket for Electric Arc Hazards

ASTM F2676

BlanketsStandard Specification for Rubber InsulatingBlankets

ASTM D1048

Blankets — In-service CareStandard Specification for In-Service Care ofInsulating Blankets

ASTM F479

Arc Protective Blankets — Selection,Care, and Use

Standard Guide for Selection, Care, and Use ofArc Protective Blankets

ASTM F3272

CoversStandard Specification for Rubber InsulatingCovers

ASTM D1049

Fiberglass Rods — Live Line ToolsStandard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Usedin Live Line Tools

ASTM F711

Insulated Hand ToolsStandard Specification for Insulated andInsulating Hand Tools

ASTM F1505

Ladders

American National Standard for Ladders —Wood — Safety Requirements

ANSI/ ASC A14.1

American National Standard for Ladders —Fixed — Safety Requirements

ANSI /ASC A14.3

American National Standard SafetyRequirements for Job Made Wooden Ladders

ANSI ASC A14.4

American National Standard for Ladders-—-Portable Reinforced Plastic — SafetyRequirements

ANSI ASC A14.5

Line HoseStandard Specification for Rubber InsulatingLine Hoses

ASTM D1050

Line Hose and Covers — In-serviceCare

Standard Specification for In-Service Care ofInsulating Line Hose and Covers

ASTM F478

Plastic GuardStandard Test Methods and Specifications forElectrically Insulating Plastic Guard Equipmentfor Protection of Workers

ASTM F712

Sheeting

Standard Specification for PVC InsulatingSheeting

ASTM F1742

Standard Specification for Rubber InsulatingSheeting

ASTM F2320

Safety Signs and Tags Series of Standards for Safety Signs and Tags ANSI Z535

Shield Performance on Live LineTool

Standard Test Method for Determining theProtective Performance of a Shield Attached onLive Line Tools or on Racking Rods for ElectricArc Hazards

ASTM F2522

Temporary Protective Grounds — In-service Testing

Standard Specification for In-Service TestMethods for Temporary Grounding JumperAssemblies Used on De-energized ElectricPower Lines and Equipment

ASTM F2249


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Subject DocumentDocument

Number

Temporary Protective Grounds —Test Specification

Standard Specification for TemporaryProtective Grounds to Be Used on De-energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment

ASTM F855


Errata: The list item in the "Subject" column of Table 130.7(G) should be "Arc Protective Blankets - Selection, Care and Use", note "Blankets - Selection, Care and Use". Rubber Insulating Blankets (ASTM F479) and Arc Protective Blankets (ASTM F3272) are very different.The list of Subjects should be reordered accordingly (i.e. alphabetically).

Related Item

• FR-58




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: The phrase "Arc protective" is editorially added in the Subject column to correlate with the subjectof ASTM F3272 Standard Guide for Selection, Care, and Use of Arc Protective Blankets.

The table rows are reordered alphabetically.


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Public Comment No. 104-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 130.8(F) ]

(F) Confined or Enclosed Work Spaces.

When an employee works in a confined or enclosed space (such as a manhole or vault) that containsexposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts where an electrical hazard exists, the employershall provide, and the employee shall use, protective shields, protective barriers, or insulating materials asnecessary to avoid inadvertent contact with these parts and the effects of the electrical hazards.


In multiple locations of the Standard, the committee has proposed to remove the phrase "operating at voltages equal to or greater than 50 volts" and retain the phrase "where an electrical hazard exists" to reflect that the requirement does not only apply to shock hazards. As modified by FR-63, the result is an awkward requirement that retains the phrase "exposed energized electrical conductors and circuit parts". The proposed change simplifies the statement, while meeting the intent of the First Revision.

Related Item

• FR-63





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: This action correlates with actions taken to remove the phrase “that contains exposed energizedelectrical conductors or circuit parts” in multiple locations of the Standard.


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Public Comment No. 82-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. 130.8(N) ]

(N) Safety Interlocks.

Only qualified persons following the requirements for working inside the restricted approach boundary ascovered by 130.4(F G ) shall be permitted to defeat or bypass an electrical safety interlock over which theperson has sole control, and then only temporarily while the qualified person is working on the equipment.The safety interlock system shall be returned to its operable condition when the work is completed.


Revise section number to correctly identify 130.4(G) Restricted Approach Boundary. 130.4(F) references Limited Approach Boundary.

Related Item

• FR-65



Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: This section was revised to correctly identify 130.4(G) which correctly references the RestrictedApproach Boundary rather than 130.4(F) that incorrectly references the Limited ApproachBoundary


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130.12 Cutting, Removing, or Rerouting of Conductors.

Where conductors are de-energized in order to cut, remove, or reroute them and the conductorterminations are terminations are not within sight from the point of work , such as where they arewhere the conductors are remote from the source of supply, such as in a junction or pull box, additionalsteps to verify absence of voltage or identify the conductors shall be taken prior to cutting, removing, orrerouting the conductors.

Informational Note: Additional steps to be taken include, but are not limited to, remotely spiking theconductors, pulling the conductors to visually verify movement, remotely cutting the conductors, orother approved methods. Nonshielded conductors could be additionally verified with a noncontacttest instrument, and shielded conductors could be verified with devices to that identify theconductors.


This public comment is meant as an editorial clarification to the intent and application of this important safety driven rule.

Related Item

• FR57




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: This revision clarifies that this rule applies where terminations for de-energized conductors to becut, removed, or rerouted are not within sight from “the point of work”.


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Where conductors are de-energized in order to cut, remove, or reroute them and conductor terminationsare not within sight, such as where they are in a junction or pull box, additional steps to verify absence ofvoltage or identify the conductors shall be taken prior to cutting, removing, or rerouting the conductors.

Informational Note: Additional steps to be taken include, but are not limited to, remotely spiking theconductors, pulling the conductors to visually verify movement, remotely cutting the conductors, orother approved methods. Nonshielded conductors could be additionally verified with a noncontacttest instrument, and shielded conductors could be verified with devices to devices that identify theconductors.


Errata: The word "to" in the final sentence in 130.12 informational note should have been deleted for grammatical accuracy.

Related Item

• FR-57




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:





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Where conductors are de-energized in order to cut, remove, or reroute them and conductor terminationsare not within sight, such as where they are in a junction or pull box, additional steps to verify absence ofvoltage or identify the conductors shall be taken prior to cutting, removing, or rerouting the conductors.

Informational Note: Additional steps to be taken include, but are not limited to, remotely spiking theconductors, pulling the conductors de-energized conductors to visually verify movement, remotelycutting the conductors, or other approved methods. Nonshielded conductors could be additionallyverified with a noncontact test instrument, and shielded conductors could be verified with devices tothat identify the conductors.


This public input is to clarify that movement of “deenergized conductors” is one method of practical and acceptable means to identify conductors at both ends. Qualified persons should be aware of multiple methods that can be used to identify conductors that are not simultaneously visible at both ends, including pulling on them in some instances, definitely not all instances.

Related Item

• FR-57



Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:





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200.1 Scope.

Chapter 2 addresses the requirements that follow.

(1) Chapter 2 covers practical safety-related maintenance requirements for electrical equipment andinstallations in workplaces as included in 90.2. These requirements identify only that maintenance isdirectly associated with employee safety.

(2) Chapter 2 does not prescribe specific maintenance methods or testing procedures. It is left to theemployer to choose from the various maintenance methods available to satisfy the requirements ofChapter 2.

(3) For the purpose of Chapter 2, maintenance shall be defined as preserving or restoring the condition ofelectrical equipment and installations, or parts of either, for the safety of employees who work whereexposed to electrical hazards. Repair or replacement of individual portions or parts of equipment shallbe permitted without requiring modification or replacement of other portions or parts that are in a safecondition.

Informational Note: Refer to NFPA 70B, Recommended Practice for Electrical EquipmentMaintenance; ANSI/NETA MTS, Standard for Maintenance Testing Specifications for ElectricalPower Distribution Equipment and Systems; and IEEE 3007.2, Recommended Practice for theMaintenance of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, for guidance on maintenance frequency,methods, and tests.


The sentence is missing a verb, hence the the sentence is meaningless. By inserting the word "is" it conveys the intent of the original standard writers. This increases the perception of competence of the standard writers. The same tightening of language problem as expressed by Public Input No. 309-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Section No. 205.2 ]

Related Item

• Public Input No. 309-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Section No. 205.2 ]




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement


Resolution: The proposed modification is not editorial and would modify the scope of Article 200.


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250.3 Safety Grounding Equipment.

(A) Inspection.

Personal protective ground cable sets shall be inspected for cuts in the protective sheath and damage tothe conductors. Clamps and connector strain relief devices shall be checked for tightness. Theseinspections shall be made at intervals thereafter as service conditions require, but in no case shall theinterval exceed 1 year.

(B) Testing.

Prior to being returned to service, temporary protective grounding equipment that has been repaired ormodified shall be tested. Temporary protective grounding equipment shall be tested as service conditionsrequire, but in no case shall the interval exceed 3 years.

Informational Note: Guidance for inspecting and testing safety grounds is provided in ASTM F2249,Standard Specification for In-Service Test Methods for Temporary Grounding Jumper AssembliesUsed on De-energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment.

(C) Grounding and Testing Devices.

Grounding and testing devices shall be stored in a clean and dry area. Grounding and testing devices shallbe properly inspected and tested before each use. Prior to being returned to service, a grounding andtesting device that has been repaired or modified shall be tested. Grounding and testing devices shall betested as service conditions require, but in no case shall the interval exceed 3 years.

Informational Note: Guidance for testing of grounding and testing devices is provided in Section 9.5of IEEE C37.20.6, Standard for 4.76 kV to 38 kV Rated Ground and Test Devices Used inEnclosures.


This changes aligns the testing periodicity to match that for the temporary protective grounds. It is not reasonable to test a grounding and test device before each and every use.

Related Item





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: For proper performance and safety, testing of a ground and test device is necessary before eachoperation. The submitter has not provided adequate technical substantiation to eliminate this task.


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(B) Testing.

Prior to being returned to service, temporary protective grounding equipment that has been repaired ormodified shall be tested. Temporary protective grounding equipment shall be tested as service conditionsrequire, but in no case shall the interval exceed 3 years.

Informational Note: Guidance for inspecting and testing safety grounds is provided in ASTM F2249,Standard Specification for In-Service Test Methods for Temporary Grounding Jumper AssembliesUsed on De-energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment.


The statement added by FR-69 should be deleted. Neither the committee, nor the submitter as indicated by the committee statement, provided any substantiation for the 3 year maximum interval for testing temporary protective grounding equipment.

Related Item

• FR-69





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: Adequate substantiation for a 3-year time interval requirement was not provided by FR 69. Thisrevision provides necessary clarity without a mandatory time frame.

Temporary protective grounds can experience varying levels of service conditions, and when theservice level is extreme, a qualified individual, through visual inspection or other methods, identifythe need for testing prior to use.


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300.3 Organization.

Chapter 3 of this standard is divided into articles. Article 300 applies generally. Article 310 applies toelectrolytic cells. Article 320 applies to batteries and battery rooms. Article 330 applies to lasers. Article 340applies to power electronic equipment. Article 350 applies to research and development (R&D) laboratories.Article 360 applies to safety related requirements for capacitors.


Article 300.3 Organization lists all sections included in chapter 3. Article 360 Capacitors, will need to be added to complete the entire list.

Related Item

• FR-00



Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: Article 300.3 Organization lists all sections included in Chapter 3. Article 360 Capacitors, needsto be added to make the list complete and accurate.


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310.1 Scope.

The requirements of this article shall apply to the electrical safety-related work practices used in the typesof electrolytic cell areas.

Informational Note No. 1: See Informative Annex L for a typical application of safeguards in the cellline working zone.

Informational Note No. 2: For further information about electrolytic cells, see NFPA 70, NationalElectrical Code, Article 668.

Note: IEEE 463, Electrical Safety Practices in Electrolytic Cell Line Working Zones, is an example ofa standard that contains additional information related to electrical safety-related work practices.






The Correlating Committee advises that article scope statements are the responsibility of the Correlating Committee and the Correlating Committee accepts the committee action.The Correlating Committee directs that the new Informational Note be numbered as required by the NEC Style Manual.This action will be considered as a public comment.

Related Item





Street Address:

City:

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Committee:

Committee Statement



Statement: The informational note is numbered as required by the NEC Style Manual.


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(2) Battery Risk Assessment.

Prior to any work on a battery system, a risk assessment shall be performed to identify the chemical,electrical shock, and arc flash hazards and assess the risks associated with the type of tasks to beperformed.

Informational Note: For an example of a risk assessment method for work on batteries, see F.7 andFigure F.7.



70E_CN10_A2020.pdf 70E_CN10



The Correlating Committee directs that the committee reconsider the text to rewrite it to clarify that F.7 and figure F.7 are located in Informative Annex F.


Related Item





Street Address:

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State:

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Committee:

Committee Statement



Statement: The informational note is revised to clarify that the reference is to Informative Annex F.


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350.9 Energy Thresholds.

Energy exposure levels shall not exceed those identified in the following list unless appropriate controls areimplemented as approved by the ESA:

(1) AC: 50- volts and 5 milliamperes

(2) DC: 100 volts and 40 milliamperes

(3) Capacitive systems:

(4) 100 volts and 1 joule of stored energy

(5) 400 volts and 25 joules of stored energy

(6) Less than 100 volts and 100 joules of stored energy

(7) Informational Note: This information is extracted from the Department of Energy, DOE ElectricalSafety Handbook , DOE-HDBK-1092.


Delete the information related to capacitive energy thresholds. The way this information is presented is not clear. Also, the information appears to conflict with the new 360.3, which is presented in the form of ranges instead of discrete values.

Related Item

• FR-77





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: The deleted information is in the new Article 360. Removing it from Article 350 preventsduplication and potential confusion. An informational note is added to point the user to theinformation in 360.3.


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(1) AC: 50- volts 50 volts and 5 milliamperes



a. Less than 100 volts and 1 joule greater than 100 joules of stored energy

b. 400 Greater than or equal to 100 volts and 25 joules greater than 1 joule of stored energy

c. Less than 100 volts and 100 Greater than or equal to 400 volts and greater than 0.25 joules ofstored energy

Informational Note No.1 : This information is extracted from the Department of Energy, DOEDOE Electrical Safety Handbook, DOE-HDBK-1092.

Informational Note No.2: See Article 360 and Annex R for more information on capacitor hazardsand controls.


This change clarifies and corrects the thresholds to align with the DOE Electrical Safety Handbook, as well as new Article 360 and Annex R.



Public Comment No. 19-NFPA 70E-2019 [Annex R]

Public Comment No. 97-NFPA 70E-2019 [Article 360]

Related Item

• FR-77 • Correlating Committee Note No. 2




Affiliation: DOE EFCOG

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:




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Article 360 Safety‐Related Requirements for Capacitors 360.1 Scope. This article covers the electrical safety‐related requirements for the practical safeguarding of employees while working with capacitors that present an electrical hazard.

Informational Note: For more information on working safely with capacitors, see Informative Annex R, Working with Capacitors.

360.2 Definitions. Arc Blast Hazard. A source of possible injury or damage to health from the energy deposited into acoustical shock‐wave and high‐velocity shrapnel. Bleed Resistor. A resistor network connected in parallel with a capacitor’s terminals that drains the charge after power has been disconnected. Charge Transfer. Improper discharging of capacitor networks that results in transferring charge from one capacitor to another instead of fully discharging the stored energy. Dielectric Absorption. The property of certain capacitors to recharge after being discharged.

Informational Note: A voltage recharge of up to 10 percent may occur a few minutes after the grounding or shorting device has been removed.

Discharge Time. The time required to discharge a capacitor to below a stored energy hazard threshold. Ground Stick. A device that is used to ensure that the capacitor is discharged by applying it to all terminals of the capacitor element.

Informational Note: This is also called a ground hook and could incorporate power‐rated discharge resistors for high‐energy applications.

Hard Grounding (Low Z). The practice of discharging a capacitor through a low impedance, also called Low Z (impedance) grounding. Hearing Protection Boundary. Worker distance at which a 1 percent probability of ear damage exists from a 20 kpa (3.0‐psi) shock wave. Lung Protection Boundary. Worker distance at which a 1 percent probability of lung damage exists from a 70 kpa (10‐psi) shock wave. Soft Grounding (High‐Z). The practice of connecting a capacitor to ground through a power resistor to avoid the hazards related with hard grounding. This is also called High‐Z (impedance) grounding. Time Constant. The time it takes for voltage to drop by 63 percent (1/e) during discharge.

360.3 Stored Energy Hazard Thresholds. Appropriate controls shall be applied where any of the following hazard thresholds are exceeded: (1) Less than 100 volts and greater than 100 joules of stored energy. (2) Greater than or equal to 100 volts and greater than 1.0 joule of stored energy. (3) Greater than or equal to 400 volts and greater than 0.25 joules of stored energy.

360.4 Specific Measures for Personnel Safety.

(A) Qualification and Training.

The following qualifications and training shall be required for personnel safety:

(1) Employees who perform work on electrical equipment with capacitors that exceed the energy thresholds in 360.3 shall be qualified and shall be trained in, and familiar with, the specific hazards and controls required for safe work.

(2) Unqualified persons who perform work on electrical equipment with capacitors shall be trained in, and familiar with, any electrical safety‐related work practices necessary for their safety.

(B) Performing a Risk Assessment for Capacitors.

The risk assessment process for capacitors shall follow the overall risk assessment procedures in Chapter 1. If additional protective measures are required, they shall be selected and implemented according to the hierarchy of risk control identified in 110.4(H)(3). When the additional protective measures include the use of PPE, the following shall be determined:

(1) Capacitor voltage and stored energy for the worker exposure. An exposure shall exist when a conductor or circuit part that could potentially remain energized with hazardous stored energy is exposed.

(2) Thermal hazard. The appropriate thermal PPE shall be selected and used if the stored energy of the exposed part is greater 100 joules.

(3) Shock hazard. The appropriate shock PPE per 130.7 shall be selected and used if the voltage is greater than or equal to 100 volts.

(4) Arc flash and arc blast hazard at the appropriate working distance. Select the appropriate protection for the arc flash and arc blast hazard, as follows:

(a) Arc flash PPE per 130.7 shall be selected and used if the incident energy exceeds 1.2 cal/cm2 at the working distance.

(b) Hearing protection shall be required where the stored energy exceeds 100 J and 400 V.

(c) The lung protection boundary shall be determined if stored energy is above 122 kJ. Employees shall not enter the lung protection boundary.

(d) Alerting techniques per 130.7(E) shall be used to warn employees of the hazards.

(5) Required test and grounding method. Soft grounding shall be used for stored energy greater than 1000 Joules. If capacitors are equipped with bleed resistors, or if using a soft grounding system, determine the required discharge wait time, where applicable. Remote soft grounding shall be used above 100 kJ.

(6) Develop a written procedure that captures all of the required steps to place the equipment in an electrically safe work condition. Include information about the amount of stored energy available, how long to wait after de‐energization before opening the enclosure, how to test for absence of voltage, and what to do if there is still stored energy present.

Informational Note No. 1: For more information on calculating capacitor stored energy, arc flash, and arc blast boundaries, see Annex R, Working Safely with Capacitors.

Informational Note No. 2: Heavy duty leather with a minimum thickness of 0.03 in. (0.7 mm) provides protection from thermal hazards.

360.5 Establishing an Electrically Safe Work Condition for Capacitor(s)

(A) Written Procedure.

Where a conductor or circuit part is operating at or above 100 V and 10 Joules, a written procedure shall be used to document the necessary steps and sequence to place the equipment into an electrically safe work condition. The written procedure shall incorporate the results of the risk assessment performed in 360.5(B) and specify the following at a minimum:

(1) Voltage in Volts

(2) Energy in Joules

(3) Specific steps to safely discharge the capacitor, or verify that it is discharged

(4) Specific tool(s) (e.g., ground stick) or engineering system to discharge the capacitors, if required

(5) Specific tools (e.g., DVM) or engineered systems used to verify a de‐energized state

(B) Safe Work Practices.

