Strategic Management andUniversities’ Institutional Developmentby Pierre Tabatoni, John Davies and Andris Barblan

t h e m a

2

4 FOREWORDAndris Barblan

4 AVANT-PROPOSAndris Barblan

5 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, A TOOL OF LEADERSHIP – CONCEPTSAND PARADOXESPierre Tabatoni, Académie des Sciences morales et politiques & Andris Barblan, EUA Secretary General• Strategic planning is different from strategic management• Strategic management becomes the educating process of change

agents• Educating the person as an agent of change• Policies and strategies• The balance between rationalisation, innovation and preservation• Contradictions and paradoxes in strategic management• Shock management• Global and local commitments• Technical innovation and culture: Internet as a strategic revolution• The electronic revolution influences individuals’ aspirations and

reference models• Powerful agents of change will probably influence social change

12 CULTURAL CHANGE IN UNIVERSITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC AND QUALITY INITIATIVESJohn Davies, Dean of Graduate School, Anglia Polytechnic University & Professor of Higher Education Policy and Management, University of Bath• Preamble• Existing cultures in universities• Emerging cultures conducive to strategic, quality-related

endeavours• Maturation of strategic, quality-oriented institutional cultures• Towards a strategic and quality-oriented culture• Leadership strategies• Conclusion• References

23 AN EXPLANATORY GLOSSARYPierre Tabatoni, Académie des Sciences morales et politiques

29 GLOSSAIRE RAISONNÉPierre Tabatoni, Académie des Sciences morales et politiques

3

Suite au séminaire organisé pour sesmembres à Istamboul en 2000, l’EUA a priéles deux animateurs de cette réunion dereprendre leurs thèses pour les élaborer enarticles.

Il est ainsi possible d’offrir aux universitésmembres de l’EUA une suite au CRE-guide n°2de juin 1998 sur les «Principes du manage-ment stratégique dans l’université» (opusculeencore disponible en français et téléchar-geable en anglais sur le site web del’Association). Ce Thema n°2 remplacel’aperçu de la «pratique de la gestion dansles universités européennes» qui aurait dûparaître à l’époque. Outre les articles dePierre Tabatoni et de John Davies, retravaillésen collaboration avec Andris Barblan, un glos-saire des termes principaux du managementstratégique est inclus dans les deux langues.L’EUA utilise ces divers concepts pour son

programme d’évaluation de la qualité desinstitutions universitaires, programme misen place dès 1994 avec l’aide des deuxauteurs précités.

Aujourd’hui, après l’évaluation de plus de 80universités, essentiellement en Europe maisaussi en Amérique du Sud et en Afrique duSud, l’EUA est devenue un acteur importantde la gestion qualitative du monde acadé-mique européen. A ce titre, elle est présenteau Comité Directeur du Réseau européen desagences de qualité (ENQA) et, pour sesmembres, elle réfléchit aux stratégies et poli-tiques de changement qui permettront leurmeilleure adaptation aux défis de l’Espaceeuropéen de l’enseignement supérieur, àconstruire d’ici 2010.

4

AVANT-PROPOSAndris Barblan

Following the seminar organised in Istanbul in2000 for its members, EUA invited the twoseminar facilitators to turn their presentationsinto articles.

We are now pleased to provide EUA memberswith a continuation of CRE-guide n°2 of June1998 on the “Principles of strategic manage-ment in universities“ (this can be downloadedin English on the EUA’s website, and theFrench version can also be obtained from theEUA Geneva office). This Thema n°2 replacesthe survey of management practices inEuropean universities that should have beenpublished at that time. In addition to thearticles by Pierre Tabatoni and John Davies,revised in collaboration with Andris Barblan, aglossary of the main expressions of strategicmanagement is included in both languages.

EUA uses these various concepts in its institu-tional review programme, which was launchedin 1994 with the help of the two mentionedauthors.

Today, having evaluated more than 80 uni-versities, essentially in Europe but also inSouth America and South Africa, EUA hasbecome a main actor for quality manage-ment on the European university scene. Assuch, it is represented on ENQA’s SteeringCommittee (European Network of QualityAgencies). Together with its members, it alsodevelops the strategies and policies forchange that will enable universities acrossEurope to adapt to the challenges of theEuropean Area of Higher Education, to beset up by 2010.

FOREWORDAndris Barblan

Strategic planning is different fromstrategic management.

Planning as a set of possible choices for actionis, by itself, an organised process of collectivechange embracing aims, norms, resources, cri-teria of choice, structures, organisational, insti-tutional and personal relations – all elementswhich are at the core of any managerialprocess. Long-term planning is supposed todetermine objectives for the future, while allo-cating responsibilities and resources to reachthem. It is becoming more difficult, however,to achieve distant goals in innovative andcomplex environments, although the potentialfor planning exists when strands of stabilitywithin that context can be presumed. On thatbasis, with some vision, long-term planningcan use scenarios, i.e., prospective states of thefuture, that can be deducted from currenttrends.

However, strategic management is more spe-cific. It aims at leading, driving and helpingpeople, those inside the organisation andthose outside (also involved in its develop-ment), to focus on the organisation's identityand image, to question its worth in a newenvironment, to fix its longer term growth,while using its present capacity and fosteringits “potential” for development.

Indeed, this implies proper planning, as it callsfor a choice among major objectives, theachievement of which requires sets of specificmeans. But, more than planning, managementstresses dynamic and critical processes, thoseof leadership, which can bypass present strate-gies and design new ones. In other words,strategic management prepares people to pro-ject themselves into the future, i.e., to facenew situations in the near future, at the costof risk and uncertainty, when dealing withchanges in structures, models of action, roles,relations and positions.

Norms are principles for collective action, shap-ing personal behaviour and group relations.Normative management is a pleonasm, as anysignificant change necessarily implies develop-ing new collective norms, new visions and newpractices. The dynamics of cultural processes(values turning into norms, models and wordpatterns) sustain any managerial move.

In management literature, strategy and iden-tity are often perceived as the two sides of thesame coin. However, in fast changing environ-ments, strategic issues can imply and inducechanged identities. Leadership then requirescritical minds, fresh vision, courage, and thecapacity to convince. Such a critical approachcan be enhanced when institutions participatein networks, which allow for comparisonsbetween different sets of inspiration and prac-tice, thus pointing to revised needs, new con-straints and new models of change, if theorganisation’s potential is to be realised.

In organisations considered as learningsystems, strategic managementbecomes the educating process ofchange agents, the institutional actors.

The actor can be anyone in the organisation,or its related environment, whose behaviourcan significantly influence change in the organ-isation and its milieu. For instance, for a univer-sity, the main actors are the students, facultyand staff, network members, public and privateregulators, as well as the media. In a learningorganisation, their education requires informa-tion, communication, motivation throughfocused exchange and open debates.

Educating the person as an agent ofchange requires well-structuredstrategic information systems.

The data collected should provide relevantmaterial available at the right time to support

5

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, A TOOL OF LEADERSHIP – CONCEPTSAND PARADOXESPierre Tabatoni, Académie des Sciences morales et politiques,and Andris Barblan, EUA Secretary General

The complete strategist’s advice: if you want to make a sculpture of an elephant out of a block of gran-ite, start cutting little parts away and then remove, fast, anything that does not look like an elephant.

the right change. Such data (i.e. well-designed information) should structuresignals, even weak signals, which impressthe organisation with a sense of change inprocess. How to magnify and transform suchsignals into data is a managerial informationtask.

Data can monitor change in the environ-ment, or in the strategies applied in otherinstitutions used as benchmarks. But, moreimportantly, data should reflect the practiceof the actors themselves, inside the organisa-tion or in its direct environment. It is cleartoday that a lot of significant information canbe drawn from staff experience inside theorganisation. It is difficult, however, for man-agement to convince employees not only toexpose their experience, but also to analyse itso that it can contribute to a database of use-ful information for the organisation.

Information must be structured so that it iseasily communicated, while providing usefuldata to the enquirer. Inside the organisation,it must be available to anyone who is con-cerned with specific elements of information:this means setting up open systems which aredifficult to organise, but essential. Such a taskrepresents a managerial challenge, especiallywhen strong competition for positions existsinside the institution or, on the contrary,when the administration, interested in rou-tines, prefers to retain information rather thanto find time to disseminate it properly, thusrisking the cultural fragmentation of theorganisation.

Policies and strategies

1. Policies deal with identity, with missions(what Max Weber calls axiologic rationality),with organisational climate. At this level ofgenerality, they are usually expressed in broadterms, even symbolic ones. But such wordingmust have meaning for the people involved,as these policies define norms of behaviourand serve as fundamental references in caseof serious conflicts between projects – orbetween people – within the institution. Theyplay the role of a constitution in a State.

Inside and outside the organisation, thesenorms represent institutional commitments

and any interpretation which might lead tostrongly divergent positions should beseriously debated, explained in writing andcommented by the people in charge.

Too often, obscure or outmoded policies arejust ignored, to avoid either the effort ofupdating or redefinition, or internal strife orpotential conflicts with external regulators. Itusually means that some of the more power-ful and determined sub-groups in the organi-sation are de facto imposing their own normsand objectives as if they were those of thewhole institution. Alternatively, it leaves theway open for policies imposed from theoutside by public authorities, the unions,resource providers or even by public opinion.Doesn’t this ring a bell in universities?

Yet, the worst situation for an institution is apolicy (statement of identity, expression ofnorms, etc.) which has no credibility; eitherbecause it has been expressed too vaguely, orbecause it is simply ignored or interpreted asfluctuating with circumstances. In such acase, most people, especially the managers,try to understand which is the real policy ofthe organisation and what this agenda reallymeans for them.

It is often said that it is not possible, noropportune, to explain all policies: someshould be kept confidential, secret, in orderto minimize potential opposition, while beingimplemented by a few people “in the know”.But secrecy is difficult when implementationrequires a wide distribution of informationand an open exchange of experience.Moreover, secrecy does not permit decen-tralised initiatives – it provides privilege to thehappy few, leaving the other actors with astrong feeling of arbitrary behaviour, if not ofmistrust.

In fact, the formulation and implementationof strategies in the organisation are the test ofthe validity of institutional policies. When nostrategic drive proves effective, there is anobvious need for change in policies.

2. Strategies describe types of changes andways of transformation; they tell us what todo in order to implement policies (instru-mental rationality, or efficiency ). That is

6

why they need to be expressed in operationalterms: recalling objectives, they enunciatethose activities selected to reach those objec-tives, the type of changes induced by suchactivities, the means which can be used – orkept untouched – to develop them, the alloca-tion of individual sub-missions, resources andauthority, the evaluation criteria for specificprojects, the procedures to implement evalua-tion and those to take account of conclusionsand recommendations.

In other words, understanding the interactionbetween actors and strategies is at the coreof any managerial process, and of the exerciseof leadership.

3. Evaluation is thus the key to any policy andstrategy, because it questions constantly theaims of the organisation, the institutional allo-cation of resources, the leadership and opera-tional capacities, i.e., the norms, communica-tion development, the criteria for quality, theirimplementation and their critical re-evaluation.At the level of the whole organisation, it iscalled institutional evaluation and deals withthe basic orientation and norms of the institu-tion.

Functional evaluation of the departments, ofspecific activities or of the use of specific meth-ods is a necessary complement to institutionalevaluation but, too often, as it is easier toachieve and exploit, functional evaluationdisplaces or replaces institutional evaluation.Strategic management must make institutionalevaluation possible and even desirable for themajority of actors, thus offering a frame ofreference to functional evaluations thatdevelop a critical approach to policies.

Managing evaluation, as a collective processof change, in order to educate and motivatepeople for change, is thus at the core of strate-gic managerial capacity. This includes the abil-ity to engage people in the evaluation process,as a critical understanding of what they do andwhy they do it. As a side benefit, this may helpother members of the organisation to under-stand the managers' tasks and difficulties.

An internally-organised evaluation is essentialto help institutional actors to question theirgoals and practices. An outsider’s viewpoint is

also useful – or even vital – to reconsider moreobjectively the organisation’s aims and opera-tions, its performance criteria or its publicimage. The outsiders could be external mem-bers of the administrative board, regular andinfluential in the governing process, as well asconsultants or members of networks cooperat-ing with the institution. The organisation’sinformation system should be able to registerthis data even if it proves difficult to gatherbecause of its informality, usually reflectingvarious actors’ needs and motivation.

Moreover, the management of evaluationimplies a proper follow-up of the recommen-dations made, i.e., getting people’s support forchange when they are shown the advantageof action adjustment. Wisdom consists here inshowing that a non-change attitude, after theevaluation has pointed to areas of weakness,could lead to external adaptation pressures,and that immobility can only undermine pre-sent positions, making it all the more difficultto adjust later.

The balance between rationalisation,innovation and preservation

Often, managers are tempted to give priorityto rationalisation, on the basis of efficiencycriteria – usually a reduction of costs thatleaves structures and roles as little affected aspossible. Indeed, when change is the key,innovation cannot be developed withoutsome rationalisation in order to provide trans-fer mobility in resource allocation as well asnew models of action. Thus, rationalisationusually leads to reorganising organisationalstructures and to developing new functionswhile, however, keeping to the basics of theexisting system.

