Summary Human Development Climate Change

8/14/2019 Summary Human Development Climate Change

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Director and lead author

Kevin Watkins

Research and statisticsCecilia Ugaz (Deputy Director and chie editor), Liliana Carvajal, Daniel Coppard, Ricardo FuentesNieva, Amie Gaye, Wei Ha, Claes Johansson, Alison Kennedy (Chie o Statistics), Christopher

Kuonqui, Isabel Medalho Pereira, Roshni Menon, Jonathan Morse and Papa Seck

Production and translation

Carlotta Aiello and Marta Jaksona

Outreach and communications

Maritza Ascencios, Jean-Yves Hamel, Pedro Manuel Moreno and Marisol Sanjines (Heado Outreach)

T fr th rrti f th

H Dt Rrt 2007/2008

The Human Development Report Ofce (HDRO): Te Human Development Report is

the product o a collective eort. Members o the National Human Development Report Unit(NHDR) provide detailed comments and advice throughout the research process. Tey also link the

Report to a global research network in developing countries. Te NHDR team comprises SharmilaKurukulasuriya, Mary Ann Mwangi and imothy Scott. Te HDRO administrative team makesthe oce unction and includes Oscar Bernal, Mamaye Gebretsadik, Melissa Hernandez and Fe

Juarez-Shanahan. Operations are managed by Sarantuya Mend.


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summary Human DevelopmenT RepoRT 2007/2008

Foewod

Climate change is now a scientically estab-

lished act. Te exact impact o greenhouse gasemission is not easy to orecast and there is a lot

o uncertainty in the science when it comes topredictive capability. But we now know enough

to recognize that there are large risks, poten-tially catastrophic ones, including the melt-

ing o ice-sheets on Greenland and the WestAntarctic (which would place many countries

under water) and changes in the course o theGul Stream that would bring about drastic cli-

matic changes.Prudence and care about the uture o our

children and their children requires that we actnow. Tis is a orm o insurance against possiblyvery large losses. Te act that we do not know

the probability o such losses or their likely exacttiming is not an argument or not taking insur-

ance. We know the danger exists. We know thedamage caused by greenhouse gas emissions is

irreversible or a long time. We know it is grow-ing with every day o inaction.

Even i we were living in a world where allpeople had the same standard o living and were

impacted by climate change in the same way, wewould still have to act. I the world were a sin-

gle country, with its citizens all enjoying simi-lar income levels and all exposed more or less to

the same eects o climate change, the threat

o global warming could still lead to substantialdamage to human well-being and prosperity by

the end o this century.In reality, the world is a heterogeneous place:

people have unequal incomes and wealth andclimate change will aect regions very dier-

ently. Tis is, or us, the most compelling reasonto act rapidly. Climate change is already starting

to aect some o the poorest and most vulner-able communities around the world. A world-

wide average 3 centigrade increase (comparedto preindustrial temperatures) over the coming

decades would result in a range o localized in-creases that could reach twice as high in somelocations. Te eect that increased droughts,

extreme weather events, tropical storms and sealevel rises will have on large parts o Arica, on

many small island states and coastal zones willbe inicted in our lietimes. In terms o aggre-

gate world GDP, these short term eects maynot be large. But or some o the worlds poorest

people, the consequences could be apocalyptic.In the long run climate change is a mas-

sive threat to human development and in some places it is already undermining the interna-

tional communitys eorts to reduce extremepoverty.

What we do today about climate change has consequences that will last a century or

more. Te part o that change that is due to greenhouse gas emissions is not revers-

ible in the oreseeable uture. Te heat trapping gases we send into the atmosphere

in 2008 will stay there until 2108 and beyond. We are thereore making choices

today that will aect our own lives, but even more so the lives o our children and

grandchildren. Tis makes climate change dierent and more dicult than other

policy challenges.


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Violent conicts, insucient resources, lack

o coordination and weak policies continue toslow down development progress, particularlyin Arica. Nonetheless in many countries there

have been real advances. For instance, Viet Namhas been able to halve poverty and achieve uni-

versal primary education way ahead o the 2015target. Mozambique has also managed to signi-

icantly reduce poverty and increase school en-rollment as well as improving the rates o child

and maternal mortality.Tis development progress is increasingly

going to be hindered by climate change. So wemust see the ght against poverty and the ght

against the eects o climate change as interre-lated eorts. Tey must reinorce each other and

success must be achieved on both ronts jointly.

Success will have to involve a great deal o ad-aptation, because climate change is still goingto aect the poorest countries signicantly even

i serious eorts to reduce emissions start im-mediately. Countries will need to develop their

own adaptation plans but the internationalcommunity will need to assist them.

Responding to that challenge and to theurgent request rom leaders in developing

countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Arica,UNEP and U NDP launched a partnership in

Nairobi during the last climate convention inNovember 2006. he two agencies commit-

ted to provide assistance in reducing vulnera-bility and building the capacity o developing

countries to more widely reap the beneits othe Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

in areas such as the development o cleanerand renewable energies, climate prooing anduel-switching schemes.

Tis partnership, that will enable the UNsystem to act promptly in response to the needs

o governments trying to actor in climate-change impacts into their investment decisions,

constitutes a living proo o the United Nationsdetermination to deliver as One on the climate

change challenge. For example, we can helpcountries improve existing inrastructure to

enable people to cope with increased oodingand more requent and severe extreme weather

events. More weather resistant crops could alsobe developed.

While we pursue adaptation we must start

to reduce emissions and take other steps at miti-gation so that the irreversible changes alreadyunderway are not urther amplied over the

next ew decades. I mitigation does not start inearnest right now, the cost o adaptation twenty

or thirty years rom now will become prohibi-tive or the poorest countries.

Stabilizing greenhouse emissions to limitclimate change is a worthwhile insurance strat-

egy or the world as a whole, including the rich-est countries, and it is an essential part o our

overall ght against poverty and or the Millen-nium Development Goals. Tis dual purpose o

climate policies should make them a priority orleaders around the world.

But having established the need or limiting

uture climate change and or helping the mostvulnerable adapt to what is unavoidable, one hasto move on and identiy the nature o the policies

that will help us get the results we seek.Several things can be said at the outset:

First, non-marginal changes are needed, giventhe path the world is on. We need big changes

and ambitious new policies.Second, there will be signicant short term

costs. We have to invest in limiting climatechange. Tere will be large net benets over

time, but at the beginning, like with every in-vestment, we must be willing to incur the costs.

Tis will be a challenge or democratic gover-nance: political systems will have to agree to

pay the early costs to reap the long term gains.Leadership will require looking beyond elec-

toral cycles. We are not too pessimistic. In the ght

against the much higher ination rates o the

distant past, democracies did come up with theinstitutions such as more autonomous central

banks and policy pre-commitments that al-lowed much lower ination to be achieved de-

spite the short term temptations o resorting tothe printing press. Te same has to happen with

climate and the environment: societies will haveto pre-commit and orego short-term gratica-

tion or longer-term well being.We would like to add that while the transi-

tion to climate protecting energy and lie styles will have short term cost, there may be eco-


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nomic benets beyond what is achieved by sta-

bilizing temperatures. Tese benets are likelyto be realized through Keynesian and Schum- peterian mechanisms with new incentives or

massive investment stimulating overall demandand creative destruction leading to innovation

and productivity jumps in a wide array o sec-tors. It is impossible to quantitatively predict

how large these eects will be but taking theminto account could lead to higher benet-cost

ratios or good climate policies.Te design o good policies will have to be

mindul o the danger o excessive reliance onbureaucratic controls. While government leader-

ship is going to be essential in correcting the hugeexternality that is climate change, markets and

prices will have to be put to work, so that private

sector decisions can lead more naturally to opti-mal investment and production decisions.

Carbon and carbon equivalent gases have to

be priced so that using them reects their truesocial cost. Tis should be the essence o mitiga-

tion policy. Te world has spent decades gettingrid o quantity restrictions in many domains,

not least oreign trade. Tis is not the time tocome back to a system o massive quotas and bu-

reaucratic controls because o climate change.Emission targets and energy eciency targets

have an important role to play but it is the pricesystem that has to make it easier to achieve our

goals. Tis will require a much deeper dialoguebetween economists and climate scientists as

well as environmentalists than what we have

seen so ar. We do hope that this Human De- velopment Report will contribute to such adialogue.

