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!Study&Report&on&Status&of&Muslims&in&Uttar%Pradesh!

!August!2015!!!!!!!

Report!prepared!for!NACDOR!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Lead!Author:!!! ! Dr.!Sajjad!Hassan!Authors:!! ! 5! Dr.!Ghazala!Jamil!!

5! Jawed!A!Khan!Research!Assistance:!! Sumaiya!Maaz!!!!!!

! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !Capacity,!Advocacy,!Knowledge!

!www.misaal.ngo!info@misaal.ngo!

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!!Table&of&contents!

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Ch. Contents Pages Table of Contents 2 List of Abbreviations 3 List of Tables & Boxes 4 Foreword 5 Executive Summary 6 1 Background of the State and the Muslim Community 9 2 Demographic Profile and Trends 15

3 Socio economic development status I. Basic Services II. Rights, Access and Control over Assets III. Crime and atrocities,

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4 Analysis of primary survey from 3 Districts (Badayun, Shrawasti, Mirzapur)

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5 Media Stories and Case Studies 47 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 62

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!List%of!Abbreviations!

!!!APL! ! ! Above!Poverty!Line!!BPL! ! ! Below!Poverty!Line!!CBO! ! ! Community!Based!Organization!!HDI!! ! ! Human!Development!Index!!ICDS!! ! ! Integrated!Child!Development!Services!!MCD!! ! ! Minority!Concentrated!District!!MCB!! ! ! Minority!Concentrated!Block!!MCT!! ! ! Minority!Concentrated!Town!!!MDM!! ! ! Mid!Day!Meal!!MSDP! ! ! Multi5Sectoral!Development!Programme!!!!NACDOR! ! National!Confederation!of!Dalit!Organisations!!NREGA! ! National!Rural!Employment!Guarantee!Act!OBC! ! ! Other!Backward!Castes!!PDS!! ! ! Public!Distribution!System!!SC! ! ! Scheduled!Caste!!ST! ! ! Scheduled!Tribe!!UNICEF! ! United!Nations!International!Children’s!Emergency!Fund!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

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!List%of%Tables%&%Boxes%!!!

Table 2.1: Percentage distribution of population of UP, by religious group Table 2.2: Trends in share of Muslim pop (UP + Uttaranchal) Table 2.3: Population growth, % increase, over the years Table 2.4: Proportion of Muslim population by region (2011) Table 2.5: Muslim social groups by region Table 2.6: from top districts by Muslim population size Table 2.7: Social break down, within Muslim general and OBC lists Table 2.8. Age distribution, 2001 census Table 2.9: Sex ratios Table 2.10: Sex ratio, including 0-6 Table 2.11: Child mortality (in brackets, India figures) Table 2.12: Infant Mortality Rate Table 3.1: Region-Wise % Distribution of Estimated Population by Religion Table 3.2: Social Group Wise % Distribution of population by Religion Table3.3: Region-Wise Estimated Population by Religion (2011)(in Crore) Table 3.4: Proportion of Muslim (%) Children in Enrolment at Elementary Stage Table 3.5: Estimates of probability of an infant or child deaths in four years preceding the survey in 1994-98 Table 3.6: Poverty ratio by social groups and residence: All-India & UP, 2014-05 Table 3.7: Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure by Regions and Social Groups (2009-10) Table 3.8: Main Household Source of Income in Uttar Pradesh- 2009-10 Distribution within each Source of Income by Social Groups Rural Table 3.9: Main Household Source of Income in Uttar Pradesh- 2009-10 Distribution within each Source of Income by Social Groups Urban Table 3.10: Formality of Work and Sectors (Age15+) 2009-10 Table 3.11: Muslim Representation in Government Jobs Table 3.12: Availability of Priority Sector Lending to Minorities at National Level, up to Sept., 2013 Table 3.13. History of communal violence In UP Table 3.14: Media reports of communal related incidents Table 4.1: Social Indicators, backward districts, UP Table 4.2: Survey districts – characteristics Box 2.1: Mahawats of Barabanki: Poor, and Excluded – A case study Box 3.1: Muslim Women in Uttar Pradesh are Least Educated Group in India Box 3.2: Availability of Muslim Officers in Uttar Pradesh Box 3.3: “20% share of welfare fund to Muslims a farce”: Mayawati Box 3.4: Atrocity crimes against Muslims of Budhna, Muzaffarnagar

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!Foreword'!

!This study, to map and analyse the socio-economic condition of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, was commissioned by NACDOR, as part of a project supported by UNICEF. The objectives of the study are: - To present an overview of the socio-economic–development status of

Muslim communities in the state of Uttar Pradesh. - To highlight the exclusion faced by Muslims in development-economic

spheres through secondary and primary data, especially in the context of women and children around a set of selected indicators

- To present recommendations for uplift of the Muslim communities in the state Research for the study was conducted through June and July 2015, and involved

5 collection and analysis of secondary data related to status report of Muslims

of Uttar Pradesh. 5 collection of anecdotal evidences / case studies/ media reports to give

humane face to the analysis of secondary data. 5 Integration of primary data of 10724 families collected by NACDOR as part of

a micro level survey, into the status report of Muslims of Uttar Pradesh.

Data sources included public reports, published works, media reports, and survey findings from Community score card survey NACDOR conducted in three districts – Badayun, Sharawasti and Mirzapur. A big challenge for us was being able to find suitable data – data broken down by religious groups is not available at state and lower levels, or is only very recently being collected and made available. In the case of 2011 census, for example, these have been withheld. As a result some of the issues to be covered as part of the study questions (land ownership for instance) could not be addressed. Progressively, we should be doing more to monitor, track and report development outcomes, as well as other forms of socio-economic data, that is disaggregated and dynamic. !

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Executive)Summary)!

PURPOSE OF STUDY AND METHODOLOGY 1. This study seeks to map and analyse the socio-economic condition of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. Its objectives are to (i) to present an overview of the socio-economic–development status of the community; (ii) highlight the exclusion faced by Muslims in development-economic spheres; and (iii) present recommendations for uplift of Muslims in the state. 2. Research for the study was conducted through June and July 2015, and involved (i) collection and analysis of secondary data from public reports and published works; (ii) collection of anecdotal evidences / case studies/ media reports; and (iii) integration of primary data of 10,724 families collected by NACDOR as part of a micro level survey in three districts – Badayun, Sharawasti and Mirzapur. SALIENT FINDINGS Demographics 3. Uttar Pradesh is central to the situation of Muslims in India. 26 per cent of India’s Muslims live in the state. The state has 21 of the country’s 90 Minority Concentrated Districts (MCD); 72 of 388 Minority Concentrated Towns (MCT); and 141 of 1228 Minority Concentrated Blocks (MCB). Of the total national MsDP allocation of Rs. 3780.40 crores for 11th Five Year Plan, UP itself accounted for 27 per cent. 4. Muslims also make up a large portion of UP’s population – 18.8 per cent, according to 2001 census, totaling 37 million, making Muslims by far, the largest minority religious group in the state. 62 per cent of Muslims belonged to the OBC category, rest General. 5. Muslims population in UP varies significantly across its four geographical regions. Almost half (46.9 per cent) live in the western UP, while the Eastern region makes up 36.3 per cent. Central UP and Bundelkhand, have only a small Muslim presence. Western region is also where population is largely urbanized – on an average 40 per cent of the Muslim population in most districts. In the Eastern region, Muslims are largely rural-based. Socio-economic condition 6. Socio-economic conditions for Muslims in UP is poor. This is on the back of the poor socio-economic indicators of the state overall, with high poverty, low literacy, high infant and U-5 mortality, widespread malnutrition and challenging public health environment, and the poor coverage of households with latrine facility, to take but a few measures, all of which combine to put UP at the bottom of HDI and other developmental rankings of states. 7. The proportion of Muslim children in elementary schools in UP is only 9.64 per cent, much lower than the corresponding figure for all-India Muslims. Literacy levels are poor, especially for females. Poverty is more prevalent among the state’s urban Muslims than rural. Per capita consumption expenditure for Muslims is much worse than the average of all groups.

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8. Out of those in “Self Employment in agriculture” in rural areas, only 7 per cent are Muslims. In urban areas only 14 per cent of salaried household are Muslim. And the situation of Muslim representation in public employment is dismal, with representation in government jobs at 5.4 percent. Crime and atrocities 9. Crime against Muslims in UP take various forms, most common being ‘communal riots’, that have been frequent occurrences in the state, specially western districts, resulting in, cumulatively, large-scale deaths, injuries, loss of property, and massive displacements along with disruption of livelihoods, besides a significant polarisation of population along religious lines. Other everyday violence abound too – hate speeches, threats and intimidation, ‘love jihad’ propaganda, and ‘ghar wapsi’ mobilization. UP topped a recent listing of states with communally motivated crimes – with 129 incidents over the past year, in which 25 persons died and 364 were injured. Micro view of exclusion from services 10. The picture of Muslim exclusion from services on the ground is dismal. A recent survey of dalit and Muslim access to social security programmes reveals that Muslims suffer overwhelming exclusion. Summary findings of the survey listed below: 10(i) ICDS: dismal working in Muslim pockets. This takes various forms, and is driven by multiple factors – many Anganwadis do not open at all; there is poor awareness about core services; the health component particularly is problematic, with large exclusions from TT, Hepatitis B and Vitamin A dosage; and from immunization. 10(ii). Education: Muslim children’s access to education, is problematic. Almost a quarter of children had not been enrolled in schools; quality of MDM provided was poor and unpredictable. Books and uniforms bypass many; scholarship seemed to have almost entirely failed; and support services – safe drinking water and clean toilets – are not provided. 10(iii). NREGS: there were various problems - awareness about the scheme was poor; half of all respondents had not been allocated work, despite having applied; and more than half not received payments within the stipulated time period. Malpractices abound - entries in job cards, are as a matter of practice, not made. 10(iv). Water and sanitation services work poorly for Muslims, with a majority claiming they had no access to safe drinking water; handpumps take much longer than stipulated to be repaired; and sanitation staff are mostly not available. 10(v). PDS does work for Muslims, with only 9 per cent of respondents claiming they receive rations regularly. An overwhelming section of pensioner respondents claim they receive payments very late. And 82 per cent of respondents said their children had not been registered within the stipulated 21 days. RECOMMENDATIONS 11. Below some suggestions on addressing the exclusions. ‘Supply side’ are those that the state needs to provide and put in place; ‘demand side’, those that create ‘voice’ for better provision and delivery. Provided in tandem, and with the active participation of Muslims, these measures could potentially engender change for Muslims in UP. 11(i) Supply-side

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Policy oriented i. Bring in an anti-discrimination law; or use the 15 Point Programme framework

effectively (to show how especially social sector budgets are prepared to deliver programmes to Muslims, how spending is made, what the results are…)

ii. Representative bureaucracy: Post Muslim officers in communally sensitive districts, in police and magistracy

iii. Reservations for poorer sections of Muslims: Create a quota within OBC quota for poorest Muslim; also revise the OBC list to correct anomalies, such as those for Mahawat ‘dalit Muslims’.

iv. Education, and specially women’s education: through (i) targeted education projects in districts with lowest female literacy rate; and (ii) investment in coaching, and pre-entrance tutoring (for competitive middle, high, and secondary school; professional courses; and public sector jobs)

v. Develop integrated (Make in India-like) package of support targeted at manufacturing hubs in western UP, containing provisions for credit availability; skill development; technical upgradation and marketing outreach.

Implementation oriented vi. Take strong action against communal mobilisation, and ensuring security,

including action against hate speech, prosecuting those charged. vii. Better data collection, including disaggregated by religious groups, on a range

of outcomes and access to services; and their dissemination, using suitable media, in the policy community, and wider stakeholder group.

ix. Develop minority rights institutional capacity at district and local level, through setting up structures, and educating, training, sensitizing, and holding state actors to deliver and be accountable (State Minority welfare department; District Minority welfare office; Tehsil/Block level; Gram Panchayats)

11(ii) Demand-side What the community can do? i. Develop autonomous people’s movements for claiming rights – through

developing ‘agency’ in Muslims communities, currently monopolized by narrow political agenda.

What governments can do? ii. Largescale programme to support development of shared living; pluralism,

and respect for mutual rights and duties, especially in communally sensitive districts, western UP.

What wider development community can do? i. Support development of local / grassroots capacity (analysis, advocacy) among

Muslims, for public action, through supporting local and regional networks ii. Support development of network of activists and CBOs at local/grassroots

level, through leadership and fellowship programmes (for monitoring, tracking, researching and analysis)

iii. Intervention to track, monitor and report working of anti-poverty programmes (minority, as well as universal) as they work for Muslims. To enable disaggregated and dynamic analysis of poverty, as it affects Muslims.

iv. Education and awareness programmes around Minority welfare programmes (MsDP, 15 Point; scholarship; bank and credit and other services) and minority rights (security, cultural, developmental)

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Chapter(1!Muslims'of'Uttar'Pradesh:'Elusive'Equal'Citizenship!

!1.1 Overview

Some of the stock phrases one can expect to come across in any discussion on Muslims in India are ‘socio-economically backward’, ‘minority appeasement’, and ‘vote-bank politics’. The story of the position of Muslims in Indian society and polity is so complex that the simplest questions elude us -- If Muslims are a vote-bank and have been appeased since after the independence of India, why are they still socio-economically backward? In this introductory chapter we attempt to unravel some of this complexity such that the resultant understanding can form a backdrop to the description of the contemporary state of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. The introduction contains analytical description which is broadly drawing from a discussion of Muslims of Uttar Pradesh but many of the assertions here are important for Indian Muslims for two reasons. The first reason is the demographic weight of Uttar Pradesh and its impact on electoral politics – Uttar Pradesh is the most populous state of India. It is also the state with largest population of Muslims in India. 31 million (22%) of the total 138 million Muslims in India live in Uttar Pradesh. Although, in none of the UP districts Muslims are in a majority1; in 12 districts of UP Muslims have a substantial presence, i.e. over 25 percent but below 50 percent. (Census of India, 2001) Due to its population Uttar Pradesh also sends the largest number of representatives to the parliament of India. Given the dynamics of electoral democracy in India Muslims’ aspirations for political representation in the Parliament are heightened in UP. Thus, a study of the various impediments to the realisation of this aspiration in UP holds keen insights for those wishing to understand the political positioning of Muslims in India. The second reason is politico-cultural – as a demographic heavyweight, with geographical/cultural proximity to Delhi -- the seat of power, Uttar Pradesh is afforded a powerful position in defining itself as the ‘heartland of India’. If we look from a linguistic and regional perspective, all the normative notions of ‘Indian-ness’ are derived from the cultures and languages of UP. Large scale out-migration from UP (of not only the poor but also of the affluent and powerful) to almost all parts of India also ensured that the narratives of bidesia leaving their des for faraway lands (Tiwari, 2012) define Uttar Pradesh as India. The estranged migrant defines Bambai, Kalkatta, Madraas with alien languages and cultures as ‘Bides’, or foreign lands (Sharma, 2009). For long, the stock portrayal of a village in popular Hindi Cinema remained a village from Uttar Pradesh. In its own hegemonic narrative Uttar Pradesh is India. This conceptualisation of UP as India is so deep-rooted and pervasive

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Only!20!districts!in!the!entire!India!out!of!a!total!of!594!are!Muslim!majority.!10!of!these!have!Muslim!population!above!75!percent,!and!the!other!10!have!a!majority!Muslim!but!less!than!75!percent!of!their!population!is!Muslim.!!

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among the natives of UP that even the stereotypes of Indian Muslims are rooted in the image of the UP Muslims. The stereotype tends to be unmindful of Muslims from other parts of India who do not understand or speak Urdu/Hindi and practice customs different from UP Muslims. Therefore, in this part of the report we try to dwell upon the specificity and generality of the conditions of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh in an attempt that could be instructive in similar exercises for Muslims in other parts of the country. We share our reading of most burning issues that confront the Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. But before we move on to a description of the contemporary realities of Muslims in UP, we take a brief look at UP and role played by its Muslims in colonial India and the events leading to the partition of India. The present, after all, is in the past. 1.2 Colonial Legacy and the Partition of India

In order to legitimise their colonisation, the British wrote a history of India presenting the Muslims of India as external aggressors and British imperialism as an improvement in comparison. In the aftermath of the Mutiny the British regarded Muslims as ‘disloyal’ and ‘dangerous’. Some contend that it was the resultant anxieties of the elites among the Muslim community along with the census exercises of the British Raj which prodded the elite Muslims to position themselves as ‘leaders of the Muslims’ such that a sense of community was forged. One of the ways in which this sense of community could be fostered took shape as the madarsa at Deoband in UP (in present Saharanpur District) in 1867. Subsequently, another important educational institution was founded in Uttar Pradesh which was to remain an important fountainhead of ‘leadership’ of Muslim community in India – Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). An important distinction between the two institutions was that while Deoband took a nationalist stance, Sir Syed’s AMU depended upon the support of the British government. Nevertheless, both received support from Muslim landlords and heads of princely states. (Metcalf, 1982) Even to the day these two institutions of Uttar Pradesh have thrown up important voices and influential perspectives on Indian Muslims. Following their policy of ‘divide and rule’ the British awarded separate electorates to Hindus and Muslims such that a common affront to the Raj could not be forged. In the events leading up to the partition of India while the elite Muslims’ support made Muslim League strongest in Uttar Pradesh, they hardly had anything in common with the Muslims in other Muslim dominated areas of the pre-partition India. Muslim League had no support in Bengal, Punjab and the North-West frontier, Sindh and Baluchistan where it had to depend on the local parties. (Anderson, 2012) Nevertheless, when the partition did take place it was the elites among the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh who found that they had to uproot themselves. While the elites left, a vast number of common Muslims of Uttar Pradesh did not see any merit in uprooting themselves from their native land and going to Pakistan. Some of the elite, who had chosen to stay after partition, went to Pakistan after Zamindari abolition. With the feudal structure of the society undergoing such drastic changes; the landless, artisan Muslim population of UP left without patrons, began their descent to pauperization and penury.

