Suny at Sen Hongkong

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An Alternative to Kuomintang-Communist Collaboration: Sun Yat-Sen and Hong Kong,January-June 1923Author(s): F. Gilbert ChanSource: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1979), pp. 127-139Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312357

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ModernAsianStudies,13, I (X979), pp. 127-I39. Printed in Great Britain.

An Alternativeo Kuomintang-CommunistCollaboration:unYat-senandHongKong,January-June 923F. GILBERT CHAN

Miami University,Oxford,OhioSUN Yat-sen arrived in Shanghai in August I922 after suffering ahumiliating defeat at the hands of his former ally, Ch'en Chiung-ming.In the next five months, he negotiated with Russian and ChineseCommunists for their collaboration with the Kuomintang. His effortwas fruitful, On January 26, 1923, he issued a joint manifesto with theSoviet emissary, AdolfJoffe, who assured the Chinese revolutionaryleader-in the name of the 'Russian people'-of their 'warmestsympathy for China' and their 'willingness to lend support.'1With no specific promise of Soviet material assistance, however, theSun-Joffe Manifesto was mostly symbolic. Russia maintained stronginterest in Wu P'ei-fu, a powerful militarist, until after the latter'sviolent suppression of the February 7 strike in 1923. Moreover, theSoviet Communists continued to negotiate with Peking for diplomaticrecognition, in spite of Sun Yat-sen's inauguration in March as General-issimo of the Canton government.2 Similarly, Sun did not permit hisagreement with Moscow to interfere with his endeavors to seeksupport from other foreign powers. His rapprochement with HongKong during the first half of 1923 was illustrative of this attitude.In a slightly modified form, this paper was presented to the 43rd Annual Meetingof the Ohio Academy of History on April 26, 1975. Acknowledgments are due toProfessors C. Martin Wilbur of Columbia University and Lloyd E. Eastman of theUniversity of Illinois at Urbana for theirconstructivecriticisms.I am also appreciativeof the valuable suggestions for improvement made by my colleagues in the HistoryDepartment Faculty Seminar at Miami University.1For the complete text of the manifesto, see H. G. W. Woodhead (ed.), TheChinarear Book,I924-5 (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, Ltd, n.d.), p. 863. The evolutionof the Kuomintang-Russian alliance is discussed in my article, 'Sun Yat-sen and theOrigins of the Kuomintang Reorganization,' in F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas H.Etzold (eds), China n theI92os: NationalismandRevolutionNew York: New View-points, 1976), pp. 15-37.2 Odoric Y. K. Wou, 'Wu P'ei-fu and the Communists' (preliminary report toUniversity Seminar on Modern China, Columbia University, November 28, 1973);and Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China,I9I7-I924 (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1953), pp. 208-35.

0026-749X/79/0200-0903 $02.00 ?I979 Cambridge University Press127


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F. GILBERT CHANProbably influenced by historical hindsight, many scholars invest the

development of the Kuomintang-Communist collaboration with anaura of inevitability.3 Such analyses fail to take into consideration Sun'sreservations about Marxism as an answer to China's problems. Theyfurther underrate the opposition of some of his comrades to the alliancewith the Communists. By using his courtship with Hong Kong as anexample, this paper demonstrates the flexibility of Sun's relations withRussia. It emphasizes the factional rivalries within the Kuomintang;they reflected the bitter dissension among party veterans over thedecision to solicit aid from Soviet Communists. The search for analternative to Sun's pro-Russian policy ended temporarily in June1923, after Hong Kong's refusal to extend to the Kuomintang thefinancial support it badly needed. This coincided with the decline ofthe anti-Communist leaders in the party.Sun and many of his closest comrades were natives of Kwangtung.In the pre-IgII years, the province was an important base for theiranti-Manchu movement.4 After his resignation as Provisional Presidentof the new republic in 1912, Sun vowed to turn Kwangtung into a'model province'. Liao Chung-k'ai, who was then Commissioner ofFinance in Canton, endeavored to put into practice Henry George'ssingle-tax theory.5 In 1917, when Sun started his 'constitution protec-tion movement' against the warlords in Peking, he chose Kwangtungas the site for his separatist government.To a considerable extent, Sun's claim to national leadership de-pended on the support of the southern militarists, whose politicalleaning was often dictated by self-interest. Lu Jung-t'ing, a formidableally in Kwangsi, had aspirations for the vice-presidency of the Peking