In order to place the capacitor(s) into an electrically safe work condition, a qualified person shall use the appropriate safe work practices and PPE and modify the process of 120.5 as follows:

(1) Determine all possible sources of electrical supply to the specific equipment. Check applicable up‐to‐date drawings, diagrams, and identification tags.


(3) Wherever possible, visually verify that all blades of the disconnecting devices are fully open or that drawout‐type circuit breakers are withdrawn to the fully disconnected position.

(4) Apply lockout/tagout devices in accordance with a documented and established policy.

(5) If bleed resistors or automatic discharge systems are applicable, wait the prescribed time for the capacitors to discharge to less than the thresholds in 360.3 and proceed to step (6). For systems without bleed resistors or automatic discharge systems, discharge the capacitors with an adequately rated grounding device (e.g., a ground stick). Soft grounding is required above 1000 joules, and remote soft grounding is required above 100 kJ.

(6) Verify that the capacitors are discharged. For capacitors less than 1000 J, this may be done either by testing or by grounding. For capacitors between 1000 J and less than 100 kJ, this must be done using testing or soft grounding, then hard grounding. Above 100 kJ, a properly engineered and redundant system shall be used for remote testing and grounding.

(7) When testing is performed in (6) use an adequately rated portable test instrument to test between each capacitor terminal and from each terminal to ground to assure that the capacitor is de‐energized. Before and after each verification, determine that the test instrument is operating satisfactorily through verification on a known dc voltage source. If voltage remains, determine and correct the cause, and repeat step (5) to discharge the capacitors.

(8) Where recharging may occur due to dielectric absorption or induced voltages, all of the capacitor terminals shall be shorted together and to ground. For series capacitors these shorting wires shall be attached across each individual capacitor, and to case. For single capacitors or for a parallel capacitor bank, the grounding device shall be permitted to be left hanging on the capacitor terminals during the work (e.g., a ground stick/hook).

Exception: Lockout/tagout is not required for work on cord‐ and plug‐connected equipment for which exposure to the hazards of unexpected energization of the equipment is controlled by the unplugging of the equipment from the energy source, provided that the plug is under the exclusive control of the employee performing the servicing and maintenance for the duration of the work.

360.6 Grounding Sticks.

Grounding sticks shall be provided for qualified persons to safely discharge any residual stored energy contained in capacitors and/or to hold the capacitor potential at 0 Volts. The grounding sticks shall be designed, constructed, installed, and periodically inspected so that the full energy and voltage of the capacitors can be safely discharged.

(A) Visual Inspection.

The ground stick shall be visually inspected for defects before each use. Resistors shall be visually inspected for cracks or other defects and electrically tested for proper resistance. The following shall occur if defects or contamination are found:

(1) If any defect or contamination that could adversely affect the insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the ground stick is present, the tool shall be removed from service. All mechanical connections shall be examined for loose connections. Ground sticks shall have a hand guard that reduces the risk of shock.

(2) If the defect or contamination exists on the grounding stick, then it shall be replaced or repaired and tested before returning to service.

(3) If the defect or contamination exists on the cable, then it shall be replaced or repaired and tested before returning to service.

(B) Electrical Testing.

All ground sticks shall be electrically tested as follows:

(1) The ground stick cable shall be tested to verify that the impedance is less than 0.1 Ohms to ground every 2 years.

(2) The testing shall be documented.

Exception: The test shall be performed annually if the ground stick is utilized outdoors or in other adverse conditions.

(3) Soft grounding (High‐Z) ground sticks with resistors shall be measured and compared to the specified value before each use.

(C) Storage and Disposal.

Any residual charge from capacitors shall be removed by discharging before servicing or removal.

(1) All uninstalled capacitors capable of storing 10 Joules or greater at their rated voltage shall be short‐circuited with a conductor of appropriate size.

(2) When an uninstalled capacitor is discovered without the shorting conductor attached to the terminals, it shall be treated as energized and charged to its full rated voltage until determined safe by a qualified person.

Informational Note: A capacitor that develops an internal open circuit could retain substantial charge internally even though the terminals are short‐circuited. Such a capacitor can be hazardous to transport, because the damaged internal wiring could reconnect and discharge the capacitor through the short‐circuiting conductor. Any capacitor that shows a significant change in capacitance after a fault could have this problem. Action should be taken to minimize this hazard when it is discovered.



Energy exposure levels shall not exceed those identified in the following list unless appropriate controlsare implemented as approved by the ESA:




a. 100 volts and 1 joule of stored energy

b. 400 volts and 25 joules of stored energy

c. Less than 100 volts and 100 joules of stored energy

Informational Note: This information is extracted from the Department of Energy, DOEElectricalSafety Handbook, DOE-HDBK-1092.






The Correlating Committee directs that First Revision 77 be reviewed and correlated with FR 88 and 89. This action will be considered as a public comment.

These First Revisions must be reviewed for compliance with the NEC Style Manual, correlated and clarified. There are inconsistencies with respect to stored energy thresholds in Articles 350 and 360. Clarification is needed on the application of new Informative Annex R and how to identify a “hazardous capacitor.” Sections R2.1 and R.2.2 in Informative Annex R must be reviewed to eliminate conflicting information.

The Correlating Committee directs the NFPA 70E Chair to appoint a task group to submit comments where necessary.


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a. 100 volts and 1 joule of stored energy

b. 400 volts and 0. 25 joules of stored energy

c. Less than 100 volts and 100 joules of stored energy

Informational Note: This information is extracted from the Department of Energy, DOEElectricalSafety Handbook, DOE-HDBK-1092.


Errata: 350.9 (3)b. should be 0.25 joules, not 25 joules in accordance with PI-231 and PI-297. See also Ballot comments from Gallo and Niemira.

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• FR-77




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Public Comment No. 97-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Article 360 ]

Article 360 Safety-Related Requirements for Capacitors

360.1 Scope.

This article applies to the electrical safety-related requirements for the practical safeguarding of employeeswhile working with capacitors that exceed 100 volts.

Informational Note: For more information on working safely with capacitors, see Informative AnnexR, Working with Capacitors.

360.2 Definitions.

Arc Blast Hazard.

A source of possible injury or damage to health from the energy deposited into acoustical shock-wave andhigh-velocity shrapnel.

Bleed Resistor.

A resistor network connected in parallel with a capacitor’s terminals that drains the charge after power hasbeen disconnected.

Charge Transfer.

Improper discharging of capacitor networks that results in transferring charge instead of fully dischargingthe stored energy.

Dielectric Absorption.

The property of certain capacitors to recharge after being discharged. A voltage recharge of up to 10percent may occur a few minutes after the grounding or shorting device has been removed.

Discharge Time.

The time required to discharge a capacitor to a safe level.

Ground Stick.

A device that is used to ensure that the capacitor is discharged by applying it to all terminals of thecapacitor element.

Informational Note: This is also called a ground hook and could incorporate power-rated dischargeresistors for high-energy applications.

Hard Grounding (Low Z).

The practice of discharging a capacitor through a low impedance, also called Low Z (impedance)grounding.

Hearing Protection Boundary.

Worker distance at which a 1 percent probability of ear damage exists from a 3.0 psi shock wave.

Lung Protection Boundary.

Worker distance at which a 1 percent probability of lung damage exists from a 10 psi shock wave.

Soft Grounding (Hi-Z).

The practice of connecting a capacitor to ground through a power resistor to avoid the hazards related withhard grounding. This is also called High Z (impedance) grounding.

Time Constant.

The time it takes for voltage to drop by ~63 percent (1/e) during discharge.


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360.3 Stored Energy Hazard Thresholds.

Appropriate controls shall be applied where the following hazard threshold conditions exist:

(1) Less than 100 volts and greater than 100 joules of stored energy

(2) Greater than or equal to 100 volts and greater than 1.0 joule of stored energy

(3) Greater than or equal to 400 volts and greater than 0.25 joules of stored energy

360.4 Specific Measures for Personnel Safety.

(A) Qualification and Training.

The following qualifications and training shall be required for personnel safety:

(1) Employees who perform work on electrical equipment with capacitors that exceed the energythresholds in 360.3 shall be qualified and shall be trained in, and familiar with, the specific hazardsand controls required for safe work.

(2) Unqualified persons who perform work on electrical equipment with capacitors shall be trained in, andfamiliar with, any electrical safety-related work practices necessary for their safety.


The risk assessment process for capacitors shall follow the overall risk assessment procedures perChapter 1. If additional protective measures are required, they shall be selected and implementedaccording to the hierarchy of risk control identified in 110.5(H) . When the additional protective measuresinclude the use of PPE, the following shall be determined:

(1) Capacitor voltage and stored energy for the worker exposure. An exposure exists when a conductoror circuit part that could potentially remain energized with hazardous stored energy is exposed.

(2) Thermal hazard. The appropriate thermal PPE shall be selected and used if the stored energy of theexposed part is greater 100 joules.

(3) Shock hazard. The appropriate shock PPE per 130.7 shall be selected and used if the voltage isgreater than or equal to 100 volts.

(4) Arc flash and arc blast hazard at the appropriate working distance. Select the appropriate protectionfor the arc flash and arc blast hazard, as follows:

(5) Arc flash PPE per 130.7 shall be selected and used if stored energy is greater than 10 kJ.

(6) Hearing protection shall be required where the stored energy exceeds 100 joules.

(7) The lung protection boundary shall be determined if stored energy is above 122 kJ. Employeesshall not enter the lung protection boundary.

(8) Alerting techniques per 130.7(E) shall be used to warn employees of the hazards.

(9) Required test and grounding method. Soft grounding shall be used for stored energy greater than1000 joules. If capacitors are equipped with bleed resistors, or if using a soft grounding system,determine the required discharge wait time, where applicable.

(10) Develop a written procedure that captures all of the required steps to place the equipment in anelectrically safe work condition. Include information about the amount of stored energy available, howlong to wait after de-energization before opening the enclosure, how to test for absence of voltage,and what to do if there is still stored energy present.

Informational Note No. 1: For more information on calculating capacitor stored energy, arc flash,and arc blast boundaries, see Annex R, Working Safely with Capacitors.

Informational Note No. 2: Heavy duty leather with a minimum thickness of 0.03 in. (0.7 mm)provides protection from thermal hazards.

360.5 Establishing an Electrically Safe Work Condition for the Capacitor Element.


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(A) Written Procedure.

Where a conductor or circuit part is operating above the thresholds per 360.3 , a written procedure shall beused to document the necessary steps and sequence to place the equipment into an electrically safe workcondition. The written procedure shall incorporate the results of the risk assessment performed in 360.5(B)and specify the following at a minimum:


In order to place the capacitor(s) into an electrically safe work condition, a qualified person shall use theappropriate safe work practices and PPE and perform the following steps:

(1) If bleed resistors or automatic discharge systems are applicable, wait the prescribed time for thecapacitors to discharge to less than the thresholds in 360.3 .

(2) For capacitors less than or equal to 1000 volts and less than or equal to 10 kJ of stored energy, usean adequately rated portable test instrument to test between each capacitor terminal and from eachterminal to ground to assure that the capacitor is de-energized.

(3) Before and after each verification, determine that the test instrument is operating satisfactorilythrough verification on a known dc voltage source. If voltage remains, proceed to 360.5(B)(4) .

(4) For capacitors greater than 1000 volts and less than or equal to 10 kJ of stored energy capacitorsand those less than 1000 volts with remaining energy, an adequately rated grounding device (e.g.,ground stick) shall be used to ground the capacitor terminals.

(5) To ensure that recharging does not occur, all of the capacitor terminals shall be shorted together andto ground with a noninsulated wire of sufficient gauge to withstand handling.

(6) For series capacitors these shorting wires shall be attached across each individual capacitor, and tocase.

For single capacitors or for a parallel capacitor bank, the grounding device shall be permitted to be lefthanging on the capacitor terminal during the work (e.g., a ground stick/hook). For capacitors greater than10 kJ of stored energy, energy removal shall be performed remotely.

360.6 Grounding Sticks.

Grounding sticks shall be provided for qualified persons to safely discharge any residual stored energycontained in capacitors. The grounding sticks shall be designed, constructed, installed, and periodicallyinspected so that the full energy and voltage of the capacitors can be safely discharged.

(A) Visual Inspection.

The ground stick shall be visually inspected for defects before each use. Resistors shall be visuallyinspected for cracks or other defects and electrically tested for proper resistance. The following shall occurif defects or contamination are found:

(1) If any defect or contamination that could adversely affect the insulating qualities or mechanicalintegrity of the ground stick is present, the tool shall be removed from service. All mechanicalconnections shall be examined for loose connections. Ground sticks shall have a hand guard thatreduces the risk of shock.

(2) If the defect or contamination exists on the grounding stick, then it shall be replaced or repaired andtested before returning to service.

(3) If the defect or contamination exists on the cable, then it shall be replaced or repaired and testedbefore returning to service.


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(B) Electrical Testing.

All ground sticks shall be electrically tested as follows:

(1) The ground stick cable shall be tested to verify that impedance is less than 0.1 Ω to ground every 2years.

(2) The testing shall be documented.

Exception: The test shall be performed annually if the ground stick is utilized outdoors or in otheradverse conditions.

(3) Soft grounding (Hi-Z) ground sticks with resistors shall be measured and compared to the specifiedvalue before each use.



(1) All uninstalled capacitors capable of storing 10 joules or greater at their rated voltage shall be short-circuited with a conductor of appropriate size.

(2) When an uninstalled capacitor is discovered without the shorting conductor attached to the terminals,it shall be treated as energized and charged to its full rated voltage until determined safe by aqualified person.

Informational Note: A capacitor that develops an internal open circuit could retain substantial chargeinternally even though the terminals are short-circuited. Such a capacitor can be hazardous totransport, because the damaged internal wiring could reconnect and discharge the capacitorthrough the short-circuiting conductor. Any capacitor that shows a significant change in capacitanceafter a fault could have this problem. Action should be taken to minimize this hazard when it isdiscovered.

REPLACE ALL WITH REVISED TEXT SUBMITTED IN SEPARATE FILE



Article_360_-_Final_Submittal_for_PC-97.docx REVISED TEXT FOR ARTICLE 360


New version incorporates improvements from DOE EFCOG and aligns to Annex R thresholds.



Public Comment No. 19-NFPA 70E-2019 [Annex R] Annex R

Public Comment No. 19-NFPA 70E-2019 [Annex R]


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360.1 Scope.

This article applies to the electrical safety-related requirements for the practical safeguarding of employeeswhile working with capacitors that exceed 100 volts .

Informational Note: For more information on working safely with capacitors, see Informative AnnexR, Working with Capacitors.


Specific criteria for hazardous capacitors is specified in 360.3 which could include capacitors less than 100V

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360.3 Stored Energy Hazard Thresholds.

Appropriate controls shall be applied where the following hazard threshold conditions exist:

(1) Less than 100 volts and greater than 100 joules of stored energy

(2) Greater than or equal to 100 volts and greater than 1.0 10 joule of stored energy

(3) Greater than or equal to 400 volts and greater than 0.25 joules of stored energy


There are many hazards of non electrical nature that can occur while performing electrical work. The Appendix R says that reflex actions can occur from energies below 10 J, but reflex actions can occur from something hot or sharp regardless of the presence if stored energy. The _written_ procedure should document the direct electrical shock hazard. Training to make workers aware of reflex hazards should be more general. It seems out of place to put this particular reflex hazard into a written form.

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• PI No 311 - NFPA 70E-2018 [New Section after 350.10]


Submitter Full Name: Chris Jensen

Organization: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory

Affiliation: None

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Rejected

Resolution: The submitter has not provided technical substantiation to reduce the hazardous energy thresholdlevels below those located in the DOE Electrical Safety Handbook, DOE-HDBK-1092.


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The risk assessment process for capacitors shall follow the overall risk assessment procedures per Chapter1. If additional protective measures are required, they shall be selected and implemented according to thehierarchy of risk control identified in 110.5(H). When the additional protective measures include the use ofPPE, the following shall be determined:

(1) Capacitor voltage and stored energy for the worker exposure. An exposure exists when a conductor orcircuit part that could potentially remain energized with hazardous stored energy is exposed.

(2) Thermal hazard. The appropriate thermal PPE shall be selected and used if the stored energy of theexposed part is greater 100 joules.

(3) Shock hazard. The appropriate shock PPE per 130.7 shall be selected and used if the voltage isgreater than or equal to 100 50 volts.

(4) Arc flash and arc blast hazard at the appropriate working distance. Select the appropriate protectionfor the arc flash and arc blast hazard, as follows:

(a) Arc flash PPE per 130.7 shall be selected and used if stored energy is greater than 10 kJ.

(b) Hearing protection shall be required where the stored energy exceeds 100 joules.

(c) The lung protection boundary shall be determined if stored energy is above 122 kJ.Employees shall not enter the lung protection boundary.

(d) Alerting techniques per 130.7(E) shall be used to warn employees of the hazards.

(5) Required test and grounding method. Soft grounding shall be used for stored energy greater than1000 joules. If capacitors are equipped with bleed resistors, or if using a soft grounding system,determine the required discharge wait time, where applicable.

(6) Develop a written procedure that captures all of the required steps to place the equipment in anelectrically safe work condition. Include information about the amount of stored energy available, howlong to wait after de-energization before opening the enclosure, how to test for absence of voltage, andwhat to do if there is still stored energy present.

Informational Note No. 1: For more information on calculating capacitor stored energy, arc flash, andarc blast boundaries, see Annex R, Working Safely with Capacitors.

Informational Note No. 2: Heavy duty leather with a minimum thickness of 0.03 in. (0.7 mm) providesprotection from thermal hazards.


In OSHA’s letter of interpretation dated 9/4/15, OSHA considers all voltages above 50 volts to be hazardous. For consistency in the standard the voltage for capacitors will need to be changed to 50 volts.

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Rejected

Resolution: The submitter has not provided technical substantiation to reduce the hazardous energy thresholdlevels below those located in the DOE Electrical Safety Handbook, DOE-HDBK-1092.


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(1) If bleed resistors or automatic discharge systems are applicable, wait the prescribed time for thecapacitors to discharge to less than the thresholds in 360.3.


(3) Before and after each verification, determine that the test instrument is operating satisfactorily throughverification on a known dc voltage source. If voltage remains, proceed to 360.5(B)(4).

(4) For capacitors greater than 1000 volts and less than or equal to 10 kJ of stored energy capacitors andthose less than 1000 volts with remaining energy, an adequately rated grounding device (e.g., groundstick) shall be used to ground the capacitor terminals.

(5) To ensure that recharging does not occur, all of the capacitor terminals shall be shorted together andbonded together and to ground with a noninsulated wire of sufficient gauge to withstandhandling estimated stored energy thresholds .


For single capacitors or for a parallel capacitor bank, the grounding device shall be permitted to be lefthanging on the capacitor terminal during the work (e.g., a ground stick/hook). For capacitors greater than10 kJ of stored energy, energy removal shall be performed remotely.


The addition of bonded adds clarity that wiring method requires electrical continuity between capacitor terminals and ground. o Adding insulated wires is in line with the construction of protective grounding equipment. o Estimated stored energy thresholds describes what the shorting wire is capable of handling. o It is not clear from this section if the shorting wire referenced in 360.5(B) are required to remain in place for the duration of the work.

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(1) If bleed resistors or automatic discharge systems are applicable, wait the prescribed time for thecapacitors to discharge to less than the thresholds in 360.3.


(3) Before and after each verification, determine that the test instrument is operating satisfactorily throughverification on a known dc voltage source. If voltage remains, proceed to 360.5(B)(4).

