“STEREOTYPES ARE DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS OF PERSON PERCEPTION”. Discuss.

8/12/2019 STEREOTYPES ARE DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS OF PERSON PERCEPTION. Discuss.

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Person perception is fundamentally important to everyday social life (Smith & Collins, 2009). It

encompasses evaluations, judgments and impressions of target others (Macrae & Bodenhausen,

2000) and inferences about their mental states, goals and traits (Quinn & Rosenthal, 2012). Thinking

categorically about others shapes person perception (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000) and

stereotypes modulate the formation of person percepts (Quadflieg, 2013). Simply put, stereotypes

are schemas (i.e., mental representations) about groups of people (Moskowitz, 2005). They help

perceivers make sense of their social worlds by aiding explanation and serve as energy-saving mental

devices (McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears, 2002; Macrae, Milne & Bodenhausen, 1994). Categorical

thinking provides the flexibility that the person perception process demands (Macrae &

Bodenhausen, 2000) and stereotypes can be adjusted to the perceivers needs (Sherman, 2004).

Therefore, stereotypes are thought of as handy cognitive tools (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae et

al., 1994; McGarty et al., 2002; Sherman, 2004).

In contrast, Gordon Allport (1954), who was highly influential, believed that stereotypes arefaulty exaggerations, they lead to error and bias and are permeated by prejudice. Much

research since then has followed the same tack (Jussim, 2012), especially in the case of

stereotypes related to ethnicity, gender and race (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Given this

controversy, are stereotypes truly tools that aid perception or do they simply create

misperception?

Thereafter, this essay aims to explore the assertion that Stereotypes are cognitive tools

designed to facilitate the process of person perception. Arguments for the functional

purposes of stereotypes in the person perception process will be put forth. Some

contradictory views of stereotyping being unconstructive and harmful will be addressed.

Resource Conservation

Some psychologists believe perceivers to be cognitive misers who rely on stereotypes as

shortcuts instead of thinking more deeply (Sherman, Bessenoff & Frost, 1998). But others

argue for the functionality of stereotypes, believing that people are not simply lazy; they

employ stereotypes because they are simplifying mental structures. Macrae et al.s (1994;

Study 2 & 3) work was seminal to demonstrating the same. Participants concurrently

performed an impression formation and a prose-monitoring task. They were primed with astereotype label, and so expected to assign more stereotypic traits to a given target. It was

predicted that they would perform better on the other task under this condition, as

activating the stereotype through the label would make impression formation easier thus

allocating more resources to the prose task. This is indeed what they found, indicating that

forming impressions through stereotypes is the perceivers go-to option, and better

performance on the concurrent task reveals that stereotypes do indeed simplify the

process. Despite providing this insight, a pitfall emerges in that the procedure is too

transparent about the impression formation task, potentially evoking demand

characteristics. Additionally, the judgment task involved assigning trait descriptions to


2/21

targets from a predetermined set, which could have perpetuated stereotypical thinking that

might not have otherwise occurred.

Macrae, Hewstone and Griffiths (1993) similarly establish the heuristic usefulness of stereotyping

under processing load. They watched a video of a woman providing information about herself, half

of which was stereotype-consistent and the other half was inconsistent. Prior to the video,

participants were primed with an occupational label. Load was manipulated by having participants

rehearse an 8-digit number prior to the video that they were told would be later tested for recall.

Creating load on attentional resources was theorized to reduce allocation of resources to the

subsequent video-watching and so, those under load would subsequently recall more stereotype-

consistent information. And this did happen.

In more recent research, Allen, Sherman, Corney, Stroessner (2009; Study 1) also looked at

processing capacity, except their findings revealed a different pattern. Under high cognitive load,

having strong stereotypes resulted in attending toward stereotype-inconsistent information. Load

was similarly manipulated through rehearsal of an 8-digit number. Impressions of a Black male

target were to be formed through provided behavioural descriptions. These appeared on a

computer screen in pairs and on some trials had to be responded to by pressing keys. If a descriptive

item was attended to more than its counterpart, key-press response to it would be quicker - this

was their prediction. Contrary to previous research, they found that under load, responses were

actually faster and more accurate for stereotype inconsistent information. They replicated their

findings in a second study, with the difference being a White female target instead. The stereotype

of women is positively valenced whereas that of African Americans is negatively valenced, and so

they wanted to test both in their paradigm to demonstrate the generality of their findings,

demonstrating methodological foresight. They successfully obtained the same results, achievingrobustness. Another strength, as the researchers point out, is their direct measurement of attention

as opposed to reliance on measures of memory that only suggest attentional use.