3 For example, as Chung-gi Kwei (Ch'ung-chi Kuei) insists, it was 'only natural'that Russia should be 'anxious' to align itself with the Kuomintang. See Chung-giKwei, TheKuomintang-Communisttrugglen China, 922-I949 (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1970), pp. I8 and 20.4 F. Gilbert Chan, 'Revolutionary Leadership in Transition: Sun Yat-sen and HisComrades, I905-I925' (unpublished paper presented to the 30th InternationalCongress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, Mexico City, August 3,1976). An expanded version of the paper was delivered at the Ohio East AsianSeminar, November 13, 1976. For a revisionist study of the Chinese revolution inKwangtung, see Edward J. M. Rhoads, China'sRepublicanRevolution:The CaseofKwangtung, I895-I9I3 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I975).5 Min-li pao (Shanghai), June 20, 1912; June 23, 1912; and June 24, 1912. Sunendorsed Liao's reform program in a meeting with the provincial leaders in Canton.See ibid., June I5, I912. For Henry George's influence on the Chinese intellectuals,see Harold Z. Schiffrin and Pow-key Sohn, 'Henry George on Two Continents: AComparative Study in the Diffusion of Ideas,' ComparativeStudies in Society and History,Vol. II, No. I (October I959), pp. 85-109.

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KUOMINTANG - COMMUNIST COLLABORATIONregime.6 As early as December 1917, Sun complained that he had notbeen 'taken with sufficient seriousness by any of the southern leaders.'7He was unable to sustain his feeble command of the government inCanton, and he resigned as its Generalissimo in May I918.When Sun returned to Kwangtung in November I920 to revive theregime he had abandoned thirty months before, he relied primarilyon Ch'en Chiung-ming's military support. A member of the T'ung-meng-hui, Ch'en had been Sun's 'follower for more than ten years.'8Nonetheless, the campaign for a federalist government in Chinaattracted Ch'en's attention, and his views on provincialism were'altogether incompatible' with Sun's constitutionalism. There was a'fundamental difference in political objectives' between the two leaders.While Ch'en labored for 'the immediate welfare of Kwangtung,' Sunchampioned 'the cause of the national revolution.'9 Their fragilealliance ended with Sun's expulsion from Canton in June 1922.His political exile in Shanghai notwithstanding, Sun never waveredfrom his determination to reunite China under his leadership. Hisentente with Soviet and Chinese Communists represented only a partof his overall strategy against the warlords in Peking. While he wasconferring with Russian envoys, he also worked hard for the reorgan-ization of the Kuomintang. Yet his immediate concern was the re-conquest of Kwangtung; he regarded this as an important step in therevitalization of his anti-warlord revolution.

6 Paul S. Reinsch to Secretary of State, September 27, I917, in United StatesDepartment of State, RecordsRelatingto InternalAffairsof China,I9Io-29 (hereaftercited as USDS), 893.00/2724; and Millard'sReviewof theFar East (renamed WeeklyReview of theFar East in June 192 I, and later China WeeklyReview in June 1923; here-after cited as CWR), December I, 91 7, p. i.7 NorthChinaHerald (hereafter abbreviated as NCH), December 8, I917, p. 584.See also Li Chien-nung, The PoliticalHistoryof China,I840-I928, trans. by Ssu-yuTeng andJeremy Ingalls (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), pp. 384-8.8 Quoted from Sun's letter to his party comrades, September I8, 1922, in Kuomin-tang Archives (ed.), Kuo-fuch'uan-chi,Taipei: Chung-hua min-kuo ko-chieh chi-nienkuo-fu pai-nien tan-ch'en ch'ou-pei wei-yuan-hui, 1965), Vol. III, p. IX:544. Inspite of Sun's claim, however, his relations with Ch'en were by no means intimate.See Chan, 'Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Kuomintang Reorganization,' p. I6.Indeed, Ch'en's image of a treacherous warlord, as projected by Kuomintanghistorians, needs reevaluation. See Winston Hsieh, 'The Ideas and Ideals of a War-lord: Ch'en Chiung-ming (1878-1933),' in Paperson China (Harvard University),Vol. XVI (December 1962), pp. 192-252.9NCH,January 8, 192I, p. 94; and Walter E. Gourlay, 'The Kuomintang and theRise of Chiang Kai-shek, I920-1924' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, HarvardUniversity, 1966), p. I6. For the Chinese federalist movement, see Jean Chesneaux,'The Federalist Movement in China, 1920-3,' in Jack Gray (ed.), ModernChina'sSearchor a PoliticalForm(London: Oxford University Press, I969), pp. 96-I37.

