CHAPTER VI

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE JVP

INTRODUCTION

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna's (JVP) strategy to capture power was unique and

devised on the basis of historical experiences and an understanding of the local environment

in Sri Lanka. It involved the capture of state power in a short and swift action. The failure

of this model in 1971, led to a re-consideration of strategy in favour of a protracted struggle.

Though the JVP's second attempt to capture power was not conceptualized or presented in

terms of a model, it was essentially based on urban guerrilla warfare and probably developed

according to the then prevalent political situation. This strategy attempted to paralyze the

economy, cripple the civil administration and create conditions for a mass uprising against

the state. Once the leadership succumbed, the JVP hoped to step in and take over power.

This strategy also failed because of the adoption of harsh counter-insurgency measures

by the Sri Lankan security forces and the systematic elimination of the top JVP leadership.

As the JVP was a cadre-based party and did not have mass support, elimination of the top

leaders disrupted the chain of command and soon the movement collapsed.

This chapter discusses the conceptualization and application of the model that the JVP

adopted in its first attempt to capture power, the lack of external support and its failure. The

analysis of JVP's second attempt is carried out keeping a macro-view of the socio-political

environment during that period, with a special focus on Indian intervention in Sri Lanka to

settle the ethnic problem and its affect on JVP's strategy. It concludes with a discussion on

counter-insurgency methods adopted by the government and other factors that helped it in

suppressing the insurgency.

164

ASSESSING THE POLITICAL SITUATION

The JVP was formed around a time when th.ere was a global upsurge in revolutionary

activity, catalyzed by the success of the Cuban revolution in 1959. The Cuban revolution had

a tremendous impact on left politics in the developing countries. After having retlected on

various revolutionary strategies, Wijeweera and his associates evolved their own strategy that

would be applicable to Sri Lanka.

In the fifth lecture of the JVP discourse, the Soviet, Chinese and Cuban models were

analyzed. They realized that the revolutionary struggle could not follow a uniform path or any

foreign model in toto, as objective conditions differed with regard to the time, the socio-

economic, political and geographical conditions.

Though the socio-economic conditions in Sri Lanka during the late 1960s may have

been conducive for revolutionary action, there was a fundamental tlaw in the assessment of

the political situation by the JVP leaders. There are two schools of thought with regard to the

JVP's stand on parliamentary politics. Unnila Phadnis contended that, initially the JVP

thought in terms of a peaceful change within a parliamentary framework. 1 Others, however,

argue that the JVP never entertained the thought of parliamentary politics. Wilson observes

that though the JVP was called 'Che Guevarist', it did not follow one of the basic tenets of

Guevara. It ignored the possibility of exhausting other means before resorting to armed

struggle.2 Guevara had stated:

where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of

1 Urmila Phaunis, "Insurgency in Ceylonese Politics: Problems anu Prospects," IDSA Journal (New Delhi), vol.3, no.4, April 1971, p.604.

2 A.J. Wilson, "Ceylon: The Peoples Liberation Front and the Revolution that Failed," Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol.3, no.2, January 1972, p.366.

165

peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted. 3

Guevara's strategy of armed struggle originally relied on a general strike to overthrow

the Batista dictatorship. Only after the general strike of April 1958 failed, did he begin to

stress on a military confrontation with Batista.4 Yet the importance of such a strike should

not be underestimated. The general strike called during the first days of January 1959,

paralysed the economy and permitted the rebel army to seize power directly without a

negotiated settlement with representatives of the government.5 Guevara's strategy of

exhausting other means of struggle was not an ideological belief but a tactical necessity.

When the JVP launched the insurgency in 1971, it was confronting a legitimately elected

democratic government. The JVP's support for the United Front (UF) in the 1970 general

elections, was limited only_ to supporting their election campaign. Wijeweera is reported to

have said that, the reason for the JVP's support to the UF in the 1970 election was to prove

to the masses the futility of the parliamentary system.6 However, it was not a rejection of

the necessity of revolutionary violence at some stage, to overthrow the ruling classes. 7

STRATEGY OF THE ONE-DAY REVOLUTION

Conceptualizing the Strategy

By late 1970, Wijeweera is supposed to have gained support for a strategy, which was

followed even after his imprisonment. Wijeweera rejected the applicability of the strategy of

a long-term struggle, on the grounds that the specific conditions in Sri Lanka were not

3 Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Harmondsworth, 1969), pp.l3-14. 4 Donald Hodges, The Legacy of Clre Guevara: A Documentary Study (London, 1977), p.19. 5 ibid. 6 Rohan Wijeweera, "Speech to the Ceylon Criminal Justice Commission," New Left Review (New Delhi), no.84, March-April 1974, p.93; and James Jupp, Sri Lanka: 11rird World Democracy (London, 1978), p.308. 7 Wilson, n.2, p.366.

166

conducive to such a strul'£!1e. e~

Wijeweera 's strategy of an overnight takeover or a 'one-day revolution' was

considered to be necessary because it was impossible for any classical model to be followed

in Sri Lanka. The urban proletariat was degenerate and in the clutches of the reformist

Marxist parties. Its social base was limited to a minority of the population, mainly centered

around Colombo.8 Hence, the Russian model of a socialist takeover of the cities, followed

by the gradual expansion to the countryside did not seem practicable. The Chinese model of

establishing liberated zones in the countryside and encircling the cities, was not considered

feasible because of the good communications network and the small size of the island. Any

such liberated zone would have been easily accessible to the government forces, who could

have crushed it with timely intervention. The Cuban model of protracted warfare from

sparsely inhabited or uninhabited forest hideouts was not possible, because such a forest

hideout did not exist in the whole of the island, particularly in areas where the JVP was more

. 9 act1ve.

Popular perceptions, including that of the press, labelled the JYP as 'Che Guevarist'.

But a closer scrutiny reveals that Wijeweera's strategy did not have much in common with

Guevara's strategy. Three points of difference may be noted. Guevara had talked of

exhausting all other means of struggle before undertaking a military confrontation. 10

Wijeweera did not abide by this principle. Secondly, Guevara's experience as a guerrilla had

made him aware of the need to involve the working class and not rely only on the peasantry

in the overall struggle for liberation. In fact, Guevara had organized the workers in their

8 See, Charles Blackton, "Sri Lanka's Marxists," Problems of Communism (Washington), vol.22, no.l, January-February 1973, pp.29-34. 9 C.A. Chandraprema, Putschism, Ethnic Chauvinism and Social Revolution (Colombo, 1989), p.6.

10 Hodges, n.4, p.19.

167

centres of production for helping the rebel armyY Wijeweera, having denounced the

working class in Sri Lanka as degenerate, evolved a strategy which would exclude them.

Thirdly, Guevara and Wijeweera differed in their methods of mobilizing the peasantry.

Guevara concentrated on mobilizing the peasantry through a programme of agrarian

reform, 12 whereas Wijeweera had no such programme. Further, the one-day strategy had no

resemblance to the Cuban strategy of 1959, which was the culmination of a long guerrilla war

waged over several years.

Wijeweera's strategy was a deviation from both the Cuban and the Chinese models.

According to him, these strategies could not be applied since the geographical conditions of

Sri Lanka ruled out this possibility. Therefore, in Sri Lanka, the revolution should start both

in the city and villages simultaneously, aiming at the seizure of power through a sudden and

very sh011 sharp attack throughout the country. He was convinced that due to the small size

of the island, it was possible to capture power in "a single blow". 13 He was also aware that

Sri Lanka had one of the weakest armed forces, 14 which also was very unpopular.

Informants within the army had suggested that the forces had insufficient ammunition to resist

any simultaneous island-wide uprising. 15 Wijeweera 's plan was that at an opportune

moment, the JVP would rise on the same day and at every place where it had a following.

It was a plan to be executed with lightning speed, and all institutions of state power captured

11 ibid., pp.17-18. 12 ibid., p.22. 13 Jupp, n.6, p.30. 14 Different figures have been cited for the total strength of the defence forces in 1971. The Military Balance cites 12,000 men out of which 8,500 were in the Army. In addition the Navy had one frigate and twenty-seven small patrol crafts. See The Military Balance, 1972-1973 (London, 1972), p.54. Urmila Phadnis puts it at 22,900. The divisions were following: police 12,500, army 7,000, navy 1,900 and air force 1,500. See Phadnis, n.1, p.610. According to Robert Kearney and Janice Jiggins, the strength was 23,700. See, Robert N. Kearney and Janice Jiggins, "The Ceylon Insurrection of 1971," The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (London), vol.13, no.1, 1 March 1975, 15 Phadnis, n.1, p.609.

168

before the state could take effective counter-measures. In line with this strategy, the JVP first

attacked police stations, which in their perception was the strength of the state.

