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Reviewing the NPV of the Colgate Precision Launch
Stephen Shnier
The launch of the Precision yields a posi=ve NPV and will allow CP to grow their overall toothbrush por?olio
2
NPV is 107% higher than the expected 1992 retail net income
Colgate can leverage their market leader posi=on and take advantage of market trends to maintain their posi=on at the top of the toothbrush market and own the top super-‐premium product
Strategy Breakdown Page #
Market Size Analysis 3-‐4
Toothbrush Market/Consumer Analysis
5-‐6
Base Case Analysis 7-‐8
Mainstream Analysis 9-‐10
Pricing Strategy 11
Adver=sing Strategy 12
SKU Analysis 13
Variable Costs Analysis 14
Investment Cost Analysis 15
Mainstream Net Income 16
Net$Present$Value$of$Income 30,638,834$$$$$$$$Investment$Cost 12,300,000$$$$$$$$NPV$of$Innovation 18,338,834$$$$$$$$
Colgate must iden=fy the number of toothbrushes distributed through the retail channel in order to determine an accurate market size
3
Retail Market Size
# of TB in Market
% of Retail TB
# of consumer using TB’s
# of TB’s Per Person
US Popula=on
% of Popula=on who use TB’s
X
X
X
The market size can also be expressed as the total popula=on less those who do not use toothbrushes, mul=plied by the number of toothbrushes per person, then mul=plied by the retail %
ShiZing trends towards more purchases and increased promo=ons are causing the retail market to steadily increase
4
1992 1993 1994Total+US+Population+(2%+growth+rate) 256,510,000''''''' 261,640,200''''''' 266,873,004'''''''Less:+Non+TB+Users+(90%) 230,859,000''''''' 235,476,180''''''' 240,185,704'''''''#+of+TB's+Owned/Year 1.75 1.90 2.05Total+#+of+TB's+in+Market 404,003,250''''''' 447,404,742''''''' 492,380,692'''''''%+of+Retail+TB's 78% 75% 76%Total+Retail+Market+Size 315,122,535''''''' 335,553,557''''''' 374,209,326'''''''
US+Retail+Market+Size
% of Retail TB’s
# of TB’s/ Person
% of Popula=on who use TB’s
Den=sts are distribu=ng approximately 1 in 4 TB’s to consumers (page 4, footnote)
By using historical market size numbers and determining the number of toothbrushes owned per person, you can calculate the % of the
popula=on that does not use toothbrushes
In 1992, it was es=mated that consumers were replacing toothbrushes on average less than every 7.5 months, and purchasing every 9.7 months
CP research also shows that 65% of consumers own more than one toothbrush
It can be es=mated based on this informa=on that consumers on average own at least 1, but more than likely 2 toothbrushes in a given year
Increased consumer involvement and interest in oral hygiene has created the need for a “Super-‐Premium” toothbrush segment
5
Not Involved Consumers are very price driven Do not brush mul=ple =mes per day Purchase products for themselves and all family members No interest in func=onal benefits
Semi-‐Involved More focus towards cosme=c/aesthe=c benefits such as whiter teeth, control of bad breath
Brush mul=ple =mes per day Primarily purchase products for themselves Less price sensi=ve than un-‐involved
High-‐Involved More focus towards therapeu=c benefits of brushing such as reduc=on in gum disease, plaque, etc.
