ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948 EN BANC

HILADO, J.:

FACTS:

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law. ISSUES:

1. Whether the PSC erred in granting the application for CPC 2. Whether the estate of Fragante is a person. 3. Whether the estate of Fragante may be considered as a citizen.

HELD: 1. NO. The right of Fragante to prosecute the application to its final conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death.

It constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for such a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the PSC might have denied the application.

Rule 88, Sec. 2 provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive. It is true that a proceeding upon an application for a CPC before the PSC is not an "action”. But the provisions of the law go to prove that the decedent’s rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death, go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, cannot be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any and the heirs of the decedent. 2. YES. Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, under the Bill of Rights, it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term “person” must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons. It was the intent of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in other of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, the Court held that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.

3. YES. The fiction of such extension of Fragante’s citizenship is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death, to the loss of the investment which he had already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of public convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution which provides

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the public interest so requires.

The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills the citizenship requirement. To our mind, the question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.

The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device by which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs. They inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his death. As there are procedural requisites for their identification and determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction has been devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of solidification.

The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, a matter of fact, intended to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.

There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they are Filipino citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they are not, it should be reversed.

LORENZO vs. POSADAS JR.

G.R. No. L-43082

June 18, 1937

FACTS: Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal

properties. Proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his

estate were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate.

The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to

administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten

years after the two executors named in the will was appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee

until he resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.

During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue

(Posadas) assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for

deliquency in payment. Lorenzo paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the

same time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its

recovery. Posadas overruled Lorenzo’s protest and refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff

went to court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzo’s complaint and Posadas’ counterclaim. Both parties

appealed to this court.

ISSUE:

(e) Has there been delinquency in the payment of the inheritance tax?

HELD: The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs against the plaintiff

in both instances

YES

The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay the inheritance tax before

the delivery of the decedent’s property to the trustee. Stated otherwise, the defendant

contends that delivery to the trustee was delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in

this case, within the meaning of the first paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the

Revised Administrative Code. This contention is well taken and is sustained. A trustee is but an

instrument or agent for the cestui que trust

The appointment of Moore as trustee was made by the trial court in conformity with the

wishes of the testator as expressed in his will. It is true that the word “trust” is not mentioned

or used in the will but the intention to create one is clear. No particular or technical words are

required to create a testamentary trust. The words “trust” and “trustee”, though apt for the

purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the use of these two words is not conclusive on the

question that a trust is created. ” To constitute a valid testamentary trust there must be a

concurrence of three circumstances:

(1) Sufficient words to raise a trust;

(2) a definite subject;

(3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so

providing.”

There is no doubt that the testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in his will that

certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period, for a stated

purpose. The probate court certainly exercised sound judgment in appointmening a trustee to

carry into effect the provisions of the will

As the existence of the trust was already proven, it results that the estate which plaintiff

represents has been delinquent in the payment of inheritance tax and, therefore, liable for the

payment of interest and surcharge provided by law in such cases.

The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10, 1924, the date when Moore became

trustee. On that date trust estate vested in him. The interest due should be computed from

that date.

NOTES: Other issues:

(a) When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be satisfied?

The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to pay the same.

Acording to article 657 of the Civil Code, “the rights to the succession of a person are

transmitted from the moment of his death.” “In other words”, said Arellano, C. J., “. . . the

heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property

belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the

ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.”

Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of the inheritance takes place, succession

takes place in any event at the moment of the decedent’s death. The time when the heirs

legally succeed to the inheritance may differ from the time when the heirs actually receive

such inheritance. ” Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued

as of the date.

From the fact, however, that Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, it does not follow that the

obligation to pay the tax arose as of the date. The time for the payment on inheritance tax is

clearly fixed by section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3031,

in relation to section 1543 of the same Code. The two sections follow:

SEC. 1543. Exemption of certain acquisitions and transmissions. — The following shall not be

taxed:

(a) The merger of the usufruct in the owner of the naked title.

(b) The transmission or delivery of the inheritance or legacy by the fiduciary heir or legatee to

the trustees.

(c) The transmission from the first heir, legatee, or donee in favor of another beneficiary, in

accordance with the desire of the predecessor. xx

SEC. 1544. When tax to be paid. — The tax fixed in this article shall be paid:

(a) In the second and third cases of the next preceding section, before entrance into

possession of the property.

(b) In other cases, within the six months subsequent to the death of the predecessor; but if

judicial testamentary or intestate proceedings shall be instituted prior to the expiration of said

period, the payment shall be made by the executor or administrator before delivering to each

beneficiary his share.

The instant case does[not] fall under subsection (a), but under subsection (b), of section 1544

above-quoted, as there is here no fiduciary heirs, first heirs, legatee or donee. Under the

subsection, the tax should have been paid before the delivery of the properties in question to

Moore as trustee.

(b) Should the inheritance tax be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time

of the testator’s death, or on its value ten years later?