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F. GILBERT CHANAmong party members, Liao Chung-k'ai, Hu Han-min, and Wang

Ching-wei were perhaps the staunchest advocates of Sun's programfor national regeneration. They had been Sun's close associates for atleast seventeen years, dating from the founding of the T'ung-meng-huiin I905.10 In the early 1920S they formed the core of the Elders Faction(yuan-laop'ai) of the Kuomintang, and they supported Sun's plan forthe military reunification of China, as well as his alliance with SovietRussia. On January 28, I923, Liao accompanied AdolfJoffe to Japanto discuss the details of the Kuomintang-Communist rapprochement.He did not return to China until the end of March.

Many of Sun's comrades, however, questioned the wisdom of hiscollaboration with the Communists. In September I922, Chang Chisignified his opposition to the admission of Chinese Communists tothe Kuomintang. Ma Ch'ao-chun, who had been active in labororganizations, held eight meetings with Sun after the latter's arrival inShanghai to voice the serious misgivings of the workers about Marx-ism. 11The effort of these leaders did not prevent Sun from reaching anagreement with Joffe in January I923.Meanwhile, there was a small yet significant group of party veterans,with Sun Fo as the central force, who tried to seek an alternative to thepolicy of Kuomintang-Communist entente. Instead of relying on SovietRussia, they turned to the West for help. Some of them, notably C. C.Wu (Wu Ch'ao-shu) and Fu P'ing-ch'ang, had intimate family con-nections in Hong Kong.12 Prior to Ch'en Chiung-ming's coup on JuneI6, 1922, they had been influential in the municipal administration of

10While Liao's association with Sun began in I903, Hu met the latter for the firsttime in I905. See F. Gilbert Chan, 'Liao Chung-k'ai (1878-1925): The Career of aChinese Revolutionary,' in Essays in Chinese Studies Presented to Professor Lo Hsiang-linon His Retirement rom the Chair of Chinese, University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Uni-versity of Hong Kong, I970), p. 325; and Hu Han-min, 'Hu Han-min tzu-chuan,'in Kuomintang Archives (ed.), Ke-ming wen-hsien (Taipei: Chung-yang wen-wukung-ying-she, 1953- ), Vol. III, p. 386. According to James R. Shirley, Wangbecame acquainted with Sun through Hu's introduction. See Shirley, 'PoliticalConflict in the Kuomintang: The Career of Wang Ching-wei to 1932' (unpublishedPh.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1962), p. I2.11Ma Ch'ao-chun, Ma Ch'ao-chunhsien-shengyen-lun hsuan-chi (Taipei: Chung-kuolao-kung fu-li ch'u-pan-she, 1967), Vol. II, pp. '93-4; and Ma Ch'ao-chun et al.,Chung-kuo lao-kung yun-tung shih (Taipei: Chung-hua ta-tien pien-yin-hui, 1966),Vol. I, pp. 236-7. Cf. Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the ChineseCommunistParty, I92I-I927: Volume One of the Autobiographyof Chang Kuo-t'ao (Lawrence: University Pressof Kansas, 1971), p. 267.12 While C. C. Wu, son of Wu T'ing-fang, graduated from University of London,Fu P'ing-ch'ang was a graduate of University of Hong Kong. Each married adaughter of Ho Kai, the first Chinese knighted in the British colony of Hong Kong.See Gourlay, 'The Kuomintang and the Rise of Chiang Kai-shek,' p. I67.

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KUOMINTANG - COMMUNIST COLLABORATIONCanton.13 Partly because of this, they tended to be more concernedwith the provincial interests of Kwangtung than with national issues,and were less inclined than, say, Liao Chung-k'ai to support Sun Yat-sen's military ventures against the Peking government. Known col-lectively as the Prince Faction (t'ai-tzu p'ai), they often came intoconflict with the Kuomintang Elders. In the first months of I923,the struggle between these two cliques centered upon the party policyof befriending Russian and Chinese Communists.Even before the Sun-Joffe discussions, Sun Fo and his Prince Factionhad endeavored to press Sun Yat-sen to abandon his Soviet orientationin favor of an alliance with the British government in Hong Kong.According to Fu P'ing-ch'ang, he went to the British colony 'towardthe end of 1922' to confer with Governor Reginald E. Stubbs. In theirmeeting, Stubbs allegedly extended to Sun Yat-sen an official invitationto visit Hong Kong, and further suggested the possibility of cooperationwith the Kuomintang.14 This narrative, as reported by Walter E.Gourlay, exaggerates Fu's role in the attempt to solicit British assistance.Besides, it errs in factual details. For instance, Sun apparently did notreceive an invitation from the government of Hong Kong until FebruaryI923.