A classical way of developing innovation is todesign experimental structures away frommainstream activities in the organisation;areas of transformation are set up at the mar-gin with their specific norms and evaluationcriteria. This allows for focusing, in mainstreamactivities, on rationalisation and efficiency, thusallowing for some questioning of current prac-tice. But, at some stage, innovation will needto be transferred from the periphery to thecore resources for increased structural change.This should lead to a difficult act of balancing

7

between rationalisation and innovation. Too often, the drive for rationalisation andinnovation, which professionally and evenculturally proves rewarding for managers,underestimates the damage it can imposeon situations that should be preserved in thelonger term interest of the organisation.

Ignoring the need for preservation can oftenendanger the institution or reduce its assetsby wasting the professional and technicalexperience of staff, thus jeopardising quality,norms of cooperation, processes and commu-nication or, more broadly, the organisationalclimate of the institution, i.e., its culturalnorms. It is an illustration of badly managedchange. Cultural organisations (universities inparticular) – which are made up of traditions,individual motivations, weak leadership, frag-mented and difficult communication proce-dures, as well as individual initiatives – areparticularly at risk.

Rationalisation, innovation and preservationmake up an interdependent system with itsown feedback loops. Designing and operat-ing an appropriate balance within this systemis at the core of strategic management, andtherefore of leadership. It cannot be an apriori policy, but should flow from the imple-mentation of change, while leaders remainaware of the danger of ignoring preservation.

Contradictions and paradoxes instrategic management

In a fast changing environment, an organisa-tion is often torn apart between differentobjectives, which are not necessarily coher-ent, especially in terms of their succession intime; an organisation working on projects,each with its own specificities, efficiency andquality criteria, types of personnel andresources, requires management to allow forinitiative from the people involved to fosterfast adjustment to unforeseen change.

Such an approach can reveal, sometimes in adramatic way, the organisation’s contradic-tions between the objectives of its staffmembers, their attitudes, their potential forchange, their constraints or their manage-ment operations. These contradictions caninduce unexpected consequences, good or

bad, and institutional leaders should be readyto manage them as components of truestrategic change, with high professional andcultural impact. This is an increasingly impor-tant dimension of management for change.In more classical terms, this represents thedialectical dimension of governance.

Many contradictions occur at the same level,i.e., within the same general framework ofrelations and criteria for action. The tradi-tional managerial solution has been to seekcompromise (by dividing stakes, risks andmeans), thus inducing short-term favourableconsequences. In the longer term, however,compromise could lead to inertia as it is builton acquired status and pre-existing strategies.For most leaders, this is seen as a stable solu-tion, a step which will introduce leverage tostructure future development. For others,however, compromise is but a temporary andtactical move, a stage conceived as part of alonger term perspective. Such managers canenvisage a changed future requiring renewednegotiations to decide on shared goals,action criteria and redistribution of resources.

On-going tensions will probably become therule when contradictions develop at differentlevels of institutional strategy. Indeed, in sucha case, the organisation deals with situationsof paradox rather than of contradiction.Paradoxes are confronting situations, posi-tions, languages or models, referring to differ-ent rationales. A compromise is thereforedifficult to design and implement in such asituation, as the frame of reference is not thesame.

Paradoxical management leaders shouldallow diverging situations to develop side byside, as an incentive towards the finding ofmanagement processes that differ accordingto the level recognised to specific goals andmeans inside the institution. While acceptingcontrasting situations leading to possible con-flicts, the organisation should re-design andadopt new models for action. In such a case,conflict brings about strategic innovation andrequires transformed leadership practices aswell as new cooperative networks.

In such a paradoxical context, managersshould play on those tensions and

8

encourage those institutional actors feelingestranged by continuous conflict to inventnew strategic models, the emergence andimplementation of which could be sustainedwithin the organisation. With the speed ofchange and the importance of external con-straints, history has provided many examplesof such managerial experience. Paradoxicalmanagement thus develops strategic modali-ties for new leadership processes in whichpreservation becomes a tool for the adminis-tration of institutional paradoxes.

Shock management

As an approach to managing change, shockcan be opposed to incremental changemanagement. Shock has its place in a strat-egy of change only if used at an appropriatetime when supporting the rhythm of change.Even so, members of the organisation shouldrealise that shock can always be employed,for mere necessity's sake. Such awarenesswould require some education, as comparedto the non-conflictual marginal move poli-cies, which usually reinforce conservativebehaviour, as people are quick to react toincremental change by using it for their owninterests.

Global and local commitments

Policy and strategy have traditionally beenconsidered as global dimensions of manage-ment, aimed at driving the whole organisa-tion towards its long-term future.Implementation has been regarded as affect-ing local levels of action. This can be true ina bureaucratic or thoroughly hierarchical sys-tem – as so often described in the literature.Everybody knows that in times of fast change,growing complexity and uncertainty, decen-tralisation and local initiatives are keys to thedevelopment of the whole institution. At suchmoments, a local initiative, in response to asignal of the market, or to the inventive spiritof local people, can, in the long run, turn intoa real strategic path for the organisation intoto, as the electronic bet taken by somedepartments or the use of Internet by othershave shown recently. Such an extension ofinnovation can occur if central managers arenot only informed in time of potentialchange, but also if they have the culture and

organisational capacity to “exploit” quicklysuch novelty, while spreading the informationthrough the strategic information system.

Looking from the top down, global views canbe interpreted only at the local level; mean-ing, motivation, awareness of practice arelocal; thus, they inform adaptation or inven-tion. Systems theory is indeed now teachingthat each item of a system incorporates allthe basic messages of the system and that“itemised” change can induce global change.Chaos theory also insists on the local sourceof global disturbance. In terms of manage-ment philosophy, this means that any generalpolicy, relative to a particular field of activity,must be explained and understood at alllevels of execution at which that activity isbeing implemented. Only language woulddiffer according to the audience and the typeof change agents.

Leadership consists in organising such global-local interactions, for the benefit of the insti-tution as a whole. This is not always easy as,in human affairs – the essence of manage-ment –, rational attitudes can only help tocommunicate and control global views; theirimplementation, however, always evokesfeelings among the members of the organi-sation: they desire to be informed, heard,respected, whatever the level of operations,even more so at the lower levels. Americanmanagers consider the affective illiteracy ofmanagers as an obstacle to innovation! Lookat Princess Diana’s tragic death and theincredible wave of emotions aroused by aroad accident turned into a stage of royalfate. Sentiments, feelings and emotions aregradually recovering their place in the under-standing of human behaviour in organisa-tions: this represents a big change in thetheory and practice of managerial processes.

Technical innovation and culture:Internet as a strategic revolution

Stressing personal growth in institutionaldevelopment is but one aspect of govern-ance. It could be comforted by theextended use of electronic communicationthat centers also on the individual. Thus, theInternet revolution should lead to majortransformations in activities and in relations,

9

especially with the new generation of easyaccess day-to-day tools, such as wireless tele-phones or satellite-televisions, which inte-grate sound, image and numeric data.

Indeed, by fostering communication and per-sonal interaction (through informationexchange, debate or networking), the Inter-net challenge strikes at the heart of socialdynamics. The electronic revolution calls formajor changes in the way people establishand conduct interpersonal relations, relyupon, confirm and contest their collectivenorms of behaviour. However, its real impacton social norms will depend on its culturalspecificity, i.e., on the values it implies and ontheir structuring role within the institution,not to speak of the prevailing rules protectingthe individual actors in the system.

It directly influences individuals’ newaspirations, motivations, referencemodels and, therefore, their political,economic and cultural organisation.

1. In political terms, this affects society’sorganising functions such as authority, leader-ship, regulation and control, or collectiveconsensus. It is clear that public administra-tion processes, sooner than expected, will beunder strong pressure to change, because ofnew modes of interaction between politicalpower and administration, on the one side,and more demanding citizens, on the other.

Power has, historically, combined “communi-cation” with “distance”. With the develop-ment of new interactive networks, people arenow able to gather information indepen-dently of the political powers' official wisdom.The desire for direct and efficient interactionwith public administration and leadershipshould be much enhanced, because the roleof traditional mediators (political agents,representatives of authority, establishmentgroups, including the media) will be chal-lenged by the new ease and capacity withwhich many people will participate in theactivities of real or virtual communities basedon exchange of individual views and on coor-dinated collective action.

More generally, as the German philosopherJürgen Habermas has suggested, the dyna-

mics of communication will change the con-cept and practice of State and Law, i.e., thecitizens' experience of democracy.

2. In cultural terms, this affects society’s lan-guage, values and significations, norms, mod-els of action, i.e., its communication, learningand teaching systems, its esthetics and leisurecriteria. The concept itself of culture, which inEurope has been traditionally linked with“enlightened” values and leadership or classcriteria, could become more attuned with the“expressed opinions” of a broader part of thepopulation, a trend already observed in thearts and media performances. This is charac-teristic of today’s mass societies.

Innovation is difficult for cultural institutions,which are supposed to preserve their funda-mental role, the collective development ofmethods of critical thinking, by keeping con-tact with the ideas of prominent thinkers andwith the heritage of culture. The rapiddecrease, now palpable, in the “reading”habits of society, even among students,challenges the self-discipline and reflectioninduced by writing and reading as the basisfor our civilisation. Mass culture, as evidencedin TV broadcasts, tends to value all opinionsin the same way, thus helping viewers toacquaint better with their neighbours’ exist-ence and needs. For Dominique Wolton,social democracy tends now to shape culturaldevelopment. European universities shouldnot stay aloof from this evolution of culturebut, on the contrary, they should reaffirm thebasic missions of higher education, also interms of culture, as required by the MagnaCharta of Bologna. Yet another paradoxicalchallenge for our institutions!

The cultural systems (in communication,education, leisure and sports, literature, per-forming arts and fine arts) will use newinformation technology heavily and widely.The language they use is already and fre-quently "permeated" by technical terms,which mirror rapid and widespread technicalchange. The level, nature and need for cul-tural development is modified, discussionsand exchanges of views will grow in impor-tance while reflecting socialisation andgroup action through fleeting interests andpersonal emotions.

10

3. In economic and managerial terms, thisaffects the production of goods and services,the markets for their exchange, the organisa-tion and use of information systems as well asthe modalities of human resource develop-ment, in other words it influences society’s“investment in people” and in their learningactivities, both being strategic processes in aknowledge society. The aim for the organisa-tion is for structures and personal behaviour tospread innovation by adapting quickly to newconstraints and opportunities, if possible at anacceptable cost. Achieving such a goal shouldbe at the core of governance strategies.

Setting up a new strategic information systemin the organisation could question the cul-tural norms of the institution, its structuresand resourcing policies and, of course, itsleadership. This is already the case in thedevelopment of “electronic commerce” andof network strategies for customised trade.

Powerful agents of change, such as thenew technical and managerial systemsof information, will probably influencesocial change in fast expanding areasand at fast growing rates.

Because the electronic revolution coincidesand combines itself, in time and space, withimportant cultural changes in society, thepersonal and social needs of citizens, theirsense of human dignity, equality or theirexercise of liberty, are now at stake.

The new norms stress personal autonomy,i.e., the need to “express” one’s own opin-ions and needs; one’s desire to communicate,to be heard, to be listened to; one’s wish forinformation and the discussion of one’s ownspecific problems; in other words, the “right”to be informed and “respected”. Thus, citi-zens expect from society more equality interms of personal recognition and individualconcerns, more personalised attention totheir problems and efforts: “We are all equalsand formality is an obstacle to free exchangesof views and to innovative practices”.Learning, leisure, entertainment, game play-ing, formal reasoning and mere expressionof opinions are becoming increasingly com-bined, or just mixed, in work, speech and,

also it would appear, in education. The infor-mation society will certainly enhance this evo-lution in social development.

According to Pierre Bonnelli, the chairman ofSEMA, a powerful Anglo-French group ofinformation services, these are still latentneeds, although they are calling for fulfil-ment. The present convergence between newneeds and new techniques is revolutionaryand should change the strategic evolution ofour societies. New marketing methods,thanks to the power of information systems,permit targeting personal profiles.Organisations will need to focus more andmore on the client’s customised needs, unlessunforeseen cultural factors block this trend.

Universities will soon meet, and in fact havestarted to face, those new latent needs, asexpressed by the changing mentalities, normsand attitudes of their students, a new behav-iour that will be hastened and reinforced bythe formidable growth of communicationtechniques. In fact, university students, withan increasing proportion of adults, nowconsider themselves as “users” of academicservices to answer their cultural, professional,if not their personal needs.

In other words, being deeply immersed in allthe currents of social change, students nolonger consider themselves as members of aseparate academic community, the medievaluniversitas. This is a major challenge. Thegeneralisation of evaluation methods should,in this sense, work towards developing someform of cultural lingua franca, making valuesand attitudes explicit among faculty and stu-dents – at least as far as the universities'objectives, means and activities are con-cerned. Evaluation comes out as one of themain tools of university governance andstrategic management.

Universities cannot ignore such overwhelm-ing trends in communication and socialnorms, nor can they delay their inclusioninto strategic management and thinking.This represents a vast domain of compara-tive and coordinated scientific research, thatshould induce concerted action on aEuropean scale.