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The colonial legacy of separation and suspicion that marked the relationship of the British colonial state and its Muslim subjects was inherited by the independent Indian state. The Partition of India and the creation of Pakistan as a State for Muslims strengthened the discourse further and produced an image of Muslims that refuses to fade even though a very large number of Muslims (also from UP) chose not to leave. Normatively, equal citizenship status still eludes them. 1.3 A Beleaguered Present

In 2006, the Prime Minister’s High Level Committee appointed to report on the social, economic and educational status of Muslims (popularly known as Sachar Committee after its chairperson Justice Sachar) reported that in almost all aspects of development and progress Muslims had fallen behind even those groups considered worst off hitherto. The picture it presented is stark. It is pertinent here to note that the findings of the Sachar committee report assumed importance not because it contained information about the status of the community – that was already well known even though not quantified. It is considered important because the commissioning of this data collection exercise was seen as the Indian state’s acknowledgement of the bad condition of its Muslim subjects. The committee found a clear and significant inverse association between the proportion of the Muslim population and the availability of educational infrastructure in most localities2. It did not surprise anyone that Muslims of Uttar Pradesh despite their demographic weight were way behind on almost all indicators of socio-economic progress. The subsequent chapters of this report will dwell in detail on various aspects of the situation. Here we will restrict ourselves only to making some broad observations about the background in which the dismal situation prevails. Unfortunately, instead of being used for amelioration of Muslims, in a rather absurd twist to the intended meaning, Sachar Committee report is often quoted to justify the argument that it is no surprise that such a disadvantaged community would turn to terrorism either actively or with sympathy. Demands for implementing Sachar Commission recommendations are responded to with allegations of appeasement. In 2011, Salman Khursheed, the Minister of Minority affairs in the Congress-led UPA-II government told Muslims that ‘Sachar committee report is not Quran’ that it must be followed. Instead of measures to improve their material conditions Indian Muslims have routinely been played up, by successive governments and token Muslim leaders in most major political parties, on stereotyped issues connected to their faith based identity. Enactment of The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 diluting the right of maintenance to divorced Muslim women and reversing the Supreme Court’s decision in the famous Shahbano case is a case in point. India’s legal pluralism and the personal laws are constantly used a ruse to rake up and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Only!7.2!percent!of!the!students!passing!out!of!school!each!year!are!Muslims.!25!per!cent!of!children!of!Muslim!parents!in!the!6514!year!age!group!have!either!never!attended!school!or!have!dropped!out.!

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strengthen ill-informed distortions of Islam that are common in India although the same have seen reform in many Muslim countries. This is done with much help from the self-styled Muslim religious leaders by various governments regardless of the ideology of the party in power in India. For these and other complex reasons things have not really improved for the Muslims in Uttar Pradesh even after the Sachar Recommendations. Leave alone making new provisions for the progress of the beleaguered minority, Uttar Pradesh government failed to utilize even a half of the allocated funds for Minorities during the period 2007-20123. In 2010, the Central government appointed 90 persons to monitor utilization of funds. This was done in response to complaints received from 90 minority-concentrated districts about ineffective implementation and the biased attitude of government officials. Of the 90 monitors only seven were Muslims. Uttar Pradesh -- the state with largest number of Minority Concentrated Districts, got one of these seven4. This was the approach of the supposedly secular UPA government. But taking stock of Muslims’ situation in India only in socio-economic terms would be telling only a part of the story. The whole is completed only when we narrate the part about communalism – its politics and the overt violence. Sure enough, in Uttar Pradesh the tensions of this story are more heightened. The paradoxical and reprehensible use of communal violence for electoral mobilization in Uttar Pradesh by all major political parties of the state is now well documented. It has become so normalised that media stories commenting on BJPs unprecedented victory in UP during the 2014 general elections was openly attributed to ‘strategies’ of Amit Shah. Tomes have been written on the history of communal violence in Uttar Pradesh. Suffice it to say that although communal violence is often a brute mobilization of electoral support (Brass, 1996, 2005), it is a multi-pronged ‘strategy’. It not only gives a tool to the political parties another way to contest their claims to the support of various social -- religious and caste groups, but is also an overt expression of the hatred aroused by myth-making about the history of Hindu-Muslim relationships in India by the belligerent Sangh Parivar affiliates. The entire Babri Masjid-Ramjanmbhoomi controversy is mired in myths, aggressions, and violence that will be impossible to be summarise in a project like the one at hand. But the narrative of this conflict is also tangled in the coalition politics of regional and national parties in India but also with caste relationships within Uttar Pradesh and India. It also acts as a very effective impediment to their economic self-sufficiency and well-being (Engineer, 1991). Finally, as a combined consequence, it acts as a disciplinary tactic to keep the ‘Muslims’ on the tenterhooks as far being treated by the state as equal citizens.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!Twelve!states!utilized!less!than!50%!of!funds!and!some!states!spent!only!20%.!States!such!as!Bihar,!UP,!Maharashtra!and!Assam!(all!with!high!concentration!of!Muslims)!were!in!the!category!of!those!that!spent!less!than!50%.!(Council!for!Social!Development,!2012)!!4!http://infochangeindia.org/human5rights/analysis/persistent5exclusion5of5muslims5in5india.html!

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A positive legacy that not only survived colonialism but perhaps thrived under the colonial rule in Awadh is the syncretic culture of the Indo-Gangetic plain. The princely state of Awadh became the bedrock of the Ganga-Jamuni culture which is understood to be the best composite tradition of the Indian Muslims who understood Hindu traditions well and the Hindus who inculcated Islamicate customs and elements of art in their everyday lives. It has been argued that Nawab Wajid Ali Shah and his predecessors, who were merely symbolic rulers dependent on the British Resident in Lucknow, had ample time to not just patronise artists but actively participate in evolving a new syncretic culture. The most characteristic aspect of Awadh was at once its finest artisitic moment and its most decadent political moment. (Mukherjee, 2007). This Indo-Islamicate culture of Awadh survived even the partition probably because it is still considered the most refined culture of northern India. The survival of this shared Ganga-Jamuni tehzeeb is arguably, the foundation on which the hope for a shared future can be based. 1.4 The Way Ahead

The BJP led government has come to power at the Centre on May 16, 2014 on the ‘development’ plank with a sub-text of consolidation of Hindu-vote. It is clear that the BJP’s political career and success has hinged on anti-Muslim rhetoric, threat and violence. The actions and words of Prime Minister Modi make no attempt to disguise that he is the government. A spate of organised and sporadic violent attacks on Muslims across India, indicate that the prejudiced and violent attackers assume impunity from any legal action against them because now their government is in power. If there is one thing that can be said with some certainty about the precarious positioning of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh (and indeed in India) it is that they are not only tired of being discriminated against, attacked violently, and not receiving justice; but they are also tired of all their citizenship issues eclipsed by a single agenda of ‘security from communal violence’. The silver lining to the dark cloud is that the prevailing political weather in the country is enabling Muslims to speak in a voice of claimants of equal citizenship status. Thus far, Muslims have felt obliged to share the blame of violence when they were clearly only the victims of the so called ‘Hindu-Muslim riots’ which have mostly been planned and pre-mediated attacks on their religious freedoms, and security of person and property. They were alleged to be benefitting from appeasement by the secular State when all they received was a mix of tokenisms, neglect and discrimination. Tragically, as in the case of Sachar Committee recommendations, even the reality of Muslim as victims of communal violence has not helped them get justice, instead it has been deployed to spawn the image of potential terrorists and sympathisers. The truth is that as a minority, Muslims have far too much at stake, and thus are invested in maintaining peace and harmony. Any aggression does not offer a way out of despicable conditions of existence. The only true choice, then, is the one that is theoretically available but normatively inaccessible. India Muslims have learnt that the only viable way to counter the unwritten discriminatory rules of Indian society is to

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demand that the State stick to the letter of its promise written in the constitution. This is evident to the numerous individuals wrongly charged of terrorist acts, who are being acquitted by the courts because of effective use of legal procedures for years. This is evident to the victims of violence in Hashimpura and Maliyana in Meerut, and Muzaffarnagar and their advocates who have been perusing their cases with much perseverance, faith in the constitution and the judiciary of the country.

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!Chapter(2:(Demographic(Profiles(&(Trends!

!2.1 Introduction: This chapter maps the demographic profile of Muslims of Uttar Pradesh, and their population trends. In doing this, it seeks to make comparisons with other social groups to try to provide a comparative picture. First we look at population size and growth. Then we take up spatial trends of Muslim population for examination, understanding how they are placed across regions, and districts of the state, concluding by an account of how the state’s Muslims are divided up along urban-rural lines. This is followed by looking at social groups within Muslims, and what that implies in terms of how Muslims are officially counted, and acquire access to public services. Finally we examine demographic trends – sex and age profiles, and mortality and fertility trends for Muslims, against those for other social groups in the state. 2.2 Population size and growth Uttar Pradesh is central to the situation of Muslims in India. 26 per cent of India’s Muslims live in the state. Muslims also make up a large portion of Uttar Pradesh population – 18.8 per cent, according to 2001 census, the last for which religion wise data is available. In sheer numbers, this is 37 million. That makes Muslims by far, the largest minority religious group in the state. (Table 2.1) Table 2.1: Percentage distribution of population of UP, by religious group Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh 2007-08 80.7 18.8 0.1 0.3 Source:!Planning!Commission,!2011:225!(India5HDR,!Table!2a.3)!! Muslim presence in UP’s population was always large5. It has also been seeing a growing trend. Starting with a 15.43 % in 1941, it experienced a dip in 1951 census, presumably due to the migration of large sections of Muslims to Pakistan. (Table 2.2) Migration mostly took place from urban areas, with rural populations largely continuing to remain in UP6. But overall it was relatively small number of Muslims leaving in the wake of Partition, cancelled out by the high birth rate of those who remained. From the next census on, Muslim population in the state picked up.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!It!was!13.53!per!cent!in!1891!census.!!6!Records!from!1950!show!in!the!vicinity!of!4000!persons!boarding!trains!to!Pakistan!every!day,!with!the!largest!migration!from!Rohilkhand,!Muzaffarnagar!and!Meerut!areas.!Whilst!Central!and!Eastern!UP!did!not!see!similar!levels!of!migration,!representation!of!professionals!among!those!who!did,!was!large.!(Hasan,!2011:176).!!!!

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Table 2.2: Trends in share of Muslim pop (UP and Uttaranchal) 1941 1951 1961 71 81 91 2001 2011 Muslim 15.43 14.28 14.6 15.5 15.9 17.3 18.2 18.5 Source:!Government of India (2006:273) and Hasan (2001:175). The increasing share of Muslim population is explained primarily by the higher growth rate of Muslims in the state, compared to the state average – while between 1961 and 2001, Muslims grew by 194.3 per cent, the growth rate for other religions, for the said period, was 136.9 per cent. As decadal growth rates show (Table 2.3), Muslim growth rate accelerated from 1961 through to 1991, when it was at 36.5 % (compared to all state at 25.5 per cent), and since being showing a decline. But this is still higher than the state’s average, and significantly, higher than the Muslim growth rate for all India. Table 2.3: Population growth, % increase, over the years 1961-71 71-81 81-91 91-2001 1961-2001 UP Muslim 26.8 29.1 36.5 31.7 194.3

All 19.8 25.5 25.5 25.6 136.9 India Muslim 30.8 30.7 32.9 29.5 194.4 Source: Government of India (2006:274), computed from RGI. Another measure of the high percentage of Muslims is that overall, 17.3 % of household heads in the state were Muslim, against 13 % all India. (NFHS-3, p2, and Table 3 of p34). 2.3 Spatial trends 2.3.1 Regional variations

Muslims population varies significantly across UP’s recognizable four regions. Almost half of all Muslims (46.9 per cent) live in the western Uttar Pradesh, with the Eastern region making up the other significant presence (36.3 per cent). Central UP, and particularly Bundelkhand, have only a small presence of the state’s Muslims. (Table 2.4) Table 2.4: Proportion of Muslim population by region (2011) Region Western Eastern Central Bundelkhand Per cent pop. 46.9 36.3 14.9 1.9 Source: Shariff, 2011 Western region is also where the Muslim OBC presence is higher than the corresponding figure for the state as whole. Conversely, it is the central region which has a higher General Muslim population compared to the state as a whole. (Table 2.5)

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Table 2.5: Muslim social groups by region Western Eastern Central Bundelkhand UP General 7.2 4.0 7.1 2.5 6.7 OBC 13.0 9.5 6.1 1.5 11.7 Source: Shariff, 2011. 2.3.2 District trends A closer look at Muslim population patterns, at district level, reveals further interesting trends. According to the 2001 Census, Muslims were a majority, that is more than 50 per cent of the population, in Moradabad, Sambhal, Rampur, Amroha and Bahraich districts, all in the western region. In terms of sheer numbers, Moradabad had the highest population of Muslims of all districts. The next six all belong to the western region. (Table 2.6) Western region is also where population is largely urbanized, and of those in rural areas, cultivators (rather than agricultural labourers) form a large proportion of Muslim rural workers.7

Table 2.6: Select Indicators of top districts by Muslim population size District Region Muslim

Pop. % (MCD)

% urban pop.

Cultivators as % of rural workers

Agri labour as % of rural workers

1 2 3 4 5 9 10 1 Moradabad West 45.54 36.5 23.7 2 Muzaffarnagar W 38.90 31.1 31.0 3 Bijnor W 41.71 38.9 32.7 4 Bareilly W 33.89 45.3 33.7 5 Saharanpur W 39.11 33.1 32.9 6 Meerut W 32.55 55.4 21.7 7 Rampur W 49.14 34.7 42.7 33.8 8 Bahraich Centre 34.83 17.1 47.6 37.9 9 Ghaziabad W 23.79 48.6 16.9 10 Lucknow C 20.52 80.9 21.0 11 Sitapur C 27.2 43.0 25.5 12 Badayun W 21.33 39.2 46.6 31.0 13 Kanpur Nagar C 88.6 37.4 14 Allahabad East 43.4 15.4 15 Balrampur C 36.72 10.3 54.0 36.3 16 Bulandshahr W 21.07 41.8 20.0

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7!Northern!districts/tarai,!cultivators!as!share!of!rural!workers!is!large!(compared!to!say!northern!Bihar!and!West!Bengal,!where!rural!workers!are!overwhelmingly!agri.!Labourers,!rather!than!cultivators)!Curiously!in!Assam,!where!Muslims!are!again!overwhelmingly!rural,!rural!workers!are!mostly!cultivators!(rather!than!agricultural!labourers,!as!in!Bihar!and!West!Bengal).!!!!!

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17 Kheri C 19.10 18.6 30.5 18 Sidhdharthnagar E 29.43 4.4 55.4 33.3 19 Azamgarh E 22.3 41.6 16.8 20 Jyotibaphulenagar W 39.39 40.5 43.2 20.3 21 Barabanki C 22.04 22.5 22 Gonda C 13.9 55.0 29.5 23 Aligarh W 61.7 24 Sultanpur E 8.6 25 Varanasi E 77.6 26 Kushinagar E 6.6 27 Shahjahanpur W 17.86 47.1 36.5 34.2 28 Hardoi C 34.3 47.0 23.4 29 Jaunpur E 26.8 34.5 14.2 30 Pilibhit C 23.11 32.4 39.3

Source: Tabulated from Centre for Peace Studies, (2014: 255-257) 2.3.3 Urbanisation Muslims are overwhelmingly urban in Western UP, with urban population percentage in most districts there hovering close to or higher than 40 % of their total population. (Table 2.6, Column 5) This urban bias gets somewhat tampered in Central region, and in Eastern region, Muslims are a largely rural-base population, with the exception of large towns – Varanasi Allahabad, Kanpur and Lucknow. What could explain this overwhelmingly urbanised nature of Muslim population, especially in western UP? Muslim communities are artisanal, specially so in western UP, and that, along with historical patterns of Muslim migrations – new arrivals settling down in qasba towns and around administrative centres – could have something to do with this urban bias. But also contributing, presumably, would be population movements as a result of internal displacements, during Partition, and subsequent riots, very commonplace in western UP, that have had a tendency of displacing Muslims from rural areas to urban Centre, especially ghettos with large Muslim presence, thus providing a sense of security? A case in point is the recent Muzaffarnagar communal violence that has seen large rural populations move to towns and qasbas, nearby. Of course urban areas also act as magnets for those looking for economic opportunities, something not much available in rural areas, especially for Muslims with limited avenues. 2.4 Social breakdown What of social breakup down of the Muslim population? In official listings, Muslims are broken down into General and OBC groupings. According to 2001 census, 62 per cent of Muslims belonged to the OBC category, whilst 38 % were General. OBC Muslims represent 11.7 per cent and General Muslims 6.7 per cent of all UP population. (Shariff, 2011.). In urban areas though, the skewedness in favour of OBC was less pronounced – 57 per cent of Muslims were OBC, rest General. (Table 2.7).

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Table 2.7: Social break down, within Muslim general and OBC lists Pop % of total

UP (2001) OBC Gen

1999-00 2005-06 1999-00 2005-06 All UP 18.2 44.4 62.0 55.6 38.0 UP Urban 32.1 46.2 57.0 53.8 43.0 All India 37.7 40.7 68.3 59.3 Source: Government of India (2006: 265), tabulated based on NNSO 55th round & 61st round

These figures have not remained constant – in 1999, OBCs made up only 44 per cent of Muslim population of UP, the majority (55.6 per cent ) being categorized as General. (Table 4). This significant change (of 17.3 per cent) within a gap of 5 years could be explained by the inclusion of further sub-castes and biradris among Muslims in the Central OBC list of the state. Contributing to the dynamism is also the fact that much of the identification is based on self-reporting. (Annexure …).8 Elsewhere, it is recognized that ‘Pasmanda Muslims’ (OBC and Arzal Muslims together) make up anywhere between 80-85 of Muslim population. 9

How groups are counted, and categorized, is of course important, since they determine access of groups to affirmative action policies. This is problematic for poorer sections among Muslims in UP. Unlike some other states, UP does not have a separate quota for Muslims, or any specific sub-category.10 Currently, there are 32 Muslim groups included in the state OBC list. The Anthropological Survey of India project People of India, lists 67 communities among Muslims in UP, 61 of whom are occupational groups. But both the State and the Central lists of OBCs contain only 32 of them, leaving many out. (Sachar, 2006) There are also other ways in which group are excluded - many groups included in the state OBC list but not in Central list, and therefore unable to make use of opportunities with the Central Government. Part of the problem is the convoluted and opaque way in which groups are included in these lists. (Sachar 2006).

Included among the category of Uttar Pradesh’s OBCs are a range of communities, variously called Arzal, Pasmanda or dalit Muslims, in recent literature on the subject, that make up the poorest sections among Muslims. Among their ranks are groups such as halalkhors, helas, lalbegis or bhangis (scavengers); dhobis (washermen); nais or hajjams (barbers), also called salmani; chiks (butchers); faqirs (beggars) and behna (dhunia, mansoori). Of the same occupational castes as many groups included in SC category, these are the poorest sections of society.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 8!There!was!a!corresponding!increase!in!the!proportion!of!OBCs!among!the!Hindu!population!of!the!state.!!!!9!KA!Ansari!10!Sachar!(2006:194).!Andhra!Pradesh!and!Manipur!are!some!such.!Bihar!too!has!no!separate!quota,!but!has!split!OBC!category!into!BC!(13%),!MBC!(18%)!and!OBC!women!(3%).!27!Muslim!groups!figure!in!the!MBC!category.!BC!has!9!Muslim!groups.!!!!!