As documents of the Foreign Office in London indicate, Sun hadactually taken a more active interest in the negotiations with theBritish diplomats than Fu intimated. This was hardly surprising, inview of his previous educational experience in Hong Kong. He alsohad grave doubts about Communism. During his meetings with SergeDalin in April-June 1922, he had emphasized China's strong oppositionto Communist philosophy. The Soviet emissary later complained thatSun had treated him with 'a certain amount of distrust.'15 Moreover,on January 15, I923, eleven days before the announcement of the Sun-Joffe agreement, the Kuomintang military allies succeeded in drivingCh'en Chiung-ming out of Canton.16 Sun planned to travel to the

13 Sun Fo, the eldest child of Sun Yat-sen, was Mayor of Canton in I921-22. Heleft the city after Ch'en Chiung-ming's June i6 coup of 1922.14 Gourlay, 'The Kuomintang and the Rise of Chiang Kai-shek,' p. I68. WalterGourlay interviewed Fu P'ing-ch'ang in Taipei on July 27, 1965.15Dalin, 'Velikii povorot: Sun Yat-sen v I922g,' in Sun rat-sen, I866-1966, Kstoletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia: Sbornik statei, vospominanii i materialov (Moscow: Glavnaiaredaktsiia vostochnoi literatury izdatel'stvo 'Nauka,' I966), p. 269.16 NCH, January 27, 1923, p. 2 8. See also American Minister in China to Secretaryof State, January I8, 1923, in USDS, 893.0o/4823. The military successes did notreally surprise Sun Yat-sen. On January 7, he had confidently predicted that hewould soon return in triumph to Canton. See the record of his interview in NCH,January 13, I923, p. 73.

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F. GILBERT CHANsouth soon, and a rapprochement with the British government in HongKong would strengthen his position in Kwangtung.In the two dispatches submitted to his superiors in Peking in JanuaryI923, Sir Sidney Barton, British Consul General in Shanghai, notedthat Sun had twice sent Eugene Ch'en to call on him. Ch'en hintedthat the Kuomintang leader would welcome a reception by GovernorStubbs of Hong Kong. Since Sir Ronald Macleay, the newly ap-pointed British Minister to China, was then in the colony on his wayto Peking, Barton transmitted the information to him.l7 Significantly,Ch'en's two visits on January II and 19 occurred after Fu P'ing-ch'ang's conference with Stubbs, but preceded Sun's agreement withAdolf Joffe.l8 During the first twelve days of February, Sun sentEugene Ch'en and C. C. Wu to confer with Macleay in Shanghai. Inhis February 28 message to Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary,Macleay stressed Sun's 'alleged desire to improve his relations with theBritish authorities' in China and Hong Kong.19On his way to Canton, Sun landed in Hong Kong on February 17,and stayed there for four days. The warm reception extended to himsymbolized an entente between the Kuomintang and the Britishgovernment in the colony. A day after his arrival, he attended an'informal' luncheon at Government House as a guest of GovernorStubbs.20 Shortly afterward, he had tea with Sir Robert Ho-tung, aprominent industrialist who was 'believed to be closely associated withthe Hong Kong government.'21 The highlight of Sun's visit took placeon February 20, when he returned to the University of Hong Kong,his alma mater, to speak to an audience of three hundred professorsand students. He described the island as his 'intellectual birthplace'

17 Barton's first dispatch to Peking, January 17, I923, in Great Britain ForeignOffice, 'General Correspondence' series, FO 37I/918I/F 649 [F 649/12/10], and hissecond dispatch, dated January 22, 1923, in ibid., FO 37I/918I/F 946 [F 946/12/IO].18 While Joffe had sent an aide to call on Sun in Shanghai as early as August 25,1922, the Soviet emissary did not come to the city until January 7 of the followingyear. On January I8, a day prior to Eugene Ch'en's second visit to Barton, Sunentertained Joffe at a dinner. After this meeting, the two leaders conferred repeatedlyat Sun's residence in the French Concession. See Chan, 'Sun Yat-sen and the Originsof the Kuomintang Reorganization,' p. 33; and C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Tat-sen:Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. I35.19 Great Britain Foreign Office, 'Confidential Print,' Vol. 236, Further Corres-pondenceRespectingChina, F I 107/12/10 (report 462).20 NCH, February 24, 1923, p. 500; and American Consul in Charge (Canton) toSecretary of State, February 24, 1923, in USDS, 893.oo/4936. Sun Yat-sen laterclaimed that his meeting with Governor Stubbs 'augured well for future relationshipsbetween Hong Kong and Canton.' See South China Morning Post (Hong Kong),February 22, 1923.21 NCH, February 24, 1923, p. 500; and USDS, 893.00/4936.