Brush mul=ple =mes per day, Primarily purchase products for themselves Willing to pay higher prices for beder func=onal benefits
Professional products are ademp=ng to fulfill the needs of both Semi and High Involved consumer, but cannot meet all needs in one type of brush
The value products meet these needs
Oral Health Involvement
Not Semi High
6
The erosion of the value segment will also cause a shiZ towards the super-‐premium segment
Just as consumers moved from value to professional, they have begun to move from the professional into the super premium New Super-‐Premium products such as Oral-‐B Indicator and J&J Reach Advanced are gaining share due to cannibaliza=on of their lower end products Significant decreases in the value segment may lead to the elimina=on of the segment en=rely, as product innova=ons are driving customers towards the professional and super premium products Super-‐Premium total from 1989 – 1991 is solely based on the Oral-‐B Regular brush
YEAR 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994SUPER/PREMIUM/TOTAL 24.0% 24.5% 24.7% 30.4% 45.2% 59.0%SUPER/PREMIUM/%/CHANGE : 2.1% 0.8% 23.1% 48.7% 30.5%PROFESSIONAL/TOTAL 30.1% 31.9% 34.7% 32.5% 28.9% 24.6%PROFESSIONAL/%/CHANGE : 6.0% 8.8% :6.3% :11.1% :14.9%VALUE/TOTAL 45.9% 43.6% 40.6% 37.1% 25.9% 16.4%VALUE/%/CHANGE : :5.0% :6.9% :8.6% :30.2% :36.7%
If Colgate does not launch their Precision product, major compe=tors will take advantage of the increased Super Premium market Share
7
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994Colgate(Precision 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Colgate(Plus 12.0% 13.7% 16.9% 17.3% 15.7% 13.4%Colgate(Classic 8.5% 8.1% 6.4% 4.9% 2.9% 0.9%
COLGATE/TOTAL 20.5% 21.8% 23.3% 22.2% 18.6% 14.3%Oral(B>Indicator 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 3.7% 8.0% 12.3%Oral(B>Regular 24.0% 24.5% 22.1% 16.1% 12.1% 8.1%ORAL5B/TOTAL 24.0% 24.5% 23.1% 19.8% 20.1% 20.4%
J&J(Reach 18.1% 18.2% 17.8% 15.2% 13.2% 11.2%J&J(Reach(Advanced 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 4.0% 8.5% 13.0%
J&J(Prevent 2.5% 1.6% 0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%J&J/TOTAL 20.6% 19.8% 19.2% 19.4% 21.7% 24.2%
Lever 10.5% 9.8% 7.2% 5.0% 3.0% 1.0%Crest((P&G) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 8.0% 13.0%Aqua(Fresh 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 4.6% 8.6% 12.6%
Butler 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%Private(Label 0.0% 0.0% 11.2% 11.5% 9.5% 7.5%
Other 24.4% 24.1% 13.1% 13.5% 8.5% 5.0%Total/Market/Share 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
US/RETAIL/MARKET/SHARE/5/BASE/CASE
Compe=tor’s will move far ahead of Colgate in the super-‐premium category as they gain market share from consumers upgrading from professional brushes – this will nega=vely impact Colgate as well as they will lose Classic and Plus consumers to other professional and super-‐premium segments Companies like Oral-‐B and J&J have shown a willingness in the past to cannibalize lower end products for their new product launches
CP will see consistent decreases in Net Income on their en=re toothbrush por?olio by not launching the Precision
8
CP can mi=gate losses in this scenario by reducing spending on adver=sing and promo=on This may lead to a further reduc=on in market share as consumers become less aware and are not drawn to CP products By not innova=ng, CP is losing more professional consumers to other super-‐premium products than they are gaining from their value consumers moving into professional
1992 1993 1994Unit*Sales 69,957,203))))))))) 62,412,962))))))))) 53,511,934)))))))))Revenue 84,251,161$))))))) 79,354,725$))))))) 72,833,993$)))))))Cost*of*Goods*Sold 41,283,069$))))))) 38,883,815$))))))) 35,688,656$)))))))Gross*Margin 42,968,092$))))))) 40,470,910$))))))) 37,145,336$)))))))Total*Fixed*Costs 34,110,139$))))))) 38,721,153$))))))) 43,973,269$)))))))Net*Income 8,857,953$********* 1,749,757$********* (6,827,932)$********
Colgate should launch the Precision Toothbrush with a message focus on gum disease preven=on and func=onal benefits to gain a strong market posi=on
9