11

Much attention in the current developmentsand debate on strategic planning and qualityassurance has focused on technical issues andthe design of various rational instruments ofinstitutional transformation. However, the inter-action of actors in the policy formation andimplementation processes is at the core of anysuccessful reform, but bound up with tensionswhich derive from differences in intellectualopinion on the best way forward, as well asfrom vested interests and fear of the unknown.Strategic management (including the qualityprocess) is thus permeated with contradictionsand paradoxes. Institutional leaders thereforehave come to appreciate that such contradic-tions have to be lived with, that strategicdevelopment, far from being a linear process,is highly interactive, and that tensions have tobe positively and creatively managed.

Central to this issue is the question of theeffective assembly, management and circula-tion of knowledge about the performanceand direction of the university. Any qualityassurance system within a strategic contextshould incorporate means by which the uni-versity learns about itself, then undertakes

activities deemed necessary for constructivechange, the so-called virtuous circle.Universities should conceive of themselves as“learning organisations”, not in a conven-tional pedagogic sense, but in the sense ofself-evaluation and ongoing monitoring, lead-ing to continuing enhancement of an institu-tion’s capacity to respond to, and lead, aturbulent environment. This clearly calls forsome university-wide strategic awareness orintelligence which does not destroy or inhibitthe creativity of the academic heartland, butenhances its vitality.

In the light of the above, this paper attemptsto analyse characteristics of cultures in univer-sities, and the extent to which particulartypes of culture support strategic and qualityinitiatives. It then goes on to explore issues inthe transformation of cultures and the variousapproaches open to institutional leaders inthis process, exploring in operational detailsome of the tensions and paradoxes discussedby P. Tabatoni. This is inevitably bound upwith a discussion of leadership authority, styleand instruments of change (especially at rec-tor’s level), and supporting structures.1

PREAMBLE

12

1 This paper builds on evidence collected by the author as academic director of the CRE(EUA)-IMHE rectors’ Management Seminar over some 28seminars, and as team leader, member or secretary of many institutional evaluations in Europe and Australasia under the aegis of CRE(EUA),IMHE and ACA and for various national governments and universities as well as for the Salzburg Seminar Universities project.

CULTURAL CHANGE IN UNIVERSITIES IN THE CONTEXT OFSTRATEGIC AND QUALITY INITIATIVESJohn Davies, Dean of Graduate School, Anglia Polytechnic University &Professor of Higher Education Policy and Management, University of Bath

The existing organisational culture in manyuniversities may not be at all conducive to thesustainability of organisational learning, bothin terms of enhancing knowledge acquisitionacross the institution, and in terms of using itconstructively for organisational change. Theliterature on organisational cultures in univer-sities emphasises how complex a phenome-non this is. McNay (1995), building on previ-ous studies, classifies university cultures alongtwo interrelated dimensions. The first is thatof the structure and character of policy for-mation which may be tightly determined bysenior leadership at university level, or, alter-natively, rather loose. The second is that ofthe nature of operational activity, which maybe tightly regulated at one end of the spec-trum by a host of rules and conventions(state or institutional) or rather loose at theother end, which clearly gives leaders andacademics in the lower parts of the university

much more operating autonomy and free-dom. This yields four categories of institu-tional culture: bureaucratic (loose on policy;tight on regulation); collegial (loose on pol-icy; loose on regulation); corporate (tight onboth policy and regulation); and entrepre-neurial (tight on policy; loose on regulation).The first paradox or contradiction we mayidentify is that, whilst a particular universitymay display an emphasis on one of theabove, inevitably all four dimensions will bepresent to a certain degree, in a specific partof the university (so that a business schoolmay be very entrepreneurial, whilst otherfaculties are not), or for a specific function(financial management clearly has to bebureaucratic in many respects given thedemands of external public accountability).The institutional leader has thus to be able tomanage strategically in different cultural set-tings, particularly within the institution, where

EXISTING CULTURES INUNIVERSITIES

the collegial mode often dominates as part ofthe academic heartland of the university.

Leaders attempting to introduce strategic orquality initiatives usually encounter difficultieslinked especially to cultures with a heavycollegial emphasis, eg.:

1. A tendency to avoid problems. This maybe explained by the individualistic cultureswhich generally respect individual academicsovereignty for teaching and research; more-over, the development of highly specialistareas of knowledge may also limit challengeor learning from other perspectives, andinduce reward structures based on the indi-vidual rather than the group. The reluctanceto confront difficult issues may be linked tosheer cowardice! In a strategic managementsetting, the practical consequences of avoid-ance are defensiveness, isolationism, non-accountability and fragmented information,which makes quality-oriented processesproblematical to install.

2. When quality assurance is initiated as a for-mal process, it is normally a top-down activ-ity, fuelled by external accountability or finan-cial reduction, requiring crisis management.Traditions of low corporate identity will createtension and defensiveness that are reflectedin non-compliance with quality processes.This translates into a reluctance to admiterrors and to be self-critical, information thenbeing passed upwards in a substantiallyunfiltered manner.

3. The fact that many universities are publicand tied to state higher education bureaucra-cies could also lead to prevalence of the rule-book and maintenance-oriented procedures.This may be encouraged by fragmentedinformation flows designed for externalaccountability purposes, as well as by limitedplanning horizons, or a separation betweenplanning and evaluative processes – all ofwhich do not help sustain quality processesin the sense outlined by Tabatoni.

4. It is also common to find barriers to thesustainability of a quality culture in the feed-back/evaluative process itself. This process isoften ambiguous (apart from some simpleperformance indicators) in terms of objective

measures. Arrival at commonly acceptedinterpretation of terms and reality may beproblematic owing to the different agendas,interests and behaviours of the various actors.There may also be lengthy delays in the feed-back, particularly for impact measures, whichrender short-term adjustments hazardouswhen contexts alter; such delays are problem-atical for consensus building.

5. A barrier exists between academic andadministrative staff, which is not simply hier-archical, but may reflect fundamental differ-ences in values and operating styles, all themore so as the two groups draw on differentknowledge bases. Each version of so-called“reality” is only partial. Filtering out of dataoccurs on both sides – and differentially – sothat the debate on quality and evaluationissues may take place from quite differentstandpoints. However, the tendency points tosome managerial discipline being imposed ona hitherto highly collegial culture, as a resultof the changing role of rectors, vice-rectorsand deans. In fact, these senior officers areoften caught in a personal paradox: are theyadministrators or academics? Especially in thecase of deans, are they part of senior manage-ment, (with what is implied in terms of collec-tive responsibility for strategic decisions) orpart, not to say leaders, of a devolved collegialstructure? They may find extreme difficulty incoping with the demands and role expecta-tions of the rectorate, on the one hand, and oftheir faculty colleagues on the other.

6. Different disciplines also display differentoperating assumptions, beliefs and modes ofbehaviour, which clearly influence the way ofunderstanding issues, approaches to decision-making, and means of intervening in com-plex issues.

7. Furthermore, many rectors and universityleaders have had at their disposal an ambigu-ous set of instruments of organisationalchange, and this clearly affects the possibilityof implementing desired quality strategies.We shall return to this later.

One might thus conclude that, by and large,existing institutional cultures are not con-ducive to the sustainability of systematicstrategic and quality activities, in particular

13

when they appear natural and inevitable, andcan be defended as part of academic freedomagainst arbitrary executive action, as anincentive to individual creativity within theacademic community. However, operatingcultures in universities are shifting from aheavy emphasis towards the bureaucratic andcollegial aspects to an entrepreneurial andcorporate orientation. This should result in a

greater concentration on strategic, university-wide thinking (usually prompted by externalconstraints): serious discussion may developon the extent of devolved authority neededto realise strategic purposes in ways bestsuited to the devolved unit (faculty) and itsexternal constituencies; that evolution oftenleads to use of resource incentives anddevolved budgeting.

EMERGING CULTURESCONDUCIVE TO

STRATEGIC, QUALITY-RELATED ENDEAVOURS

14

1. A “learning organisation” being naturallyadaptive, self-reflexive, and self-critical atstrategic and operational levels, a “learninguniversity” should display a strong ability toidentify, confront and resolve problems; itmeans recognising its weaknesses, collectivelyand singly, and acting accordingly; it impliesalso to use internal competitiveness and com-parisons transparently and constructively, aswell as a readiness to account for perfor-mance. Such features are not obvious inEUA quality reviews: therefore, institutionsreviewed have not often developed staffappraisal and development processes.

2. Transformation should then be groundedin the experimentation and tolerance oferror as a counterbalance to stability andpredictability. Such a non-punitive ethosimplies transparency, openness and frank-ness, not only in leadership style, but also inthe incentives and support systems of insti-tutional change. It encourages conscious risktaking, i.e., the capacity to prepare for theunexpected.

3. An “adaptive” university is thus able tomake choices openly and systematically bydetermining clear measurable objectivesgenerated through consensus and commit-ment. Not an easy task for leaders facing adilemma difficult to resolve: how to balancedemocratic procedures against executivepower, as consensus does not automaticallyarise out of strategic thinking or vice-versa.

4. Flexibility is therefore essential, i.e., thewillingness of leaders at various levels to testthe legitimacy, relevance and robustness ofrules and regulations: this could mean allow-ing space for a dean or an entrepreneurialprofessor to contest the administration, or fora rector to question a national agency, with agood chance of being heard.

5. Hence, the creation of consciouslydesigned feedback loops is important to turnexperiments and initiatives into learning,spreading information on good practicethroughout the institution, and providingshort turn-around time for the use of evalua-tion results. Cross-university/cross disciplinelinkages are not, however, so common inmany universities, where rigid demarcationsbetween faculties still represent a major con-straint to multi-disciplinary approaches – notto speak of simply learning about other facul-ties! Therefore, building what James calls a“collective IQ” is not always evident.

6. Since organisational change in universities,to be thorough, must occur way down in theorganisation, the basic academic unit – thedepartment or its equivalent – is the key tocultural transformation. Recognising tradi-tional autonomy is one thing, but it will neverstimulate a quality or strategic culture in theinstitution unless team performance isrewarded as much as individual results. Inother words, a collective approach to qualityexercises remains a prerequisite for institu-tional change.

7. Structural experimentation, therefore,characterises an emerging culture of trans-formation in which formal and former struc-tures are no longer considered adequate tonew purposes when the institution needs tocope with different external stakeholders,each with a different agenda, in terms ofservice requirements and time frames (forcontinuing education, technology transfer,franchising, co-operative education, inde-pendent study, and e-learning, to mention afew fields for concerted change). The differ-entiation of demand requires a diversifica-tion of organisational patterns, both in inter-faces with the environment and in internaloperations. Tensions, contradictions and

paradoxes can then be accommodatedwithin an institution through purpose-builtstructures and personnel arrangements fordifferent organisational objectives and prior-ities. Universities, however, run the risk thata wide spectrum of objectives will affecttheir sense of identity, all the more so whenthey depend on simple linear organisationstructures, based on historic roles andfunctions.

In order to support an overall institutionalspecificity, one would not only expect differen-tiated structures, but also conscious experi-mentation monitored from the centre, thusdeveloping a structured process of organisa-tional learning based on shared evaluation cri-teria, on accepted assessment modalities, andon a clear understanding of the identity andmotives of the reviewers. In short, the univer-sity must be able to learn from its experiments.

MATURATION OFSTRATEGIC,

QUALITY-ORIENTEDINSTITUTIONAL CULTURES

15

Pierre Tabatoni pleads for a greater sophisti-cation in strategic thinking and management,using inter alia openness and transparency,credibility, collective education and innova-tion. Developing such elements for strategicmanagement and quality assurance requires arelatively slow process of maturation if univer-sities are to cope with the many tensions forchange inside and outside. Maturity is not aninstantaneous process, and its evolution maybe discerned as follows:

1. First, interpersonal and intergroup under-standing should evolve both within universi-ties and between university personnel andexternal stakeholders. The 1998 CRE studyanalysing the dialogue of universities withtheir regional stakeholders pointed to fivestages in the development of effective andmature working relationships (see Figure 1,p.16) that cannot be short-circuited. Theprocess is both intuitive and interactive. Thesame considerations apply in creating maturerelationships internally. The contention here isthat tensions and contradictions often reflectmisunderstanding or lack of information aswell as genuinely held beliefs. A sense of theevolution of dialogue towards trust andrespect of the other is an intrinsic part of thedialectic to which Tabatoni refers.

2. The evolution towards maturity in strategicand quality domains is partly related to thedegree of importance given to activities inboth fields. A low level of activity does notlead to much visibility or sense of priority,thus downgrading the sense of urgencyneeded to learn on these issues.

3. Of equal importance in the maturation ofstrategic and quality cultures is the degree ofsystematisation adopted by the university inits approaches to new challenges, i.e., the

institution’s sophistication. Does it mainlyrespond to change needs in an ad hoc dis-jointed manner, with little attempt to developrobust policy and procedural frameworks, ordoes it carefully attempt to design stableinstruments to guide collective behaviour,thus building on experience of good prac-tice? In the latter case, the tensions outlinedby Tabatoni have been built on and used cre-atively: in the former, the tensions will tend toparalyse lateral learning and restrict construc-tive innovation.

The dimensions of maturity outlined abovemay be portrayed diagrammatically, as in Figure2 (see on p.16): its four different quadrantsreflect different approaches to the question.• Quadrant A: Low on importance/volume,

and low on systematisation.• Quadrant B: Low on importance/volume,

and high on systematisation.• Quadrant C: High on importance/volume,

and low on systematisation.• Quadrant D: High on importance/volume,

and high on systematisation.