If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance

taxes takes its being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the

right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the

estate as it stood at the time of the decedent’s death, regardless of any subsequent

contingency value of any subsequent increase or decrease in value

(c) In determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the

compensation due to trustees?

A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services. But from this it

does not follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net

value of the estate subject to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires

trustees’ commissions to be deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to

inheritance tax

(d) What law governs the case at bar? Should the provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the

tax-payer be given retroactive effect?

A statute should be considered as prospective in its operation, whether it enacts, amends, or

repeals an inheritance tax, unless the language of the statute clearly demands or expresses

that it shall have a retroactive effect, . . . .” Act No. 3606 itself contains no provisions

indicating legislative intent to give it retroactive effect. No such effect can be given the statute

by this court.

Nera v. Rimando G.R. L-5971 February 27, 1911

Ponente: Carson, J.:

'Test of Presence'

Facts:

1. At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room by a doorway

where a curtain hangs across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room when the other witnesses

were attaching their signatures to the instrument.

2. The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to the position of the witness as of

vital importance in determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta v. Gustillo

that the alleged fact being that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room while the

signing occurred in the inner room, would not be sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will.

3. The CA deemed the will valid.

Issue: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator and other witnesses in

the act of affixing their signatures.

HELD: YES

The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been proven to be in the outer room when

the testator and other witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would have invalidated the will

since the attaching of the signatures under the circumstances was not done 'in the presence' of the

witnesses in the outer room. The line of vision of the witness to the testator and other witnesses was

blocked by the curtain separating the rooms.

The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each other at the moment of the attaching

the signatures, they may see each other sign if they chose to.

In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not they actualy saw each other sign

but whether they might have seen each other sign if they chose to doso considering their physical,

mental condition and position in relation to each other at the moment of the inscription of the

signature.

Icasiano vs. Icasiano

G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

Facts:

1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his

appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12,

1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in

duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.

2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will

while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of

the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he

signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses

in his presence.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a

page is sufficient to deny probate of the will

RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the

duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the

original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be

defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be

probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the

inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the

law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or

deliberate deviation existed.

Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by

the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects.

Cruz v. Villasor G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973

Ponente: Esguerra, J.:

Facts:

1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz.

However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud,

deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed

without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in

accordance with law.

2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged.

Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is

substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary

public was one of them.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD: NO.

The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he

cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot

serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in

front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one

will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such

situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements,

a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be

interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his

own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment,

which is to minimize fraud.

Gan v. Yap

104 P 509

FACTS:

Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and

in Manila.

Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with

apetition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.

The will was not presented because Felicidad’s husband, Ildefonso, supposedly

took it. What was presented were witness accounts of relatives who knew of

her intentionto make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to

the witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know about it, but she had

made known to her other relatives that she made a will.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the

deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused to

probate the alleged will on account of the discrepancies arising from the facts.

For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made her will known to so many of her

relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not have carried it in

her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it. There

was also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.

In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor’s

evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic

will.

ISSUE:

1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have

allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

2. W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will.

HELD:

1. No. The will must be presented.

The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-

814. “A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written,

dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other

form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.”

This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills

under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be

subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page;

such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the

testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the

testator and of each other. Authenticity and due execution is the dominant

requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for

allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the

subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule

77). If there is, the three must testify, if available. From the testimony of

suchwitnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion

as to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its

due execution.

With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are

demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they

are “entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself.”

“In the probate of a holographic will” says the New Civil Code, “it shall be

necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of

the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the

handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three

such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar

with decedent’s handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony

may be resorted to.”

The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they

must be familiar with the decedent’s handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself

is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not

available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity — the testator’s handwriting

— has disappeared.

The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost

or destroyed will by secondary — evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of

the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic

wills which could not then be validly made here. Could Rule 77 be extended, by

analogy, to holographic wills? (NO)

Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the

holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen — an implied admission that such

loss or theft renders it useless.

As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the

testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution

or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting

such relatives to state whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of

the document itself they think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can’t do

unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them.

This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo,

admittedlythe basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the

matter.(According to the Fuero, the will itself must be compared with specimens

of the testators handwriting.)

All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the

deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his

handwriting and signature.

Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the

execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be

proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.

At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why,

unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence

when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first,

the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the

testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now).

The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the

ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.

In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four

with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and

exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that

they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if

they wereintimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end

themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they

can not receive anything on account of the will.

Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only

one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable

imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let

three honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter,

having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith

affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger

may have purposely destroyed it in an “accident” — the oppositors have no way to

expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And

considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only

one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be

the most important ones, may go undetected.

If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable

feature — feasibility of forgery — would be added to the several objections to this

kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-

known Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil Law.

One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing

witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the

testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the

witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they

allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly

contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.

In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost

holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so

tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that

“clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.

2. No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost

holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so

tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that

“clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.

Rodelas v. Aranza

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

Relova, J. (Ponente)

Facts:

1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo

Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground that

the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.