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KUOMINTANG - COMMUNIST COLLABORATIONwhere he had learned his 'revolutionary and modern ideas.' In themidst of 'deafening cheers,' he lauded the British parliamentary system,and urged his audience to 'carry the example of good government toall parts of China.'22Contemporary pro-British publications in China were generallyenthusiastic about Sun's trip to Hong Kong. While he was still in thecolony, an influential local newspaper suggested that he might need'some Hong Kong financial and other help.' It predicted: 'The colonymay at no distant date find itself working in close cooperation with theneighboring province, breaking new ground to the great benefit ofboth.'23 In view of the hostile confrontation between the Kuomintangand Hong Kong during the seamen's strike in 1922, this friendlygesture was-to quote a weekly periodical in Shanghai-truly 'one ofthe most significant things occurring in South China affairs.'24Sun, too, was evidently happy with the results of his pro-Britishovertures. On March I8, he informed a public gathering in Cantonof 'the loans now under negotiation,' and vowed to 'bring about theprosperity and development' of Kwangtung 'by means of good under-standing and cooperation' with both Hong Kong and Macao.25 In adispatch to the Secretary of State, R. P. Tenney, an American diplomatin South China, likewise reported on Sun's cordial relations with J. W.Jamieson, British Consul General in Canton. He noted that Sun'sattempt to raise funds in Hong Kong 'may be successful.' Apparently,this observation was not groundless. In response to an invitation to tea,the Kuomintang leader had visited Jamieson on the afternoon of March.6. On March 20, two days after Sun's public expression of optimism,Jamieson courteously paid a return call on the Chinese revolutionary.26Meanwhile, Sun was appreciative of the assistance of the PrinceFaction, and he rewarded its leaders with important positions in hisnewly established government. While his son, Sun Fo, regained themayoralty of Canton, Fu P'ing-ch'ang became Commissioner ofForeign Affairs and concurrently Superintendent of Customs. Further-more, on April I5, Sun Yat-sen appointed C. C. Wu as Minister of

22 USDS, 893.00/4936. The university was named Hong Kong College of Medicinefor Chinese when Sun was a student there. See W. W. Hornell, The University ofHong Kong: Its Origins and Growth (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, I925),p. I; and Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu ta-hsueh shih-tai (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1954),esp. pp. 27-65.23 South China Morning.Post, February 20, 1923.24 CWR, March 3, 1923, p. I.25 NCH, March 24, 1923, p. 787.26 American Consul in Charge (Canton) to Secretary of State, March 13, I923,in USDS, 893.oo/4950; and Wilbur, Sun Tat-sen, p. 337, n. 63.

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Foreign Affairs.27 This ascendancy of the Prince Faction was largelyresponsible for the temporary eclipse of the Kuomintang Elders. Asearly as February 28, Sun had dispatched Hu Han-min and WangChing-wei to Shanghai to work for the 'peaceful reunification ofChina.'28 Coupled with Liao Chung-k'ai's stay in Japan, their departureleft a power vacuum in Canton, which the Prince Faction eagerly filled.For some time, the Kuomintang rapprochement with Soviet andChinese Communists seemed to be in jeopardy.At this critical juncture, Liao returned to Canton toward the endof March. When he recounted to Sun the details of his discussions withAdolf Joffe in Japan, he reaffirmed his backing of the program ofKuomintang-Communist collaboration. In the Political Report givento the Second Party Congress in January 1926, Wang Ching-weiverified Liao's faith in the alliance with the Communists, and praisedhim for having had the courage to resist the severe opposition of hiscomrades.29 Indeed, Liao's challenge of the pro-British policy aggra-vated the power struggle between the Elders and the Prince Faction,and adversely affected Sun's entente with Hong Kong.The success of Sun Fo and his clique in winning Sun Yat-sen'sconfidence resulted mostly from their promise to bring to Canton thefinancial resources of the Hong Kong merchants and possibly of theBritish government. Sun Fo's impressive performance in the Cantonmunicipal administration during 1921-22 had gained the admirationof many merchants in the neighboring colony, and he appeared likelyto earn their support in I923. His father's pronouncement on March I8exhibited genuine optimism. Soon afterward, a Hong Kong newspaperdeclared that the Prince Faction had successfully cemented a coalitionwith 'the capitalists.'30 Yet, as proved by subsequent events, much of