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Box 2.1: Mahawats of Barabanki: Poor, and Excluded – A case study In villages of Barabanki District, live a community of severely poor, identifying themselves as Muslims of the “Mahawat” caste. Traditionally ‘mahawats’ or elephant drivers of nawabs and kings, the community is mainly engaged in making hand-made decorative plastic flowers and other items and selling it in nearby markets. Mahawats are landless, indeed homeless too, as they not have ownership to the patches of land on which their temporary sheds are built – mostly on village commons, where they are also subjected to frequent evictions by local strongmen. Besides flower-making, menfolk work as day labourers in nearby urban areas, and boys migrate out to larger cities in search of work. Women mostly work as domestic hands in the village.

According to existing literature, Mahawats are a sub-category of the Muslim “Nat ” caste – other sub castes being Aman, Goleri, Rari, Siarmaroa and Turkata - who are seen across Northern India, but concentrated in Varanasi, Allahabad, Barabanki and Jaunpur districts.11 The term “Nat” came from the word nata or dancer, and identifies a group of vagrant acrobats and showmen ‘especially those who make it their business to do feats on the tight-rope or with poles, and those who train and exhibit snakes’.12

But in the official categorization, Mahawat figure nowhere, not as sub-category of Nat, even the nat category is in the state OBC list. But this exclusion mean that mahawat are unable to get caste certificates – officials refusing to issue those due to non-inclusion in OBC list – and mahawat being too weak and unorganized to have any changes made to the list. Hence mahawat, although being the poorest sections of society, are not even counted among the OBC, for the range for government services. This translates into almost complete exclusion from government welfare schemes or entitlements.

A survey conducted in Padrohi village, in Banki block of Barabanki district, revealed there was just one ration card in a Mahawat population of about 150. And that is APL, allowing the family the occasional quota of kerosene. No one has worked under NREGA; few students go to the primary school; and the nearest Anganwadi is a KM away in the section of the village populated by more powerful sections. Their only claim to government programme is the voter I card, that curiously most individuals possess.

Source: Jawed Abbas & Vaseem Ahmad paper on on Mahawats of Barabanki.

2.5 Demographic trends: 2.5.1 Age and sex composition How about age profile of the Muslim community? Compared to the rest of the state, more Muslims were in lower age groups (0-14). This is significantly higher than the corresponding all India figure. Conversely, there are fewer Muslims in the state in the 60+ category, compared to the rest of UP, and even fewer than the All India figure.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11!Abida!Samiuddin!and!R!Khanam,!(2008),!Global!Encyclopaedic!Ethnography!of!Indian!Muslim,!Vol.!2,!Global!Vision!Publishing!House,!New!Delhi.!12!R.V.!Russell!and!Hira!Lal!(1916)!The!Tribes!and!Castes!of!the!Central!Provinces!of!India,!Macmillan!and!Co.!London.!!!

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(Table 2.5) The profile that emerges of Muslims in the state is of a young population, with a lower life expectancy rate. Table 2.8. Age distribution, 2001 census All Muslim 0-14 15-59 60+ 0-14 15-59 60+ UP 40.9 51.7 7.1 42.1 52.7 5.0 India 35.3 56.9 7.4 41.1 52.9 5.8 Source: Government of India (2006) Sex ratio among Muslims is favourable, at 916, being much higher than the state average at 898, and that for the state majority Hindu, and better than all religious groups, except Christians. (Table 2.9) Table 2.9: Sex ratios Muslim Hindu Sikh Christian All 2011 (Prov.) Overall 918 898 831 963 898 908 0-6 Source: Planning Commissions (2011:296), using census of India 2001. Table 2.10: Sex ratio, including 0-6 1991 2001 2001 0-6 All Muslim All Muslim All Muslim UP 876 899 898 918 916 935 Al India 927 930 933 936 927 950 Government of India (2006: 280), table 3.8 2.5.2 Mortality Table 2.11: Child mortality (in brackets, India figures) All UP Muslim in UP IMR 95 (73) 76 (59) U5MR 132 (101) 108 (83)

Source: Government of India (2006:283) Table 3.11 Infant mortality Rate (IMR) among Muslims in UP is much less than the all state figure and for the majority community. (Table 2.12) However, a worrying fact is that although IMR among the majority community has dropped a significant 15 points between 1999 and 2005, that for Muslims has actually gone up by a point.

Table 2.12: Infant Mortality Rate Muslim Hindu 2005-06 76.5 85.2 1998-99 75.9 100.2

Source: Planning Commissions (2011:280)

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2.5.3 Fertility (TFR: Children per woman) At 3.7, UP TFR is second only to Bihar’s (at 4.0), compared to 2.7 for India. This decreased by 3 points since NFHS-2. (p5), and was 3.8 according to RGI, (Planning Commission, 2011:293). Fertility rates are higher for women in disadvantaged groups (4.5 for scheduled castes and 3.8 for other backward classes), than for women who are not in any of these groups (3.2). The total fertility rate for Muslims (4.3) is about half a child higher than the rate for Hindus (3.7). NFHS-3 (p5). There is however a decreasing trend .The three rounds of NFHS show that the gap between Muslims and the rest has been narrowing over the years. (Shariff, 2011:101-2) In terms of contraceptive use, Muslim women are less likely to use contraception (30 per cent ) than Hindu women (46 per cent) and women of other religions. But contraceptive use has always been bundled up with economic profile -women from the lowest wealth quintile, women with no education, and scheduled-tribe women are less likely to use family planning methods than most other women. Contraceptive use is particularly high among the wealthiest women (63 per cent). (NFHS-3) Interestingly, ‘unmet need’ for contraceptive, defined as percentage of couples of reproductive age, who desire to regulate fertility, but are not using any contraception, is high among Muslims. More than contraceptive use, it is sterilization that Muslims do not prefer. If another way that could be found to address ‘unmet need’, that would be a significant change. 2.6 Conclusion i. How Muslims in UP perform - and its corollary, how programs for welfare of Muslims perform in UP – has a significant bearing on overall wellbeing of Muslims in India. This is because of the sheer size of Muslims of UP in the overall size of the Muslim population of the country. ii. A measure of this heft of Muslims of UP is the number of districts, town and blocks in UP classified as ‘minority concentrated’ by Government of India – 21 of the total 90 Minority Concentrated Districts (MCD); 72 of the 388 Minority Concentrated Towns (MCT); and 141 of the total 1228 Minority Concentrated Blocks (MCB) in the country. Of the total MsDP allocation of Rs. 3780.40 crores for 11th Five Year Plan, UP accounted for a hefty 27% (Ministry of Minority Affairs, 2015:77). iii. For this reason alone, a study of the socio-economic study of Muslims of Uttar Pradesh, and tracking and monitoring the working of different programs for welfare of Muslims in the state (universal programmes, such as ICDS, NREGS, PDS et al, as well as minority specific ones – scholarships, credit, MsDP and the like) is an important exercise. iv. But the finer details too are important – what are the regions and specific districts that require greater attention for improving wellbeing of Muslims; what specific groups amongst Muslims are further excluded than the norm; what are the dynamics of the spatial, social and other dimensions of the demography of Muslims in UP, that require understanding and policy attention? And finally, what could be the design and set up of interventions to address the specific challenges these groups (and regions) face? These will require further and ongoing work, both for analysis and communication and advocacy with stakeholders.

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Chapter(3! !Socio%Economic%Development*Status&of&Muslims!!

3.1 Introduction: State Level Development Indicators

Uttar Pradesh (UP) is the most populous state in the country accounting for 16.4 per cent of the India’s population. UP has 19.96 crore population as per census 2011.It is the fourth largest state in terms of geographical area covering 9 per cent of the country’s geographical area (2,94,411 square kilometers). The sex ratio of the state accounts 908 per thousand. The child population upto 0-6 years of age is 2.97 crore, whereas the child sex ratio of the same age group is found to be 899 per thousand. The total literacy rate of the state accounts 69.72 percent, whereas the male and female literacy rate accounts 79.24 per cent and 59.26 percent respectively (Census of India 2011). The situation of female literacy in Uttar Pradesh gives a dismal picture. Percentage of population below the poverty line (BPL) stood at 37.7 percent in Uttar Pradesh in 2009-10. Total number of BPL persons in Uttar Pradesh has increased from 730.7 lakhs in 2004-05 to 737.9 lakhs in 2009-10. Uttar Pradesh ranked 18th among Indian states in terms of Human Development Index (HDI) in 2007-08. The overall social indicators of the state show that the state stands on 13th or 14th position among the sixteen major States. Only Bihar and Orissa lag behind U.P. in terms of social development indicators like medical facilities, teacher-pupil ratio in primary schools, birth rate, death rate, infant mortality rate, literacy, per capita income, electrification of villages, per capita power consumption etc. (http://www.up.gov.in/) Percentage of households having no latrine facility was 64.4 percent in Uttar Pradesh, 75.4 percent in Chhattisgarh, 76.9 percent in Bihar, 78.0 percent in Jharkhand, 78.0 percent in Odisha, 71.2 percent in Madhya Pradesh and 53.1 percent at the all India level during 2011. Percentage of households having electricity facility as a source of lighting was 36.8 percent in Uttar Pradesh, 75.3 percent in Chhattisgarh, 16.4 percent in Bihar, 45.8 percent in Jharkhand, 43.0 percent in Odisha, 67.1 percent in Madhya Pradesh and 67.2 percent at the all India level during 2011. (http://www.up.gov.in/) Muslims are the largest religious minority group just about 18.5 per cent of State population according to census data (Census 2011). Muslims live mostly in urban areas in UP. Muslims are the largest minority with dominance of OBC Muslims (11.7 % out of 18.5 percent of Muslim population) in the state. In Uttar Pradesh, the proportion of Muslim children is only 9.64% in elementary schools while the percentage of Muslims in total population of the state is 18.5%. The per capita consumption expenditure of Muslims is better than the OBCs, SCs and STs, but it is worse than the average of all groups. The share of Muslim HHs is less in the category of “Self Employment in non-agriculture”. Out of total “Self Employment in agriculture” in rural areas households only 7% are Muslims. In urban areas only 14%

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of salaried Household is the Muslims. The situation of muslim representation in public employment is worse in the States with a greater share of Muslim population like UP. Uttar Pradesh and Assam, while the Muslim population is 18.5 percent and their representation in government jobs is 5.4 percent. Poverty is more prevalent among Muslims UP in urban areas than the rural areas. At all India and UP level (urban), percentage of poverty among is found to be 44 and 43 percent whereas in rural areas it is 33 and 37 percent respectively. 3.2 Socio Economic Status of Muslim in UP

Muslims live mostly in urban areas in UP. Further, the Muslim community is mainly concentrated in Eastern and Western regions of Uttar Pradesh. The presence of Muslim community is thin in Bundelkhand region. However, the presence of Muslims in the central region is slightly better than Bundelkhand region (Table 1).

Table 3.1: Region-Wise % Distribution of Estimated Population by Religion (2011)

Total Hindus Muslim Christian Sikh Buddhist Jains Others

UP 100 80.61 18.5 0.13 0.41 0.18 0.12 0.05 Bundelkhand 5 5.7 1.9 5.3 1.5 2.5 14.1 2.8 Central region 18.4 19.2 14.9 19.6 25.8 23 9.1 24.8 Eastern region 43.1 44.9 36.3 29.6 10.5 39.8 6.6 44.4 Western region 33.5 30.2 46.9 45.5 62.2 34.7 70.3 27.9

Source: Shariff (2011) In terms of social group wise distribution of population of UP, OBC from Muslims and Hindus have largest shares in total population of the state after SC, ST population (23.3 per cent). Muslims are the largest minority with dominance of OBC Muslims (11.7 % out of 18.5 percent of Muslim population) in the state. Further, the high caste Hindus and Muslims constitute 20.7 and 6.7 percent respectively. It can be seen from the table that more than 72 percent of population in the state belongs to SCs, STs and OBCs (Table 2 and 3).

Table 3.2: Social Group Wise % Distribution of estd. population by Religion (2011)

Social Group SC/ST OBC-Hindus

High Caste Hindus

Gen-Muslims

OBC-Muslims Total

Uttar Pradesh 23.3 40.6 20.7 6.7 11.7 100 Bundelkand 27.8 44.3 23.9 2.5 1.5 100 Central region 28.3 35.9 22.6 7.1 6.1 100 Eastern region 24.1 47 15.4 4 9.5 100 Western region 19.2 35.9 24.7 7.2 13 100

Source: Shariff (2011)

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Table3.3: Region-Wise Estimated Population by Religion (2011)(in Crore)

Total population Hindus Muslims

Uttar Pradesh

19.96 16.09 3.69 Bundelkand 0.97 0.89 0.7 Central region 3.65 3.07 0.54 Eastern region 8.56 7.19 1.33 Western region 6.47 4.70 1.68

Source: Shariff (2011) 3.3 Section I: Basic Services a. Education Table 3 gives the percentage share of Muslim children of major States in elementary schools from class 1 to class 8. In 2011-12, in most of the States, the percentage of Muslim children in elementary classes was near their ratio in total Muslim population as per 2001 Census. However, in Uttar Pradesh, the proportion of Muslim children is only 9.64 per cent in elementary schools while the percentage of Muslims in total population of the state is 18.5 per cent. Looking at the national average, enrollment ratio of Muslims is found to be 12.79 per cent in 2011-12 which close to total Muslim population (13.4) at nation level. With regard to attainment of higher education, high castes Hindus have a lead over other social groups in literacy. The share of Muslim student declines in the total population as educational level goes up (table 4).

Table 3.4: Proportion of Muslim (%) Children in Enrolment at Elementary Stage

2006-07 2009-10 2011-12

Proportion of Muslims in 2001Census (%)

Andhra Pradesh 9.62 8.69 9.61 9.2 Assam 27.31 37.11 38.15 30.9 Bihar 8.73 13.63 14.73 16.5 Chhattisgarh 0.64 1.27 1.4 2 Gujarat 3.9 6.51 8.41 9.1 Haryana 0.51 5.69 8.18 5.8 Himachal Pradesh 1.15 1.38 1.69 2 J& K 60.8 67.52 67.66 67 Jharkhand 7.25 12.89 14.27 13.8 Karnataka 13.22 36.24 15.41 12.2 Kerala 9.71 31.77 30.44 24.7 Madhya Pradesh 2.31 4.08 4.73 6.4 Maharashtra 6.82 11.55 12.97 10.6 Orissa 7.14 1.73 1.5 2 Punjab 0.19 1.53 1.46 1.6 Rajasthan 2.1 6.26 7.66 8.5 Tamil Nadu 3.89 5.21 5.7 5.6 Uttar Pradesh 8.92 9.84 9.64 18.5

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Uttaranchal 0.28 13.3 15.34 11.9 West Bengal 25.23 30.23 31.12 25.2 All India 8.84 13.05 12.79 13.4

Source: Prepared by NUEPA from DISE, Standing Committee of National Monitoring Committee for Minorities Education (NMCME), 2013 Box 3.1 Muslim Women in Uttar Pradesh are Least Educated Group in India admin | January 15, 2014 |

India’s Ministry of Minority Affairs has said that Muslim women in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh are the least educated group in the country. It said that high level of illiteracy was caused by extreme poverty among the community in many districts of the state.

As per available information, due to Socio-Economic factors, Muslim women have low literacy rates compared to the National level for literacy for women in Uttar Pradesh, including the districts of Bahraich, Deoria and Gorakhpur. Further, the incidence of poverty among Muslims including Muslim women in the State of Uttar Pradesh is high.

Source: http://islamicvoice.com/muslim-women-in-uttar-pradesh-are-least-educated-group-in-india/

b. Health and Nutrition Development activists often say that if there were a need to prioritise development indicators and choose just one most efficient indicator they would use measures of mortality among children. These contain information about many social realities such as sanitation, nutrition, medical facilities, and gender discrimination. Uttar Pradesh is a state with high infant mortality and under-five mortality but both have shown high decline among Muslims in the 1990s when compared to other communities included ‘upper caste’ Hindus. Researchers have branded this phenomenon ‘puzzling’ because lower levels of female schooling and lower performance on income and livelihood indicators ought to produced opposite effect from what is being observed (Bhalotra et al, 2010). Although Researchers are yet to establish a cause for this improvement but have variously attributed to this decline to higher age of marriage of girls among Muslims, less strong son preference, better care of mother and new born due to familial ties, (ibid) better infant feeding and child care (Deolalikar, 2010). Others have attributed lower IMR to lesser prevalence of open defecation among Muslims, that then reduces the chance of children contracting infection. (Gruso & Spears, 2014)

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Table 3.5: Estimates of probability of an infant or child deaths in four years preceding the survey in 1994-98 Independent variable Probability (Z-ratio) of child dying at the

age of 0-59 months 0-11 months

Mother’s age at Child Birth -13.45 -18.71 Whether SC/ST 0.76 0.77 Whether Muslim -0.66 -1.19 Whether upper caste Hindu 0.84 0.57 Whether child female -1.01 2.56 Whether house has piped water -0.31 -0.37 Whether house has no access to toilet 2.41 3.42 Birth order of the child 5.91 14.15 Whether household head female -0.02 -1.08 Household heads’ schooling years -0.81 -2.29 Mother’s schooling years -6.56 -10.81 Whether household has medium standard of living

-3.45 -8.12

Whether household has high standard of living

-4.32 -7.94

Whether rural residents 0.65 1.78 Whether resident of : Bihar 0.57 3.5 Madhya Pradesh 3.89 8.62 Rajasthan 3.07 7.12 Tamil Nadu -0.10 0.41 Uttar Pradesh 4.04 8.50 Source: Extracted from Deolalikar (2012) 3.4 Section II Rights, Access & Control over Assets a. Poverty Table 10 shows that Poverty ratio in urban and rural areas by social groups and residence at all-India and UP level. The percentage share of poverty among Muslims found to higher than the all India and UP level in case rural and urban areas, but Muslims are better than SC and STs. Poverty is more prevalent among Muslims UP in urban areas than the rural areas. At all India and UP level (urban), percentage of poverty among is found to be 44 and 43 percent whereas in rural areas it is 33 and 37 percent respectively. Table 3.6: Poverty ratio by social groups and residence: All-India & UP, 2014-05