(4) For capacitors greater than 1000 volts and less than or equal to 10 kJ of stored energy capacitors andthose less than 1000 volts with remaining energy, an adequately rated grounding device (e.g., groundstick) shall be used to ground the capacitor terminals.

(5) To ensure that recharging does not occur, all of the capacitor terminals shall be shorted together andto ground with a noninsulated wire of sufficient gauge to withstand handling.


For single capacitors or for a parallel capacitor bank, the grounding device shall be permitted to be lefthanging on the attached to the capacitor terminal during for the duration of the work (e.g., a groundstick/hook). For capacitors greater than 10 kJ of stored energy, energy removal shall be performedremotely.


It is assumed that grounding device left hanging on is the same as attached to. This change adds clarity to the intent of leaving the grounding device attached for the duration of the work.

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(1) All uninstalled capacitors capable of storing 10 joules or greater at their rated voltage shall be short-circuited with a conductor of appropriate size.

(2) When an uninstalled capacitor is discovered without the shorting conductor attached to the terminals,it shall be treated as energized and charged to its full rated voltage until determined safe by a qualifiedperson.

Informational Note: A capacitor that develops an internal open circuit could retain substantial chargeinternally even though the terminals are short-circuited. Such a capacitor can be hazardous totransport, because the damaged internal wiring could reconnect and discharge the capacitor throughthe short-circuiting conductor. Any capacitor that shows a significant change in capacitance after afault could have this problem. Action should be taken to minimize to reduce the risk associatedwith this hazard when it is discovered.


The phrase "minimize this hazard" in 360.6(C) Informational Note should be revised to "reduce the risk associated with this hazard" to be consistent with the definitions of "hazard" and "risk" and with similar Technical Committee actions taken in the 2015 and 2018 editions. Hazards are not controlled, reduced or minimized, they exist or do not exist. Risk is controlled.



Public Comment No. 71-NFPA 70E-2019 [SectionNo. R.14.4]

The material in New Annex R is related to NewArticle 360.

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Statement: Text is modified to clarify that Article 360 applies to capacitors that are considered hazardous evenwhen the voltage is less than 100 V. Arc flash risk assessment thresholds are revised to beconsistent with Chapter 1. The thresholds for a written procedure in 360.5(A) are specified to ensureusability. The steps for creating and verifying an electrically safe work condition are revised to


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harmonize with Article 120. Non-technical wording changes are made to correct grammar, complywith the NEC Style Manual, clarify the intent, or consistency with other parts of the standard.


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Public Comment No. 57-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. D.4 ]

D.4 IEEE 1584 Calculation Method.

D.

4

.1 Basic Equations for Calculating Incident Energy and Arc Flash Boundary.

This section provides excerpts from IEEE 1584, Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations , forestimating incident energy and arc flash boundaries based on statistical analysis and curve fitting ofavailable test data. An IEEE working group produced the data from tests it performed to produce models ofincident energy.

The complete data, including a spreadsheet calculator to solve the equations, can be found in IEEE 1584.Users are encouraged to consult the latest version of the complete document to understand the basis,limitation, rationale, and other pertinent information for proper application of the standard. It can beordered from the IEEE Standards Store, 6300 Interfirst Drive, Ann Arbor, MI 48108.

D.4.1.1 System Limits.

An equation for calculating incident energy can be empirically derived using statistical analysis of raw dataalong with a curve-fitting algorithm. It can be used for systems with the following limits:

(1) 0.208 kV to 15 kV, three-phase

(2) 50 Hz to 60 Hz

(3) 700 A to 106,000 A available short-circuit current

(4) 13 mm to 152 mm conductor gaps

For three-phase systems in open-air substations, open-air transmission systems, and distribution systems,a theoretically derived model is available. This theoretically derived model is intended for use withapplications where faults escalate to three-phase faults. Where such an escalation is not possible or likely,or where single-phase systems are encountered, this equation will likely provide conservative results.

D.4.2 Arcing Current.

To determine the operating time for protective devices, find the predicted three-phase arcing current.

For applications with a system voltage under 1 kV, solve Equation D.4.2(a) as follows:

[D.4.2a]

where:lg = the log 10

I a = arcing current, kA

K = −0.153 for open air arcs; −0.097 for arcs-in-a-box

I bf = bolted three-phase available short-circuit current (symmetrical rms), kA

V = system voltage, kV

G = conductor gap, mm (see Table D.4.2 )

For systems greater than or equal to 1 kV, use Equation D.4.2(b):

[D.4.2b]

This higher voltage formula is used for both open-air arcs and for arcs-in-a-box.

Convert from lg:


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[D.4.2c]

Use 0.85 I a to find a second arc duration. This second arc duration accounts for variations in the arcingcurrent and the time for the overcurrent device to open. Calculate the incident energy using both arcdurations ( I a and 0.85 I a ), and use the higher incident energy.

Table D.4.2 Factors for Equipment and Voltage Classes

System Voltage(kV) Type of Equipment Typical Conductor Gap (mm) Distance Exponent Factor x Openair 10–40 2.000 0.208–1 Switchgear 32 1.473 MCCs and panels 25 1.641 Cables 13 2.000 Openair 102 2.000 >1–5 Switchgear 13–102 0.973 Cables 13 2.000 Openair 13–153 2.000 >5–15 Switchgear 153 0.973 Cables 13 2.000

D.4.3 Incident Energy at Working Distance — Empirically Derived Equation.

To determine the incident energy using the empirically derived equation, determine the log 10 of thenormalized incident energy. The following equation is based on data normalized for an arc time of0.2 second and a distance from the possible arc point to the person of 610 mm:

[D.4.3a]

where: E n = incident energy, normalized for time and distance, J/cm 2 k 1 = −0.792 for open airarcs = −0.555 for arcs-in-a-box k 2 = 0 for ungrounded and high-resistance grounded systems = −0.113for grounded systems G = conductor gap, mm (see Table D.4.2 )

Then,

[D.4.3b]

Converting from normalized:

[D.4.3c]

where:E = incident energy, J/cm 2 .

C f = calculation factor

= 1.0 for voltages above 1 kV.

= 1.5 for voltages at or below 1 kV.

E n = incident energy normalized.

t = arcing time, sec.

x = distance exponent from Table D.4.2 .

D = distance, mm, from the arc to the person (working distance). See Table D.4.3 for typical workingdistances.

Table D.4.3 Typical Working Distances

Classes of Equipment Typical Working Distance* (mm) 15-kV switchgear 910 5-kV switchgear 910 Low-voltage switchgear 610 Low-voltage MCCs and panelboards 455 Cable 455 Other To be determined infield

*Typical working distance is the sum of the distance between the worker and the front of the equipment andthe distance from the front of the equipment to the potential arc source inside the equipment.

If the arcing time, t , in Equation D.4.3(c) is longer than 2 seconds, consider how long a person is likely toremain in the location of the arc flash. It is likely that a person exposed to an arc flash will move awayquickly if it is physically possible, and 2 seconds is a reasonable maximum time for calculations. Soundengineering judgment should be used in applying the 2-second maximum clearing time, because therecould be circumstances where an employee’s egress is inhibited. For example, a person in a bucket truckor a person who has crawled into equipment will need more time to move away.


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D.4.4 Incident Energy at Working Distance — Theoretical Equation.

The following theoretically derived equation can be applied in cases where the voltage is over 15 kV orthe gap is outside the range:

[D.4.4]

where:E = incident energy, J/cm 2


I bf = available three-phase bolted fault current

t = arcing time, sec

D = distance (mm) from the arc to the person (working distance)

For voltages over 15 kV, arcing fault current and bolted fault current are considered equal.

D.4.5 Arc Flash Boundary.

The arc flash boundary is the distance at which a person is likely to receive a second degree burn. The

onset of a second degree burn is assumed to be when the skin receives 5.0 J/cm 2 of incident energy.

For the empirically derived equation,

[D.4.5a]

For the theoretically derived equation,

[D.4.5b]

where:D B = distance (mm) of the arc flash boundary from the arcing point

C f = calculation factor

= 1.0 for voltages above 1 kV

= 1.5 for voltages at or below 1 kV

E n = incident energy normalized

t = time, sec

x = distance exponent from Table D.4.2

E B = incident energy in J/cm 2 at the distance of the arc flash boundary


I bf = bolted three-phase available short-circuit current

Informational Note: These equations could be used to determine whether selected personalprotective equipment (PPE) is adequate to prevent thermal injury at a specified distance in theevent of an arc flash.

D.4.6 Current-Limiting Fuses.

The formulas in this section were developed for calculating arc flash energies for use with current-limitingClass L and Class RK1 fuses. The testing was done at 600 V and at a distance of 455 mm, usingcommercially available fuses from one manufacturer. The following variables are noted:

I bf = available three-phase bolted fault current (symmetrical rms), kA

E = incident energy, J/cm 2


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(A) Class L Fuses 1601 A through 2000 A.

Where I bf < 22.6 kA, calculate the arcing current using Equation D.4.2(a), and use time-current curvesto determine the incident energy using Equations D.4.3(a), D.4.3(b), and D.4.3(c).

Where 22.6 kA ≤ I bf ≤ 65.9 kA,

[D.4.6a]

Where 65.9 kA < I bf ≤106 kA,

[D.4.6b]

Where I bf >106 kA, contact the manufacturer.

(B) Class L Fuses 1201 A through 1600 A.

Where I bf <15.7 kA, calculate the arcing current using Equation D.4.2(a), and use time-current curvesto determine the incident energy using Equations D.4.3(a), D.4.3(b), and D.4.3(c).

Where 15.7 kA ≤ I bf ≤ 31.8 kA,

[D.4.6c]

Where 44.1 kA ≤ I bf ≤ 65.9 kA,

[D.4.6d]


[D.4.6e]


(C) Class L Fuses 801 A through 1200 A.

Where I bf <15.7 kA, calculate the arcing current using Equation D.4.2(a), and use time-current curvesto determine the incident energy per Equations D.4.3(a), D.4.3(b), and D.4.3(c).

Where 15.7 kA ≤ I bf ≤ 22.6 kA,

[D.4.6f]

Where 22.6 kA < I bf ≤ 44.1 kA,

[D.4.6g]

Where 44.1 kA < I bf ≤ 106 kA,

[D.4.6h]



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(D) Class L Fuses 601 A through 800 A.


Where 15.7 kA ≤ I bf ≤ 44.1 kA,

[D.4.6i]


[D.4.6j]

Where I bf > 106 kA, contact the manufacturer.

(E) Class RK1 Fuses 401 A through 600 A.


Where 8.5 kA ≤ I bf ≤ 14 kA,

[D.4.6k]

Where 14 kA < I bf ≤ 15.7 kA,

[D.4.6l]

Where 15.7 kA < I bf ≤ 22.6 kA,

[D.4.6m]


[D.4.6n]


(F) Class RK1 Fuses 201 A through 400 A.


Where 3.16 kA ≤ I bf ≤ 5.04 kA,

[D.4.6o]

Where 5.04 kA < I bf ≤ 22.6 kA,

[D.4.6p]


[D.4.6q]



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(G) Class RK1 Fuses 101 A through 200 A.


Where 1.16 kA ≤ I bf ≤1.6 kA,

[D.4.6r]

Where 1.6 kA < I bf ≤3.16 kA,

[D.4.6s]


[D.4.6t]


(H) Class RK1 Fuses 1 A through 100 A.


Where 0.65 kA ≤ I bf ≤ 1.16 kA,

[D.4.6u]

Where 1.16 kA < I bf ≤ 1.4 kA,

[D.4.6v]


[D.4.6w]


D.4.7 Low-Voltage Circuit Breakers.

The equations in Table D.4.7 can be used for systems with low-voltage circuit breakers. The results of theequations will determine the incident energy and arc flash boundary when I bf is within the range asdescribed. Time-current curves for the circuit breaker are not necessary within the appropriate range.

When the bolted fault current is below the range indicated, calculate the arcing current using EquationD.4.2(a), and use time-current curves to determine the incident energy using Equations D.4.3(a), D.4.3(b),and D.4.3(c).

Table D.4.7 Incident Energy and Arc Flash Protection Boundary by Circuit Breaker Type and Rating

480 V and Lower 575 V–600 V Rating(A) Breaker Type Trip Unit Type Incident Energy

(J/cm 2 ) a Arc FlashBoundary(mm) a Incident Energy (J/cm 2 ) a Arc Flash Boundary

(mm) a 100–400 MCCB TM or M 0.189 I bf + 0.548 9.16 I bf + 194 0.271 I bf + 0.180 11.8 I bf+ 196 600–1200 MCCB TM or M 0.223 I bf + 1.590 8.45 I bf + 364 0.335 I bf + 0.380 11.4 I bf+ 369 600–1200 MCCB E, LI 0.377 I bf + 1.360 12.50 I bf + 428 0.468 I bf + 4.600 14.3 I bf +568 1600–6000 MCCB or ICCB TM or E, LI 0.448 I bf + 3.000 11.10 I bf + 696 0.686 I bf +0.165 16.7 I bf + 606 800–6300 LVPCB E, LI 0.636 I bf + 3.670 14.50 I bf + 786 0.958 I bf +

0.292 19.1 I bf + 864 800–6300 LVPCB E, LS b 4.560 I bf + 27.230 47.20 I bf + 2660 6.860I bf + 2.170 62.4 I bf + 2930

MCCB: Molded-case circuit breaker.

TM: Thermal-magnetic trip units.

M: Magnetic (instantaneous only) trip units.

E: Electronic trip units have three characteristics that may be used separately or in combination: L: Longtime, S: Short time, I: Instantaneous.


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ICCB: Insulated-case circuit breaker.

LVPCB: Low-voltage power circuit breaker.

a I bf is in kA; working distance is 455 mm (18 in.).

b Short-time delay is assumed to be set at maximum.

The range of available three-phase bolted fault currents is from 700 A to 106,000 A. Each equation isapplicable for the following range:

where:I 1 = minimum available three-phase, bolted, short-circuit current at which this method can be applied.

I 1 is the lowest available three-phase, bolted, short-circuit current level that causes enougharcing current for instantaneous tripping to occur, or, for circuit breakers with no instantaneous trip,that causes short-time tripping to occur.

I 2 = interrupting rating of the circuit breaker at the voltage of interest.

To find I 1 , the instantaneous trip ( I t ) of the circuit breaker must be found. I t can be determined fromthe time-current curve, or it can be assumed to be 10 times the rating of the circuit breaker for circuitbreakers rated above 100 amperes. For circuit breakers rated 100 amperes and below, a value of I t =1300 A can be used. When short-time delay is utilized, I t is the short-time pickup current.

The corresponding bolted fault current, I bf , is found by solving the equation for arc current for boxconfigurations by substituting I t for arcing current. The 1.3 factor in Equation D.4.7(b) adjusts current tothe top of the tripping band.

[D.4.7a]

At 600 V,

[D.4.7b]

At 480 V and lower,

[D.4.7c]

[D.4.7d]

D.4.8 References.

The complete data, including a spreadsheet calculator to solve the equations, can be found in IEEE 1584,Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations . IEEE publications are available from the Institute ofElectrical and Electronics Engineers, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331, USA(http://standards.ieee.org/).

Replace the existing Text in AnnexD4 with the attached text



.1556851478209

70E_Annex_D4.docx Text based on IEEE 1584-2018


Annex D4 describes IEEE 1584 calculation method.


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The existing text is based on IEEE 1584- 2002 edition. This document has been revised. The revised version IEEE 1584-2018 has new models for calculating incident energy and arc flash boundary based on over 1800 new tests performed in five different testing facilities. 'The new text is based on the revised standard IEEE 1584-2018 to inform users of the scope, range of parameters, and definition and description of electrode configurations used in IEEE 1584-2018

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Submitter Full Name: Daleep Mohla

Organization: DCM Electrical Consulting Serv

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: IEEE 1584 has been updated to the 2018 version. Annex section D.4 is replaced with newinformation that provides an overview of the new revision, along with the scope, purpose andmodel parameters.

Unless changes in the electrical distribution system render previous calculations inaccurate,existing calculations are acceptable if they complied with the requirements in effect at the time thecalculations were performed.


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INTRODUCTION

This section provides a summary of the scope and purpose of IEEE Std 1584 TM-2018 and it also provides an overview of the model range of parameters. Readers are encouraged to consult IEEE Standard 1584-2018 IEEE Guide for Performing Arc- Flash Hazard Calculations for further information and detailed guidelines for proper application of the standard

IEEE Std. 1584-2018 is a revision of IEEE Std. 1584-2002 as amended by IEEE Std 1584a-2004 and IEEE Std 1584b-2011.

The scope and purpose of IEEE 1584-2018 are below Scope

This guide provides models and an analytical process to enable calculation of the predicted incident

thermal energy and the arc-flash boundary (AFB). The process covers a collection of applicable field data, consideration of power system operating scenarios, and calculation parameters. Applications include electrical equipment and conductors for three-phase alternating current (ac) voltages from 208 V to 15 kV. Calculations for single-phase ac systems and direct current (dc) systems are not a part of this guide, but some guidance and references are provided for those applications. Recommendations for personal protective equipment (PPE) to mitigate arc-flash hazards are not included in this guide.

Purpose:

The purpose of the guide is to enable qualified person(s) to analyze power systems for the purpose of calculating the incident energy (IE) to which employees could be exposed during operations and maintenance work. Contractors and facility owners can use this information to provide appropriate protection for employees in accordance with the requirements of applicable electrical workplace safety standards. The new arc-flash model is a result of the IEEE/NFPA Arc-Flash Phenomena Collaborative Research Project and is based on over 1800 tests. The tests were performed at five different testing facilities over a six-year period to ensure consistency and repeatability.

Range of the Model The range of the IEEE 1584-2018 model is provided in Table I (section 4.2 of [1]).

TABLE I RANGE OF INPUT PARAMETERS FOR IEEE 1584-2018

Input parameter Range Voltage (Voc) 208 to 15 000 V 3-phase (line-to-line) Bolted Fault Current ( ) 208 V to 600 V – Low Voltage (LV)

500 to 106 000 A (rms Sym.)

Bolted Fault Current ( ) 601 V to 15 000 V – Medium Voltage (MV)

200 to 65 000 A (rms Sym.)

Gap ( ) 208 V to 600 V

6.35 mm to 76.2 mm (0.25 in to 3 in)

bfI

bfI

G

Gap ( ) 601 V to 15 000 V

19.05 mm to 254 mm (0.75 in to 10 in)

Working Distance ( ) ≥ 305 mm (12 in) Fault Clearing Time ( ) No limit Maximum Height 1244.6 mm (49 in) Maximum Width 1244.6 mm (49 in) Minimum Width Four times the gap mm (4 × ) Opening Area 1.549 m2 (2401 in2) Frequency 50 Hz or 60 Hz

Comparison with IEEE 1584-2002

The IEEE 1584-2002 arc-flash model was based on ~ 300 tests The IEEE 1584-2018 model was based on over 1800 tests IEEE 1584-2002 used 2 configurations IEEE 1584-2018 includes 5 configurations

Five different labs were used for performing the tests IEEE 1584-2002 test results were also used in new model

Note: Based on the testing performed it was observed that Sustainable arcs are possible but less likely in three-phase systems operating at 240 V nominal or less with an available short-circuit current less than 2000 A.