2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the

original will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.

Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy

RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be

admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be

determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.

Azaola v. Singson FACTS: Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City onSeptember 9, 1957. Petitioner submitted for probate herholographic will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir asagainst the nephew, who is the defendant. Only one witness,FrancisocoAzaola, was presented to testify on the handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more orless, before the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him andhis wife; and that it was in the testatrix’s handwriting. He presentedthe mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and the generalpower of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an affidavit toreinforce his statement. Two residence certificates showing thetestatrix’s signature were also exhibited for comparison purposes.The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) theexecution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressureand influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) thatthe testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her lastwill, and that the same wasactually written either on the 5th or 6thday of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears onthe will. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesseswho could declare that the will and the signature are in the writingof the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lonewitness presented "did not prove sufficiently that the body of thewill was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound toproduce more than one witness because the will's authenticity wasnot questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorilyrequire the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if itsauthenticity should be denied by the adverse party. ISSUE: W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive. HELD: Article 8111 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Sincethe authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was notrequired to produce more than one witness; but even if thegenuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted to require the compulsory presentation of threewitnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penaltyof having the probate denied. Since no witness may have beenpresent at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that theexistence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is amatter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely aquestion of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of thetestator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the lawdoes not so express) "that the will and the signature are in thehandwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness ofthe testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may beunwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule ofparagraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811allows the court to resort to expert evidence. The law foresees thepossibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amountsto the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing totestify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed numberof witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary tocall for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competentwitness is available, or none of those produced isconvincing, theCourt may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts.The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines ofinquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent thatthe true intention of the testator be carried into effect.

Molo vs. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951

Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

Facts:

1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June

1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the

will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife,

herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and

nieces.

2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for

the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set

aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918

will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been

revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of

the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the

1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the

revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that

a subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been

disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot

produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory

clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the

testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of

the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will

can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative

revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a

will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the

intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the

old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

Guevara v. Guevara Digest

Facts:

1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife,

stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario.

Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any

settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he

adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the

acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a

large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption

that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in

favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent

the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is

mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to

dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

Gallanosa v. Arcangel

83 SCRA 676

FACTS:

Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito.

In his will, Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate to his

second wife, Tecla, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his ½

share would be assigned to spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Tecla’s son

by her first marriage who grew up under the care of Florentino. His other

properties were bequeathed to his protégé Adolfo Fortajada.

Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was

registered by Florentino’s brother, nephews and nieces.

After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge

admitted the will to probate.

The testator’s legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the

order of partition and distribution.

Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro

alleging that they had been in continuous possession of those lands and praying

that they be declared owners thereof.

Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the ground

of res judicata.

The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.

15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the probate of

the will, the legal heirs filed a case for “annulment of the will” alleging fraud and

deceit.

The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after

the heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the “annulment” of the will of

Florentino and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land adjudicated under that

will to the petitioners.

HELD:

NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in

setting aside its order of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case and the

firstcivil case which is the same as the instant case. It is evident that second civil

case is barred by res judicata and by prescription.

The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of

the will. That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the

time he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or

undueinfluence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required

number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine.

Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding,

not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will.

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its

execution cannot be raised anymore.

The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding

in rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil

case, which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the merits. Thus.

It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the Rules of Court.

The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the

recovery of the lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of NCC

(the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not

prescribe) cannot apply to last wills and testaments.

The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for “annulment” of a will.

A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.

A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole

world.After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under

Rule 38 of the Rules of court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set

aside only on the grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law

or (b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In

the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is four (4) years from the

discovery of fraud. The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence

of a contract does not prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and testaments.

Austria v. Reyes

Facts:

1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the

respondents, alll have been declared by the former as her legally adopted

children.

2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was

opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was

dismissed and the will was allowed.

3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging

that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in

fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, hence the latter were

strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.

4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the

institution of heirs. It held that the testator was possessed of testamentary

capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or

undue influence.

Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the

testamentary institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution.

An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aide the institution if certain

factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled under Art.

850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the will,

2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will

that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the

falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side

especially when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to

dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.

AZNAR v. DUNCAN (1966) Doctrine: When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. Facts: Edward Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will. CFI admitted the will to probate, and declared that Helen Garcia was his natural child. The declaration was appealed to this Court; affirmed. Meanwhile, CFI approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the will, which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia appealed from the order of approval, and this Court reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said law. CFI approved the project of partition submitted by the executor, wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Lucy Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his natural daughter, and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death. - Basis: Since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled. Hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees. Hence this appeal. The CFI ruled, and appellee maintains, that there has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

Appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition. Considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited. Based on Articles 906 and 918 of the Civil Code, Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate. Issue: WON the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be divided in equal shares, OR the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced Held/Ratio: Lucy's inheritance should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover Helen's legitime, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate. Edward Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.

When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. CFI's order is set aside; case remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew.