Kempner Blocks

Pro Blocks

A/T Banning would hurt private prison market / economy.

1. There’s no reason why the government couldn’t take back control over the private prisons.

2. The shrinking prison population is already threatening the private prison market. Peter H. Kyle, J.D.

Candidate, William & Mary, Contracting for Performance: Restructuring the Private Prison Market, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2087 (2013), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol54/iss6/8

Yet as the Corrections Corporation of America and the GEO Group both acknowledge, and as independent market analysis suggests, the decline of determinate sentencing measures and the concomitant shrinking of the prison population represent the greatest threat to the viability of the private prison industry.

3. The impact isn’t unique: states have already started to ban for-profit prisons. Peter H. Kyle, J.D. Candidate, William & Mary, Contracting for Performance: Restructuring the Private Prison Market, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2087 (2013), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol54/iss6/8

Illinois and New York have banned for profit prisons entirely, and (also) many states that allow privatization place stringent restrictions on the practice.

Accompanying the prison privatization movement has been a consistent stream of opposition to privatizing the fundamental government function of punishing criminals. As testament to the controversial nature of prison

privatization, Illinois and New York went so far as to ban the practice entirely, and many states that allow privatization place stringent restrictions on the practice. The most resounding critiques of prison privatization invariably relate either to the positivist concern about the increased weight placed on cost effectiveness over quality improvements or to the normatively problematic encroachment of the profit motive into the public domain of corrections policy.

A/T Prison corporations lobby for overcriminalization and harsher

punishments. 1. According to Professor Peter Kyle, who analyzes for profit prisons around the world, he concludes that there is no empirical support that for profit prison companies have assisted in over-criminalization.

Peter H. Kyle, J.D. Candidate, William & Mary, Contracting for Performance: Restructuring the Private Prison Market, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2087 (2013), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol54/iss6/8

The Corrections Corporation of America, draws its management team from the public sector and has brought former state prison wardens, superintendents, corrections commissioners, and one former head of the Federal Bureau of Prisons into the fold. This revolving door phenomenon exists in a number of industries but has the potential to become particularly insidious in the delicate arena of corrections and sentencing in which individual liberty is at stake. Although the connection of prison industry stakeholders to policymakers with a capacity to influence the market does not equate to the presence of inappropriate conduct, the appearance of impropriety and the capacity for such influence nevertheless remains. While it appears clear that strong incentives to affect sentencing policy could prove severely troublesome, the strength of this incentive structure has served as a point of contention in the private prison literature. Notably, scholars have challenged the influence of the private prison industry on sentencing policy from both economic and historical perspectives, each of which will be treated in turn.

2. This is non- unique, Over-criminalization and harsher punishments are supported more by public prison guard unions than by for-profit prisons.

Professor Alexander Volokh argues there is “virtually no evidence” of proincarceraration advocacy supported by the private sector. Volokh points out that long before prison privatization took off, actors in the public sector, such as prison guard unions, actively advocated proincarceration policies. Indeed, prison guard unions, which also benefit from increases in incarceration, contribute vastly more money to political campaigns and other lobbying efforts than private prison companies.

Peter H. Kyle, J.D. Candidate, William & Mary, Contracting for Performance: Restructuring the Private Prison Market, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2087 (2013), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol54/iss6/8

Pro: A/2 Economic Benefits

Hartney, Christopher, and Caroline Glesmann. "Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S." Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S. (n.d.): n. pag.

National Council on Crime & Delinquency, May 2012. Web. 3 Dec. 2014. <http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf>. RY

Recent studies have found that growth and expansion of prisons in general (whether

public or private)have had limited positive impact on economic development at the

local level. In fact, communities in which private prisons are located can experience unfavorable economic effects, especially in already depressed economies. A common dynamic is that a small town or county commits most of its limited resources and infrastructure—labor force, emergency response services, trade services (electricians, plumbers, sanitation, etc.)—to supporting the prison, leaving the locality dependent on the success of the prison and unable to support other businesses that might want to locate there. Further, local governments that sell bonds to fund construction can find themselves on the hook if the prison company fails to secure sufficient contracts to fill beds. At the least, the bond rating for the locality is likely to be lowered

if it has trouble repaying the debt, resulting in a worsened local economy. When the lease is up or abandoned, the aging plant is owned by the government.

Even a healthy state or local government exposes itself to risk if all or part of the

public prison structure is dismantled and reliance placed on private structures. Significant challenges may be experienced if the government or contractor then chooses to end the contractual relationship at a later point and the government is left to scramble to redevelop a public system or seek one of the other essentially similar private contractors.

Texas, which experienced an immense prison building boom in the 1990s, especially related to immigration detention, has experienced several examples of public-private partnerships that have led to challenges for local

jurisdictions. In July 2011, a west Texas 373-bed prison was auctioned off due to a dearth of prisoners, a 424-bed facility in Fort Worth (managed by GEO) has been empty since February 2011, and a recently constructed 1,100-bed facility located near Abilene has never housed inmates.

Montana has dealt with similar economic woes tiedto private prison construction. Corplan Corrections worked with local officials to build a 464-bed facilityin the small town of Hardin, Montana. Although the facility was completed in 2007, as of 2010 it had held no inmates due to a lack of in- or out-of-state prisoners suitable for the minimum security jail; in fact, Montana prohibits the incarceration of offenders

convicted outside Montana. This project has left Hardin to cope with millions of

dollars in debt. Ultimately, any financial savings gained from privatization leave the local area and benefit the prison corporation’s executives, board

of directors, and shareholders,as well as the innumerable lobbyists, marketers, politicians, and government officials benefitting from the broader private prison industry.

Pro: A/2 Better Health Care

Hartney, Christopher, and Caroline Glesmann. "Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S." Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S. (n.d.): n. pag.

National Council on Crime & Delinquency, May 2012. Web. 3 Dec. 2014. <http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf>. RY

Private prison companies have pursued the area of immigration both in the

United States and internationally, with huge monetary success. Accompanying that success are numerous documented cases of abuse and neglect and poor conditions of confinement,9 exacerbated by long stays awaiting immigration proceedings. On any

given day in 2009, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) held an average of 32,606 adults in a total of 178 facilities. Just under half of these detainees, 15,942, were housed in 30 private

facilities.10 Although ICE has developed standards for immigration detention facilities, the standards may not adequately address the conditions and treatment experienced by many immigrant detainees and, in any case, they are not implemented in all facilities.11

One example of immigration detention neglect is the case of Hiu Lui “Jason” Ng, who died in 2008 while being detained in the privately run Wyatt Detention Facility in Central Falls, Rhode Island. Ng suffered from liver cancer that was not diagnosed until just days before his death. A lawsuit filed by the Rhode Island ACLU, which

names officials and employees of both the Wyatt facility and ICE, noted that prison officials not only consistently claimed that Ng was faking his illness but also prevented him from receiving adequate medical care.

Pro: A/2 Cheaper Prison Staff

Hartney, Christopher, and Caroline Glesmann. "Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S." Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S. (n.d.): n. pag.

National Council on Crime & Delinquency, May 2012. Web. 3 Dec. 2014. <http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf>. RY

A critical part of the debate regarding cost savings, as well as conditions and quality of care, focuses on staffing and personnel costs. Since private prisons are generally expected to serve the same functionas public prisons but also save public money, prison companies need to make their profit in the small window between their own costs and the costs of public prisons, minus some percentage of savings to taxpayers. (Some contracts stipulate that this

savings will be at least a certain percentage, such as 7%.) The most expensive part of running a prison is staffing; therefore any savings associated with privatizationare

primarily due to reduced personnel-relatedcosts. Private prisons tend to

employ frontline staff who are non-unionized and low-paid, receive few fringe benefits, and lack sufficient training. These circumstances contribute to the high rate of staff turnover and the security issues with

which privately managed facilities are often fraught. In turn, the high rate

of staff turnover results in a lack of mentoring

for new employees. Similarly, cost cutting with regard to services, programming, and facility conditions will increase inmate dissatisfaction and inmate-staff tension, and increase negative outcomes like grievances and behavioral issues. This suggests that any cost savings achieved by privatization is at the expense of inmate, guard, and public safety.

When a public facility is replaced by a private prison, public facility staff are often unwilling to work forthe private operator for a variety of reasons, including substantially lower pay, poor benefits, and safety concerns. This leads to a loss of seasoned, trained employees who can mentor new staff and establish a culture of professionalism and appropriate treatment of prisoners. Conversely, staff who had worked at a private prison may be ineligible for employment at publicly operated facilities based on factors such as the lack of training and experience mandated by state standards, or failed background checks.

Pro: A/2 Easy to Reform

Hartney, Christopher, and Caroline Glesmann. "Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S." Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S. (n.d.): n. pag.

National Council on Crime & Delinquency, May 2012. Web. 3 Dec. 2014. <http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf>. RY

Early on, the rise of private prisons promised to encourage public prison officials to

make improvements in cost efficiencies and to be more open to other reforms. However, it is more likely that the opposite has occurred, as a larger dynamic has taken hold that contributes to a suppression of innovative thinking and reform in the public sphere. When states relieve overcrowding in public facilities through private contracting, stakeholders— state officials, prosecutors, judges, and

corrections agencies—lose the impetus to seek innovative ways of reducing reliance on incarceration and to save taxpayer money without threatening public safety. Thus, the prison population continues to grow, asdo corrections budgets, at least until the

newly contracted beds are themselves full. The speed and flexibility with which private prison companies can acquire bed space provides, in essence, a permanent pressure release valve that quashes what might otherwise be an opportunity for permanent reform.

Pro: A/2 Decrease Recidivism

American Civil Liberties Union, April 2011, “Prisons for Profit: A look at Prison Privatization”, http://www.acluohio.org/assets/issues/CriminalJustice/PrisonsForProfit2011_04.pdf, 12/2/2014, BZ

However, states with the most private prisons do not have the lowest recidivism rates. Ohio’s prisons are, with the exception of two facilities, entirely state-operated. Only 4.4% of Ohio inmates are in private beds. States with much higher percentages of inmates in private beds have significantly higher recorded recidivism rates. The five states with the highest percentage of privatized prisons are New Mexico, Montana, Alaska, Vermont, and Hawaii. According to 2005 statistics; four out of the five states had higher three-year recidivism rates than Ohio. 2005 data was not available from New Mexico, but its 2007 three-year recidivism rate of 43% was higher than Ohio’s 2007 rate of 34%.

National Crime Prevention Council, 2008, “Private Prisons and Recidivism Rates”, http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/prisons/private-prisons-and-recidivism-rates.pdf, 12/2/2014, BZ

Between June 1, 1997 and May 31, 2001, 22,359 state prison inmates were released from state and private prisons in Oklahoma. There were 23,114 cases total in the study (some prisoners recidivated and were released again within the study period). There was a higher rate of recidivism among inmates released from private prisons (32.8%) than from state prisons (29.8%)

Pro: A/2 Benefit Minorities

Lisa Wade, PhD, professor of sociology at Occidental College, January 2013, “RACE, REHABILITATION, AND THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY”, The Society Pages, http://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2013/01/25/race-rehabilitation-and-the-private-prison-industry/, 12/2/2014, BZ

This is a deeply unethical system and new research shows that, in addition to being disproportionately incarcerated, racial minorities and immigrants are disproportionately housed in private prisons. Looking at three states with some of the largest prison populations — California, Texas, and Arizona – graduate student Christopher Petrella reports that racial minorities are over-represented in private prisons by an additional 12%; his colleague, Josh Begley, put together this infographic: This means that, insofar as U.S. state governments are making an effort to rehabilitate the prison population, those efforts are disproportionately aimed at white inmates. Petrella argues that this translates into a public disinvestment in the lives of minorities and their communities.

Pro: A/2 Prisoners Fed more

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), September 2014, Dockery vs. Epps, ACLU, The American Civil Liberties Union is a nonpartisan non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to

every person in this country, [https://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/dockery-v-epps] SM

The Mississippi Department of Corrections, which ultimately bears responsibility for the unconstitutional conditions at ECMF, has known about these conditions for years but failed to protect the health and safety of prisoners.

EMCF is a cesspool. Prisoners are underfed and routinely held in cells that are infested with rats and have no working toilets or lights. Although designated as a facility to care for prisoners with special needs and serious psychiatric disabilities, ECMF denies prisoners even the most rudimentary mental health care services. Many prisoners have attempted to commit[ted] suicide; some have succeeded. One prisoner is now legally blind after EMCF failed to provide his glaucoma medications and take him to a

specialist, and another had part of his finger amputated after he was stabbed and developed gangrene.

The facility is dangerously understaffed, and prisoners routinely set fires to attract the attention of officers to respond to emergencies. Without sufficient staff to protect prisoners from violence, rapes, stabbings, and gang violence are rampant.

In 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Southern Poverty Law Center offered to pay for an assessment of the system last year, but Mississippi Department of Corrections rejected our offer.

Pro: A/2 More Medical Care

Huffington Post, February 2013

Other breaches highlighted in the September audit included problems with medical care and concerns about security [such as]:

Inmates requesting to be seen by a nurse were not seen within 48 hours[for over two days] Doctors' appointments were usually delayed, and often there were no follow-ups Staff wasn't following the proper procedures for chronically ill inmates, including those

with diabetes and AIDS Inmates were triple-bunked, with some sleeping on mattresses on cell floors "Some staff expressed safety concerns due to low staffing numbers and not having enough

coverage."

Pro: A/2 More Protection

Problem of understaffed prisons meaning that they cannot provide protection for its inmates.

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), September 2013, CCA At It Again: Held in Contempt for Understaffing Prison and Lying About It, The American Civil Liberties Union is a nonpartisan non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country, [https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/cca-it-again-held-contempt-understaffing-prison-and-lying-about-it] SM

CCA is the nation's largest owner and operator of for-profit prisons, with annual revenues topping $1.7 billion. The company runs the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC), a for-profit prison so violent that prisoners call it the "Gladiator School" – a study by the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) in 2008 found it had higher levels of violence than Idaho's seven other prisons combined.

In 2010, the ACLU filed suit against CCA for turning a blind eye to the epidemic violence at ICC, and in 2011, the parties agreed to settle the lawsuit after CCA promised to make a number of improvement, including hiring all the guards required in its contract with IDOC plus three additional guards.

A2 Federal Overreach

It’s possible to ban private prisons in states, because many don’t use them, and 2 states were able to ban them outright.

Kirkham 20121,

“At this point, it's unclear how many states will be interested in selling off prisons.

Arizona, New Hampshire and Florida are considering privatizing the management of state prisons, but so far none have specifically broached the

topic of a sale. State corrections officials who were contacted in California, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Montana, Georgia, Texas, Illinois and New York all said they were not considering such prison sales at this time. In Illinois and New York, laws prohibit state inmates from being housed in private prisons, according to corrections officials.”

The government is able to undermine federalism if it’s legally justified; the 13th amendment gives it the power to override state powers.

Marion 20092,

“The Thirteenth Amendment states, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime where of the party shall have been duly convicted,shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."' 3 Sinceits passage, the "Punishment Clause" has been a bane for prisoners who argue that they are being subjected to conditions resembling slavery or involuntary servitude. Finding support from the Slaughter-House Cases, 4 federal courts have held that the main purpose of the amendment was specific-to abolish African-American chattel slavery and its incidents. As such, the Punishment Clause renders any current prisoner's argument that they are slaves or involuntary servants void and frivolous. 5 In these cases, the Court either implicitly assumes or directly states that private prison inmates have no Thirteenth

Amendment claim without further elaboration. This Note argues that, given the history of the Thirteenth Amendment and the current state of private prison contracts, inmates working in these privately owned and operated facilities do indeed have a constitutional claim. The Punishment Clause does not, in fact, justify the current

relationship between government entities and private prison companies. In its current form, the state is handing over control of prisoners to private companies who, in turn, use the prisoners to improve their

facilities and increase profits, thus indirectly benefiting these companies' shareholders. Such a system of private, unpaid use of labor too closely resembles the slave system that the Thirteenth Amendment sought to abolish, and was not the punishment scheme envisioned by its drafters when they carved out an exemption for convict servitude

1 Kirkham, Chris. “Private Prison Corporation Offers Cash In Exchange For State Prisons.”Huffington Post. 14 Feb 2012. Web. 4 November 2014.<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/private-prisons-buying-stateprisons_n_1272143.html>.2 Marion, Ryan S. “Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thrteenth Amendment Case AgainstState Private Prison Contracts.” William and Mary Journal of Law. 2009. Web. 4Nov 2014.<http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=wmborj>.

A2 Innovation

Governments actually have a greater long term financial capability than the private sector in terms of innovation.

Mazucatto 20133,

“A quick look at the pioneering technologies of the past century points to the state, not the private sector, as the most decisive player in the game. Whether an innovation will be a success is uncertain, and it can take longer than traditional banks or venture capitalists are willing to wait. In countries such as the United States, China,

Singapore, and Denmark, the state has provided the kind of patient and longterm finance new technologies need to get off the ground. Investments of this kind have often been driven by big missions, from putting a human on the moon to solving climate change. This has

required not only funding basic research—the typical "public good" that most economists admit needs state help—but applied research and seed funding too.”

The logic of the free market cannot apply to the prison scenario because nobody chooses to purchase a time in prison.

Culp 20114,

“The prison business is fundamentally different in that no one can freely purchase incarceration services as a private individual. There is no natural market for incarceration services. The power to incarcerate

someone – to hold a person against his or her will – is a defining characteristic of the state. The government holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force and the power to incarcerate. Only the government has the legitimate power to restrict a citizen’s liberty; individuals are prohibited by law from incarcerating another person under “false imprisonment” statutes. The government can delegate this power on a limited basis – for example, “shopkeeper’s privilege” allows merchants to temporarily detain suspected shoplifters. But long-term incarceration is a different matter. The only potential buyers who can legally purchase incarceration services are the government jurisdictions that have custody over indicted, convicted

or detained persons. In order to privatize its incarceration function, the government has had to create a market since one does not and cannot exist without its direct intervention. “

3 Mazucatto, Mariana. “It’s a Myth That Entrepreneurs Drive New Technology.” SlateMagazine, September 2013.<http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/new_scientist/2013/09/entrepreneurs_or_the_state_innovation_comes_from_public_investment.html>4 Culp, Richard. “The Failed Promise of Prison Privatization.” Prison Legal News, October2011.<https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2011/oct/15/the-failed-promise-ofprison-privatization/>

The competition and innovation supposedly promised with privatization has not materialized because there are so few companies controlling such a large market share.

Culp 20115,

“Secondly, the development of the private prison industry has resulted in a highly concentrated producer market where only four companies control over 90% of the incarceration services business. Economic theory tells us that when production is highly concentrated in very few companies, the market becomes an oligopoly, a market situation that is inherently less competitive and innovative than a market with more broad-based representation. An oligopoly is characterized by interdependence, avoidance of competition and a rigid attachment to the status quo among the leading firms.”

Because there is no actual free market with regard to prison services, there is no real incentive to innovate.

Culp 20116,

“A third part of the story is that government itself unwittingly stifles innovation in the private prison industry. Since the only legitimate

customers of prison companies are the jurisdictions that can indict, convict or otherwise detain people, the potential customer base for incarceration services is very limited. In practice, this has led to a situation where only a handful of customers, an oligopsony in economic terms, has come to dominate the customer base. The limited number of customers serves to dissuade private prison companies from conducting research and development into innovative correctional programming, as the tiny customer base tends to demand only those services that mimic what the governments themselves are accustomed to providing.”

5 Culp, Richard. “The Failed Promise of Prison Privatization.” Prison Legal News, October

2011.<https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2011/oct/15/the-failed-promise-ofprison-privatization/>

6 Culp, Richard. “The Failed Promise of Prison Privatization.” Prison Legal News, October

2011.<https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2011/oct/15/the-failed-promise-ofprison-privatization/>

A2 Alternative Regulations

The profit motive will lead to private prisons consistently trying to increase prisoners and criminal laws; this will systemically increase prices.

“Recognizing the opportunities behind increasing federal incarceration and the challenges around decreasing state incarceration, private prison companies must work hard to expand or maintain their market share. At the same time that some states may be looking to close private facilities, others may continue to move people to private facilities for a variety of reasons. Stricter immigration laws and enforcement increase the number of people in federal detention facilities, and increases in the number of offenses listed as

federal crimes leads to more people held in federal prisons. While private prison companies may claim that changes in criminal justice legislation are ‚outside our control,‛ they are in fact engaged in a number of activities aimed at increasing their control of the market; this includes applying political pressure to lawmakers, working to influence elections, and building relationships within agencies or with government officials to directly formulate policy.7”

The profit motive will always lead to the private prison to try and force more prisoners, expanding the number of people incarcerated through excessive laws; private prisons will do so because high profits allow increased lobbying.

Shen 20128

“A decade ago, more than 3,300 criminal immigrants were sent to private prisons under two 10-year contracts the Federal Bureau of Prisons signed with CCA worth $760 million. Now, the agency is paying the private companies $5.1 billion to hold more than 23,000 criminal immigrants through 13 contracts of varying lengths. CCA was on the verge of bankruptcy in 2000 due to lawsuits, management problems and dwindling contracts. Last year, the company reaped $162 million in net income.

Federal contracts made up 43 percent of its total revenues, in part thanks to rising immigrant detention. GEO, which cites the immigration agency as its largest client,

saw its net income jump from $16.9 million to $78.6 million since 2000. As the AP explains, these remarkable profits come in the wake

of an equally remarkable lobbying campaign. In the past decade, three major private prison companies spent $45 million on campaign donations and lobbyists to push legislation at the state and federal level. At times, this money has gone to truly nefarious

legislation. A 2011 report found that the private prison industry spent millions seeking to increase sentences and incarcerate more people in order to increase the industry’s profits. 30 of the 36 legislators who co-sponsored Arizona’s

7 “Gaming The System: How The Political Strategies Of Private Prison CompaniesPromote Ineffective Incarceration Policies.” Justice Policy Institute. June 2011.Web. 4 Nov 2014.<http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_syste

m.pdf>8 Shen, Aviva. “Private Prisons Spend $45 Million On Lobbying, Rake In $5.1 Billion ForImmigrant Detention Alone.” Think Progress. 3 Aug 2012. Web. 4 Nov 2014.<http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/08/03/627471/private-prisons-spend-45-million-on-lobbying-rake-in-51-billion-for-immigrant-detention-alone/>.

now mostly invalidated immigration law — which would have landed many more people in detention — received campaign contributions from private prison lobbyists or companies, including CCA and GEO. According to a report released last

year, CCA spent over $900,000 on federal lobbying and GEO spent between $120,000 to $199,992 in Florida alone during a short threemonth span in 2011. $450,000 went to the Republican national and congressional committees, while Democrats received less than half that number. House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) and Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) were also among the private prison lobby’s top benefactors.”

Private prison lobbying has been effective in influencing conservative politicians that entrenches support for the expansion of private prisons.

Fang 20139,

“The private prison industry grew quickly thanks in no small part to its close ties to politicians and its

ability to take advantage of right-wing trends, starting with the with privatization wave in the eighties and on to the politics of crime, terrorism and immigration. The money spent on influencing lawmakers has coincided with a sharp increase in immigrant detention and deportation. Immigrant detention costs taxpayers about $2 billion a year, and private prisons are increasingly tapped by the federal government to house the over 400,000

undocumented immigrants detained annually, a number that has more than doubled over the last decade. In 2012 alone, the two publicly traded prison companies, CCA and Geo Group, took in over $441.9 million in federal contracts to house so-called “criminal aliens” for the federal Bureau of Prisons. That year, the two companies combined netted $296.9 million in

revenues from ICE contracts. These figures could grow or shrink depending on the details of the immigration reform overhaul debated in the coming months. As immigration talks began formally in January with the so-called ‘Gang of Eight’ negotiations in the Senate, legislators close to the industry were quick to promote policies that are in line with what critics call ‘the business of detention.’”

9 Fang, Lee. “How Private Prisons Game the Immigration System.” The Nation. 27 Feb2013. Web. 4 Nov 2014. < http://www.thenation.com/article/173120/how-privateprisons-game-immigration-system?page=0,1 >.

A2 Budget Savings and accountability

Private prisons cherry pick data in order to appear cheaper; often public prisons are cheaper in price.

Oppel 201110,

“Such has been the case lately in Arizona. Despite a state law stipulating that private prisons must create ‘cost savings,’ the state’s own data indicate that inmates in private prisons can cost as much as $1,600 more per year, while many cost about the same as they do in state-run prisons. The research, by the Arizona Department of Corrections, also reveals a murky aspect of private prisons that helps them appear less expensive: They often hous[ing] only relatively healthy inmates. ‘It’s cherry-picking,’ said State Representative Chad Campbell, leader of the House Democrats. They leave the most expensive prisoners with taxpayers and take the easy prisoners.”

Arizona and Florida are two major examples of where private prisons refuse to take high healthcare cost prisoners, and push them on to public prisons.

Oppel 201111,

“While private prisons collect a daily rate per inmate, some expenses disproportionately borne by states are not counted. The most significant are terms limiting sicker

inmates. Five of eight private prisons serving Arizona did not accept inmates with ‘limited physical capacity and stamina” or severe physical illness or chronic conditions, according to the state’s analysis, issued last

month. None took inmates with ‘high need’ mental health conditions. Some inmates who became sick were “returned to state prisons due to an increase of their medical scores that exceeds contractual exclusions.’ ‘Unlike the private contractors,’ the analysis said, the state ‘is required to provide medical and mental health services to inmates regardless of the severity of their condition.’ Medical costs averaged up to $2.44

a day more for state inmates, a third higher than private prisons. That gap can be wider. In Florida, officials found that two private prisons spent only about half as much on health care per inmate as comparable state prisons, a difference of $9 million over two years. Florida officials say that the new plan will better balance costs, and that private prisons comply with a 7-percent-savings law.”

10 Oppel, Rachel A. “Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings.” NYT. 18 May 2011.Web. 4 Nov 2014.<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/us/19prisons.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>11 Oppel, Rachel A. “Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings.” NYT. 18 May 2011.Web. 4 Nov 2014.<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/us/19prisons.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>

Accounting for the full costs shows that there’s actually a budgetary loss.

Oppel 201112,

“But skeptics like State Senator Mike Fasano, a Republican, fear cherry-picking may be the only way they can do that. In Arizona, minimum-security state inmates cost 2.6 percent — or $1.39 per day — more than those in private prisons, before accounting for extra costs borne by the state. But after eliminating these, state

prisoners cost only three cents more per day, the analysis found. And state medium-security inmates cost 4.4 percent less before adjustments and 8.7 percent less afterward. That is more than $2 million annually at one prison, or $1,679 per inmate. Using 2009 corrections data, state auditors calculated the difference at up to $2,834 per inmate.”

Even reducing crime rates will still cost the states, which isn’t a problem with public prisons.

Habibi13

“Other states see the effects, too. According to our study, the most frequent quota in private state and local prisons was 90 percent, and three for-profit prison contracts in the state of Arizona operate under contracts that guarantee an astounding 100% occupancy. In effect, if communities realize their objective of a lower crime rate, taxpayers will see no benefit. They will still be on the hook to pay the private prisons as if they remained filled to capacity. A recent article reported by the Tennessean that followed up on the ITPI study found

that taxpayers shelled out nearly $500,000 for empty prison beds in a local women’s prison that had a 90% quota. A spokesperson for CCA, the company that runs the facility, defended the use of quotas to pay for “fixed costs…no matter how many inmates are housed” and that they “enabled us to cover those fixed costs and ensure the State has access to needed capacity, which can fluctuate.” Which sounds reasonable, if you buy into CCA’s premise that incarceration exists to help private prison companies get a return on their investment, rather than to punish and rehabilitate lawbreakers.”

12 Oppel, Rachel A. “Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings.” NYT. 18 May 2011.Web. 4 Nov 2014.<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/us/19prisons.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>13 Habibi, Shar. “’Lockup quotas’ guarantee profits for the U.S. private prison industry.” Inthe Public Interest. <http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/blog/%E2%80%9Clockupquotas%E2%80%9D-guarantee-profits-us-private-prison-industry>.

A2 Economic Benefit to Community

Low salaries and poor training, especially in comparison to the public sector, mean that private prisons do not ensure long term employment.

McEntee14,

“According to The Corrections Yearbook, 2000, the average annual starting salary for public corrections officers was $23,002, compared to $17,628 for private prison guards. The poor pay undoubtedly contributes to the high turnover that exists in private prisons, a whopping 52.2 percent, compared to 16 percent in publicly run prisons. Plenty of anecdotal evidence substantiates a high level of staff turnover in privately operated prisons. Wackenhut Corporation, now the GEO Group Inc., won a contract to build and operate the East Mississippi Correctional Facility. City and county officials hoped the facility would create up to 350 jobs. News reports from

2005 revealed that the facility currently employs 220 people with an annual turnover rate of 65 percent.”

Prisons attract larger businesses that replace local ones, thus hurting tax revenue overall and harming the local community.

Huling 200215,

“Prisons may also fail to foster significant retail development. Because prisons, as a large-scale enterprise, attract chain stores, there is a "replacement" effect, with giants such as McDonalds and Walmarts pushing out locally-owned enterprises. In Tehachapi, California, home to two state prisons, 741 locally-owned businesses failed in the last decade of the 1990s, while box-store chains absorbed the local markets. As a result, there

may be no net increase in tax revenues, and, because profits made by chain stores are not locally reinvested in the way that locally-owned profits may be, the circulation of dollars within a community may drop in absolute terms.”

A comprehensive, national look at the effects of prisons on employment shows the impact of these economic harms.

Genter 201316,

14 McEntee, Gerald. “Don’t be a prisoner to empty promises.” American Federation ofState, County and Municipal Employees. <http://www.afscme.org/newspublications/publications/privatization/pdf/Prison-1.pdf>15 Huling, Tracy. “Invisible Punishment: The Collateral Consequences of MassImprisonment.” The New Press, 2002.<http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/building.html#_edn15>16 Genter, Shaun. “Prisons, Jobs And Privatization: The Impact Of Prisons On EmploymentGrowth In Rural U.S. Counties, 1997-2004.” Washington State University,January 2013.

“Most studies of prison privatization have focused on cost efficiencies (or inefficiencies) and comparisons of the “quality” of imprisonment with that found in public facilities. Our research

broadens the scope to consider local employment impacts. Consistent with recent studies, we find that prisons do not contribute to growth. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a state’s decision to privatize some of its prisons does not improve employment prospects for the host county. In fact, it impedes them. Proponents of privatization have long stressed its potential to

induce a transformation of public agencies and services these agencies provide (McFarland, McGowan and O’Toole 2001; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). However, few studies have empirically examined this assertion. Our research into county employment impact of prisons takes initial steps towards assessing this claim; our findings challenge these optimistic claims. That is, in states undergoing a rapid shift towards privatization, prisons run by public agencies have reduced staffing to levels similar to private prisons (see Figure 3, especially trends in medium and maximum

security facilities). In turn, we provide evidence that these shifts in staffing have consequences for the rural counties hosting prisons. Specifically, new prisons in states undergoing a rapid shift towards privatization are inversely related to employment growth.”

<http://cooley.libarts.wsu.edu/hooks/prisonsJobsPrivatization%20SSR.pdf>

A2 Private Prisons Compete for Highest Quality

The monopoly in the prison system decreases competition.