Te most dicult policy challenges willrelate to distribution. While there is potential

catastrophic risk or everyone, the short and me-dium-term distribution o the costs and bene-

ts will be ar rom uniorm. Te distributionalchallenge is made particularly dicult because

those who have largely caused the problemthe rich countriesare not going to be those

who suer the most in the short term. It is thepoorest who did not and still are not contrib-

uting signicantly to green house gas emissionsthat are the most vulnerable. In between, many

middle income countries are becoming signi-

cant emitters in aggregate termsbut they donot have the carbon debt to the world that therich countries have accumulated and they are

still low emitters in per capita terms. We mustnd an ethically and politically acceptable path

that allows us to startto move orward eveni there remains much disagreement on the long

term sharing o the burdens and benets. Weshould not allow distributional disagreements

to block the way orward just as we cannot a-ord to wait or ull certainty on the exact path

climate change is likely to take beore we startacting. Here too we hope this Human Develop-

ment Report will acilitate the debate and allowthe journey to start.

Kemal Dervi Achim SteinerAdministrator Executive Director

United Nations Development Programme United Nations Environment Programme

The analysis and policy recommendations o the Report do not necessarily reect the views o the United Nations Development

Programme, its Executive Board or its Member States. The Report is an independent publication commissioned by UNDP. It

is the ruit o a collaborative eort by a team o eminent consultants and advisers and the Human Development Report team.

Kevin Watkins, Director o the Human Development Report Ofce, led the eort.


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HnDevelopentrepot2007/2008

Oveview Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world

Chpte1 The 21st Century climate challenge

1.1 Climate change and human development

1.2 Climate science and uture scenarios

1.3 From global to localmeasuring carbon ootprints in an unequal world

1.4 Avoiding dangerous climate changea sustainable emissions pathway

1.5 Business-as-usualpathways to an unsustainable climate uture1.6 Why we should act to avoid dangerous climate change

Conclusion

Chpte2 Climate shocks: risk and vulnerability in an unequal world

2.1 Climate shocks and low human development traps

2.2 Looking aheadold problems and new climate change risks

Conclusion

Chpte Avoiding dangerous climate change: strategies for mitigation

3.1 Setting mitigation targets

3.2 Put ting a price on carbonthe role o markets and governments

3.3 The cri tical role o regulation and government action

3.4 The key role o international cooperation

Conclusion

Chpte Adapting to the inevitable: national action and international cooperation

4.1 The national challenge

4.2 International cooperation on climate change adaptation

Conclusion

Hndevelopentindicto

Indicator tables

Readers guide and note to tables


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Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable. We are aced now with the act

that tomorrow is today. We are cononted with the ferce urgency o now. In this un-

olding conundrum o lie and history there is such a thing as being too lateWe may

cry out desperately or time to pause in her passage, but time is dea to every plea and

rushes on. Over the bleached bones and jumbled residues o numerous civilizations are

written the pathetic words: oo late.

Martin Luther King Jr. Where do we go om here: chaos or community

Delivered in a sermon on social justice ourdecades ago, Martin Luther Kings words re-

tain a powerul resonance. At the start o the21st Century, we too are conronted with the

erce urgency o a crisis that links today andtomorrow. Tat crisis is climate change. It is

still a preventable crisisbut only just. Teworld has less than a decade to change course.

No issue merits more urgent attentionormore immediate action.

Climate change is the dening humandevelopment issue o our generation. All devel-opment is u ltimately about expanding human

potential and enlarging human reedom. It isabout people developing the capabilities that

empower them to make choices and to leadlives that they value. Climate change threatens

to erode human reedoms and limit choice. Itcalls into question the Enlightenment princi-

ple that human progress will make the uturelook better than the past.

Te early warning signs are already visible.oday, we are witnessing at rst hand what

could be the onset o major human develop-ment reversal in our lietime. Across developing

countries, millions o the worlds poorestpeople are already being orced to cope with

the impacts o climate change. Tese impactsdo not register as apocalyptic events in the

ull glare o world media attention. Tey gounnoticed in nancial markets and in the

measurement o world gross domestic product(GDP). But increased exposure to drought, to

more intense storms, to oods and environ-mental stress is holding back the eorts o the

worlds poor to build a better lie or them-selves and their children.

Climate change will undermine interna-

tional eorts to combat poverty. Seven yearsago, political leaders around the world gathered

to set targets or accelerated progress in humandevelopment. Te Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs) dened a new ambition or 2015.Much has been achieved, though many countries

remain o track. Climate change is hamperingeorts to deliver the MDG promise. Looking to

the uture, the danger is that it will stall and thenreverse progress built-up over generations not just

in cutting extreme poverty, but in health, nutri-tion, education and other areas.

Oveview

Fightingclitechnge:hnoliditindividedwold


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o carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) exceeding

the natural range o the last 650,000 years. Inthe course o the 21st Century, average globaltemperatures could increase by more than 5C

(gure 1).

o put that gure in context, it is equiva-lent to the change in temperature since thelast ice agean era in which much o Europe

and North America was under more than onekilometre o ice. Te threshold or dangerous

climate change is an increase o around 2C.Tis threshold broadly denes the point at

which rapid reversals in human developmentand a drif towards irreversible ecological dam-

age would become very dicult to avoid.Behind the numbers and the measure-

ment is a simple overwhelming act. We arerecklessly mismanaging our ecological inter-

dependence. In eect, our generation is runningup an unsustainable ecological debt that uture

generations will inherit. We are drawing down

the stock o environmental capital o our chil-dren. Dangerous climate change will representthe adjustment to an unsustainable level o

greenhouse gas emissions.Future generations are not the only con-

stituency that will have to cope with a problemthey did not create. Te worlds poor will suer

the earliest and most damaging impacts. Richnations and their citizens account or the over-

whelming bulk o the greenhouse gases lockedin the Earths atmosphere. But, poor countries

and their citizens will pay the highest price orclimate change.

Te inverse relationship between responsi-bility or climate change and vulnerability to

its impacts is sometimes orgotten. Public de-

bate in rich nations increasingly highlights thethreat posed by rising greenhouse gas emissionsrom developing countries. Tat threat is real.

But it should not obscure the underlying prob-lem. Mahatma Gandhi once reected on how

many planets might be needed i India were toollow Britains pattern o industrialization.

We are unable to answer that question. How-ever, we estimate in this Report that i all o the

worlds people generated greenhouse gases atthe same rate as some developed countries, we

would need nine planets (table 1). While the worlds poor walk the Earth

with a light carbon ootprint they are bear-ing the brunt o unsustainable management

o our ecological interdependence. In richcountries, coping with climate change to date

has largely been a matter o adjusting thermo-stats, dealing with longer, hotter summers,and observing seasonal shits. Cities like

London and Los Angeles may ace loodingrisks as sea levels rise, but their inhabitants

are protected by elaborate lood deencesystems. By contrast, when global warming

changes weather patterns in the Horn oArica, it means that crops ail and people go

hungry, or that women and young girls spendmore hours collecting water. And, whatever

the uture risks acing cities in the rich world,today the real climate change vulnerabilities

linked to storms and loods are to be oundin rural communities in the g reat river deltas

Rising CO2 emissions arepushing up stocks and

increasing temperature

Figure 1

0.1

0.0

0.1

1856 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2004

Temperature (C)

relative to preindustrial levels

Source:CDIAC 2007; IPCC 2007a.

0.70.80.9

250

275

300

350375

400

Atmospheric CO2

concentration

(ppm CO2)

0

5

25

30

CO2

emissions

(Gt CO2)

We are recklessly

mismanaging our ecological

interdependence. Our

generation is running

up an unsustainableecological debt that uture

generations will inherit


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10 summary Human DevelopmenT RepoRT 2007/2008

o the Ganges, the Mekong and the Nile, and

in sprawling urban slums across the develop-ing world.

Te emerging risks and vulnerabilitiesassociated with climate change are the out-

comes o physical processes. But they are alsoa consequence o human actions and choices.

Tis is another aspect o ecological inter-dependence that is sometimes orgotten. When

people in an American city turn on the air-conditioning or people in Europe drive their

cars, their actions have consequences. Toseconsequences link them to rural communitiesin Bangladesh, armers in Ethiopia and slum

dwellers in Haiti. With these human connec-tions come moral responsibilities, including a

responsibility to reect uponand changeenergy policies that inict harm on other peo-

ple or uture generations.