Encoding Flexibility

The pattern Allen et al. (2009) found fits in with Sherman et al.s (1998) encoding-flexibility model

(EFM). According to EFM, stereotype-consistent information, being easy to comprehend and

confirmatory of prior knowledge, receives little attention and finer details are not thoroughly

encoded but the basic gist is extracted in case of possible use. Attention is instead redirected toward

inconsistent information because it is harder to make sense of and receives more perceptual andcontextual encoding (encoding of sensory details and specifics of contexts), whereas consistent

information receives only the cursory glance that is conceptual attention. Therefore, stereotypes

enable this dual process form of encoding that is flexible and sophisticated and particularly

important when resources are low and the need for efficiency becomes acute. Efficiency is defined

as the ratio of social information gained to effort expended. Sherman, Conrey and Groom (2004)

provide empirical support for the model. Their experiment comprised the same impression

formation task as that of Allen et al. (2009), except with different stereotypes. The load

manipulation was also the samerehearsal of the 8-digit number. Their data showed faster

reaction times to consistent information under high and low load conditions, whichindicates confirmatory bias toward stereotype-relevant information. However, reaction


3/21

times to inconsistent items were faster under by high load. The researchers explicate that

existence of the EFM can be inferred not from preference toward inconsistent information

but from the shiftof attention toward inconsistent information (and away from consistent

information), and its greater perceptual encodingwhich is exactly what their results

reflected. Perceivers can only be sensitized to unexpected information if they possess priorexpectancies. So categorical thinking provides the flexibility the person perception process

demands - by delivering either stability or plasticity as required (Macrae & Bodenhausen,

2000).

McKimmie, Masters, Masser, Schuller and Terry (2013; Study 3) provide further evidence for

EFM, investigated in a juror decision-making scenario, a context having more powerful and

weighty consequences than everyday social life. Participants were given a transcript of a

criminal case and had to determine the defendants guilt, measured through a

questionnaire. Defendant stereotypicality was manipulated by varying gender (females areviewed as counterstereotypical). Strength of the defendants case was also manipulated,

measured through multiple-choice questionnaire. They hypothesised that case strength

would be given more attention in the case of stereotypical defendants (males), than that of

counterstereotypical defendants (females). Being incongruent with gender-expectations, a

female defendant requires greater perceptual encoding, reducing the resources available

for analysing the evidence. Their hypothesis was confirmed and they concluded that jurors

are cognitive optimizers (p. 344) rather than cognitive misers, as they enlist different

depths of information processing depending on the defendant. To elaborate, a

counterstereotypical defendant benefits from more thorough impression formation, and astereotypical defendant receives fuller evaluation of evidence, and these two modes of

operation are thought to reflect cognitive versatility. This study provides sound theoretical

insight and highlights practical implications of stereotype use. However, it is limited in that

the participants were students acting as jurors. In reality, jurors are presumably better

trained at making judgments and might think in different ways, also given the high pressure

of an actual courtroom scenario.

Perceptual Efficiency

While the studies outlined so far relay the cognitive economy of stereotypes, recent

evidence moreover suggests that perceptual efficiency is another function of stereotyping

(Cloutier & Macrae, 2007). In fact, perceptual operations guide categorical thinking even

before cognitive effects can surface (Cloutier & Macrae, 2007). For example, Cloutier,

Macrae and Mason (2005) aimed to investigate the ease with which social information can

be gleaned from faces. Participants were shown faces that had to be recognized in terms of

either gender (categorization process) or familiarity - some were faces of celebrities

(identification process). They manipulated complexity of processing by inverting faces in one

study, degrading faces in a second study and presenting faces rapidly in a third, to cover arange of difficult viewing conditions. As predicted, categorizing on gender basis was easier


4/21

than identification, as indicated by faster reaction times and greater accurate responses.