These categories are broad generalisations,and, whilst at institutional level, one type maylargely predominate, elements of all four maybe recognised somewhere in the university,given the nature of the institution as anorganisation, and the cultural idiosyncrasiesof different subject disciplines.

Four strategic questions arise for the institu-tional leader when considering this typology:

(a) Which category best describes the currentposition of the institution?

(b) Are the leader and the various interestgroups in the institution satisfied with thisposition, or should there be movement toanother, more desirable, quadrant?

FIGURE 1MATURITY SPECTRUM

FOR INTER-GROUPEFFECTIVENESS

16

Ability of partici-

pants to under-

stand terminology

and expectations

Ability of partici-

pants to identify

and describe all

relevant elements

in interaction

Ability of partici-

pants to analyse all

elements in terms

of effectiveness

Ability of participants

to confront problems,

criticise openly and con-

structively the elements

and respective roles

Ascending levels of maturity

FIGURE 2INSTITUTIONAL

MATURITY IN RESPECTOF STRATEGIC AND

QUALITY PROCESSESLow Ad hoc High

Degree of systematisation in internal processes

High

Degree of impor-tance of strategicand quality processesand the volume ofprocess activity

A B

C D

Excessivebureaucratisation?

(c) If the latter, to which quadrant should theinstitution move?

(d) How should the movement be stimulated,managed and achieved?

These four questions are clearly at the hub ofcultural transformation. In general, we mayreasonably say that Quadrant A is probablythe weakest in terms of strategic and qualityculture, whereas Quadrant D is the strongest.

However, for many institutions, in southernand central/eastern Europe in particular,Quadrant A often represents the current loca-

tion, and, as long as the external imperativescan be reasonably accommodated, a move-ment from A to B, and then maybe to D, isprobably optimal. Quadrant C should beavoided, if possible, since the combination offrenetic activity with uncoordinated growthsimply leads to so-called “organised anarchy”.Moreover, it is rather difficult to move fromC to D, assuming that the latter is a desiredposition, since the ad hoc nature of effort inC may well have become endemic andbeyond control in the institution. In otherwords, Quadrant C could prove to be a deadend.

TOWARDS A STRATEGICAND QUALITY-ORIENTED

CULTURE

17

To enrich a quality culture within universities,the question posed is “how to move a univer-sity to a more desired position in the matrix”,where quality has a higher priority, and wherestrategy is better systematised.

External factors

Various environmental factors, i.e., frame-work conditions in which institutions oper-ate, have played an important role in chang-ing attitude to strategy and quality in mostsystems and universities. They refer to theneeds of government departments (educa-tion, finance, industry and trade), statehigher education agencies (planning, fund-ing or quality), rectors’ conferences or peergroups of institutions or subject specialisms,industrial or commercial stakeholders (inter-ested in the nature, quality and price ofservices), individual consumer groups (stu-dents), research funding bodies (publiccouncils, academies and foundations), andinternational agencies. Each university issubject to various combinations of suchexternal requirements, depending on its aca-demic profile, mix of activities and particularcontext, and the relative weight of theseexternal demands is clearly an importantfactor for the institution’s possible response.For universities subject to all the above, thereconciliation and accommodation of differ-ences requires internal management skill ofa high order, and considerable sensitivity toexternal agendas.

Social demand may nourish the developmentof diverse quality-oriented cultures, forinstance, by

(a) requiring universities directly to operateor conform to externally designed qualityprocesses for assessing teaching andresearch, a culture of compliance;

(b) requiring universities to develop internalprocesses which are intended to satisfybroad external criteria and benchmarks,a culture of introspection;

(c) requiring universities to set standards foraccreditation purposes, a culture ofnormalisation;

(d) requiring universities to have an institu-tional strategy and transparent qualityprocesses, a culture of quality management;

(e) requiring linkages between quality reviewsand resource allocation, directly or indi-rectly, a culture of retroactive strategies;

(f) benchmarking university performance insuch domains as teaching, research, costeffectiveness, value for money, resourcebase, student satisfaction, incomegeneration, a culture of transparency.

Viewed as a spectrum, these various “cultures”range from point (a), enslaving obedience, topoint (f), informed service.

All too often, universities replicate internallytheir approaches to external demands. Then,the internal culture is driven by outsideneeds, an understandable development giventhe threats which external evaluation mayvery well pose. Such a trend becomes partic-ularly obvious when quality officers, internal

reviews, quality committees, or directors ofquality abound. To meet the requirements setby some external industrial stakeholders, forinstance, the university could adopt generallyrecognised commercial or public sector TotalQuality regimes, such as ISO 9000, at the riskof disagreeing with the university’s missionand vision, thus evoking new sources oftension inside the institution.

There is clearly a wide psychological spec-trum of responses by universities to the above… from a highly defensive closed, even rigid,stance ready to repel perceived invaders (inwhich the admission of failure is not high oninstitutional agendas) to a welcoming stancein which the university, trusting in its owncapacities, will be frank, tolerant and open,and will use external initiative as a means ofstimulating internal change.

However, whatever type of external frame-work appertains, many universities wouldnot have adopted, or moved towards astrategy and quality culture, without anexternal stimulus of some kind. The forcesof traditional academe, whilst clearlyquality-oriented, especially at lower levelsin terms of scientific relevance, have oftennot permitted a strategically oriented qual-ity culture with its own mechanisms, atinstitutional level.

Internal factors

If quality transformation often relies on exter-nal stimulation, quite a few universities haveachieved change by enhancing internal qual-ity awareness; for their rectors and seniorleaders, external imperatives have becomeextra means for changing behaviour, when itbecame obvious that refusing change wouldjeopardise the institution’s future. Strategicand quality processes are ideally about

(a) holding up a mirror so that the institutionand its parts are able to see themselves forwhat they really are, rather than cling toobsolete identity myths;

(b) providing to people at all levels within theinstitution insights about existing issues,as well as possibilities and perspectives ofchange;

(c) providing a vehicle for the provision ofstructured advice in relation to definedissues and opportunities;

(d) providing education in the ways andmeans of institutional improvement.

It might therefore be said that effectivequality processes are, in fact, exercises in thesupportive destabilisation of the status quo,with a view to constructive transformation.The process builds on uncertainty regardingthe validity of status quo arrangements, thusstimulating an assessment of institutionalstrengths and weaknesses as far as mission,strategy, processes, role, structure andresources are concerned; this internal andcreative capability to be critical often refersto similar phenomena in other institutions:such comparisons allow for improvement.Changes in behaviour and attitude are thedesired end-products of the exercise.

When universities move across the matrix,various activities may prove unhelpful, and,as experience indicates, should be avoided.There is no need for processes which areerratic and inconsistent, which offer exces-sively narrow and rigid perspectives, whichreflect partiality and bias, or which containheavy, costly, and time-consuming datacollection. Such processes, indeed, are likelyto deter innovation, while leading to substan-tial demotivation.

18

To develop sound quality cultures whichmove their institutions broadly in the direc-tion of Quadrant D (High Priority/System-atic), senior managers may adopt severaldistinctive leadership strategies. Thoughconceptually distinct, in terms of underlyingleadership style, they are nonetheless linkedin practice, since university leaders will usuallycombine them for effective implementation,

thus remaining sensitive to the micropoliticalmap of the university. Some university groupsmay well respond to rational approaches,others to normative educative approaches,and others to the exercise of more power-related political approaches. Considerableflexibility and judgement of the strategies’appropriateness is thus required fromuniversity.

LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES

1. Rational approaches to the developmentof quality cultures, and the movementtowards Quadrant D, are based on theassumption that the people who inhabit uni-versities are generally rational, and will reactpositively to arguments which are clearly andlogically presented, demonstrate a case, andare supported by sound and relevant data.

In this event, the quality strategy must beclear and explicit, its rationale (external andinternal) transparent, its purpose well-defined, its decision clear, and its link to insti-tutional mission obvious. A rational qualityculture calls for performance indicators whichare perceived to be relevant and appropriateto what is to be assessed, neither excessive innumber and complexity, nor overpowering interms of the paperwork which is generated.Legitimate ground rules would be expectedfor the operation of the system, with accom-panying documentation and handbooks forthe various parties – evaluators, evaluated,and system maintainers. In addition, legiti-mate experts – internal or external – whosespecific reports are likely to have credibilitywith the evaluated, should fulfil the role ofchange agents. Finally, the whole effort mustbe supported by a respected organisationalframework to guide the quality endeavours,for instance an office or offices to sustain theprocess and provide assistance, as well as aforum to discuss policy and define outcomes.

Whilst rational approaches may certainly bejustified in terms of intellectual rigour, this,per se, does not generate acceptance by theacademic community, given that the contextof their use may be fraught with financialreduction, local crises and internal micropoli-tics. It is normally wise to develop such “ratio-nal” instruments in a period of relative institu-tional calm, and well before they are likely tobe used for rather difficult organisational pur-poses. In this case, questions of validity andintegrity are rather less likely to arise, givingacademics less opportunities to disparage thevalidity of the proposed instruments andprocesses.

Rational approaches clearly imply highlytransparent and open procedures and a freeflow of information. This is more difficult tosustain in a very turbulent environment.

2. Given the limitations of rational behaviourpatterns in the academic community, forma-tive or educative approaches to strategicquality culture development can better concurto change. The underlying assumption here isthat people are likely to feel threatened bythe development of quality instruments,which could reveal personal inadequacies interms of past performance, or because theiruse brings insecurity and uncertainty in termsof induced change. Educative approaches arethus designed to enable academics and otherstaff to feel comfortable and proficient inchanged circumstances, in order to reduceresistance, alienation and the feeling of inade-quacy. Rectorate and deans can set an exam-ple by subjecting themselves to review andpersonal development initiatives. Widespreadbriefings on the reasons why qualityprocesses are needed, the likely ramificationsand consequences of their use at variouslevels, and a demonstration, in specific terms,of expected and likely positive outcomes arealso vital. If difficulties are likely to crop up,staff should be briefed on the support theycan expect when coping with change.Colleagues could be further involved in thedesign of processes, relevant structures, per-formance indicators and databases as thisshould generate commitment and ownershipof the change process. Systematic trainingand staff development are also important tostrenghten mature approaches: external andinternal workshops for both academics andnon-academics on assessment procedurescould lead to counselling, mentoring andrelated activities, in order to provide tailor-made assistance to staff members involved ina specific area of transformation.

The rector benefits from a significant advantagedue to his/her position, i.e., a global understand-ing of all the facets of a quality issue and of aquality strategy; this gives the leaders immensescope for institutional integration and cross-refer-encing. Moreover, the rector often has advancenotice of likely external issues and strategicdevelopments, because of membership of thenational rectors’ conference and closeness to thenational higher education agencies; thus, univer-sity leadership should be able to prepare thepolitical climate of the institution for the likelybig issues looming on the horizon, or use insideinformation to create shock.

19

The educative approach is in essence a con-tinuous procedure, highly flexible to theneeds of particular groups when assistance isrequired. Therefore, considerable calls arelikely to be made on expert support from uni-versity quality offices, from quality specialistsat faculty level, all people able to identify anddiagnose likely problem areas at an earlystage, and to provide support, remediationand follow-up. The constructive partnershipbetween rector’s office, strategic planningoffice, quality office, staff developmentdepartment and deans is thus a key factor inthe evolution of a quality culture.

3. There will inevitably be occasions whenthe rational and educative approaches abovemay need to be supplemented by a third,the political or power-coercive approach.The assumption here is that, in times oforganisational stress and high conflict, thedensity of institutional micro-politics is likelyto increase substantially. Even in relativelyquiet times, there will always be people whodo not respond positively to rational oreducative approaches. Thus, acquiescence orcompliance with university strategy may needto be achieved through other means. This isoften quite difficult in various institutional ornational settings where the formal instru-ments of authority available to the rector arenot adequate when facing substantial opposi-tion from colleagues. To enlarge on rationaland educative approaches, however, politicalapproaches may encompass a number of dif-ferent possibilities if power is to be exerted.

(a) Rectors and senior leaders may well wishto sustain change by referring to sources ofexecutive legitimacy, the university law orcharter; or to the authority delegated by theMinistry, Senate, University Council; or totheir personal job descriptions. Credibilityoften arises from a rectoral election, especiallyif it can rely on strong management struc-tures. However, this needs to be supplement-ed by personal competence, credibility andreputation, as expressed by trust and prestige(personal and scientific).

(b) The targeted use of reviews and perfor-mance indicators on those parts of the uni-versity deemed to be in need of improve-ment, investment or remediation, and the

widespread publication of results arising arean important tactic to destabilise the statusquo, and may certainly be an exercise ofpower. This little group of instruments canput considerable pressure on particulargroups within the institution, developingquality awareness in the area concerned, andhelping others to realise that they are notimmune from such pressure.

(c) Resulting from such a targeted use ofreviews, a link with funding can also be estab-lished either within or alongside the normalbudgetary process. Funds may be awardedor withdrawn, evoking formidable incentivesto quality awareness and, progressively, to astrategic culture. That represents “shock tactic”in a different guise. Aggressive follow-up ofchange induced by a review exercise is likelyto have the same effect.