All India Hindus SC/ST Muslims

All India(Urban) 29 27 46 44 UP (Urban) 32 27 46 43 All India(Rural) 28 28 41 33 UP (Rural) 34 33 45 37

Source: Government of India (2006)

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b. Expenditure The Table 5 shows the per capita expenditure social group wise in different regions in state. The high castes Hindus have high per capita expenditure per month (Rs.1539) after Muslims (Rs.911), OBCs (Rs.881), SC/STs (808) whereas average of all groups is Rs 1035 per month. The per capita consumption expenditure of Muslims is better than the OBCs, SCs and STs, but it is worse than the average of all groups. In terms of regional compassion, Muslims in western and central region have better per capita expenditure. Table 3.7: Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure by Regions and Social Groups (2009-10)

Region/Group All Groups Muslims OBCs SC/STs High Caste Hindus

Uttar Pradesh 1035 911 881 808 1539 Bundelkand 918 960 831 716 1165 Central region 1010 820 909 884 1516 Eastern region 901 824 831 727 1221 Western region 1187 1016 947 971 1812

Source: 65th round, NSSO, 2009-10; Shariff, 2011. c. Employment and Income Table 6 states that the share of Muslim HHs is less in the category of “Self Employment in non-agriculture”. Out of total “Self Employment in agriculture” in rural areas households only 7 per cent are Muslims. In urban areas only 14 per cent of salaried Household is the Muslims. Table 3.8: Main Household Source of Income in Uttar Pradesh- 2009-10 Distribution

within each Source of Income by Social Groups Rural

Social Group

Self-Employment (Agri) Agri labour

Self-Employment (Non- Agri)

Other Labour

Others (some Organized Employment etc.) Total

SC/STs 17.2 42.5 25.1 52.3 27 28.7 OBCs 52.6 33.9 42.1 30 32 42.7 Upper Caste 22.5 5.1 10.2 4.7 23 15.4 Muslims 7.8 18.5 22.5 13 18 13.3 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: Shariff (2011)

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Table 3.9: Main Household Source of Income in Uttar Pradesh- 2009-10 Distribution within each Source of Income by Social Groups Urban Social Group

Self-Employment

Casual labour salaried Others Total

SC/STs 11.3 27 13.7 11.6 14.1 OBCs 31.2 39.7 26.5 16.2 28.8 Upper Caste 28.7 4.6 45.9 55.1 34.4 Muslims 28.8 28.6 14 17.1 22.7 Total 100 100 100 100 100

Source: 65th round, NSSO, 2009-10; Shariff (2011) The below table enumerates the Formality of Work and Sectors by the social group wise. The table 8 shows the share of Muslims in all sector is 12.4 percent. Muslims lag behind in the public sector employment from all social groups. Share of Muslims in informal and private sector has been more as compared to formal and public sector respectively in urban areas. SC/STs generally have high share in labour and casual work for rural and urban areas. Table 3.10: Formality of Work and Sectors (Age15+) 2009-10

Social Group Formal Informal Private Sector

Public Sector

Ltd./Co-op Total

SC/STs 21.9 28.6 27.2 41.5 44.7 28.4 OBCs 37.7 44.5 45.4 29.4 31.9 44.3 Upper Caste 25.3 14.6 14.7 25.5 10.7 14.8 Muslims 15.2 12.4 12.7 3.6 12.7 12.4

Total 100(2.4)

100(97.6)

100(92.7)

100(3)

100(4.4) 100

Source: Shariff (2011)

Another vital indicator that assesses the extent of marginalization is the level of exclusion of Muslims from the mainstream employment pattern. Table reveals that the share of Muslims in government jobs is merely 6.4 percent. The situation is worse in States with a greater share of Muslim population. For example, in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Assam, while the Muslim population is 25.2 percent, 18.5 percent and 30.9 percent of the population, respectively, their representation in government jobs is 4.7 percent, 5.4 percent, and 10.9 percent, respectively. Only 4.5 percent of railway employees are Muslims, and of these 98.7 percent occupy lower-level positions at the national level. India’s elite civil service corps has a miniscule 3.2 percent of Muslims (Table 9).

d. Representation in public sector jobs

Table 3.11: Muslim Representation in Government Jobs

States Muslims in Total population (%)

Muslim Representation in Govt Jobs (%)

Assam 30.9 11.2 West Bengal 25.2 4.2

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Kerala 24.7 10.4 Uttar Pradesh 18.5 5.4 Bihar 16.5 7.6 Jharkhand 13.8 6.7 Karnataka 12.2 8.5 Delhi 11.7 3.2 Maharashtra 10.6 4.4 Andhra Pradesh 9.2 8.8 Gujarat 9.1 5.4 Tamilnadu 5.6 3.2 Total 15.4 6.4

Source: Government of India, 2006 Box 3.2: Availability of Muslim Officers in Uttar Pradesh

Only 2 per cent of sub-inspectors, 3 per cent of head constables and 4 per cent of constables in the U.P. Police are Muslims. Muslims, who constitute over 19 per cent of the total 20 crore population of Uttar Pradesh, are under-represented in the State police. U.P. civil police employs 236 Muslim sub-inspectors out of a total of 10,197 (2.31 per cent); 269 Muslim head constables out of a total of 8,224 (3.27 per cent); and 4,430 Muslim constables out of a total of 1,01,245 (4.37 per cent). The data was made available until June 3, 2013.

Muslims also remain underrepresented in districts with a large population of the minority community, like Aligarh, Azamgarh, Muzaffarnagar and Sambhal. There was no Muslim inspector as of June 2013 in the districts of Allahabad, Shamli, Baghpat, Saharanpur, Hapur, Bulandhshahar, Shahjahanpur, Badayun, Amroha, Firozadabad, Mau, Fatahpur and Pratapgarh, among others. In police stations across Lucknow district one out of 43 inspectors, 16 out of 501 sub-inspectors and 14 out of 498 head constables are Muslims. In Aligarh one of 19 inspectors, 13 of 135 sub-tnspectors and 3 out of 195 head constables belong to the minority community. The situation in Rampur is not very different. One out of seven inspectors, four out of 134 sub-inspectors and just four out of 266 head constables are from the minority community.

The situation remains the same in “sensitive” districts like Moradabad, Faizabad and Azamgarh, according to the RTI reply. The Sachar Committee report of November 2006 had also pointed to the poor representation of Muslims in various government services and recommended posting Muslim officers to top positions in police stations as a way to build confidence among the population. The facts were released by the State government in response to separate RTI queries moved by activists Ashraful Huda and Urvashi Sharma.

(The Hindu, February 12, 2014, New Delhi)

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e. Access to Credit

For access to credit a scheme called “Priority Sector Lending‟ (PSL) is being implemented by Department of Financial Services of Union Government to lend to minority communities covered under weaker sections. PSL is part of the Prime Minister’s New 15-point programme for welfare of the minorities which has to ensure 15 per cent of all priority sector lending goes to minorities. RBI has issued its Master circular on 1st July, 2013 on priority sector lending for improving credit facilities to minority communities. With regard to total credit flows to minorities since 2006-07, it has improved in recent years because of specific government directives, but the Muslim community still does not have access to loans commensurate with its population.

Muslims have availed less than 50 per cent of total lending in PSL whereas they constitute 72 per cent of the country’s total minority population. Of the Rs.1, 83,072.45 crore given in credit to minorities in the year 2013-14, Muslims have got Rs.87, 603 crore, just 47.98 per cent of the total lending. In contrast, other minorities such as Sikhs and Christians who make up 10.13 and 12.71 per cent of the total minority population have availed 25.99 and 23.35 per cent of the total credit. It raises the issue of possible prejudices among banks with Muslims. The Sachar Committee Report on the Social, Economic and Educational Status of Muslims in India also found Muslims had trouble opening bank accounts and accessing credit.

Table 3.12: Availability of Priority Sector Lending to Minorities at National Level, up to Sept., 2013 S.N Religious Communities % share of Credit Availed 1 Muslims 47.01 2 Christians 21.58 3 Sikhs 27.49 4 Buddhists 2.15 5 Parsis 1.77 Source: Ministry of Minority Affairs Box 3.3: 20% ‘Share of welfare fund to Muslims a farce’: Mayawati TNN | Aug 22, 2013, 03.21 AM IST LUCKNOW: BahujanSamaj Party chief Mayawati has said that UP government's decision to earmark 20% funds in welfare schemes for minorities was a farce. In a press statement, the former chief minister said that the SP was trying to mislead minorities, particularly Muslims, ahead of the Lok Sabha elections. "This is a fraud which will create communal atmosphere in the state. The SP government is trying to incite people and parties like BJP to gain political mileage. The intentional step is not in the interest of the people," Mayawati said. She added that the decision also indicated that SP had deviated from its poll promise of giving reservation to Muslims on the basis of their population. "SP had promised reservation to Muslims based on recommendations of the Sachar Committee by considering them most backward in social, economic and educational areas, but no concrete decision had been taken (for their welfare) in past one and a half year," she

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said. The BSP chief said that the decision would have held some significance had the SP government taken it before the closing of the 2012-13 financial year. "Had the scheme been launched earlier the benefit of different schemes would have reached some people in the target group. But now it is of little help as half the year has passed," she said. Pointing out that SP's promises to open new educational institutions in Muslim-dominated areas and give special legal rights to Arbi-Farsi University in Lucknow were also not kept, she said the SP government was not serious about addressing issues of minority community. "Had the SP government been serious about issues relating to the minority community, they would have fulfilled their poll promises or at made serious efforts to achieve them. But this has not been done," she said. Concluding that Akhilesh government was a failure, Mayawati said people in UP, particularly Muslims, had lost faith in it. "Poor law and order and increasing communal clashes and tension in the state under the present regime are the reason," she said. Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/20-share-of-welfare-fund-to-Muslims-a-farce-Mayawati/articleshow/21967987.cms? 3.5 Section III: Crime and Atrocities 3.5.1 Overview Much of the crime against Muslims, in UP as in the rest of India involves hate crimes – that take various forms, most common being ‘communal riots’. For long, Muslims have been the target of right-wing Hindu mobilisation, frequently suffering violence. Called ‘communal riots’ in India, such violence is increasingly taking the form of organised pogroms by those aligned to right-wing Hindu organisations, including political parties such as Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that use violence instrumentally, both to consolidate Hindu support behind them, and counter Muslim mobility. (Brass: 2003). In these situations, state agencies have often been seen to be either complicit or overwhelmed, unable to provide Muslims the security of life and property.13 ‘Communal riots’ have a long history, during and after the partition of 1947. Recent violence in Muzaffarnagar and Shamli districts, in September 2013, in Uttar Pradesh, was the latest case of such violence against Muslims.14 We use the Muzaffaranagar communal violence against Muslims, as case study, to demonstrate how Muslims are excluded form their basic rights to life and security, and to post violence legal rights. In early days of the month, as the country was getting ready for General elections scheduled for the following April, large scale communal violence engulfed the twin districts in western Uttar Pradesh. A BBC report described the violence as “the worst in India in a decade”. By the time the violence had abated later that month, 52 persons lay dead, over 60 had been grievously injured, and scores of houses, destroyed in fires, across 14 villages in the two districts. This was the official count – many instances of deaths, injuries, sexual violence and destruction of property remain uncounted, to this day. The overwhelming target of the violence were

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13!ibid!!14!http://www.tehelka.com/tag/muzaffarnagar5riots/!

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Muslims, especially from poorer backgrounds. Additionally, the violence affected 74 villages in in the two districts, and surrounding districts, as Muslim families in those, especially where they were in minority, fled fearing violence, in the tens of thousands, resulting in one of the largest violence-induced displacements in the country in recent years – estimates vary, but a figure of 50,000, at its peak, has been widely accepted. ‘Communal riots’ are, regrettably, common to Uttar Pradesh. The table below lists some of the major incidents since 1960s.

Table 3.13. History of communal violence In UP Table: Major Incidents of Communal Violence in post-Independence Uttar Pradesh*

Year Dates District/Town UP Chief Minister Ruling Party Casualties

1961 Oct 5-8 Meerut C B Gupta Congress 13-17 1977 Oct 22-23 Varanasi Ram Naresh Yadav Janta Party 10 1978 Mar 29 Sambhal Ram Naresh Yadav Janta Party 25 1978 Oct 5 Aligarh Ram Naresh Yadav Janta Party 12 1978 Nov 6 Aligarh Ram Naresh Yadav Janta Party 15-20 1980 Aug 13-14 Moradabad V P Singh Congress Party 400 1982 Sep 29 –Oct 2 Meerut Sripat Mishra Congress Party 71 1987 May 18-23 Meerut Bir Bahadur Singh Congress Party 400 1988 Oct 8-11 Muzaffarnagar Narain Dutt TIwari Congress Party 87 1989 Sep 28 Badaun Narain Dutt TIwari Congress Party 80 1990 Sep 30 Colonelganj Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 100 1990 Oct 30-Nov 2 Ayodhya Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 1990 Oct 30-Nov 2 Bijnor Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 40 1990 Dec 7-10 Aligarh Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 92 1990 Dec 10-15 Kanpur Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 20 1990 Dec 16 Agra Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 22 1990 Dec15-23 Khurja Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 74 1991 Jan 31, Feb 5 Khurja Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 22 1991 Mar 27 Saharanpur Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 12 1991 May 19 Kanpur Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 20 1991 May 20 Meerut Mulayam S Yadav Janta Dal 30 1991 Nov 8 and 13 Varanasi Kalyan Singh BJP 50 1992 Dec 6 -11 Kanpur (President’s Rule) 11 2005 Oct 13-14 Mau Mulayam S Yadav Samajwadi Party 9 2006 Mar 3 Lucknow Mulayam S Yadav Samajwadi Party 4 2007 Jan 27-29 Gorakhpur Mulayam S Yadav Samajwadi Party 5 2012 May Partapgarh Akhilesh Yadav Samajwadi Party 2012 June Mathura Akhilesh Yadav Samajwadi Party 5 2012 July Bareilly Akhilesh Yadav Samajwadi Party 3 2012 September Ghaziabad Akhilesh Yadav Samajwadi Party 7 2012 Oct 22-23 Faizabad Akhilesh Yadav Samajwadi Party 2013 Aug 27-Sep 17 Muzaffarnagar Akhilesh Yadav Samajwadi Party 60 2014 Jul 26 Saharanpur Akhilesh Yadav Samajwadi Party *Table compiled by the authors from Graff and Galonnier (2013) for data until 2011, and from media reports15 thereafter

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15!http://www.tehelka.com/up5recent5incidents5of5communal5violence5under5sp5rule/!

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3.5.2 Anatomy of ‘Hindu-Muslim Riots’ If we study the incidents of major communal violence in Uttar Pradesh a typical turn of events is something like this – a religious practice that is not the norm in a given area. People leading a religious procession insist on taking a new route through a locality where mostly Muslims live. Sometimes the trigger is provided by insistence on competitive use of loudspeakers at places of worship when a mutually respecting and tolerant agreement for it has long been in practice. Essentially, an assertion involving invention of a tradition that raises a faith-based dispute which, it is insisted, cannot possibly be addressed by any modern legal dispute settlement mechanism. Conferring of minority Status to AMU, Urdu, and of course, various turns of events in Babri Masjid dispute have provided the trigger. Most reports involve one or more right-wing groups too. Next steps often involve hartaals and bandhs in which involvement of local traders’ associations is also observed. Also involved are local strong-men who are criminals or politicians or both. They operate on the logic of personal animosities (business/ property/ criminal cases) but project it as if it were an inter-community issue. Many incidents also involved procession of remains/dead bodies as provocation or catalyzing event. An altercation turns into selective and targeted damage, looting and arson of Muslims’ businesses and homes. The reports also show that Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) and UP Police force act in complicity with the Hindu ‘rioters’ and attackers. They describe that Muslims are ‘provoked’, rush in ‘defense of the community or their faith’. Implicit in these narratives in that it is the responsibility of the Muslims to react in a way that helps ‘prevent’ ‘riots’. Any action even in self-defense, like stone pelting on PAC men who attack Muslims in their homes is seen as a further provocation and justification of violence that inevitably follows. After the violent attacks politicians’ interventions involve symbolism more than any concrete relief. Allegations of ‘appeasement’ follow because of ‘political visits’. Some reports alleged ‘appeasement’ in rare cases where the administration and officials were merely doing their duty. Transfer of police officials and administrators is also a part of the symbolism. But registration of criminal cases against the perpetrators is extremely rare and investigations that can lead to convictions are rarer still. To this purpose the description of the entire episode as a ‘riot’ is extremely handy in subversion of justice. No one is ever held responsible. No one is ever punished. Thus, the use of the word ‘riot’ is not only a misnomer but also one whose usage furthers the cause of the perpetrators of violent attacks on Muslims. One of the most prominent aspects of these enquiry/fact-finding reports is the mention of those who actually perpetuate the violence. The attackers, arsonists and murderers are reported to be Dalits, SCs or Valmikis. It is often alleged that they are ‘manipulated’ or ‘used’ by the upper caste, right-wing persons into attacking the Muslims. How this manipulation is affected is something that is neither studied by academicians nor debated in the civil society. A close look at the ‘Communal riots’, indicates amply that these are rarely conflicts in which the members of two communities fight each other. Rather these are targeted attacks in which Muslims invariably suffer more, get indicted for being equal

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perpetrators if they act in any kind of self-defense, do not receive any justice and get further ridiculed for the empty acts of ‘appeasement’. 3.5.3 Impact of violence on Muslims, and access to justice The impact of the violence on the victim populations are severe, and long term. Returning to aforesaid Muzaffarnagar ‘riots’, sexual violence, including rape and molestation, has been widely reported16. Concerns about ‘family honour’ and fear of further violence, typically result in large number of under-age girls among Muslims married off.17 And then there is the large scale forced displacement. At its peak, official estimates of the displaced in Muzaffarnagar was above 50,000, most in relief camps in the two districts. By February 2014, this figure remained at an estimated 24, 000.18 Till as March 2015, the displaced still numbered some 18,000 persons. 19 Many families, especially extended ones, have been torn apart. Life in camps was, and continues for those still there, to be insecure, with state government providing scanty support, rather actively seeking to shut down the camps. According to available official records, the police filed a total of 566 cases, of which 59 were for murders, 6 for rape, and the rest for dacoity, arson, and other crimes. But for survivors to pursue criminal prosecutions and get justice has been an uphill task, especially given the context of a criminal justice system that is anyways not supportive of legal justice for the poor. The denial of legal rights have taken many forms. FIRs were recorded wrongly; police action for arresting and apprehending accused was tardy; investigations have been slow and shoddy; large number of cases have been dropped, without giving any chance to defendants to question their being dropped; and cases against politicians and powerful hate-mongers have not been not taken up at all. And cases are only very slowly coming up for hearing before trial courts. As a result, no convictions have been made yet, rather a large number of the accused have been getting bails. But ‘communal violence’ is not the only site of crime against Muslims. Small everyday violence happens on a regular basis. UP is the site for a majority of those. According to a recent catalogue of violence against minorities nationally, UP was the state with the highest incidents, 129, in which 25 persons died and 364 were injured. (Dayal, 2015:11). Hate speeches, recent ‘love jihad’ propaganda, and ‘ghar wapsi’ mobilization , all have been occurring frequently, many acting as triggers for violence. The following table catalogues incidents of violence in the state in recent months, reported in the press.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16!‘WSS!Statement:!Women’s!bodies!are!not!political!battlefields!’!December!5,!2013!http://sanhati.com/articles/8679/!17!‘Less!Evident!Forms!of!Violence:!Muzzafarnagar!riots’.!February!6,!2014.!Sushmita!Verma,!Jenny!Sulfath!http://sanhati.com/articles/9144/!18!Based!on!information!provided!to!civil!society!groups!in!meeting!with!District!Administration,!Muzaffarnagar,!1052514.!!!19!Afkar!India!–!MAJMA!survey!of!relief!camps!and!resettlement!colonies.!March!2015.!!