Cloutier and Macrae (2007) made compatible discoveries using the same paradigm. Using

facial inversion, in one study (Study 2) they manipulated presence of hairstyles and found

that, while gender categorization was easier than identification, it was easier still when

hairstyle was depicted than when it was not. In another study (Study 3) they investigated

race as category-specifying cue, whilst maintaining the facial inversion manipulation. Faces

had to be categorized as Caucasian or African American and on some trials, faces were

presented in a green hue so that skin tone was indiscernible. Once again, categorization was

much harder in the absence of skin tone information. Thus, some featural details serve as

critical category-specifying cues. Furthermore, the researchers state that perhaps it is not

incidental that the dominant categories in routine perceptions (race, age, sex) are ones that

are cued by easily discernible features. All in all, the present work along with Cloutier et al.s

(2005) work indicate that categorical construal is prompted by basic featural cues and isresistant to disruptions (distortion of viewing conditions, as in the experiments) and these

are functional properties that imply stereotyping as a process that streamlines social

processing (Macrae et al., 2005).

Further backing comes from neuroscientific evidence provided by Quadflieg et al.s (2011)

study confirming the modulation of person perception through stereotyping at the basic

level of cortical functioning. In a social judgment task, participants viewed photographs of

people in either gender-stereotypical or counterstereotypical occupational roles and had to

determine gender of the person depicted. While doing so, fMRI measured activity in brainregions thought to comprise the neural system of person perception (Gobbini & Haxby,

2007, as cited in Quadflieg et al., 2011). Results did reveal increased activity in said regions.

Moreover, when there was no element of social judgment, only low-level visual areas were

activated, indicating the treatment of targets as simple perceptual entities rather than

socially significant (Quadflieg et al., 2011). This brings to focus the role of processing goals,

elucidating that stereotyping should not be taken for granted as, not only does it contribute

to perceiving others but it does so in meaningful, goal-oriented ways. Another point to

note, this piece of work along with Cloutier et al.s (2005) and Cloutier and Macraes (2007)

research use pictorial representations to elicit stereotypes rather than verbal stimuli (as isdone in many a studies), which is a methodological strength as it better clarifies the role

played by perceptual operations (Macrae et al., 2005).

Enhancing Comprehension

Stereotype use can be examined in terms of easing the burden of perception but also, from

the very aim of better understanding and making meaning of the new individuals we

encounter. They ease perception when information processing is constrained (as per

evidence provided hitherto), but also they are used differentially depending on the

situational variables to best aid comprehension of novel others (McGarty et al., 2002). For


5/21

example, Hoshino-Browne and Kunda (2000) found that when a topic sensitive to a racially

stereotyped-group arises during interaction with a group member, the relevant stereotype

is used to predict that persons reactions and avoid conflict andinsensitivity. Interestingly, in

the same situation, some participants actually stereotyped less with the motivation to

appear unprejudiced.

Apart from social stereotypes, person inferences are also formed using trait-categories that

provide more individuating information (Quinn & Rosenthal, 2012). Some have found

stereotypes to be associatively richer and more distinctive and therefore more informative

(Andersen & Klatzky, 1987). They are also accessed more quickly and better encoded in

memory than traits (Andersen & Klatzky, 1990). Yet others have found individuating

information to be more predictive of character (Kunda & Spencer, 2003). However,

stereotypes might actually assist trait-based inferences as when a targets behaviour is

stereotype-consistent, trait inferences are more likely to be made. Additionally, when targetbehaviour is stereotype-inconsistent, attention shifts to form situational inferences to

explain the discrepancy (Ramos, Garcia-Marques, Hamilton, Ferreira & Acker, 2012).

Therefore, stereotypes can also be advantageous by prompting alternate encoding of

behaviour (Ramos et al., 2012). The adaptability of stereotypes emerges again in that, they

can either act as gate-keepers, extracting expected information, or redistribute efforts

toward novel information by undermining themselves should the need arise (Allen et al.,

2009). The EFM previously discussed operates on the same principle.

Another way stereotyping fulfills comprehension goals is by aiding everyday mind readingor empathic accuracy - the ability to infer other peoples thoughts, as discovered by Lewis,

Hodges, Laurent, Srivastava, Biancarosa (2012, p. 1040). Their experiment used the

stereotype of new mothers. Participants inferred multiple thoughts of multiple new

mothers, following viewing a video of the targets naturalistic behaviour. Accuracy was

measured by comparing participants inferences to the targets actual reported thoughts,

carried out by 6 coders (achieving inter-coder reliability). The more stereotypic knowledge

applied, the more accurate the overall empathic inferences were. Albeit, the researchers

point out that this finding may not generalize to other stereotypes that are not as

accurate/factual, which reduces theoretical generalizability. A plus point on the other hand,is the element of ecological validity. Participants made inferences based on viewing

naturalistic behaviour of real-life persons, which presumably better captures the dynamics

of perceptions in reality. This is very pertinent because in laboratory settings, perception

operates in more passive ways than it would in reality. To elaborate, real world perceivers

choose the kind and quantity of information obtained whereas laboratory perceivers are

limited to pre-selected stimuli and behaviour represented only by verbal or pictorial forms

(Smith & Collins, 2009). The present study corrects for this problem at least partially.