Definitions Electrode Configuration: The orientation and arrangement of the electrodes used in the

testing performed for the model development. The following electrode configurations (test arrangements) are defined and utilized in the incident energy model: — VCB: Vertical conductors/electrodes inside a metal box/enclosure — VCBB: Vertical conductors/electrodes terminated in an insulating barrier inside a metal box/enclosure — HCB: Horizontal conductors/electrodes inside a metal box/enclosure — VOA: Vertical conductors/electrodes in open air — HOA: Horizontal conductors/electrodes in open air

TABLE II ELECTRODE ORIENTATION & CONFIGURATIONS

E.C. Standard Orientation Configuration Termination

G

D

T

G

VOA 2002/2018 Vertical Open air Open air VCB 2002/2018 Vertical Metal enclosure Open air VCBB 2018 Vertical Metal enclosure Insulating Barrier HOA 2018 Horizontal Open air Open air HCB 2018 Horizontal Metal enclosure Open air

Enclosure Size Correction factor

The VCB, VCBB, and HCB equations were normalized for a 508 mm × 508 mm × 508 mm (20 in × 20 in × 20 in) enclosure. This model provides instructions on how to adjust incident energy for smaller and larger enclosures using a calculated correction factor Cautions and Disclaimers

As an IEEE guide, this document suggests approaches for conducting an arc-flash hazard analysis but does not contain any mandatory requirements that preclude alternate methods. Following the suggestions in this guide does not guarantee safety, and users should take all reasonable, independent steps necessary to reduce risks from arc-flash events. This information is offered as a tool for conducting an arc-flash hazard analysis. It is intended for use only by qualified persons who are knowledgeable about power system studies, power distribution equipment, and equipment installation practices. It is not intended as a substitute for the engineering judgment and adequate review necessary for such studies. This guide is based upon testing and analysis of the thermal burn hazard presented by incident energy. Due to the explosive nature of arc-flash incidents, injuries can occur from ensuing molten metal splatters, projectiles, pressure waves, toxic arc by-products, the bright light of the arc, and the loud noise produced. These other effects are not considered in this guide. This guide is subject to revision as additional knowledge and experience is gained. IEEE, those companies that contributed test data, and those people who worked on the development of this standard make no guarantee of results and assume no obligation or liability whatsoever in connection with this information. The methodology in this guide assumes that all equipment is installed, operated, and maintained as required by applicable codes, standards, and manufacturers’ instructions, and applied in accordance with its ratings .Equipment that is improperly installed or maintained may not operate correctly, possibly increasing the arc flash incident energy or creating other hazards.

Public Comment No. 20-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Sections D.4.4, D.4.5 ]

Sections D.4.4, D.4.5

D.4.4 Incident Energy at Working Distance — Theoretical Equation.

The following theoretically derived equation can be applied in cases where the voltage is over 15 kV or thegap is outside the range:

[D.4.4]

where:E = incident energy, J/cm2


Ibf = available three-phase bolted fault current, kA

t = arcing time, sec

D = distance (mm) from the arc to the person (working distance)

For voltages over 15 kV, arcing fault current and bolted fault current are considered equal.

D.4.5 Arc Flash Boundary.

The arc flash boundary is the distance at which a person is likely to receive a second degree burn. The

onset of a second degree burn is assumed to be when the skin receives 5.0 J/cm2 of incident energy.

For the empirically derived equation,

[D.4.5a]

For the theoretically derived equation,

[D.4.5b]

where:DB = distance (mm) of the arc flash boundary from the arcing point

Cf = calculation factor

= 1.0 for voltages above 1 kV

= 1.5 for voltages at or below 1 kV

En = incident energy normalized

t = time, sec

x = distance exponent from Table D.4.2

EB = incident energy in J/cm2 at the distance of the arc flash boundary


Ibf = bolted three-phase available short-circuit current, kA

Informational Note: These equations could be used to determine whether selected personalprotective equipment (PPE) is adequate to prevent thermal injury at a specified distance in the eventof an arc flash.



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I have done hand calcs using the IEEE 1584 equations and if you try to do the equation in Mathcad using the Annex D verbiage, you quickly realize that the bolt fault current (Ibf) units are required to be in kA for AF Boundary calculation, as you will see your boundary 31.6 times greater [31.6=sqrt(1000)] than expected if you don't use the right units. You can try to do units labels in Mathcad versus an AF calculator program or spreadsheet...and then you will see that the bolt fault current (Ibf) units don't resolve well if they aren't in kA. Either way, the NFPA 70e Annex D section is currently broken. Any PE Power Engineer who can hand calculate an AF using IEEE 1584 equations will tell you the same if asked to look at my suggestion.

Sincerely, Richard W. Jensen PE, Power Engineer WA lic#47837 509-387-1349 [email protected] [email protected]

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Submitter Full Name: Richard Jensen

Organization: RW Jensen Engineering, CH2M

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Mon Mar 04 14:52:28 EST 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: Annex sections D.4.4 and D.4.5 have been replaced with the new IEEE-1584 2018 revision andtherefore the modifications to these sections are no longer necessary.


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Public Comment No. 21-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. D.5.1 ]

D.5.1 Maximum Power Method.

The following method of estimating dc arc flash incident energy that follows was published in the IEEETransactions on Industry Applications (see reference 2, which follows). This method is based on theconcept that the maximum power possible in a dc arc will occur when the arcing voltage is one-half thesystem voltage. Testing completed for Bruce Power (see reference 3, which follows) has shown that thiscalculation is conservatively high in estimating the arc flash value. This method applies to dc systems ratedup to 1000 V.

[D.5.1]

where:Iarc = arcing current, amperes

Ibf = system bolted fault current, amperes

IEm = estimated dc arc flash incident energy at the maximum power point, cal/cm2

Vsys = system voltage, volts

Tarc = arcing time, sec

D = working distance, cm

For exposures where the arc is in a box or enclosure, it would be prudent to consider additional PPEprotection beyond the values shown in Table 130.7(C)(15)(b).


To harmonize with sections D.4.4 and 4.5, with respect to units, this change, adding commas is beneficial for readability.

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Submitter Full Name: Richard Jensen

Organization: RW Jensen Engineering

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: Commas have been added into Annex D.5 to separate the mathematical units from the variablebeing defined. This action will correlate with the look of other mathematical expressionsthroughout Annex D.


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Public Comment No. 113-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. F.3 ]

F.3 Hierarchy of Risk Control.

The purpose of specifying and adhering to a hierarchy of risk control methods is to identify the mosteffective individual or combination of preventive or protective measures to reduce the risk associated with ahazard. Each risk control method is considered less effective than the one before it. Table F.3 lists thehierarchy of risk control identified in this and other safety standards and provides examples of each.

Table F.3 The Hierarchy of Risk Control Methods

Risk ControlMethod

Examples

(1) Elimination

Conductors and circuit parts in an electrically safe working conditionA change in process or workplace condition that removes the hazard or ensures that

no worker can be exposed to a hazard under any foreseeable circumstances.

(2) Substitution Reduce energy by replacing 120 V control circuitry with 24 Vac or Vdc control circuitry

(3) Engineeringcontrols

Guard Permenant guarding of energized electrical conductors and circuit parts toreduce the likelihood of electrical contact or arcing faults

(4) Awareness Signs alerting of the potential presence of hazards

(5) Administrativecontrols

Procedures and job planning tools

(6) PPE Shock and arc flash PPE


The example for Elimination does not correlate with OSHA definition of Elimination and does not correlate with the December 2018 ruling by the federal OSHA Review Commission in the case of OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA. The example of Engineering Controls must be a permanent design change and not a temporary measure for a specific task. A temporary guard is more appropriately described as an Administrative Control.

In the context of the Hierarchy of Controls, Elimination, Substitution and Engineering Controls are design controls, and not safe work practices. The committee should review my original proposals 207, 208 and 209 in light of the December 2018 ruling of the federal OSHA Review Commission in the case of OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA. In this case, the Review Commission ruled that Jacobs practices were flawed in assuming establishing an Electrical Safe Work Condition eliminated hazardous energy. I am providing the complete ruling for the technical committee to take into consideration. The following is a synopsis of the ruling.

This ruling in the case of OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA brings attention to the problem in how the term “Elimination” is used in the context of an Electrical Safe Work Condition (ESWC). The current language in NFPA 70E does not correlate with the OSHA Review Commission ruling and OSHA definition of Elimination and is misleading concerning the risk that remains after an ESWC is established. OSHA cited Jacobs after an employee who was injured in an arc flash incident. Jacobs appealed the citation, claiming its procedures were compliant with NFPA 70E requirements for establishing an Electrical Safe Work Condition, eliminating exposure to hazardous energy, and that the injury was due to employee misconduct. The Review Commission ruled that Jacobs procedures were flawed in assuming that an ESWC eliminated exposure to hazardous energy. The ruling contradicts statements in NFPA 70E and related NFPA documents that claim or infer hazard and risk are eliminated when an ESWC is established. Based on the ruling in OSHA vs Jacobs Field Services NA, statements in NFPA 70E and associated handbooks, training materials, and certification programs which claim or imply that establishing an ESWC eliminates exposure to hazardous energy is misleading and not aligned with OSHA.Although defined in safety management standards and literature for more than 50 years, the definition of “Elimination” did not appear in OSHA documents until the October 2016 publication of OSHA Recommendations for Safety and Health Programs. Elimination of a hazard and associated risk is only achievable through design changes that permanently remove the hazard or alters the workplace in such a manner that a worker cannot be exposed to the hazard under any foreseeable circumstances. Elimination of hazardous energy in existing installations is very difficult and usually not achievable. Risk must be reduced to an acceptable level using other controls in the Hierarchy of Controls. Applying Administrative Controls that reduce the likelihood of exposure to as


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low as reasonably practicable is the focus of NFPA70E. Establishing an ESWC and safe work practices to keep workers inside the safe work zone are temporary Administrative Controls vulnerable to foreseeable employer and employee errors. Any statements that claim or infer that an ESWC eliminates hazards and risk is not aligned with the OSHA definition of “Elimination." This misalignment could mislead employers, employees and other stakeholders to underestimate the risk that may remain after establishing an ESWC. Failure to address remaining risk after creating an ESWC was the basis of the OSHA citation against Jacobs. It does not matter if the safe work practice is called De-energization, Lockout/Tagout, ESWC, Zero Energy State, or some other term, the fact remains that safe work practices to keep workers in a safe work zone are vulnerable to management, supervision and worker error. Elimination of hazards and risk, as defined by OSHA, cannot be achieved by safe work practices. This does not change the fact that an ESWC is essential to reducing risk of exposure to hazardous energy.





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Affiliation: none

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Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: The process of placing equipment in an electrically safe work condition is different than the finalstate. Once established, an electrically safe work condition temporarily eliminates exposure toelectrical hazards by disconnecting and isolating energy sources for all electrical conductors orcircuit parts to which a worker might be exposed in the area where work is to take place. Languagethat informs users that the only way to eliminate electrical hazards is via the permanent removal ofelectrical circuits does not align with the purpose of NFPA 70E of providing a practical safe workingarea for employees relative to the hazards arising from the use of electricity


249 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM





Risk ControlMethod

Examples

(1) EliminationConductors and circuit parts in an electrically safe working condition The hazard is

removed

(2) SubstitutionReduce energy by replacing 120 V control circuitry with 24 Vac or Vdc controlcircuitry


Guard energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to reduce the likelihood ofelectrical contact or arcing faults



Procedures and job planning tools



In OSHA Publication 3885, Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs, October 2016 - CORE ELEMENTS OF THE SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMRECOMMENDED PRACTICES - HAZARD PREVENTION & CONTROLIn their Hierarchy of Controls Triangle, Source: NIOSH, Elimination --Physically remove the hazard• Employers and workers cooperate to identify and select methods for eliminating, preventing, or controlling workplace hazards.• Controls are selected according to a hierarchy that uses engineering solutions first, followed by safe work practices, administrative controls, and finally personal protective equipment (PPE).Several dictionaries define "eliminate" as removal, "completely remove or get rid of (something)", or "to remove or take away someone or something". Hazard is defined as "A source of possible injury or damage to health" in NFPA 70E, Article 100. If a hazard is eliminated there should be no source of possible injury or damage to health.Exposed live parts at 50 volts or more are usually considered to be a hazard and protection from exposure is often provided by guarding, using approved enclosures. It can be argued that the hazard is not eliminated, the source still exists in the enclosure, but exposure is controlled or limited. This seems to correspond to the NEC purpose in 90.1, the practical safeguarding of persons and property from hazards arising from the use of electricity. It doesn't say eliminate or remove the hazards.For example, from an non electrical perspective, if a trip hazard is removed such as debris that has accumulated, that source of injury or damage to health has been eliminated. That hazard can only exist again if the situation is recreated or the item is brought back in.The title of 29 CFR 1910.147 is "The Control of Hazardous Energy (lockout/tagout)". If the hazardous energy was eliminated would there be a need to control it?PPE is commonly used for various electrical tasks, often with other means of control, even though it is at the bottom of the hierarchy list. It seems that making this change improves clarity and usability besides corelating with the use of administrative controls.Establishing an electrically safe work condition (ESWC) is a very good process used to provide protection from electrical hazards. That process, considered an administrative control by some, is subject to human error during and after establishing an ESWC. Once that state has been achieved exposure to the electrical hazards have been controlled - if it is properly done. Faulty or miswired equipment, interlock operation, malfunctions and other situations can result in reenergization. There is still electrical energy at the other end of the wire. Industrial control panels, that are part of industrial machinery or used for building systems, often have a disconnecting means within the enclosure. Even with it in the open position and locked out, the line side is still energized unless an upstream disconnecting means is used to establish an ESWC. In certain situations, tagout can be used for establishing an


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electrical safe work condition. Eliminating electrical hazards is the place to start at the design stage but is likely not feasible while servicing or maintaining existing installations or even for many new ones. Having an understanding that reenergization is possible, even if unlikely during servicing or maintenance activities, would seem to enhance overall safety.

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• PI 358




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Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected



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Risk ControlMethod

Examples

(1) EliminationConductors and circuit parts in an electrically safe working condition Permanentlyremoving electrical feeds from a demolition site in a way that they will never berestored.

(2) Substitution Reduce energy by replacing 120 V control circuitry with 24 Vac or Vdc control circuitry


Guard energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to reduce the likelihood ofelectrical contact or arcing faults



Procedures and job planning tools, placing equipment in an electrically safe workcondition






Here are 10 better examples of hazard elimination:

- Prevent, by design, installation of electrical lights for children's playground sets.- Prevent, by design, installation of overhead lines across areas where manlifts, ladder trucks, or other elevated platforms are routinely maintained and exercised.- Prevent, by design, installation of 120 VAC inverters in automotive vehicles.- Prevent, by design, installation of high incident energy electrical panels in hallways accessible to the public.- Prevent, by design, installation of electrical equipment in low areas subject to expected flooding.- Permanently remove all electrical power from a building before demolition. Demolish all connections in a way that they will never be restored.- Permanently remove electrical power entirely from mechanical service areas, use only pneumatic differential pressure gauges and mechanical indicators. Do not colocate relay controls with valve locations.- Permanently remove unused receptacles and wiring from areas that don't need them and could be subject to damage from heavy equipment.- Permanently remove electrical panels from janitor closets.- Permanently remove overhead lines that are not in use anymore.




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Public Comment No. 42-NFPA 70E-2019 [Definition: Electrically Safe WorkCondition.]

Related change in FirstDraft

Public Comment No. 43-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. 110.1]Related change in FirstDraft

Public Comment No. 42-NFPA 70E-2019 [Definition: Electrically Safe WorkCondition.]


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Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected



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Public Comment No. 95-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. G.1.0 ]

1.0 Purpose.

This procedure establishes the minimum requirements for lockout /tagout of electrical energy sources. It isto be used to ensure that conductors and circuit parts are disconnected from sources of electrical energy,locked (tagged), and tested before work begins where employees could be exposed to dangerousconditions. Sources of stored energy, such as capacitors or springs, shall be relieved of their energy, and amechanism shall be engaged to prevent the reaccumulation of energy.

1.1 Defini on. For the purpose of this Annex the following defini on shall apply:

Employee (Person) in Charge . An Employee or Person in Charge is a qualified person directly in charge ofworkers performing the work. The terms “Employee in Charge” and “Person in Charge” are synonymous and are

interchangeable. An Employee in Charge is not an unqualified person.

The responsibilities of an Employee in Charge include, but is not limited to:

(1) The Employee in Charge completes the job safety plan and conducts a job briefing with the employeesinvolved.

(2) The Employee in Charge is responsible for the safety of the workers under their direction.

(3) The Employee in Charge supervises the lockout/tagout procedure


This definition was originally submitted in the first draft and was resolved. This public comment moves the definition to Annex G where it particularly applies.

This definition makes it clear what the basic responsibilities are of an Employee or Person in Charge.

Having an Employee in Charge increases worker safety by providing vigilance during the execution of a task and of the safety of the assigned workers.

Over ten years of providing training in electrical safety has shown that this issue needs to be fully defined in a standard such as 70E. The 70E Standard needs to define and address this issue because no other standard, not OSHA nor the NESC does.

Related Item

• Public Input No. 147-NFPA 70E-2018


Submitter Full Name: Alvin Havens

Organization: E Hazard Mgmt Llc

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected


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Resolution: The proposed text contains requirements that are not permitted in annex material. In addition, theterm “person in charge” is used in different contexts and with different responsibilities throughoutthe document and a one size fits all definition located in the annex may create confusion.


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Public Comment No. 89-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. I.2 ]

I.2 Job Safety Planning Checklist.

Figure I.2 illustrates considerations for a job safety planning checklist.

Figure I.2 Sample Job Safety Planning Checklist.



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First_Draft_Job_Safety_Plan_Revision.docx Job Safety Plan Revision


Figure I.2 does not include all the elements of a job safety plan as required by Article 110.1(I)(1). Adding sections on energy source controls, work procedures and special precautions will provide user a complete job safety plan for a reference.

Related Item

• FR-91



Organization: NECA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: Annex I.2 is updated to include sections on energy source controls, work procedures and specialprecautions.

The term “Available short circuit current” is changed to “Available fault current” to correlate withproper terminology used throughout NFPA 70E as well as NFPA 70.


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Equipment:

Task:

Location:

Qualified Submitter: Date:

Section A, General Mark “Y” or “N” as appropriate No. Item Yes No Instructions

1.

Is there justification for the energized work? If No, the equipment must be placed in an electrically safe working condition. If Yes, complete 2a, b and c. and shock and arc flash risk assessments are required to determine the appropriate hazard controls. Proceed to Line 2.

a. Equipment operating at less than 50 volts

b. Additional hazard or increased risk

c. Infeasible to deenergize d. Normal operating condition

2.

Will the worker be exposed to energized parts?

If No, a shock risk assessment is discretionary and completing Sections B and C is optional.

Proceed to Line 3. 3.

Is there an arc flash hazard? If No, arc flash risk assessment is discretionary and completing Sections D or E and F is optional. Proceed to Line 4.

4. Were any of the answers to Questions 3 or 4 yes?

If No, further risk assessment is discretionary. If Yes, proceed to Line 5.

5.

Did the arc flash risk assessment determine that additional protective measures are required?

If No, completing Parts D or E and F is discretionary. If Yes, Part D or E is required to be completed. Proceed to Line 6.

6.

Is the required working distance available? If Yes, proceed to Line 7. If No, Additional risk assessment is required before completing Section D or E or performing any work. Proceed to Line 7.

Section B, Shock Hazard Information Use Table 130.4(D)(a) for ac system boundaries or Table 130.4(D)(b) for dc system boundaries

7.

Voltage between phases: Establish the shock boundaries Limited Approach Boundary: Proceed to Line 8.

Restricted Approach Boundary: Section C, Shock Control Information

Mark “Y” or “N” as appropriate

8.

Will the task require the worker to cross the restricted approach boundary?

If No, shock protection controls discretionary. Proceed to Section D or E as appropriate. If Yes, shock protection controls are required. Proceed to Line 9.

9. Will rubber insulating gloves and leather protectors be used for the task?

If Yes, proceed to Line 10. If No, proceed to Line 11.

10. Minimum Glove Class required for insulating gloves

Establish minimum glove Class. Proceed to Line 11.

11. Will insulating blankets be used for the task? If Yes, proceed to Line 12. If No, proceed to Line 13.

12. Minimum voltage rating for insulating blankets

Establish minimum voltage rating. Proceed to Line 13.