“Privatization advocates argue that competition in the for-profit sector is the key to quality. This argument holds that for-profit operators,

knowing they could be replaced if they fail to deliver, have incentives to provide quality service. This theory assumes a system in which there is an adequate supply of competitors. However, this is definitely not the case in the for-profit corrections industry. In general, the market is characterized by many buyers (in this case the jurisdictions) and a very limited number of sellers. CCA and Wackenhut control over 75 percent of the privately managed beds in the United States. The big two are often the only companies with enough resources to go after a contract. The use of speculative prisons, which only CCA and Wackenhut have been building, has further increased their competitive advantage over the rest of the industry. Speculative prisons often result in a sole source contract, which cannot be readily replaced because the company owns the facility. The market-efficiency

argument also assumes that the buyer has adequate information to make a decision. The lack of public access to for-profit prisons means that the public officials who buy the service, as well as the taxpayers that pay for it, do not have adequate information. Spec prisons pose a unique challenge. A host jurisdiction may have difficulty getting information about a spec facility, let alone the contracting state. A contracting state may not find out about problems at a contract facility until it is hit with a lawsuit or there is extensive media coverage.17”

The contract system for prison companies limits potential competition.

Donahue 198818,

“Neither theory nor the limited data which exist suggest that the task of incarceration is very well suited to the advantages offered by profit-seeking organizations—

chiefly, cost consciousness and an aptitude for innovation. There are serious structural barriers to genuine competition for prison management contracts; not only are incumbent contractors likely to become entrenched, but the quality of performance may be so difficult to monitor and evaluate that quality-based competition is unlikely to develop. In general, the enterprise of incarcerating people has relative little scope for technical progress

in trimming costs: once the decision to imprison a criminal has been made, the task does not allow much room for innovation.”

17 “The Record — For-Profit Prisons Raise Quality Concerns.” American Federation ofState, County & Municipal Employees, 1999.<http://www.afscme.org/news/publications/privatization/the-evidence-is-clearcrime-shouldnt-pay/the-record-for-profit-prisons-raise-quality-concerns>18 Donahue, John. “Prisons for Profit: Public Justice, Private Interests.” Economic PolicyInstitute, 1988. <http://epi.3cdn.net/e6e28612a19ac589e8_ozm6ibbye.pdf>

Cost-cutting techniques decrease prison quality.

Mason 201219,

“Privately managed prisons attempt to control costs by regularly providing lower levels of staff benefits, salary, and salary advancement than publicly-run facilities (equal to about $5,327 less in annual salary for new recruits and $14,901 less in maximum

annual salaries). On average, private prison employees also receive 58 hours less training than their publicly employed counterparts.57 Consequently, there are higher employee turnover rates in private prisons than in publicly operated facilities. These dynamics

may contribute to safety problems within prisons. Studies have found that assaults in private prisons can occur at double the rate found in public facilities. Researchers also find that public facilities tend to be safer than their private counterparts and that “privately operated prisons appear to have systemic problems in maintaining secure facilities.”

In Arizona specifically, security lapses, under-trained guards, and decreased job and rehabilitation programs hurt the community overall and decreased quality.

“There are six prisons operated by Corrections Corporation of America that house prisoners from other states (such as Hawaii and California) and the Federal

government (Immigration and Customs Enforcement). There have been serious problems in these facilities, including riots, deaths, and abuses of prisoners. AFSC’s analysis found patterns of serious safety lapses in all the private prisons for which data was available. Together, this data demonstrates a set of problems endemic to the industry and could

lead to future tragedies like the Kingman escapes. Under-trained guards combined with poor state oversight leads to assaults, disturbances, and riots. For-profit prison staff members are unprepared, or unwilling, to intervene in these events, and risk losing control of the facility. Insufficient rehabilitation programs, educational opportunities, or jobs for the

prisoners provide idle time for conflicts to brew. The result is facilities that are unsafe for the people living and working inside them, as well as the surrounding community.20”

19 Mason, Cody. “Too Good to Be True.” Sentencing Project, January 2012. <

http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be_True.pdf>20 “Private Prisons in Arizona More Costly and Less Safe.” American Friends ServiceCommittee, December 19 2011. <http://www.afsc.org/story/private-prisonsarizona-more-costly-and-less-safe>

A2 For Profit Prisons More Cost effective

Because many for-profit prisons only house healthy inmates, statistics saying they are cheaper are misleading.

Harris 201321,

“In fiscal 2013, which ended June 30, the non-adjusted average daily cost per inmate at a medium-security prison was $64.52, compared with the private-prison cost

of $58.82. However the state’s number includes inmates who have significant medical or mental-health issues. The private prisons house only healthy inmates. When an adjustment is made for the medical costs, the balance tips significantly in the state’s favor. The adjusted 2010 daily cost of housing a medium-security inmate in a state-run facility was $48.42, compared with the private-prison cost of $53.02. Ryan acknowledged that private-prison inmates are “a healthier, less-expensive population” to house.”

Even if states may initially appear to save money with private prisons, these prisons renegotiate their contracts to increase their profits and force the government to pay more.

“Contracts that may seem like a good deal at the beginning can shortly become a drain on taxpayer dollars. Once states have committed to working with for-profit prisons, they are vulnerable to shifting contract terms that raise costs. Indeed, in CCA’s 2010 Annual Report, the company explicitly cites, “enhancing the terms of our existing contracts” as one of the approaches it uses to develop its business

and increase profits. Potential amendments include raising the per diem rate (the rate the state pays per prisoner per day to the

contractor), or inserting occupancy guarantees that ensure that the state will either keep a facility filled to a certain level, frequently 90%, or pay the contractor for the empty beds if occupancy dips below the required threshold.22”

Many studies claiming an economic benefit from for-profit prisons ignore oversight costs and other factors that make public prisons seem more expensive.

“One method for making private prisons look more cost effective is to pad the costs of public prisons. Ohio’s experience is not unique. For example, the Florida Department of Correction’s central office has overhead costs that are often not even factored into cost comparisons of public and private prisons.

Additionally, there are costs that the state must incur regardless of whether the prison is public or private, such as sentence calculation and review of grievances and disciplinary actions, which are often not properly included in cost comparisons. Similarly, the costs to the state to oversee and monitor private prisons are also rarely included in cost comparisons, but can be a significant expense if the state properly oversees its

contractors.23”

21 Harris, Craig. “Arizona Faces Growing Cost of Private Prisons.” Arizona Central,December 29 2013.<http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131204arizonaprivateprisons-growing-cost.html>22 “The Costs of Private Prisons.” In The Public Interest, April 2014.<http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/default/files/Prison%20Costs%20Backgrounder%20Brief_Template.pdf>23 “The Costs of Private Prisons.” In The Public Interest, April 2014.<http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/default/files/Prison%20Costs%20Backgrounder%20Brief_Template.pdf>

A2 Early Release

In California, inmates released early showed lower rates of recidivism.

Miles 201224,

“The report says the 1,000 prisoners released early so far have a recidivism rate of 2 percent -- as opposed to the usual 16 percent for all California inmates. They were released because California voters in November passed Prop 36, revising the state's three strikes law, which mandates a life sentence for anyone convicted of a third felony.”

Even when there are savings, they are negated by higher rates of recidivism in the long term.

Bayer 200325,

This paper uses data on juvenile offenders released from correctional facilities in Florida to explore the effects of facility management type (private for-profit, private nonprofit, public state-operated, and public county-operated) on recidivism outcomes and costs. The data provide detailed information on individual characteristics, criminal and correctional histories, judge-assigned restrictiveness levels, and home zip codes—allowing us to control for the non-random assignment of individuals to facilities far better than any previous study. Relative to all other management types, for-profit management leads to a statistically significant increase in recidivism,

but, relative to nonprofit and state-operated facilities, for-profit facilities operate at a lower cost to the government per comparable individual released. Cost-benefit analysis implies that the short-run savings offered by for-profit over nonprofit management are negated in the long run due to increased recidivism rates, even if one measures the benefits of reducing criminal activity as only the avoided costs of additional confinement.”

24 Miles, Kathleen. “Inmates Released Early In California Under Prop 36 Have LowRecidivism Rate, Report Says.” Huffington Post, 11 September 2012. Web.http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/11/inmates-released-earlycalifornia_n_3901363.html25 Bayer, Patrick. “The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public VersesPrivate Management.” Yale University, July 2003.http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp863.pdf

A2 Private Prisons help Economy

1. Private prisons cost more

The Economist, Aug 24, 2010, “The perverse incentives of private prisons”, The Economist, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/08/private_prisons>, BY

The dominant argument for private prisons is that they will save taxpayers money, as for-profit owners have an incentive to seek efficiencies

bureaucrats overseeing government institutions lack. Anyway, that's the theory. According to the Arizona Republic, the reality is that private prisons in the Grand Canyon State so far cost more on a per-prisoner basis than do public institutions.

Some experts contend that firms in the prison business reap profits by billing government for rather more than their initial lowball estimates while scrimping in ways that may make prisons less secure.

2. Private prisons are bad economically

NPR, November 5, 2011, “Who benefits when private prisons come to town?”, NPR, <http://www.npr.org/2011/11/05/142058047/who-benefits-when-a-private-prison-comes-to-town>, BY

Shapiro says it's possible a town could reap some small economic benefits from a private prison, but it may not bring the larger economic boost the county is hoping for.¶ "That's what the empirical evidence has shown ... and there are various

theories for why that may be the case," Shapiro tells weekends on All Things Considered guest host Laura Sullivan.¶ The presence of a prison might actually squeeze out other businesses that could bring greater benefits than the prison itself, he says. Also, many of the jobs created by a private prison don't actually go to people in the community.

A2 Companies bring money

Companies are corrupt.

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), September 2013, CCA At It Again: Held in Contempt for Understaffing Prison and Lying About It, The American Civil Liberties Union is a nonpartisan non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country, [https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/cca-it-again-held-contempt-understaffing-prison-and-lying-about-it] SM

CCA is the nation's largest owner and operator of for-profit prisons , with annual revenues topping $1.7 billion . The company runs the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC), a for-profit prison so violent that prisoners call it the "Gladiator School" – a study by the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) in 2008 found it had higher levels of violence than Idaho's seven other prisons combined.

In 2010, the ACLU filed suit against CCA for turning a blind eye to the epidemic violence at ICC, and in 2011, the parties agreed to settle the lawsuit after CCA promised to make a number of improvement, including hiring all the guards required in its contract with IDOC plus three additional guards.