Timing of the Insurrection

There are reasons to believe that the uprising was premature and did not go according

to plan. The original plan was to carry out the insurrection at 11.30 p.m., on 5 April 1971. 16

But due to some reasons, action was initiated in the early hours of the scheduled day and the

Wellawaya police station attacked at 5.00 a.m .. 17

Various reasons are ascribed for this. Some believe that the insurgents were forced to

act sooner than they had intended, because the government measures were getting tighter day

by day during the preceding few weeks. 18 Others argue that, it could have been due to

confusion arising from the fact that Sunanda Deshapriya failed to inform the leaders of

Wellawaya and Moneragale about the decision taken on 2 April. 19 But on the other hand,

the preponement of the timing of the attack might have been deliberate. Chandraprema points

to the infighting within the top leadership between the Loku Athala-Sanath groups and the

Piyatilleke-Bopage faction. This infighting had generated some dissidence within the

organization. Thus, it might have heen a deliberate decision of some of the cadres of the

Wellawaya-Moneragale region to sabotage the insurrection and not allow it to succeed.20

The April Insurrection of 1971

The 1971 insurrection had commenced with an attack on a rural police station and a

small police party, in the early hours of 5 April. The same night, simultaneous attacks were

16 Judgement of the Criminal Justice Commission (Insurgency), Inquiry no. 1 (Politburo), (Colombo, 1976), p.209. 17 ibid., p.408. 18 Phadnis, n.l, p.607. 19 For more details about the pattern in which the decision to attack was to be conveyed down the chain of command, refer to the Judgement of the Criminal Justice Commission, n.16, p.438. Also see, A.C. Alles, Insurgency- 1971 (Colombo, 1976), p.105. 20 C.A. Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror: TheJVP Insurrection 1987-1989 (Colombo, 1991), pp.33-36.

169

made on at least 74 police stations at widely scattered points across the island. This was

stated in Parliament on 20 June 1971 by Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike. However, in

April, the army commander had stated that about 100 police stations had been attacked and

20 were captured. The Inspector-General of Police, in a subsequent report to the Criminal

Justice Commission (OC), said that 93 police stations were attacked between 5 and 11

April.2l

Government security forces were, m 1971, ill-prepared to meet a major challenge.

Even if the Sri Lankan intelligence had anticipated the uprising, they had failed to assess its

extent and intensity.22 Mrs. Bandaranaike endorsed this. view on 24 April 1971, that on the

5th of April, the government was militarily unprepared for the kind of concentrated armed

attacks launched by the insurgentsY Not surprisingly, therefore, the government found itself

unable to cope with the unprecedented situation. The total strength of the police and defence

forces was much lower than the estimated figures of the insurgents. The police forces in 1lJ70

had numbered 10,605. They were assigned to 266 police stations, out of which 171 were

staffed by 20 or less policemen. Police stations were supplied with fifty year old bolt-action

rifles and very small quantities of ammunition. The military services had remained small,

generally poorly armed and equipped, and without experience in military operations.24

In their initial attack, the insurgents overran a few small police stations and forced the

abandonment of others. They seized or destroyed a number of public buildings and cut off

major roads and railroads, virtually isolating Kandy, and severing communication links

between Colombo and most provincial areas. 25 They had set-up road blocks at Warakapola

21 Judgement of the Criminal Justice Commission, n.l6, p.409. 22 Phadnis, n.l, p.609. 23 Ceylon Daily News (Colombo), 25 April 1971. 24 Kearney and Jiggins, n.l4, p.41.

25 ibid., p.42.

170

and Kegalle on the main Colomho-Kandy road, wrecked the rail lines and cut off telegraph

lines. They concentrated their efforts on gaining control of the towns of Kegalle, Kurunegale,

Maho and Moneragale which were situated on the roads leading from the main areas of the

island to the port of Trincomalee. 26 Road traffic was blocked by felling trees and damaging

bridges. The areas surrounding these towns remained among the most stubborn centres of

insurgent activity. In some of these towns, police and public servants were besieged in public

buildings, while the insurgents moved freely through the remaining areas of the town.

However, the insurgents could not keep these towns under their control for long. It

was only in Elpitiya, some outstation regions of the south, the Kandy area, and the Dry zone

north-ward to the southern limit of Tamil settlements, that remained under JVP's control for

a longer period of time. 27

By the end of April, the offensive power of the insurgents was spent. Village vigilance

committees helped government forces. With the insurgents yielding ground, the Prime

Minister proclaimed on the radio and hy air-dropped leatlets, an open period for surrender,

beginning on 1 May till 10 June. In the first few days some 4,000 surrendered while the

hardcore members fell back into the Sinharaja forest in the south, the Ritigale range near

Kurunegale, the steep hills around Kegalle, and the vast jungles of the Walipattu National

park.28 By mid-June, the government announced that it had arrested around 14,000 rebels,

who were being held in detention camps. The death toll was estimated at 1,200, including 60

army and police personnel.29 A few civilian deaths also occurred.

26 Blackton, n.8, p.37.

27 ibid. 28 ibid. 29 These figures were given by Mrs. S. Bandaranaike in the House of Representatives on 20 July 1971. See, Asian

Recorder (New Delhi), vol.17, no.34, 20-26 August 1971, p.10315.

171

AREAL SUMMARY OF THE INSURGENCY ,1971.

I

' ' • I ' I

"''"- ., . ..,,,""( \\ II

I

' ' . ( r-'

... ~'&' • I ' . ' .

I I -A

' ,, I I

Fig.- 3

•

0

0

' I

INDEX.

e POLICE STATIONS STOR~ED.

0 POLICE STATIONS ABANDONED .

• MAJOR CENTRES OF GOVERNMENTAL STRENGTH.

AREAS CONTESTED.

AREAS CONTROLLED

BY INSURGENTS .

•

•

20 40 60 MILES.

20 40 60 80 100 KM.

Source: BERNARD SWAN SRI LANKA NOSAIC: Environment. Man' Continuity

and Chang.-• (Colombo: Marga In1titute, 1987.)

172

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

The question of external support has been discussed earlier.30 Moral, political and

material support for either the insurgents or the incumbent regime, can upset the balance of

forces. In this section, we would be discussing the external support which was forthcoming

and in whose favour, and how it proved to be a decisive factor for the Sri Lankan state.

The possibility of external involvement or instigation was the subject of much

speculation and controversy. Differences of opinion exist on the level of external help and

its nature. It is not known to what extent and in what form the Chinese and the North

Koreans assisted the insurgency, although wild rumours to that effect floated around Colombo

for months. 31 Following the allegedly mysterious departure of a Chinese Ship, supposedly

carrying a cargo of arms hound for Tanzania from Colombo harbour, led to suspicion about

Chinese involvement.32 While the Sri Lankan government was still seeking the permission

of both the Chinese and Tanzanian government for some arms to be unloaded in Colombo,

the ship left in a hurry?3

The North Korean embassy too came under suspicion. It was closed on 13 April and

the entire staff was told to leave the country. Mrs. Bandaranaike stated that the North

Koreans had been warned that some of their activities was giving strength and support to the

JVP. And when they failed to comply with her request to stop those activities, they were

expelled from the country. Though the government did not describe the activities that led to

their expulsion, apparently the North Korean Embassy staff had been engaged in

30 Refer to Chapter I.

31 For detailed reports on the rumours, see, Ceylon Daily News, 18 April 1971; and Ceylon Daily News, 26 Arril 1971. 32 Kearney and Jiggins, n.14, p.42. 33 S. Arasaratnam, "The Ceylon Insurrection of April 1971: Some Causes and Consequences," Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), vol.45, no.3, Fall 1972, p.365.

173

disseminating revolutionary propaganda ami sponsoring more than forty 'friendship societies·

across the island. The writings of Kim-Il-Sung and literature on guerrilla warfare was

available in abundance. The government may have had evidence of North Koreans training

and perhaps financing the Sri Lankan insurgents, but it did not reveal all of it.34 Llter,

however, it was revealed that at least two fishing boats of North Korean origin, carrying arms

for the rebels had been intercepted by an Indian naval patrol.35 The left parties argued that

the JVP and the insurrection was sponsored and instigated by the American CIA.36

Notwithstanding all these speculations and accusations, the insurrection seems to have

been a home-grown affair, though JVP supporters had been made to believe that armed

assistance from sympathetic foreign powers would arrive at the appropriate time, and there

would also be defections among the ranks in the armed forces. 37 One does not know on

what eviden~e these assumptions were based. Or if actually external assistance was available

at the crucial time, would it have made a significant difference in the balance of forces?

Thus, it may he argued that the question of external support was used as a psychological ruse

hy the JVP leadership to boost the morale of its cadres.

Assistance for the Sri Lankan Government

. · External support was certainly forthcoming for the Sri Lankan government and it

obtained arms, ammunition and equipment from various countries. Mrs. Bandaranaike sought

aid from India and several other countries on 6 April 1971. The assistance from India

included equipment for 5,000 combat troops, five frigates which sealed off the Sri Llnkan

34 ibid. 35 M. Vander Kroef, "The Sri Lanka Insurgency of April 1971: Its Development and Meaning," Asia Quarterly (Brussels), no.2, 1973, p.125.