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994Colgate(Precision 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.0% 14.0%Colgate(Plus 12.0% 13.7% 16.9% 17.3% 14.3% 11.3%Colgate(Classic 8.5% 8.1% 6.4% 4.9% 2.9% 0.9%COLGATE/TOTAL 20.5% 21.8% 23.3% 22.2% 25.2% 26.2%Oral(B>Indicator 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 3.7% 6.7% 10.7%Oral(B>Regular 24.0% 24.5% 22.1% 16.1% 12.1% 8.1%ORAL5B/TOTAL 24.0% 24.5% 23.1% 19.8% 18.8% 18.8%J&J(Reach 18.1% 18.2% 17.8% 15.2% 12.2% 9.2%J&J(Reach(Advanced 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 4.0% 7.0% 10.0%J&J(Prevent 2.5% 1.6% 0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%J&J/TOTAL 20.6% 19.8% 19.2% 19.4% 19.2% 19.2%Lever 10.5% 9.8% 7.2% 5.0% 3.0% 1.0%Crest((P&G) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 7.0% 12.0%Aqua(Fresh 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 4.6% 8.6% 12.6%Butler 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%Private(Label 0.0% 0.0% 11.2% 11.5% 8.1% 5.1%Other 24.4% 24.1% 13.1% 13.5% 8.1% 3.1%Total/Market/Share 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
US/RETAIL/MARKET/SHARE/5/MAINSTREAM
Colgate can cannibalize some of their professional market share and s=ll be able to turn a profit on that product -‐ The launch will most likely lead to the demise of the Colgate Classic as the value segment is decreasing overall Colgate’s entrance into the market will also slow compe=tors growth in comparison to the base case, allowing the Precision too take the top spot
Colgate’s strong concept tes=ng (77% of consumers think it is beder than current brush/87% probably would buy/29% definitely would buy) will allow Colgate to gain super premium market share over compe=tors
The Colgate Precision will earn a posi=ve Net Income by the end of 1994 that surpasses total por?olio Net Income of previous years
10
Colgate(Precision 1993 1994Price 1.80$+++++++++++++++++++ 1.84$+++++++++++++++++++
Quantity 26,844,285+++++++++ 52,389,306+++++++++Unit+Variable+Cost 0.72$+++++++++++++++++++ 0.73$+++++++++++++++++++
Revenue 48,319,712.14$+ 96,186,765.21$+Cost+of+Goods+Sold 19,327,884.85$+ 38,474,706.08$+
Gross+Margin 28,991,827.28$+ 57,712,059.13$+Fixed+Costs 32,478,000.00$+ 36,376,000.00$+Net(Income (3,486,172.72)$(( 21,336,059.13$(
Although the Precision is losing money in 1993, this is similar to the compe==ve landscape: J&J, Crest and Aqua Fresh all produced a loss on their new super premium brushes in their first year of launching
Oral%B'Indicator J&J%Reach%Advanced
Crest%(P&G) Aqua%Fresh
Net%Income 1,322,467.69$++++ (1,511,725.02)$++ (611,199.03)$++++++ (1,764,113.78)$++
Colgate will achieve this through an above average Manufacturing Net Price, as well as produc=on capabili=es that will allow them to lower their variable costs The Precision Net Loss in 1993 can be adributed to a significant increase in adver=sing spending
A penetra=on pricing strategy to Oral-‐B enable’s Colgate to take advantage of more price conscious super-‐premium consumers
11
Manufacturer*List*Price
Manufacturer*Net*Price
Food*Retail*Price*(avg.*42%*margin)
Drug*Retail*Price*(avg.*35%*margin)
Mass*Merchandiser*Retail*Price*(avg.*30%*margin)
1.89$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 1.80$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 2.55$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 2.42$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 2.33$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
COLGATE*PRECISION
The Colgate Precision would take the #2 price in all major retail outlets, posi=oning itself as a high end super-‐premium product By not posi=oning as the most expensive or least expensive super-‐premium brush, it leaves Colgate a future opportunity to release a new brush and strategically price it higher/lower than the Precision to capture more of the super-‐premium market By pricing below the Indicator, Colgate can adract more of the Involved Oral Care market (both therapeu=c and cosme=c) Colgate currently has the majority of sales in the food outlet, which offers the greatest retail margin – product success with precision could lead to a greater demand in the food outlets and give Colgate an opportunity to raise their Manufacturer Net Price
Colgate needs to increase adver=sing spending to be on par with their compe=tors
12
Colgate is already the market leader coming out of 1992, and the 80% increase puts them level with the spending of top compe=tors
Category 1992 1993Media&($M) 9,623$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 21,652$&&&&&&&&&&&Consumer&Promotion&($M) 6,978$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 10,826$&&&&&&&&&&&Trade&Promotion($M) 7,457$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 10,826$&&&&&&&&&&&TOTAL1SPENDING 24,058$11111111111111 43,304$11111111111
A strong media strategy for the Precision launch will enable Colgate to take a larger ini=al market share than their compe=tors
The promo=on spending for precision is almost equal to the total 1992 promo=on spending – this should lead to a much higher trial rate and poten=al repeat purchase of the Precision
Oral%B J&J Crest ColgateMedia2Spending2on2New2Product2Launch2($M) 10.0$%%%%%%%%%% 8.0$%%%%%%%%%%%% 15.0$%%%%%%%%%% 19.5$%%%%%%%%%%Year212Anticipated/Actual2Market2Share 3.7% 4.0% 7.0% 8.0%
ProductYear %,Split 1993 1994Media,($'000s) 60% 19,487$+++++ 21,825$+++++Consumer,Promotion,($'000s) 18% 5,846$++++++++ 6,548$++++++++Trade,Promotion,($'000s) 22% 7,145$++++++++ 8,003$++++++++TOTAL,SPENDING,($'000s) 100% 32,478$,,,,, 36,376$,,,,,
Precision
Colgate’s large SKU presence will give it the best opportunity to reach the consumer for this low-‐involvement product
13
Adult&SKUs SKU&% Child&SKUs SKU&%Colgate 28 33.73% 8 38.10%Oral5B 16 19.28% 5 23.81%Reach 14 16.87% 4 19.05%Crest&Complete 10 12.05% 0 0.00%Aquafresh&Flex 6 7.23% 1 4.76%Lever 7 8.43% 2 9.52%Plax 2 2.41% 1 4.76%TOTAL 83 100.00% 21 100.00%
Colgate has close to twice the number of adult and child SKUs as the next closest compe=tor which will allow give the Precision a much greater presence than any of the other products in major retail outlets As consumers are not usually ac=vely searching for a toothbrush, Colgate’s SKU ra=o gives it more awareness than other products Colgate should look to remove low performing children’s SKU’s from the Classic product to make room for the Precision The brush should be posi=oned in store with it’s own separate display to maximize consumer awareness
The combining produc=on of the precision and plus will allow Colgate to decrease its Unit Variable Costs
14
From 1989 to 1992, Colgate product their products with a 49% margin, and averaged 23M units per year Under a mainstream strategy the Precision would be adding 53M units over two years to the current Classic and Plus This increased produc=on would allow Colgate and Anchor Bay to achieve an economy of scales that can be passed on to the Precision product This will allow Colgate to achieve a lower margin on the Precision product, which we are es=ma=ng to be 40%
1989$1991%Average
1992 1993 1994
Classic 13,972,500))))) 42,039,000))))) 7,047,000))))))) 2,187,000)))))))Plus 25,879,500))))) 11,907,000))))) 34,749,000))))) 27,459,000)))))Precision ,)))))))))))))))))) ,)))))))))))))))))) 19,440,000))))) 34,020,000)))))Total 39,852,000%%%%% 53,946,000%%%%% 61,236,000%%%%% 63,666,000%%%%%
An investment of $12.3M in produc=on equipment is needed to product the required output over 1993 and 1994
15
1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994Total*Units*Required*(MM) 26.8 56.1 Total*Units*Required*(MM) 26.8 56.1 Total*Units*Required*(MM) 26.8 56.1Opening*Unit*Balance*(MM) 0 0.2 Opening*Unit*Balance*(MM) 0 1.2 Opening*Unit*Balance*(MM) 0 13.2Total*Ouput*Required*(MM) 26.8 55.9 Total*Ouput*Required*(MM) 26.8 54.9 Total*Ouput*Required*(MM) 26.8 42.9Output/Tufter*(MM) 3 3 Output/Mold*(MM) 7 7 Output/Packaging*(MM) 40 40Total*Tufters*Required 9 19 Total*Molds*Required 4 8 Total*Packaging*Required 1 2Current*Tufters*on*hand 0 9 Current*Molds*on*hand 0 4 Current*Packaging*on*hand 0 1#*of*Tufters*to*be*Purchased 9 10 #*of*Molds*to*be*Purchased 4 4 #*of*Packaging*to*be*Purchased 1 1Total*Output 27 57 Total*Output 28 56 Total*Output 40 80Excess*Output 0.2 1.1 Excess*Output 1.2 1.1 Excess*Output 13.2 37.1Cost*per*Tufter*($MM) 0.5$- 0.5$- Cost*per*Mold*($MM) 0.3$- 0.3$- Cost*per*Packaging*($MM) 0.15$- 0.15$-Total*Investment*Cost*($MM) 4.5$- 5.0$- Total*Investment*Cost*($MM) 1.2$- 1.2$- Total*Investment*Cost*($MM) 0.2$---- 0.2$----
MOLD PACKAGINGTUFTER
Launching the Precision will allow Colgate to substan=ally increase their retail Net Income over the next two years
16
Even with substan=al increases to fixed costs (primarily from adver=sing) the overall Toothbrush por?olio s=ll turns a higher profit in 1993 than it did in 1992 AZer being on the market for two years, the Toothbrush por?olio net income will have increased by 183%
1992 1993 1994Unit*Sales 69,957,203))))))))) 84,559,496))))))))) 98,042,843)))))))))Revenue 84,251,161$))))))) 121,205,636$))))) 157,983,327$)))))Cost*of*Goods*Sold 41,283,069$))))))) 55,041,987$))))))) 68,755,021$)))))))Gross*Margin 42,968,092$))))))) 66,163,648$))))))) 89,228,305$)))))))Total*Fixed*Costs 34,110,139$))))))) 54,425,153$))))))) 64,198,269$)))))))Net*Income 8,857,953$********* 11,738,495$******* 25,030,037$*******