Job Safety Planning Checklist, Continued Section C, Shock Control Information, Continued


13. Are insulated or insulating hand tools required for the task?

If Yes, proceed to Line 14. If No, proceed to Section D or E as applicable.

14.

Identify the hand tools, including the minimum voltage rating required. Proceed to Section D or E as applicable.

Section D, Arc Flash Control Information – Incident Energy Analysis Method Use information from incident energy study

15.

Incident energy: Working Distance: Include: the arc flash boundary and at least one of the following: the incident energy and the working distance or the level of PPE or the minimum arc‐ rating of clothing. Proceed to Section F

Level of PPE:

Minimum Arc‐Rating of Clothing: Arc Flash Boundary:

Section E, Arc Flash Hazard Control Information – Arc Flash PPE Category Method Use Table 130.5(C)(15)(a) for ac systems or Table 130.7(C)(15)(b) for dc systems

16.

Determine the estimated available fault current and clearing times for the task. Available short circuit Current:

Overcurrent Device Clearing Time:


17.

Do the estimated available fault current and clearing times for the task exceed the maximum allowed by Table 130.7(C)(15)(a) or (b)?

If Yes, an incident energy analysis is required.

If No, proceed to Line 18

18. Arc Flash Boundary: Proceed to Line 19 19. Arc Flash PPE Category: Working Distance: Proceed to Line 20 and 21, Section F

Section F, Arc‐rated Clothing and Other Arc Flash Protection Equipment Information

20. Minimum arc rating in cal/cm2 for protective clothing and other PPE

Establish the required arc‐rated clothing and other PPE

21.

List the required arc‐rated clothing and other arc flash PPE.

PPE Category Method: use 130.7(C)(15)(c) & Table 130.7(C)(15)(c)

Incident Energy Analysis Method: Use 130.5(G) and Table 130.5(G)

Section G, Energy Source Controls

22. List all sources of electrical supply to the specific equipment. Include Location and method to lock or tag Include method to verify and test for absence of voltage List temporary protective grounding equipment.

Section H, Work Procedures and Special Precautions

23. List specific work procedures required to complete the task. List any special precautions needed to safely complete the task. (i.e. discharge time for capacitors)

FIGURE I.2 Sample Job Safety Planning Checklist

Public Comment No. 2-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. K.1 ]

K.1 General.

Electrical injuries represent a serious workplace health and safety issue to electrical and non-electricalworkers. Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) indicate that there were nearly 6000 fatalelectrical injuries to workers in the United States from 1992 through 2012. BLS data also indicate that therewere 24,100 non-fatal electrical injuries from 2003 through 2012. From 1992 to 2013, the number of fatalworkplace electrical injuries has fallen steadily and dramatically from 334 in 1992 to 139 in 2013. However,the trend with non-fatal electrical injuries is less consistent. Between 2003 and 2009, non-fatal injury totalsranged from 2390 in 2003 to 2620 in 2009, with a high of 2950 injuries in 2005. Non-fatal injury totalsbetween 2010 through 2012 were the lowest over this 10-year period, with 1890 non-fatal injuries in 2010,2250 in 2011, and 1700 in 2012.

There are two general categories of electrical injury: electrical shock and electrical burns. Electrical burnscan be further subdivided into burns caused by radiant energy (arc burns), burns caused by exposure toejected hot gases and materials (thermal burns), and burns caused by the conduction of electrical currentthrough body parts (conduction burns). In addition, hearing damage can occur from acoustic energy, andtraumatic injury can be caused by toxic gases and pressure waves associated with an arcing event.

About 98 percent of fatal occupational electrical injuries are electrical shock injuries. A corporate case studyexamining electrical injury reporting and safety practices found that 40 percent of electrical incidentsinvolved 250 volts or less and were indicative of a misperception of electrical safety as a high-voltage issue.In addition, electrical incidents once again were found to involve a large share of non-electrical workers,with approximately one-half of incidents involving workers from outside electrical crafts. Research ofelectrical fatalities in construction found that the highest proportion of fatalities occurred in establishmentswith 10 or fewer employers employees and pointed out that smaller employers could have fewer formaltraining requirements and less structured training in safety practices.


The existing text is incorrect and creates the impression of loose standards work. It is fundamentally the same problem as expressed in Public Input No. 274-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Section No. K.4 ]

Related Item

• Public Input No. 274-NFPA 70E-2018 [ Section No. K.4 ]




Street Address:

City:

State:

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Committee:

Committee Statement

Committee Action: Accepted


Statement: The term “employers” is changed to “employees” to provide the correct terminology.


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Public Comment No. 64-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. K.4 ]

K.4 Arc Blast.

The tremendous temperatures of the arc cause the explosive expansion of both the surrounding air and themetal in the arc path. For example, copper expands by a factor of 67,000 times when it turns from a solidto a vapor. The danger associated with this expansion is one of high pressures, sound, and shrapnel. Thehigh pressures can easily exceed hundreds or even thousands of pounds per square foot, knockingworkers off ladders, rupturing eardrums, and collapsing lungs. Finally, material and molten metal areexpelled away from the arc at speeds exceeding 1120 km/hr (700 mph), fast enough for shrapnel tocompletely penetrate the human bodyPressures in arc flash can cause addi onal injury and are a primarily func on of fault current and containment of the

equipment. Most of the documented injuries have been from door ejec ons, shrapnel from broken parts caused by

the arc flash event, and sha ered insulators, but concussions and falls have also been recorded. The standard

acknowledges that there is no correla on of arc blast pressure to incident energy but arc blast should be considered

in the risk assessment process. High fault current in some equpment can cause equipment containment or parts of

the containment like a door to be ejected toward the worker with great force.

The papers below contain the research on pressure effects from arc blast. Un l this hazard is be er quan fied,

workers should operate equipment with high poten al fault current from the side, out of the line‐of‐fire, use remote

racking or use other measures to prevent injury. Arc blast is also normally prevented by using arc resistant

equipment as it contains and/or shunts to blast pressure away from the worker during opera on.

For more informa on:

K. Crawford, D. Clark, and R. Doughty, "Motor terminal box explosions due to faults," IEEE Transac ons on Industry

Applica ons, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 72‐81, Jan./Feb. 1993.

E. H. Hoagland, C. Maurice, A. Haines and A. Maurice, "Arc Flash Pressure Measurement by the Physical Method,

Effect of Metal Vapor on Arc Blast," in IEEE Transac ons on Industry Applica ons, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 1576‐1582,

March‐April 2017.

E. H. Hoagland, C. Maurice, A. Haines and A. Maurice, " Arc Flash Pressure and Door Ejec on Measurement

ESW2019‐19," ESW2019‐19 .


The inaccurate information in the standard will be corrected and the best peer reviewed and data driven papers are now cited to guide companies.

Related Item

• PI 274




Street Address:

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Committee:

Committee Statement


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Resolution: Technical substantiation has not been provided that the present information is not accurate.


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Public Comment No. 72-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. M.1.1 ]

M.1.1

Layering of arc-rated clothing is an effective approach to achieving the required arc rating . The use of allarc-rated clothing layers will result in achieving the required arc rating when the layers have been testedtogether to determine the combined composite rating . The use of all arc-rated clothing layers will resultin achieving the required arc rating with the lowest number of layers and lowest clothing system weight.Garments that are not arc rated should not be used to increase the arc rating of a garment or of a clothingsystem.


FR-84 inaccurately captures the revision proposed by PI-246 and has created unnecessary redundancy.PI-246 requested that the phrase "when the layers have been tested together to determine the composite rating" be appended to the end of the first sentence. Instead, the second sentence was split into two sentences, each beginning with the same phrase: "The use of all arc-rated clothing layers will result in achieving the required arc rating...". M1.1 should be revised as originally proposed.

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• FR-84




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Committee Statement



Statement: Editorial changes are made to Annex M.1.1 for clarity and grammar.


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Public Comment No. 111-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. P.1 ]

P.1 General.

Injuries from electrical energy are a significant cause of occupational fatalities in the workplace in theUnited States. This standard specifies requirements unique to the hazards of electrical energy. By itself,however, this standard does not constitute a comprehensive and effective electrical safety program. Themost effective application of the requirements of this standard can be achieved within the framework of arecognized health and safety management system standard. ANSI/AIHA Z10, American NationalStandard for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems

ISO 45001:2018 Occupational health and safety management systems — Requirements with guidance foruse , provides comprehensive guidance on the elements of an effective health and safety managementsystem and is one recognized standard. ANSI/AIHA Z10 ISO 45001 is harmonized with otherinternationally recognized standards, including CAN/CSA Z1000, and Occupational Health and SafetyManagement; ANSI/ISO 14001, Environmental Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance forUse; and BS OSHAS 18001, Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems . Some companiesand other organizations have proprietary health and safety management systems that are aligned with thekey elements of ANSI/AIHA Z10 ISO 45001 .

The most effective design and implementation of an electrical safety program can be achieved through ajoint effort involving electrical subject matter experts and safety professionals knowledgeable about safetymanagement systems.

Such collaboration can help ensure that proven safety management principles and practices applicable toany hazard in the workplace are appropriately incorporated into the electrical safety program.

This informative annex provides guidance on implementing this standard within the framework ofANSI/AIHA Z10 of ISO 45001 and other recognized or proprietary comprehensive occupational healthand safety management system standards.


ANSI Z10 was published in 2012, and although it was a fairly good document for its time, it uses out of date risk assessment terminology and addresses safety management system concepts more from a process industry viewpoint. More current standards such as ISO 45001-2018 and CSA Z1000-2014 do not have these drawbacks. Deletion of the reference to BS OSHAS 18001 is recommended as it has effectively been replaced by ISO 45001.See related Public Comment to revise 110.5(A) Informational Note 2.



Public Comment No. 110-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. 110.5(A)]

Public Comment No. 110-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. 110.5(A)]

Related Item

• FR-9 and Correlating Committee Public Comment




Street Address:

City:

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Zip:


Committee: EEW-AAA


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Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



Statement: References to ISO 45001:2018 Occupational health and safety management systems —Requirements with guidance for use, which was developed with the participation of over 80countries, including the U.S.A., has been added. The reference to the Canadian and Britishstandard have been removed, because those countries have harmonized with the ISO standard.


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Public Comment No. 19-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Annex R ]

Informative Annex R Working with Hazardous Capacitors

R.1 Introduction.

Capacitors have the ability to store energy after source power has been disconnected. While most systemswith capacitors are built with bleed resistors that automatically discharge the stored energy within a settime, these systems can sometimes fail, leaving a shock, arc flash, or arc blast hazard. This informativeannex provides detailed guidance on how to properly assess the risk in working with capacitors andimplement suitable controls.

R.2 Qualification and Training.

R.2.1

Employees who perform work on electrical equipment with capacitors that exceed 10 J and 50 volts shouldbe qualified persons as required in Chapter 1 and should be trained in, and familiar with, the specifichazards and controls required for safe work.

R.2.2

Unqualified persons who perform work on electrical equipment with capacitors that exceed 1 joule (50–400volts), or 0.25 joules (greater than 400 volts) should be trained in, and familiar with, any electrical safety-related practices necessary for their safety.

R.3 Shock Hazard.


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R.3.1 General.

The capacitor shock hazard to a person is an impulse shock with an exponential decay curve. The severityof the shock is related to the amount of energy (joules) delivered within a set time period. Heart fibrillationis the primary shock hazard and can be fatal. Heart fibrillation can happen when the voltage exceeds 50volts and the stored energy delivered exceeds 10 joules under certain circumstances. However, evenwithout fibrillation, a high-voltage, high-energy shock can cause serious injuries, either directly or throughreflex action, down to as low as 0.25 joules. Instances of temporary paralysis, loss of consciousness,hearing damage, temporary loss of eyesight, burns, and dislocated joints have been reported. [See FigureR.3.1(a) for a capacitive shock circuit and Figure R.3.1(b) for a capacitive discharge curve.]

Figure R.3.1(a) Capacitor Shock Circuit.

Figure R.3.1(b) Typical Exponential Discharge Characteristic of a Capacitor Through a Resistor.


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R.3.2 Capacitive Discharge

The duration of a capacitive discharge shock is independent of voltage and is generally assumed to bethree times the time constant of the shock circuit. After three time constants, the voltage is reduced by 95percent, and the energy has been reduced by 99.25 percent. The time constant, τ, is equal to body shockpathway resistance times capacitance, as follows:

[R.3.2]

R.3.3 Current.

The current delivered by the shock is independent of capacitance and is proportional to the initial peakvoltage and inversely proportional to shock pathway resistance. Assuming that all of the stored energy isdelivered in 3τ, the rms equivalent current can be expressed as follows

[R.3.3]

where:I rms = rms current

V p = peak voltage

R = pathway resistance

:

R.3.4 Pathway Resistance.

The shock pathway resistance, which can vary depending on skin resistance, entry and exit locations, andmany other factors, has a relatively minor effect on the severity of a capacitor discharge shock. A capacitordisconnected from a live voltage source has only a finite amount of energy and can deliver that energyeither quickly or slowly. As shock pathway resistance increases, the current lowers but the time todischarge also takes longer, and vice versa. Overall, a higher shock pathway resistance will likely reducethe severity of the shock.

R.3.5 Stored Energy.

For a given stored energy, there is a difference in response to whether it is a high-voltage, low-capacitanceshock, or a low-voltage, high-capacitance shock. At high voltage and low capacitance, a hazardous shockwill fully discharge nearly instantaneously (in microseconds) and could miss the vulnerable part of the heartcycle. However, the full energy is delivered to the person. At low voltage and high capacitance, the totaldischarge time can extend several seconds (multiple heart beats), behaving more like a dc shock.However, a person’s reflex action could interrupt the shock before all of the energy is delivered. Bothscenarios remain highly hazardous as fibrillation could still occur.

Informational Note: For more information on impulse shock hazards, see IEC TS 60479-2, Effectsof Current on Humans and Livestock, Part 2, Special Aspects .

R.3.6 Reflex Hazard.

Even when fibrillation does not occur, there remains the potential for serious bodily injury, especially athigher voltages. The reflex action to an impulse shock can be severe, causing persons to fall off ofelevated platforms or ladders, knock a body part into nearby objects, or in some cases cause severemuscle clenching, temporary paralysis, or dislocated joints. This reflex hazard extends to lower energieseven where fibrillation is unlikely.

R.3.7 Shock Hazard Thresholds.

Capacitors connected to conductors or circuit parts operating at voltages equal to or greater than 50 Vdcand containing a stored energy equal to or greater than 10 J present a significant risk of shock andfibrillation. Below 10 J, a significant risk of reflex action leading to injury could exist in the followingsituations:

(1) 50–400 volts: if the stored energy is 1–10 joules

(2) >400 volts: if the stored energy is 0.25–10 joules

R.4 Short-Circuit Hazard.


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Capacitors have the unique ability to discharge very rapidly in a shorted condition. AC power system faultstypically occur on the order of milliseconds and are limited by transformer impedances. Battery faults takeseconds or minutes to discharge. In contrast, capacitors have very little internal impedance and can fully

discharge in microseconds, with very high discharge current. This current can cause thermal burn hazards,arc flash hazards, and arc blast hazards when the stored energy is high enough.

R.4.1 Thermal Hazard.

At around 100 joules, a short through a ring or tool can cause rapid heating and burns to the skin. Above 1kJ, there can be substantial heating of metal, arcing, and magnetic forces causing mechanical deformation.Above 10 kJ, there is massive conductor melting, massive magnetic/mechanical motion, and an explosionhazard.

R.4.2 Arc Flash Hazard.

Above around 44 kJ (in a box) or 131 kJ (in open air), there exists sufficient stored energy to create an arc

flash hazard (greater than 1.2 cal/cm 2 at a working distance of 18 in.). This is a conservative lower boundthat assumes all of the stored energy has been converted to radiant heat. Note that capacitor banks canhave an arc flash hazard much greater due to the ac contribution to incident energy.

R.4.3 Arc Blast Hazard.

Capacitors can have a significant arc blast hazard due to the very high short-circuit current involved. Theconcussive effects of the acoustic shock wave can rupture eardrums and collapse lungs. While hearingprotection should be used above 100 joules to mitigate against hearing damage, there is no PPE forprotection against lung collapse, which becomes a hazard above 112 kJ.

R.5 Other Hazards.

R.5.1

An additional hazard exists when a capacitor is subjected to high currents that can cause heating andexplosion.

R.5.2

When capacitors are used to store large amounts of energy, internal failure of one capacitor in a bankfrequently results in explosion when all other capacitors in the bank discharge into the fault.

R.5.3

Fuses are generally used to preclude the discharge of energy from a capacitor bank into a faultedindividual capacitor. Improperly sized fuses for this application can explode.

R.5.4

Internal faults can rupture capacitor containers. Rupture of a capacitor can create a fire hazard. Dielectricfluids can release toxic gases when decomposed by fire or the heat of an electric arc.

R.6 Performing a Risk Assessment for Hazardous Capacitors.

R.6.1

The risk assessment process for hazardous capacitors can follow the overall risk management processfound in Annex F. This risk assessment should be coordinated with the shock risk assessment of 130.4and the arc flash risk assessment of 130.5 .

R.6.2

Whether there is an exposure to capacitor stored energy hazard should be determined. An exposure wouldexist when a conductor or circuit part that could potentially remain energized with hazardous stored energyis not properly guarded, enclosed, or insulated. All circuit parts that are electrically connected to a capacitorbank could present this hazard. For example, a power factor correction bank could be in a completelyseparate enclosure; however, should the bank remained charged for some reason, the switchgear to whichit is connected could also deliver the stored energy hazard.

R.6.3

The shock hazard should be determined (see R.7 ). Use the shock risk assessment process of 130.4 andthe dc shock approach boundaries and PPE ratings.

R.6.4

The total capacitor stored energy (see R.8 ) of the system should be determined.


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R.6.5

The arc flash hazard (see R.9 ) should be determined. If stored energy is greater than 40 kJ (in a box) or120 kJ (open air), the arc flash incident energy and the arc flash boundary should be determined at theappropriate working distance. Appropriate arc flash PPE should be selected accordingly but should remainout of the lung protection boundary.

R.6.6

The arc blast hazard (see R.10 ) should be determined. Hearing protection should be required where thestored energy exceeds 100 J. Where the stored energy exceeds 10 kJ, the hearing protection boundaryshould be calculated. If stored energy is above 112 kJ, determine the arc blast boundary for lung hazards.A lung collapse hazard could exist above 112 kJ. DO NOT ENTER THE LUNG PROTECTIONBOUNDARY. There is no PPE for lung protection.

R.6.7

The required test and grounding method (see R.11 ) should be determined. Because of the loudness ofhard grounding, which can be uncomfortable or hazardous to nearby personnel, soft grounding should beused for stored energy greater than 1000 joules. For systems less than 1000 volts and less than 10 kJ,with a bleed system, this can be simply performed using an approved voltage tester in accordance with110.8 . As long as the capacitors have discharged, then the equipment is safe. However, should the bleedsystem malfunction, there needs to be a prescribed and safe method to discharge the capacitors. Thiswould include whether hard or soft grounding is preferred, if a specific sequence is necessary, and whethershorting straps would remain applied to account for the possibility of dielectric absorption.

R.6.8

If capacitors are equipped with bleed resistors, or if using a soft grounding system, the required dischargewait time should be determined where applicable (see R.12 ).

R.6.9

A written lockout/tagout procedure should be developed that captures all of the required steps to place theequipment in an electrically safe work condition. Information about the amount of stored energy available,how long to wait after de-energization before opening the enclosure, how to test for absence of voltage,and what to do if there is still stored energy present should be included.

R.6.10

Labeling the equipment with a hazard warning label (see R.15 ) should be considered so that qualifiedpersons are made aware of the potential for stored energy and the need for a written lockout/tagoutprocedure.

R.7 Determining the Shock Hazard.