36 Blackton, n.8, p.36. 37 Wilson, n.2, p.367. Later, some captured JVP members said that they were assured that help would be coming from China and North Korea. See, Van der Kroef, n.35, p.l25.

174

coastline to prevent any outside aid from reaching the insurgents. 150 Indian troops to guard

Bandaranaike airport and six helicopters with pilots solely for reconnaissance purpose arrived

in Colombo on 14th April. Air Ceylon tlew in 9 tons of military equipment made available

by the USSR, from supplies i"n Cairo. Further, six American Bell Helicopters through the

British, 2 Pakistani Helicopters and a Warship, 6 Mig-17s with some fitted for US type

ammunition and 10 armoured cars. The United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Malaysia had

.1. · 3R sent non-m1 1tary assistance.

Thus, with the major international powers on the side of the government, and effective

military assistance to the insurgents from abroad having been made impossible, the JYP was

fighting a losing battle from the start. Apparently, this was not taken into consideration by

the JVP leadership. A cursory examination of the ideological profiles of the neighbouring

countries and states capable of extending material help across large distances, makes it clear

that a communist insurgency would not have been tolerated. The Indian state's response has

to be seen in this context and it was also guided by the 'ideological protile' of the JVP. 34

It is important to keep in mind that around this time, the Indian state was battling against a

communist insurgency in the form of a Naxalite movement. Similarly, the other countries'

support for the Sri Lankan state was part of their policy to suppress communist insurgencies

world-wide. A<> most of these insurgencies were inspired by the Maoist model, the Soviet

Union having adhered to the concept of 'peaceful coexistence,' was not too keen for it to be

successful. 40

38 For details, see, Asian Recorder, voi.I7, no.17, 23-29 April1971, p,10111; and Somasundaram, "An Insurrection

Remembered," Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vol.3, no.6, 15 July 1980, p.20. 39 Sec, S.D. Muni, Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis (New Delhi, 1993), pp.25-26, 37-38. 40 Since the Soviet Union was not too pleased with Wijeweera's espousing the Chinese line during his days in Lumumba University, it had denied Wijeweera permission to enter the Soviet Union after a vacation in Sri Lanka.

175

FAILURE OF THE INSURRECTION

The insurrection was short-lived and failed to achieve its objectives for vanous

reasons. The social and political milieu in Sri Lanka at that time was clearly not conducive

for the launching of the insurrection. This limited its chances of success and validated the

strict Leninist insistence on the necessary preconditions for a successful insurrection.

At the political level, two factors seemed to have played a major role in the failure

of the insurrection. First was its timing. The insurrection might have had greater success if

it had been staged against a United National Party (UNP) government, instead of the UF. 41

The UF government composed of SLFP, LSSP and the CP, had been voted to power only

eleven months before the insurrection and the JVP had fully supported and campaigned for

its victory. It was too early to take up arms against a government which had constitutional

legality and popular mandate. This explains why the insurrection remained cut off from its

mass base. Even if the JVP was convinced that "the UF government was not committed to

a socialist programme",42 it should have waited till the masses reached the same conclusion

and rallied around the JVP leadership. The sense of deprivation was not so heightened as to

make the masses support the insurgency. Secondly, the JVP seemed to have a loose and

unsystematic organizational structure. It was not a Leninist party. In the absence of

Wijeweera, the internal leadership crisis portrayed the organization as comprising of loosely

coordinated factions. Thirdly, the JVP activists who managed to control large areas of the

country, were not clear about the next course of action in terms of setting up political :md

administrative structures. It was a purely military action and JVP cadres had no idea as to

41 Blackton, n.8, p.37. The urban working class might have suppOrted the JVP against a UNP government. Whereas,

when the insurrection took place against the UF govenunent, the working class helped the government to suppress the revolt. This was inevitable as most of the trade unions were under the control, of left parties which were the coalition partners in the UF. 42 Sat chi Ponnambalam, Sri Lanka: Tlte National Question and the Tamil Liberation Struggle (London, 1983), p.l56.

176

what to do with the liberated areas.

At the military level too, the JVP was at a disadvantage. The rapid despatch of

military assistance by external powers, undermined the JVP's calculations of arms and

ammunition stocks with the security forces. It is difficult to understand how the JVP

leadership did not consider the possibility that external help would be more forthcoming to

the government than to itself. Further since August 1970, its work among the armed forces

had been hampered by careful government screening. Thus, there was no significant

weakening of the police or army during the uprising. There were reports of individual

desertions from the army but there was no mass desertion or mutiny as the cadres were made

to believe by their leaders.43 The JVP was also weakened by its lack of independent arms

supplies. Their strategy was to procure weapons from the enemy, but once the security forces

were alerted, this method could no longer serve as a rei iable source.

The JVP did not have the necessary social base for an island-wide insurrection. Its

geographical base was limited to the low-country and Kandyan Sinhalese peasantry of the

central and south-west provinces. There was not much support among the Tamils in the north

and east.44 Most urban workers in and around Colombo stood by the UF government. When

the insurrection broke out, the JVP quickly found itself confined to the south-central foothills

and the north-central dry zone, where the bulk of the actual fighting took place.45

Finally, the possibility that the insurrection was sabotaged from within the

organization, cannot be totally ruled out. Tht· bomb-explosion at Mars Hall, Peradeniya

campus, the attack on the US embassy, and the premature attack on the Wellawaya police

43 Fred Halliday, "The Ceylonese Insurrection," New Left Review, no.69, September-October 1971, p.88.

44 Ideologically, the JVP had alienated the Tamil population to have been able to build its base among them. Refer to Chapter IV for its support base among the Tamil population and Chapter V for its stand on the Tamils and the National question.

45 Halliday, n.43, p.89.

177

station have not been explained fully. These could have been the work of disgruntled

elements or agents within the organization.

RECONSIDERING STRATEGY

After the insurrection, the Criminal Justice Commission held an inquiry and sentenced

Wijeweera to rigorous life imprisonment and awarded sentences ranging from three to fifteen

years rigorous imprisonment to the other suspects.46 However, some cases were

recommended for executive clemency. Later, when the UNP came to power in 1977, most

of the suspects were given an executive pardon on the condition that they would enter the

parliamentary process and not take recourse to violent methods. Since then, the JVP

functioned as a parliamentary party, till it was proscribed on grounds of complicity in the

ethnic riots of 1983.

The year of 1983 was a watershed in Sri Lankan history. A few developments around

this time, created the grounds for JVP to reconsider its strategy. The ethnic conflict had flared

up in the north of Sri Lanka. This gave a respite to the JVP cadres from the onslaught of the

Sri Lankan security forces. After going underground, it had started amassing weapons and

infiltrating the armed forces. 47

Following the 1983 riots, the JVP leadership realized the enormous power of Sinhala

chauvinism for mobilization of the masses.48 Thus, a new element of its strategy was to

denounce all the Tamil militant groups. Though they believed in the right of the Tamil people

to self-determination, yet their separatist demand was seen as the result of a bourgeois plan

to divide and rule the country. They believed that none of the Tamil militant organizations

46 Judgement of the Criminal Justice Commission, n.l6, pp.325-328.

47 Chandraprema, n.9, p.73. 48 ibid., p.l3.

178

were Marxist-Leninist and severely criticized their terrorist tactics, which drove the masses

away from the revolutionary movement. 49 The JVP never saw the need to collaborate with

the pro-Marxist Tamil militant groups, probably because it did not want to align with any

separatist group. This would have affected their Sinhala support base. 50

Another reason for the JVP's hostility to armed struggle for Tamil Eelam may have

been plain political jealousyY Having observed the JVP's experience in 1971, the Tamil

militant organizations had evolved a more successful military strategy. While Wijeweera·s

strategy in 1971 failed, the Tamil militant organizatio-ns had managed to keep the Sri L1nkan

security forces at bay with their methods of guerrilla warfare. Their strategy was to hit and

run --- typical urban guerrilla operations rather than a mass uprising. The selection of targets

was done carefully and consciously, so as not to antagonize the public.

JVP and the Tamil Militant Groups

Although the JVP made use of the experiences of the Tamil militant groups 111

reconsidering its strategy, their relationship with these militant groups was not clear.

Wijeweera's animosity to the militants stems from chauvinistic, rather than strategic reasons.

The guerrilla warfare of the Tamil militant groups, arising from the ethnic conflict, was never

perceived as the opening of a second front. 52 The engagement of the Sri Lankan security

forces in the north and east between 1983 and 1987, had provided a breathing-space to the

JVP to re-group, re-constitute and embark on a new strategy which was more likely to

succeed in the changed circumstances. Under the new conditions, with most security

personnel deployed in the north and east, the JVP never thought of launching an attack on

49 "JVP on the LSSP, CP," Lanka Guardian, vol.3, no.19, 15 February 1981, p.l4.

5° Chandraprema, n.9, p.15.

51 Dayan Jayatilleka, "The JVP ---The Need for Self-Criticism," Lanka Guardwn, volA, no.l1, 1 October 1981, p.22. 52 ibid.