The case for action

I the world acts now it will be possiblejust

possibleto keep 21st Century global temper-ature increases within a 2C threshold above

preindustrial levels. Achieving this uture willrequire a high level o leadership and unparalleled

international cooperation. Yet climate change is

a threat that comes with an opportunity. Aboveall, it provides an opportunity or the world tocome together in orging a collective response

to a crisis that threatens to halt progress.Te values that inspired the drafers o

the Universal Declaration o Human Rights provide a powerul point o reerence. Tat

document was a response to the political ai lurethat gave rise to extreme nationalism, ascism

and world war. It established a set o entitle-ments and rightscivil, political, cultural,

social and economicor all members o thehuman amily. Te values that inspired the

Universal Declaration were seen as a code oconduct or human aairs that would prevent

the disregard and contempt or human rights

that have resulted in barbarous acts which haveoutraged the conscience o mankind.

Te drafers o the Universal Declaration o

Human Rights were looking back at a humantragedy, the second world war, that had already

happened. Climate change is dierent. It is ahuman tragedy in the making. Allowing that

tragedy to evolve would be a political ailurethat merits the description o an outrage to the

conscience o mankind. It would represent asystematic violation o the human rights o the

worlds poor and uture generations and a stepback rom universal values. Conversely, pre-

venting dangerous climate change would holdout the hope or the development o multilat-

eral solutions to the wider problems acing theinternational community. Climate change con-

ronts us with enormously complex questionsthat span science, economics and internationalrelations. Tese questions have to be addressed

through practical strategies. Yet it is importantnot to lose sight o the wider issues that are at

stake. Te real choice acing political leadersand people today is between universal human

values, on the one side, and participating in thewidespread and systematic violation o human

rights on the other.Te starting point or avoiding dangerous

climate change is recognition o three distinc-tive eatures o the problem. Te rst eature is

the combined orce o inertia and cumulativeoutcomes o climate change. Once emitted,

CO2

emissions

per capita

Equivalent global

CO2

emissions bEquivalent number of

sustainable carbon

budgets

c

(t CO2) (Gt CO

2)

2004 2004

World d 4.5 29 2

Australia 16.2 104 7

Canada 20.0 129 9

France 6.0 39 3

Germany 9.8 63 4

Italy 7.8 50 3

Japan 9.9 63 4

Netherlands 8.7 56 4

Spain 7.6 49 3

United Kingdom 9.8 63 4

United States 20.6 132 9

Table 1 Carbon ootprints at OECD levels wouldrequire more than one planet a

a. As measured in sustainable carbon budgets.

b. Reers to global emissions i every country in the world emitted at the same per capita level as the specifed country.

c. Based on a sustainable emissions pathway o 14.5 Gt CO2

per year.

d. Current global carbon ootprint.

Source:HDRO calculations based on I ndicator Table 24.


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carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse

gases stay in the atmosphere or a long time.Tere are no rapid rewind buttons or runningdown stocks. People living at the start o the

22nd Century will live with the consequenceso our emissions, just as we are living with the

consequences o emissions since the industrialrevolution. ime-lags are an important conse-

quence o climate change inertia. Even strin-gent mitigation measures will not materially

aect average temperatures changes until themid-2030sand temperatures will not peak

until 2050. In other words, or the rst halo the 21st Century the world in general, and

the worlds poor in particular, will have to livewith climate change to which we are already

committed.

Te cumulative nature o the climatechange has wide-ranging implications. Perhapsthe most important is that carbon cycles do not

ollow political cycles. Te current generation o

political leaders cannot solve the climate change problem alone because a sustainable emissions pathway has to be ollowed over decades, not

years. However, it has the power either to priseopen the window o opportunity or uture

generations, or to close that window.Urgency is the second eature o the climate

change challengeand a corollary o inertia.In many other areas o international relations,

inaction or delayed agreements have limitedcosts. International trade is an example. Tis is

an area in which negotiations can break downand resume without inicting long-term dam-

age on the underlying systemas witnessedby the unhappy history o the Doha Round.

With climate change, every year o delay in

reaching an agreement to cut emissions adds togreenhouse gas stocks, locking the uture intoa higher temperature. In the seven years since

The Human Development Report 2007/2008 comes at a time when

climate changelong on the international agendais starting to

receive the very highest attention that it merits. The recent nd-

ings o the IPCC sounded a clarion call; they have unequivocally

armed the warming o our climate system and linked it directly to

human activity.

The eects o these changes are already grave, and they are

growing. This years Report is a powerul reminder o all that is at

stake: climate change threatens a twin catastrophe, with early set-

backs in human development or the worlds poor being succeeded

by longer term dangers or all o humanity.

We are already beginning to see these catastrophes unold. As

sea levels rise and tropical storms gather in intensity, millions o

people ace displacement. Dryland inhabitants, some o the most

vulnerable on our planet, have to cope with more requent and

more sustained droughts. And as glaciers retreat, water supplies

are being put at risk.

This early harvest o global warming is having a dispropor-

tionate eect on the worlds poor, and is also hindering eorts to

achieve the MDGs. Yet, in the longer run, no onerich or poor

can remain immune rom the dangers brought by climate change.

I am convinced that what we do about this challenge will dene

the era we live in as much as it denes us. I also believe that climate

change is exactly the kind o global challenge that the United Na-

tions is best suited to address. That is why I have made it my per-

sonal prior ity to work with Member States to ensure that the United

Nations plays its role to the ull.

Tackling climate change requires action on two ronts. First,

the world urgently needs to step up action to mitigate greenhouse

gas emissions. Industrialized countries need to make deeper

emission reductions. There needs to be urther engagement o

developing countries, as well as incentives or them to limit their

emissions while saeguarding economic growth and eorts to

eradicate poverty.

Adaptation is the second global necessity. Many countries, es-

pecially the most vulnerable developing nations, need assistance in

improving their capacity to adapt. There also needs to be a major

push to generate new technologies or combating climate change,

to make existing renewable technologies economically viable, and

to promote a rapid diusion o technology.

Climate change threatens the entire human amily. Yet it also

provides an opportunity to come together and orge a collec-

tive response to a global problem. It is my hope that we will rise

as one to ace this challenge, and leave a better world or uture

generations.

Ban Ki-moon

Secretary-General o the United Nations

Special contribution Climate changetogether we can win the battle


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the Doha Round started, to continue the anal-

ogy, stocks o greenhouse gases have increasedby around 12 ppm o CO2eand those stockswill still be there when the trade rounds o the

22nd Century get underway.Tere are no obvious historical analogies

or the urgency o the climate change prob-lem. During the Cold War, large stockpiles o

nuclear missiles pointed at cities posed a gravethreat to human security. However, doing

nothing was a strategy or containment o therisks. Shared recognition o the reality o mutu-

ally assured destruction oered a perversely predictable stability. With climate change, by

contrast, doing nothing oers a guaranteedroute to a urther build-up greenhouse gases,

and to mutually assured destruction o human

development potential.Te third important dimension o the climate

change challenge is its global scale. Te Earths

atmosphere does not dierentiate greenhousegases by country o origin. One tonne o green-

house gases rom China carries the same weightas one tonne o greenhouse gases rom the United

Statesand one countrys emissions are anothercountrys climate change problem. It ollows

that no one country can win the battle againstclimate change acting alone. Collective action is

not an option but an imperative. When BenjaminFranklin signed the American Declaration o

Independence in 1776, he is said to havecommented: We must all hang together, or

most assuredly, we shall all hang separately. Inour unequal world, some peoplenotably poor

peoplemight hang sooner than others in theevent o a ailure to develop collective solutions.But ultimately, this is a preventable crisis that

threatens all people and all countries. We toohave the choice between hanging together and

orging collective solutions to a shared problem,or hanging separately.

Seizing the moment2012 and beyond

Conronted with a problem as daunting asclimate change, resigned pessimism might

seem a justiied response. However, resignedpessimism is a luxury that the worlds poor

and uture generations cannot aordandthere is an a lternative.

Tere is cause or optimism. Five years

ago, the world was still engaged in debatingwhether or not climate change was taking place,and whether or not it was human-induced.

Climate change scepticism was a ourishingindustry. oday, the debate is over and climate

scepticism is an increasingly ringe activity. Teourth assessment review o the International

Panel on Climate Change has established anoverwhelming scientic consensus that climate

change is both real and man-made. Almost allgovernments are part o that consensus. Fol-

lowing the publication o the Stern Reviewon Te Economics o Climate Change, most

governments also accept that solutions to cli-mate change are aordablemore aordable

than the costs o inaction.

Political momentum is also gathering pace. Many governments are setting boldtargets or cutting greenhouse gas emissions.