R.7.1

A shock risk assessment should be performed in accordance with 130.4 . Shock approach boundaries arebased on the peak voltage and the dc shock approach boundaries of Table 130.4(E)(b) . Appropriatelyrated shock protection PPE, such as voltage-rated gloves and insulating sheeting, should be selected. Thedc ratings for rubber insulated products should be used. (See ASTM D120, Standard Specification forRubber Insulating Gloves , for dc ratings.)

R.7.2

Shock protection PPE is required for all parts of the body that enter the restricted approach boundary. [SeeTable 130.4(E)(b) .]

R.8 Determining Capacitor Stored Energy.

R.8.1

Determining capacitor stored energy could require detailed examination of drawings or manufacturer’sinformation to properly determine both the peak voltage that will be applied to the capacitors and the totalsystem capacitance.


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R.8.2

The stored energy in a capacitor is calculated as follows:

[R.8.2]

where:E = capacitive stored energy in joules

C = total capacitance in farads

V = peak voltage in volts

R.8.3

The total capacitance of capacitor banks is calculated as follows:

(1) For capacitors in parallel, add the capacitance as follows:

[R.8.3a]

(2) For capacitors in series, use the following:

[R.8.3b]

(3) Capacitor banks used for power factor correction are often labeled with a kVAr value (kilovolt-amperes reactive) to facilitate power engineering calculations. Calculate the capacitance as follows:

[R.8.3c]

where:C = total capacitance in farads

Q = reactive power in VAr (volt-amperes reactive)

f = frequency in hertz

V = phase-to-phase voltage in volts rms

(4) Long high-voltage coaxial cables can have significant capacitance, normally on the order of 15–35

pF/ft (1 picofarad = 1 × 10 −12 F). Manufacturer’s specifications on capacitance per foot should beconsulted.

R.8.4

For peak voltage, the voltage applied across the capacitors that would cause the maximum charge shouldbe used. For disconnected capacitors in storage or for disposal, the capacitor rated voltage should beused.

R.8.4.1

For dc systems use the maximum available pole-to-pole voltage that could be applied to the capacitor bythe system.


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R.8.4.2

For ac systems nominal system voltage is normally expressed in volts rms. For capacitor stored energycalculations, use the peak amplitude of the voltage, V p , as follows:

[R.8.4.2a]

(1) For single-phase ac systems, use peak ac voltage, as follows:

[R.8.4.2b]

(2) For 3-phase wye-connected systems, use the peak phase-to-neutral ac voltage, as follows:

[R.8.4.2c]

(3) For 3-phase delta-connected systems, use the peak phase-to-phase ac voltage, as follows:

[R.8.4.2d]

Informational Note: For the same capacitance, a delta-connected system will have a total energythree times higher than a wye-connected system. Always check the configuration as designrequirements vary.

R.9 Determining the Arc Flash Hazard.

R.9.1

The maximum theoretical possible arc flash incident energy can be calculated by assuming that all of thestored energy is dissipated as radiant energy in a spherical expansion in open air. While this is unlikely, ithelps set a lower bound of stored energy below which an arc flash hazard is unlikely.

R.9.1a]

Converting to cal/cm2 (1 cal = 4.184 joules) we obtain the following:

[R.9.1b]

where:IE = incident energy

E = energy

C = capacitance

V = voltage

r = radius


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R.9.2

The arc flash boundary, where IE = 1.2 cal/cm 2 , is then as follows:

[R.9.2a]

In a box, we apply a three times factor over the open-air incident energy calculation, as follows:

[R.9.2b]

[R.9.2c]

where:AFB = arc flash boundary

IE = incident energy

Thus, the minimum stored energy (lower bound) required to obtain 1.2 cal/cm 2 at a working distance of 18in. is roughly 44 kJ in a box or 131 kJ in open air. Extreme caution should be used with the open aircalculation, as the arc flash boundary can fall inside the lung protection boundary for arc blast. A betterpractice is to always use the box arc flash boundary as a minimum approach distance.

R.10 Determining the Arc Blast Hazard.

R.10.1

The arc blast hazard is directly related to the instantaneous (initial) short circuit current. Since capacitorscan discharge so rapidly, the shockwave generated by a capacitor discharge can cause barotrauma(overpressure injury) to persons in the area. The most sensitive organs are the ears and lungs. When adifferential pressure across the eardrums exceeds around 20–35 kilopascals (3–5 psi), the eardrum canrupture. At 200 kilopascals (29 psi), lung damage can occur. The following formulas are used to estimatesafe boundaries based on total stored energy, where “safe” is less than a 1 percent probability of eardrumrupture or lung injury:

[R.10.1a]

[R.10.1b]

where:R ear = eardrum rupture boundary (1 percent probability) in cm

R lung = lung collapse boundary (1 percent probability) in cm

E = capacitor stored energy in joules

Informational Note: For more information about the derivation of these formulas, see Charles R.Hummer, Richard J. Pearson, and Donald H. Porschet, “ Safe Distances From a High-EnergyCapacitor Bank for Ear and Lung Protection ,” Army Research Laboratory Report, ANL-TN-608, July2014.

R.10.2

Above 112 kJ a lung collapse hazard can exist. It is not sufficient to wear arc flash PPE, as this will notprotect against lung injury. Remain outside of the lung collapse boundary.


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R.10.3

Above 448 kJ, the lung protection boundary will be greater than the arc flash boundary in open aircalculated in R.9 . A better practice is to always use the box arc flash boundary as a minimum approachdistance. (See Figure R.10.3 .)

Figure R.10.3 Plot of Arc Flash and Blast Protection Boundaries.

R.11 Selecting the Appropriate Grounding Method: Hard Grounding vs. Soft Grounding.

R.11.1

Hard grounding is the practice of shorting a capacitor directly to ground. Since the resistance is typically<0.1 ohm, the discharge time is very rapid. A loud spark and bang can happen at higher voltage andenergies. Above 100 joules there is a hearing damage hazard.

R.11.2

Soft grounding is the practice of connecting a capacitor to ground through a power resistor. The resistorraises the time constant (τ = RC ) and reduces the peak discharge current ( I = V/R ) to safer levels. Softgrounding is required above 1000 joules.

R.11.3

At the conclusion of the specified discharge time, there is still voltage on the capacitors. A properlymatched resistor and capacitor will reduce the voltage to less than 50 volts and the energy to less than 5joules. At this point hard grounding is applied to fully short the capacitors to ground.

R.11.4

Sometimes the grounding resistor is attached directly to the grounding stick. Other times, there are twoseparate grounding points built into the equipment itself. The grounding point labeled “Hi-Z” is the softgrounding point, where “Hi-Z” stands for high impedance. In this case the same ground stick is applied, firstto the Hi-Z point, then to the ground point.

R.11.5

The grounding method should keep all personnel clear of the lung protection boundary. For this reason,above 100 kJ, remote soft grounding and testing may be required.


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R.11.6

All ground sticks should meet the requirements of R.16 . (See Figure R.11.6 for illustrating of groundingtechniques.)

Figure R.11.6 Illustration of Hard and Soft Grounding Examples.

R.11.7

Other considerations are as follows:

(1) Charge transfer: Grounding capacitors in series may transfer rather than discharge the stored energy.Special precaution should be taken in selecting the tools and sequence necessary to dischargecapacitors connected in series. Improper grounding can result in moving charge around and not fullydischarging to ground. Capacitor cases are not always grounded and should be considered chargedunless otherwise determined.

(2) Dielectric absorption: Not all the charge in an electrolytic capacitor is dissipated when it is short-circuited for a short time. A voltage rebound of up to 10 percent can occur a few minutes after thegrounding or shorting device has been removed.

(3) High-voltage capacitors can build a charge in the presence of high electric fields.

(4) A momentary hazardous voltage can exist at the moment of contact across the impedance of a fewfeet of grounding cable at the moment of contact with a charged capacitor.

R.12 Determining the Capacitor Discharge Time.

R.12.1

The discharge time, T d , of a capacitor is the time it takes to reduce to less than 50 volts. It is related tothe time constant, τ. The discharge resistance can be permanently installed on the capacitors,automatically switched in after power shutoff, or applied through a soft grounding stick.

R.12.2

For voltages up to 1000 volts, it is sufficient to wait three times the time constant, or one minute, whicheveris greater. That is because after 3τ, the residual voltage is less than 5 percent of the initial voltage.


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R.12.3

For voltages above 1000 volts, the discharge time will need to be longer than 3τ and should be calculated.Use the following formula to determine the minimum wait time:

[R.12.3a]

[R.12.3b]

where:τ = time constant

R = discharge path resistance

C = total capacitance

T d = discharge time (wait time)

V p = peak voltage

R.13 Establishing an Electrically Safe Work Condition.

R.13.1

Where a conductor circuit part is operating at 50 volts or greater and the stored capacitive energy is 10joules or greater, a written lockout/tagout procedure should be used to document the necessary steps toplace the equipment in an electrically safe work condition. The written lockout/tagout procedure shouldincorporate the results of the risk assessment performed in R.6 and specify the following at a minimum:

(1) Energy in joules

(2) Specific steps to safely discharge the capacitor or verify that it is discharged

(3) Specific tool to ground the capacitors, if required


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R.13.2

In order to place the equipment with stored hazardous energy in an electrically safe work condition, aqualified person should follow the steps in 120.5 as well as the specific sequence outlined in the writtenlockout/tagout procedure. These would then be as follows:

(1) Review the scope of work and the written lockout/tagout procedure. Determine all required safeapproach boundaries and necessary PPE and tools for the task.

(2) Perform a job briefing with the personnel involved and notify affected persons that the equipment willbe de-energized.


(4) Wherever possible, visually verify that all blades of the disconnecting devices are fully open or thatdrawout-type circuit breakers are withdrawn to the fully disconnected position.

(5) Apply lockout/tagout devices in accordance with a documented and established policy.

(6) If applicable, wait the prescribed time for the capacitors to fully discharge to less than 50 voltsthrough the bleed resistors.

(7) Use an adequately rated test instrument to test each phase conductor or circuit part to verify it is de-energized. Test each phase conductor or circuit part both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground.Before and after each test, determine that the test instrument is operating satisfactorily throughverification on a known voltage source. If voltage remains, proceed to step 8. For high energycapacitors, where no safe test equipment is available, this step can be omitted, provided that step 8 isfully implemented.

(8) Using a properly rated grounding device, ground the phase conductors or circuit parts beforetouching them. To ensure that all charge is properly dissipated and that charge transfer did not occur,ensure that that all of the poles are shorted together and to ground. Follow the specific sequenceprescribed in the written lockout/tagout procedure.

(9) Where dielectric absorption could cause a hazardous voltage rebound, apply suitably rated shortingstraps as necessary to dissipate any remaining stored energy. The grounding devices of step 8should remain in place while the shorting straps are applied.

R.14 Storage and Disposal.

R.14.1

Any residual charge from capacitors should be removed by grounding the terminals before servicing orremoval.

R.14.2

All uninstalled capacitors capable of storing 10 joules or greater at their rated voltage should be short-circuited with a conductor of appropriate size (typically 14 AWG bare copper wire or equivalent). Theconductor should be able to withstand damage related to transportation activities.

R.14.3

When an uninstalled capacitor is discovered without a shorting wire attached to the terminals, it should betreated as energized and charged to its full rated voltage until determined otherwise. A qualified personshould be contacted to determine the appropriate steps to safely discharge the capacitor.

R.14.4

A capacitor that develops an internal open circuit can retain a substantial charge internally even though theterminals are short-circuited. Such a capacitor can be hazardous to transport because the damagedinternal wiring can reconnect and discharge the capacitor through the short-circuiting wires. Any capacitorthat shows a significant change in capacitance after a fault can have this problem. Action should be takento minimize this hazard when it is discovered.

R.15 Capacitor Hazard Labeling.


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R.15.1

Electrical equipment operating at 50 volts and greater and containing capacitive stored energy of 10 joulesor greater should be field marked with a label containing all the following information:

(1) A warning about the potential for capacitive stored energy, with the word “WARNING” on an orangecolored background

(2) Stored energy in joules

(3) Wait time before opening enclosure (usually 1 minute or 5 minutes per NFPA 70, National ElectricalCode , and Underwriters Laboratories requirements)

(4) Date of the stored energy hazard analysis

(5) An instruction that a qualified person is required and that they should use a written lockout/tagoutprocedure

R.15.2

Labeling should conform to the requirements of ANSI Z535.4, Product Safety Signs and Labels .

R.16 Grounding Hooks.

R.16.1

Grounding hooks should be provided for qualified persons to safely discharge any residual stored energycontained in capacitor banks. The grounding hooks should be designed, constructed, installed, andperiodically inspected so that the full energy of a capacitor bank can be safely discharged.

R.16.2

Design and construction is as follows:

(1) Ground hook stick: When built of fiber reinforced plastic (FRP), the rod in the ground hook assemblyshould meet ASTM F711, Standard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod andTube Used in Live Line Tools , specifications. Other insulating materials can be used provided theyare of acceptable insulation and durability for the application. The stick should be long enough to behandled effectively and also to keep a person’s hands out of the restricted approach boundary.

(2) Ground hook tip: The ground hook connection to discharge points can be chain links, bare conductor,or solid copper bar in various geometries. The selection of the grounding tip should match therequirements of the intended application and ensure that all necessary circuit parts are fullydischarged and grounded at the same time in order to avoid charge transfer. The grounding tips canbe designed to remain applied in order to safely prevent voltage rebound from dielectric absorption.Alternatively, shorting straps can be applied while the grounding hooks are applied. Discharge pointsshould be clearly marked and caution should be used to prevent transferring charges to othercapacitors or reversing the charge on affected capacitors.

(3) Ground hook resistor. Soft grounding should be provided where stored energy exceeds 1000 joules.The resistor used to soft ground a capacitor bank should be fully rated to handle power, voltage, andcurrent. A proper engineering safety margin would be to calculate peak power, voltage and current,and double the resistor rating for each parameter. The resistor should be able to discharge thecapacitor bank to less than 50 volts and less than 5 joules in less than 1 minute (<1000 volts) or lessthan 5 minutes (greater than 1000 volts) to match NFPA 70, National Electrical Code , requirements.Note that soft grounding is always followed by hard grounding to complete the discharge.

(4) Ground hook cable: The cable should be grounding or welding cable, flexible rope lay, soft drawncopper. The individual strands should not be larger than #30 AWG. Grounding cables have flexibleelastomer or thermoplastic jackets primarily for mechanical protection of the conductor it covers.Connections should be crimped according to manufacturer instructions. The lugs should be rated forthe cables to be clamped. In permanent equipment installations the cable conductor size should be atleast #2 AWG or larger. For temporary or benchtop situations, the conductor should be capable ofsafely carrying any potential current. Ground hooks should never be fused.


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R.16.3

Installation is as follows:

(1) Connection to building ground: Ground hooks should be connected to the building groundingelectrode system. A qualified engineer should evaluate the connection point to ensure the integrity ofthe ground hook system. This connection should be in a location accessible to and visible to theoperator of the ground hook. Ground hooks should be connected such that impedance is less than

0.1 ohms to ground. Hi-Z ground hooks should be connected such that impedance is less than 0.1between the resistor and the ground connection.

(2) Operator access: The ground hooks should be permanently grounded and stored in the immediatearea of the equipment in a manner that ensures they are used. The approach path to the equipmentbeing grounded should be perpendicular to the equipment and clear of debris or obstructions. Theground hook operator will then always be facing the potential hazard and have the groundedconductor between them and the potentially energized equipment.

R.16.4

The visual inspection is as follows:

(1) The ground hook should be visually inspected for defects before use each day. Excessive dirt shouldbe wiped off the ground stick.

(2) If any defect or contamination that could adversely affect the insulating qualities or mechanicalintegrity of the ground hook is present, the tool should be removed from service and examined andtested. Special attention should be paid to the ground cable, as any fraying or damage could impairthe integrity of the ground on the end of the ground hook.

(3) If the defect or contamination exists on the grounding stick, then it should be replaced.

(4) If the defect or contamination exists on the cable, then it should be repaired or replaced and testedbefore return to service.

R.16.5 Biennial Testing (every 2 years).

A ground hook system places a grounded conductor at the end of the rod between the operator and theelectrical hazard. The low impedance (Lo-Z) ground hook system is not a live line tool, and there will not bea voltage potential at the end of the ground hook rod. High-impedance (Hi-Z) ground hooks can have avoltage potential at the end of the rod and should be treated as live line tools.

(1) For all ground hooks: The ground hook system should be tested to verify that impedance is less than0.1 Ω to ground. This test should be performed annually when it is located outside or under any otheradverse conditions.

(2) All Hi-Z ground hook insulating rods should be removed from service to be recertified to the ASTMF711, Standard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in LiveLine Tools , standard or equivalent.

(3) Hi-Z ground hooks with resistors: The resistor on the Hi-Z ground hook should be measured andcompared to the specified value.


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R.17 References.

Dalziel, Charles F., “A Study of the Hazards of Impulse Currents,” Transactions of the American Institute ofElectrical Engineers. Part III: Power Apparatus and Systems , Volume 72, Issue 2, 1953, DOI:10.1109/AIEEPAS.1953.4498738.

DOE-HDBK-1092-2013, DOE Handbook for Electrical Safety , U.S. Department of Energy, Washington,DC

Gordon, Lloyd B. and Cartelli, Laura, “A complete electrical hazard classification system and itsapplication,” Electrical Safety Workshop 2009 , IEEE IAS, pp. 1–12, 2009.

Hummer, Charles R., Pearson, Richard J., and Porschet, Donald H., “Safe Distances From a High-EnergyCapacitor Bank for Ear and Lung Protection,” Army Research Laboratory Report, ANL-TN-608, July 2014.

IEC TS 60479-1, 4th Edition (2005), Effects of Current on Human Beings and Livestock, Part 1, GeneralAspects , Geneva, Switzerland.

IEC TS 60479-2, 3rd Edition (2007), Effects of Current on Human Beings and Livestock, Part 2, SpecialAspects , Geneva, Switzerland.

Richmond, D.R., Yelverton, J.T., Fletcher, E.R., and Phillips, YY, “Physical Correlates of Eardrum Rupture,”Annals of Otology Rhinology and Laryngology , Vol 109 (May 1989): 35-41.

Scott, Mark, “Working Safely with Hazardous Capacitors,” Paper No. ESW2018-20.

REPLACE ALL WITH REVISED TEXT SUBMITTED IN SEPARATE FILE



Annex_R_-_Final_Submittal_for_PC-19.docx


New version incorporates improvements from DOE EFCOG, including: thermal hazards, test and grounding method selection table and flowchart, technical clarifications, and editorial corrections to original input.



Public Comment No. 97-NFPA 70E-2019 [Article 360] ARTICLE 360

Public Comment No. 97-NFPA 70E-2019 [Article 360]


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• FR-89





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Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:



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The term “Hazardous” has been removed in the title to Annex R to respond to the CorrelatingCommittee public comment.






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1

Informative Annex R – Working with Capacitors

R.1 Introduction

Capacitors have the ability to store electrical energy after the source power has been disconnected. While most small systems with capacitors are built with bleed resistors that automatically discharge the stored energy within a set time, these systems can sometimes fail, leaving a thermal, shock, arc flash or arc blast hazard. Some custom‐fabricated capacitor systems may not have built‐in bleed resistors. This informative annex provides detailed guidance on how to properly assess the risk in working with capacitors and implement suitable controls.

R.2 Qualification & Training

R.2.1 Employees who perform work on electrical equipment with capacitors that exceed the energy thresholds in section 360.3 should be qualified persons as required in Chapter 1 and should be trained in, and familiar with, the specific hazards and controls required for safe work.

R.2.2 Unqualified persons who perform work on electrical equipment with capacitors should be trained in, and familiar with, any electrical safety‐related practices necessary for their safety. Unqualified persons may not work on or near capacitor hazards.

R.3 Shock hazard

R.3.1 General.

