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Summary of Flotilla - Final Version

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    June 10th, 2010

    Operation SeaBreeze

    Summary and

    BackgroundMay 31st June 5th

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 2

    Table of Contents

    State of Armed Conflict

    Strategic

    Context

    The Naval Blockade

    Humanitarian Status:Gaza

    Hamas & HumanitarianAid

    General

    Flotilla

    Background

    Blockade Enforcement

    Diplomatic Efforts

    Participating Boats

    The IHH

    Flotilla

    Participants

    IHH and Turkey

    Other Terrorist Links

    Intercepting the Boats

    Interception

    Interception toRepatriation

    The Rachel Corrie

    Materials Onboard

    The Aftermath

    IDF Investigation

    1 2 3

    4 5

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 3

    The Broader Context

    Rockets and

    Mortars

    Terrorist Activity in 2010 (As of June 7th) Military Buildup

    Jan.-Jun. 2010

    56 Rockets

    33 Mortar Shells

    Refusal ofInternationalCommunity

    Conditions:

    Cessation of hostile terrorist activity against Israel Recognition of agreements between Israel and the PA Recognition of the State of Israels right to exist

    2006 2007 2008 2009

    UnilateralDisengagement

    2005

    PA Elections

    ShalitKidnapped

    Hamas Coup State of Calm Operation CastLead

    2010

    Increaseddeterrence

    LightArms

    Attacks

    Anti-TankFire

    IEDs

    Grenade

    34

    7

    5

    1

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Israel enforces certain restrictions aimed atensuring its security, by preventing Hamas

    military buildup. This is subject to ongoing scrutiny bythe Supreme Court.

    Unclassified || Slide 4

    The Naval Blockade on Gaza

    DeclarationThe date the blockade begins, the duration and location must be notified

    to every affected country. [Israel began the blockade on 03/01/09]

    Effectivene

    ss

    A State that declares a naval blockade must enforce it in practice

    Impartiality Blockades must be applied impartially to vessels of all States

    Purpose

    Proportionalit

    y

    Neutral

    Access

    The goal of the blockade must not be to punish the population or refusesupplies vital for its survival.

    The damage to the population must not exceed the military advantage.

    A naval blockade must not bar access to the ports and coasts of neutral

    States

    Under International Law, naval blockades is alegitimate mean in armed conflicts. Its use requiresthe fulfillment of a number of conditions:

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 5

    Humanitarian Status in Gaza

    Weekly Transfers (30/5-

    5/6)

    In coordination with the PA and NGOs,

    supplies and goods are transferred on a daily

    basis to the Gaza Strip, extending beyond

    the requirements of international law.

    Israel continues to assist in ensuring that

    basic water and infrastructure requirements in

    Gaza exist, allowing equipment transfers

    when necessary.

    Trucks: 484

    Tons: 12,413

    Medical Evacs: 373

    Fuel: 1.08 million

    liters

    Transfers in 2009

    Trucks: 30,920

    Tons: 738,576

    Medical Evacs: 10,544

    NGO Personnel:

    21,200

    Pictures of a Gaza Market(2009(

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 6

    Hamas and Humanitarian Aid

    Hamas seeks to create an illusion of a humanitarian crisis within the

    Gaza Strip. This relies largely on preventing the entry or distribution of aid

    and exploitation of the aid for its own purposes, achieving political and militarygains at the expense of Gaza residents.

    While the Hamas charges Gaza residents for

    electricity, it has refused to transfer the money to

    the PA for fuel, leading to a Hamas instigated

    reduction in transfer.

    Using Molotov cocktails, radical elements in Gaza

    set fire to a UNRWA camp (23/5,10), apparently due

    to the non-religious agenda of the camp.

    In mid-May 2010, the Hamas razed dozens ofhomes within the Gaza Strip, beating civilians who

    refused to leave them.

    Recent Examples

    In early June 2010, Hamas forces raided and shut

    down numerous NGO charities in the Gaza Strip. UN

    officials expressed concern.

    Pictures of the Burnt UNRWAChildrens Camp

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 7

    Flotilla Background

    On April 28th , a number of organizations, led by the Turkish-based IHH,

    announced that they intended to sail a flotilla to the Gaza Stripcoast to breach the naval blockade imposed in January, 2009.