Climate change mitigation has now registeredirmly on the agenda o the Group o Eight

(G8) industrialized nations. And dialoguebetween developed and developing countries

is strengthening.All o this is positive news. Practical out-

comes are less impressive. While governmentsmay recognize the realities o global warm-

ing, political action continues to all ar shorto the minimum needed to resolve the climate

change problem. Te gap between scientic evi-dence and political response remains large. In

the developed world, some countries have yetto establish ambitious targets or cutting green-

house gas emissions. Others have set ambitioustargets without putting in place the energy pol-icy reorms needed to achieve them. Te deeper

problem is that the world lacks a clear, credibleand long-term multilateral ramework that

charts a course or avoiding dangerous climatechangea course that spans the divide between

political cycles and carbon cycles.With the expiry o the current commitment

period o the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, the inter-national community has an opportunity to put

that ramework in place. Seizing that opportu-nity will require bold leadership. Missing it will

push the world urther on the route to danger-ous climate change.

No one country can win

the battle against climate

change acting alone.

Collective action is not an

option but an imperative


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Developed countries have to take the

lead. Tey carry the burden o historic re-sponsibility or the climate change problem.And they have the nancial resources and

technological capabilities to initiate deep andearly cuts in emissions. Putting a price on

carbon through taxation or cap-and-tradesystems is the starting point. But market

pricing alone will not be enough. Te develop-ment o regulatory systems and publicprivate

partnerships or a low-carbon transition arealso priorities.

Te principle o common but dierenti-ated responsibilityone o the oundations

o the Kyoto rameworkdoes not mean thatdeveloping countries should do nothing. Te cred-

ibility o any multilateral agreement will hinge

on the participation o major emitters in thedeveloping world. However, basic principles oequity and the human development imperative

o expanding access to energy demand that de-veloping countries have the exibility to make

the transition to a low-carbon growth path at arate consistent with their capabilities.

International cooperation has a criticalrole to play at many levels. Te global mitiga-

tion eort would be dramatically enhanced ia post-2012 Kyoto ramework incorporated

mechanisms or nance and technology trans-ers. Tese mechanisms could help remove

obstacles to the rapid disbursement o thelow-carbon technologies needed to avoid dan-

gerous climate change. Cooperation to supportthe conservation and sustainable management

o rainorests would also strengthen the miti-gation eort.

Adaptation priorities must also be

addressed. For too long, climate change adap-tation has been treated as a peripheral concern,

rather than as a core part o the international poverty reduction agenda. Mitigation is an

imperative because it will dene prospectsor avoiding dangerous climate change in the

uture. But the worlds poor cannot be lef tosink or swim with their own resources while

rich countries protect their citizens behindclimate-deence ortications. Social justice

and respect o human rights demand strongerinternational commitment on adaptation.

Our legacy

Te post-2012 Kyoto ramework will power-ully inuence prospects or avoiding climatechangeand or coping with the climate change

that is now unavoidable. Negotiations on thatramework will be shaped by governments with

very dierent levels o negotiating leverage. Pow-erul vested interests in the corporate sector will

also make their voices heard. As governments em-bark on the negotiations or a post-2012 Kyoto

Protocol, it is important that they reect on twoconstituencies with a limited voice but a power-

ul claim to social justice and respect or humanrights: the worlds poor and uture generations.

People engaged in a daily struggle to im-prove their lives in the ace o grinding poverty

and hunger ought to have rst call on human

solidarity. Tey certainly deserve something morethan political leaders who gather at internationalsummits, set high-sounding development targets

and then undermine achievement o the verysame targets by ailing to act on climate change.

And our children and their childrens grandchil-dren have the right to hold us to a high standard

o accountability when their utureand maybetheir survivalis hanging in the balance. Tey

too deserve something more than a generationo political leaders who look at the greatest chal-

lenge humankind has ever aced and then sit ontheir hands. Put bluntly, the worlds poor and u-

ture generations cannot aord the complacencyand prevarication that continues to characterize

international negotiations on climate change. Norcan they aord the large gap between what leaders

in the developed world say about climate changethreats and what they do in their energy policies.

wenty years ago Chico Mendes, the

Brazilian environmentalist, died attempting todeend the Amazon rainorest against destruc-

tion. Beore his death, he spoke o the ties thatbound his local struggle to a global movement

or social justice: At rst I thought I was ght-ing to save rubber trees, then I thought I was

ghting to save the Amazon rainorest. Now Irealise I am ghting or humanity.

he battle against dangerous climatechange is part o the ight or humanity.

Winning that battle will require ar-reachingchanges at many levelsin consumption, in

The worlds poor and

uture generations cannot

aord the complacency

and prevarication that

continues to characterize

international negotiations

on climate change


14/31


how we produce and price energy, and in in-

ternational cooperation. Above all, though, itwill require ar-reaching changes in how wethink about our ecological interdependence,

about social justice or the worlds poor, andabout the human rights and entitlements o

uture generations.

The 21st Century climate challenge

Global warming is already happening. World

temperatures have increased by around 0.7Csince the advent o the industrial eraand the

rate o increase is quickening. Tere is over-whelming scientic evidence linking the rise in

temperature to increases in the concentrationo greenhouse gases in the Earths atmosphere.

Tere is no hard-and-ast line separating

dangerous rom sae climate change. Many othe worlds poorest people and most ragile eco-logical systems are a lready being orced to adapt

to dangerous climate change. However, beyonda threshold o 2C the risk o large-scale human

development setbacks and irreversible ecologi-cal catastrophes will increase sharply.

Business-as-usual trajectories will take the world well beyond that threshold. o have a

50:50 chance o limiting temperature increaseto 2C above preindustrial levels will require

stabilization o greenhouse gases at concentra-tions o around 450ppm CO2e. Stabilization

at 550ppm CO2e would raise the probabilityo breaching the threshold to 80 percent. In

their personal lives, ew people would know-ingly undertake activities with a serious injury

risk o this order o magnitude. Yet as a globalcommunity, we are taking ar greater risks with planet Earth. Scenarios or the 21st Century

point to potential stabilization points in excesso 750ppm CO2e, with possible temperature

changes in excess o 5C.emperature scenarios do not capture

the potential human development impacts.Average changes in temperature on the scale

projected in business-as-usual scenarions will trigger large scale reversals in human

development, undermining livelihoods andcausing mass displacement. By the end o

the 21st Century, the spectre o catastrophicecological impacts could have moved rom

the bounds o the possible to the probable.

Recent evidence on the accelerated collapseo ice sheets in the Antarctic and Greenland,acidiication o the oceans, the retreat o

rainorest systems and melting o A rctic per-marost all have the potentialseparately or

in interactionto lead to tipping points.Countries vary widely in their contribution

to the emissions that are driving up atmosphericstocks o greenhouse gases. With 15 percent o

world population, rich countries account oralmost hal o emissions o CO2. High growth

in China and India is leading to a gradual con-vergence in aggregate emissions. However, per

capita carbon ootprint convergence is more lim-ited. Te carbon ootprint o the United States is

ve times that o China and over 15 times that o

India. In Ethiopia, the average per capita carbonootprint is 0.1 tonnes o CO2 compared with 20tonnes in Canada (gure 2 and map 1).

What does the world have to do to get onan emissions trajectory that avoids dangerous

climate change? We address that question bydrawing upon climate modeling simulations.

Tese simulations dene a carbon budget orthe 21st Century.

I everything else were equal, the global car-bon budget or energy-related emissions would

amount to around 14.5 Gt CO2 annually. Cur-rent emissions are running at twice this level.

Te bad news is that emissions are on a risingtrend. Te upshot: the carbon budget or the

entire 21st Century could expire as early as 2032(gure 3). In eect, we are running up unsus-

tainable ecological debts that will lock uturegenerations into dangerous climate change.

Carbon budget analysis casts a new light on

concerns over the share o developing countriesin global greenhouse gas emissions. While that

share is set to rise, it should not divert attentionrom the underlying responsibilities o rich

nations. I every person in the developing worldhad the same carbon ootprint as the average

person in Germany or the United Kingdom,current global emissions would be our times

the limit dened by our sustainable emissions pathway, rising to nine times i the develop-

ing country per capita ootprint were raised toCanadian or United States levels.

Figure 2 Rich countriesdeep carbonfootprints

Canada

20.0

15.0

United States

20.6

19.3

Russian

Federation

10.6

13.4 (1992)

United Kingdom

9.8

10.0

France

6.0

6.4

China

3.8

2.1

Brazil 1.8 1.4

Egypt 2.3 1.5

Bangladesh 0.3 0.1

Tanzania 0.1 0.1

Ethiopia 0.1 0.1

Source:CDIAC 2007.

CO2 emissions

(t CO2 per capita)

2004

1990

Viet Nam 1.2 0.3

India 1.2 0.8

Nigeria 0.9 0.5


15/31


Changing this picture will require deep

adjustments. I the world were a single country itwould have to cut emissions o greenhouse gasesby hal to 2050 relative to 1990 levels, with sus-

tained reductions to the end o the 21st Century(gure 4). However, the world is not a single coun-

try. Using plausible assumptions, we estimate thatavoiding dangerous climate change will require

rich nations to cut emissions by at least 80 percent,with cuts o 30 percent by 2020. Emissions rom

developing countries would peak around 2020,with cuts o 20 percent by 2050.

Our stabilization target is stringent but a-ordable. Between now and 2030, the average

annual cost would amount to 1.6 percent oGDP. Tis is not an insignicant investment.

But it represents less than two-thirds o global

military spending. Te costs o inaction couldbe much higher. According to the Stern Review,they could reach 520 percent o world GDP,

depending upon how costs are measured.Looking back at emission trends highlights

the scale o the challenge ahead (appendixtable). Energy related CO2 emissions have

increased sharply since 1990, the reerence

years or the reductions agreed under the KyotoProtocol. Not all developed countries ratiedthe Protocols targets, which would have reduced

their average emissions by around 5 percent.Most o those that did are o track or achiev-

ing their commitments. And ew o those thatare on track can claim to have reduced emissions

as a result o a policy commitment to climatechange mitigation. Te Kyoto Protocol did not

place any quantitative restrictions on emissionsrom developing countries. I the next 15 years o

emissions ollows the linear trend o the past 15,dangerous climate change will be unavoidable.

Projections or energy use point preciselyin this direction, or worse. Current investment

patterns are putting in place a carbon intensive

energy inrastructure, with coal playing a dom-inant role. On the basis o current trends andpresent policies, energy-related CO2 emissions

could rise by more than 50 percent over 2005levels by 2030. Te US$20 trillion projected

to be spent between 2004 and 2030 to meetenergy demand could lock the world on to an

Energy-related CO2

emissions, 2004 (Gt CO2)

Mapping the global variation in CO2

emissionsMap 1

United StatesChina

World total

India

North Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

Latin America

Russian Federation

JapanEuropean Union

6.0 Gt CO2

5.0 Gt CO2

1.3 Gt CO2

0.5 Gt CO2

0.7 Gt CO2

1.4 Gt CO2

1.5 Gt CO2

1.3 Gt CO2

4.0 Gt CO2

The size of this square equals 1 Gt CO2

29.0 Gt CO2

Each countrys size is relative to its annual CO2

emissions

Source:Mapping Worlds 2007, based on data from CDIAC.

Note:The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply offical endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted lines represent approximately the Line of Control in

Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not y et been agreed upon by the parties.


16/31


unsustainable trajectory. Alternatively, new in-

vestments could help to decarbonize economicgrowth.

Climate shocks: risk and vulnerability in

an unequal world

Climate shocks already gure prominently in the

lives o the poor. Events such as droughts, oodsand storms are ofen terrible experiences or those

aected: they threaten lives and leave peopleeeling insecure. But climate shocks also erodelong-term opportunities or human development,

undermining productivity and eroding humancapabilities. No single climate shock can be attrib-

uted to climate change. However, climate changeis ratcheting up the risks and vulnerabilities

acing the poor. It is placing urther stresson already over-stretched coping mechanisms

and trapping people in downward spirals odeprivation.

Vulnerability to climate shocks is unequallydistributed. Hurricane Katrina provided a

potent reminder o human railty in the aceo climate change even in the richest coun-

triesespecially when the impacts interact

with institutionalized inequality. Across thedeveloped world, public concern over expo-sure to extreme climate risks is mounting.

With every ood, storm and heat wave, thatconcern is increasing. Yet climate disasters are

heavily concentrated in poor countries. Some262 million people were aected by climate

disasters annually rom 2000 to 2004, over 98percent o them in the developing world. In the

Organisation or Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) countries one in 1,500

people was aected by climate disaster. Tecomparable gure or developing countries is

one in 19a risk dierential o 79.High levels o poverty and low levels o

human development limit the capacity o poor

households to manage climate risks. With lim-ited access to ormal insurance, low incomesand meagre assets, poor households have to deal

with climate-related shocks under highly con-strained conditions.

Strategies or coping with climate risks canreinorce deprivation. Producers in drought

prone areas ofen orego production o cropsthat could raise income in order to minimize

risk, preerring to produce crops with lower eco-nomic returns but resistant to drought. When

climate disasters strike, the poor are ofenorced to sell productive assets, with attendant

implications or recovery, in order to protectconsumption. And when that is not enough

households cope in other ways: or example, bycutting meals, reducing spending on health and

taking children out o school. Tese are desper-ation measures that can create lie-long cycleso disadvantage, locking vulnerable households

into low human development traps.Research carried out or this report under-

lines just how potent these traps can be. Usingmicrolevel household data we examined some o

the long-term impacts o climate-shocks in thelives o the poor. In Ethiopia and Kenya, two o

the worlds most droughtprone countries, chil-dren aged ve or less are respectively 36 and

50 percent more likely to be malnourished i theywere born during a drought. For Ethiopia, that

translates into some 2 million additional malnour-ished children in 2005. In Niger, children aged

The 21st Century carbon budget is set for early expiryFigure 3

2000 2032 2042 2100

Cumulative total CO2

emissions (Gt CO2)

Note: IPCC scenarios describe plausible future patterns of populat ion growth, economic growth, technological

change and associated CO2

emissions. The A1 scenarios assume rapid economic and populat ion growth

combined with reliance on fossil fuels (A1FI), non-fossil energy (A1T) or a combination (A1B). The A2 scenario

assumes lower economic growth, less globalizat ion and continued high populat ion growth. The B1 an d B2

scenarios contain some mit igat ion of emissions, through increased resource eff iciency and technology

improvement (B1)and through more localized solut ions (B2).

Source:Meinshausen 2007.

1

2

3

4

5

6

71,456

0

2,000

1,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,0001 IPCC scenar io A1F l

2 IPCC scenar io A2

3 IPCC scenar io A1B

4 IPCC scenar io B2

5 IPCC scenar io A1T

6 IPCC scenar io B1

7 Susta inable emissions

pathway

Carbon budget to avoiddangerous climate change


17/31


two or less born in a drought year were 72 percentmore likely to be stunted. And Indian womenborn during a ood in the 1970s were 19 percent

less likely to have attended primary school.Te long-run damage to human develop-

ment generated through climate shocks is in-suciently appreciated. Media reporting o

climate-related disasters ofen plays an impor-tant role in inorming opinionand in cap-

turing the human suering that comes withclimate shocks. However, it also gives rise to a

perception that these are here-today-gone-to-morrow experiences, diverting attention rom

the long-run human consequences o droughtsand oods.

Climate change will not announce itselas an apocalyptic event in the lives o the poor.Direct attribution o any specic event to

climate change will remain impossible.However, climate change will steadily increase

the exposure o poor and vulnerable householdsto climate-shocks and place increased pressure

on coping strategies, which, over time, couldsteadily erode human capabilities (gure 5).

We identiy ve key transmission mecha-nisms through which climate change could stall

and then reverse human development: Agricultural production and ood security.

Climate change will aect rainall, tempera-ture and water availability or agriculture in

0%1990

50%

+50%

+100%

100%

20502040 206020302020201020001990

Greenhouse gas

emissions, CO2e

(% of 1990 emissions)

=

IPCC scenarios

50% chance


18/31


vulnerable areas. For example, droughtaected areas in sub-Saharan Arica could

expand by 6090 million hectares, with dryland zones suering losses o US$26 bill ion

by 2060 (2003 prices), a gure in excess obilateral aid to the region. Other developing

regionsincluding Latin America and SouthAsiawill also experience losses in agricul-

tural production, undermining eorts to cutrural poverty. Te additional number aected

by malnutrition could rise to 600 million by2080 (gure 6).