But then CCA broke that promise – and lied about it. Repeatedly.

In April of this year, CCA issued a press release claiming that based on "an extensive internal investigation," it had found there were "some inaccuracies" in staffing records over a seven-month period in 2012, and that the company regretted "decisions made by certain ICC staff members." The press release said nothing about the number of hours that had been falsely reported as having been filled. In a separate press

release issued by IDOC, however, it was disclosed that there were approximately 4,800 hours of time during those seven months where CCA employees had falsified records to indicate a correctional officer was staffing a security post, but the post was actually left vacant.

In response, the ACLU asked the judge to find CCA in contempt of court, forced CCA to turn over more records, and called CCA employees to testify. As the judge noted in his decision, these additional records and testimony showed "the non-compliance was far worse than the report of about 4,800 hours would lead one to believe."

First, CCA's "extensive internal investigation" [and that’s only] only examining vacancies in the night shift, not [even] the day shift – even though CCA knew that day-shift posts were also going unfilled. Second, the investigation only covered a seven-month period from April 2012 to October 2012 – even though there was no reason to believe that the falsified records began as late as April or stopped as early as October. Third, until very recently, CCA's poor recordkeeping and lax internal monitoring made it difficult to identify when an employee was listed as staffing two different posts at the same time.

A2 Private Prisons increase quality

1. According to Kyle 2013, private prisons are paid by the amount of prisoners they have in their prison. For this reason, these prisons empirically increase

Schlosser, Eric. THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (n.d.): n. pag. The Prison Industrial Complex. Brown University. Web. 2 Dec. 2014. <http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Glenn_Loury/louryhomepage/teaching/Ec%20222/Schlosser_PrisonComp.pdf>.

This claim is not actually true, private prisons often put prisoners through terrible conditions, Schlosser in 2014 explains that:

The U.S. Corrections Corporation, for years the nation's third largest private-prison company, has encountered legal difficulties even more serious than those of the Bobby Ross Group. In 1993 an investigation by the Louisville Courier-Journal discovered that the

company was using unpaid prison labor in Kentucky. Inmates were being forced to perform a variety of jobs, including construction work on nine small buildings at

the Lee County prison; construction work on one church and renovation work on three others attended by company employees; renovation work on a company employee's game-room business; painting and maintenance at a country club; and painting at a private school attended by a prison warden's daughter. The Courier-Journal

concluded that "U.S. Corrections has repeatedly profited financially from its misuse of inmate labor.

2.

A2 Less government oversight

Private prisons may encourage stricter laws

The Economist, Aug 24, 2010, “The perverse incentives of private prisons”, The Economist, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/08/private_prisons>, BY

From an economic point of view, we should expect firms that compete for and rely on government contracts, such as

weapons manufacturers and prison operators, to maximise the spread between the amount billed and the actual cost of delivering the service. If contractors can get away with providing less value for money than would the government-run alternative, they will. Moreover, contractors have every incentive to make themselves seem necessary. It is well-known that public prison employee unions constitute a powerful constituency for tough sentencing policies that lead to larger prison populations requiring additional prisons and personnel. The great hazard of contracting out incarceration "services" is that

private firms may well turn out to be even more efficient and effective than unions in lobbying for policies that would increase prison populations.

Con Blocks

A2 For profit prisons create prison labor

1. Turn this argument, according to

Atkinson, Congress should actually expand on prison labor rather than reduce it. There are three reasons for this.

Atkinson, Robert D. "Prison Labor." Progressive Policy Institute, May 2002. Web. 3 Dec. 2014. <http://www.dlc.org/documents/prison_labor_502.pdf>. RY

Just as Congress should not give in to protectionists on trade, they should not give in to protectionists on prison labor. There are three main reasons why Congress should expand, not re- duce, prison labor. First, there is clear evidence that prisoner work requirements lead to lower recidivism. Second, the revenue from prison work can and should pay for the costs of housing them in prisons as well as victim restitution, child support, and the like. Finally, because it leads to increased production of goods and services, prison labor helps

spur the U.S. economy.

A2 Private Prisons are more expensive

Private prisons actually cost less in Arizona. Per-citizen costs are less

Kavanagh 201426,

“A recent column by The Arizona Republic’s E.J. Montini and an editorial criticizing state government for using private prisons were short on facts and misleading (“Taxpayers held hostage by private prisons,” Dec. 29, and “Private prisons: Let’s see hidden cost comparisons,” Jan. 2).

The suggestion that private prisons cost taxpayers more money to operate than state-run prisons is wrong. A recent Republic news article disclosed that the “non-adjusted” cost of housing a medium-security prisoner was

$64.52 in a state-run facility and only $58.82 in a private prison. When you further adjust these figures, as the nonpartisan Joint Legislative Budget Committee did, by adding in the high expenses of constructing the prisons and paying for the costly and grossly underfunded public pensions of state corrections employees, the private prisons become an even better deal for Arizona taxpayers.”

Private is less expensive because the state doesn’t pay for construction costs.Private is cheaper because the state doesn’t pay for employee pensions.

Private market encourages innovation and better efficiency because of competition.

Moore 199927,

“The private sector saves money by doing a number of things differently from government. Since their success hinges on delivering the same product as the government but at lower cost, or a better

product at a cost-effective price, they turn to new management approaches, new monitoring techniques, and administrative efficiencies—in a word, innovation. 31 Moving beyond “the way it has always been done” allows them to reduce labor costs, reduce tension between correctional officers and inmates, make full use of a facility’s capacity, and make more efficient purchases.”

…

“The evidence from comparative cost studies strongly supports the conclusion that private prisons save an average of 10 to 15 percent on operating costs. The conclusion is also supported by the experience of public officials in many states that

use private prisons. Competitive pressure provides the incentive to be efficient that helps drive private-sector costs down, and the firms achieve cost savings through innovative design and management practices. The next section considers whether these savings are accompanied by adequate quality.

26 Kavanagh, John. "Private Prisons Really Are Cheaper for Taxpayers."Azcentral.com.Gannett Company, 10 Jan. 2014. Web. 04 Nov. 2014.<http://www.azcentral.com/opinions/articles/20140111private-prisons-keepmoney-taxpayers-pockets.html>.27 Moore, Adrian T. "PRIVATE PRISONS: Quality Corrections at a Lower Cost." (n.d.): n.pag. Reason Public Policy Institute, 1999. Web. 4 Nov. 2014.<http://reason.org/files/d14ffa18290a9aeb969d1a6c1a9ff935.pdf

A2 Overcrowding

Private prisons did not create the need for more prisons, they just responded to it. : Private prisons offer a viable solution to overcrowding in the status quo and enables states to better deal with it in the future.

Chuang 200428,

“Private sector involvement in prisons is not new — federal and state governments have had a long history of contracting out specific services to private firms, including medical services, food

preparation, vocational training, and inmate transportation. The 1980s, though, ushered in a new era of prison privatization. With a burgeoning prison population resulting from the “war on drugs” and increased use of incarceration, prison overcrowding and rising costs became increasingly problematic for local, state, and federal governments. In response to this expanding criminal justice system, private business interests saw an opportunity for expansion, and consequently, private-sector involvement in prisons moved from the simple contracting of services to contracting for the complete management and operation of entire prisons. Today, the privatization of prisons refers both to the takeover of existing public facilities by private operators and to the

building and operation of new and additional prisons by for-profit prison companies.”

California used private prisons to decrease overcrowding, which was becoming a deadly issue.

Knafo 201329,

“Brown responded by shifting responsibility for certain nonviolent offenders from the state to county governments. Within two years, the state prison population declined by about 25,000. But

that didn't satisfy the fed. Overall, California houses about 119,000 prisoners within its borders and thousands more in CCA prisons in other states, and it has one of the most crowded prison systems in the country. In 2009, a panel of federal judges concluded that the in-state prisons were so densely packed that prisoners were dying as a result. The judges ordered the state to reduce overcrowding. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ruling,

with Justice Anthony Kennedy declaring in the majority opinion that the lack of adequate space in California's prisons was causing at least one inmate to "needlessly die" every six or seven days.

judges, who have given the state until the end of February to come up with a plan to further decrease the system's population by about 10,000 inmates. Brown's recent deals with CCA and the GEO Group represent attempts to meet that quota.”

28 Chuang, Amy. "Prison Privatization and the Use of Incarceration." (n.d.): n. pag. TheSentencing Project, Sept. 2004. Web. 6 Nov. 2014.<http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_prisonprivatization.pdf>.29 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/25/californiaprivateprison_n_4157641.html

A2 Abuse Problems

Private prisons have been proven to be better managed than public ones. If private prisons are better managed, it can be implied that the guards are probably utilized more effectively and manage the prison to a safer degree. This means the harms the pro talks about will be seen less in the world of private prisons versus the world of public prisons.

Segal 200530,

Furthermore, there is clear and significant evidence that private prisons actually improve quality. Independent

accreditation by the American Correctional Association (ACA) is designed to show a facility meets nationally accepted standards for quality of operation, management, and maintenance. Currently there are more than 5,000 government and privately managed detention facilities located around the United States, with only 532 accredited by the ACA--465 are public and 67 are

private.16 Thus, no more than 10 percent of government correctional facilities have been accredited, whereas 44 percent of private facilities have been accredited. This dramatic difference suggests that private prisons are providing quality services—while remaining cost-efficient and providing significant cost savings.”

Private prisons are safer than public ones. Private prisons have been proven to have a better track record with assault than their public counterparts.

Segal 200531,

“The 1997 report compared performance of the state’s one private prison to other state prisons. Many

aspects of prison management were examined including, frequency of escapes, major disturbances, homicides, assault, and inmate grievances. Quality findings: The performance of the private prison was superior in public safety issues, protecting staff and inmates, and compliance with professional standards. The primary function of the 2000 study was a quality comparison. Government and private prisons were compared on ten individual dimensions including security, food service, facility safety and sanitation, and inmate health services.”

30 Segal, Geoffrey F. "Comparing Public and Private Organizations." Public AdministrationReview 36.2 (1976): 233-44. The Reason Foundation, 2005. Web. 6 Nov. 2014.<http://www.burnetcountytexas.org/docs/6-Segal-Commission-onPrisonAbuse.pdf>.31 Segal, Geoffrey F. "Comparing Public and Private Organizations." Public AdministrationReview 36.2 (1976): 233-44. The Reason Foundation, 2005. Web. 6 Nov. 2014.<http://www.burnetcountytexas.org/docs/6-Segal-Commission-onPrisonAbuse.pdf>.

A2 Private Prisons harm economic competition

The impact is non-unique. Public Prisons also have prison labor, but at the rate of 100%.