Perception Or Misperception?


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Now that the purposive nature of stereotypes across a range of processing contexts and

objectives has been demonstrated, a few challenging perspectives should be considered.

For starters, stereotypes are conventionally thought to be inaccurate overgeneralizations,

caricatures of social reality (Park & Judd, 1993, p. 110). However, actually determining

accuracy is very hard to do empirically as there exist different criterions for accuracy andmore obviously, statements cannot be made about the accuracy of stereotypes in general

because there exist countless stereotypes of all kinds, some socially shared and some

individually contrived (Park & Judd, 1993). More fundamentally, if stereotypes are so

inaccurate and erroneous why are they so routinely used, how are they able to aid

explanation and how can a process so rudimentary and basic be so deficient (McGarty et al.,

2002; Macrae et al., 1994)? A potential solution to the puzzle: stereotyping provides viable

although potentially erroneous judgments at little cognitive cost and these characterizations

are adequate enough for the interactions we routinely face and should the need arise, they

can be adjusted and improved upon with a little extra effort (Macrae et al., 1994; Gilbert &Hixon, 1991). The value of such an inferential system, after all lies in its rapid, automatic and

effortless provision of inferential knowledge (Gilbert, 1989, as cited in Macrae et al., 1994).

Another pressing issue is that many believe prejudice is intrinsically linked to stereotyping

and is practically inevitable (e.g., Allport, 1954). Firstly, it is important to clarify that in terms

of perceiving groups, stereotyping has a mainly cognitive position, whereas prejudice is

related to affect (Schneider, 2004). Even so, it has been shown that both high-prejudice and

low-prejudice individuals activate stereotype, even against conscious will or awareness, but

only the latter inhibit stereotypes with the motivation to prevent prejudice (Devine, 1989).Granted there is a link between the two concepts as high-prejudiced individuals had to

activate and apply relevant stereotypes to then enact prejudice but the separation of

stereotyping from prejudice is still evident as stereotyping does not necessitate prejudice.

Moreover, the motivation to avoid prejudice can inhibit activation of stereotypes or allow

activation but inhibit application, such as when egalitarian goals or salient egalitarian norms

dominate, further demonstrating that prejudice is a step further demonstrating that

stereotyping and prejudice are not interchangeable processes (Kunda & Spencer, 2003).

Lastly, literature in this area tends to focus on race, gender and age stereotypes and thesefunction uniquely (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Pitfalls such as stereotype threat (being

pressured by expectations of a stereotype that one belongs to) and self-fulfilling prophecies

(fulfilling expectations simply because they exist) occur mostly in relation to said categories

(Jussim, 2012). Some researchers contend that such consequences should not be considered

in the analysis of stereotype use for they do not really provide insight about accuracy or the

effectiveness of the perceptions formed (Jussim, 2012). Be that as it may, Macrae and

Bodenhausen (2000) propose that these social categories actually represent the

fundamental divides in society and so too are important to perceivers social

representations. They also point out that not all categories are alike in their functioning,their activation, application and validity, and so they should not always be treated equally.


7/21

Therefore, the issues that surface in regard to some sensitive and complex categories need

not necessarily apply to stereotyping as a process in general.

In summation, stereotypes exist because of their functional value and so whether they are

good or bad, or true or false is irrelevant to understanding the process and only when the

moral and attitudinal issues surrounding stereotypes are put aside will we be able to do so

(Tyler & Aboud, 1973). Therefore, stereotypes are a fundamentally valuable part of the

person perception system as expressed by Gilbert and Hixon (1991), the ability to

understand new and unique individuals in terms of old and general beliefs is certainly

among the handiest tools in the social perceivers kit. To borrow Lewis et al.s (2012)

comparison, when reading a story, just as the reader looks beyond the words on the page

and turns to prior knowledge and expectations to fill in gaps in understanding, so too the

social perceiver reaches beyond directly observable stimuli and unto stereotypes to fill in

the perception of a novel person.

Taylor, D. M., & Aboud, F. E. (1973). Ethnic stereotypes: Is the concept necessary?. Canadian

Psychologist/Psychologie Canadienne, 14(4), 330.

Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: their automatic and controlled components. Journal

of personality and social psychology, 56(1), 5.

Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1993). Definition and assessment of accuracy in social stereotypes.

Psychological review, 100(1), 109.

STEREOTYPES ARE DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS OF PERSON


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PERCEPTION.

Student number: 610051145

Module code: PSY 3251

Word count: 2996

Person perception is fundamentally important to everyday social life (Smith & Collins, 2009).

It encompasses evaluations, judgments and impressions of target others (Macrae &

Bodenhausen, 2000) and inferences about their mental states, goals and traits (Quinn &

Rosenthal, 2012). Thinking categorically about others shapes person perception (Macrae &

Bodenhausen, 2000) and stereotypes modulate the formation of person percepts (Quadflieg,

2013). Simply put, stereotypes are schemas (i.e., mental representations) about groups of

people (Moskowitz, 2005). They help perceivers make sense of their social worlds by aiding

explanation and serve as energy-saving mental devices (McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears, 2002;

Macrae, Milne & Bodenhausen, 1994). Categorical thinking provides the flexibility that the

person perception process demands (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000) and stereotypes can be


9/21

adjusted to the perceivers needs (Sherman, 2004). Therefore, stereotypes are thought of as

handy cognitive tools (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae et al., 1994; McGarty et al., 2002;

Sherman, 2004).

In contrast, Gordon Allport (1954), who was highly influential, believed that stereotypes are

faulty exaggerations, they lead to error and bias and are permeated by prejudice. Much

research since then has followed the same tack (Jussim, 2012), especially in the case of

stereotypes related to ethnicity, gender and race (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Given this

controversy, are stereotypes truly tools that aid perception or do they create misperception?

Thereafter, this essay aims to explore the assertion that Stereotypes are cognitive tools

designed to facilitate the process of person perception. Evidence for the functional purposes

of stereotypes in the person perception process will be put forth. Some contradictory views of

stereotyping being unconstructive and harmful will be addressed.

Resource Conservation

Some psychologists believe perceivers to be cognitive misers who rely on stereotypes as

shortcuts instead of thinking more deeply (Sherman, Bessenoff & Frost, 1998). But others

argue for the functionality of stereotypes, believing that people are not simply lazy; they

employ stereotypes because they are simplifying mental structures. Macrae et al.s (1994;

Study 2 & 3) work was seminal to demonstrating the same. Participants concurrently

performed an impression formation and a prose-monitoring task. They were primed with a

stereotype label, and so expected to assign more stereotypic traits to a given target. Also

expected was better performance on the other task under this condition, as activating the


10/21

stereotype through the label would make impression formation easier thus allocating more

resources to the prose task. This is indeed what they found, indicating that forming

impressions through stereotypes is the perceivers go-to option, and better performance on

the concurrent task reveals that stereotypes do indeed simplify the process. Despite providing

this insight, a pitfall emerges in that the procedure is too transparent about the impression

formation task, potentially evoking demand characteristics. Additionally, the judgment task

involved assigning trait descriptions to targets from a predetermined set, which could have

perpetuated stereotypical thinking that might not have otherwise occurred.

Macrae, Hewstone and Griffiths (1993) similarly establish the heuristic usefulness of

stereotyping under processing load. They watched a video of a woman providing information

(both stereotype-consistent and inconsistent) about herself. Prior to the video, participants

were primed with an occupational label. Load was manipulated by having participants

rehearse an 8-digit number prior to the video that they were told would be later tested for

recall. Creating load on attentional resources was theorized to reduce allocation of resources

to the subsequent video-watching and so, those under load would subsequently recall more

stereotype-consistent information. And this did happen.

In more recent research, Allen, Sherman, Corney, Stroessner (2009; Study 1) also looked at

processing capacity, except their findings revealed a different pattern. Under high cognitive

load, having strong stereotypes resulted in attending toward stereotype-inconsistent

information. Load was similarly manipulated through rehearsal of an 8-digit number.

Impressions of a Black male target were to be formed through provided behavioural

descriptions. These appeared on a computer screen in pairs and on some trials had to be

responded to by pressing keys. If a descriptive item was attended to more than its counterpart,

key-press response to it would be quicker - this was their prediction. Contrary to previous


11/21

research, they found that under load, responses were actually faster and more accurate for

stereotype inconsistent information. They replicated their findings in a second study, with the

difference being a White female target instead. The stereotype of women is positively

valenced whereas that of African Americans is negatively valenced, and so they wanted to

test both in their paradigm to demonstrate the generality of their findings, demonstrating

methodological foresight. They successfully obtained the same results, achieving robustness.