The capacitor shock hazard to a person is an impulse shock with an exponential decay curve. The severity of the shock is related to the amount of energy (Joules) delivered and the time in which the energy is delivered. Injuries from capacitor shock include severe reflex action, internal and external burns, and heart fibrillation. Reflex injury can occur at energy levels as low as 0.25 Joules when the capacitor voltage is over the skin breakdown threshold (about 400 V) resulting in a very rapid delivery of the energy. Reflex action can result in injuries from falling, involuntarily coming in contact with other hazards, tearing muscles, tendons, and ligaments, or dislocation of joints. Internal burn injuries to nervous system and other tissues can occur at energies as low as 10s of Joules. Heart fibrillation can happen when the voltage exceeds 100 V and the stored energy delivered exceeds 10 Joules under certain circumstances. [See Figure R.3.1(a) for a capacitive shock circuit and Figure R.3.1(b) for a capacitive discharge curve.]

Figure R.3.1(a) ‐ Capacitor Shock Circuit Figure R.3.1(b) ‐ Typical exponential discharge characteristic of a capacitor through a resistor.

2

R.3.2 The duration of a capacitive discharge shock is independent of voltage and is generally assumed to be three times the time constant of the shock circuit. After three time constants, the voltage is reduced by 95%, and

the energy has been reduced by 99.25%. The time constant, , is equal to body shock pathway resistance times capacitance:

𝑅𝐶 [R.3.2]

R.3.3 The current delivered by the shock is independent of capacitance and is proportional to the initial peak voltage, and inversely proportional to shock pathway resistance. Assuming that all of the stored energy is

delivered in 3, the rms equivalent current can be expressed as:

𝐼√ [R.3.3]

R.3.4 The shock pathway resistance depends on skin resistance, entry and exit locations, and internal body resistance. The severity of a capacitor discharge shock depends on the time of delivery (quickly or slowly) and the energy delivered. A capacitor disconnected from a live voltage source has only a finite amount of energy and can deliver that energy either quickly or slowly depending on specific shock pathway resistance. As shock pathway resistance increases, the current lowers but the time to discharge also takes longer, and vice versa. Below 400 V, skin breakdown is less likely and skin resistance (over 10,000 ohms for intact skin) will significantly reduce the shock current and extend discharge time. For punctured, broken, or very wet skin, the contact resistance is 0 to 100 ohms.

R.3.5 For a given stored energy, there is a difference in response to whether it is a high voltage, low capacitance shock, or a low voltage, high capacitance shock. At high voltage and low capacitance, a hazardous shock will fully discharge nearly instantaneously (in microseconds) and could miss the vulnerable part of the heart cycle. However, the full energy is delivered to the person and there may be nerve or other tissue damage. At low voltage and high capacitance, the total discharge time can extend several seconds (multiple heart beats), behaving more like a dc shock. Both scenarios remain highly hazardous as fibrillation may still occur.

Informational Note: For more information on impulse shock hazards, see IEC TS 60479‐2, Effects of Current on Humans and Livestock, Part 2, Special Aspects.

R.3.6 Reflex hazard. Even when fibrillation does not occur, there remains the potential for serious bodily injury, especially above 400 V. The reflex action to an impulse shock can be severe, causing persons to fall off of elevated platforms or ladders, knock a body part into nearby objects, or in some cases cause severe muscle clenching, temporary paralysis, or dislocated joints. This reflex hazard extends to lower energies even where fibrillation is unlikely. The lower threshold for hazardous reflex shocks is 0.25 Joule for over 400 V.

R.3.7 Shock hazard thresholds. Capacitors connected to conductors or circuit parts operating at voltages equal to or greater than 100 V dc and containing a stored energy equal to or greater than 10 Joules present a significant risk of shock and fibrillation. Below 10 Joules, a significant risk of reflex action leading to injury may exist when:

(1) 100‐400 V: if the stored energy is greater than 1 J

(2) >400 V: if the stored energy is greater than 0.25 J

R.4 Short‐circuit hazard

Capacitors have the unique ability to discharge very rapidly in a shorted condition due to their low internal impedance. In ac power system faults typically occur on the order of milliseconds and are limited by transformer

3

impedances. Battery faults take seconds or minutes to discharge. In contrast, capacitors have very little internal impedance and can fully discharge in microseconds, with very high discharge current. This current can cause heating of metals, arc flash injury, and arc blast injury dependent on the stored energy in the capacitor. The shock injuries, including reflex and fibrillation, were discussed above. Additional hazards that can result from capacitor energy include the following.

R.4.1 Thermal Hazard. At around 100 J, a short through a metal object in contact with the worker, such as a ring or tool, can cause rapid heating and burns to the skin. Above 1 kJ, there can be substantial heating of metal, arcing and magnetic forces causing mechanical deformation. Above 10 kJ, there is massive conductor melting, massive magnetic/mechanical motion, and an arc blast hazard.

R.4.2 Arc Flash Hazard. Above around 120 kJ, there exists sufficient stored energy to create an arc flash hazard (greater than 1.2 cal/cm2 at a working distance of 18 inches). This is a conservative lower bound that assumes all of the stored energy has been converted to radiant heat. The threshold of 120 kJ may be lower for a capacitor in a box. There may be an additional contribution to the arc flash energy from an ac or dc source connected to the capacitor or capacitor bank.

R.4.3 Arc Blast Hazard. Capacitors can have a significant arc blast hazard due to the very high short circuit current involved. The effects of the acoustic shock wave can rupture eardrums and collapse lungs. While hearing protection should be used above 100 J to mitigate against hearing damage, there is no PPE for protection against lung collapse, which becomes a hazard above 122 kJ.

R.5 Other hazards

R.5.1 When a capacitor is subjected to high currents, such as a short circuit condition, internal stresses may result in violent rupture of the capacitor enclosure.

R.5.2 When capacitors are used to store large amounts of energy, internal failure of one capacitor in a bank may result in the rupture and explosion of the failed capacitors when all other capacitors in the bank discharge into the fault. Fuses or inductive elements are often used to limit the fault current from a capacitor bank into a faulted individual capacitor. Improperly sized fuses or inductive elements for this application may explode.

R.5.3 Rupture of a capacitor can create a fire hazard from ignition of the dielectric fluids. Dielectric fluids may release toxic gases when decomposed by fire or the heat of an electric arc.

R.6 Performing a Risk Assessment for Capacitors

R.6.1 The risk assessment process for capacitors can follow the overall risk management process found in Annex F. This risk assessment should be coordinated with the Shock Risk Assessment of 130.4 and the Arc Flash Risk Assessment of 130.5.

R.6.2 Determine whether there is an exposure to capacitor stored energy hazard. An exposure would exist when a conductor or circuit part that could potentially remain energized with hazardous stored energy is not properly guarded, enclosed or insulated. All circuit parts that are electrically connected to a capacitor or capacitor bank may present this hazard. For example, a power factor correction bank may be in a completely separate enclosure; however, should the bank remained charged for some reason, the switchgear to which it is connected may also deliver the stored energy hazard.

R.6.3 Determine the shock hazard (R.7) using both the voltage and stored energy of the capacitor. Note that a high voltage capacitor is not a shock hazard below the energy threshold of 0.25 Joule. Use the Shock Risk

4

Assessment process of 130.4 and the dc shock approach boundaries (for capacitors above 100 V and 10 J) and PPE ratings.

R.6.4 Determine the total capacitor stored energy (R.8) of the system.

R.6.5 Determine the arc flash hazard (R.9). If stored energy is greater than 120 kJ, determine the arc flash incident energy and the arc flash boundary at the appropriate working distance. Select appropriate arc flash PPE accordingly, but workers should always remain out of the arc blast lung protection boundary (R.6.6).

R.6.6 Determine the arc blast hazard (R.10). Hearing protection should be required where the stored energy exceeds 100 J and 400 V. Where the stored energy exceeds 10 kJ, the hearing protection boundary should be calculated. If stored energy is above 122 kJ, determine the arc blast boundary for lung hazards. A lung collapse hazard may exist above 122 kJ. DO NOT ENTER THE LUNG PROTECTION BOUNDARY. There is no PPE for lung protection.

R.6.7 Determine the required test and grounding method (R.11).

R.6.8 If capacitors are equipped with bleed resistors, or if using a soft grounding system, determine the required discharge wait time, where applicable (R.12). After the required discharge time a hard ground stick or hard grounding system should be applied.

R.6.9 Develop a written discharge procedure. This should capture all of the required steps to place the equipment into an electrically safe work condition. Include information about the amount of stored energy available, how long to wait after deenergization before opening the enclosure, how to test for absence of energy, and what to do if there is still stored energy present.

R.6.10 Consider labeling the equipment with a hazard warning label (R.15), so that qualified persons are made aware of the potential for stored energy and the need for a written discharge procedure. Include the maximum voltage and stored energy.

R.7 Determining the Shock Hazard

R.7.1 Perform a Shock Risk Assessment for capacitors exceeding the thresholds in 360.3 in accordance with 130.4. Shock approach boundaries are based on the peak voltage and the dc shock approach boundaries of Table 130.4(D)(b). Select appropriately rated shock protection PPE, such as voltage‐rated gloves and dielectric insulating sheeting. Use the dc ratings for rubber insulated products (see ASTM D120 for dc ratings). Use the Restricted Approach Boundary to assist in the selection of the length and voltage rating of the ground stick. Note that capacitors below the thresholds defined in 360.3 are not shock hazards and 130.4 does not apply. This includes capacitors from 0 to 100 V and less than 100 joules, 100 to 400 V and less than 1 Joule, and capacitors greater than 400 V and less than 0.25 Joules.

R.7.2 Shock protection PPE is required for all parts of the body that enter the Restricted Approach Boundary for capacitor shock hazards defined above (See Table 130.4(D)(b)).

R.8 Determining Capacitor Stored Energy

R.8.1 This may require detailed examination of schematics or manufacturer’s information to properly determine both the peak voltage that will be applied to the capacitors and the total capacitance. The value of capacitance and the capacitor voltage rating may also be obtained from the labels on the capacitor, if done safely. Note that commercial capacitors often use unit labels of mF for milliFarads and MF for microFarads.

5

R.8.2 The stored energy in a capacitor is calculated as follows:

𝐸 𝐶 ∗ 𝑉 [R.8.2]

where E = Capacitive stored energy in Joules

C = Total capacitance in Farads

V = Peak voltage in Volts

R.8.3 Total capacitance of capacitor banks:

(1) For capacitors in parallel, add the capacitance:

𝐶 𝐶 𝐶 𝐶 ⋯ [R.8.3a]

(2) For capacitors in series, use the following:

⋯ [R.8.3b]

(3) Capacitor banks used for power factor correction are often labeled with a kVAR value (kilo Volt‐Ampere Reactive) to facilitate power engineering calculations. Calculate the capacitance as follows:

𝐶 [R.8.3c]

Where C= Total capacitance in Farads

Q = Reactive power in VAR (Volt Amps Reactive)

f = line frequency in Hertz

V = Phase‐to‐phase voltage in Volts rms

(4) Long, high ‐voltage coaxial cables can have significant capacitance, normally on the order of 45‐10 pF/m (1 picofarad = 1 x 10‐12 F) for low‐current applications, or 150‐450 pF/m for utility‐grade, medium ‐voltage insulated cable. Manufacturer’s specifications on capacitance per meter should be consulted.

R.8.4 For peak voltage, use the voltage applied across the capacitors that would cause the maximum charge. For disconnected capacitors in storage or for disposal, use the capacitor rated voltage.

(1) dc systems: Use the maximum available terminal voltage that could be applied to the capacitor by the system.

(2) ac systems: Nominal system voltage is normally expressed in Volts rms (root mean square). For capacitor stored energy calculations, use the peak amplitude of the voltage, Vp.

𝑉√

𝑉 0.707 𝑉 [R.8.4a]

Single phase ac systems: use peak ac voltage.

𝑉 𝑉 . √2 [R.8.4b]

For 3‐phase Wye‐connected systems, use the peak phase‐to‐neutral ac voltage.

6

𝑉 𝑉 . √2 [R.8.4c]

For 3‐phase Delta‐connected systems, use the peak phase‐to‐phase ac voltage.

𝑉 𝑉 . √2 [R.8.4d]

Note: for the same capacitance, a delta‐connected system will have a total energy 3 times higher than a wye‐connected system. Always check the configuration as design requirements vary.

R.9 Determining the Arc Flash Hazard

R.9.1 The maximum theoretical possible arc flash incident energy can be calculated by assuming that all of the stored energy is dissipated as radiant energy in a spherical expansion in open air. While this is unlikely, it helps set a lower bound of stored energy below which an arc flash hazard is unlikely.

𝐼𝐸 𝐽/𝑐𝑚 [R.9.1a]

r is distance to the arc in cm

C is capacitance in Farads

V is voltage in Volts

Converting to cal/cm2 (1 cal = 4.184 J) we obtain:

𝐼𝐸 𝐶𝑉2

105.1 𝑟2𝐸

52.6 𝑟2 𝑐𝑎𝑙/𝑐𝑚 [R.9.1b]

R.9.2 The arc flash boundary, where IE=1.2 cal/cm2, is then:

𝐴𝐹𝐵 0.126 √𝐸 𝑐𝑚 0.05 √𝐸 𝑖𝑛 [R.9.2a]

In a box, we can apply a 3 times factor over the open‐air incident energy calculation:

𝐼𝐸 3 𝐼𝐸 [R.9.2b]

𝐴𝐹𝐵 √3 𝐴𝐹𝐵 [R.9.2c]

Thus, the minimum stored energy (lower bound) required to obtain 1.2 cal/cm2 at a working distance of 18 inches is roughly 44 kJ in a box or 120 kJ in open air. Extreme caution should be used with the open‐air calculation, as the arc flash boundary may fall inside the lung protection boundary for arc blast. A better practice is to always use the box arc flash boundary as a minimum approach distance.

R.10 Determining the Arc Blast Hazard

R.10.1 The arc blast hazard is directly related to the instantaneous (initial) short circuit current. Since capacitors can discharge very rapidly, the shockwave generated by a capacitor discharge can cause barotrauma (overpressure injury) to persons in the area. The most sensitive organs are the ears, lungs and brain. When a differential pressure across the eardrums exceeds around 20‐35 kilopascals (3‐5 psi), the eardrum may rupture. At 200 kilopascals (29 psi), lung damage may occur. The following formulas are used to estimate safe boundaries based on total stored energy, where “safe” is less than a 1% probability of eardrum rupture or lung injury:

7

𝑅 49.29 5.09 (cm) [R.10.1a]

𝑅 31.32 155.45 (cm) [R.10.1b]

where 𝑅 = Eardrum rupture boundary (1 percent probability) in cm

𝑅 = Lung collapse boundary (1 percent probability) in cm

𝐸 = capacitor stored energy in joules

Informational note: For more information about the derivation of these formulas, see Charles R. Hummer, Richard J. Pearson, and Donald H. Porschet, “Safe Distances From a High‐Energy Capacitor Bank for Ear and Lung Protection”, Army Research Laboratory Report, ARL‐TN‐608, July 2014.

R.10.2 Above 122 kJ a lung collapse hazard may exist. It is not sufficient to wear arc flash PPE, as this will not protect against lung injury. Remain outside of the lung collapse boundary.

R.10.3 Above 448 kJ, the lung protection boundary will be greater than the arc flash boundary in open air calculated in R.9. A better practice is to always use the box arc flash boundary as a minimum approach distance. (See Figure R.10.3).

Figure R.10.3 – Plot of Arc Flash and Blast Protection Boundaries.

R.11 Selecting the Appropriate Test & Grounding Method.

R.11.1 The method to safely discharge, or verify discharge of a capacitor will vary depending on the degree of hazard. Low voltage, low energy capacitors may be verified deenergized with a properly rated test instrument meeting the requirements of Chapter 1, Article 110.8, and/or hard grounded. At higher energy and voltage, soft grounding through a resistor may be required to limit the discharge current. At very high energies (>100 kJ), manual testing or grounding can become a serious arc blast hazard and remote metering and grounding should be performed.

R.11.2 For systems with permanently installed bleed systems, testing for absence of voltage after the prescribed

8

discharge time may be performed instead of applying grounds. Testing may also be performed as a means to verify absence of voltage after an automatically switched bleed system has grounded the system. In all cases, the test device must be rated for the system. (See Table R.11.9 for the appropriate test method.)

(1) Below 1000 V and below 10 kJ, a properly rated, high‐impedance digital voltmeter (DVM) may be used.

(2) Above 1000 V and below 100J, a properly rated, high‐impedance digital voltmeter (DVM) may be used with an approved attachment for measuring high‐voltage dc on non‐utility systems. On utility systems, a utility‐grade, dc, resistive type voltmeter must be used with a live‐line tool.

(3) Above 1000 V and between 100J and 100 kJ, a utility‐grade, dc, resistive type voltmeter may be used with a live‐line tool.

(4) Above 100 kJ, use an engineered method only for verifying absence of voltage.

R.11.3 Hard grounding is the practice of shorting a capacitor from terminal to terminal and then directly to ground. Since the resistance is typically <0.1 Ohm, the discharge time is rapid and the discharge current can be high. An intense spark and a loud noise can happen at higher energies. Above 100 Joules there is a hearing damage hazard. The voltage reversal associated with using a hard ground may put excessive voltage stress on the capacitor. Since this is an equipment issue, check with the manufacturer for their recommendations.

R.11.4 Soft grounding is the practice of discharging a capacitor through a resistor rated for the power. The

resistor raises the time constant (=RC) and reduces the peak discharge current (I= V/R) to safer levels. Soft discharge is required above 1000 Joules.

R.11.5 At the conclusion of the specified discharge time, there is still voltage on the capacitors. A properly matched resistor and capacitor will reduce the voltage to less than 50 V and the energy to less than 5 Joules. At this point hard grounding is applied to fully short the capacitors to ground.

R.11.6 Sometimes the grounding resistor is attached directly to the grounding stick. Other times, there are two separate grounding points built into the equipment itself. The grounding point labeled “High‐Z” is the soft grounding point, where “High‐Z” stands for High Impedance. The grounding point labeled “Low‐Z” is the hard grounding point, directly to ground. In this case the same ground stick is applied, first to the High‐Z point, then to the Low‐Z ground point. See Fig. R.11.6.

R.11.7 The grounding method should keep all personnel clear of the lung protection boundary. For this reason, above 100 kJ, remote soft grounding is required.

R.11.8 All ground sticks should meet the construction and periodic inspection requirements of R.16.

R.11.9 See Table R.11.9 and Figure R.11.9 for selection of the proper test and grounding methods.

9

Hard grounding: an insulating stick with a grounding tip is used to discharge a capacitor between its two terminals and then to ground.

Soft grounding 1: an insulating stick with a mounted resistor is used to perform a controlled discharge of the capacitor using the Hi‐Z tip first. Then, after the prescribed wait time, hard grounding is applied with the second (Lo‐Z) tip that bypasses the resistor.

Soft grounding 2: an insulating stick with a grounding tip is first applied to the Hi‐Z point to perform a controlled discharge of the capacitor. Then, after the prescribed wait time, the grounding tip is applied to the Lo‐Z point to bypass the resistor and hard‐ground the capacitor.