27USDS, 893.00/4950; Lo Chia-lun (ed.), Kuo-fu nien-p'u tseng-ting-pen, withadditions by Huang Chi-lu (Taipei: Kuomintang Archives, 1969), hereafter citedas KFNP, Vol. II, pp. 958-9 and 963; and Lu-hai-chunta-yuan-shuaita-pen-yingkung-pao(Canton; reprinted in 12 volumes in 1969 by the Kuomintang Archives in Taipei),No. i, March 9, I923, in Vol. I, pp. 58-9.28 KFNP, Vol. II, p. 958; and Lu-hai-chun ta-yuan-shuai ta-pen-ying kung-pao, March9, 1923, in Vol. I, p. 58.29Wang Ching-wei, 'Tui Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh-tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui cheng-chih pao-kao,' in Ke-ming wen-hsien, Vol. XX, p. 3856. To empha-size the element of Soviet influence, Lyon Sharman labels Liao 'Joffe's disciple.' SeeSharman, Sun rat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning: A Critical Biography (Hamden: ArchonBooks, 1965), p. 225. For further discussion of Liao's attitude toward the Kuomintang-Communist alliance, see F. Gilbert Chan, 'The Death of a Revolutionary: LiaoChung-k'ai's Assassination' (unpublished paper presented to Midwest RegionalSeminar on China, May 19, I973).30 Hua-tzujih-pao (Hong Kong), April 9, 1923.

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KUOMINTANG - COMMUNIST COLLABORATION 135the optimism was premature, and the inability of the Prince Factionto fulfill its promise led, in part, to the resurgence of the KuomintangElders.

In order to secure the support of the non-Cantonese militarists, SunYat-sen needed an almost inexhaustible supply of money, and heexpected his son to obtain this from the Hong Kong merchants. But,Sun Fo could only deliver the cash if the Kuomintang would agree tosurrender its control over Canton finances to the creditors.31 Forinstance, the merchants of the colony insisted that Sun Yat-sen shoulddesignate men of their choice to fill such important governmentpositions as provincial Commissioner of Finance. This was a con-cession the Elders stubbornly refused to make. Liao Chung-k'ai'sappointment to the governorship on May 7 to replace Hsu Shao-chen,a favorite of the Hong Kong merchants, was therefore demonstrativeof the victory of the Elders over Sun Fo and his clique in the factionalstruggle.On March 2, prior to Liao's return from Japan, Sun Yat-sen hadnamed him Minister of Finance of the military government. Upon hisarrival in Canton at the end of the month, Liao found the city in gravefinancial difficulties. The loans that Sun had anticipated from theHong Kong merchants were not forthcoming, and he had receivedlittle help from his erstwhile supporters, the overseas Chinese. Conse-quently, the government had to depend on gambling and opiumtraffic for its major income. On one occasion, Sun defended the legal-ization of gambling as 'a necessity.'32 These expedient measures werefinancially productive. A contemporary source maintained that theopium traffic alone yielded an average of 800,000 yuan a month.33Nevertheless, when Ch'en Chiung-ming was in control of Kwangtung,he had tried to eradicate these two vices from the province. TheCantonese were openly critical of their restoration by the Kuomintanggovernment. Hence, these financial policies of Sun and Liao fatallyundermined their previous claim to transform Kwangtung into a'model province'.There were other methods with which the Kuomintang exactedmoney from the populace, and the merchants were obvious victims ofits financial extortions. Besides being obligated to pay taxes regularlyin advance, they frequently had to make substantial contributions to

31 See Gourlay's interview with Fu P'ing-ch'ang in 'The Kuomintang and theRise of Chiang Kai-shek,' pp. 174-6; and Hua-tzujih-pao,March 30, 1923; May I7,1923; May I8, 1923; and May I9, 1923.32 J.CH, March 24, I923, p. 787. 33 CWR, May Io, I924, p. 396.


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F. GILBERT CHANthe Canton government. In addition, the Provincial Bank of Kwang-tung, at periodic intervals, placed large amounts of paper notes incirculation without the guarantee of proper security. The merchantshad to accept them at their face value. Sun's statements in an interviewwith Rodney Gilbert a year earlier reflected his views on the subject.According to him, it was 'not essential' either to provide a cash reservefor the currency or to promise to redeem it on demand. He admittedthat the paper money would not be 'immediately redeemable', but hecontended that the 'security' for the notes 'is the work which we havedone with them.'34 The assumption that whatever he did would ulti-mately benefit the Cantonese, as well as the argument that the endthus justified the means, did not endear the Kuomintang to thebusiness community of Canton. As Minister of Finance in March-May1923, Liao Chung-k'ai won the notoriety of a villain among the com-mercial interests in the province. His pro-Russian leanings furtheralienated the merchants. With him gaining influence in the government,whatever hope Canton might have had to obtain financial assistancefrom Hong Kong evaporated.As the demand for money became increasingly acute, Sun turnedto Liang Shih-yi, a leader of the Communications Clique (Chiao-t'ung-hsi), for extraparty support. A veteran financier of national reputation,Liang was then in political retirement in Hong Kong. He shared withSun a common hatred for Wu P'ei-fu and the Chihli militarists whodominated Peking at that time. Earlier in March I923, Sun hadendeavored to seek the financier's help to arrange a loan with theconsortium of banks.35 When this failed, Sun requested him to servein the Kuomintang government in an official capacity. Liang declined,yet he offered the aid of his two close associates, Yeh Kung-ch'o andCheng Hung-nien. To solidify his alliance with the CommunicationsClique, Sun named Yeh his new Minister of Finance on May 7 toreplace the embattled Liao Chung-k'ai, and designated Cheng asVice Minister.36 A Shanghai periodical commended the appointmentswhich, it argued, would strengthen the Canton government. 37