Water stress and water insecurity. Changed

run-o patterns and glacial melt will add toecological stress, compromising ows o water

or irrigation and human settlements in theprocess (gure 7). An additional 1.8 billion

people could be living in a water scarce envi-ronment by 2080. Central Asia, Northern

China and the northern part o South Asiaace immense vulnerabilities associated with

the retreat o glaciersat a rate o 1015meters a year in the Himalayas. Seven o Asias

great river systems will experience an increasein ows over the short-term, ollowed by a

decline as glaciers melt. Te Andean region

also aces imminent water security threatswith the collapse o tropical glaciers. Severalcountries in already highly water-stressed

regions such as the Middle East could experi-ence deep losses in water availability.

Rising sea levels and exposure to climatedisasters. Sea levels could rise rapidly with

accelerated ice sheet disintegration. Globaltemperature increases o 34C could result

in 330 million people being permanentlyor temporarily displaced through ood-

ing. Over 70 million people in Bangladesh,6 million in Lower Egypt and 22 million

in Viet Nam could be aected. Small islandstates in the Caribbean and Pacic could

suer catastrophic damage. Warming seas

will also uel more intense tropical storms. With over 344 million people currentlyexposed to tropical cyclones, more intensive

storms could have devastating consequencesor a large group o countries. Te 1 billion

people currently living in urban slums onragile hillsides or ood prone river banks

ace acute vulnerabilities. Ecosystems and biodiversity. Climate

change is already transorming ecologicalsystems. Around one-hal o the worlds

Disaster risks are skewed

towards developing countries

Figure 5

Source: HDRO calculations based on OFDA and CRED 2007.

Risk of being affected by natural disaster

(per 100,000 people)

198084 200004

Developing countries

High-income OECD

50 people per 100,000

Africa

Climate change will hurt

developing country agriculture

Figure 6

World

Industrial countries

Developing countries

Asia

Middle East & North Africa

Latin America

Source:Cline 2007.

20 10 0 10 20

Change in agricultural output potential

(2080s as % of 2000 potential)


19/31


coral ree systems have suered bleach-

ing as a result o warming seas. Increasingacidity in the oceans is another long-term

threat to marine ecosystems. Ice-basedecologies have also suered devastating

climate change impacts, especially in theArctic region. While some animal and

plant species wi ll adapt, or many speciesthe pace o climate change is too rapid:

climate systems are moving more rap-idly than they can ollow. With 3C o

warming, 2030 percent o land species

could ace ex tinction. Human health. Rich countries are already

preparing public health systems to deal with

uture climate shocks, such as the 2003European heatwave and more extreme

summer and winter conditions. However, thegreatest health impacts will be elt in develop-

ing countries because o high levels o povertyand the limited capacity o public health

systems to respond. Major killer diseasescould expand their coverage. For example, an

additional 220400 million people could beexposed to malariaa disease that already

claims around 1 million lives annually.Dengue ever is already in evidence at higher

levels o elevation than has previously been the

case, especially in Latin America and partso East Asia. Climate change could urtherexpand the reach o the disease.

None o these ve separate drivers will op-erate in isolation. Tey will interact with wider

social, economic and ecological processes thatshape opportunities or human development.

Inevitably, the precise mix o transmissionmechanisms rom climate change to human

development will vary across and within coun-tries. Large areas o uncertainty remain. What is

certain is that dangerous climate change has the potential to deliver powerul systemic shocks

to human development across a large group ocountries. In contrast to economic shocks that

aect growth or ination, many o the humandevelopment impactslost opportunities or

health and education, diminished productive potential, loss o vital ecological systems, orexampleare likely to prove irreversible.

Avoiding dangerous climate change:

strategies for mitigation

Avoiding the unprecedented threats posed

by dangerous climate change will require anunparalleled collective exercise in international

cooperation. Negotiations on emission limitsor the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol commitment

period canand mustrame the globalcarbon budget. However, a sustainable global

emissions pathway will only be meaninguli it is translated into practical national

Latin Americas

retreating glaciersFigure 7

Source: Painter 2007, based on data from the Andean Community.

Peru

2006 1,370 sq km 1970 1,958 sq km

Bolivia

2006 396 sq km 1975 562 sq km

Ecuador

2006 79 sq km 1976 113 sq km

Colombia

2006 76 sq km 1950 109 sq km

Venezuela

2006 2 sq km 1950 3 sq km


20/31


strategiesand national carbon budgets.

Climate change mitigation is about transorm-ing the way that we produce and use energy.And it is about living within the bounds o

ecological sustainability.Setting credible targets linked to global mit-

igation goals is the starting point or the transi-tion to a sustainable emissions pathway. Tese

targets can provide a basis or carbon budgetingexercises that provide a link rom the present

to the uture through a series o rolling plans.However, credible targets have to be backed by

clear policies. Te record to date in this area isnot encouraging. Most developed countries are

alling short o the targets set under the KyotoProtocol: Canada is an extreme case in point. In

some cases, ambitious Kyoto-plus targets have

been adopted. Te European Union and theUnited Kingdom have both embraced such tar-gets. For dierent reasons, they are both likely

to all ar short o the goals set unless they moverapidly to put climate mitigation at the centre

o energy policy reorm (table 2).wo major OECD countries are not bound

by Kyoto targets. Australia has opted or a wide-ranging voluntary initiative, which has

produced mixed results. Te United States doesnot have a ederal target or reducing emissions.

Instead, it has a carbon-intensity reductiongoal which measures eciency. Te problem is

that eciency gains have ailed to prevent largeaggregate increases in emissions. In the absence

o ederal targets, several United States stateshave set their own mitigation goals. Caliornias

Global Warming Solutions Act o 2006 is abold attempt to align greenhouse gas reductiontargets with reormed energy policies.

Setting ambitious targets or mitigationis an important rst step. ranslating targets

into policies is politically more challenging.Te starting point: putting a price on carbon

emissions. Changed incentive structures are avital condition or an accelerated transition to

low-carbon growth. In an optimal scenario, thecarbon price would be global. Tis is politically

unrealistic in the short-run because the worldlacks the required governance system. Te more

realistic option is or rich countries to developcarbon pricing structures. As these structures

evolve, developing countries could be integrated

over time as institutional conditions allow.Tere are two ways o putting a price on

carbon. Te rst is to directly tax CO2 emis-

sions. Importantly, carbon taxation does notimply an increase in the overall tax burden.

Te revenues can be used in a scally neu-tral way to support wider environmental tax

reormsor example, cutting taxes on labourand investment. Marginal taxation levels would

require adjustment in the light o greenhousegas emission trends. One approach, broadly

consistent with our sustainable emissions path-way, would entail the introduction o taxation

at a level o US$1020/t CO2 in 2010, rising inannual increments o US$510/t CO2 towards

a level o US$60100/t CO2. Such an approach

would provide investors and markets with aclear and predictable ramework or planninguture investments. And it would generate

strong incentives or a low-carbon transition.Te second route to carbon pricing is cap-

and-trade. Under a cap-and-trade system, thegovernment sets an overall emissions cap and is-

sues tradable allowances that grant business theright to emit a set amount. Tose who can reduce

emissions more cheaply are able to sell allow-ances. One potential disadvantage o cap-and-

trade is energy price instability. Te potentialadvantage is environmental certainty: the cap

itsel is a quantitative ceiling applied to emissions.Given the urgency o achieving deep and early

quantitative cuts in greenhouse gas emissions,well-designed cap-and-trade programmes have

the potential to play a key role in mitigation.he Europea n Unions Emissions rading

Scheme (ES), is the worlds largest cap-and-

trade programme. While much has beenachieved, there are serious problems to be

addressed. he caps on emissions have been setar too high, primari ly because o the ailure o

European Union member states to resist thelobbying eorts o powerul vested inter-

ests. Some sectorsnotably powerhavesecured windall gains at public expense. And

only a small raction o ES permitslessthan 10 percent in the second phasecan

be auctioned, depriving governments o rev-enue or tax reorm and opening the door

Climate change mitigation

is about transorming the

way that we produce and

use energy. And it is about

living within the bounds oecological sustainability


21/31


to political manipulation and generating ine-iciencies. Restricting ES quota allocations

in line with the European Unions commit-ment to a 2030 percent cut in emissions by

2020 would help to align carbon marketswith mitigation goals.

Carbon markets are a necessary conditionor the transition to a low-carbon economy. Tey

are not a sucient condition. Governmentshave a critical role to play in setting regula-

tory standards and in supporting low-carbonresearch, development and deployment.