179

the Sri Lankan state. It is difficult to establish for what reasons Jayewardene feared an

insurrection in the south before July 1977. However, after the signing of the accord, it was

not an insurrection that followed but guerrilla warfare, most of the tactics having been picked

up from the Tamil militant groups, and perhaps some from Latin American gue'iTilla

groups.53 Like the Tamil militants, the NP made the deep south, which has been a

traditional stronghold, its chief base, hoping to convert it soon into a "liberated zone".54 Its

tactics of terrorizing politicians, killing informers and policemen, collecting weapons,

conducting hit-and-run raids on police stations and camps, raising funds and imposing taxes

on the rich and crippling the civil administration through death-threats, were all borrowed

from the experiences of the Tamil militant groups.

The mystery surrounding the sources of arms supply to the JVP has not been resolved

totally. Some observers believe that after the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, some Tamil militant

groups sold their arms to the JVP in return for hard cash, instead of surrendering them to the

IPKF. PLOTE and the LTTE were reported to have sold arms to the JVP.55 Unlike

Wijeweera, the LTTE is believed to have made arms available to the JVP to create a second

front against the Sri Lankan armed forces. 56 It is possible that the JVP got a cut on the

LITE's arms unloaded in the southern ports and Colombo.57 Besides, there may have been

communication and transfer of information and explosive technology between the two groups.

This is reinforced by the fact that the JVP had started using powerful land mines similar to

53 The JVP tactics had some resemblance to a guerrilla group in Peru, called the "Sendero Luminoso" (Shining Path).

For a brief comparison, see, Ajay Darshan Behera, "Shadow Over the Shining Path and the Politics of the Underground," Mainstream, vol.31, no.20, 27 March 1993, pp.23-28 and Mervyn de Silva, "Pullout of Capital and Brain Likely," Times of India (New Delhi), 4 August 1989. 54 Mervyn de Silva, "Things Fall Apart, But Some Into Place", Lanka Guardian, vol.30, no.17, 1 January 1988, p.S. 55 Shekhar Gupta, "The Opposition Within," India Today (New Delhi), 15 January 1988, p.76. 56 Mohan Ram, "The JVP has Arrived," fl1e Sunday Mail (New Delhi), 6-12 August 1989. 57 S.D. Muni, "JVP and the IPKF," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 24 August 1989.

180

those successfully used in the north hy the LITE since 1983.58 Others reported that the JYP

and the L TIE would cooperate to oppose Indian intervention, 59 but the JYP denied any

links with the Tamil tigers. Perhaps these rumours were part of a smear campaign launched

by the Communist party.60

THE 1987-1989 INSURGENCY

The course of action followed during the 1987-89 insurgency was distinctly different

from the JVP's strategy during the 1971 insurrection. The failure of the 'one-day revolution'

and success of the Tamil militants made the JVP fall back on the time-tested strategy of

protracted struggle. This was to be an insurgency and not insurrection, probably a long drawn

out affair hacked hy guerrilla tactics.

While there is not much information available about JVP's strategy to execute its

plans, it is a widely shared belief that the Indo-Sri Lankan accord provided it with the

opportune moment for a vigorous course of action. However, inklings of an armed revolution

had come to hold the imagination of the public much before the signing of the Accord. This

was evident from reports that the JYP had started arming itseif massively since late 1985.

Due to their limited sources, they relied heavily on weapons stolen from the armed forces and

government armoury.61

58 Bruce Matthews, "The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and the Politics of Underdevelopment in Sri Lanka," Round Table (Surrey), no.322, April 1992, pp.430-431. There is more probability of the PLOTE having given the landmine technology to JVP. The PLOTE had been providing training to JVP cadres in the jungles of Matale and Batticalao districts. See, C.A. Chandraprema, n.20, p.141.

59 Barnett Rubin, Cycles of Violence: Human Rights in Sri Lanka Since the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, An Asia Watch Report, December 1987, pp. 69-70.

60 Wijeweera 's Speech. Translations of Transcripts of Wijeweera 's Tapefi Speech, April 1988, (Mimeograph).

61 Gunaratna writes that reports of arms training of JVP cadres first came around February 1986 in Polonnaruwa (p.212). In 1987, numerous attacks were carried out to retrieve am1s and ammunition. On 15 April, the Pallakele Army camp was attacked and twelve T-56 rifles and seven sub-machine guns were stolen. On 7 June, two attacks were carried out. One was on the Kotlewala Defence Academy in Ratmalana, from where fifteen T-56 rifles and 3300 rounds of ammunition were captured. The second was on the Air Force base in Katunayake, from where they took

181

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and the JVP

The Indo-Sri Lankan accord to settle the Tamil ethnic crisis was signed on 29 July

1987, by J.R. Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi. Jayewardene's fears about a revolt in the south

was one of the main compulsions for signing the accord: In an interview to London Times,

he disclosed that he decided to sign the accord when intelligence reports alerted him to a

growing JVP-led revolt in the south. He was well aware that he could not control both the

JVP and the Tamil militant groups simultaneously. Therefore, he sought India's help in

settling the Tamil problem,62 hoping that if the security forces were relieved from the north,

he could tackle the JVP in the south.63

However, the manner in which the accord was signed gave rise to apprehensions in

the Sinhala community. This was because it cuntained important concessions to the Tamil

demands for greater autonomy and gave India a say in the conduct of Sri Lanka's foreign

affairs. It created a perception that Jayewardene was incapable of protecting Sinha( a interests

and was succumbing to Indian pressure.64 Further, Jayewardene's tactics for ensuring

ratification of the accord, reinforced the Sinhalese perception that institutional channels for

expressing dissent were rendered inoperative by the President's autocratic style of leadership

and that the only means left to express this dissent was through extra-parliamentary

methods. 65

The immediate reaction to the accord was one of violent protests and demonstrations

in southern, western and central Sri Lanka. From 29 to 31 July, mobs, at times led by militant

seven self-loading rifles, one sub-machine gun, six .38 pistols and one shot gun. See. Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP (Kandy, 1990), p.224. Also see, Chandraprema, n.20, pp.133-136. 62 Reported in Lanka Guardian, vol.11, no.14, 15 November 1988.

63 The government had charged that the JVP and the LTTE were working together to sabotage the Accord. However, no evidence was put forward to substantiate this claim. See, Asia Watch Report, n.59, p.70. 64 Nilan Fernando, "Sri Lanka in 1989: Maintaining the State," BJ/SS·lournal (Dhaka), vol.11, no.1, 1990, p. 117. 65 ibid., pp.121-122.

182

Buddhist monks, attacked and hurnt government offices and property. The government

estimated the total property damage to he around Rs. 4 billion. The Ceylon Transport Board

buses were the hardest hit, 453 of which were destroyed. Seventy four people were killed in

police firing and about 500 arrested while rioting.66 The government rushed 3,000 Sri Lanka

troops from Jaffna to the south. The JVP, along with some other parties, was believed to be

at the forefront of these protests and demonstrations.67 The accord served as a catalyst for

a resurgence in the activities of the JVP. The ensuing confusion in the protests and

demonstrations against the accord, allowed the JVP to carry out a campaign of terror and

attacked all individuals and institutions that supported the accord.

Though the JVP had started ?.rming itself long ago, a spurt in its activities could he

clearly observed after the signing of the accord.68 Following an unusually violent May Day

rally, Jayewardene had warned that the JVP was planning another insurgency along the lines

of the 1971 insurrection. 6<i The UNP government took the threat seriously. After a wave of

student unrest, the government closed six of the country's nine universities which were

believed to be recruiting grounds for the JVP.70

Change in Strategy

A comparative study of the methods of the JVP in 1971 and during the 1987-89

period shows significant differences between the two. In the second phase, the JVP's

66 Daily News, 3 August 1987; and Island (Colombo), 6 August 1987. 67 Since the announcement of the Acmrd on 23 July 1987, there was general unrest and certain nationalist forces and even some political parties planned to launch a campaign against the Accord. At the head of this campaign was the Mavubima Surakeeme Viyaparaya (MSV), the MEP, the SLFP and the JVP. See Gunaratna, n.61, pp.233-235.

68 Bryan Pfaffenberger, "Sri L1nka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP," Asian Survey, voi.2X, no.2, February 1988, p.139. 69 President Jayewardene in an interview with the present author said that the JVP"s May Day rally that year was threatening. The JVP carried out its march in the most disciplined way wearing military uniforms. These reports haLl alerted him. Interview on 13 January 1994, Colombo.

70 Pfaffenberger, n.68, p.l39.

183

campaign was marked by some amount of professionalism and it did not repeat the mistakes

it made in 1971. It avoided frontal attacks and self-destructive methods like launching attacks

on police stations, army camps and other well-guarded installations like airports. 71

Whenever the police stations and army camps were attacked, it was done to acquire weapons.

Their planning and secrecy made sure that they got away with minimal losses.

A multi-front protracted war was launched on the Sri Lankan state. Initially, a

selective assassination of personalities who supported the accord were carried out. Their main

target was the UNP, though members of other political parties, the bureaucracy and the

security forces, were not exempted.

On 18 August 1987, they got very close to assassinating many UNP leaders, including

the President, when a grenade was lobbed into a room in the parliament building in which

the cabinet was discussing implementation of the accord.Jayewardene escaped but the assault

killed the -District Minister for Matara, Keerthi Abeywickrema and a clerk, and caused

injuries to the Minister for National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali. 72 The responsibility

for this attack was claimed by the Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya (DJV). L1ter, on 23

December 1987, Harsha Abeywardene, Chairman of the UNP and three others were killed in

Colombo by unidentified gunmen, suspected to be JVP members. 73 In September 1988,

Lionel Jayatilleke, Minister for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, was shot dead. The JVP

had targeted the UNP for having conceded devolution to a minority at the periphery. The idea

was to destroy the UNP morale and terrorize politicians who supported the accord.74

71 Shekhar Gupta, n.55, p.75.

72 Gunaratna, n.61, p.271. 73 Some believe that Harsha Abeywardene's killing was in retaliation to a statement by President Jayewardene thnt the JVP should be wiped out. Interview with Champika Ranaweke, 24 January 1994, Colombo. 74 Shekhar Gupta, n.55, p.75.

184

THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: A PARADOX

According to provisions of the accord, the Provincial Council elections were held on

2 June and 9 June 1988. These elections were boycotted by the SLFP, while the JVP tried

to disrupt them by clamping a curfew, so as to prevent voters from reaching the polling

booths. They made it clear that anyone who violated the order would be sentenced to death.

That is why the voter turnout was as low as 30 per cent. There was also some suspicion and

uncertainty regarding the forthcoming Presidential elections.

In December 1982, the UNP had not held parliamentary elections and instead a

referendum was held to prolong the life of parliament.75 This proved to be a potent factor

in the revival of the JVP. Even in 1970, the rise of the JVP is related to the suspicion that

the UNP would not hold elections. 76 For weeks before the presidential elections of 19

December 1988, it was felt that the JVP might he in the process of capturing power. 77

Paradoxically, it was perhaps the JVP's threats that forced Jayewardene to hold the

Presidential elections78 and later the same gun may have threatened the holding of the

elections.79

The announcement of Presidential elections brought certain contending forces together.

Around this time, most political parties were trying to win the support and collaboration of

the JVP. This was partly due to fear and partly due to prospective electoral gains. It may

have also been a recognition of the ethno-populist appeal of the JVP and, thus, both Mrs.

75 For details, see, Wiswa W.A. Wamapala and L. Dias Hewagama, Recent Politics in Sri Lanka: The Presidential

Election and the Referendum of 1982 (New Delhi, 1983), pp.126-200. 76 Refer to the Judgement of the Criminal Justice Commission, n.16, p.128; and Bruce Matthews, n.58, p.426. 77 Matthews, ibid., p.425. 78 There was a general feeling among most Sinhalese that the JVP "was instrumental in dissuading the President from amending the constitution to seek a third term and to call parliamentary elections for the first time in twelve years. Sri Lankans looked forward to the Presidential elections, scheduled for 19 December 1988 as an opportunity for a new government to secure a fresh mandate". See, Nilan Fernando, n.64, p. 122. 79 Arun Weerasuriya, "Backdrop to Presidential Election," Mainstream, vol.27, no.13, 24 December 1988, p.S.

185

Bandaranaike and Prime Minister Premadasa avoided any direct indictment of the JVP in

fomenting violence, preferring to blame unspecified subversives. The accord and the

subsequent developments brought two bitter enemies ---the JYP and SLFP together. This was

the emergence of a complex coalition of opposition forces in which both the non-violent

parliamentary-oriented and the violent non-parliamentary forces considered each other useful

allies in opposing the incumbent government. Wijeweera had agreed to join the electoral

process in 1988 on the fulfillment of certain conditions.80 These conditions were:

(a) the illegal government to quit; (b) to make the Presidentship vacant immediately; (c) to replace it with a neutral government; (d) to dissolve the provincial councils; (e) to abrogate the Jayewardene-Rajiv agreement immediately; (f) to send back the aggressive Indian army immediately; (g) to put an immediate end to repression unleashed on the people; (h) to disband all armed units manned by the henchmen of the regime; (i) to withdraw and surrender to a neutral caretaker government, all the weapons issued to the UNP and the USA (United Socialist Alliance); U) to hold a general election and Presidential elections under the neutral caretaker government.81

Around August and October that year, there emerged an anti-UNP political alliance with the

JVP as its focal point. The other members were the SLFP, Eksath Lanka Janatha Peramuna

(EUP), MEP, Liberal Party, Tamil Congress, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the

Democratic Workers Congress and the Inter University Students Federation (IUSF).82 This

alliance was amenable to the anti-Indian political stand of the JYP, in its attempt to unite

patriotic for:es to establish a government of the National Liberation Front with the people's

80 "Wijeweera Replies Readers," Sunday Times (Colombo), 13 November 1988.

81 National Programme of the United Front for National Redemption (Preliminary Draft). See Appendix H. 82 Weerasuriya, p.8. Kumar Ponnambalam claimed in an interview that he was instrumental in getting all the parties together. He also tried to get some Tamil parties like the EPRLF into this alliance, but they refused. He recalled that the person negotiating on behalf of the JVP went by the name of Dhammika, probably a pseudonym. Interview on 1 February 1994, Colombo.

186

R' mandate.'·'

But this alliance did not last long as the JVP withdrew in the first week of November

1988. One important reason for this rift was Mrs. Bandaranaike's refusal to accept the JVP's

call for an armed struggle if President Jayewardene did not submit to their pre-election

demand for dissolving the government and appointing a caretaker administration.84 Another

reason had to do with the selection of a common candidate for the presidential election and

subsequent demands for the allocation of parliamentary seats among the constituent members

of the alliance, in the forthcoming parliamentary elections.85 The JVP wanted 25 per cent

of the seats while it wanted the SLFP to retain only 60 per cent. They also demanded that

if the alliance broke up after the formation of the government, that government should

automatically stand dissolved and fresh elections be called immediately. These demands were

unacceptable to the SLFP because such a distribution would have weakened them.Rt> The

other reason for the rift could have been the composition of the future cabinet. It was reported

that the JVP bargained for two key portfolios --- Defence and Foreign Affairs.R7 Probably

the JVP wanted to use the SLFP to come to power and then transform an elected alliance

government into a form of Sinhala nationalist authoritarianism.88 Once the alliance came

to power, the JVP could have very easily neutralized the SLFP and dictated terms.

After the JVP and the SLFP parted ways, the former was determined to disrupt the

Presidential elections in order to weaken the SLFP. Had they succeeded, the breakdown of

law and order would have worsened and a subsequent shaky authoritarian rule would have

83 National Programme of the United Front for National Redemption, n.Sl, p.3.

84 Interview with Chanaka Ameratunge, leader of the Liberal Party, who was also involved in the negotiations, on 14 January 1994, Colombo. 85 . Weerasunya, n.79, p.S. 86 ibid., p.33.

87 ibid.

88 ibid., p.34.

187

been easier to challenge and overcome.1N However, when the presidential elections were

held, the JVP's violent campaign helped UNP defeat Mrs. Bandaranaike. Later, the JYP

branded the presidential poll "fraudulent" and the presidency as "illegal". 90 It renewed its

call for a patriotic war and the overthrow of the "puppet regime". It also gave a call to

boycott the parliamentary elections and urged the armed forces to join the patriotic people

and defeat the fascists. The parliamentary elections which were held after eleven years, was

one of the most violent in Sri Lanka. Fourteen opposition candidates were killed during the

campaign. During the elections, each candidate was permitted six armed bodyguards and

issued shotguns and revolvers for self-defence. 91 Thus, the holding of the election was an

effort to usher in democracy through the point of a gun.

JVP AND THE IPKF

Under the provisions of the 1987 accord, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was

to supervise the surrender of arms by the Tamil militants and maintain law and order in the

north and east. The induction of Indian troops was interpreted by the JVP as an advance of

their earlier thesis on "Indian Expansionism". Even some mythical facts were used to draw

analo~ies to influence the minds of the common man.

One may attribute two probable reasons for the JVP's violent campaign for the

abrogation of the accord and the withdrawal of the IPKF. First, the presence of the IPKF in

Sri Lanka had affected the JVP's strategy to capture power. The accord, along with the

89 Matthews, n.58, p.427.

90 Mervyn de Silva, "Time Bomb Ticks Away in East Lanka," Times of India, 29 February 1989. It was not only the JVP, but various independent sources have also pointed out that the election was rigged. See, Janaki Perera, The Subversion of tlze Electoral Process in Sri Lanka (n.d.) and Vasantha Amerasinghe, "Sri Lanka's Presidential Elections: An Analysis," Economic and Political Weekly, vol.24, no.7, 18 February 1989, pp.346-350. 91 Amnesty International, Sri Lanka, Extrajudicial Executions, Disappearances and Torture, 1987-1990, September 1990, p.9.

presence of the Indian troops, had altered the balance of military forces against the JVP. 92

Second, it used the IPKF in its propaganda war. This position helped it to mobilize support

in some sections of the Sinhala society. 93

Notwithstanding its repeated verbal assaults on the IPKF, the JYP did not get into a

direct confrontation with the IPKF. Though Upatissa Gamanayake, the General secretary

claimed in a letter to the US Ambassador in Sri Lanka, "the patriotic army of Janatha

Yimukthi Peramuna which confronts Indian imperialism militarily, has so far claimed the

lives of 63 soldiers of the Indian Army which occupied the north and east of Sri Lanka on

the heels of the Accord",94 it is difficult to assess the veracity of this claim.95 The JVP

could not have engaged the IPKF in any confrontation for two reasons. First, the geographical

limitations of the JVP's reach since it was confined to the areas outside the north and east,

. which was IPKF's operational areas. Second, it would not have been in JVP's strategic

interests to provoke the IPKF into a direct confrontation. Media reports during this period had

highlighted that the JYP had refrained from directly attacking the Indian troops, citizens or

even businessmen of Indian origin.96 The only way this claim of taking Indian lives may

be explained is that it was more of a psychological warfare with the Sri Lankan government

and an effort to mobilize the Sinhala masses on an anti-Indian, anti-imperialist plank. This

was evident in the following passage from the same letter written by Gamanayake:

Since its start, the patriotic struggle was propelled and nurtured by all sections of the society ranging from workers to students, and increased in intensity

92 Muni, "JVP and IPKF," n.57. Also see, Muni, n.39, p.157. 93 ibid. 94 Upatissa Gamanayake's letter to the US Ambassador in Colombo dated 20 September 1989. See Appendix D. Gunaratna mentions that the JVP carried out two attacks against the LPKF. See, Gunaratna, n.61, p.317. 95 Mr. J.N. Dixit, former Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, denied in a discussion that the JVP had killed any Indian soldiers.

96 For details, see Muni, "JVP and IPKF," n.57; and Majed Ali Sayeed, "Peace Prospects Still Obscure," Pakistan and Gulf Economist (Karachi), vol.8, no.41, October 1989, p.52 and Mervyn de Silva, "Time Bomb," n.90.

189

despite the violent crackdown by the government intent upon protecting Indian Imperialism for their own sake and greed for power.97

ANTI-INDIA CAMPAIGN: EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY

Along with its campaign for the abrogation of the accord, Wijeweera, set a deadline

of 14 June 1989 for a complete boycott of Indian goods, departure of all Indians of Sri

L1nkan and Indian origin, and the pullout of the IPKF. He said:

since we are engaged in war against Indian imperialism to gain our national liberation we request all patriotic citizens to boycott all Indian goods, terminate all transaction with Indian banks and insurance institutions, keep away from trade and other economic activities with India.98

This call was to have a devastating effect on the economy and bring the country to

a standstill. Not only is Sri L1nka dependent on India for certain essential goods, there were

eighteen private and public sector Indian companies operating in Sri L1nka, including state

Bank of India (SBI), Indian Overseas Bank (IOB), Indian Airlines (IA), Air India (AI),

Pugoda Textiles, Bombay Dyeing and the Taj group of hotels. 99

There were also about thousand Indian nationals in Sri Lanka. The Indian community

reacted by taking shelter in hotels. Since no untoward incident took place, they resumed their

normal life. But everyone was not willing to believe that the JVP had issued the boycott call.

Some Indians also felt that the anti-Indian campaign was orchestrated by influential sections

in the government in a bid to pressurize India to withdraw the IPKF. It is possible that some

vested interests could have been exploiting the situation. It was particularly felt in

97 Upatissa Gamarnayake"s letter, n.94.

98 Rohana Wijeweera, "Boycott India Campaign," Lanka Guardian, vol.12, no.3, 1 June 1989, p.S. Also see Shelton U. Kodikara, "The Continuing Crisis in Sri Lanka: The JVP, the Indian Troops, and Tamil Politics," Asian Survey (Califomia), vol.29, no.7, July 1989, p.716. 99 Seema Guha, "JVP asks Indians to Quit," Times of India, 24 May 1989.

190

pharmaceutical imports where India accounted for 70% of Sri Lanka's drug impurts.!llo

Chemists admitted that they had been asked by government officials not to sell Indian drugs.

Most of these orders were passed over the phone. 101

PARALYZING THE ADMINISTRATION: SECTOR BY SECTOR

President Premadasa's Jan Saviya programme had triggered off a strike m all the

sectors. Twelve key trade unions had announced that they would launch agitations to seek Sri

Lankan Rs. 2,500 as basic minimum wages, the amount which was being offered to the Jan

Saviya families under the poverty line. 102 The JVP had instigated these strikes with workers

who were now demanding a similar sum as a minimum monthly wage. 103 The JVP targeted

the transport sector first which paralyzed the country and brought it to a standstill. Employees

of the government road transport service had been on strike since 12 June 191-{9 demanding

higher wages. They were later joined by the private run mini-buses and railways crippling the

public transport. 104 Over 70 per cent of the state Transport Board buses were of Indian

make and the Sinhala drivers could not defy the JVP boycott call. 105 This, coupled with

the Sri Lankan Transport Board Employees Union Strike for wage revision, resulted in the

100 It is interesting to note that the anti-India campaign was hurting the Sri Lankan economy most, as brought out

poignantly in a pamphlet released by a vigilante group. It tried to point out that there was some mutuality of interests between the JVP and the MNCs. Toxide injections bought from India used to cost Rs. 8 each, while after the boycott, it was imported from Germany at the rate of Rs. 130 each. See Appendix K.

101 Dilip Bobb, "Sri L1nka: Dangerous Deadlock," lndw Today, 15 July 1989, p.61.

102 Seema Guha, "JVP's Ge1~ral Strike Today," Times of India, 26 June 1989. Under one of the schemes, a family with an income below Rs.750 was to be granted Rs.2500 per month. Out of this, Rs. 1458 was to be provided as an income subsidy and Rs. 1042 was to be given as a capital grant to be saved in a bank. This grant was to be given for two years after which the family was encouraged to invest its accumulated capital in a small enterprise. In the

1989 budget, Rs. 10 million was allocated for this scheme. For details, see, Sri Lanka, Country Report, The Economist Intel! igence Unit, No. 1 (London), 1989, p.12.

103 India Today, 15 July 19S9, p.69.

10~ See the news report in Times of India, 3 July 1989.

105 "JVP: The Unseen Influence," Money Mauers, July 1989, p.14.

191

transport service hei ng para I yzed complete! y. This caused a lot of inconvenience to the

common man.

The transport strike was followed by several token and one-day strikes. On 26 June

1989 the JVP called for a 24 hour general strike to sympathize with the 52,000 striking

transport workers. 106 Telecommunications and postal workers had walked out of their posts

in support of the bus workers demands, port workers and state sector workers staged a

wildcat strike that once again paralyzed the island. 107 On 15 August 1989, the JVP called

for a total island wide general strike on Indian independence day. Some 90,000 tea plantation

workers in the southern Ratnapura district went on a week-long strike from 7 September 19X9

in response to a JVP call. 10R

Neither the imposition of emergency nor the threat of dismissal had any effect on the

workers. This could he possible partly because of the terror the JVP inspired and partly due

to its ability to mobilize the trade unions because of the weakness of established union

leaders and the infiltration of some trade unions. 109 The striking workers also could not be

dismissed as it might have resulted in a wave of sympathy strikes in other sectors. 110

The JVP's strategy of hitting the key sectors in the economy was taken seriously hy

the authorities. Tea gardens in the Uva Badulla areas and coconut and rubber estates in the

south were badly hit. Over 2,09,000 kilograms of tea were destroyed by the JVP in the

central provinces. Tea exports is one of the main foreign exchange earners of the country,

which earned Rs. 12.29 billion in 1988. 111 Both the state-owned and private tea gardens

106 Seema Guha, "JVP Strike," n.l02. 107 Kodikara, n.98, p.717; and Dilip Bobb, n.101, p.60. 108 Times of India, 9 September 1989. 109 Mervyn de Silva, "The Phoney Pe~ce is Over --- Protracted War Begins," Lanka Guardian, vol.12, no.S, 1 July 1989, p.3. The JVP controlled seventeen trade unions. For their list, see, footnote 60, Chapter IV. 110 Seema Guha, "JVP Strike," n. 102.

Ill Seema Guha, "No JVP Indication About Cease-fire," Times of India, 25 September 1989.

192

,------ ----· I

I I ! AREAL SUMMARY OF THE INSURGENCY,

• ~~JA;c;N~ 1987-89 .

lit 0

; ULLAITTIVU

AR 11

.··· MANN~

····· ·· .. 0 ···. :=~ \IAVUHIYA •••

J ······. ........ · : t) ·.

TRIHC01o4ALEE .. ... ~ ..

~ ~ m ,

' ~ ): .... .... " .·~ ) 0 .. .. i" ANURAOHAPURA

JVP DOMINATED

AREAS.

~\Jo BATT I COLO PUT TAL AM .···· A

~ ..... ........ "'

0 : 'f: 0 . . . I<EGALL~. . . : ~ . ~ . ... -.. . .:. .

- ..:. -· ~

1-/ ';) 80 I

COL OM

··~.<" .f_ -- 1 ~ 'l JCQ . '\ ·.

_j' ADURA .';- ;.. PAN

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Fig.-4 Source: Adaplrd from INDIA TODAY. lOth Srpt.1989, P. 2'>.

were affected by the JVP. They organized strikes and continued to set fire on sub-post offices

and agricultural centres and land record offices in rural areas. 112 They were able to paralyse

various sectors of the economy and life in general including civil administration, transport,

telecommunications, business, industry, banks, universities and schools 113 as was done by

the Tamil militants in the north and east earlier. They also did not want the Jan Saviya

programme to succeed because this poverty alleviation programme had a potent appeal to the

poor which was the main support base of the JVP. They tried to disrupt this programme by

assassinating key officials involved in its implementation. 114

The extensive use of violence, destruction of public property, 115 work stoppages,

demonstration by school children inspired by JVP student wing and unauthorized curfews

caused lot of inconvenience to the general public. Gradually the JVP was losing their

sympathy. The only section from where the JYP got support, though not vocal, was from the

Sinhala entrepreneur class who had business links with countries other than India and had

always resented the role played by the businessmen of Indian origin in the Sri L'lnkan

economy. 116

TACKLING THE JVP

Premadasa took a more conciliatory approach towards the JVP than his predecessor

Jayewardene. Premadasa tried to appease the JVP by launching an anti-India rhetoric. He

called for the withdrawal of the IPKF. Although the official explanation for this was the

112 ibid.

113 Gamini Navaratne, "JVP's Firm Hold over Sri Lanka," Times of India, 1 August 1989. 114 Seema Guha, "Lanka's JVP Marks An Anniversary," Times of India, 5 April 1989. 115 Property worth Rs.95,000 million was destroyed by the JVP. Daily News, 9 May 1991. 116 See, Muni, "JVP and IPKF," n.57.;and.Gamini Navaratne, "Quit Lanka, JVP Tells Indian Traders," Times of India, 12 June 1989.

194

holding of the SAARC meeting in November 1989 but the actual reason was to preempt the

JVP. 117 Soon after coming to power Premadasa had withdrawn the emergency in January

1989. But such steps did not have much effect on the violent campaign of the JVP which was

determined in its efforts to· cripple the economy and civil administration and pull down the

government. Emergency was reimposed on 20 June 1989 and the government started

delegating more powers to the security forces and gave them orders to shoot at sight, arrest

or detain those engaged in sabotage, inciting people to strike or damaging public

propertyY8 Premadasa, however, kept the option for negotiations open, while the Minister

of state for Defence Ranjan Wijeratne took a tough stand.

Simultaneously, the government had made known its plans to allow 100 UNP

members of Parliament to recruit private militia or home guards of 300 supporters to provide

protection. This force of 30,000 men was to be under the personal control of politicians. 11lJ

At the same time, Premadasa was willing to talk to the JVP provided they were willing. He

had a secret meeting with JVP leaders on 1 August 1989 but their demands, of course, could

not be conceded. They asked for the pull-out of the IPKF; dissolution of parliament; dropping

of three ministers--- Ranjan Wijeratne, Lalith Athulathmudali, and Gamini Dissanayake, and

revocation of the emergency. 120 Later, the JVP was also invited to the All Party Conference

held on 13 September 1989, to discuss proposals to resolve the crisis in the south, hut

declined to participate. A cease-fire against the JVP was declared from 27 September 1989

for 72 hours. Within twenty four hours, thirty five cadres surrendered --- 29 in north central

117 Kodikara, n.98, p.717.

118 Seema Guha, "JVP Men May Lay Do""11 Am1s," Times of India, 24 March 1989.

1 !'l An Asia Watch Report, n.59, p.3.

120 Seema Guha, "Premadasa, JVP Hold Secret Talks," Times of lmlia, 2 August 1989. Also see, "The New Killing Fields," Ginipupura (London), September 1989, pp.2-3.

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Anuradhapura and six in the southern Matara district. 121 However, the party did not gtve

any indication whether it would accept the cease-fire. On 2 November 1989, Premadasa

appealed to the JVP to enter into a dialogue to restore peace and order. 122

The security forces' onslaught had considerably weakened the JVP, though it was still

in a position to organize strikes and hit out at key industries and sectors of the economy. But

its potential to face the security forces was gradually ebbing away. This prompted a debate

among the JVP leadership on the future course of action. One section believed that it should

have a dialogue with the government and after ensuring the dissolution of the parliament, try

its luck once more in the electoral process. But there were a large number of younger cadres

who were opposed to this. 123

. JVP And the Armed Forces

After 1977, the JVP had been able to infiltrate all important institutions including the

defence establishment. This was possible due to the expansion of the armed forces and poor

recruitment procedures. It managed to get arms training and weapons by this method. Some

of the attacks on defence installations and the Katunayake air force base could not have been

possible without inside connivance. The JVP's supposed military wing, the DJV was manned

largely by army deserters. 124 These deserters also trained the JVP cadres which carried out

more successful military operations. Quite a few defence personnel had been discharged from

the services on suspicion of being JVP activists.

121 For details, see, Seema Guha, "Cease-fire Begins in Sri Lanka: 35 JVP Men Surrender," Times of lrulia, 2o

September 1989. 122 The JVP was not interested in a dialogue as by this time, it was quite optimistic of pulling down the govenunent and coming to power. It made this clear in the JVP organ, The Red Power: "We would like to stress most emphatically that our fight is to regain the sovereignty of the nation and the independence of its people, not to share a few seats in the Parliament. The masses have realized this very important fact. The President and the entire gallery of rogues must quit." Quoted from Jrulia Today, 15 July 1989, p.65. 123 ibid. 124 Mervyn de Silva, "Premadasa Makes a Desperate Move," Times of Jrulia, 13 April 1989. Wijeweera's Taped Speech, n.60.

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In a last hid effort, the JVP had appealed through posters and leatlets to the patriots

within the armed forces, to rise up and overthrow the UNP regime. In fact, Wijeweera had

always claimed that patriotic sections of the armed forces were with the JVP. 125 This could

have been part of a psychological warfare to induce fear amo'ngst the security forces. By late

1988, the number of army deserters exceeded 2000. It is believed that many left for the fear

that either they, their families or relatives would be killed by the JVP. However, when there

was no mass uprising or desertions as the JVP claimed, they gave a deadline to police and

security forces to resign by 20 August 1989, which was later extended to 28 August 1989,

or else see their families killed. 120 This proved to be a big tactical mistake on the part of

the JVP.

A strategic plan was devised by the security forces in September 1988. According to

this plan, the hardcore members of the JVP/DJV were to be identitied, tracked and

exterminated by hand picked men. Extra-judicial killings by these squads were to he ignored

by the government. The government intelligence agencies were streamlined. Five intelligence

agencies were working on the JVP simultaneously--- the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB),

the Counter Subversive Unit (CSU), Colombo Detective Bureau (COB), Military Intelligence

and Operation Combine (Ops Com). Operation Combine was reorganized within the armed

forces, under the command of the Army Chief, to co-ordinate military and police operations

against the JVP. In the end, it was the Operation Combine, along with the Army's special

forces adopting unconventional methods that was able to achieve success.

125 Wijeweera's Taped Speech, ibid. 126 Seema Guha, "Lankan PM Holds Out Olive-Branch to JVP," Times of India, 21 August 1989. Gamanayake explains the circumstances in which this call was given, in the letter to the US Ambassador, "On 28th and 29th of July alone, the second mmiversary of the Accord, 523 unam1ed people were shot dead when they were engaged in essentially anti-Indian demonstrations. Following this massacre, we appealed to the security forces personnel to desert the forces in order to stem the ongoing genocide of the people by a desperate government". See, Gamanayake 's letter, n.94.

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DIG Premadasa Udugampola, who had suffered personal loses at the hands of the

JVP, 127 devised his own methods. He formed small groups of hand-picked trained men

armed with automatic weapons, who travelled in unmarked vehicles. They wore black overalls

and were masked or sported a beard. They were recruited from families that had suffered at

the hands of the JVP. These squads, often known as death or killer squads, ruthlessly went

after the JVP members and their families and relatives. Arrests were mostly followed by

executions, often in the most gruesome manner. To prevent identification, the bodies were

disfigured, burnt or dumpedin rivers. The objective ofthLse actions was to eliminate as many

members of the JVP as possible and to create a fear psychosis among the JVP members and

sympathizers and prevent others from joining them.