Another strength, as the researchers point out, is their direct measurement of attention instead

of relying on measures of memory that only suggest attentional use.

Encoding Flexibility

The pattern Allen et al. (2009) found fits in with Sherman et al.s (1998) encoding-flexibility

model (EFM). According to EFM, stereotype-consistent information, being easy to

comprehend and confirmatory of prior knowledge, receives little attention and finer details

are not thoroughly encoded but the basic gist is extracted in case of possible use. Attention is

instead redirected toward inconsistent information because it is harder to make sense of and

receives more perceptual and contextual encoding (encoding of sensory details and specifics

of contexts), whereas consistent information receives only the cursory glance that is

conceptual attention. Therefore, stereotypes enable this dual process form of encoding that is

flexible and sophisticated and particularly important when resources are low and the need for

efficiency becomes acute. Efficiency is defined as the ratio of social information gained to

effort expended. Sherman, Conrey and Groom (2004) provide empirical support for the

model. Their experiment comprised the same impression formation task as that of Allen et al.

(2009), except with different stereotypes. The load manipulation was also the same

rehearsal of the 8-digit number. Their data showed faster reaction times to consistent

information under high and low load conditions, which indicates confirmatory bias toward


12/21

stereotype-relevant information. However, reaction times to inconsistent items were faster

under by high load. The researchers explicate that existence of the EFM can be inferred not

from preference toward inconsistent information but from the shiftof attention toward

inconsistent information (and away from consistent information), and its greater perceptual

encodingwhich is exactly what their results reflected. Perceivers can only be sensitized to

unexpected information if they possess prior expectancies. So categorical thinking provides

the flexibility the person perception process demands - by delivering either stability or

plasticity as required (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000).

McKimmie, Masters, Masser, Schuller and Terry (2013; Study 3) provide further evidence

for EFM, investigated in a juror decision-making scenario, a context having more powerful

and weighty consequences than everyday social life. Participants were given a transcript of a

criminal case and had to determine the defendants guilt, measured through a questionnaire.

Defendant stereotypicality was manipulated by varying gender (females are viewed as

counterstereotypical). Strength of the defendants case was also manipulated, measured

through multiple-choice questionnaire. They hypothesised that case strength would be given

more attention in the case of stereotypical defendants (males), than that of

counterstereotypical defendants (females). Being incongruent with gender-expectations, a

female defendant requires greater perceptual encoding, reducing the resources available for

analysing the evidence. Their hypothesis was confirmed and they concluded that jurors are

cognitive optimizers (p. 344) rather than cognitive misers, as they enlistdifferent depths of

information processing depending on the defendant. To elaborate, a counterstereotypical

defendant benefits from more thorough impression formation, and a stereotypical defendant

receives fuller evaluation of evidence, and these two modes of operation are thought to reflect

cognitive versatility. This study provides sound theoretical insight and highlights practical

implications of stereotype use. However, it is limited in that the participants were students


13/21

acting as jurors. In reality, jurors are presumably better trained at making judgments and

might think in different ways, also given the high pressure of an actual courtroom scenario.

Perceptual Efficiency

While the studies outlined so far relay the cognitive economy of stereotypes, recent evidence

moreover suggests that perceptual efficiency is another function of stereotyping (Cloutier &

Macrae, 2007). In fact, perceptual operations guide categorical thinking even before cognitive

effects can surface (Cloutier & Macrae, 2007). For example, Cloutier, Macrae and Mason

(2005) aimed to investigate the ease with which social information can be gleaned from

faces. Participants were shown faces that had to be recognized in terms of either gender

(categorization process) or familiarity - some were faces of celebrities (identification

process). They manipulated complexity of processing by inverting faces in one study,

degrading faces in a second study and presenting faces rapidly in a third, to cover a range of

difficult viewing conditions. As predicted, categorizing on gender basis was easier than

identification, as indicated by faster reaction times and greater accurate responses.