    The flotilla aimed to reach Gaza with

    approximately 10 ships, departing from south

    of Cyprus on May 24th.

    This was the 3rd flotilla since the blockade was

    imposed. Two flotillas attempting to

    breach the blockade since have been

    stopped. Humanitarian supplies aboard

    transferred to Gaza by the land crossings.The option of transferring supplies via the land crossings was conveyed,

    even suggesting that the organizers oversee the transfer. This

    was declined by the organizers, who declared that the purpose of the

    flotilla was to breach the blockade. Israel unequivocally conveyed

    that ships would not be permitted to breach the blockade.

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 8

    Enforcing Naval Blockades

    The entry of a vessel into a blockaded area without permission

    constitutes a breach of a naval blockade. According to International

    Law, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a vessel has

    breached the blockade, it may be captured. If the vessel refuses to

    stop, use of force is permissible.

    Attempted Breaching of the Blockade

    Moreover, a vessel may be captured when attempting to breach a

    naval blockade if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the

    vessel intends to breach it, even before the vessel reaches the

    blockaded area. In such a case, the capture must take place outside

    of territorial waters of neutral states.Attempted breach of blockade occurs fromthe time a vessel or aircraft leaves a port or

    airfield with the intention of evading theblockade The Commanders Handbook on

    the Law of Naval Operations, USNavy

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 9

    Diplomatic Efforts to Avoid the Use of Force

    Prior to the operation, a multi-pronged diplomatic effort was made in to

    prevent the flotilla from attempting to breach the naval blockade:MFA and Others Israeli Defense Forces

    Messages conveyed to relevant

    countries.

    Message conveyed to flotilla

    organizersWritten messages conveyed to all

    foreign delegates in Israel

    Meeting between Navy Planning and

    Organization Department and relevant

    foreign attachs

    Personal meeting between Navy

    Commander in Chief and relevant

    attachsLetter from Navy CoC sent to relevant

    naval CoCs.

    Messages

    prior to

    interception

    and boarding

    Reiteration of blockade

    Offer to transfer humanitarian supplies through Ashdod

    Warning that necessary measures would be taken if course

    unchanged

    Warning that ship would be boarded barring change

    Meetings on working levels and higher

    in relevant countries

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense ForcesNaval Warnings

    Insert Video

    Naval Warnings Prior to Interception

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 11

    Name

    Max.

    SpeedFlag

    Passengers

    MaviMarmara

    15knots

    Comoros

    561

    Gazze

    13knots

    Turkey

    18

    Challenger1

    20 knots

    Unknown

    (Hoisted USflag)17

    Sfendonh

    15knots

    Togo

    48

    Defne Y

    13knots

    Kiribati

    21

    Sofia

    12.5knots

    Greece

    30

    RachelCorrie

    12.5knots

    Cambodia

    19

    Name

    Max.

    SpeedFlag

    Passengers

    Participating Boats

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 12

    IHH

    The IHH (Insani Yardim Vakfi) is a radical Islamic organization

    established in 1992, formally registered in Istanbul (1995) and led byBulent Yildrim. While its activities include legitimate humanitarian

    activity, it also includes the support of radical Islamic terrorist

    organizations:

    IHH provided 40 core activists, three boats, including the Mavi Marmara, as

    well as aid to the Hamas regime in preparing to receive the flotilla. Bulent

    Yildrim also admitted to having children and elderly on board as a deliberate

    human shields (30 May)

    Hamas

    The IHH openly supports

    the Hamas, as a member

    of the Union of Good

    (UoG), which supports

    Hamas institutes in the PA.

    UoG was defined a

    terrorist entity by the USgovernment in 2008.

    Global Jihad

    IHH has links with the GJ in the

    Middle East, as well as Syria, Iraq,

    Afghanistan and Chechnya. A CIA

    report (1996) exposed the IHHs

    connection with extremist groups.

    It also provided aid to a terrorist

    planning an attack in the US

    (2000)

    al-Qaeda

    In 2006, a Danish

    research group showed

    IHH involvement in

    recruitment, the

    purchase of weapons and

    the planning of attacks

    for al-Qaeda.

    Mili S i I f i S i

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 13

    The IHH and Turkey

    Core group of 40 IHH activists on MaviMarmara

    Boarded without security inspection inIstanbulHierarchy based on regional coordinators.