34 NCH, May 6, 1922, p. 373.35See the records of conversation in Hong Kong between Liang Shih-yi and S. F.Mayers of the British and Chinese Corporation, March i6, I923, in Great BritainForeign Office, 'General Correspondence' series, FO 371/9181/F I520.36 Ts'en Hsueh-lu, San-shuiLiang Ten-sunhsien-sheng ien-p'u(Taipei: Wen-hsingshu-tien, 1962), Vol. II, p. 255; Lu-hai-chun ta-yuan-shuai ta-pen-ying kung-pao, No. Io,May ii, I923, in Vol. I, pp. 502-3; KFNP, Vol. II, p. 973; and China Review (NewYork), Vol. IV, No. 6 (June 1923), p. 263. See also CWR, May 19, 1923, p. 426;and May 26, I923, p. 462.37 CWR, July 7, 1923, P. I88.

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KUOMINTANG - COMMUNIST COLLABORATIONBecause of deteriorating political and military conditions in Kwang-tung, the new team in the treasury never had a chance to reverse thetrend of the Kuomintang toward financial bankruptcy. Shen Hung-

ying, a Kwangsi militarist of doubtful loyalty, had been flirting withWu P'ei-fu since January, when Ch'en Chiung-ming withdrew fromCanton in defeat. In March, Sun gave Shen 150,oooyuan, and tried invain to persuade him to leave the province. In an attempt to underminefurther Sun's already fragile authority in South China, the Pekinggovernment appointed the Kwangsi militarist on March 21 to takecharge of military affairs in Kwangtung. With additional encourage-ment from Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan of the Political Study Society (Cheng-hsueh-hui), Shen decided to challenge the Kuomintang rule in Canton.He declared on April 14 that he was 'compelled ... to drive out theoppressors of the people.'38 Two days later, he engineered a militarycoup, which allegedly enjoyed Wu P'ei-fu's backing. In a protestaddressed to the northern government, Sun held Wu responsible forthe warfare, and insisted that Peking should dismiss him.39Nor were the coup and the fighting that followed Sun's sole prob-lems. In the middle of the military crisis, Ch'en Chiung-ming, who hadencamped at Waichow since his January defeat, marched west withhis troops and threatened Canton on May 30. Sun's effort to repelthe attacks of both Shen and Ch'en plunged the provincial treasuryinto financial catastrophe. During the summer of I923, he had to buythe loyalty of his soldiers with a reported total of 26,oooyuan per day.40In desperation, the Kuomintang government imposed new and oftenexcessive taxes on the Cantonese populace; it also tried to requireevery rich merchant to make a special war contribution. It wasgovernment policy, too, to arrest all opponents of the tax laws on thecharge of 'treason' and to release them afterward upon payment of a'heavy bail'. Provoked by these abuses, a journalist characterized Sun'sregime in Canton as the 'darkest spot in China'.41

38J\CH, March 24, I923, p. 787; and April 28, 1923, p. 218; CWR, April 7, 1923,p. 216; and KFNP, Vol. II, p. 968.39China Review, June I923, p. 259. NCH reported the presence in Shen's camp of'northern troops sent by General Wu P'ei-fu'-'men speaking a northern dialect andwearing a queue' (April 28, 1923, p. 22 I). Without substantiating the NCH account,CWR described Wu's intervention as an attempt 'to- effect a nominal reunification ofChina by force.' The same publication considered Wu's policy 'extremely unwise,'since it might unite all opposing forces in Kwangtung behind Sun (July 7, I923,p. 12).40 CWR, September 8, I923, p. 6o.41 Ibid., November 3, I923, p. 350. See also September 8, I923, p. 60; September

22, I923, p. I43; and October I3, 1923, p. 235.