Table 2 Emission reduction targets vary in ambition

Greenhouse gas reduction targets

and proposals

Near term

(20122015)

Medium term

(2020)

Long term

(2050)

HDR sustainable emissions

pathway (for developed countries) Emissions peaking 30% at least 80%

Selected countries

Kyoto targets a

(20082012) Post-Kyoto

European Union b 8% 20% (individually) or

30% ( with international agreement)

6080 % (with international

agreements)

France 0% 75%

Germany 21% 40%

Italy 6.5%

Sweden 4% increase

(4% reduction national target)

(by 2010)

25%

United Kingdom 12.5% (20% national target) 2632% 60%

Australia c 8% increase

Canada 6% 20% relative to 2006 6070% relative to 2006Japan 6% 50%

Norway 1% increase

(10% reduction national target)

30% (by 2030) 100%

United States c 7%

Selected United States state-level proposals

Arizona 2000 levels 50% below 2000 (by 2040)

Caliornia 2000 levels (by 2010) 1990 levels 80% below 1990 levels

New Mexico 2000 levels (by 2012) 10% below 2000 levels 75% below 2000 levels

New York 5% below 1990 (by 2010) 10% below 1990 levels

Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

(RGGI) dStabilization at 20 022004 levels

(by 2015)

10% below 20022004 levels

(by 2019)

Selected United States Congress proposals

Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act 2004 levels (by 2012) 1990 levels 60% below 1990 levels

Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act 2% per year reduction

rom 20102020


Climate Stewardship Act 2006 level (by 2012) 1990 levels 70% below 1990 levels

Sae Climate Act o 2007 2009 level (by 2010) 2% per year reduction rom

20112020


United States non-governmental proposals

United States Climate Action Partnership 05% increase o current level

(by 2012)

010% below current level

(by 2017)

6080 % below current level

a. Kyoto reduction targets are generally against 1990 emission levels or each country, by 20082012, except that or some greenhouse gases (hydrouorocarbons,

peruorocarbons and sulphur hexauoride) some countries chose 1995 as their base year.

b. Kyoto targets only reer to 15 countries which were members o the European Union in 1997 at the time o signing.

c. Signed but did not ratiy the Kyoto Protocol, thereore commitment is not binding.

d. Participating states include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode I sland and Vermont.

Source:Council o the European Union 2007; Government o Australia 2007; Government o Caliornia 2005; Government o Canada 20 07; Government o France 2007;

Government o Germany 2007; Government o Norway 2007; Government o Sweden 200 6; Pew Center on Climate Change 2007c; RGGI 2005; The Japan Times 2007;UNFCCC 1998; USCAP 2007.


22/31


23/31


generating large gains or human development in

the process. We demonstrate this by examiningthe impact on CO2 emissions o an accelerated

technology transer programme or the coal sec-tor in China. For China alone, emissions in 2030

would be 1.8 Gt CO2 below the level projectedby the International Energy Agency (gure 9).

Tat gure is equivalent to around one-hal ocurrent European Union emissions. Similar e-ciency gains are attainable in other areas.

Enhanced energy eiciency is a winwinscenario. Developing countries stand to gain

rom improved energy eiciency and lowerenvironmental pollution. All countries stand

to gain rom CO2 mitigation. Unortunately,the world currently lacks a credible

mechanism or unlocking this winwinscenario. We propose the development,

under the auspices o the post-2012 Kyotoramework, o a Climate Change Mitigation

Facility (CCMF) to ill this gap. he CCMFwould mobilize US$2550 billion annually

to inance low-carbon energy investments in

developing countries. Financing provisions would be linked to the circumstances oindividual countries, with a menu o grants,

concessional support and risk guaranteesavailable. Support would be programme-

based. It would cover the incremental costs oachieving deined emission reduction targets

by scaling-up nationally-owned energy poli-cies in areas such as renewable energy, clean

coal and enhanced eiciency standards ortransport and buildings.

Deorestation is another key area or inter-national cooperation. Currently, the world is

losing the carbon assets contained in rainorestsat a raction o the market value they would have

even at low carbon prices. In Indonesia, every

US$1 generated through deorestation to growpalm oil would translate into a US$50100 lossi the reduced carbon capacity could be traded on

the European Unions ES. Beyond these mar-ket ailures, the loss o rainorests represents the

erosion o a resource that plays a vital role in thelives o the poor, in the provision o ecosystem

services and in sustaining biodiversity.Tere is scope or exploring the potential

o carbon markets in the creation o incentivesto avoid deorestation. More broadly, carbon

nance could be mobilized to support the res-toration o degraded grasslands, generating

benets or climate change mitigation, adapta-tion and environmental sustainability.

Adapting to the inevitable: national action

and international cooperation

Without urgent mitigation action the worldcannot avoid dangerous climate change. But

even the most stringent mitigation will be in-sucient to avoid major human development

setbacks. Te world is already committed tourther warming because o the inertia built

into climate systems and the delay betweenmitigation and outcome. For the rst hal o the

21st Century there is no alternative to adapta-tion to climate change.

Rich countries already recognize the imperative to adapt. Many are investing heavily

in the development o climate deence inra-structures. National strategies are being drawn

Coal

Oil

asas

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

2004

UnitedStates

RussianFederation

EuropeanUnion

2030 2004 2030 2004 2030 2004 2030 2004 2030 2004 2030

Coal set to raise CO2

emissions in power sector

Figure 8

Source:IEA 2006c.

Note:2030 emissions refer to the IEA Reference scenario as defined

in IEA 2006c.

CO2

emissions from power generation,

2004 and 2030 (projected Gt CO2)

AfricaChina India


24/31


up to prepare or more extreme and less certainuture weather patterns. Te United Kingdom

is spending US$1.2 billion annually on ooddeences (gure 10). In the Netherlands, people

are investing in homes that can oat on water.Te Swiss alpine ski industry is investing in ar-

ticial snow-making machines.Developing countries ace ar more severe

adaptation challenges. Tose challenges have tobe met by governments operating under severe

nancing constraints, and by poor peoplethemselves. In the Horn o Arica, adaptation

means that women and young girls walk urtherto collect water. In the Ganges Delta, people

are erecting bamboo ood shelters on stilts.And in the Mekong Delta people are plantingmangroves to protect themselves against storm

surges, and women and children are beingtaught to swim.

Inequalities in capacity to adapt to climatechange are becoming increasingly apparent. For

one part o the worldthe richer partadap-tation is a matter o erecting elaborate climate

deence inrastructures, and o building homesthat oat on water. In the other part adapta-

tion means people themselves learning to oatin ood water. Unlike people living behind

the ood deences o London and Los Angeles,young girls in the Horn o Arica and people

in the Ganges Delta do not have a deep car-

bon ootprint. As Desmond utu, the ormerArchbishop o Cape own, has argued, we aredrifing into a world o adaptation apartheid.

Planning or climate change adaptationconronts governments in developing countries

with challenges at many levels. Tese challengespose systemic threats. In Egypt, delta ooding

could transorm conditions or agricultural production. Changes to coastal currents in

southern Arica could compromise the uture oNamibias sheries sector. Hydroelectric power

generation will be aected in many countries.Responding to climate change will require

the integration o adaptation into all aspects o policy development and planning or poverty

reduction. However, planning and implemen-

tation capacity is limited: Inormation. Many o the worlds poorest

countries lack the capacity and the resources

to assess climate risks. In sub-Saharan Arica,high levels o rural poverty and dependence

on rained agriculture makes meteorologicalinormation an imperative or adaptation.

However, the region has the worlds low-est density o meteorological stations. In

France, the meteorological budget amountsto US$388 million annually, compared with

just US$2 million in Ethiopia. Te 2005G8 summit pledged action to strengthen

Aricas meteorological monitoring capacity.Follow-up has allen ar short o the commit-

ments made. Inastructure. In climate change adap-

tation, as in other areas, prevention isbetter than cure. Every US$1 invested in pre-disaster risk management in develop-

ing countries can prevent losses o US$7.In Bangladesh, research among impoverished

populations living on charislands shows thatadaptation against ooding can strengthen

livelihoods, even in extreme conditions. Manycountries lack the nancial resources required

or inrastructural adaptation. Beyond disasterprevention, the development o community-

based inrastructure or water harvesting canreduce vulnerability and empower people to

cope with climate risks. Partnerships betweencommunities and local governments in Indian

Increased coal efficiency could cut CO2

emissionsFigure 9

Source:Watson 2007.