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Table 3.14: Media reports of communal related incidents Date Topic Source

25/05/2014 Communal clash in Faizabad ToI Faizabad 06/06/2015 20 injured as Hindus and Muslims clash over sewer in

Shamli Indian express Shamli

18/06/2015 BKU leaders booked for inciting communal trouble in Meerut

Times of India, Meerut

02/07/2015 Communal violence in Noida leaves man injured Indian Express 21/07/2015 Bareilly tense after incident at religious spot Times of India

Bareilly 25/07/2015 Moradabad tense after VHP laders plans puja over

disputed shrine NDTV

26/07/2015 Saharanpur violence. 9 FIRs filed DNA India 05/08/2015 Over 600 communal incidents in UP after LS polls, near

booth Indian Express

06/08/2015 120 communal incidents over loudspeakers at mosques and temples

Indian express

07/08/2015 One in 9 communal incident in UP invoves Muslims or dalits.

Indian express

17/08/2015 Saharanpur riot report: questions role of BJP Indian express 13/11/2015 Dalit-muslims communal clashes rattle west UP again India today 22/12/2015 Communal tension in western UP Mail today 04/01/2015 Meerut communal tension- 10 injured Mail today 02/05/2015 Shamli attack on madarsa students. Clashes Times of India Box 3.4: Atrocity crimes against Muslims of Budhna, Muzaffarnagar Last year during the night between 7 and 8 September, 45 terror stricken families from Velly village of Budhana had moved to safer places leaving behind their houses and farms. Now [one year on] as these families are trying to return to their houses they are facing intimidation and various types of threats. When some of them tried to sell their houses and farm lands the prices offered were extremely low and that has added further to their miseries. To date these 45 families have not been able to return to their homes. The Village mosque and Madrasa remain locked and deserted so are dozens of the houses. These families are staying with their relatives in Kerana, Jalalabad, Shamli, Ghaziabad, Nagla and Bagiana in Muzaffarnagar and Budhana. According to sources the estimated price of their houses and agricultural lands would be in several crores. But the atmosphere has been so much polarised that now the prices being offered are for a throw away. These displaced families are trying to sell their properties but the price of their life long and hard earned assets are being offered are very low. They allege that this is part of a conspiracy as well. One of them, Muhammad Sadiq, has been able to sell his large house for only Rs. 2 lakh while Sabir and Liaqat have only been able to sell their farm lands as peanuts. Inquilab’s correspondent after a tour of the area has found out that water pumps from the farms belonging to minority community dug out and taken away. Many houses have been plundered or burnt down. These 45 families are the ones that no social organisation has so far bothered to contact them, and no compensation has been paid to them by the Government; nor have any community organisation built houses for them. These hapless people have been left with no option but to dispose of their houses and agricultural land. It has been one year since the riots had broken out in Muzaffarnagar but the wounds of the victims are still fresh. Riot hit people are facing harassment and every possible effort

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is being made to stop their return to their homes. http://www.urdumediamonitor.com/2014/09/05/muslim-families-muzaffarnagar-forced-sell-properties-extreme-low-prices/Urdu Media Monitor September 5, 2014

3.6 Conclusion

i. The socio-economic conditions for Muslims in UP clearly is poor. This is on the back of the poor socio-economic indicators of the state overall, with high poverty, low literacy, high infant and U-5 mortality, widespread malnutrition and challenging public health environment, and the poor coverage of households with latrine facility, to take but a few measures. These combine to put Uttar Pradesh at the bottom of HDI and other developmental ranking of states. ii. The condition of the state’s Muslims, in this already challenging environment is worse. This is especially so in western districts - that have high concentration of Muslims in urban areas - with high incidence if poverty and illiteracy, and diminishing livelihood choices. But conditions in eastern and central districts are not any better either. iii. Yet, state provisioning seems not to take account of this serious condition of the state’s Muslims. There is enough evidence – from empirical research as well as anecdotal sources - of how public provisioning is not working for poor Muslims. Development projects for Muslims, central as well as state-led, are rolled out with much fanfare, that are hardly followed through in actions on the ground. And universal programmes for education and health and incomes, hardly ever take into account, the specific barriers Muslims face to accessing those. Rather there is evidence of their active denial in Muslim concentrated pockets. Of course, no affirmative action instruments have been deployed to bring poor Muslims at par, instruments that are working well for other marginalized groups. v. Of late, it is becoming clear that part of the problem of poor provisioning for Muslims has to do with the increasing polarization in society in Uttar Pradesh resulting in frontline providers (teachers, panchayat functionaries, health workers, municipality functionaries) weighing communal considerations in the provision of services. We know that polarization is almost entirely engineered, with actors using a variety of tools, an important one being hate-inspired violence. vi. This brings us to the other aspect of denial of rights of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh– around rule of law and justice. Violence against Muslims takes place regularly, more so in more polarized western districts, but also in others regions – some reported, most not. Its only when large-scale massacres take place, such as that in Muzafarnagar in September 2013, that these become public news. vii. Yet, these gross violations of human rights – resulting in large-scale deaths, injuries, loss of property, mass displacements, and destruction of livelihoods – seldom call forth robust response by the criminal justice system and the state. Time and again, we see the police acting in a partisan, unfair manner during the violence; and police and investigating agencies mostly being lax, sometimes actively favouring perpetrators of violence; and law courts often being less than sensitive to the plight of victims. The state at high political as well as lower implementation levels has been seen to be biased, unfair and insensitive to the plight of Muslim victims of violence and atrocities.

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Chapter!4:!!Mapping!Muslim!exclusion!from!basic!services!!!4.1 Introduction The preceding chapters documented the status of Muslims in UP, using secondary sources, to provide a macro picture, of the various facets of Muslim exclusion in the state, whilst also introducing us to the processes at play resulting in the exclusion. What is the picture like on the ground? How does exclusion work for Muslims in everyday practices? What is the micro picture, especially what sort of exclusions occur with Muslims, whilst attempting to access public services and schemes, and what does that say about exclusion of Muslims, overall. This mapping Muslim exclusion in basic services, is the matter of this chapter. The objective here is “to highlight the exclusion faced by Muslims in development-economic spheres through primary data, especially in the context of women and children around a set of selected indicators.” 4.2 Survey design: survey tool, sample design, The material we use for this mapping is the primary data collected by NACDOR partners, using household surveys, over [year] of a total of 10,724 families spread over three districts – Badayun, Sharwasti and Mirzapur – on access to a range of services. These related to the working of key social sector schemes like ICDS, SSA, NRHM, PDS, NREGA and pension schemes. The survey method used, was Community Score Card (CSC) process. CSC is a community based monitoring tool that is a hybrid between social audit, community monitoring and citizen report cards. Like the citizen report card, the CSC process is an instrument to promote social and public accountability and responsiveness from service providers. However, by including an interface meeting between service providers and the community that allows for immediate feedback, the process is also a strong instrument for empowerment. The CSC enquiry involves soliciting user perceptions on quality, efficiency and transparency of services. The CSC process uses the “community” as its unit of analysis, and is focused on monitoring at the local/facility level. It can therefore facilitate the monitoring and performance evaluation of services, projects and even government administrative units (like district assemblies) by the community themselves. A 36 question score card was developed, as the survey tool, to be administered on dalit and Muslims users of the services, by community stakeholders (current and past ward members), again all dalit and Muslims, especially trained for the task, each being assigned 10 households each. Sample design: NACDOR has identified five districts in Uttar Pradesh as focus districts for interventions – given their low levels of outcomes on basic rights. These districts include Shrawasti, which has the highest IMR (103) in the country, traditional carpet belt districts of Mirzapur, Sonebhadra, Balrampur and Badayun. Sonebhdra also has the highest proportion of scheduled tribes in the state and Badayun still struggles with over 2000 families involved in manual scavenging. Key indicators of

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these districts are given below: Table 4.1: Social Indicators, backward districts, UP

Three districts were chosen from this list, each representing the three geographical regions of the state: Badayun (western UP), Shrawasti (central UP) and Mirzapur (Eastern UP). Of these, Sharawasti and Badayun are Minority Concentrated Districts (MCD). The most backward blocks in the three districts were chosen for the survey. Idea being to check out access to services of hardest to reach communities, and how this exclusion persists due to a variety of, often mutually reinforcing, factors – from lack of awareness about schemes (among rights bearers), to lack of sensitiveness and capacity among duty bearers, and institutional factors such as poor accountability mechanisms. Table 4.2: Survey districts – characteristics

District MCD Region Block chosen Muslim ratio Mirzapur NO East Marihan/Patera Kalan Shrawasti yes Central Gilaula 25.6 Badayun, yes West Wazirganj 21.0 In these blocks (none was Minority Concentrated Block, even though two of the three districts happened to be MCD), all GP were covered for the survey, and respondents made up all dalit and Muslim households in all GPs of the said blocks. The actual sample households (of dalits and Muslims) came to 10,724, with Shrawasti making up the bulk of the sample. (Fig.1)20 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20!The!district!representation!was!more!even!in!the!case!of!dalits,!47!%!of!dalit!household!in!the!sample!coming!from!Sharawasti;!!24%!from!Badayun;!and!29%!from!Mirzapur.!!!

Indicator

Households Not having toilet within

the premises ( Open defecation) IMR

Children (aged 6-35 months) who

received at least 1 dose of Vitamin A

during last 6 months Drop Out Rate (I-V)

Source:

Census_2011 AHS 2011-12

AHS 2010-11

DRC/ SRC*

2011-12, DISE

Balrampur 84.50 89 20.8 08.8 Budaun 67.70 88 19.4 06.8 Mirzapur 72.40 81 47.5 04.6 Shrawasti 86.90 103 15.1 14.7 Sonbhadra 74.20 68 26.1 04.7 UP 63.00 70 37.2 11.9

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Figure 1: District representation in the sample

Further, Muslims made up 23% of the sample, rest were all dalits (Fig. 2). Overall, this is higher than the all UP figure of Muslim composition (18%) and district wise (25% for sharawasti, and 21% for Badayun, both MCDs) not far from the reality, hence broadly representative. Figure 2: group wise breakup.

4.3 Reporting the findings So in the following section, we report the findings from the survey. We consider how specific services perform for Muslims as a whole, and where there are useful comparisons also unpack this to provide district level insights. Finally we also make comparisons between performance for Muslims with performance e for dalits, the other excluded groups, to try to understand how the two look. We check out performance across key services, most prominently ICDS and education (scholarship, MDM, Scholarship); but also examine work under MG-NREGS, working of PDS and of pension schemes. Overall, the preliminary analysis of score cards of 10,724 Muslim and Dalit families reaffirm that even after 66 years of independence, the goal of improving the living conditions of excluded communities remains elusive for the nation. While overall weaknesses of delivery capacity of social sector schemes have a role to play in these poor outcomes, it is primarily the phenomenon of social exclusion – specifically discrimination – that accounts for much of the explanation. Social discrimination over-determines poor access of Muslims and dalit household’s to basic services, in turn leading to transfer of inter-generational poverty and deprivation of rights. This argument, as the data shows, is particularly and severely true for Muslim families. We report raw data, by service categories, and follow this up with an analysis of performance of each category. We conclude with drawing out lessons from the findings, about public services, and exclusions of specific communities from it.

3%!

75%!

22%!Mirzapur!Shrawas-!Badayun!

77%!

23%!Dalit!

Minority!

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1.0 ICDS Service Response 1.1 Regularity of ICDS

service 43% respondents, from all three districts, claim the AWW rarely opens.

For dalits this figure is 26% 1.2 Provision of hot cooked

meal 48% of respondents were unaware of the service.

In t case of dalits this figure is 47% 1.3 Plotting of growth chart

in AW centre 62% of the respondents were unaware of the service

The comparative figure for Dalits is 52%. 1.4 Cleanliness in the AWC 35% of respondents were unaware of the

service. 10% reported the Centre was very dirty. For dalits, 14% of respondents were unaware of

service. 1.5 Punctuality of staff 45% of respondents unaware of the service.

19% of dalit respondents were unaware. 1.6 Behaviour of staff 37% of respondents were unaware; another

37% felt it was ‘normal’ Only 15% unaware of the service.

1.7 Mother receiving SNP as per rules

41% were unaware, 26% said they had never received SNP

20% Dalit respondents were unaware of the service

1.8 Children learning rhyme and songs

62% of respondents were not aware of the service.

This figure for dalit respondents was 39%. 1.9 Pregnant mothers

receiving TT dose 35% reported never having receiving any dose, and only 23% having received all doses .

A high 31 % of dalit respondents also said they had received no dosage.

1.10 Children get Hep. B within 24hrs f birth

50% respondents reported not getting it.

The figure in case if dalit respondents was 38%. 1.11 Children with polio

immunized (in 15 days) 44% said they had not been immunized; 22 % reported it was done after 15 days.

34% dalit respondents reported not having been immunised

1.12 Children receiving BCG within a month

48% reported not having received it. 25% claimed they received it after a month.

39% dalit respondents said they had not been immunized.

1.13 Children receiving triple booster within 45 days.

53% reported not having received triple booster. 26% said they received it after 45 days.

42 % of dalit respondents reported not having received it.

1.14 Children receiving Vit a dose within 9 month

67% reported not having received the dosage

This figure for dalit respondents was 48%.

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Early years health, nutrition and education are critical to the wellbeing of an individual, and by extension, the community. The principal national programme of support for early years is the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), with it provision of food, pre-school education and primary healthcare to children under 6 years of age and their mothers. Services included are, supplementary nutrition programme; immunization; regular health check and follow up; and pre-school education, provided through the Anganwadi centre and the village/Mohalla level Anganwadi workers. How does ICDS work for our cohort, in the three districts? The figures are not encouraging. In fact a close look at them hints at widespread exclusion of Muslims from ICDS and related services. 43% of respondents claim the Anganwadi rarely opens - this is much higher than the comparative, and still dismal, figure for dalit respondents, at 26%. As to principal services under ICDS, there seems to be very poor awareness about them in the community – among Muslims, 48% were unaware of the provision of hot cooked meal for young children, and so clearly they hardly ever availed of it; a whopping 62% were unaware of the requirement of ICDS staff to maintain regular growth charts of all children; 41% respondents were unaware of the SNP service for mothers; and 62% were unaware of the programme for pre-scholl education. This poor performance of key ICDS services among Muslims is reflected in somewhat equal measure in the dalit cohort, with corresponding figures being 47%, 52%, 20% and 39% respectively. Respondents were not aware of the punctuality of ICDS staff, or about the their behaviour – signifying lack of engagement of ICDS staff with the community, a signifier of distance and poor ownership of ICDS in the community. Cleanliness was not ICDS centre’s chief virtue – in fact 10% of the respondent described it as being very unclean. The health component of ICDS came across as equally problematic for Muslims, with large exclusions from TT dosage - 35% never received and only a small section (23%) having received all doses; 50% children not received Hepatitis B dose within the stipulated 24hrs of birth; 55% children not immunized within 15 days of birth; and almost half of children not having received BCG within the required month, and triple booster within 45 days; and 67% reporting not having received vitamin A dosage within 9 months. Notably, outcomes for the dalit cohort are equally dismal, with large exclusions from TT (31 %); Hepatitis B (38%); Polio (34 %); BCG (39%); Triple booster (42%) and Vitamin A (42%), signifying the general breakdown in ICDS health services, especially for Muslim and dalit households. 2.0 Education

Service Response 2.1 Children of 6-14 yrs

enrolled in schools 22% of respondents said not enrolled

In case of dalits, that figure was 12% 2.2 MDM served by menu 9% of respondents claimed they were unaware. 12

% said they had never received MDM; and 21% said the menu was by the rule.

In case of dalits, 4% were unaware; and 37% of respondents said menu was as prescribed.

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2.3 Students getting good quality & quantity of MDM

31% reported they never got it, whereas 39% reported they got it sometime.

In the case of dalits, 21% reported not getting it. 2.4 Teachers are punctual and

regular 18 % respondents claimed they either did not know, or the regularity was poor

In the case of dalits, 10% said they either did not know, or the punctuality was poor.

2.5 Students having received books and uniform timely.

25% claimed they had not received the items; whilst 35% said they had received it late

In the case of dalits, 13% claimed they had not received it.

2.6 Timely scholarships A large 70% of respondents claimed they had not received scholarships. An additional 13% said they received it late.

In the case of dalits, the not received figure was a whopping 78%

2.7 children access to safe drinking water in schools

38% of respondents said they had no access.

19% of dalit respondents said they had no access 2.8 Children’s access to toilets

per SSA norms 43% of respondents claimed they had no access at all. 39% said what they had was unclean toilets.

In case of dalits, 29% said they had no access to toilets.

Muslim children’s (6-14 years) access to education, and various laws and programs converging on education (from enrolment, MDM; teachers quality and attendance; provision of scholarship; and safe drinking water and clean toilets - everything that enables better access to education) seems severely under challenge, looking at the evidence provided by the survey. Almost a quarter of Muslim children in the sample population have not been enrolled in schools; quality of MDM provided to them is poor and unpredictable, thus defeating the purpose of this schemes (to attract students whilst providing at least one nutritional meal a day). Books and uniforms bypass a large section of students; scholarship seem to have almost entirely failed (with 70% respondents claiming their wards had not received scholarship), and teachers behaving erratically, not being punctual, resulting it seems also in poor attendance and punctuality by students. Finally infrastructure services – safe drinking water and clean toilets – have not reached a very large section of Muslim children. With the dismal reach and access of education programmes, and poor enforcement of RTE, especially for Muslim children - although much the same could also be said for dalit and other excluded groups - it is no wonder that so few Muslim children enter, and move up the educational chain. 3.0 Birth Registration & Issuance of Certificates

Service Response 3.1 Birth registration of

children within 21 days 82% respondents never had it done. Only in 7% of the cases, was it done in a timely manner.