(d) To make obvious the need for change,rectors may wish to engage external review-ers coming from the stakeholders’ commu-nity, especially if the academic unit concernedrelies on such outside partner for business orcredibility (e.g., a health authority, company,or government department).

(e) In terms of the formulation, legitimisationand acceptance of a quality strategy in thefirst place, rectors may well exert their powerin bartering loss and advantages amongvarious university groups, thus developingcoalitions of university interest groups whocan deliver a majority verdict for a policy; thisneeds clear steering techniques (appointmentof committee chairs and members; influenceon agenda setting; provision of documenta-tion etc.).

(f) The selection or nomination of allies to keypositions in the strategy quality process is aninstrument certainly open to rectors who, insome systems, can influence the choice of avice-rector for strategy or quality, of the direc-tor for the quality office, or even of the deans.This can help influence and condition subse-quent behaviour by academic colleagues inthe area concerned.

(g) An especially important area of concernshould be the composition and operation ofthe rectorate or senior management group

20

itself. Here, the important elements would befor members to share values on the qualityagendas relevant to the university, to developfrequent contact and dialogue throughoutthe university (for instance, when deans arepart of the institutional management teams).One would expect that one member of therectorate has prime responsibility for qualitymatters as a whole, but all senior managersshould feel responsible for quality within theirportfolios – be it teaching and learning,research, postgraduate or continuingeducation.

It might be argued that these devices are notnecessarily power-coercive approaches per se.Nonetheless, they are tools often used to forcerather than encourage movement in a specificpart of the university. As such, their inclusionin political instruments is justified.

We have already alluded to the importanceof the dynamics of policy formation in under-standing the nature of paradoxes, utilisingthe existence of tensions to foster change.Therefore, the skill of the leader in recognis-ing and exploiting ambiguity is crucial.Analysis shows that a policy portfolio needsto encompass strategic directions (size, shapeand scope of the university) as well as sup-porting “bread and butter” policies (for cur-riculum, research, personnel, finance, busi-ness generation etc.) if it is to reinforce trustin the process of transformation, particularly

in a turbulent environment where effectivepolicy-making (in relation to the originalcrisis) tends to move through four stages:

• an ambiguous stage (typified by a clarifi-cation of the dimensions of the problemand the parameters of likely solutions, andby an identification of policy actors in aclimate of high tension and uncertainty);

• a political stage (typified by a sorting outof viable policy options, by the selectionof incentives and bargains, by informality,and by a solid information base);

• a legitimisation phase (typified by thetesting of solutions against criteria, bypolitical acceptability leading to commit-ment, and by formal collegial approvalprocesses);

• a bureaucratisation stage completingthe maturation process and correspond-ing to implementation.

One is not insinuating in the above that rec-tors should become unbridled disciples ofMachiavelli in the development of a particulartype of culture. Rather, in view of the micro-politics of the academe, there is a need forpolitical as well as intellectual leadership of ahigh order. That is why institutional leadersshould develop a balanced portfolio ofapproaches – rational, formative and political– in order to move the institution to a posi-tion which is both one of high priority and anappropriate systematisation.

21

The stimulation of university cultures support-ive of strategic quality endeavours is far fromeasy, but is probably a precondition of effectivequality operations. Such stimulation usuallyneeds a kick-start from externally inspired ini-tiatives, at least if a university-wide approach isto be achieved. However, given the nature ofthe academic community, its beliefs and values

concerning innovative and creative research,teaching and community service, the institu-tion requires a quality-related culture thatavoids rigidity, and harnesses the enthusiasmand sense of ownership of the academe. In thisrespect, the selection by university leaders ofappropriate approaches to cultural transforma-tion is clearly critical.

CONCLUSION

22

Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1978). “Organisational Learning: a Theory of Action”. Perspective.Addison-Wesley.

Barnett, R. (2000). The University in an Age of Super-Complexity. Society for Research into HigherEducation. Open University Press.

Becher, A. and Trowler, P. R. (2001). Academic Tribes and Territories. Society for Research into HigherEducation. Open University Press.

Clark, B. (1998). The Entrepreneurial University. Pergamon Press.

Davies, J. L. (1985). “Personnel Policies at a Time of Financial Reduction: the Case of the StateUniversity of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo”. Higher Education Management Vol. 9, No. 2. OECD.

Davies, J. L. (1985). Policy Formation in Universities: the Management Challenge. Lockwood, G. andDavies, J. L. Nelson.

Davies, J. L. (1998). The Dialogue of Universities with their Regional Stakeholders: ComparisonsBetween Different Regions of Europe. 11th General Assembly, Berlin. CRE (now EUA).

Duderstadt, J. (2000). A University for the Twenty-First Century. University of Michigan Press.

Duke, C. (1992). The Learning University: Towards a Paradigm. Society for Research into HigherEducation. Open University Press.

Eckel, P., Green M. and Hill, B. (2001). On Change: Riding the Waves of Change : Insights fromTransforming Institutions. American Council on Education.

James, R. (2000). “Quality Assurance and the Growing Puzzle of Managing OrganisationalKnowledge”. Higher Education Management Vol. 12, No. 3. OECD.

McNay, I. (1995). “From Collegial Academy to Academic Enterprise: The Changing Cultures ofUniversity” in Schuller, T. (Ed.) The Changing University. Society for Research into Higher Education.Open University Press.

Middlehurst et al (2000). The Business of Borderless Education. Higher Education Funding Councilfor England, Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (now Universities UK).

Wächter, B. (Ed) (1998). Vision 20-10: European University Leaders’ Perspectives on the Future. 11thGeneral Assembly, Berlin. CRE (now EUA).

REFERENCES

The management of a body is a way ofconducting collective action on the part ofthose responsible for it. While “govern-ment” and “leadership” are also employed,these terms tend to express the structuresof command and control, whereas“management“ describes the processes bywhich collective action is stimulated with aview to change.

The aim of any management activity is to steerthe development of a body in certain direc-tions, to co-ordinate its different initiatives tothe same end, and to ensure that its adminis-trative activities deliver the appropriate sup-port, logistic, evaluation and control services.It is essential that management and adminis-tration, which are highly interdependent, arecoherently devised and implemented.

MANAGEMENT ANDADMINISTRATION

23

AN EXPLANATORY GLOSSARYPierre Tabatoni, Académie des Sciences morales et politiques

As part of the function of management, theultimate aim of policies and strategies is toguide the activities and operation of a univer-sity with respect to the transformations in itsenvironment which are observed, foreseeableor liable to result from its own innovations.These bearings or objectives apply to its activi-ties, structures, methods and operationalregulations, as well as its resources, relationsand public image. They concern the entire uni-versity when they are defined and acted on byits central bodies, or each of its decentralisedunits (faculties, departments, institutes orresearch centres, and services) whenever theypossess some developmental autonomy.

Policy is formulated in terms of general princi-ples regarding what to do (or not do) andhow: it comprises rules and common stan-dards which condition the long-term develop-

ment of an institution. Strategies reflect policyfrom an operational standpoint, defining a setof aims and associated means. They fix priori-ties and balances to be respected across differ-ent objectives. They determine precise goals,whose achievement can be measured and per-formances evaluated. And, finally, they specifytheir time frame, allocate responsibilities andresources, organise structures and ways ofworking and set up evaluation exercises. Apolicy may thus give rise to several differentstrategies, all of which are compatible with itsgeneral thrust.

Policy and strategy thus engender quality cri-teria for evaluation of activities. This evalua-tion makes it possible to see how objectivesand goals are implemented and to analyseobstacles and positive factors, and may some-times lead to their reappraisal.

POLICY AND STRATEGIES

The identity of a university seeks to communi-cate the essential aspects of its different tasks, thespecific nature of its objectives and methods, andits public image. Although symbolic, identity issufficiently precise to influence subsequent strate-gic decisions and give rise to arbitration regard-ing new institutional policies. The latter express,in terms of action principles, the concreteembodiment of this identity. They also define thequality criteria that are the basis of institutionalevaluation. By this is meant the appraisal of thecapacity of the university to formulate and fur-ther general policies for change, which affect thelong-term development of the entire institution.

With the development of numerous and variednetworking activities both internally and withexternal partners, and as part of the futureinformation society, universities might gradu-

ally assume a more virtual form, in which itwould become hard to circumscribe preciselytheir activities, and structural and organisa-tional rules, indeed their very being.Ultimately, the identity of an institution wouldbe expressed mainly by rules of conductenabling the operation of networks, norms,the shared perception of a collective interest –and, where possible, common policies andcommunication within and between networks– rather than through strong action anddecision-making structures, regulations andcontrol mechanisms. It is to be expected thatelements of this “virtual” nature will becomean increasingly marked feature of the organisa-tion of universities and the university system.

When a university simply turns to experts toevaluate what it does, it implicitly adopts the

IDENTITY,INSTITUTIONAL POLICIES

AND THE “VIRTUAL”UNIVERSITY

policies and strategies of the bodies or profes-sional milieux that these experts have chosenas their model. Indeed, its institutional policymay be to adopt a model which the expertsrecommend as good. However, this decisionhas to be clear and explicit. And the variousexperts consulted who, in most cases, eval-uate specific activities (such as organisation,finance, particular training programmes, dif-ferent kinds of research and staff policies), stillhave to adopt coherent points of view amongthemselves.

The absence of formulated institutional poli-cies certainly does not mean that there arenone whatever. Often they are implicit, corre-sponding to the policies of certain bodies orinfluential persons who make use of thepotential of the institution for the benefit oftheir own particular strategies. As far as thedevelopment of the institution is concerned,the result may be good or bad, depending onthe quality of those strategies, as well as theircapacity to influence for the good thosebodies and agencies that are least influential.But often this mode of management has the

effect of strengthening centres of excellenceat the expense of sectors the least able toadapt and improve the quality of their activi-ties. In the last resort, this leads to internaltension.

Naturally, these institutional policies must beadapted to the development of the environ-ment or, in other words, to changes whichhave occurred or are foreseeable in restric-tions, in the perception of new opportunities,or in appreciating the capacity for changewithin an institution, so that it may betterfulfil its responsibilities.

In our societies, in which environmentalchanges are numerous, rapid and interdepen-dent, future developments are not easilypredictable. As a result, institutional policiesare aimed above all at preparing an institu-tion for change, at ensuring their own flexibleadaptability and ability to grasp innovativeopportunities. They primarily concern theinstitution’s organisation, its standards andattitudes, and its leadership relies on strategicmanagement methods.

STRATEGICMANAGEMENT

24

This is a particular form of management. It isparticipatory, critical, forward-looking, lead-ing towards institutional policies which seekessentially to enhance the potential forchange in a university. This potential dependson skills, the principles governing the con-duct of all parties concerned, the organisationand management methods and the networkof relations and their quality.

It is directed towards complex situationsinvolving numerous and highly autonomousactors. In such situations, there is consider-able uncertainty as regards both informationand trends, which can only be forecast to alimited extent, while the evaluation of resultsencounters serious difficulties.

Thus, strategic management strives to intro-duce and sustain a capacity for adaptation,and collective learning about change at alldecision-making levels. It relies on organisa-tional methods (behavioural norms, struc-tures, communications, rules, procedures,etc.), on a solid and clear commitment onthe part of administrators in new courses ofaction, which is an integral part of appropri-

ate methods of leadership (stimulation ofcollective action). It encourages decentralisedinitiative, innovation, personal involvement,but also co-operation, the exchange of infor-mation, and network activity, with a constantconcern for quality and the widest possiblepropagation of evaluation methods and qual-ity standards.

A university and the university system are com-plex organisations. But they also include, to agreater or lesser extent, more standard situa-tions with clearly perceptible developmentaltrends, which have to be planned, programmedand organised in the classical manner.

Strategic management must be able to con-trol these two types of situation in combina-tion.

There is no standard strategic managementmodel. Each university possesses its ownform of government, structures, traditions,experience, problems to be resolved, individ-ual persons, means, capacity to manage and,in particular, its practice of leadership. It ischaracterised by its own management style.

Strong centralised leadership, whose authorityand know-how are fully accepted, with real staffconcern for quality and good communication,can exercise innovative management in a waythat has its limits. There are also bureaucraticmanagement methods with little leadership, inwhich management essentially entails adminis-tration, cost supervision and sound program-ming of the implementation of decisions, andthe conduct of operations according to therules, etc. Such methods may suit certain situa-tions. But forces for change may then comefrom outside an institution (external reforms and

regulations, limitation of means, competition,“centrifugal” movements of staff or resources,or the arrival of influential new staff, etc.).

The level of participation and initiative ofmembers in the formulation and achievementof policies is also specific. Traditions and lead-ership play a central part in them.

Despite the highly specific nature of strategicmanagement, it may be considered to possessgeneral principles which are the subject of thisdocument.

STRATEGICMANAGEMENT AND

COACHING

25

To lead, in the strict sense of the term, is tobring to bear a particular line of actionthrough organisational, resourceful and super-visory means aimed at achieving objectiveslaid down by the management bodies. But in abody as varied and fragmented as a university,the different management units (boards, man-agers, etc.) strive to engage in coaching, bymeans of a participatory management sys-tem in which discussion makes for agreement,in line with experience, on the nature of thedevelopmental problems to be resolved, aswell as on appropriate strategic methods, andgroups of objectives, goals and means whicharise from them.

The real vectors of strategic practice are, then,the behavioural norms, the richness and

effectiveness of internal and external com-munication and the quality of discussions,rather than plans, structures and regulationswhich are part of the administration of activi-ties and persons.

Coaching therefore entails methods ofcollective orientation which are devised andcarried out with a constant eye to possibledivergences from the aims, the very validityof the latter and the suitability of the means.There is simultaneous concern also for pro-moting the quality of activities through prop-agation of a quality culture, the nurturing ofresponsibility among the greatest possiblenumber of “actors”, encouragement of initia-tive and innovation and the spread of goodpractice.

To adopt now the most current expression,coaching practices at the heart of strategic man-agement seek to strengthen the nature of a uni-versity as a “learning organisation”. This termrefers to an organisation capable of establishinga collective memory vis-à-vis its innovations, andof learning to change on the basis of its ownexperience or that of partners or competitors.The expression “collective learning withregard to change” may also be coined.

Clearly, a university is by definition a learningorganisation. All its members, teaching staffand students or partners are part of a broadcommunity of specialists in their disciplines orprofessional expertise who are ceaselesslyreshaping their knowledge and exchangingexperience via their publications and meetings.

However, the move from knowledge possessedby individuals to that of a collective entity is

not straightforward. The information compris-ing it is still specialist, in the domain ofexperts, and is linked to the play of power andinfluence or, in other words, to the highlycompartmentalised strategies of the differentparties possessing it. Neither is it made upsolely of firmly recorded and clearly structureddata that are easily transferable. In fact, it isonly fully accessible in the complex context ofexperience, expertise, “know-how” and, aboveall, the practice of collective action.

There are other forms of knowledge thanscientific or academic expertise. They includeexperience of teaching innovations, workingmethods in co-operation and exchange net-works, the development of relations, methodsof organisation and management, etc.Furthermore, communication is not neutral,but a participatory exchange in which subjec-tive, cultural and even social factors associated

COLLECTIVE LEARNINGWITH REGARD TO

CHANGE

with those involved contribute to the verynature of the information and to the mean-ings and representations with which it isinvested. The German philosopher, JürgenHabermas refers to “action conducive tocommunication”. The circulation of knowl-edge is thus a complex process the effective-ness of which depends on a real organisa-tional culture.

In a period when progress in information pro-cessing both implies and makes it technicallypossible to work in networks and when infor-mation must be widely available for all con-cerned, experience demonstrates the difficul-ties involved in establishing it on an integraland integrated basis. It is easier for informa-tion related to standardised clearly identifiedactivity in technical, scientific, commercial

and financial fields or in personnel administra-tion. Broadly accessible databases can bebuilt up, at least if there is a suitable commu-nication policy.

On the other hand, in less standardised sec-tors, the specialisation and fragmentation ofinformation on the very conduct of occupa-tions are often much stronger. The exchangeand propagation of information are harder toachieve. Universities are in this category of“non-industrial” small-scale culture in which,other than in publications and formal teach-ing, non-formal knowledge is transmittedamong the small number of persons, teach-ers, researchers or students who are involvedin the execution of a project or teachingsession. Strategic management methodsmust strive to reduce these difficulties.

HOW ISORGANISATIONALLEARNING TO BE

IMPROVED?

26

• By ensuring good communicationsbetween those party to it and, in particular,carefully noting their innovatory prac-tices, circulating and initiating criticaldiscussion of them, with a view to trans-posing them and possibly amendingprevailing institutional policies.

• By encouraging behavioural norms andinstitutional organisation which promptthose involved to try out new solutionsand systematically analyse other experi-mentation or experience which seemrelevant.

• By gathering and interpreting outwardsigns of satisfaction on the part of thosewho resort to its services (students andusers, staff, partners and co-contractors,supervisory authorities and suppliers ofresources, public opinion), and takingaccount of them in quality evaluation pro-cedures and the reformulation of actionprogrammes.

• By learning to identify and exploit signalsof discontinuity or weak signals whichhelp one to understand that majorchanges are likely to develop in the futureand that very close attention should bepaid to the way they do so. Such changesare far from self-evident, and identifica-tion and interpretation are only possiblewhere there is a strategic and forward-

looking culture. In general, real strategiesfor change are based on these signals,and are reflected in new directions whichare necessarily characterised by risk andwhich, in the context of the present, maywell seem misplaced and impossible toimplement. Such signals are associatedwith uncertainty.

• By maintaining competitive pressures toreduce inertia and “defensive routines”and to induce the emergence of new rolesand new innovative “actors” and assistthem in their enterprise. This spirit ofcompetition and the individualism whichaccompanies it, should not however leadto reinforcement of the “boundaries” be-tween bodies or individuals, inhibitingco-operation and thus creating a barrierto the development of a learning organi-sation culture. For management, this is aserious challenge and a paradox to beresolved in an imaginative and vigorousmanner.

• By establishing structures and modes oforganisation and, therefore, communica-tion which are as flexible as possible inthat they are fairly rapidly adaptable tonew situations, and can facilitate experi-mental activities. In this way, the adapta-tion of structures and organisation itselfbecomes a process of change and a col-lective way of learning how to change.

Here, however, another paradox has to beovercome, since structures have to be wellestablished in order to be useful as opera-tional and communications networks.They are often strengthened by an asso-ciated culture and by working norms andrelations compatible with them. But, in astructural framework, different culturesare conceivable, with modes of operationand relations between those concerned

which make for greater adaptation, includ-ing changes in the structures themselves.

Furthermore, there always exist informal struc-tures which may be more flexible or, on thecontrary, more rigid, and work within networksoften results in the setting up of a matrix-styleorganisation, in which individual “actors” maybe related to different structures, depending onthe activities for which they are responsible.

RATIONALISATION,INNOVATION,

PRESERVATION

27

The methods of strategic management seekto oblige the different individuals and agen-cies involved in university strategies to appro-priately combine the three components ofany strategy for change, namely strategies forrationalisation, strategies for innovation andstrategies for conservation.

Rationalising means implementing definedobjectives with optimal efficiency. Reductionof unitary costs is the most classical form theytake, at least when it is possible to define newand more productive methods, or to expandthe scale of operations with existing means(for example, a greater number of students,or a reduction in the teacher/student ratio).A policy of rationalisation is always necessarywhen changes seem inevitable, since itreleases resources which may be earmarkedfor innovation. However, efficiency cannot bemeasured solely in terms of cost since qualityis at stake.

Innovation in the nature of the service sup-plied, or in the processes which enable it tobe so, is frequently the means to rationalisean activity, making it more efficient andenhancing its quality, but at a higher devel-opment cost. However, it often entails newresponsibilities related to conception, andthen development. Therefore, there is alwaysa measure of arbitration between rationalisa-tion and innovation, and these strategies arerarely dissociated.

Conserving or preserving is also frequently anessential requirement in change. Intense andrapid rationalisation through cost reductionmay certainly prompt compensatory innova-tions. Indeed, this is one of the expectedreactions in policies for reduced financial sup-port which often accompany basic reforms.But when the quality of services does notsuffer, it may be because the contractualor conditional modes of funding have beenincreased, with specific costs in terms ofacademic independence.

In short, rationalisation, innovation and conser-vation are linked in paradoxical interdependentrelations. Only a clear, coherent and conse-quential institutional policy in strategic man-agement practice can lead to a dynamic equi-librium between the three dimensions ofchange. The exercise is all the more difficult inthat the consequences of processes of rationali-sation and innovation on the preservation ofcertain characteristics may be difficult to envis-age or foresee, and hard to control too in theircumulative development. Moreover, in phasesof important and rapid change, there is a fre-quent tendency to underestimate their long-lasting effects on the attitudes, norms andmodes of operation necessary to preserve thevalues, know-how, relations and a publicimage, which are part of the potential fordevelopment. From this standpoint, strategicmanagement must be constantly on the alertand ready to redirect its goals and means.

By definition, participatory, strategic manage-ment relies considerably on jointly conductedprocesses, with a view to resolving theinevitable conflicts associated with change.The term “consensus strategy” can be usedwhen the diversity of interests and points ofview does not threaten the identity of institu-tions. The aim of the joint effort and negotia-

tion is thus to reduce differences and find asolution in the general interest. At the outset,the essential phase is for leaders to makeapparent, understand, and if possible admit,the need for change, to identify clearly itsforms and to make credible, for the mostinfluential at least, the idea that this change ispossible and will be profitable. This is the way

STRATEGICMANAGEMENT MODELS

to establish a climate of confidence, withoutwhich the cultural and organisational cost ofthe change may be prohibitive.

A flexible model. The complexity and uncer-tainty which reigns over problems and solu-tions in strategic practices, the need to learnjointly through experience, the action of amultiplicity of interdependent processes, thedivergent values, motivations, interests andinfluences of everyone involved, the fact thatuniversity statutes often provide for electedrepresentatives, are the factors that put a pre-mium on adaptive logic. Partial, acceptableand promising changes, lead on to otherswithin the framework of general inspirationregarding change, which becomes clearer insuccessive stages.

The task of leadership, therefore, is both totransmit this general inspiration as regardsaction, and to prepare through negotiationthe acceptance of what are often compro-mise solutions enabling its concrete conver-sion into particular strategies; then, toencourage the transfer of new ideas andpractices from one sector to the other. Witha view to ensuring maximum credibility forchange and fresh inspiration, leaders thustake the time to choose innovations that havethe best chance of being accepted, achiev-able and transferable. These are so-calledadaptive strategies, entirely consistent withthe hypotheses of “bounded rationality”proposed by H. Simons.

Proactive model. But to ensure the credibilityof strategic management essential to its prac-tice, leaders may have rapidly to introducenew strong policies which set the tone for thefresh inspiration regarding the action theyintend to promote. Such is the case, forinstance, with far-reaching reforms in organisa-tion, programmes, recruitment, funding, or

where there is a change of leadership at thetop, or where new strategic limitations pointto a rapid and radical reaction. One exampleof this might be a sudden major reduction infinancial support. Firm and fast action is there-fore necessary so that at least the idea of newstrategic scenarios is rapidly communicated,while the expectations and different perspec-tives of all concerned are modified. At thesame time, there is reorganisation and a redis-tribution of responsibilities and resources.

Paradoxical strategies. Mention has alreadybeen made of paradoxical situations in 74and 75. At the outset, there is no search forcompromises. Here are contradictions whichprovoke confrontation, initiating a new para-doxical scenario. This modus operandi presup-poses vigorous and efficient leadership.Although leaders may open their new visionto wide debate, they do not attempt to settlecontradictions through joint effort at the out-set, for fear of weakening in initial compro-mises the new action principles they wish toimplement. On the contrary, they revealthem clearly in the initial procedures, relyingon subsequent debate and on proceduresthat will have to resolve these inconsistenciesto launch the impetus for collective change. Itis clear that this kind of strategy can only beachieved in circumstances in which the needfor change cannot be contested or over-looked long, and where the leaders of theinstitution concerned have the necessaryauthority, ability and influence to make the newideas credible, if not immediately acceptable.

Here, one may refer to a paradoxical strategyas a way of prompting the emergence of anew vision and meaning and, therefore, afresh inspiration. It is through strategic man-agement that these paradoxes can behandled, while developing a new strategicpractice through collective action.

STRONG AND SIMPLESTRATEGIES

28

The need for strong simple strategies capableof mobilising and committing the most activeinterested parties around new principles of col-lective action: this is the true test of leadership.

The choice of a method of strategic manage-ment is always specific to each case. But inall cases, policies and strategies have to bedefined and conducted. Whatever the com-plexity of the situation, a strategy, which is

the expression of a new vision, is a collectionof new principles and highly significant actioncriteria. All must be as simple and clearlyexpressed as possible, in order to be easilycommunicated and, also, to release initiativesand give rise to new norms. In this sense, anystrategy is cultural and normative, drawingadmittedly on certain existent norms whichpermit its inception, but carrying new normswithin it.

Le management d’un organisme est unmode de conduite de l’action collective parles responsables. On parle aussi de gouver-nement, de direction, mais ces termesexpriment plutôt les structures de commande-ment et de contrôle alors que le termemanagement décrit des processus d’anima-tion de l’action collective en vue du change-ment.

Toute activité de management a pour butd’orienter le développement d’un organismedans certaines directions, de coordonner lesdiverses activités dans ce but et de s’assurerque les activités administratives fournissentles services de soutien, de logistique, d’éva-luation et de contrôle. Il est essentiel quemanagement et administration, qui sontfortement interdépendants, soient conçus etmis en oeuvre de manière cohérente.

MANAGEMENT ETADMINISTRATION

29

GLOSSAIRE RAISONNÉPierre Tabatoni, Académie des Sciences morales et politiques

POLITIQUES ETSTRATÉGIES

Dans le cadre de la fonction de management,politiques et stratégies ont pour objet d’orien-ter à terme les activités et le fonctionnementde l’université en fonction des transforma-tions de son environnement, observées ouprévisibles, ou qui pourraient résulter de sespropres novations. Ces orientations, ou objec-tifs, s’appliquent à ses activités, ses structures,ses méthodes et règles de fonctionnement, sesressources, ses relations, son image publique.Elles concernent l’université dans sonensemble, lorsqu’elles sont définies et suiviespar ses organes centraux, ou chacun de sesorganes décentralisés (facultés, départements,instituts et centres de recherche, services),lorsqu’ils disposent d’une certaine autonomiede développement.