Figure R.11.6 – Illustration of Hard and Soft Grounding Examples

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Test Method Grounding Method

0 ‐ 100V 100 ‐ 1kV >1kV 0 ‐ 100V 100 ‐ 1kV >1kV

< 0.25 J no hazard no hazard no hazard < 0.25 J no hazard no hazard no hazard

0.25 ‐ 100J no hazard DVM DVM with

HV adapter 0.25 ‐

100J no hazard Hard

ground ok Hard

ground ok

100 ‐ 1kJ DVM DVM HV Utility

Grade DC Voltmeter

100 ‐ 1kJ

Hard ground ok

Hard ground ok

Hard ground ok

1k ‐ 100kJ

DVM DVM HV Utility Grade DC Voltmeter

1k ‐ 100kJ

Soft ground

then hard ground

Soft ground

then hard ground

Soft ground

then hard ground

>100kJ Engineered Method

Engineered Method

Engineered Method

>100kJ

Remote grounding

only

Remote grounding

only

Remote grounding

only

Table R.11.9 – Capacitor Test and Grounding Matrix to Establish Safe Discharge

11

Figure R.11.9 – Flowchart of Capacitor Test and Grounding Methods to Establish Safe Discharge

R.11.10

Other considerations are as follows:

(1) Charge transfer: Grounding capacitors in series may transfer charge between capacitors rather than discharge the stored energy. Special precaution should be taken in selecting the tools and sequence necessary to discharge capacitors connected in series. Improper grounding may result in moving charge around and not fully discharging to ground. Capacitor cases are not always grounded and should be considered charged unless otherwise determined.

(2) Dielectric Absorption: not all the energy in a capacitor is dissipated when it is short‐circuited for a short time. Although the charge on the plates may be initially removed, dielectric polarization may cause charge to accumulate after the ground is removed. A voltage recharge of up to 10% may occur a few minutes after the grounding or shorting device has been removed. This can occur in capacitors with liquid dielectrics, such as an electrolytic capacitor, and in capacitors with solid dielectrics, such as polyethylene film capacitors.

(3) High voltage capacitors may build a charge in the presence of high electric fields.

(4) A momentary hazardous voltage can exist at the moment of contact across the inductance of a few feet of the grounding cable of a ground stick at the moment of contact with a charged capacitor. This is why a worker should never hold the grounding cable during a discharge event.

R.12 Determining the Capacitor Discharge Time

R.12.1 The discharge time Td of a capacitor is the time it takes to reduce to less than 100 V. It is related to the time constant 𝜏. The discharge resistance may be permanently installed on the capacitors (e.g., a bleeder

>100 kJ1000 J ‐ 100 kJ< 1000 J

Bleed resistors

or automatic

discharge installed?

Wait the

discharge time

Test Hard ground Test

Hard ground

Soft ground

Remote Test & Ground

Manual Test &

Ground

OR

NO

YES

Bleed resistors

or automatic

discharge installed?

Wait the

discharge time

NO

YES

OR

Soft ground

Short out

terminals or leave ground applied

Short out


Discharge stored

energy

Verify discharge

(test or ground)

Keep discharged

(short and/or

ground)

Hard ground

Short out


12

resistor), automatically switched in after power shutoff (e.g., a resistor dump bank), or applied through a soft grounding stick.

R.12.2 For voltages up to 1000 V, it is sufficient to wait three times the time constant, or one minute, whichever is greater. That is because after 3𝜏, the residual voltage is less than 5% of the initial voltage.

R.12.3 For voltages above 1000 V, the discharge time will need to be longer than 3𝜏 and should be calculated. Use the following formula to determine the minimum wait time:

𝜏 𝑅𝐶 [R.12.3a]

𝑇 ln 𝜏 [R.12.3b]

where = time constant

R = discharge path resistance

C = total capacitance

Td = discharge time (wait time)

Vp = Peak voltage

R.13 Establishing an Electrically Safe Work Condition

R.13.1 Where a conductor circuit part is operating at or above 100 V and 10 Joules a written discharge procedure (such as a complex LOTO procedure) should be used to document the necessary steps to place the equipment in an electrically safe work condition. The written discharge procedure should incorporate the results of the risk assessment performed in R.6 and specify the following at a minimum:

(1) Voltage in Volts

(2) Energy in Joules

(3) Specific steps to safely discharge the capacitor, or verify that it is discharged

(4) Specific tool(s) (e.g., ground stick) or engineering system to discharge the capacitors, if required

(5) Specific test instruments (e.g., DVM) or engineered systems used to verify a de‐energized state

R.13.2 In order to place the equipment with stored hazardous energy in an electrically safe work condition, a qualified person should follow the steps in 120.5 as well as the specific sequence outlined in the written discharge procedure. Note that the process to remove stored energy in a capacitor is a part of the overall process to establish an electrical safe work condition in 120.5. These would then be:

(1) Review the scope of work and the written discharge procedure. Determine all required safe approach boundaries and necessary PPE and tools for the task.

(2) Perform a job briefing with the personnel involved and notify affected persons that the equipment will be deenergized.

(3) After properly interrupting the supply current, open the disconnecting device(s) for each source feeding the

13

equipment.

(4) Wherever possible, visually verify that all blades of the disconnecting devices are fully open or that drawout type circuit breakers are withdrawn to the fully disconnected position.

(5) Apply lockout/tagout devices in accordance with a documented and established policy, or use plug control on smaller equipment.

(6) If bleed resistors or automatic discharge systems are applicable, wait the prescribed time for the capacitors to discharge to less than the thresholds in 360.3.

(7) Perform the test and grounding method selected in R.11.

(8) To ensure that recharging does not occur, all of the capacitor terminals should be shorted together and to ground with a non‐insulated wire of sufficient gauge to withstand handling. For series capacitors these shorting wires should be attached across each individual capacitor, and to case. For single capacitors or for a parallel capacitor bank, the grounding device should be permitted to be left hanging on the capacitor terminal during the work (e.g., a ground stick/hook).

R.14 Storage & Disposal

R.14.1 Any residual charge from capacitors should be removed by discharging the terminals before servicing or removal.

R.14.2 All uninstalled capacitors capable of storing energy exceeding the thresholds of 360.3 at their rated voltage should be short‐circuited with a conductor of appropriate size.

R.14.3 When an uninstalled capacitor is discovered without a shorting wire attached to the terminals, it should be treated as energized and charged to its full rated voltage until determined otherwise. Contact a qualified person to determine the appropriate steps to safely discharge the capacitor.

R.14.4 Large, high‐voltage capacitors are often formed of a network of smaller capacitor elements connected inside a case. When such a capacitor develops an internal open circuit, it may retain substantial charge internally even though the external terminals are short‐circuited. Such a capacitor can be hazardous to transport, because the damaged internal wiring may reconnect and discharge the capacitor through the short‐circuiting wires. Any capacitor that shows a significant change in capacitance after a fault may have this problem. Action should be taken to minimize this hazard when it is discovered.

R.15 Capacitor Hazard Labeling

R.15.1 Electrical equipment operating at or above 100 V and 10 Joules should be field marked with a label containing all the following information:

(1) A warning about the potential for capacitive stored energy, with the word “WARNING” on an orange colored background

(2) Stored energy in Joules and the maximum voltage for that stored energy

(3) The required wait time before opening the enclosure (the wait time shall be greater than the discharge time).

(4) Date of the stored energy hazard analysis

14

(5) An instruction that a qualified person is required and that they should use a written discharge procedure.

R.15.2 Labeling should conform to the requirements of ANSI Z535.4, Product Safety Signs and Labels.

R.16 Ground Sticks

R.16.1 Ground sticks should be provided for qualified persons to safely discharge any residual stored energy contained in capacitor(s). The ground sticks should be designed, constructed, installed and periodically inspected so that the full energy of a capacitor(s) can be safely discharged. See Table R.6.7 for selection guidance.

R.16.2

Design and construction are as follows:

(1) Ground stick rod. When built of fiber reinforced plastic (FRP), the rod in the ground stick assembly should meet ASTM F711 specifications. Other insulating materials may be used provided they are of acceptable insulation and durability for the application. The stick should be long enough to be handled effectively and also to keep a person’s hands out of the restricted approach boundary. This should include a non‐moveable hand stop to remind the worker during use where to hold the ground stick.

(2) Ground stick tip. The ground stick connection to discharge points may be chain links, bare conductor or solid copper bar in various geometries. The selection of the grounding tip should match the requirements of the intended application and ensure that all necessary circuit parts are fully discharged and grounded at the same time in order to avoid charge transfer. The grounding tips may be designed to remain applied (e.g., a hook) in order to safely prevent recharging from dielectric absorption. Alternatively, shorting straps may be applied while the grounding sticks are applied. Clearly mark discharge points and use caution to prevent transferring charge to other capacitors or reversing the charge on affected capacitors.

(3) Ground stick resistor. Soft grounding should be provided where stored energy exceeds 1000 J. The resistor used to soft ground a capacitor(s) should be fully rated to handle power, voltage and current. An engineering safety margin would be to calculate peak power, voltage and current, and double the resistor rating for each parameter. The resistor should be able to discharge the capacitor bank to less than 50 V and less than 5 J in less than 1 minute (<1000 Volts) or less than 5 minutes (greater than 1000 Volts). Ideally, the current should be limited to 500 A peak in order to reduce the magnetic force on the ground stick and its cable. This may require a discharge time longer than 5 minutes. Note that soft grounding is always followed by hard grounding to complete the discharge.

(4) Ground stick cable. The cable should be grounding or welding cable, flexible rope lay, soft drawn copper. The individual strands should not be larger than #30 AWG. Grounding cables have flexible, transparent elastomer or thermoplastic jackets primarily for mechanical protection of the conductor it covers and to allow visual examination of stranding degradation. Connections should be crimped according to manufacturer instructions. The lugs should be rated for the cables to be clamped. In permanent equipment installations the cable conductor size should be at least #2 AWG or larger. For temporary or benchtop situations, the conductor should be capable of safely carrying any potential current. Ground sticks should never be fused.

R.16.3

Installation is as follows:

(1) Connection to system ground. Ground sticks should be connected to the system ground to ensure proper discharge of the capacitors, if one terminal of the capacitor is grounded. If the capacitor or capacitor bank is

15

not connected to a system or facility ground, then two ground sticks may be required. A double‐ended ground stick may be used to short the capacitor terminals, and then a third ground stick, connected to system or facility ground may be used to assure the shorted capacitor is at ground potential. Or, two ground sticks, connected to system/facility ground, may be used to short each capacitor terminal to ground. Such “floating” capacitors and capacitor banks must have a detailed risk assessment considering all voltages during the procedure and a detailed procedure, including step‐by‐step processes for safing the system, must be developed. The system ground should be bonded to the building grounding electrode system where practicable. A qualified engineer should evaluate the connection point to ensure the integrity of the ground stick system. This connection should be in a location accessible to and visible to the operator of the ground stick. Ground stick should be connected such that impedance is less than 0.1 Ohms to ground. High Z ground sticks should be connected such that impedance is less than 0.1 Ohms between the resistor and the ground connection.

(2) Operator access. The ground sticks should be permanently grounded and stored in the immediate area of the equipment in a manner that ensures they are used. The approach path to the equipment being grounded should be perpendicular to the equipment and clear of debris or obstructions. The ground stick operator will then always be facing the potential hazard and have the grounded conductor between them and the potentially energized equipment. For cases of capacitors in a field situation, or in portable equipment, a portable ground stick may be used. The ground stick must be effectively connected to the system ground, by a bolt or heavy‐duty clamp, before opening the enclosure.

R.16.4

Visual Inspection is as follows:

(1) The ground stick should be visually inspected for defects before use each day.

(2) If any defect or contamination that could adversely affect the insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the ground stick is present, the tool should be removed from. All mechanical connections should be examined for loose connections. Ground sticks should have a hand guard which reduces the risk of improper hand position.

(3) If the defect or contamination exists on the grounding stick, then it should be replaced.

(4) If the defect or contamination exists on the cable, then it should be replaced or repaired and tested before return to service.

R.16.5 Biennial testing (every 2 years)

A ground stick system places a grounded conductor at the end of the rod between the operator and the electrical hazard. The low impedance (low Z) ground stick system is not a live line tool and there will not be a voltage potential at the end of the ground stick rod. High impedance (high Z) ground sticks may have a voltage potential at the end of the rod and should be treated as live line tools.

(1) For all ground sticks: The ground stick system should be tested to verify that impedance is less than 0.1 Ohms to ground. NOTE: perform this test annually when it is located outside or under any other adverse conditions.

(2) All High‐Z ground stick insulating rods should be removed from service to be recertified to the ASTM F711 standard or equivalent.

(3) High‐Z ground sticks with resistors: The resistor on the High Z ground stick should be measured and compared

16

to the specified value.

R.17 References

R.17.1 IEC TS 60479‐1, 4th Edition (2005), Effects of Current on Human Beings and Livestock, Part 1, General Aspects, Geneva, Switzerland: IEC

R.17.2 IEC TS 60479‐2, 3rd Edition (2007), Effects of Current on Human Beings and Livestock, Part 2, Special Aspects, Geneva, Switzerland: IEC

R.17.3 DOE‐HDBK‐1092‐2013, DOE Handbook for Electrical Safety, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC

R.17.4 Charles F. Dalziel, “A Study of the Hazards of Impulse Currents”, Transactions of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers. Part III: Power Apparatus and Systems, Volume 72, Issue 2, 1953, DOI: 10.1109/AIEEPAS.1953.4498738.

R.17.5 L. B. Gordon, L. Cartelli, N. Graham, “A Complete Electrical Shock Hazard Classification System and Its Application”, IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. 54, pp 6554‐6565, November/December 2018.

R.17.6 Charles R. Hummer, Richard J. Pearson, and Donald H. Porschet, “Safe Distances From a High‐Energy Capacitor Bank for Ear and Lung Protection”, Army Research Laboratory Report, ARL‐TN‐608, July 2014.

R.17.7 D.R. Richmond, J.T. Yelverton, E.R. Fletcher, YY Phillips, “Physical Correlates of Eardrum Rupture”, Annals of Otology Rhinology and Laryngology, Vol 109 (May 1989): 35‐41.

R.17.8 Mark A. Scott, “Working Safely With Hazardous Capacitors: Establishing Practical Thresholds for Risks Associated With Stored Capacitor Energy”, IEEE Industry Applications Magazine, Volume 25, Issue 3, 2019: 44‐53.

Public Comment No. 45-NFPA 70E-2019 [ Section No. R.13.1 ]

R.13.1

Where a conductor circuit part is operating at 50 volts or greater and the stored capacitive energy is 10joules or greater, a written lockout/tagout procedure should be used to document the necessary steps toplace the equipment in an electrically safe work condition. The written lockout/tagout procedure shouldincorporate the results of the risk assessment performed in R.6 and specify the following at a minimum:

(1) Energy in joules

(2) Specific steps to safely discharge the capacitor or verify that it is discharged

(3) Specific tool to ground the capacitors, if required

(4) Provisions to assure that magnetic fields, resulting from capacitor discharges, do not exceed 5 gaussat the electrical worker



Comment_rational_190424.docx Rational for comment uploaded on 4/24/2019


The present proposed capacitor working practices are cognizant of shock, arc flash, and arc blast hazards.While there may be other hazards, magnetic field hazards should be identified as well.A hard discharge of a capacitor at low Voltage - perhaps as low as 5 Volts - can produce a very large current pulse.Prior to discharging a capacitor, it would be wise to know both the ESR and the Voltage.

Related Item

• R.13.1


Submitter Full Name: Peter Argo

Organization: Rolls Royce

Affiliation: Employee

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Wed Apr 24 16:11:43 EDT 2019

Committee:

Committee Statement

CommitteeAction:

Rejected

Resolution: While the limit for 5 Gauss for magnetic fields may be appropriate for static magnetic fields thiswould not be the case for magnetic fields from capacitive discharge.


280 of 284 9/20/2019, 3:38 PM

Rational:

I have spent some time looking through the NFPA 70E comments for the upcoming version – Still in

process!

I salute the discussions focused on capacitor safety, and look forward to see what the upcoming version

retains.

I am somewhat concerned that these discussions do not appear to be aware of some of the cell‐line

considerations.

Simply put, a current of 500 Amps at a distance of 0.5m gives rise to concerns about magnetic fields.

These are rough numbers, but they are the sorts of numbers I am looking at to start bounding the cell‐

line field concerns.

At Rolls‐Royce we have a few equipment items that fall into the regime of the cell‐line consideration.

One of the items – a power supply – has 5 parallel 12000 uF capacitors that each have an ESR of 17.4

mOhms.

By the time these are in parallel, we have 60 mF with an ESR of 3.5 mOhms.

It doesn’t take much potential to create a high current with a hard discharge.

From my view, if I can’t establish that the total capacitor Voltage is less than 4 Volts I will raise a flag.

The present draft references 50 Volts – I believe that this is based upon the shock hazard. It is possible

that discharges

From this Voltage level will result in magnetic fields that could prove to be just as damaging.

The cell‐line topic is intended to address impact to workers with embedded medical equipment – this

certainly isn’t everyone!

I think the new discussions around capacitor safety should provide some degree of consideration in this

direction.

Thank you,

Peter Argo 4/24/2019


R.14.4

A capacitor that develops an internal open circuit can retain a substantial charge internally even though theterminals are short-circuited. Such a capacitor can be hazardous to transport because the damagedinternal wiring can reconnect and discharge the capacitor through the short-circuiting wires. Any capacitorthat shows a significant change in capacitance after a fault can have this problem. Action should be takento minimize to reduce the risk associated with this hazard when it is discovered.


The phrase "minimize hazard" to should be revised to "reduce the risk associated with this hazard" to be consistent with the definitions of "hazard" and "risk" and with Technical Committee actions taken in the 2015 and 2018 editions. Hazards are not controlled, reduced or minimized, they exist or do not exist. Risk is controlled.



Public Comment No. 73-NFPA 70E-2019 [Section No. 360.6(C)]

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Changes have been made to better correlate Annex R with Article 360 and to match critical energy


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thresholds that apply to arc flash and shock hazards.


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R.16.2

Design and construction is as follows:

(1) Ground hook stick: When built of fiber reinforced plastic (FRP), the rod in the ground hook assemblyshould meet ASTM F711, Standard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod andTube Used in Live Line Tools, specifications. Other insulating materials can be used provided they areof acceptable insulation and durability for the application. The stick should be long enough to behandled effectively and also to keep a person’s hands out of the restricted approach boundary.

(2) Ground hook tip: The ground hook connection to discharge points can be chain links, bare conductor,or solid copper bar in various geometries. The selection of the grounding tip should match therequirements of the intended application and ensure that all necessary circuit parts are fully dischargedand grounded at the same time in order to avoid charge transfer. The grounding tips can be designedto remain applied in order to safely prevent voltage rebound from dielectric absorption. Alternatively,shorting straps can be applied while the grounding hooks are applied. Discharge points should beclearly marked and caution should be used to prevent transferring charges to other capacitors orreversing the charge on affected capacitors.

(3) Ground hook resistor. Soft grounding should be provided where stored energy exceeds 1000 joules.The resistor used to soft ground a capacitor bank should be fully rated to handle power, voltage, andcurrent. A proper engineering safety margin would be to calculate peak power, voltage and current,and double the resistor rating for each parameter. The resistor should be able to discharge thecapacitor bank to less than 50 volts and less than 5 joules in less than 1 minute (<1000 volts) or lessthan 5 minutes (greater than 1000 volts) to match NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, requirements.Note that soft grounding is always followed by hard grounding to complete the discharge.

(4) Ground hook cable: The cable should be grounding or welding cable, flexible rope lay, soft drawncopper. The individual strands should not be larger than #30 AWG. Grounding cables have flexibleelastomer or thermoplastic jackets primarily for mechanical protection of the conductor it covers.Connections should be crimped according to manufacturer instructions. The lugs should be rated forthe cables to be clamped. In permanent equipment installations the cable conductor size should be atleast #2 AWG or larger sized no smaller than #10 AWG and capable of safely carrying any potentialcurrent . For temporary or benchtop situations, the conductor should be capable of safely carrying anypotential current. Ground hooks should never be fused.


The ground stick cable size for a 100 Joule capacitor does not need to be the same as the cable for a 100 kJoule capacitor. Using a ground stick with a #2 AWG wire on it to apply a ground to capacitor than only contains 100 joules is unwieldly and unneccesary. Ground conductors in a branch circuit are rated to carry a fault load (e.g. Table 250.122 ). The conductor size should have something to do with the stored energy.

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• Public Input No 311


Submitter Full Name: Chris Jensen

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