    Wore security badges during journey and

    carried radio communication devices

    Top deck restricted to IHH access alone

    Conducted instructional briefing regarding

    resistance during the boarding process.

    Turkey refused to nine separate

    Israeli requests to provide security

    oversight over the ships loading,

    unlike other countries which

    provided oversight.

    The Mavi Marmara was acquiredfrom a Turkish company (IDO),

    created in 1987 by the Istanbul

    municipality.Interviews with passengers aboard

    reveal that the Turkish

    government aided the flotilla prior

    to its departure.

    Elements in the Turkishgovernment continue to defend

    and praise the IHH, despite the

    organizations terrorist

    affiliations and the blatant,

    organized attack on Israeli

    soldiers.

    Turkey and the IHH

    Gasmasks

    andTurkishmilitary

    vests usedby IHH

    activists

    The Mavi Marmara contained passengers

    alone, no humanitarian aid.

    Milit St t i I f ti S ti

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 14

    Other Terrorist Links

    While internal investigations continue, it is becoming more and more

    evident that individuals affiliated with terrorist groups were aboard the

    boat:ArmedGroups

    A large number of passengers involved in the extreme violence were

    found without any identification papers and with large thousands of

    Euros in envelopes, indicating that they may be mercenaries, or people

    wanted for unlawful activity, therefore hiding their identity.

    Passengers Specific passengers with known terror involvement:

    Fatimah Mahdami Iranian-born US resident caught smuggling into the

    Gaza Strip and an active member ofViva Palestine

    Ken OKeefe Irish citizen; operative in the Hamas organization; has

    attempted to enter Gaza to form a commando unitHassan Iynasi Turkish citizen; supported the Islamic Jihadfinancially

    Hussein Urosh Turkish citizen who sought to smuggle Al-Qaeda

    operatives into the Gaza Strip

    Ahmed Umimon French citizen of Moroccan origin; Hamas operative

    Milit St t i I f ti S ti

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 15

    Interception of the Ships

    On 31 May, at 0428, after numerous warnings were given to ships

    approaching the Gaza Strip, clarifying that entrance to the blockadedarea would not be allowed, the six ships were boarded.

    Passe

    nge

    rs

    Mavi Marmara 561

    Challenger 17

    SFENDONH 48

    Gazze 18

    Sofia 30

    Defne Y 21

    Boarding Preparation

    Soldiers boarding the boats were instructed

    personally by the Chief of the Navy to use

    the minimal amount of force necessary,

    as befits operations involving civilians. They

    were equipped with paintball guns,

    beanbag ammunition, tasers and stun

    grenades, as well as pistols to be used

    when facing a clear and immediate threat

    to life.Despite some resistance from passengers on five boats (excluding

    the Mavi Marmara), no injuries or casualties were sustained. The

    boats were brought to Ashdod port without extraordinary incidents.

    Militar Strategic Information Section

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense ForcesViolence Onboard Ship

    Insert Video

    Violence Before Boarding

    Military Strategic Information Section

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 17

    Violence on the Mavi Marmara

    Calls on the boat directed non-IHH members

    (including 16 parliament members & 34 journalists)

    below deck prior to the IDF boarding. Weapons wereprepared and IHH members split into squads for the

    violent confrontation.

    Soldiers upon the Mavi Marmara encountered organized, life-

    threatening violence. Troops limited fire to aggressors alone, after non-

    lethal force failed to prove effective. All casualties resulted from attacks

    immediately threatening the life of Israeli soldiers.

    IHH Violence Upon Boarding

    Soldiers were fired upon, thrown off the top deck,

    abducted, stabbed and attacked with metal rods,slingshots, and other weapons. Soldiers were

    forced to respond with force in self-defense.

    7 IDF

    Wounded

    (2 critical)

    9 IHH

    casualties

    34 wounded

    Military Strategic Information Section

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense ForcesViolence Onboard Ship

    Insert Video

    Violence Against Soldiers - Overhead

    Insert Video

    Violence Against Soldiers - Side View

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    We will definitely

    resist and we willnot allow theIsraelis to enter

    here if Israelwants to boardthe ship, it willmeet strongresistance.

    Bulent Yildrim, Head of the IHH

    May 30th, 2010

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    There were guyswho they threw off

    the top deck, andwho were strippedof their gear. They

    jumped into the seaas a last resort Testimony of one of theNavy commandos onthe Mavi Marmara

    Military-Strategic Information Section

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    Military-Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 21

    IHH Preparation for Boarding

    Metal rods 100

    Knives 200

    Kevlar boards 11

    Military vests 150

    Electric saws 7

    Large tools 100

    Gas Masks 200

    Axes 20

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    Every person whocame down the ropes,was grabbed by three

    or four people and

    violently assaulted.We were lynched.

    They had metal rods,

    knives, slingshots,and glass bottles. Atsome point, live fire

    was shot at two of our

    Testimony of one of theNavy commandos onthe Mavi Marmara

    Military-Strategic Information Section

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    Military Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense ForcesViolence Onboard Ship

    Insert Video

    Soldier Describes Violence

    Military-Strategic Information Section

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    Military Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 24

    Interception until Repatriation

    Injured passengers were evacuated byhelicopter to five hospitals in Israel

    Belinson

    Hadassah Ein Karem

    Tel Hashomer

    Rambam

    In Ashdod Port, passengers were given

    medical examinations and screened for

    security purposes. Passengers who agreed

    to sign deportation notices were brought to

    Ben Gurion Airport for immediate

    repatriation. Those who refused were

    detained until deportation procedures werecompleted.

    Procedure Once in Port

    Barzilay

    June 1st

    Two Egyptians returned to Egypt

    Approximately 120 transferred to

    Jordan as final destination and as

    transfer pointJune 2nd

    Four Lebanese residents returnedvia Rosh HaNikra crossing

    June 3rd

    With the exception of 7 injured

    passengers and 3 others, allpassengers returned to Turkey via

    3 airplanes and 3 ambulance

    airplanesJune 6th

    One returned on flight to Turkey

    Military-Strategic Information Section

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    Military Strategic Information Section

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 25

    The Linda (Rachel Corrie)

    Interception || July 5th

    On July 6th, 8 of the passengers were transferred

    to Jordan via Allenby crossing. The remaining

    passengers were transferred to Turkey by

    airplane.

    Repatriation || July 6th

    The Rachel Corrie arrived in the region on July 5th and, after ignoring calls to avert its course, was

    boarded by IDF forces. The boarding was done

    calmly and peacefully. All 19 passengers were

    brought to Ashdod port, where they underwent

    medical examinations and security screening.

    The perceptible difference between the behavior of the activistsupon the Linda, as well as the other five ships, when comparedto the hostile aggression from the passengers of the Mavi

    Marmara, reflect upon the nature of the peace activists aboard

    each of the ships.

    Military-Strategic Information Section

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    a y S a eg c o a o Sec o

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

    Unclassified || Slide 26

    Materials Aboard the Ships

    Materials Aboard the Ships

    After passengers disembarked, the supplies were unloadedand transferred to some 80 trucks, sent to pass through

    the land crossings at Kerem Shalom. The supplies included

    medical equipment (including expired medicine),

    clothing and childrens toys. Material requiring

    refrigeration are in IDF storage units.

    Hamas has refused to accept the materials,threatening those who do try to transfer them. Thematerials remain at Kerem Shalom crossing.The routine, daily shipments of supplies continue in thepast week, 484 trucks (including two with concrete) weretransferred.

    Transferring the Materials

    However, large portions of the aid were rendered useless by poor packaging upon

    the boat. In addition, much of the materials did not match the standard definition of

    humanitarian aid. Camouflage fabric intended to be transferred was found on

    board. Much of the clothing is old and not wearable and medical equipment

    was not transferred in a sterile manner.

    Military-Strategic Information Section

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    y g

    Strategic Division // Israel Defense ForcesIDF Investigation

    Field investigations within the navy are currently taking place.

    In addition, the Chief of the General Staff has appointed a

    professional inquiry team, led by Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland to

    examine the flotilla operation and establish lessons. The team is

    to present the findings no later than July 4th . Consisting of

    professionals who are experts in the field, the investigative team was

    not part of the chain of command, allowing impartial investigation.

    Command

    investigati

    on

    Criminal

    misconductCriminal

    investigati

    onInc

    iden

    t

    Credible allegation or non-operational

    incident

    Model of IDF Investigations

    MAG

    oversigh

    t

    Supreme

    Court

    oversight


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