Les politiques sont formulées sous forme deprincipes généraux de faire, ou de ne pasfaire, et comment faire; elles expriment desrègles, des normes communes qui orientent

le développement à terme de l’institution. Lesstratégies traduisent une politique de façonopérationnelle, définissant un ensemble d’ob-jectifs et de moyens associés. Elles fixent despriorités et des équilibres à préserver entredivers objectifs. Elles déterminent des butsprécis dont la réalisation est mesurable et lesperformances sont évaluables. Elles précisentles délais, affectent des responsabilités et desressources, organisent des structures et desmodes de travail, mettent en place les évalua-tions. Une politique peut ainsi donner lieu àplusieurs stratégies différentes mais qui sonttoutes compatibles avec ses orientationsgénérales.

Politiques et stratégies fournissent les critèresde qualité pour évaluer les activités. Cetteévaluation permet d’apprécier comment lesobjectifs et buts sont mis en oeuvre, d’analyserles obstacles et les facteurs positifs et conduitéventuellement à les remettre en cause.

IDENTITÉ, POLITIQUESINSTITUTIONNELLES,

UNIVERSITÉ VIRTUELLE

L’identité d’une université vise à communi-quer l’essentiel de ses missions, la spécificité deses objectifs et méthodes, son image publique.Elle est symbolique mais suffisamment précisepour orienter des choix stratégiques ultérieurs,inspirer des arbitrages entre de nouvelles poli-tiques de l’institution. Ces dernières expri-ment, en principes d’action, la significationconcrète de cette identité. Elles définissentainsi les critères de qualité qui servent de baseà l’évaluation institutionnelle. On entend parlà l’appréciation de la capacité de l’universitéde formuler et conduire des politiques géné-rales de changement, politiques qui affectentle développement à terme de l’institution dansson ensemble.

Avec le développement des activités enréseaux multiples et divers, aussi bien en sonsein qu’avec des partenaires extérieurs, l'uni-versité, dans le cadre de la future société d’in-formation, pourrait tendre vers une forme vir-tuelle où la localisation des activités, les règlesde structure et d’organisation, en bref les fron-tières de l’université deviendraient floues. A lalimite, l’identité de l’institution s’exprimeraitsurtout par des règles de conduite permettantle fonctionnement des réseaux, des normes, lesens partagé d’un intérêt collectif, éventuelle-ment aussi par des politiques communes etdes communications intra ou inter-réseaux,plutôt que par de fortes structures d’activitéset de décisions ou par des réglementations et

contrôles. On peut s’attendre à ce que deséléments de virtualité soient de plus en plusprésents dans l’organisation des universités etdu système universitaire.

Lorsque l’université s’en remet simplement àdes experts pour évaluer ce qu’elle fait, elleadopte, implicitement, les politiques et lesstratégies des organismes ou des milieux pro-fessionnels que ces experts ont pris pourmodèle. Sa politique institutionnelle peut êtrealors l'adaptation d'un modèle qui a bonneréputation, telle que la recommandent lesexperts. Encore faut-il que ce choix soit clairet explicite et que les divers experts consultés,qui évaluent le plus souvent des activités spé-cifiques (organisation, finance, programmesparticuliers de formation, types de recherches,politiques de personnels...), adoptent despoints de vue cohérents entre eux!

L’absence de politiques institutionnelles for-mulées ne signifie nullement qu’il n’y en aitaucune. Souvent elles sont implicites et cor-respondent aux politiques de certains desorganes ou personnes influentes qui, de fait,utilisent au profit de leurs stratégies particu-lières le potentiel de l’institution. Le résultatpour le développement de l’institution peut

être bon ou mauvais, selon la qualité des stra-tégies particulières, et selon leur capacitéd’influencer dans le bon sens les organes etacteurs les moins influents. Mais souvent cemode de management revient à renforcer descentres d’excellence au détriment des sec-teurs les moins aptes à s'adapter et à amélio-rer la qualité de leurs activités et il finit parêtre source de tensions internes.

Bien entendu, ces politiques institutionnellesdoivent être adaptées à l’évolution de l’envi-ronnement, c’est-à-dire aux changementsintervenus, ou prévisibles dans les contraintes,ou dans la perception d’opportunités nou-velles, ou dans l’appréciation des capacités dechangement de l’institution, toujours en vuede mieux remplir ses missions.

Dans nos sociétés où les changements dansl’environnement sont nombreux, rapides etinterdépendants, le futur n’est pas aisémentprévisible. Les politiques institutionnellesvisent alors surtout à préparer l’institution àchanger, à s’adapter en souplesse, à savoirsaisir des occasions innovatrices. Ellesconcernent surtout son organisation, sesnormes et mentalités, et son leadership relèvede méthodes de management stratégique.

MANAGEMENTSTRATÉGIQUE

30

C’est une forme particulière de management.Il est participatif, critique, prospectif, condui-sant à des politiques institutionnelles quivisent essentiellement à accroître le potentielde changement dans l’université: ce poten-tiel dépend des compétences, des normes decomportement des acteurs, de l’organisationet des méthodes de management, du réseaudes relations et de leur qualité.

Il s’applique à des situations complexes oùopèrent de nombreux acteurs disposantd’une forte autonomie, où l’incertitude del’information et l’incertitude sur les évolutionsest importante, où, par conséquent, la prévisi-bilité est limitée et où l’évaluation des résul-tats rencontre de sérieuses difficultés.

Aussi le management stratégique s’efforce-t-ild’instaurer et d’entretenir une capacitéd’adaptation, un apprentissage collectif duchangement à tous les niveaux de décision.Il repose sur des méthodes d’organisation(normes de comportement, structures,

communications, règles, procédures) sur unferme et évident engagement des responsa-bles dans des voies nouvelles, un engagementqui s’insère dans des méthodes de leadershipappropriées (animation de l’action collective).Il favorise l’initiative décentralisée, l’innovation,l’implication personnelle mais aussi la coopéra-tion, l’échange d’information, le travail enréseaux, avec le souci constant de la qualité etla plus large diffusion des méthodes d’évalua-tion et des normes de qualité.

Une université et le système universitaire sontdes organisations complexes. Mais elles com-portent également, de manière plus ou moinsextensive, des situations plus standardisées,dont il est possible d’apprécier les évolutionstendancielles et qui doivent être planifiées,programmées et organisées de manièreclassique.

Le management stratégique doit pouvoirgérer, en les combinant, ces deux types desituation.

Il n’existe pas de modèle standard du mana-gement stratégique. Chaque université a saforme de gouvernement, ses structures, sestraditions, son expérience, ses problèmes àrésoudre, ses personnes, ses moyens, sa capa-cité de manager et en particulier sa pratiquede leadership. C’est son style de managementpropre.

Une direction forte, centralisée, mais dontl’autorité et le savoir-faire sont bien acceptés,avec des personnels motivés pour la qualité,et une bonne communication, peut exercerun management innovateur mais qui a seslimites. Il existe aussi des modes de directionbureaucratique qui comportent peu de leader-ship, où le management consiste surtout àadministrer, surveiller les coûts, bien pro-grammer la mise en oeuvre des actions déci-

dées, effectuer des opérations selon les règles,etc. Le management bureaucratique peutrépondre à certaines situations mais lesimpulsions pour le changement risquent alorsde provenir de l’extérieur (réformes et régle-mentations externes, contraintes sur lesmoyens, concurrence, mouvements centri-fuges des personnels et des ressources ouarrivée de personnels influents nouveaux ...).

Le degré de participation et d’initiative desmembres à la formulation et la réalisation despolitiques est également spécifique; les tradi-tions et le leadership y jouent un rôle clef.

Malgré cette spécificité, on peut considérerqu’il existe des principes généraux de mana-gement stratégique: ils sont l’objet de cedocument.

PILOTAGE DUCHANGEMENT

COLLECTIF

31

Diriger, au sens strict, c’est exercer une orien-tation par des moyens d’organisation, d’ani-mation et de contrôle, qui visent à réaliser desobjectifs assignés par les organes de direction.Mais dans un organisme aussi divers et frag-menté qu’une université, ces organes de direc-tion (conseils, dirigeants..) s’efforcent plutôt depiloter le changement (coaching) grâce à unsystème de management participatif où lesdiscussions permettent de s’entendre, en fonc-tion de l’expérience, sur la nature des pro-blèmes de développement à résoudre, sur desméthodes stratégiques pour y parvenir, sur lesensembles d’objectifs, de buts, de moyens quien découlent.

Ce sont alors les normes de comportement,la richesse et l’efficacité des communica-

tions externes et internes, la qualité des dis-cussions qui sont les véritables vecteurs de lapratique stratégique plutôt que les plans, lesstructures et la réglementation, qui relèventdes fonctions d’administration des activitéset des personnes.

Le pilotage pratique donc des méthodesd’orientation collective conçues et réaliséesavec le souci constant d’apprécier les écartspar rapports aux objectifs, ainsi que la validitémême de ces objectifs et l’adéquation desmoyens; il s'agit de promouvoir la qualité desactivités par la diffusion d’une culture dequalité, la responsabilisation du plus grandnombre d’acteurs, l’incitation à l’initiative et àl’innovation, et la diffusion des bonnespratiques.

Pour reprendre l’expression aujourd’huiusuelle, les pratiques de pilotage du change-ment, qui sont la base même du manage-ment stratégique, visent à renforcer le carac-tère d’«organisation apprenante» del’université. On appelle ainsi une organisationcapable d’établir une mémoire collective deses innovations et d’apprendre à changer – àpartir de ses expériences ou de celle des par-tenaires ou concurrents. On parle aussi d’ap-prentissage collectif du changement.

Evidemment, une université est par définitionune organisation apprenante puisque sesmembres, corps enseignant et étudiants ou

partenaires, inclus eux-mêmes dans une largecommunauté de spécialistes de leurs disci-plines ou d’expertise professionnelle, ne ces-sent de renouveler leurs connaissances etd’échanger leurs expériences par les publica-tions et les rencontres.

Mais il n’est pas aisé de passer de la connais-sance des individus à celle d’une collectivité.L’information reste spécialisée, experte, liéeaux jeux de pouvoir, d’influence, en bref auxstratégies des différents acteurs qui la détien-nent, toutes forts cloisonnées. Elle n’est pasnon plus uniquement constituée de connais-sances bien enregistrées et modélisées, qu’il

APPRENTISSAGECOLLECTIF DUCHANGEMENT

est facile de transférer. En fait, elle n’est plei-nement accessible que dans le contexte com-plexe de l’expérience, de l’expertise, du«savoir-faire», et surtout de la pratique del’action collective.

Il existe d’autres connaissances que les exper-tises scientifiques: expérience d’innovationspédagogiques, méthodes de travail dans desréseaux de coopération et d’échange,développement des relations, méthodesd’organisation et de gestion, etc..). En outrela communication n’est pas neutre; elle est unéchange participatif, où les facteurs subjectifs,culturels, sociaux même, affectant les parte-naires, contribuent à la nature même del’information, aux significations et représen-tations qui lui sont associées. Le philosopheallemand J. Habermas parle, on le sait, d’«agircommunicationnel». De ce fait, la circulationdes connaissances est un processus complexedont l’efficacité dépend d’une véritable cul-ture organisationnelle.

A l’heure où les progrès de l’informatiqueimpliquent et permettent techniquement detravailler en réseau, et où l’information doit

être largement disponible pour tous lesacteurs, l’expérience de l’entreprise démontreles difficultés à mettre en place une informa-tion intégrale et intégrée. La réalisation estplus facile pour l’information qui concernedes activités standardisées, bien identifiées,dans les domaines techniques, scientifiques,commerciaux, financiers ou d’administrationdes personnels. On peut alors constituer desbases de données largement accessibles, si dumoins il y une politique de communicationadéquate.

En revanche, dans les secteurs moins standar-disés, la spécialisation et la fragmentation del’information sur la pratique même des métiersy sont souvent plus fortes; son échange et sadiffusion sont plus difficiles à réaliser. Etant deculture artisanale, les universités relèvent de cetype d'organisation où, en dehors des publica-tions et des enseignements, la connaissancenon formelle se transmet entre le petitnombre de personnes – enseignants, cher-cheurs, étudiants – impliquées dans la réalisa-tion d’un projet ou d’un cours. Les méthodesde management stratégique doivent s’efforcerde réduire ces obstacles.

COMMENT AMÉLIORERL’APPRENTISSAGE

ORGANISATIONNEL?