China

IEA referencescenario

IEA alternativepolicy scenario

Enhancedtechnology scenarioa

India

a. Based on IEA alternative policy scenario but assumes 45% average efficiency levels in coal power plants and 20% carbon

capture and storage (CCS) for new plants (2015-2030)

0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000

Projected CO2

emissions from coal-fired power generation, 2030 (Mt CO2)

IEA referencescenario

IEA alternativepolicy scenario

Enhanced

technology scenarioa


25/31


states such as Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat

provide examples o what can be achieved. Insurance or social protection. Climate change

is generating incremental risks in the lives

o the poor. Social protection programmescan help people cope with those risks while

expanding opportunities or employment,nutrition and education. In Ethiopia the

Productive Saety Net Programme is anattempt to strengthen the capacity o poor

households to cope with droughts withouthaving to sacrice opportunities or health

and education. In Latin America condi-tional cash transers have been widely used

to support a wide range o human develop-ment goals, including the protection o basic

capabilities during a sudden crisis. In southern

Arica cash transers have been used dur-ing droughts to protect long-run productivecapacity. While social protection gures only

marginally in current climate change adapta-tion strategies, it has the potential to create

large human development returns.Te case or international action on adap-

tation is rooted in past commitments, shared values, the global commitment to poverty re-

duction and the liability o rich nations orclimate change problems. Under the terms o

the United Nations Framework Conventionon Climate Change (UNFCCC), northern

governments are obliged to support adaptationcapacity development. Support or the MDGs

provides another powerul rationale or action:adaptation is a key requirement or achieving

the 2015 targets and creating the conditionsor sustained progress. Application o the legal principles o protection rom harm and com-

pensation or damage would constitute urthergrounds or action.

Expressed in diplomatic language, theinternational response on adaptation has

allen ar short o what is required. Severaldedicated multilateral inancing mecha-

nisms have been created, including the Lea stDeveloped Country Fund and the Special

Climate Change Fund. Delivery throughthese mechanisms has been limited. otal

inancing to date has amounted to aroundUS$26 mil liona derisory response (table 3).

For purposes o comparison, this is equivalentto one weeks worth o spending under the

United K ingdom lood deence programme.

Current pledged unding amounts to US$279million or disbursement over several years.his is an improvement over past delivery but

still a raction o what is required. It repre-sents less than one-hal o what the German

state o Baden-Wrtemberg will allocate tothe strengthening o lood deences.

It is not just the lives and the livelihoods othe poor that require protection through adap-

tation. Aid programmes are also under threat. We estimate that around one-third o cur-

rent development assistance is concentrated inareas acing varying degrees o climate change

risk. Insulating aid budgets rom that risk willrequire additional investment o around

US$4.5 billion. At the same time, climatechange is contributing to a diversion o aid into

disaster relie. Tis has been one o the astest-growing areas or aid ows, accounting or 7.5percent o total commitments in 2005.

Estimating the aid nancing requirementsor adaptation is inherently dicult. In the

absence o detailed national assessments oclimate change risks and vulnerabilities,

any assessment must remain a guesstimate(table 4). Our guesstimate is that by 2015 at

least US$44 billion will be required annuallyor climate proong development investments

(2005 prices). Building human resilience isanother priority area. Investments in social

protection and wider human developmentstrategies are needed to strengthen the capacity

Adaptation fund

Total pledged

(US$ million)

Total received

(US$ million)

Total disbursed (less fees)

(US$ million)

Least Developed Countries Fund 156.7 52.1 9.8

Special Climate Change Fund 67.3 53.3 1.4

Adaptation Fund 5 5

Sub-total 229 110.4 11.2

Strategic Priority on Adaptation 50 50 14.8 a

Total 279 160.4 26

a. Includes ees.

Note:data are as o 30th April 2007.

Table 3 The multilateral adaptation fnancing account

Source:GEF 2007a, 2007b, 2007c.

Developedcountry invest-

ments dwarfinternationaladaptation funds

Source:Abbott 2004; DEFRA 2007

and GEF 2007.

US$ million

UK annual

flood and

coastal

defence

(20042005)

Venice flood

gate (annually

20062011)

Aggregate

donor

adaptation

fund pledges

as of June

2007

(SCCF, LDCF)

100

0

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

Figure 10


26/31


27/31


returns or human security, adaptation nancing

is a highly cost-eective investment. Tere are arange o innovative nancing mechanisms thatcould be explored to mobilize resources. Tese

include carbon taxation, levies administeredunder cap-and-trade programmes and dedicated

levies on air transport and vehicles.International support or adaptation has

to go beyond inancing. Current internationaleorts suer not just rom chronic under-

inancing, but also a lack o coordinationand coherence. he patchwork o multilat-

eral mechanisms is delivering smal l amountso inance with very high transaction costs,

most o it through individual projects. While project-based support has an important role

to play, the locus or adaptation planning has

to be shited towards national programmesand budgets.

Te integration o adaptation planning

into wider poverty reduction strategies is a priority. Successul adaptation policies can-

not be grafed on to systems that are ailing toaddress underlying causes o poverty, vulner-

ability and wider disparities based on wealth,gender and location. Dialogue over Poverty

Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) providesa possible ramework or integrating adapta-

tion in poverty reduction planning. Revisiono PRSPs through nationally-owned processes

to identiy nancing requirements and policyoptions or adaptation could provide a ocal

point or international cooperation.

Conclusion and summary of

recommendations

Climate change conronts humanity with stark

choices. We can avoid 21st Century reversals inhuman development and catastrophic risks or

uture generations, but only by choosing to actwith a sense o urgency. Tat sense o urgency

is currently missing. Governments may use therhetoric o a global security crisis when de-

scribing the climate change problem, but theiractionsand inactionson energy policy re-

orm tell a dierent story. Te starting pointor action and political leadership is recogni-

tion on the part o governments that they are

conronted by what may be the gravest threat

ever to have aced humanity.Facing up to that threat will create chal-

lenges at many levels. Perhaps most unda-mentally o all, it challenges the way that we

think about progress. Tere could be no clearer

demonstration than climate that economicwealth creation is not the same thing as humanprogress. Under the current energy policies, ris-

ing economic prosperity will go hand-in-handwith mounting threats to human development

today and the well-being o uture genera-tions. But carbon-intensive economic growth

is symptomatic o a deeper problem. One othe hardest lessons taught by climate change is

that the economic model which drives growth,and the proigate consumption in rich nations

that goes with it, is ecologically unsustainable.Tere could be no greater challenge to our as-

sumptions about progress than that o realign-ing economic activities and consumption with

ecological realities.Combating climate change demands that

we place ecological imperatives at the hearto economics. hat process has to start in thedeveloped worldand it has to start today.

he uncertainties have to be acknowledged.In this report we have argued that, with the

right reorms, it is not too late to cut green-house gas emissions to sustainable levels

without sacriicing economic growth: thatrising prosperity and cli mate security are not

conlicting objectives.Te current state o international coopera-

tion and multilateralism on climate change isnot t or the purpose. As a priority, the world

needs a binding international agreement to cutgreenhouse gas emissions across a long time

Table 4 Investing in adaptation up to 2015

Estimated cost

Estimated donor country cost

% of OECD GDP

2015

US$ billion

2015

Climate-proofng development investment 0.1 44

Adapting poverty reduction to climate change 0.1 40

Strengthening disaster response (.) 2

Total 0.2 86

Source:HDRO estimates based on GDP projections rom World Bank 2007d.


28/31


horizon, but with stringent near-term and

medium-term targets. Te major developingcountries have to be party to that agreementand make commitments to reduce emissions.

However, those commitments will need toreect their circumstances and capabilities,

and the overarching need to sustain progress inpoverty reduction. Any multilateral agreement

without quantitative commitments rom devel-oping countries will lack credibility in terms o

climate change mitigation. At the same time,no such agreement will emerge unless it incor-

porates provisions or nance and technologytranser rom the rich nations that bear historic

responsibility or climate change.International cooperation must also address

the pressing issue o climate change adaptation.

Even with stringent mitigation, the world is al-ready committed to sustained global warmingor the rst hal o the 21st Century. Having cre-

ated the problem, the worlds richest countriescannot stand aside and watch the hopes and the

aspirations o the worlds poor be undermined by

increased exposure to the risks and vulnerabili-

ties that will come with climate change.Fighting climate change is a cross-generational

exercise. For the current generation, the challenge

is to keep open the window o opportunity bybending greenhouse gas emissions in a downward

direction. Te world has a historic opportunityto begin this task. In 2012, the current

commitment period o the Kyoto Protocol expires.Te

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