The army's method of dealing with the J':'P was to combat the violence unleashn~ by

the extremists with counter-terrorism. On 19 August, posters were put up by the security

forces all over the country warning the extremists that if one person on the side of the

authorities was killed, they would retaliate by exterminating twelve on the other side.m

The posters were signed by the People's R~volutionary Red Army (PRRA). It is commonly

believed that the PRRA, like "Green Tigers" and "Black Cats" were the unauthorized killer

gangs of the government. Most of these groups belonged to the elite forces like the Special

Task Forces (STF), which operated in civilian clothes, wearing masks. 129

127 On 28th July 1988, the JVP had bombed his family home in Galle and killed his mother, brother, sister-in-law

and two children. On the same day, DIG Udugampola told a SLFP MP that though he knew that Wijeweera's mother and sister were at Tangalle, he had not touched them. That night, security personnel came in search of Wijeweera 's family, which had already escaped by then on being fore-warned by the same MP. Interview in Colombo with the MP. 128 Shekhar Gupta, "Sri Lanka: Falling Apart," India Today, 30 September 1989, p.26. 129 Green Tigers, Black Cats, Scorpions and People's Revolutionary Red Army (PRRA) --- These emerged as a counter to the DJV's own death squads and claimed responsibility for the death of dozens of suspected JVP/DJV members. Their real identity was unknown, but there was little doubt that they had the state's tacit approval, though the goverrunent denied rumours that they consisted of members of some security units operating under cover. See Rohan Gunasekera, "Sri Lanka's Security Nightmare", International Defence Review (Geneva), vol.23, January 1990, p.42. Premadasa had said in September 1989 in parliament, "The militants have arms in their hands, representatives

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The JVP did not pay heed to the threats issued hy the security forces. Their tactics

\vas marked hy a certain over-confidence. One popular JVP poster warned the army,

"Remember, we will take blood for blood, life for life, parents for parents, property for

prop'erty. One day someplace, somewhere, we will get you, do not forget" .U0 The task of

the security forces was made easier by the fact that JVP cadres and supporters were

identifiable in the villages and thus, retaliation was swift. The most disturbing part of the

counter-violence unleashed by the security forces was that they did not distinguish between

members, supporters and family-membersY 1 Some civil rights lawyers and human rights

activists were also murdered.

The JVP was not able to withstand the counter-violence of the security forces. Its

main problem had been a lack of regular supply of sophisticated arms 132 and sufficient

manpower. Without the tirepower to take on the military, they had no chance of winning in

the short term or even long run. JVP's threat to the security forces to 'desert or die' proved

to be self-defeating. It is likely that this threat was only a tactical move and never meant to

be carried out. Perhaps the JYP thought that having realized its enormous power, its threat

would be taken seriously by the armed forces hut in effect, it brought massive retaliation.

The security forces were gaining the upperhand. By 27 August 1989, they were

optimistic of achieving a breakthrough. With the JVP refusing to accept the olive branch, the

upper echelons of the administration believed that the only way to deal with the insurgents

of all political parties have also sec"l!red arms for their security .... " Shekhar Gupta, ibid., p.26. Many politicians had built their own private armies like Black Panthers. 1 ~0 Seema Guha, "L·mkan PM Holds Out Olive-Branch," n. 126. 131 Estimates regarding the number of people killed during the counter-insurgency operations varies. One estimate puts it at about 100 per 1,00,000 people, which is about 0.1% of the population. See, "Uncivil Wars," Economist (London), vol.313, no.7623, 7 October 1989, p.76. 132 However, intelligence reports indicated that the frequent use of landmines by the JVP/DJV showed that it was receiving regular supplies of explosives from overseas. See, Gunasekera, n.129, p.41.

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was to eliminate them. 133 Within three months, the government forces were able to

penetrate the JVP and eliminate its leadership. Sumith Athukorale was the tirst member of

the politbureau to be killed in March 1989. In August Nandatilake Galappatti and Polwatte

Wimalaratne were captured and subsequently executed in September. In the early hours of

13 November 1989, Wijeweera was arrested at his house at Ulapane in the central hills and

later shot dead. Soon, Upatissa Gamanayake, the second in command was apprehended and

killed. 134 This was followed by Ranasinghe, Herath and D.M. Ananda. By the end of

December, three members of the Politbureau, Saman Fernando, Shantha Bandara and

Wijeratne, were captured and subsequently executed. The only politburo member to survive

wa..<; Somawansa Amerasinghe. 135 By mid-January 1990, the government said that it had

captured all 13 members of the JVP politbureau. 136 Operation Combine was wound up in

early March 1990.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE 1987-89 STRATEGY

In the final analysis, the anticipated mass uprising against the state never took place.

The JYP, which had gained tremendous strength due to its tactical moves in the early months

of 1989, suddenly found itself leaderless, with all except one politbureau member having been

eliminated. The Sri Lankan state, having been pushed to the wall by the JVP with its ability

to strike at will, did not hesitate in adopting counter-insurgency methods which were very

unconventional and gruesomely violent. These were carried out in spite of stringent criticism

133 Seema Guha, "Sri Lanka Confident of Crushing JVP," Times of India, 28 August 1989.

134 For details, see, "JVP Chief Wijeweera Killed in Encounter," Times of India, 14 November 1989 and Suranimala, "The Last Days of Wijeweera," The Sunday Times, 19 November 1989. 135 Subsequently, Amerasinghe escaped to London via India. It is believed by many Sri Lankans that his escape was possible because of his relationship with Sirisena Cooray, a top UNP politician. See, Gunaratna, n.61, p.312. 136 According to newspaper reports, only 12 were eliminated. One among them, Somawansa Amersinghe, however, escaped.

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of the security forces for human rights violations.

It would he pertinent here to look at the strategy of the JVP during the 19H7-19H9

period. The strategy adopted during the 1971 insurrection was a straight forward strategy of

trying to capture the state· in a single blow. The strategy during the latter period was a

protracted long drawn-out affair. In the short-term, the effort was to weaken the civil

administration, cripple the economy and enforce hardship on the common man. In the long

term, it was hoped to generate sufficient public support, and as a result of the above factors,

the people were expected to rise in a mass uprising against the state and bring about a

systemic change. The JVP hoped to ride to power as a part of coalition of the opposition

parties. This projection never worked out.

Reasons for Failure

The basic tlaw in this strategy was that once the JVP had lost the upperhand, it did

not allow any escape route. They were also not able to control the violence they had

unleashed. What is important in guerrilla warfare is that the use of force has to he selective

and specifically against the symbols of state authority or repression. The moment it becomes

indiscriminate, the masses are alienated and their support is not forthcoming.

To garner popular support, it is important that the political front of H'le organization

should have played an active and effective role. However, the conditions which were created

due to the insurgency, were not conducive to the functioning of the political front. The

process of mobilization of the masses was, therefore, confined to a narrow and chauvinistic

stand on anti-Indianism. In a paradoxical way, this proved to be their strength as well as their

downfall. The presence of the IPKF was used as the basis of their propaganda war. And it

was this very presence of the IPKF which enabled the Sri Lankan security forces to be

deployed against the JVP in their counter-insurgency operations.

Although the JVP demonstrated its ability to paralyze the civil administration and was

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often referred to as the Rathri Anduwa (night government) and the Kuda Anduwa (small

government), their political programme was inadequate to mobilize the masses. A strategy

to overthrow the prevailing capitalist state could not have been based on anti-lndianism alone.

It had to grow beyond this. As in 1971, the JVP had no agrarian programme to speak of.

Since the NP failed to give political meaning to its military actions, the anticipated mass

uprising did not occur and ultimately allowed the Sri Lankan state to crush it.

CONCLUSION

The JVP's strategy to capture power was characterized by two models. The first was

a fairly conceptualized and unique model of capturing power in a single hlow, hy

simultaneous attacks on police stations throughout the country. The other was a model of

'sectoral paralysis', whereby the economy and civil administration were paralyzed sector hy

sector, prior to the final takeover of state power. In this approach, JVP had considered using

the parliamentary opposition as a popular front to ride to power.

Behind both these strategies was the ingenuity of the JVP leadership, particularly

Rohana Wijeweera, who could devise a model of insurgency keeping in mind the specific

socio-economic, political and geographical conditions in Sri Lanka. While in the first model,

geographical considerations took precedence, in the latter, it was the political factor --- and

that is the struggle for power was against a highly unpopular political regime. The impetus

was provided by the political regime authorizing the Indian government to place its army on

Sri Lankan soil. This was a potent issue around which the NP tried to mobilize the masses.

In the long run, both the models failed because they did not have any contingency

plans, in the event of failure. Thus, once the strategies were operationalized, there were no

~scape routes. While after the first insurrection, the JVP leaders as well as the cadres

managed to get away with light sentences, in the second attempt, the insurgents got trapped

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in the violence they had unleashed. JYP's incapacity to match state violence. finally resulted

in the complete elimination of the movement.

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