32

• assurer de bonnes communications entreles membre de l'institution, et en particu-lier recenser soigneusement leurs pra-tiques innovatrices, les diffuser, engagerleur discussion critique en vue de lestransposer et, éventuellement, de modifierles politiques institutionnelles en cours;

• favoriser des normes de comportement etune organisation institutionnelles qui inci-tent ses membres à expérimenter dessolutions nouvelles et à analyser systémati-quement d’autres expériences qui sem-blent pertinentes;

• recueillir et interpréter les signaux de satis-faction émis par ceux qui utilisent ses ser-vices (étudiants et usagers, personnels,partenaires et co-contractants, organes detutelle et pourvoyeurs de ressources, opinionpublique), les prendre en compte dans lesprocédures d’évaluation de la qualité pour lareformulation des programmes d’action;

• apprendre à repérer et à exploiter lessignaux de discontinuité ou signaux

faibles, qui peuvent aider à comprendreque des changements importants sontsusceptibles de se développer à l’avenir etqu’il faut être vigilant sur leur évolution.Ils sont peu évidents et on ne peut lesrepérer et les interpréter qu’avec une cul-ture stratégique et prospective. Les véri-tables stratégies de changement sontgénéralement fondées sur ces signaux etse traduisent par des orientations nou-velles, nécessairement risquées, qui, dansle contexte actuel, peuvent sembler aber-rantes, impossibles à mettre en oeuvre. Cesont des signaux conduisant à des paris.

• maintenir des pressions concurrentiellespour réduire les inerties et «routinesdéfensives», induire l’émergence de nou-veaux rôles, de nouveaux acteurs innova-teurs, les aider dans leur entreprise. Cetesprit de compétition et l’individualismequi l’accompagne ne doivent pas cepen-dant renforcer les «frontières» entreorganes et personnes, freiner la coopéra-tion, donc faire obstacle au développe-ment d’une culture d’organisation appre-

nante. C’est un sérieux défi pour le mana-gement, un des paradoxes à résoudre defaçon dynamique.

• établir des structures, des modes d’orga-nisation, et donc de communication, aussiflexibles que possible, c’est-à-dire rapide-ment adaptables à des situations nou-velles; faciliter les activités expérimentales.Ainsi l'adaptation des structures et de l’or-ganisation devient elle-même un proces-sus de changement, en même tempsqu'une manière collective d’apprendrecomment changer. Mais c’est un autreparadoxe à résoudre car, pour être utilescomme réseaux de communication etd’opérations, les structures doivent être

bien établies. Elles sont souvent renforcéespar une culture associant des normes detravail et de relations compatibles avecelles. Mais, dans tout cadre structurel, dif-férentes cultures sont concevables, avecdes modes de fonctionnement et des rela-tions entre acteurs qui permettent plusd’adaptation, y compris une évolution desstructures elles-mêmes.

En outre, il existe toujours des structuresinformelles qui peuvent être plus souples ouau contraire plus rigides, et le travail enréseaux aboutit souvent à la mise en placed’une organisation matricielle, où un acteurdéveloppe des allégeances institutionnellesselon les diverses activités qu’il assure.

RATIONALISATION,INNOVATION,

PRÉSERVATION

33

Les méthodes de management stratégiques’efforcent d’exercer les différents acteursdes stratégies universitaires à combiner demanière appropriée les trois composantes detoute stratégie de changement: stratégies derationalisation; stratégies d’innovation; stra-tégies de conservation.

Rationaliser, c’est mettre en oeuvre des objec-tifs déjà définis avec une efficacité meilleure. Laréduction des coûts unitaires en est la forme laplus classique, du moins lorsqu’il est possiblede définir de nouvelles méthodes plus produc-tives ou d'accroître le volume des opérationsavec les moyens existants (par exemple unplus grand nombre d’étudiants ou une réduc-tion du taux d’encadrement). Une politique derationalisation est toujours nécessaire lorsquedes changements paraissent inévitables car elledégage des ressources qui pourront êtreconsacrées à l’innovation. Cependant l’effica-cité ne peut être mesurée uniquement enterme de coût car la qualité est en jeu.

L’innovation dans la nature du service fourniou dans les processus qui permettent de lefournir est fréquemment le moyen de rationa-liser une activité, de la rendre plus efficaceet de meilleure qualité mais à un coût dedéveloppement plus élevé. En effet, elleinduit souvent de nouvelles charges pour samise au point et son développement. Il y adonc toujours un arbitrage entre rationalisa-tion et innovation, et ces stratégies sont rare-ment dissociées.

Conserver, préserver, sont aussi fréquemment

un impératif du changement: une rationalisa-tion par réduction des coûts, intense et rapide,peut certes inciter à des innovations de com-pensation. C’est même l’une des réactionsattendues dans les politiques de réduction decrédits qui accompagnent souvent desréformes de fond. Mais lorsque la qualité desservices n’en souffre pas, ce peut être parceque les modes de financement contractuels ouconditionnels ont été accrus, tenant comptede coûts spécifiques, c’est-à-dire des risques deréduction de l’indépendance scientifique.

En bref, rationalisation, innovation, conserva-tion ont entre eux des relations paradoxalesd’interdépendance. Seule une politique insti-tutionnelle claire, cohérente et suivie, dansune pratique claire de management straté-gique, peut conduire à un équilibre dyna-mique entre les trois dimensions du change-ment. C’est un exercice d’autant plus arduque les conséquences du processus de ratio-nalisation et d’innovation sur la préservationde certaines caractéristiques peuvent être dif-ficiles à concevoir ou à prévoir – et difficiles àcontrôler dans leurs développements cumula-tifs. De plus, dans les phases de changementimportant et rapide, on sous-estime souventleurs effets durables sur les attitudes, normeset modes de fonctionnement, toutes chosesnécessaires à la préservation des valeurs, dessavoir-faire, des relations, d’une imagepublique, qui font partie du potentiel dedéveloppement de l'institution. De ce pointde vue, le management stratégique doit êtreconstamment en alerte, prêt à réorienter sesbuts et ses moyens.

Etant par définition participatif, le manage-ment stratégique a largement recours à desprocessus de concertation en vue de résoudreles conflits inévitables associés au changement.On parle de stratégie consensuelle lorsque ladiversité des intérêts et des points de vue nemet pas en cause l’identité de l’institution. Laconcertation et la négociation ont donc pourobjet de réduire les différences et de trouverune solution d'intérêt général. La phase essen-tielle au départ est pour les leaders de faireapparaître, comprendre et, si possible,admettre, la nécessité d’un changement, d’endiscerner les formes, et de rendre crédible,pour les plus influents au moins, l’idée que cechangement est possible et sera fructueux.C’est le moyen d’établir un climat de confiancesans lequel le coût, culturel et organisationnel,du changement peut être prohibitif.

Le modèle adaptatif. La complexité et l’in-certitude quant aux problèmes et aux solu-tions qui règnent dans les pratiques straté-giques; la nécessité d’apprendre en communpar l’expérience; l’intervention de multiplesprocessus interdépendants; les divergencesde valeurs, de motivations, d’intérêt, d’in-fluence entre les acteurs; le fait que les statutsuniversitaires comportent souvent l’électiondes élus, sont tous des facteurs qui donnentprime à une logique adaptative; il s'agit delancer des changements partiels, acceptableset prometteurs, qui en entraînent d’autres,dans le cadre d’une inspiration générale duchangement qui se définit au coup par coup.

La fonction de leadership consiste donc à lafois à diffuser cette inspiration générale del’action et à préparer par des négociationsl’acceptation des solutions, souvent de com-promis, qui permettent de la traduire concrè-tement en stratégies particulières, puis defavoriser le transfert des idées et pratiquesnouvelles d’un secteur à l’autre. En vue d’as-surer la meilleure crédibilité du changementet des inspirations nouvelles, les leaders pren-nent ainsi le temps de choisir les innovationsqui ont les meilleurs chances d’être accep-tées, d’être réalisables et transférables. Onparle de stratégies adaptatives, tout à faitconformes aux hypothèses de rationalitélimitée, «bounded rationality», de H. Simons.

Le modèle volontariste. Cependant, pourassurer la crédibilité du management straté-

gique, qui est essentielle à sa pratique, les lea-ders peuvent devoir introduire rapidementdes politiques nouvelles, fortes, et qui don-nent le ton aux inspirations nouvelles pourl’action qu’ils entendent promouvoir. C’est lecas, par exemple, des réformes profondesd’organisation, de programmes, de recrute-ment, de financement, souvent facilitées parun changement de leadership au sommet oupar des contraintes stratégiques nouvelles,qui impliquent une réaction rapide et pro-fonde – par exemple, en cas de réductionsoudaine et importante de crédits. Des chocssont alors nécessaires qui diffusent rapide-ment au moins l’idée de nouveaux scénariosstratégiques et modifient les anticipations, lesperspectives de positionnement des uns parrapport aux autres, ce qui d’ailleurs estaccompagné de réorganisation, de redistribu-tion de responsabilités et de ressources.

Stratégies paradoxales. Nous avons déjàparlé de situations paradoxales en 74 et 75.On ne recherche pas le compromis au départ.Ce sont même les contradictions qui provo-quent le choc, nécessaire au nouveau scéna-rio paradoxal. Cette manière d’opérer sup-pose un leadership vigoureux et efficace. Lesleaders, bien qu’ils soumettent leur visionnouvelle à de larges débats, ne tentent pas derégler les contradictions par la concertationau départ, de crainte d’affaiblir, dans descompromis initiaux, les principes nouveauxd’action qu’ils souhaitent voir mis en oeuvre.Au contraire, ils les révèlent clairement dansles procédures initiales et ils comptent sur lesdébats ultérieurs et sur les procédures quidevront résoudre ces incohérences pourengager une dynamique de changement col-lectif. Il est clair que ce type de stratégie n’estréalisable que dans des circonstances où lanécessité du changement ne peut être long-temps contestée ou ignorée, que dans les ins-titutions où les leaders ont l’autorité, la capa-cité et l’influence nécessaires pour rendre aumoins crédibles, sinon immédiatement accep-tables, les idées nouvelles.

On peut donc parler de stratégie paradoxale,comme moyen de faire apparaître une visionnouvelle, une signification et donc une inspi-ration nouvelles. C’est par le managementstratégique que ces paradoxes devront êtregérés afin d'élaborer par l’action collectiveune nouvelle pratique stratégique.

MODÈLES DEMANAGEMENTSTRATÉGIQUE

34

Nécessité de stratégies simples, fortes, capablesde rallier et d’engager les protagonistes lesplus actifs autour de principes nouveauxd’action collective: c’est le test du leadership.

Le choix d’une méthode de managementstratégique est toujours un cas d’espèce mais,de toute manière, il s’agit de définir et deconduire des politiques et des stratégies.Quelle que soit la complexité de la situation,une stratégie, qui est l’expression d’une

vision autre, est un ensemble de principesnouveaux, se référant à des critères d’actionsignificatifs. Ils doivent être aussi simples etclairement exprimés que possible, afin depouvoir être aisément communiqués et aussiafin de libérer les initiatives et de susciter desnormes inédites. En ce sens, toute stratégieest culturelle, normative, s’appuyant certessur des règles existantes qui permettent del’engager, mais aussi porteuse de nouvellesnormes.

DES STRATÉGIESSIMPLES ET FORTES

35

36

The European University Association, as the representative organisation of both European universi-ties and national rectors’ conferences, is the main voice of the higher education community inEurope. Its membership includes 609 individual members, 34 collective members and 7 affiliatemembers in 45 countries throughout Europe.

EUA’s mission is to promote the development of a coherent system of European higher educationand research, through active support and guidance to its members, to enhance their contributionsto society and the quality of their core activities.

EUA focuses its policies and services to members on the creation of a European area for highereducation and research. More specifically, EUA’s objectives are to develop consensus on• a European higher education and research identity based on shared values;• the compatibility of European higher education structures through commonly accepted norms;• convergence of the European higher education and research areas to strengthen further the

sector’s attractiveness in Europe and beyond.

Organisation représentant à la fois les universités européennes et les conférences nationales derecteurs, l’Association Européenne de l’Université est le principal porte-parole de la communautéde l’enseignement supérieur en Europe. 609 membres individuels, 34 membres collectifs et 7membres affiliés dans 45 pays d’Europe en constituent les forces vives.

L’EUA a pour mission de favoriser la mise en place d’un système cohérent d’enseignement supé-rieur et de recherche en Europe en orientant ses membres vers une amélioration de la qualité deleurs activités fondamentales, soutenant ainsi activement leur apport à la société.

L’EUA articule sa politique et ses services autour de la construction d’un espace européen de l’ensei-gnement supérieur et de la recherche. Plus spécifiquement, elle vise à rassembler ses membres sur:• une identité européenne de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche qui se fonde sur des

valeurs partagées;• la compatibilité des structures de l’enseignement supérieur européen à travers des normes

acceptées en commun;• la convergence en un espace européen des systèmes d’enseignement supérieur et de recherche

pour renforcer l’attrait des institutions en Europe et dans le reste du monde.

EUA Genève EUA Bruxelles10 rue du Conseil Général 42 rue de la LoiCH - 1211 Genève 4 B – 1000 Bruxellestel. +41 22 3292644/3292251 tel. +32 2 2305544fax +41 22 3292821 fax +32 2 2305751info@eua.unige.ch info@eua.be

http//www.unige.ch/eua

WHAT IS EUA ?

QU'EST-CE QUE L’EUA ?

Editeur/Publisher: EUA GenèveRédaction/Editors: Dr Andris Barblan

Catherine Fayant (catherine.fayant@eua.unige.ch)Graphiste/Designer: Atelier Thierry ClausonImprimerie/Printer: Cojo sa/Somco Publicité