“Prison labor in the federal prisons. Percent of able-bodied sentenced federal prisoners required to work in the prison509: 100% Number of prisoner workers in UNICOR, the federal prison industries510:22,560 Pay scale for federal prisoners who work outside of

UNICOR in prison maintenance, in dollars per hour511: $0.12-$0.40”.

This argument means that any negative effects that arise from private prison labor would happen in either world because without private prisons, 100% of prisoners would still be required to work. If anything 100% is going to be even worse under the logic of the pro, as at least there is a chance in the pro world that an inmate can say no to working.

If the labor is cheaper, it can save companies and communities money, which helps the economy. In Florida 2.4 million dollars were saved solely from inmate farming.

Brown 201132,

But the budget savings are worth it, many state officials say. In Florida, where the budget was cut by $4.6 billion this year, analysts say inmate farming could save

$2.4 million a year. That is relatively small potatoes, but enough for the new governor, Rick Scott, to call for an expansion of prison farming. The state already uses 550 inmates to grow 4.8 million pounds of produce a year, and the governor has pledged $2.5 million to have more inmates grow their own food. “It’s a win-win,” said Jeff Mullahey, the director of an agricultural center at the University of Florida whose staff was downsized in 2007 and replaced, in part, by prisoners. “It’s obvious to me why governments should be doing this.” Inmates arrive at the center from the Century

Correctional Institute every weekday, rain or shine, to grow tomatoes, peppers, squash, broccoli and oranges. The partnership with the prison began two years ago, after the university’s agriculture program sustained deep budget cuts. Professors

provide farming expertise, and inmates supply the labor and learn marketable skills as fieldworkers. The result has been so successful, providing $192,000 worth of food a year to the prison and saving $75,000 a year for the university, that wardens

from around the state have visited to learn about replicating it with their inmates.”

Prison labor and wage lowers taxes, improves spending, and decreases spending on things like welfare.

Reynolds 1997,

“One of the most promising proposals to reduce the cost of criminal justice is to increase the amount of productive work performed by prisoners. At present 80 percent of the income earned by prisoners who work is customarily used to reduce

32 Brown, Robbie, and Kim Severson. "Enlisting Prison Labor to Close Budget Gaps." TheNew York Times. The New York Times, 24 Feb. 2011. Web. 04 Nov. 2014.<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/us/25inmates.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

the financial burden on taxpayers and for victim compensation. Thus about $11,000 per prison worker would be available. The remainder could help prisoners' families, pay personal expenses and be set aside as savings for use after release. Over the next five years, the prison population is projected to increase to 1.6 million. If half

of the prisoners could be employed by private enterprise during that time, their work would reduce taxpayer costs by almost $9 billion per year, or about 25 percent of the total cost of prison support.”

Prison labor reduces recidivism. People who have steady jobs because of prison labor after they leave prison commit less crimes.

Reynolds 199733,

“One of the most important benefits of prisoner work is that it reduces the recidivism rate. A federal Post-Release Employment Project (PREP) study confirms that employed prisoners do better than those who do not work. After release to halfway

houses, participants in the PREP study were 24 percent more likely to get a full-time or day labor job than those who had not worked in prison. Those who had worked in prison also earned more than those who had not and were more likely to move on to a better-paying job. Only 6.6 percent of those who worked in prison had their parole revoked or were charged with committing a new crime during their first year of supervised release. This compares to 10.1 percent of the group who had not worked in prison. These findings hold up over a much longer period. Most participants in a follow-up to the PREP study had been released for at least eight years and some for as long as 12 years. Prison work and training programs seem to have been especially effective in reducing the likelihood of recidivism in the long term.

The overall spending from the prison labor industry creates jobs.

Reynolds 199734,

“Wouldn't Prison Labor Steal Private-Sector Jobs? Quite the contrary. Once at work, the prisoner is a job creator, on balance, because prison production requires new purchases from free-world businesses. That mean[ing] jobs and higher real wages in the rest of the economy. Everyone recognizes that getting able-bodied adults off welfare and into productive jobs is a social boon, and we have been willing to subsidize that transition from welfare to work. The same thing should be true for prison labor.”

33 Reynolds, Morgan O. "The Economic Impact of Prison Labor." National Center forPolicy Analysis. Texas A&M University, 17 Nov. 1997. Web. 04 Nov. 2014.<http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba245>.34 Reynolds, Morgan O. "The Economic Impact of Prison Labor." National Center forPolicy Analysis. Texas A&M University, 17 Nov. 1997. Web. 04 Nov. 2014.<http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba245>.

A2 Private Prisons have inferior healthcare

The public sector is responsible for oversight of private, for-profit prisons.

Culp 200535,

“Simply contracting with a nongovernment entity to provide correctional services does not guarantee that contract facilities can actually provide correctional services at less cost or greater quality than government programs. The body of research comparing public and private facilities finds that cost savings in contract facilities are most likely to occur in jurisdictions where the wages and benefits of public employees exceed the national average and that, on the whole, contract facilities provide a quality of inmate care on parity with public facilities. However, research also

shows that many problems in contract facilities are prompted by poorly written contracts or by inadequate contract monitoring by government agencies. Prior to entering into the contract process, government agencies should consider whether they have the capacity to manage and monitor contracts with private entities adequately. While the use of contract facilities may streamline government operations, it does not relieve government from the ultimate responsibility for custody and care of inmates. At minimum, successful contracting requires that governments assign full-time staff to the tasks of contract management. Contract development should begin with a competitive bidding process that permits bids by nonprofit as well as for-profit organizations. Many government jurisdictions also allow government agencies, including divisions within the contracting jurisdiction, to compete head-to-head with nongovernment bidders. Commonly referred to as “market testing,” this practice was pioneered in the United Kingdom and has had the collateral effect of prompting government-operated facilities to adopt cost-saving strategies in order to remain competitive with the private sector.”

Private prisons have higher participation in drug rehabilitation programs.

Blakely 200436,

“The private sector reported on average 28% of their inmate population participated in drug treatment programs. Drug treatment includes counseling, group therapy, and specialized drug addiction programs. On the other hand, the public sector reported that 14% of their inmate population participated in similar treatment programs. This suggests that private sector prisons had, on average, twice the number of inmates participating in drug treatment than did the public sector. Thus, the related hypothesis was not supported and suggests that the private sector is nearer the normalization end of the ideological continuum than is the public sector.

State-run prisons struggle with healthcare and may turn to private companies to alleviate problems Kutscher37,

35 Culp, Richard. "Contract Facilities." Encyclopedia of Prisons & Correctional Facilities.Ed. Mary Bosworth. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2005. 163-66.SAGE knowledge.Web. 1 Nov. 2014.<http://books.google.com/books?id=2ftyAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT206&lpg=PT206&dq=Culp,+Richard.+%22Contract+Facilities&source=bl&ots=vmJLZwPhz4&sig=yKGyj36JT56qRjTnU_i3mC63z0E&hl=en&sa=X&ei=o19cVJLMcOvyASkgoHQAw&ved=0CDkQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=Culp%2C%20Richard.%20%22Contract%20Facilities&f=false>36 Blakely, Curtis R., and Vic W. Bumphus. "Private And Public Sector Prisons--AComparison Of Select Characteristics." Federal Probation 68.1 (2004): 27-31. Academic Search Elite. Web. 3 Nov. 2014.https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=20713437 Kutscher, Beth, and Harris Meyer. "Rumble Over Jailhouse Healthcare. (Cover Story)."Modern Healthcare 43.35 (2013): 6-16. Academic Search Elite. Web. 3 Nov.

”On the other hand, state-operated prison healthcare systems also can find themselves in trouble, which is what happened in California. There, inmate healthcare has operated under federal court supervision since [in[ 2005 after a judge found the state failed to provide inmates with adequate care. The state has tried to regain control, but the judge said the state

must first prove it can do a better job. In that situation, privatization was floated as a way to improve quality of care, said Len Gilroy, director of government refor

A2 Private Prison’s Influence Intensify Incarceration Laws

Lobbying happens from public groups already, so private corporations have a minimal impact. Non-Unique.

Volokh 200838,

“Even without privatization, actors in the public sector already lobby for changes in substantive law—in the prison context, for example, public corrections officer unions are active advocates of pro-incarceration policy. Against this background, adding the “extra voice” of the private sector will not necessarily increase either the

amount of industry-increasing advocacy or its effectiveness.”

Lots of public funds exist already that donate to lobbying, so private groups would just displace funds and not contribute.

Volokh 2008,39

“First, self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy is already common in the public sector—chiefly from public-sector corrections officers unions. For instance, the most active corrections officers union, the California Correctional Peace Officers Association, has contributed massively in support of tough-on crime positions on voter initiatives and has given money to crime victims’ groups, and public corrections officers unions in other states have endorsed candidates for their toughon-crime positions. Private firms would thus enter, and partly displace some of the actors in, a heavily populated field.”

Private Corporations actually decrease lobbying for higher incarcerations.

Volokh 2008,40

“Second, there is little reason to believe that increasing privatization would increase the amount of self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy. In fact, it is even possible that increasing privatization would reduce such advocacy. The intuition for this perhaps surprising result36 comes from the economic theory of public goods and collective action. The political benefits that flow from prison providers’ pro-incarceration advocacy are what economists call a “public good,” because any prison provider’s advocacy, to the extent it is effective, helps every other prison provider. (We call it a public good even if it is bad for the public: the relevant “public” here

is the universe of prison providers.) When individual actors capture less of the benefit of their expenditures on a public good, they spend less on that good; and the “smaller” actors, who benefit less from the public good, free ride off the expenditures of the “largest” actor. In today’s world, the largest actor—that is, the actor that profits the most from the system— tends to be the public-sector union, since the public sector still provides the lion’s share of prison services, and public-sector corrections officers benefit from wages significantly higher than their private-sector

38 Volokh, Alexander. Stanford Law Review. 4th ed. Vol. 60. N.p.: n.p., n.d. LelandStanford Junior University, 2008. Web. 4 Nov. 2014.<http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/articles/Volokh_0.pdf39 Volokh, Alexander. Stanford Law Review. 4th ed. Vol. 60. N.p.: n.p., n.d. LelandStanford Junior University, 2008. Web. 4 Nov. 2014.<http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/articles/Volokh_0.pdf>.40 Volokh, Alexander. Stanford Law Review. 4th ed. Vol. 60. N.p.: n.p., n.d. LelandStanford Junior University, 2008. Web. 4 Nov. 2014.<http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/articles/Volokh_0.pdf>.

counterparts’. The smaller actor is the private prison industry, which not only has a smaller proportion of the industry but also does not make particularly high profits.