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Birth and registration is clearly not a matter that is taken seriously by the state, especially when it comes to Muslims. 82% of respondents said their children had not been registered within the stipulated 21 days, only 7% claiming they had. 4.0 MG-NREGA

Service Response 4.1 Work allocated under

MG-NREGA after applying

50% of respondents reported, they had not been allocated work. 20% said they were unaware.

In the case of dalits, the never received category was 44%.

4.2 Timely receipt of MG-NREGA payment

55% of respondents claimed they received their payments after 2 months of the work; only 19% said payment was made within the required 2 weeks

4.3 Status of MG-NREGA job card filled

54 % respondents reported the job card not filled at all. Only 8 % reported as fully filled

MG-NREGA programme has not been known to work efficiently, and data from the survey shows how it works even worse for Muslims. 20% respondents had not even heard of the scheme, ad its provisions, especially about the duty of the state under law, to provide work. That itself is a serious indictment of the working of NREGS. And additional half of all respondents had not been allocated work, despite having applied. In the case of dalits, that category was only marginally better. Again provisions of the MG-NREGA act on timely payment of wages seem to be flouted significantly, with more than half of respondents not receiving payments within the stipulated 2 weeks time, and only a small 19% claiming that was that case with them. Further it appears that entries in the job cards, are as a matter of practice not made. In this case more than half of respondents claimed so was the case with them. Clearly MG-NREGA is implemented in UP, especially for Muslims, more in violation, than in accord. 5.0 Water and sanitation

Service Response 5.1 Availability of safe

drinking water 60% of respondents said they had no access to safe drinking water

In the case of dalits, that figure was 34% 5.2 Time taken to repair

faulty handpump 59% respondents reported that the time taken was more than a month

In the case of dalits, 42% reported the time taken was more than a month.

5.3 Regularity of village cleaning person

75% of respondents reported that the possibility was only once in few months

For dalit respondents, 61% said the probability of being in village was once in three months.

Water and sanitation services work poorly for Muslims, with strong majorities claiming they had no access to safe drinking water; that handpumps took much longer than stipulated to be repaired; and sanitation staff was mostly not available. These failures could be an outcome of poor coverage of Muslim tolas, under drinking

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water programmes, or sanitation; and poor response by service providers to Muslim concerns, in this case to repairing faulty handpumps. The outcomes for Muslims on this count, are only slightly better in the case of Dalits – access of dalits to water and sanitation services is equally under strain, with 34% of respondents claiming they had no access to safe drinking water. 6.0 Public Distribution Service

Service Response 6.1 Distribution of PDS as

per norms 61% said they had never received provisions as per norms. 9 % said they had received it sometime.

42% dalit respondents said they had never received provisions by norm.

PDS and the much vaunted Right to Food Act does poorly for Muslims, with only 9% claiming they receive PDS provisions regularly. An Overwhelming 61% claimed they had never received their provisions in time. The performance regards dalit respondents, is better, at 42%, but that itself is a high negative score, underlining how PDS does not deliver for excluded groups in the state. 7.0 Pension and social security

Service Response 7.1 Timely receipt of old

age pension 80% of respondent reported never having received Old Age pension on time

For dalit respondents, the figure was 61% 7.2 Timely receipt of

widow pension 77 % of respondent reported never having received Widow pension on time never

66% of dalit respondents reported never having received widow pension on time.

7.3 Pension by physically handicapped

81% of respondent reported never having received handicapped pension on time

Clearly pensions do not work for Muslim communities, with an overwhelming section of the respondents, from the three districts, reporting very late payments. The situation is only slightly better for dalit respondents, although in the case of old age pension, the difference is marked. 4.4 Conclusion This finding, of the extremely poor working of much of these flagship anti-poverty programmes for Muslims, at least in the 3 focus districts, are not surprising. Since the publication of the Sachar Commission reports, and its pointing to poor Muslim access to public services across the board, various studies have pointed to the severe challenges Muslims face in accessing the most basic of services. 21 While we already know that Muslims are poorly serviced, what is somewhat new is the realisation, from

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21!Some!illustrative!cases!being!–!Centre!for!Equity!Studies!(2011);!!Trivedi!(2012);!Hasan!and!Hasan!(2012);!Fazal!(2013);!Centre!for!Peace!Studies!(2014).!

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this survey data, that programme work so badly for Muslims, including much than they do for other excluded groups – dalits, in this case. Conclusionary remarks, sector/scheme wise: i. ICDS: performs poorly for Muslims. Survey data reveals that this takes various forms, and is driven by multiple factors – many Anganwadis do not open at all; there is poor awareness about its core services; and the health component particularly is problematic. ii. Education: Muslim children’s (6-14 years) access to education, is poor. Almost a quarter of the children have never been enrolled in schools; and those that attend, are served poorly, by teachers, by entitlements such as scholarships, infrastructure services (toilets, water) and uniforms; and quality of MDM meals provided. iii. NREGS: awareness about the scheme is poor; half of all respondents had not been allocated work, despite having applied; and more than half of respondents had not received payments within the stipulated time period. Malpractices abound entries in job cards, are as a matter of practice not made. In this case more than half of respondents claimed so was the case with them. iv. Water and sanitation services work poorly for Muslims, with a majority claiming they had no access to safe drinking water; that handpumps took much longer than stipulated to be repaired; and sanitation staff mostly not available. v. PDS does work for Muslims, with only 9 per cent of respondents claiming they receive PDS provisions regularly. Likewise, an overwhelming section of the respondents, from the three districts, reporting very late payments. And 82 per cent of respondents said their children had not been registered within the stipulated 21 days.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!

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Chapter(5.!!Reportage$and$Representation:"Muslims"and$News$Media!Fair and accurate reportage of events is the first and foremost role of the news media but the role that news media play in formation of public opinion and in influencing public policy measures is increasingly significant too. This chapter of the report acknowledges the coverage in popular news media of issues related to communal violence and socio-economic deprivation of Muslims, which lead to intervention by various philanthropic organizations, human rights organizations, bilateral and multilateral agencies etc. It also aims to record that while the there are political reasons that the State restricts itself from collecting data that may divulge the reality of communal attacks on Muslims and their socio-economic realities, it is the media reports that provide the information related to the figures in terms of deaths during riots. For example, Ashutosh Varshney’s data set on communal violence in india has been entirely eked out of media reports. As is apparent in the compilation that follows this introduction, it has pointed out issues of concerns. The socio-economic status, participation of Muslims in public spheres and policy level, their representation in public institutions is known of because of media reportage. It is the media pronunciation of how the community is left behind by the institutions and agencies of state welfare and pointing out of mere tokenism in terms of welfare grants and policy measures to alleviate their conditions, which has brought the problems to the fore. The reports contained in this section pertain broadly to the following themes.

5 Communal violence 5 Justice: Issue of the release of innocent Muslim youths 5 Financial Grant to Madarsas for Modern Education 5 Education: Muslim Women 5 Hate Propaganda against Muslims – Love Jihad, Ghar Wapsi, 5 ConversionModern Sanitation in Rural Areas 5 Muslim Personal Law 5 Political commitments – Welfare funds for Muslims 5 Reservation for Backward Muslims - Welfare Schemes for Muslims - Demand of Delimitation Commission - Deletion of Muslim names from Voters’ list

However, it has restricted itself from un-covering the reasons behind the suffering of the community. While focusing on the immediate issues it delimits itself from the enveloping issues related to accountability, transparency and strategic othering of the community. Often it has been criticized to be oblivious to the parties involved in the process of instigating violence and propaganda against the community, even top the extent that it has played into the hands of these players. Communal attacks on Muslims in Muzaffarnagar and other parts of western Uttar Pradesh are a case in point. While there is enough evidence in public domain to suggest that even any honest welfare measures in the name of Muslims have been used by others or subverted not leading to benefit in real terms, it continues to employ terminology such as ‘minority appeasement’. There are numerous reports and opinion pieces that continue to suggest that the ‘backward’ Muslims themselves are responsible for their

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conditions. The stereotypical image of the community as fanatic and fundamentalists is portrayed by the section of media completely ignoring that historical factors are responsible for how the community is pushed towards living in deplorable conditions and lives of penury. It can, in all fairness, be accused of a formal and studied lack of response over this issue. Especially in UP, but also in other parts of India - the trend is that while a section of English media, which is liberal and left inclined has presented a more accurate representation of issues of Muslims. Most publications of the vernacular (Hindi in case of UP) media has been parochial and instigative in both its reportage of events and its representation of Muslims as a community and their issues. It can be agreed in principle that the fourth estate has a long way to go in truly living up to its duty in the Indian Republic as was envisaged by the founding fathers of the nation. But it is also true that sections of media have been relentless in bringing the truth of events to the fore, lest we see a completely bleak picture of representation of Muslims in Media. ! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/Deoband-seminary-seeks-govt-help-to-set-up-English-school/articleshow/18475788.cms? Deoband seminary seeks govt help to set up English school Pervez Iqbal Siddiqui,TNN | Feb 13, 2013, 06.05 AM IST LUCKNOW: DarulUloomDeobandWaqf, an offshoot of well-known Islamic seminary DarulUloom, has sought help from the UP government to set up an English medium school in the state. In a letter to the chief minister, the Saharanpur-based seminary has shown its willingness to run the school with affiliation from ICSE or CBSE. In his letter, the seminary's deputy director Maulana Sufiyan Qasmi, addressing Samajwadi Party national president Mulayam Singh Yadav and his son, chief minister Akhilesh Yadav, has requested the government to come forward and help the community in establishing a full-fledged educational institution at par with any other leading English medium school. The letter was handed over to SP leader from Saharanpur, Ashu Malik, on Monday night. Malik is slated to hand over the letter to his party president on February 14 next. Maulana Sufiyan is believed to have stated in the letter that the waqf was planning to set up the English medium school with the aim to help Muslim youth keep pace with the fierce competition in the outside world. Both Darul Uloom (DuD) and Darul Uloom Waqf (DuDW) happen to be the top names in the field of Islamic studies, they share the same syllabus, founded by the same sect and survive on donations from the community, While DuD does not accept any government help to survive, DuDW is open to the idea. It's move is being seen as an attempt to reach out to the masses to bring an end to the growing misgivings about Islam and its institutes outside the community. While the DuD has taken up a series of "first ever" initiatives since September 2012 in this regard, the DuDW has reached out to the government for help to initiate more pragmatic steps to deal with the issue. Of late, Darul Uloom, too, has taken some initiatives to show its liberal side. It has not only started publication of books on Islam in Hindi and English as well but also put up a stall at the 18th National Book Fair at Pragati Maidan in New Delhi last year, the first time in its 150-year history.

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With some unexpectedly high attendance at the Maktaba Darul Uloom Deoband stall in Hall 9 which offered over 1000 publications in Hindi and English, the stall witnessed a complete sellout much before the fair concluded. Encouraged by the response, the DuD is all set to put up a better stall during the next book fair. Talking to TOI, Ashu Malik confirmed that he was handed over a letter by the DuDW. Asked about the immediate provocation behind the letter, he told TOI that the community had noticed a growing need to familiarize the world about Islam and its related aspects to counter the misgivings about the religion. He said once an English medium school is in place, the DuDW will seek help of the other organizations in and outside India to bring up many more similar institutes in UP and beyond. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/20-share-of-welfare-fund-to-Muslims-a-farce-Mayawati/articleshow/21967987.cms? 20% share of welfare fund to Muslims a farce: Mayawati TNN | Aug 22, 2013, 03.21 AM IST LUCKNOW: BahujanSamaj Party chief Mayawati has said that UP government's decision to earmark 20% funds in welfare schemes for minorities was a farce. In a press statement, the former chief minister said that the SP was trying to mislead minorities, particularly Muslims, ahead of the Lok Sabha elections. "This is a fraud which will create communal atmosphere in the state. The SP government is trying to incite people and parties like BJP to gain political mileage. The intentional step is not in the interest of the people," Mayawati said. She added that the decision also indicated that SP had deviated from its poll promise of giving reservation to Muslims on the basis of their population. "SP had promised reservation to Muslims based on recommendations of the Sachar Committee by considering them most backward in social, economic and educational areas, but no concrete decision had been taken (for their welfare) in past one and a half year," she said. The BSP chief said that the decision would have held some significance had the SP government taken it before the closing of the 2012-13 financial year. "Had the scheme been launched earlier the benefit of different schemes would have reached some people in the target group. But now it is of little help as half the year has passed," she said. Pointing out that SP's promises to open new educational institutions in Muslim-dominated areas and give special legal rights to Arbi-Farsi University in Lucknow were also not kept, she said the SP government was not serious about addressing issues of minority community. "Had the SP government been serious about issues relating to the minority community, they would have fulfilled their poll promises or at made serious efforts to achieve them. But this has not been done," she said. Concluding that Akhilesh government was a failure, Mayawati said people in UP, particularly Muslims, had lost faith in it. "Poor law and order and increasing communal clashes and tension in the state under the present regime are the reason," she said. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Schemes-for-minorities-being-cornered-by-non-Muslims-Report/articleshow/22612844.cms? Schemes for minorities being cornered by non-Muslims: Report Deeptiman Tiwary,TNN | Sep 16, 2013, 06.07 AM IST NEW DELHI: Even as minority politics takes centrestage in the wake of recent riots in Uttar Pradesh, a report by the Council for Social Development shows how the UPA government has failed to implement the recommendations of the Sachar Committee,

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with its response to Muslim deprivation at best being "cautious and minimalist". The report said most of the benefits intended for minorities were being cornered by either the majority population or non-Muslim minorities. The report listed misplaced focus of minority-oriented programmes, lack of funds and fear of 'minority appeasement' taunts as the reasons for government's failure to fulfil its promises. The 'Social Development Report 2012: Minorities at the Margins' was prepared by scholars such as Zoya Hasan, Mushirul Hasan, Tanweer Fazal, Javed Alam Khan and Abusaleh Sharif among others. For example, the report illustrates how programmes intended to improve school education among Muslims has focused on modernization of madarsas even though only 4% Muslims go there for education. In higher studies, the government has focused on providing assistance to minority institutions rather than expanding the overall education network to include Muslims. It also brought out the failure of multi-sectoral development programme (MSDP) — launched after the Sachar Committee's report — targeting 90 districts with around 25% Muslim population for infrastructure development through enhanced funding. The report noted that benefits of the scheme reached only 30% of Muslim population in these areas, indicating others have cornered most of the resources. In states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (with high concentration of Muslims), infrastructure projects have been diverted to non-minority areas. The Reserve Bank of India's efforts to extend banking and credit facilities to Muslims, a major fallout of the Sachar Committee report which said Muslims were out of the banking system, has also ended up benefiting non-Muslim minorities whose socio-economic status is comparable to upper caste Hindus, the report said. "Diffidence at the policy level to clearly focus on Muslim deprivation translates into active reluctance by the implementing agencies on the ground to target the Muslims even in districts with high Muslim concentration," the report said. Mushirul Hasan blamed the minority affairs ministry for such failures. He told TOI, "The ministry has become a liability. It is devoid of any ideas and lacks social commitment." According to the report, both funding and its utilization have been a problem. In the 11th plan, allocation for minorities was 6% of the total outlay with minority affairs ministry's share being only 0.79%. The report called it insignificant to address minority development. It also noted that unlike SC/ST, budgetary plans for minorities were not proportional to their population. Even these funds are not utilized properly. During 2007-2012, state governments did not utilize even half of the allocated funds. Twelve states utilized less than 50% of funds and some states spent only 20%. States such as Bihar, UP, Maharashtra and Assam (all with high concentration of Muslims) were in the category of those that spent less than 50%. Government's scholarship scheme for Muslim students has been widely praised, but the report found it to be too little and poorly implemented. While 2.45 crore Muslim students were enrolled up to upper primary level (2009-10 data), the government has provided 24 lakh pre-matric scholarships for minorities, the report said. It also found the scholarship amount of Rs 1,000 to be too little. It noted that compared with SC/ST, the scheme was discriminatory. While income eligibility criteria for SC/ST to avail scholarship was kept at Rs 2 lakh per annum, for minorities it is only Rs 1 lakh. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/varanasi/Agitation-for-Muslim-representation-in-Railways/articleshow/34443782.cms?