Cloutier and Macrae (2007) made compatible discoveries using the same paradigm. Using

facial inversion, in one study (Study 2) they manipulated presence of hairstyles and found

that, while gender categorization was easier than identification, it was easier still when

hairstyle was depicted than when it was not. In another study (Study 3) they investigated race

as category-specifying cue, whilst maintaining the facial inversion manipulation. Faces had to

be categorized as Caucasian or African American and on some trials, faces were presented in

a green hue so that skin tone was indiscernible. Once again, categorization was much harder

in the absence of skin tone information. Thus, some featural details serve as critical category-

specifying cues. Furthermore, the researchers state that perhaps it is not incidental that the

dominant categories in routine perceptions (race, age, sex) are ones that are cued by easily


14/21

discernible features. All in all, the present work along with Cloutier et al.s (2005) work

indicate that categorical construal is prompted by basic featural cues and is resistant to

disruptions (distortion of viewing conditions, as in the experiments) and these are functional

properties that imply stereotyping as a process that streamlines social processing (Macrae et

al., 2005).

Further backing comes from neuroscientific evidence provided by Quadflieg et al.s(2011)

study confirming the modulation of person perception through stereotyping at the basic level

of cortical functioning. In a social judgment task, participants viewed photographs of people

in either gender-stereotypical or counterstereotypical occupational roles and had to determine

gender of the person depicted. While doing so, fMRI measured activity in brain regions

thought to comprise the neural system of person perception (Gobbini & Haxby, 2007, as cited

in Quadflieg et al., 2011). Results did reveal increased activity in said regions. Moreover,

when there was no element of social judgment, only low-level visual areas were activated,

indicating the treatment of targets as simple perceptual entities rather than socially significant

(Quadflieg et al., 2011). This brings to focus the role of processing goals, elucidating that

stereotyping should not be taken for granted as, not only does it contribute to perceiving

others but it does so in meaningful, goal-oriented ways. Another point to note, this piece of

work along with Cloutier et al.s (2005) and Cloutier and Macraes (2007) research use

pictorial representations to elicit stereotypes rather than verbal stimuli (as is done in many a

studies), which is a methodological strength as it better clarifies the role played by perceptual

operations (Macrae et al., 2005).

Enhancing Comprehension

Stereotype use can be examined in terms of easing the burden of perception but also, from the

very aim of better understanding and making meaning of the new individuals we encounter.


15/21

They ease perception when information processing is constrained (as per evidence provided

hitherto), but also they are used differentially depending on the situational variables to best

aid comprehension of novel others (McGarty et al., 2002). For example, Hoshino-Browne

and Kunda (2000) found that when a topic sensitive to a racially stereotyped-group arises

during interaction with a group member, the relevant stereotype is used to predict that

persons reactions and avoid conflict and insensitivity. Interestingly, in the same situation,

some participants actually stereotyped less with the motivation to appear unprejudiced. The

adaptability of stereotypes to perceivers needs is thus once again evident.

Apart from social stereotypes, person inferences are also formed using trait-categories that

provide more individuating information (Quinn & Rosenthal, 2012). Some have found

stereotypes to be associatively richer and more distinctive and therefore more informative

(Andersen & Klatzky, 1987). They are also accessed more quickly and better encoded in

memory than traits (Andersen & Klatzky, 1990). Yet others have found individuating

information to be more predictive of character (Kunda & Spencer, 2003). However,

stereotypes might actually assist trait-based inferences as when a targets behaviour is

stereotype-consistent, trait inferences are more likely to be made. Additionally, when target

behaviour is stereotype-inconsistent, attention shifts to form situational inferences to explain

the discrepancy (Ramos, Garcia-Marques, Hamilton, Ferreira & Acker, 2012). Therefore,

stereotypes can also be advantageous by prompting alternate encoding of behaviour (Ramos

et al., 2012). The adaptability of stereotypes emerges again in that, they can either act as gate-

keepers, extracting expected information, or redistribute efforts toward novel information by

undermining themselves should the need arise (Allen et al., 2009). The EFM previously

discussed operates on the same principle.

Another way stereotyping fulfils comprehension goals is by aiding everyday mind reading


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or empathic accuracy - the ability to infer other peoples thoughts, as discovered by Lewis,

Hodges, Laurent, Srivastava, Biancarosa (2012, p. 1040). Their experiment used the

stereotype of new mothers. Participants inferred multiple thoughts of multiple new mothers,

following viewing a video of the targets naturalistic behaviour. Accuracy was measured by

comparing participants inferences to the targets actual reported thoughts, carried outby 6

coders (achieving inter-coder reliability). The more stereotypic knowledge applied, the more

accurate the overall empathic inferences were. Albeit, the researchers point out that this

finding may not generalize to other stereotypes that are not as accurate/factual, which reduces

theoretical generalizability. A plus point on the other hand, is the element of ecological

validity. Participants made inferences based on viewing naturalistic behaviour of real-life

persons, which presumably better captures the dynamics of perceptions in reality. This is very

pertinent because in laboratory settings, perception operates in more passive ways than it

would in reality. To elaborate, real world perceivers choose the kind and quantity of

information obtained whereas laboratory perceivers are limited to pre-selected stimuli and

behaviour represented only by verbal or pictorial forms (Smith & Collins, 2009). The present

study corrects for this problem at least partially.