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F. GILBERT CHANSun's third endeavor to establish a rival government in the southhad, so far, been an exercise in frustration. He was an advocate ofsocial changes, and he had aspired to turn Kwangtung into a 'model

province'. In face of political reality, however, he was obliged tocompromise his ideological commitment and resort to financial extor-tions, of which he had often accused the militarists in Peking. Thus,Kwangtung became a pawn in the intricacies of national politics. Un-like Sun Fo and his Prince Faction, Sun Yat-sen and the KuomintangElders were willing to sacrifice the interests of the Cantonese, if suchsacrifice would contribute to the fulfillment of their dream to reunifyChina. This seemingly provided the rationale for the tax abuses oftheir government. Despite the expenses involved, Sun's reliance on themilitarists had not been productive, as proved by the coups of Ch'enChiung-ming in 1922 and of Shen Hung-ying in 1923. In mid-I923,the Canton regime evidently needed more help to extricate itself fromthe quagmire of Kwangtung politics than the Communications Cliquecould offer. With Hong Kong turning its back on him, Sun's hope toreassert his leadership in a national revolution rested on the supportof Soviet Russia.In June 1923, the Chinese Communist Party held its Third Congressin Canton, with Maring as a participant. During his previous trips toChina in 1921 and 1922, the Soviet representative had conferred withSun and had since been the latter's principal advocate in Moscow.42When the two leaders met again in Canton in mid-1923, Sun was busilyengaged in combat with Ch'en Chiung-ming. The Kuomintang wasin urgent need of assistance, and the Russian government had decidedin March to aid its Chinese ally with a sum of approximately twomillion Mexico dollars.43 Sun conversed with Maring three or fourtimes a week. At the end of their discussions, the Chinese revolutionaryagreed that the policy of Soviet orientation would help solve his manyproblems. Prompted simultaneously by the Elders, Sun cast his dice.44

42 Dov Bing, 'Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP,' in China Quarterly,No. 48(October-December I971), pp. 677-97; and Dov Bing, 'Revolution in China:Sneevliet Strategy' (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, New Zealand,1968). Maring was the pseudonym of H. Sneevliet, a Dutch Communist of theComintern.43 On May I, the Soviet leaders telegraphed Sun about their 'readiness to rendernecessary assistance to China.' There is, however, no available record to show Sun'sreceipt of the telegram. See Wilbur, Sun rat-sen, p. I48; and C. Martin Wilbur,'Further Reflections on Sun Yat-sen' (preliminary report to University Seminar onModern China, Columbia University, March 21, I973), p. 42.44According to Maring, Liao Chung-k'ai, Hu Han-min, and Chiang Kai-sheksupported him 'wholeheartedly' in his effort to guide Sun toward the policy of

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KUOMINTANG - COMMUNIST COLLABORATIONWith the backing of Russia, the Kuomintang won a fresh lease on life,and this enabled Sun to make his last bid for national prominence.Sun was a political realist with a genuine commitment to thenationalist revolution in China. He decided to collaborate with theCommunists in spite of his ideological differences with Marxism, be-cause Russia was the only foreign country to lend him a helping hand.Many of his comrades-including his own son, Sun Fo-stronglyobjected to his alliance with Soviet Russia, and he was keenly awareof the damaging effect of party dissension on his revolutionary move-ment. Hence, even after the promulgation of his joint manifesto withAdolfJoffe, he readily pursued an alternative to his pro-Communistpolicy. This accounted for his brief flirtation with the British authoritiesin Hong Kong.Political development in Canton during the first half of I923 re-vealed the major weaknesses of Sun's campaign against militarism inChina. As a revolutionary leader, he commanded the loyalty of buta small group of followers. He lacked a popular base of support, andthis necessitated his dependence on the militarists. The excesses of hisfinancial extortions estranged the business community and were par-tially responsible for the failure of his entente with Hong Kong. Mostimportantly, his limitations as a revolutionary were attributable to hisinability to mobilize the masses. It was only in the last fifteen monthsof his life that he learned this secret from his Soviet advisers, thusturning a new page in the history of the Chinese revolution.45Kuomintang-Communist collaboration. See H. Sneevliet, 'Met en bij Soen Yat-sen,enige persoonlijke herinneringen,' Klassenstrijd (Amsterdam), No. 3 (March I926).

45 For an analysis of the subject, see F. Gilbert Chan, 'Liao Chung-k'ai and theLabor Movement in Kwangtung, I924-1925' (preliminary report to UniversitySeminar on Modern China, Columbia University, November 13, 1975). A revisedversion of the paper was presented to the Annual Meeting of Association for AsianStudies, March 20, 1976.

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