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Agitation for Muslim representation in Railways TNN | May 1, 2014, 02.22 AM IST VARANASI: For representation of Muslims in railway service the Bharatiya Rail Dalit Mazdoor Association will be starting an agitation from May Day on May 1. "We have decided to start a movement from May 1 to increase the representation of Muslims in railway services," said Rajendra Ram, general secretary of the association. Ram had sought information regarding the number of employees in North Central Railway (NCR) under RTI Act. According to him, the NCR has less than 1% Muslim representation. He said as per the information there were 67,056 employees in three divisions including Agra, Jhansi and Allahabad out of which 53 belong to Muslim community, and only two of them have been allotted railway quarters. The number of SC employees is 14,552, 3,258 ST, 80 OBC and 7 Christian in the three divisions of NCR. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/Protests-after-6000-voters-in-Muslim-areas-dropped-from-list-in-Varanasi/articleshow/35039152.cms? Protests after 6,000 voters in Muslim areas 'dropped' from list in Varanasi Swati Mathur,TNN | May 13, 2014, 04.25 AM IST VARANASI: Polling ended with a fair bit of drama in the ninth and final phase of the general elections. In Varanasi, the epicentre of the electoral war, voters claimed that nearly 6,000 names were deleted from the records without prior intimation. At the National Inter College in Pilikothi, where a large number of Muslim weaver families are registered to vote, conditions turned riotous by afternoon when people were denied permission to vote because their names had allegedly been deleted from the voters' list. The group of voters first protested outside the Adampura police station and then drifted back towards the National Inter College to continue their protest and raise slogans against the Election Commission. The groups maintained that the EC must allow them to vote after completing formalities. The mobs could only be controlled after the CRPF was sent in. They resorted to a mild lathicharge at the National Inter College to disperse the angry crowd. In Madanpura, another minority pocket in the city, a similar situation unfolded, where a large number of voters claimed their names had been deleted. Many among them said they had also voted, using the same voter IDs, during the assembly elections in 2012, but were now unable to find their names on the voters list. On Monday, some voters were also allegedly misled into believing that a "Form 7" could be filled up for a last-minute inclusion of their names. Election officials, unwilling to be drawn into a controversy with an angry crowd, did not clarify to the crowds that they would not be allowed to vote if their names were not on the list. "We were told that if we fill in Form 7 and provide one photograph, we will be allowed to vote. As a result, we have been waiting since 11am," said Danish Waqar, a voter at Bengali Tola inter college at Madanpura. By evening, the alleged large-scale deletion of names had also led to wild conspiracy theories, with voters alleging a BJP hand in ordering the deletion of Muslim names. Election officials, however, confirmed that the exclusion of names was not limited to any particular community. They also said that the Election Commission had set up camps for as many as five weeks to facilitate inclusion of names and for voter list

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revision and those who had visited these camps people who took the initiative to visit these camps had been able to vote, exercise their franchise, they said. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/agra/RSS-re-converts-200-Agra-Muslims-says-more-in-line/articleshow/45419338.cms? RSS 're-converts' 200 Agra Muslims, says more in line Ishita Mishra,TNN | Dec 9, 2014, 02.42 AM IST AGRA: Members of at least 57 Muslim families were converted to Hinduism at a ceremony called 'Purkhon ki ghar vapsi', a mass conversion jointly organized by Dharma Jagran Samanvay Vibhag, an offshoot of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and Bajrang Dal in Agra on Monday. RSS regional head Rajeshwar Singh said more than 200 Muslims were "brought back to Hinduism" in the mass event held in Madhunagar area of the city. According to organizers, the converts will soon be given new names. Talking to TOI, Singh claimed that around 5,000 more Muslims and Christians will be "brought back into Hindu fold" in Aligarh on this Christmas. "The grand event will be held at Maheshwari College in Aligarh," he said, daring anyone to stop it. With saffron flags hoisted on rooftops of makeshift houses in this slum cluster, and matras being recited by priests, members of as many as 57 Muslim families washed feet of Hindu idols to mark their return to the religion. Long vermillion marks were put on their foreheads and they were given Prasad to eat. Later, RSS and Bajrang Dal activists gave them a 'mantra' to chant the whole day and prepared a list of all the 'converts', to get their voter IDs and Aadhaar cards made, with their new names. Sharifa, 40, was seen debating the right way of performing an aarti with her daughter-in-law, Afsha, in a small temple that has been erected by RSS men in the slum in Madhunagar. An idol of goddess Kali has also been placed in the temple, as majority of people living in the area hail from West Bengal. Sufia Begum,76, who is the oldest woman among the converts, told TOI: "I read Quran and offered namaz five times a day. Now at this age, I will read Ganesh aarti. I don't find any major difference in the teachings of the two religions." "The RSS people assured us that they will provide us better place to live, better food and schooling for my grandsons. I don't mind change of religion, as religion doesn't give us food to eat." -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://zeenews.india.com/news/uttar-pradesh/up-govt-to-include-recognised-madrassas-on-grant-list_1598031.html UP Govt to include recognised madrassas on grant list Lucknow: Uttar Pradesh government on Tuesday took some important decisions including, inclusion of madrassas on grant list and launch of Janeshwar Mishra solar street light scheme, an official spokesperson said. The decisions were taken during a cabinet meeting chaired by Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav here.During the meeting it was decided to take 99 madrasas up to Alia level on grant list in two phases, the spokesperson said.These include six madrassas, which have already been taken on the list in compliance with the High Court order, the spokesperson said."Though it is bit delayed, the government has decided to take recognised madrasas on grant list," the Chief Minister said after the meeting.In another important decision, the Cabinet approved the launch of

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Janeshwar Mishra solar street light scheme under which solar lights would be installed at eight public places in all 2,000 gram panchayats, the spokesperson said.Installation of solar street lights along with social upliftment in rural areas would create a sense of security, he added.The Cabinet also approved a proposal to construct structures such that Agra-Lucknow expressway could be expanded to eight lanes in future from the current proposal of six lanes, the spokesperson said. An increase of Rs 491.41 crore was estimated on constructing eight lane structures instead of six lane under the project, he added.Among the other decisions taken by the Cabinet, it approved appointment of teachers in government homoeopathy colleges on contractual basis and also create a new tehsil Sewarai in Ghazipur district with its headquarters in Sewrai village. The Cabinet also approved a proposal to exempt footwears up to Rs 300 from Value Added Tax (VAT) provided the maximum retail price was printed printed in firm ink or was engraved. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://islamicvoice.com/muslim-women-in-uttar-pradesh-are-least-educated-group-in-india/

Muslim Women in Uttar Pradesh are Least Educated Group in India admin | January 15, 2014 | 0 Comments

India’s Ministry of Minority Affairs has said that Muslim women in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh are the least educated group in the country. It said that high level of illiteracy was caused by extreme poverty among the community in many districts of the state.

As per available information, due to Socio-Economic factors, Muslim women have low literacy rates compared to the National level for literacy for women in Uttar Pradesh, including the districts of Bahraich, Deoria and Gorakhpur. Further, the incidence of poverty among Muslims including Muslim women in the State of Uttar Pradesh is high.

Ministry of Minority Affairs has adopted a multi-pronged strategy for development of minorities including minority women. For educational empowerment, Pre-Matric, Post-Matric and Merit-cum-Means Scholarships are awarded. Under these schemes, minimum 30% seats are reserved for girls. In addition, Maulana Azad Education Foundation, an autonomous body under the Ministry, provides scholarships to minority girls studying in class XI and XII exclusively. Further, under Prime Minister’s 15 Point Programme and Multi-sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) for minorities, educational infrastructure like schools, girls’ hostels etc., Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs), Polytechnics etc., are constructed. In addition, the scheme of “Nai Roshni”, the Leadership Development of Minority Women, is also being implemented since 2012-13 to empower and instill confidence among minority women by providing knowledge, tools and techniques for interacting with Government systems, banks and other institutions at all levels.

To meet the needs of Micro-Finance, a specific scheme of “Mahila Samriddhi Yojana” is being implemented by the National Minorities Development and Finance Corporation. Recently, the Ministry has formulated a scheme of “Seekho aur Kamao

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(Learn & Earn)” for Skill Development of Minorities, wherein 30% of the seats have been reserved for minority girls. This was stated by Ninong Ering, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Minority Affairs in response to a written question in the Lok Sabha. (Compiled by Mohammad Shahanshah Ansari) (www.ampindia.org) (shahanshah.java@gmail.com)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/indi-d14.html Uttar Pradesh government sanctions mass expulsion of Muslim villagers By Kranti Kumara; 14 December 2013 Tens of thousands of Muslims who were attacked and driven from their villages by Hindu communalists three months ago are being illegally blocked from returning to their homes by the Samajwadi Party (SP–Socialist Party) government of Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state. Exploiting the vulnerability of people who have lost their homes and livelihoods, the SP government is using an offer of woefully inadequate compensation to extort pledges from the dispossessed Muslims that they will never return to their native villages in Uttar Pradesh’s Muzaffarnagar District . This constitutes nothing less than state support for the expulsion of the Muslims—akin in both its methods and outcome to ethnic cleansing (although, apart from their religion, the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh are identical to their Hindu compatriots). Neither India’s Congress Party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) nor India’s Supreme Court have intervened to stop this blatantly exclusivist and unconstitutional victimization of members of the largest religious minority in what purports to be the “world’s largest democracy.” Barred from returning to their own homes, overwhelmingly poor, and without political support, the internally exiled Muslims of Muzaffarnagar are being left to languish in wretched refugee camps, consisting of nothing more than flimsy plastic tents. Abandoned by both the UP state and the Indian governments, these traumatized villagers who ran away with almost nothing other than the clothes they were wearing are being forced to survive on the meagre emergency relief provided them by the SP government and aid from volunteer organizations. With very little food, water, medical care and no proper toilet facilities and exposed to bitter winter cold, the relief camps are becoming incubators for sickness. At least 50 children have already died and many other people who are sick are at grave risk since they have no access to proper medical care. The refugee camps, in other words, have become even more deadly to their inhabitants than the communal violence that forced them to flee their homes in Muzaffarnagar. The first large scale attacks occurred in early September, when the reactionary leaders of the Jat Mahapanchayat (Great Council) — a caste-body that purports to represent the interests of the Jats, historically a land-owning peasant group—mobilized angry mobs to attack “Muslims,” whom they held responsible for the deaths of two Hindu Jat youth. These mobs went on a rampage, driving all or most of the Muslims out of a number of villages. At least 48 people, most of them Muslims, were killed. Thousands of others were injured with a number of Muslim women gang-raped. These attacks left over 50,000 people, mostly Muslims, homeless. There is much evidence showing that cadres of Hindu-supremacist organizations—the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and its “partners,” the RSS (Rashriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or National Volunteers Organization), and the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad or the World Hindu Council)—helped instigate the mass violence

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against Muzaffarnagar’s Muslim villagers. The New Delhi-based Center for Policy Analysis, for example, has published an extensive report on the role of the BJP and its allies. These organizations have a long history of fomenting communal influence. The Center for Policy Analysis report and other credible sources have also provided compelling evidence that the SP government held back the police from intervening when communal strife erupted in Muzaffarnagar — deliberately allowing the communal attacks on the Muslims to proceed. On Oct. 28, almost two months after the Muslims had been expelled from their villages, the state government under the leadership of Chief Minister Akilesh Yadav announced that it will provide 500,000 Rupees (approximately US$8,000) to each displaced family to “compensate” them for the loss of their houses and livelihoods. According to the government, this offer has been made to 1,600 families. However, to receive this meager sum, the Muslim victims must sign an affidavit promising never to return to their villages and homes. The affidavit declares: “Myself and members of my family who have left our village and our homes due to violent incidents in our village, will not now return to our original village and home under any circumstance.” Compensation from the UP government is also conditional on the signees foregoing any other government compensation “for property in their village, or any more immovable property.” While sanctioning, and indeed, enforcing the expulsion of Muzaffarnagar’s Muslims, the government is cynically claiming that any property they possess will still remain in their names and that they will be free to sell it or keep it. In practice, such legal niceties have no meaning. The villagers are utterly fearful of even setting foot in their villages. They well know that the state government will not protect them from any attack, even if they return home only for a short period to conduct business transactions, and that to do so now risks depriving them of the little government compensation available. The Stalinist CPI (M) (Communist Party of India-Marxist) has long maintained close political relations with the SP, promoting this reactionary, caste-based outfit as a progressive political force and stalwart defender of secularism. While the SP has been supporting the UPA government from “the outside”—crucially providing it with the votes it need to survive a July 2008 non-confidence motion, when Congress broke its alliance with the CPM-led Left Front to pursue closer relations with Washington—the Stalinists are currently wooing the SP. Their hope is the SP will join it in a Third Front (anti-Congress/anti-BJP) alliance in next spring’s general election. Toward this end, the CPM welcomed the SP to participate in its October 30 “Secular Convention” and has maintained a criminal silence on its sanctioning of anti-Muslim communal-cleansing. (See: “Indian Stalinists invoke Hindu-communalist threat”). Meanwhile, the SP state government has been seeking to shut down the refugee camps, since it considers the displaced villagers as little more than human refuse. That this is the sole goal of the SP government was observed by a volunteer at one of the relief camps. Commenting to the press he stated, “People are being called to the tehsil (local government) office and made to sign these papers. Many of them have sustained losses of about Rs 10 lakh (1 million rupees, about US$16,000), but are settling for much less. The administration is forcing them to leave the relief camps which have become an embarrassment for them.” In its original notification, the SP government had stated that the compensation was restricted to “Muslim victims,” despite the fact that a small section of non-Muslim families also lost their homes.

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India’s Supreme Court, in a Nov. 22 ruling in response to a legal complaint filed on behalf of some Jat families, ordered the SP government to reissue the notification to stipulate that compensation would be provided to any displaced family, regardless of religious affiliation, who agreed to the government’s terms. In response, the attorney for the SP government presented its sanctioning and support for the Muslims’ expulsion—that is for “communal cleansing”—as a voluntary relocation program. “The team which visited the relief camps,” said the government attorney, “thought only Muslims wanted relocation. Now, it will be extended to all, whoever wants to relocate. ” [Emphasis added] As for the court—the ostensible guardian of India’s secular constitution—it was utterly indifferent to the fact that the government was making compensation to the victims of communal violence conditional on their permanent, state-enforced expulsion from their native villages. It merely wanted to ensure that this crime was given a “secular” cover by not explicitly limiting it to Muslims. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.urdumediamonitor.com/2015/06/11/muslim-personal-law-board-demands-uttar-pradesh-government-to-give-inheritance-rights-for-muslim-married-daughters-and-mothers-in-agricultural-land/ Muslim Personal Law Board Demands Uttar Pradesh Government to Give Inheritance Rights for Muslim Married Daughters and Mothers in Agricultural Land Five Member Delegation Led By Maulana Kalb-e-Sadiq Calls upon Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav: Additional Advocate General Visits Nadwa and Meets Maulana Syed Rabey Hasani Nadvi By Fazlur-Rehman Lucknow: Advocating emphatically for the rights of women All India Muslim Personal Law Board has declared that inheritance rights must be given to married daughters and mothers and has therefore demanded the Uttar Pradesh Government, that is now preparing Revenue Code to replace Zamindari Abolition Act, to include in it the right for women to inherit agricultural land.Muslim women. This should be borne in mind that Shari’ah gives married daughters and mothers the right to share and inherit agricultural land while Zamindari Abolition Act does not have such a provision. A Revenue Code is being prepared by the Uttar Pradesh Government that will now replace the Zamindari Abolition Act. All India Muslim Personal Law Board has demanded to include daughters’ and mothers’ right to inherit in the new legislation. Following a meeting of Executive Committee of All India Muslim Personal Law Board on Monday a delegation — including Acting General Secretary Maulana Wali Rahmani, Assistant Secretary Abdur-Raheem Qureshi, Secretary Maulana Khalid Saifullah Rehmani and Zafaryab Jilani Advocate — led by Board’s Vice President Maulana Dr Kalb-e-Sadiq called upon Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav at his official residence and handed him a memorandum. Raising the above demand the memorandum reminds Government of Uttar Pradesh of their previous communications on which no action has been taken so far. The Chief Minister has been reminded of his assurance given to the Chairman of All India Muslim Personal Law Board, through a letter, that amendment would be made in Zamindari Abolition Act and married daughters and mothers would be given the right to inherit agricultural land but to date no action has been taken. Zafaryab Jilani Advocate told Inquilab that the Chief Minister has shown positive response and has sent the Chairman of Revenue Code Drafting Committee,

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Additional Advocate General, Raj Bahadur Singh Yadav to Nadwatul Ulema and see Maulana Rabey Hasani. Raj Bahadur Singh Yadav reached Nadwah in the evening and saw Maulana Rabey Hasani and other dignitaries and listened to their views. He said that Muslim Personal Law Board’s suggestions would be included in recommendations. In the meanwhile Board’s Executive Committee issued a press note next day detailing the resolutions passed in its session late last night according to which a meeting of scholars and Muftis will be held to discuss the misuse of divorce in the Muslim community and the resultant difficulties being faced by divorced women. Maulana Khalid Saifullah Rehmani has been appointed as the Convenor to organise the meeting. In addition declaring a judgement of Nagpur High Court giving an orphan grandson the right to inherit as against the injunctions of Shari’ah it has also been decided that after contacting the concerned parties Nagpur High Court’s judgement would be challenged in the Supreme Court. On an another issue relating to Muslim Personal Law in which the Supreme Court has deprived women of their right to inherit Nawab of Murshidabad’s property, Board’s Executive Committee has decided to review legal implications to challenge the decision and if possible file a writ petition. The Board has also decided to file a writ petition in relation to mosques occupied by Archaeological Survey of India. On the other hand Board’s General Secretary Maulana Syed Nizamuddin has called a meeting of its various committees to be held on 2nd August to be attended by the convenors of the committees and Board’s Secretaries. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.urdumediamonitor.com/2014/12/10/truth-religious-conversion-agra-exposed-poor-economically-weak-muslims-duped-attending-havan/ Urdu Media Monitor December 10, 2014 Truth about Religious Conversion in Agra Exposed: Poor and economically weak Muslims were duped into attending Havan Agra (SNB): Conspiracy of bribing and duping some individuals to become Hindu has been exposed. Some mischief mongers invited some of their neighbours to participate in a Havan (a ceremony in Hindu religion), put Tilak on their foreheads, photographed them and handed these pictures to the media.The so called conversion in which Muslims were asked to wear traditional camps The news created an atmosphere of unrest in the city while the organisers of the so called Dharam Parivartan (Religious conversion) have bluntly denied any role in such an exercise. According to the detailed information, officials of religious cell of a Hindutva organisation proposed to construct a Hindu temple in an economically backward area of Agra known as Dev Nagar. This area is inhabited by some highly poverty stricken Muslim families from outside UP. About 60 families of them live in a big house or a large courtyard. In total they are approximately 250 individuals. Large number of them consists of minor children. Almost 90% of these people are from Bihar or West Bengal. For their livelihood they pick reusable things from the rubbish and sell them from which they earn about Rs. 60-80 per day. One hundred per cent of them are illiterate. Being extremely poor from outside the state and unable to read and write neither they have a voter card nor any other document to prove their identities.

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Hindu organisations made them believe that they wanted to build a temple in that area and if by being neighbours came and sat in the Havan then they will help them and will get them BPL card, Adhar Card and Ration Card and will also try to get their children educated and get government help. They were told to come to the Havan wearing their traditional caps and then were asked ‘to do as we do’. Thus the programme was attended by 40 to 50 Muslims. However the number is being inflated and is claimed to be 200-250. The fact is that none of them has changed his religion. One of them Mohammad Ismail whose name has been so greatly advertised in this report has said that he had participated in the programme of the construction of a temple as a goodwill gesture only. He said that Alhamdulillah (All Praise be to God) he is a Muslim, he has always been a Muslim and will remain a Muslim. Others Mohammad Zalal, Saleem, Anwar, Jahangeer and Anwar said that they had no intention of changing their religion. They told Rashtriya Sahara correspondent that they were offered with the promise of ID cards, education for their children and financial help if they changed their religion but they are not going to change their religion on this basis. City elders have reacted with anger at the incident. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.urdumediamonitor.com/2014/09/05/muslim-families-muzaffarnagar-forced-sell-properties-extreme-low-prices/ Urdu Media Monitor September 5, 2014 Last year during the night between 7 and 8 September 45 terror stricken families from Velly village of Budhana had moved to safer places leaving behind their houses and farms. Now [one year on] as these families are trying to return to their houses they are facing intimidation and various types of threats. When some of them tried to sell their houses and farm lands the prices offered were extremely low and that has added further to their miseries. To date these 45 families have not been able to return to their homes. The Village mosque and Madrasa remain locked and deserted so are dozens of the houses.These families are staying with their relatives in Kerana, Jalalabad, Shamli, Ghaziabad, Nagla and Bagiana in Muzaffarnagar and Budhana. According to sources the estimated price of their houses and agricultural lands would be in several crores. But the atmosphere has been so much polarised that now the prices being offered are for a throw away. These displaced families are trying to sell their properties but the price of their life long and hard earned assets are being offered are very low.They allege that this is part of a conspiracy as well. One of them, Muhammad Sadiq, has been able to sell his large house for only Rs. 2 lakh while Sabir and Liaqat have only been able to sell their farm lands as peanuts. Inquilab’s correspondent after a tour of the area has found out that water pumps from the farms belonging to minority community dug out and taken away. Many houses have been plundered or burnt down. These 45 families are the ones that no social organisation has so far bothered to contact them, and no compensation has been paid to them by the Government; nor have any community organisation built houses for them. These hapless people have been left with no option but to dispose of their houses and agricultural land. It has been one year since the riots had broken out in Muzaffarnagar but the wounds of the victims are still fresh. Riot hit people are facing harassment and every possible effort is being made to stop their return to their homes.