Perception Or Misperception?

Now that the purposive nature of stereotypes across a range of processing contexts and

objectives has been demonstrated, a few challenging perspectives should be considered. For

starters, stereotypes are conventionally thought to be inaccurate overgeneralizations,

caricatures of social reality (Park & Judd, 1993, p. 110). However, actually determining

accuracy is very hard to do empirically as there exist different criterions for accuracy and

more obviously, statements cannot be made about the accuracy of stereotypes in general

because there exist countless stereotypes of all kinds, some socially shared and some


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individually contrived (Park & Judd, 1993). More fundamentally, if stereotypes are so

inaccurate and erroneous why are they so routinely used, how are they able to aid explanation

and how can a process so rudimentary and basic be so deficient (McGarty et al., 2002;

Macrae et al., 1994)? A potential solution to the puzzle: stereotyping provides viable

although potentially erroneous judgments at little cognitive cost and these characterizations

are adequate enough for the interactions we routinely face and should the need arise, they can

be adjusted and improved upon with a little extra effort (Macrae et al., 1994; Gilbert &

Hixon, 1991). The value of such an inferential system, after all lies in its rapid, automatic and

effortless provision of inferential knowledge (Gilbert, 1989, as cited in Macrae et al., 1994).

Another pressing issue is that many believe prejudice is intrinsically linked to stereotyping

and is practically inevitable (e.g., Allport, 1954). Firstly, it is important to clarify that in

terms of perceiving groups, stereotyping has a mainly cognitive position, whereas prejudice is

related to affect (Schneider, 2004). Even so, it has been shown that both high-prejudice and

low-prejudice individuals activate stereotype, even against conscious will or awareness, but

only the latter inhibit stereotypes with the motivation to prevent prejudice (Devine, 1989).

Granted there is a link between the two concepts as high-prejudiced individuals had to

activate and apply relevant stereotypes to then enact prejudice but the separation of

stereotyping from prejudice is still evident as stereotyping does not necessitate prejudice.

Moreover, the motivation to avoid prejudice can inhibit activation of stereotypes or allow

activation but inhibit application, such as when egalitarian goals or salient egalitarian norms

dominate, further demonstrating that prejudice is a step further demonstrating that

stereotyping and prejudice are not interchangeable processes (Kunda & Spencer, 2003).

Lastly, literature in this area tends to focus on race, gender and age stereotypes and these

function uniquely (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Pitfalls such as stereotype threat (being


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pressured by expectations of a stereotype that one belongs to) and self-fulfilling prophecies

(fulfilling expectations simply because they exist) occur mostly in relation to said categories

(Jussim, 2012). Some researchers contend that such consequences should not be considered

in the analysis of stereotype use for they do not really provide insight about accuracy or the

effectiveness of the perceptions formed (Jussim, 2012). Be that as it may, Macrae and

Bodenhausen (2000) propose that these social categories actually represent the fundamental

divides in society and so too are important to perceivers social representations. They also

point out that not all categories are alike in their functioning, their activation, application and

validity, and so they should not always be treated equally. Therefore, the issues that surface

in regard to some sensitive and complex categories need not necessarily apply to stereotyping

as a process in general.

In summation, stereotypes exist because of their functional value and so whether they are

good or bad, or true or false is irrelevant to understanding the process and only when the

moral and attitudinal issues surrounding stereotypes are put aside will we be able to do so

(Tyler & Aboud, 1973). Therefore, stereotypes are a fundamentally valuable part of the

person perception system as expressed by Gilbert and Hixon (1991), the ability to

understand new and unique individuals in terms of old and general beliefs is certainly among

the handiest tools in the social perceivers kit. And to borrow Lewis et al.s (2012)

comparison, when reading a story, just as the reader looks beyond the words on the page and

turns to prior knowledge and expectations to fill in gaps in understanding, so too the social

perceiver reaches beyond directly observable stimuli and unto stereotypes to fill in the

perception of a novel person.

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