By breaking up the government’s monopoly of prison provision and awarding part of the industry to private firms, therefore, privatization can reduce the industry’s advocacy by introducing a collective action problem. The public-sector unions will spend less because under privatization they experience less of the benefit of their advocacy, while the private firms will tend to free ride off the public sector’s advocacy.

A2 Medical experimentation is likely in for profit prisonsPrivate prisons have contracts with the government that are made to ensure they will operate under the same regulations as public prisons. The government negotiates contracts with private prisons that determine how the prison will operate.

Gran 2007,41

This article contributes to research on privatization in general and private prisons in particular through a socio-legal analysis of governments'

contractual relationships with private prison firms (Vincent-Jones, 1989; Alien, 2002). The contractual relationships private companies enter with governments shape the services they provide and the degree to which they fulfill obligations to their prisoners, to government agencies, and to local communities. When government and private authorities form contracts, they negotiate the contract's particular terms that establish how "private" these prisons actually are. The contract's terms determine the degree to which political actors and civil society can hold these private prisons accountable to civil society, accord protection to social groups that may be disadvantaged by contracting out, and ensure that private prisons promote justice. Our socio-legal analysis of three contracts analyzes their formation, maintenance, and liability components. The U.S. case study considers how a prison contract was interpreted and amended. Multiple problems with the prison, including the types of prisoners received and a major prison escape, brought attention to this case. Major sociopolitical actors sprang into action to urge changes to the contract, some from the federal government and others at the state level, including the introduction of new legislation. The new aspects of the reformed contract, we contend, are instances of publicization. By reforming the contract, government attempted to reassert control over some aspects of the government-private firm relationship.”

Private prisons have contracts that are still subject to government oversight.

Miller 201042,

“Private prisons can be defined in one of the following manners: a transfer of public facilities to a private organization; a contract to design and operate new prisons;

and a contract to provide other services to public prisons such as transportation, medical care, food, and maintenance. A misconception about private prisons is that they are not tied to the government. However, private prisons typically enter into a contract with a government agency to house inmates; in return, the government plays a major role in regulating private prisons. Thus, it is important to note that there is less of a difference than commonly believed between public and prisons-for-profit correctional systems (Dolovich, 2005). Indeed, the primary distinction of a private prison is that an organization rather than the government oversees its operation. Often the relationship is blurred, with the government outsourcing thousands of prisoners to private prisons per year, but also, through contracts, extending its power by placing limitations and regulations on these organizations (Mulone, 2008).

41 Gran, Brian and William Henry. “Holding Private Prisons Accountable: A Socio-LegalAnalysis of "Contracting Out" Prisons.” Social Justice. 2007. Web. Accessed 7November 2014. https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-183553469/holding-private-prisons-accountable-a-socio-lega42 Miller, David. “The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization:An Analysis of State Correctional Systems.” ProQuest Academic. Feb 2010.Web.Accessed 7 November 2014http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/prisons/review.pdf

A2 Prison Industrial Complex

In the status quo the Justice Department is trying to decrease the use of incarceration.

Merica 201343,

“The Justice Department will no longer pursue mandatory minimum sentences for certain low-level, nonviolent drug offenders, Attorney General Eric Holder said Monday, noting the nation is "coldly efficient in jailing criminals," but that it "cannot prosecute or incarcerate" its way to becoming safer. "Too many Americans go to too many prisons for far too long, and for no truly good law enforcement reason," Holder told the American Bar Association's House of Delegates in San Francisco. He questioned some assumptions about the criminal justice system's approach to the "war on drugs," saying that excessive incarceration has been an "ineffective and unsustainable" part of it. Although he said the United States should not abandon being tough on crime, Holder embraced steps to address "shameful" racial disparities in sentencing, the budgetary strains of overpopulated prisons and policies for incarceration that punish and rehabilitate, "not merely to warehouse

and forget."

Things like Marijuana are becoming legal. Private prisons lobby to punish harmless crimes, such as the use of marijuana. But currently despite these efforts marijuana is becoming legal showing that these private interest have little impact.

Voorhees 201444,

“Voters in Alaska and possibly Oregon will decide this November whether their states will join Colorado and Washington in legalizing the commercial sale and recreational use of pot. Similar initiatives are at varying stages in more than a half-dozen other states— Nevada, Arizona, and California among them—where advocates are looking toward 2016, when they hope the presidential election will turn out enough liberals to push those efforts across the finish line. All told, more than 1 in 5 Americans live in states where marijuana use has a legitimate chance to become legal between now and when President Obama leaves office. It’s not just at the ballot box where the pro-pot crowd is putting points on the board. Lawmakers in at least 40 states have eased at least some drug laws since 2009, according to a

recent Pew Research Center analysis. According to the

Marijuana Policy Project, proposals to treat pot like alcohol have been introduced in 18 states and the

District of Columbia this year alone. Meanwhile, 16 states have already decriminalized marijuana, according to the pro-pot group NORML—

Maryland will become the 17th in October. In large swaths of the country getting caught with a small amount of weed at a concert is now roughly the same as getting a speeding ticket on the way to the show. While not leading the charge, the Obama administration is allowing states the chance to experiment.”

43 Merica, San. "Eric Holder Seeks to Cut Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences." CNN, 12Aug. 2013. Web. 4 Nov. 2014. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/12/politics/holdermandatory-minimums/>.44 Voorhees, Josh. "Could Pot Soon Be Legal Just About Everywhere?" Slate Magazine.N.p., 10 June 2014. Web. 02 Nov. 2014.<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/06/marijuana_legalization_will_weed_soon_be_legal_everywhere_in_the_united.html>.

A2 Exploitation of Prison Labor

The impact is non-unique. Public Prisons also have prison labor, but at the rate of 100%.

“Prison labor in the federal prisons. Percent of able-bodied sentenced federal prisoners required to work in the prison509: 100% Number of prisoner workers in UNICOR, the federal prison industries510:22,560 Pay scale for federal prisoners who work outside of

UNICOR in prison maintenance, in dollars per hour511: $0.12-$0.40”.

This argument means that any negative effects that arise from private prison labor would happen in either world because without private prisons, 100% of prisoners would still be required to work. If anything 100% is going to be even worse under the logic of the pro, as at least there is a chance in the pro world that an inmate can say no to working.

Making prisoners work is good for society. Prisoners who have worked are less likely to be a burden to society in the future.

Unicor doesn't agree with the criticism. According to spokeswoman Julie Rozier, inmates working for Unicor are 24% less likely to reoffend and 14% more likely to be employed long-term upon release. She also noted that over 40% of Unicor's supplies were purchased from small businesses in 2011. She cited the unique costs associated with operating within a prison. For example, Unicor employs more

supervisors than a private sector firm would, and security lockdowns disrupt production.45

The work helps rehabilitate prisoners and gives them key skills for the future.

Elk 201146,

“At the Union Correctional Facility, a maximum security prison in Florida, inmates from a nearby lower-security prison manufacture tons of processed beef, chicken and pork for Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises (PRIDE), a privately held non-profit corporation that operates the state’s forty-one work programs. In addition to processed food, PRIDE’s website reveals an array of products for sale through contracts with private companies, from eyeglasses to office furniture, to be shipped from a distribution center in Florida to businesses across the US. PRIDE boasts that its work programs are “designed to provide vocational training, to improve prison security to reduce the cost of state government, and to promote the rehabilitation of the state inmates.”

45 Factory Owners: Federal Prisoners Stealing Our Business." CNNMoney. Cable NewsNetwork, 14 Aug. 2012. Web. 04 Nov. 2014.<http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/14/smallbusiness/federal-prison-business/>.46 Elk, Mike. "The Hidden History of ALEC and Prison Labor." The Nation. N.p., 1 Aug.2011. Web. 04 Nov. 2014. <http://www.thenation.com/article/162478/hiddenhistory-alec-and-prison-labor>.

Prison work offsets the cost of incarceration

Steadman 201347,

“Between 2005 and 2008, the Howard League ran the Barbed graphic design studio,

Britain's [With the] first proper business inside prison. Our employees received the market rate for their work, paid tax, contributed to a victims fund and could save to support themselves and their families on release - rather than leaving the taxpayer to foot the bill.”

Working gives prisoners a goal they can earn, and learn valuable skills along the way.

Gibbs 201148,

“We need a new regime of work, with private companies hiring more prisoners to fulltime jobs. Most prisoners – illiterate and drug dependent – are not ready for real work, but governors should aspire to increase the number who are, and to embed profitable, paid work as the core activity in

their prison. The rationale is clear – employment is an obligation for everyone, but paid employment for prisoners is a privilege that they should earn. If an offender abides by the rules, gets off drugs and becomes literate, then they should be able to apply for work. If they do none of these things, then they should receive fewer privileges and none of

the work benefits.”

47 Steadman, Karen. "Viewpoints: Should Prisoners Have Jobs?" BBC News. N.p.,21 Aug. 2013. Web. 04 Nov. 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-23781988>48 Gibbs, Blair. "If Prisoners Worked, We'd All Be Better off." The Telegraph. TelegraphMedia Group, 12 June 2011. Web. 04 Nov. 2014.

A2 Increased Recidivism

There are no major differences in recidivism between the two sectors. In a Florida study that looked at 36 measures of recidivism for different groups of nearly 90,000 prisoners, private and public prisons had nearly identical rates of recidivism.

Bales 200349,

The three private prison release cohorts of adult males, adult females, and youthful male offenders are identified and compared to similar release cohorts of public

prisons. Results of multivariate statistical analyses indicated no significant differences in recidivism rates were discovered for adult males and youthful male offenders released from private versus public prisons, which is consistent with previous research on Florida offenders. The results of the female adult offenders indicated that 1 of the 12 measures of public versus private prison exposure resulted in a significant reduction in recidivism among this group of offenders. Overall, only 1 in 36 comparisons resulted in a significant finding of lower recidivism rates among inmates released from private versus public prisons.”

Private prisons are changing their policies to improve recidivism rates.

Huling 201450,

Damon Hininger, chief executive of Nashville, Tenn.-based Corrections Corp. of

America, CXW -0.71% said in an interview that government clients are increasingly concerned about the long-term costs of housing inmates and are pushing CCA and other private operators to save them money by reducing recidivism, the number of

inmates who are released only to do a repeat turn in prison. He plans to expand the company's prison rehabilitation programs, drug counseling and its prisoner reentry work in cities around the country. It's a significant shift for

CCA, which has built a profitable business from incarcerating people—nearly 70,000 inmates are currently housed in more than 60 facilities. The company is the fifth-largest correction system in the country, after only the federal government and the states of California, Florida and Texas. "This is a watershed moment for our company and we hope it will be for our entire industry,'' Mr.