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http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-love-jihad-threatens-to-unleash-new-wave-of-hatred-in-uttar-pradesh-2013308

'Love Jihad' threatens to unleash new wave of hatred in Uttar Pradesh

Monday, 25 August 2014 - 5:35am IST | Place: Lucknow | Agency: dna

A queer new term is churning up the politics of Uttar Pradesh into a tidal wave of allegations and recrimination between the major political rivals.

It is also threatening to disturb communal harmony and unleash a wave of communal violence throughout the state if the self-seeking 'netas' do not stop harping on the new-fangled phenomenon for their petty gains soon. The BJP says it's spreading like hay fever while the ruling Samajwadi Party says it can't stop this feeling anymore.

"Love Jihad", the latest – and indeed one of the most unlikely – entrant into the UP politicians' lingo promises to destroy amity between the two communities. "The government has done nothing so far to gauge the sharply rising communal tensions over this new phenomenon. Once it gets out of hand, it could be devastating for law and order," warns a senior police official in a rather somber tone. "Love Jihad" is the term given by the BJP and its associated organizations to Hindu girls allegedly being enticed by Muslim boys only to convert them to Islam. The saffron brigade alleges that Muslim boys slolemnise a 'nikah' with these girls, and that this is nothing but just a sham to ensure conversion of Hindu girls. They also allege that there is no sanctity of this 'nikah' as one Muslim boy is being married to several Hindu girls.

The BJP took up the issue with great gusto at the party's state convention at Mathura on Saturday, with UP unit chief LK Bajpayee crying himself hoarse that "love jehad" is a threat to the entire country, and that it would be part of the resolution to be adopted at the end of the meet. But, within 24 hours, the party seemed to have developed cold feet in view of all-round criticism, and even top leaders like Rajnath Singh distancing themselves from the controversy. "We are discussing the safety and security of women here and this will be a part of the resolution to be adopted," said a rather sheepish Bajpayee when grilled by reporters on Sunday over his fiery "love jihad" spiel just a day earlier.

Recently, riots broke out in Moradabad after local BJP leaders worked up a frenzy over a missing Hindu girl, alleging she had been gang raped and kidnapped by a Muslim boy and his relatives as part of the "love jehad" plot. Later, on being found in Delhi, she told police she had had a 'nikah' with Kaleem voluntarily. Police also revealed that she had undergone an abortion at a Meerut hospital.

In another case in Faizabad, a Hindu girl was found dead and her Muslim paramour was named in the case. The BJP brigade was quick to give a "love jihad" spin to this case, too, and violence broke out in Faizabad, a rather sensitive district due to Ayodhya being in the vicinity. Timely action by the district administration saved the situation from snowballing into a full-fledged communal riot.

"There have been many such incidents, especially in west UP, of late where certain elements have been deliberately been blowing up small and petty disputes," UP chief secretary Alok Ranjan told dna. "In many places, they have instigated violence and arson. We are identifying these people who are clearly part of a conspiracy. We have

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also directed our district officers to respond swiftly to such situations and nip the trouble in the bud," he added.

With more than 600 instances of communal tension since June this year, and over 200 incidents of communal violence each in 2012 and 2013, the Akhilesh regime surely has much to worry about than just love and politics.

What UP leaders said

You ask them (BJP) what is the effect of the songs that their MP (Hema Malini) sings in films like 'Dharmatma', the one who is from the place (Mathura) where their meeting is going on. Does it increase love or decrease it?" (The song he was referring to is "Tere chehre mein wo jaadu hai") - Akhilesh Yadav, Uttar Pradesh chief minister

First of all, I want to know where did they (BJ) get this term (love jihad) from. Is it from Pakistan, Afghanistan or from the ISIS in Iraq? After all, the government cannot stop grown-up boys and girls from falling into love. In fact, no one has the right to do this — Naresh Agarwal, SP leader

Tension in UP district after group clash

Tension erupted in Alipur Khera town in Bhogaon area of the district on Sunday when members of two communities clashed and set some shops on fire, police said. Superintendent of police (SP) Srikant Singh said tension started after a girl and a boy belonging to two communities were allegedly found in a compromising situation in a shop.

Some local residents, however, claimed that the girl was dragged inside the shop and raped while she had gone there for mobile recharge.

As the news spread, a mob assembled and set the shop and some other kisoks on fire. The SP, district magistrate and the sub-divisional magistrate, along with a large posse of police personnel, rushed to the site to control the situation, but the agitated mob pelted bricks and stones at their vehicles and tried to set them ablaze.

The SDM's vehicle was damaged and a station officer was injured in stone pelting. District Magistrate Govindraju NS said that the SDM's vehicle was damaged and he, along with the SP, are on the spot and monitoring the situation.

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http://unicef.in/Story/1018/UP-Rural-Madarsas-take-to-Modern-Sanitation UP Rural Madarsas’ take to Modern Sanitation Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, April 15, 2008: For ten year old Suleman, hailing from a poor weaver’s family and the other scholars of Jamia Arabia Faizul Ullum madarsa in Kotwa, in Varanasi district it was " Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, April 15, 2008: For ten year old Suleman, hailing from a poor weaver’s family and the other scholars of Jamia Arabia Faizul Ullum madarsa in Kotwa, in Varanasi district it was indeed a proud moment. The ramshackle, tin shed traditional toilet in their madarsa was finally being replaced by a row of modern, innovative gadgets albeit flush toilets. The formal inauguration on 8th April was

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hailed with cheers of joy and enthusiasm. The year 2008 has been declared as International Year of Sanitation by the United Nations. This madarsa is one of the 30 rural centers of Islamic religious learning which has been chosen for a pilot project by a local NGO, Human Welfare Association (HWA). HWA with the support of UNICEF and Department of Panchayati Raj and Government of Uttar Pradesh is promoting sanitation, cleanliness and providing safe drinking water facilities in the madarsas in rural areas of the state. Statistics reveal that more than 65 per cent Muslim children up to the 8th standard are getting education in madarsas. But it is also true that there is no proper provision of sanitation for these madarsas in the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan (SSA). As a result even after 60 odd years of the country’s independence the sanitation at theses centers leaves much to be desired. By focusing on sanitation in these madarsas the project has addressed the much needed and vital need of the community. It is all the more laudable that the work has been initiated from Varanasi, which is the oldest living city in the world. If this innovative sanitation model at these rural madarsas proves to be a success the state government will replicate the model at the other relevant districts. Dr. Rajnikant of the HWA said, “We have been working on this issue for the last 14 years. We aim at the development of poorest of the poor community and downtrodden toiling masses through education, child labor, child rights, and income generation activities with self help groups, women empowerment, health and hygiene. Now our work is bearing fruit.” Terming a clean environment, as part of Child Rights, Mr. Amit Mehrotra, State UNICEF sanitation officer said, “Our goal is to create proper learning environment in the madarsas. This is fully possible with the support of proper sanitation and safe drinking water facilities.” He stressed that the madarsa project aims at not only making cosmetic changes but also trying to instill awareness about sanitation among both the children and parents. A community dialogue has been initiated on total sanitation. While demonstration will be made by the construction of proper flush toilets, usage of hand pump, teachers will also be imparted training on sanitation so that they can guide the children on issues of hygiene. The madarsa walls will carry messages of sanitation painted in bold letters. Slogans related to sanitation, drinking water, basic education and child rights will be written in public places on the walls of houses, other public places (panchayat bhavans, schools, and madarsas) in the villages and road side. “This will ensure that we achieve one of the Millennium Development Goals of United Nations — that of providing proper sanitation and pure drinking water to all by 2015,” said the divisional commissioner of Varanasi, Mr. Nitin Ramesh Gokaran.

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Chapter!6.!Conclusion)&)Recommendations!!6.1 Introduction The extent of Muslim exclusion in Uttar Pradesh then, is all-round and deep-seated. The following description of Muslims nationally, applies equally, perhaps especially to Uttar Pradesh. ‘….the all India pattern that emerges is of a community steeped in poverty, having low educational attainment, bereft of land and other immovable assets, and largely dependent on self employment in low income activities.’ (Fazal & Kumar, 2012:195). In this concluding chapter, we try to pull together the different strands of descriptions and explanations, to try to reiterate how Muslims exclusion is created and recreated. This will, hopefully provide the basis for us to propose some tentative recommendations on how to improve Muslim condition in the state. 6.2 Explanations What are the explanations for the poor Muslim outcomes? Education Let’s start with education, where Muslims do particularly badly. The received wisdom, reflecting long-standing stereotypes about the community, has been that Muslims are not interested in modern education, rather they prefer to send their children to madrasas, and are particularly reluctant to send their girls out to schools. (Gayer & Jaffrelot, 2013:4). The Sachar Committee report, examining Muslim socio-economic condition nationally report, made the point that there was a great deal of evidence now to show that Muslims are as keen to send their children to schools as any other community, but that they are prevented from doing so for a variety of reasons. As to madrasas, the report showed that actually only a minuscule population of Muslims prefer madrasas, and that too as other avenues of education are not available close by. The report cited, for example, a recent study to make the point that economic circumstance of households has a major role to play in determining schooling outcome. It explained, school enrolment for different communities was significantly affected by the local level of development (e.g., availability of schools and other infrastructure) and the educational status of parents. (Government of India,2006: 58). The Sachar report argued that despite overall improvement in educational status of Muslims, the rate of progress had been the slowest for the group, including in UP. This has meant that the gap between Muslims and other groups has widened since Independence, and particularly since the 1980s. Sachar report attributed this to the inability of Muslims to reap the benefits of planning, noting that Muslims have gradually slipped further and further behind other SRCs, (Ibid: 84). Comparing the performance vis a vis other SRCs, the report concluded, SCs and STs have reaped at least some advantages of targeted government and private action supporting their educational progress. (Ibid: 86). These ‘targeted actions’ are about affirmative action – the policy of reservation in educational institutions in proportion to their share of the

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population. There is nothing like this for Muslims, at least at the national level. ‘Private action’ was the other determinant that was missing. Public Sector Employment Regarding poor representation in public sector employment, Sachar report noted the general perception among Muslims alleging discrimination against them, in procedures (such as unhelpful eligibility criteria), practices (unrepresentative selection boards), and a general sense of discrimination in selection processes, as result of absence of Muslims in positions of authority, to raise their voice. This, the report noted, meant lack of any concerted focus at best and prejudice at worst, leading to denial of Muslims their rightful share of services, even in grade IV positions where high qualifications are not required. (Ibid: 20-21) Given the salience of politics of patronage, especially in states such as Uttar Pradesh (refer Chandra, 2006 on this), this does not seem like a far-fetched grievance. As for higher positions, where there are high eligibility criteria and laid down procedures, Sachar report proposed, based on data provided by the Union Public Service Commission, that the biggest challenge was not enough Muslim youth opting to apply, indicating a possible sense of alienation of Muslim youth from the mainstream. (Government of India, 2006: 165-66). The relevant question then is, what is behind this? Public Services We have seen in the preceding pages how Muslim access to public services and development programmes in UP, especially the many beneficiary oriented schemes, and those that offer direct and sizeable benefits to the poor is lacking. Similar is the case with access to civic amenities and infrastructure. Muslims being forced into slums, and increasingly ghettoised, and the poor provision of services in these slums (missing health centres, aganwadis, and school; ill kept roads, lack of piped water and sanitation; poor electricity coverage and that of banks for credit provision); large staff shortages there, or at least staff absence, combined with the negative attitude of staff posted there, result in overall poor working of those services for the inhabitants of the slums. There is little effort too to track and measure quality of service, resulting in poor outcomes. Perceptions among Muslims about why there is such poor access and uptake, blamed poor awareness among the community about these programmes and widespread discrimination in provision of services, such as when Muslims are hindered, rather than facilitated, in getting their caste certificates to avail schemes. (Government of India, 2006: 23-24). Perceptions also attributed poor reach of the services to Muslims to the low participation of Muslims in the political process, especially at the local level, in panchayats and block samitis, including of women. (Ibid: 188). Evidence points to discrimination in public provision of services to Muslims, as well as play of market discrimination (in relation to employment), both formal and informal structures perpetuating this exclusion. (Hasan et al, 2013:9). There is a rich body of evidence pointing to the discrimination against Muslims in job market, even more

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than dalits, in the private sector, and particularly in the public sector. (R Jeery et al, 1997; Jeffrey C. 2010; Thorat SK et al, 2007; Thorat et al (Ibid); Basant R et al (eds)]. India-HDR provides some useful insights into how this discrimination plays out and what that implies for Muslims. In Government schools already plagued by poor performance, the under-representation of teachers belonging to excluded socio-religious groups (Muslims besides SC and ST) creates a social distance between teachers and students of the excluded community that is not conducive to learning and acquiring an education. For children of poorer backgrounds – where Muslims, along with SC and STs are over represented – private schools, with their steep fee structure are hardly an option, further widening the learning gap and subsequent inequality. (Government of India, 2011: 12) A recent case study of Muslim development experiences at multiple sites across the country makes much the same argument about social distance, when it reports that communal polarisation in Barabanki district (in Central Uttar Pradesh) combined with poor hold of Muslims over political/ bureaucratic power there enables discrimination by state agents (school teachers, panchayat workers) against poor Muslims, forcing most Muslims to withdraw their wards from government schools, and join madrasas, that themselves are not particularly effective centres of learning. (Trivedi, 2013: 233). The author concludes, ‘it is this communal character that induces discrimination in the form of social welfare schemes not reaching the Muslims.’ (Ibid: 235). The dominant power structures (in Barabanki in this case) use the communal card to monopolise bureaucratic and political power (panchayats elections) and that impacts the provision of services to poor Muslims. Critical learning here, the author notes, is the ‘marked failure of the state in overcoming hurdles put up by dominant classes in providing legitimate rights to …Muslims‘ (Ibid: 238), To summarise, cutting across sectors are disabling factors (keeping Muslims down) that recur with regularity: in the context of education, lack of targeted public and ‘private action’, besides poor resources and low level of parental education; in the sphere of jobs, discrimination and prejudice, and the sense of alienation among Muslims youth; and in the context of public services, factors such as poor awareness about programmes, and discrimination created due to poor participation of Muslims in panchayat and ward blocks, indeed adverse political and bureaucratic power, resulting in ‘social distance’, coming in the way of provision of services. Undergirding all this, however is the state’s seeming inability to overcome the power of dominant forces that systematically deny Muslims their rights. This is widely confirmed by our own survey of socio-economic status of Muslims in UP, in the preceding chapters, using secondary, as well as primary sources. 6.3 Recommendations Following are some suggestions for improving the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. ‘Supply side’ are steps that the state needs to undertake and put in place, and which create laws, systems and capacities to be able to deliver a programme of work for poorest Muslims. ‘Demand side’ ones are those that would potentially create ‘voice’ for more and better design and delivery of the services, thus pushing the state to respond. Provided in tandem, and with the active participation of

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Muslim communities, these measures could potentially engender change for Muslims in UP. Supply-side Policy oriented i. Bring in anti-discrimination legislation, making it illegal to discriminate in

provision of public services, and opportunities including in the private sphere ii. Use 15 Point Programme framework effectively, to channelize state

interventions towards uplift of Muslims, demonstrating resource allocations (especially social sector budgets); usage; and achievements.

iii. Representative bureaucracy: Post Muslim officers in communally sensitive districts, in police and magistracy; special recruitment drives for Muslims in public sector appointments

iv. Reservations for poorer sections of Muslims: Create a quota within OBC quota for poorest Muslim; also revise the OBC list to correct anomalies, such as those for Mahawat ‘dalit Muslims’.

v. Education, and specially women’s education: reverse poor literacy among Muslims, through targeted education projects in districts with lowest female literacy rate; and promote excellence in education through investment in coaching, and pre-entrance tutoring of Muslim candidates, for competitive high, and secondary school levels; professional courses; and for public sector jobs.

vi. Devise integrated (Make in India-like) package of support targeted at manufacturing hubs in western UP, containing provisions for credit; skill enhancement; technical upgradation and marketing outreach.

Implementation oriented vii. Take strong action against communal mobilisation, and ensuring security,

including action against hate speech, prosecuting those charged. viii. Better data collection, including disaggregated by religious groups, on a range

of outcomes and access to services; and their dissemination, using suitable media, in the policy community, and wider stakeholder group.

ix. Develop minority rights institutional capacity at district and local level, through setting up structures, and educating, training, sensitizing, and holding state actors to deliver and be accountable (State Minority Welfare Department; District Minority Welfare office; Tehsil/Block offices; Gram Panchayats)

Demand-side What the community can do? i. Develop autonomous people’s movements for claiming rights – through

developing ‘agency’ in Muslims communities, currently monopolized by narrow political agenda.

What governments can do? ii. Largescale programme to support promotion of shared living; pluralism, and

respect for mutual rights and duties, especially in communally sensitive districts of western UP.

What wider development community can do?

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iii. Support development of grassroots capacity (for analysis, dissemination, advocacy) among Muslims, for public action, through supporting local and regional networks

iv. Support development of network of activists and CBOs at local/grassroots level, through leadership and fellowship programmes, for monitoring, tracking, researching and analysis

v. Intervention to track, monitor and report working of anti-poverty programmes (minority, as well as universal) as they work for Muslims, enabling disaggregated and dynamic analysis of poverty, as it affects Muslims.

vi. Education and awareness programmes around Minority welfare schemes (MsDP, 15 Point; Scholarship; bank and credit et al) and on minority rights (security, cultural, developmental)

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