Hininger said. “We are determined to prove that we can play a leadership role in reducing recidivism and that we have every incentive to do so. The interests of government, taxpayers, shareholders, and communities are aligned. We all just need to recognize that and commit to that.''

49 Bales, Williams. “Recidivism: An Analysis of Public and Private State Prison Releases inFlorida.” Florida State University, December 2003.<https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=205465 >50 Huling, Tracy. “Prison Firm CCA Seeks to Reduce Number of Repeat Offenders.” WallStreet Journal, September 2014. <http://online.wsj.com/articles/prison-firm-ccaseeks-to-reduce-number-of-repeat-offenders-1410561176>

A2 Regulation

Long track record of safety.

Gilroy 200951,

“The notion that private prisons are somehow less safe than public facilities is unfounded. Private corrections companies have a long track record of safe operations and are routinely held contractually to higher safety and performance standards than even public prisons are able to meet. Put simply, if these companies can’t demonstrate a strong safety record, they won’t be able to retain existing [contracts] and attract new ones.”

Private prisons are of higher standard than public ones.

Gilroy 200952,

“To this end, most privately-operated prisons meet or exceed the performance standards outlined by the American Correctional Association (ACA), a national organization providing professional certification and accreditation of correctional

facilities to ensure that they meet high operating standards in such areas as safety and emergency procedures, staff training and development, and sanitation and food services. By contrast, in many states public prisons do not hold themselves to these same standards (which is one of the reasons private prisons are so attractive— policymakers can mandate the achievement and/or maintenance of accreditation as part of a performance-based contract). Hence, officials should probably be more concerned about the safety of felons held in public

facilities, as opposed to private prisons.”

Private prisons have quality monitors on hand.

Crawford 199853,

“Of the 89 contracts for which we have information, 46 of them (or 52 percent) reported having monitors on-site on a daily basis. These monitors generally worked full-time on these assignments, although some had responsibilities for more than one contract. A smaller

number of contracts (16) had part-time monitors, who averaged about one day a week, visiting the facilities on a monthly basis.

Ten contracts had monitors who devoted about the same level of attention to the contract, but visited only quarterly.”

Inmates in private prisons are less likely to reoffend.

Volokh 201454,

51 Gilroy, Leonard. "Mythbusting: Private Prisons and Inmate Safety." Reason FoundationBlog. N.p., 26 Mar. 2009. Web. 04 Nov. 2014.<http://reason.org/blog/show/mythbusting-private-prisons-an>.52 Gilroy, Leonard. "Mythbusting: Private Prisons and Inmate Safety." Reason FoundationBlog. N.p., 26 Mar. 2009. Web. 04 Nov. 2014.<http://reason.org/blog/show/mythbusting-private-prisons-an>.53 Crawford, Stephen. (n.d.): n. pag. Department of Justice, 1998. Web. 4 Nov. 2014.<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203968.pdf>54 Volokh, Sasha. "Are Private Prisons Better or Worse than Public Prisons?" WashingtonPost. The Washington Post, 25 Feb. 2014. Web. 02 Nov. 2014.<http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/25/areprivate-

“A later study by David Farabee and Kevin Knight that “corrected for some of these deficiencies” found no comparative difference in the reoffense or

reincarceration rates of males or juveniles over a three-year post-release period, though women had lower recidivism in the private sector. However, this study may still suffer from the problem of the attribution of inmates who spent some time in each sector, as well as possible selection bias to the extent that private prisons got a different type of inmate than public prisons did. Another study by William Bales and coauthors, even more rigorous, likewise found no statistically significant difference between public-inmate and private-inmate recidivism.”

prisons-better-or-worse-than-public-prisons/>.

A2 Rehabilitation

Private prisons do rehabilitate on a large scale. Rumors about private prisons are overblown.

“It’s been easy for opponents of privatization to alarm the public by conjuring up frightening images of privately operated prisons, with staffing cuts so deep that

security becomes a challenge and rehabilitation an impossibility. Not only is this image overblown, it is also demonstrably incorrect. Data readily available makes it clear that private prisons can provide a better environment for education, vocational and life skills programs – without sacrificing a strong commitment to public safety – that will help inmates make a smoother transition to their communities when they are released. The chart below compares data for facilities in Department of Corrections Region IV – the area affected by the proposed privatization pilot program – and the privately operated South Bay Correctional and Moore Haven Correctional Facilities. The comparison excludes the facilities the state has identified for closure (Broward, Glades and Indian River Correctional Institutions). The Region IV data comes from the state’s recent Region IV RFP, while the private-facility figures have been provided by Corrections Corporation of America and The GEO Group.55”

Private prisons have prepared thousands of inmates to be reintroduced into society.

Cowling 201456,

“Our company invests close to $100 million per year in rehabilitation, education and re-entry programs, which help offenders reintegrate into society,” The GEO Group said in a statement. GEO

says it offers training in such things as academic and vocational classes to life skills and treatment programs. GEO says it has awarded more than 10,000 GEDs through its in-prison academic programs in the last decade. And, in that time, about 40,000 inmates have achieved completion certificates from\ a variety of GEO vocational programs including computer support, carpentry, culinary arts, horticulture, masonry, electrical and commercial driver’s license courses. Other prisoners have benefited from cognitive behavior, problem solving, employability and parenting courses, along with

substance abuse and therapeutic programs, the company’s statement said. Officials at Corrections Corporation of America said, “The underlying premise of this question is incorrect.”

In an effort to earn government contracts in the future private prisons have every incentive to rehabilitate.

Cowling 201457,

“CCA’s success or failure is based on our ability to meet or exceed our government partners’ expectations for safe, secure facilities and providing value to taxpayers. “Collectively, the industry only houses about 10 percent of the total inmate population in the

U.S. What’s more, the rehabilitation and re-entry programming we provide is part of the value we provide our partners. In other words, in addition to being the right thing to do, it’s a great selling point for our company.” CCA spokesman Steve Owen said each year CCA’s principals and teachers help inmates earn GEDs and learn employable skills such as

55 Data: Privately Run Prisons Can Provide Better Rehabilitation Programs." WCTV RSS.N.p., 13 Feb. 2012. Web. 07 Nov. 2014.<http://www.wctv.tv/blogs/editorial/Data_Privately_Run_Prisons_Can_Provide_Better_Rehabilitation_Programs_139216274.html>.56 Cowling, Mark. " Prison Legal News ." PLN Mentioned in AZ Article on Private Prisonsand Rehabilitation. N.p., 21 May 2014. Web. 07 Nov. 2014.<https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/in-the-news/2014/pln-mentioned-az-articleprivate-prisons-and-rehabilitation/>.57 Cowling, Mark. " Prison Legal News ." PLN Mentioned in AZ Article on Private Prisonsand Rehabilitation. N.p., 21 May 2014. Web. 07 Nov. 2014.<https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/in-the-news/2014/pln-mentioned-az-articleprivate-prisons-and-rehabilitation/>.

computer skills and cabinetmaking. Full-time chaplains teach values like responsibility and anger management. According to a recent study by RAND Corp., offenders who participate in correctional education programs have 43 percent lower odds of returning to prison than those who do not, Owen said.

A/T: MORALLY WRONG TO PRIVATELY INCARCERATE

PRIVATE PRISONS ARE MORALLY ACCEPTABLE-Mitchell 200558,

Before Maryland can consider the financial benefits of using privately run prisons, it should first consider whether such facilities are morally acceptable. At first blush,

the idea that one person may profit from another's incarceration may seem inhumane. But in a free society of voluntary exchange, it is impossible to separate profit from any sort of good or service—including the operation of a prison. In state institutions, guards are paid to watch the prisoners, administrators are paid to run the facilities, and other employees provide services from preparing the food to washing the sheets. Each of those employees is motivated to do that work by the compensation he or she receives—that is, by the opportunity to profit personally. If it is morally acceptable for each of a prison's many employees to be motivated by profit, then it seems strange to claim that the employees cannot bind together as a corporation backed by investors and pursue profit for their combined work.

58 Matthew; Private Prisons Benefit Inmates; How Should Prisons Treat Inmates?; 2005; Gale Group

A2: Savings Just Due to Wage Differences

Most of the savings is not due to wage differences.

Dr. Simon Hakim and Dr. Erwin A. Blackstone, 2013, Professors of Economics, Temple, April 29, 2013, Cost Analysis of Public and Contractor Operated Prisons, http://tinyurl.com/mze64qw

Salaries of correctional officers in public and private prisons are comparable. For example, beginning public correctional officers in 2012 earned $24,605, while private officers earned $24,190, a 1.7 percent difference. The total long run savings by contracting out medium security prisoners were $8.63 and

$11.37 per inmate per day for the two prisons, which results mostly from capital savings. The two maximum security prisons achieved savings of $31.58, and $32.92

per inmate per day. Additional savings arose from avoided unaccounted pensions and healthcare costs of $1.29. The cost advantage of Private Prison facilities likely arises from their greater productivity and possibly

greater purchasing power. This coincides with the 15 percent greater productivity of private prisons experienced in Ohio. Thus, the long run savings from contracting out to private prisons is marginally attributed to wage differences.

A2 Illegitimate Delegation of Authority

Private prisons operate under contract, no authority has been surrendered

Professor Richard Harding, 2001, is inspector of custodial services for the state of Western Australia, Crime & Justice, v. 28, Private Prisons, p. 265-6

A private prison is one managed by a nongovernment entity on behalf of the state. As Logan states (1990, p. 13), it is "a place of [involuntary justice system] confinement managed by a private company under contract to government." The inmates would otherwise be incarcerated in government operated prisons. The U.K.

chief inspector of prisons has said that "so-called 'private prisons' are not private sector prisons but [state] prisons run on contract for the [responsible government department] by a private sector company" (Ramsbotham 1995/96, p. 8). This observation remains true whether the private company manages a state-owned prison or also owns the physical structure itself.

These definitions bring out two crucial points: that authority to hold and deal with prisoners is derived from public law, not private arrangement, and that private prisons are an integral component of the jurisdiction's prison system. It is crucial to emphasize the first point so as to contrast contemporary privatization with the statutorily unregulated deals relating to the leasing of convict labor that first emerged in the United States in the early nineteenth century. The second point highlights that the state, in outsourcing or delegating service delivery, has not in principle surrendered any part of its

overall responsibility for system objectives, standards, legality, or equity.