SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF …

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

Department 7, Honorable CHRISTOPHER G. RUDY, Presiding Courtroom Clerk: R. Belligan

DATE: 11-9-2021 TIME: 9:00 A.M. 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113

Telephone: 408-882-2170

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LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING

LINE 1 19CV358532 Maria Morelos vs. Reynaldo

Morelos

Motion: Motion for Summary

Judgment/Adjudication by Defendant/Cross

Complainant Reynaldo Morelos.

Motion DENIED.

Click link at line 1 for full ruling.

The Court will prepare the formal order.





Telephone: 408-882-2170







LINE 2 20CV366946 Rajesh Raghani vs Samir

Maharjan et al

Motion: Motion to Compel Defendant Classic

Diamond and Jewelry LLC (CDJ) to Respond to

Production of Docs and Produce Documents in

Response to Plaintiff's Amended Notice of

Taking Deposition of CDJ's PMK Request for

Sanctions by Plaintiff Rajesh Raghani.

Motion DENIED.

Click link at line 2 for full ruling.

The Court will prepare the formal order.

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Telephone: 408-882-2170







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Telephone: 408-882-2170







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Case Name: Maria Morelos v. Reynaldo Morelos

Case No.: 19CV358532

Before the court is Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff Reynaldo Morelos’s (“Defendant”)

motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication.

I. Background

A. Factual

In the 1990s, Defendant and his brother, Ricardo Morelos (“Ricardo”), started a

business, a general partnership, called the Automatic Transmission Clinic. On or about July 13,

1995, Defendant and Ricardo purchased real property located at 7896 Monterey Highway,

Gilroy, California 95020 (“the subject property”) for use as a business location. They took title

as “Ricardo A. Morelos, a married man as his sole and separate property” and “Reynaldo R.

Morelos, a married man as his sole and separate property”.

Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Maria Morelos (“Plaintiff”) was married to Ricardo

Morelos. On August 19, 2011, Ricardo Morelos passed away. After Ricardo’s death, Plaintiff

and Defendant entered into an agreement memorialized by a letter to the California Board of

Equalization. The parties dispute the exact terms of the agreement, Defendant taking the

position that the parties agreed that he would be the sole owner of the subject property and

Plaintiff taking the position that the agreement only encompassed Defendant’s ownership of

the business and property owned by the business. Around the same time, Defendant told

Plaintiff that he was the sole owner of the subject property.

In 2019, Plaintiff was informed by an attorney that Ricardo’s estate retained an interest

in the subject property and she opened a probate action in which was named personal

representative of Ricardo’s estate.

B. Procedural

Plaintiff initiated this action on November 14, 2019 with the filing of the complaint,

which asserts a sole cause of action for partition of the subject property. On January 22, 2020,

Defendant filed an answer to the complaint. On January 22, 2020, Defendant filed a cross-

complaint. On February 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed an answer to the cross-complaint. On

December 14, 2020, Defendant filed a first amended cross-complaint, alleging causes of action

for: (1) quiet title, (2) fraud, (3) negligent representation, (4) breach of contract, (5) promissory

estoppel, (6) quiet title based on adverse possession, (7) partition, (8) accounting, and (9)

declaratory relief. On February 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed an answer to the first amended cross-

complaint.

Defendant filed the instant motion on May 5, 2021. Plaintiff has opposed the motion

and Defendant has filed a reply.

II. Discussion

Defendant seeks summary judgment granting the relief requested in his first amended

cross-complaint and denying Plaintiff’s complaint. Defendant moves for summary judgment on

the grounds that (1) Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiff

transferred any interest she had in the subject property to Defendant and (2) Defendant has met

the requirements of adverse possession with respect to the subject property. In the alternative,

he seeks summary adjudication as to the first (quiet title), fourth (breach of contract), and sixth

(adverse possession) claims in his first amended cross-complaint.

A. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of (1) the fact that the “Great Recession” began in

2007 and ended in 2009, (2) a deed of trust securing a mortgage on the subject property signed

by Defendant and Ricardo. The first request will be denied because the date the “Great

Recession” began is irrelevant to the outcome of the motion. (People ex rel. Lockyer v.

Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [“any matter to be judicially noticed

must be relevant to a material issue”].) Defendant states that the business suffered during the

“Great Recession” and that he had to take out certain loans that Ricardo agreed to pay a portion

of in 2010. But, it is clear that the relevant portion of Defendant’s statements is that he and

Ricardo agreed that Ricardo agreed to repay Defendant a portion of the amounts borrowed.

Accordingly, the fact that the “Great Recession” may have ended prior to the agreement

between Defendant and Ricardo is irrelevant.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the deed of trust is granted. (See Evans v.

California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549 [“The court may take judicial

notice of recorded deeds.”].)

B. Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff objects to multiple portions of Defendant’s declaration in support of the

motion. In her response to Defendant’s separate statement, Plaintiff also makes several

objections to statements made in Defendant’s separate statement. With respect to the objections

contained within the separate statement, these fail to comply with Rules of Court, rule

3.1354(b). As such, the court will not rule on them.1 With respect to the objections contained in

Plaintiff’s document entitled “Objections to the Declaration of Reynaldo Morelos, the court

need not rule on these objections as it does not deem them material to the outcome of the

motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q) [“In granting or denying a motion for summary

1 Because the court will rely on one statement Plaintiff objected to in her separate

statement, the court will note Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s statement in his declaration that

he told her that the subject property belonged to him alone (Declaration of Reynaldo Morelos,

¶ 32) on hearsay grounds. But, the statement is not offered for its truth (i.e., that the property

actually belonged to him alone but to show his belief that the property was his alone and his

communication of that belief to Plaintiff to establish the elements of adverse possession. (See

People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 820 [statement that victim was afraid was not

offered for its truth but for its effect on defendant].) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection to

paragraph 32 of the Declaration of Reynaldo Morelos is overruled.

judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence

that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.”].)

C. Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections

Defendant objections to portions of Plaintiff’s evidence consisting of letters and

portions of Plaintiff’s declaration regarding the substance of those letters on hearsay grounds.

The court need not rule on these objections as the court does not deem them material to the

outcome of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q) [“In granting or denying a motion

for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections

to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.”].)

D. Legal Standard

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended

that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) A “motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers

submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Summary

adjudication works the same way, except it acts on specific causes of action or affirmative

defenses, rather than on the entire complaint. (§ 437c, subd. (f).) … Motions for summary

adjudication proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.’” (Hartline

v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 458, 464.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the initial

burden “of showing that a cause of action has no merit” by “show[ing] one or more elements of

the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a

complete defense to that cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (p)(2).) If the

defendant makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to show that a triable issue

of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of production, and

must present evidence demonstrating there is no triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. (“Aguilar”) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A plaintiff moving for

summary judgment also bears the burden of persuasion, and must establish each element of any

cause of action alleged, and thus there is no defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.

(a)(1), (p)(1); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) The plaintiff, who bears the burden

of proof at trial by a preponderance of the evidence, must therefore “present evidence that

would require a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying material fact more likely than not

- otherwise he [or she] would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to

present his evidence to a trier of fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 851.)

Generally, the motion must be supported by evidence, such as declarations and

discovery responses, and include a separate statement listing all material facts the moving party

contends are undisputed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1); see also Rules of Court, rule

3.1350(c)(2).) The opposition shall also be supported by evidence and include a responsive

separate statement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(2)-(3).) While a party can object to the

admissibility of evidence presented (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1352), a court cannot weigh the

evidence or deny summary judgment or adjudication on the ground any particular evidence

lacks credibility. (Melorich Builders v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 931, 935; see

also Lerner v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 656, 660.)

E. Merits of the Motion

Defendant moves for summary judgment as to his first amended cross-complaint and

Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement

whereby Plaintiff transferred any interest she had in the subject property to Defendant and (2)

Defendant has met the requirements of adverse possession with respect to the subject property.

In the alternative, he seeks summary adjudication as to the first (quiet title), fourth (breach of

contract), and sixth (adverse possession) claims in his first amended cross-complaint on the

same grounds.

i. The 2011 Agreement Between Plaintiff and Defendant

Defendant argues that Plaintiff transferred her entire ownership interest in the subject

property when she signed an agreement with Defendant in 2011. The agreement takes the form

of a letter to the California State Board of Equalization, signed by Plaintiff, which states, in

pertinent part, “As of September 1, 2011, I, Margarita Morelos will no longer be the owner of

the business and property of Automatic Transmission Clinic located at 7896 Monterey

Highway, Gilroy, CA 95020. Therefore, I will no longer be liable for any bills, property taxes,

California State Board fees, and Internal Revenue Service debts that are associated with

Automatic Transmission Clinic. Reynaldo Morelos will be the sole owner of the business and

property of Automatic Transmission Clinic. He will assume all liability for the bills, expenses,

and debts belonging to business and property.”

Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of the 2011 agreement or that she signed it.

Instead, she argues that she did not relinquish her interest in the subject property by the

agreement. She argues that she intended to relinquish any ownership interest she might have

had in the business, Automatic Transmission Clinic. But, she did not intend to convey any

interest in the real property located at 7896 Monterey Highway and that the letter does not

evidence that she, in fact, did convey such an interest. Further, she argues that Ricardo’s

interest in the subject property was owned by his estate upon his passing and that she was not

in a position to convey any interest in the property at the time the letter was signed.

Plaintiff’s argument is well taken. The letter indicates that Plaintiff “will no longer be

the owner of the business and property of Automatic Transmission Clinic.” (Italics added.)

Although it states that the business is located at the subject property, it does not appear to

transfer any ownership interest in the subject property itself. The letter further provides that

“Reynaldo Morelos will be the sole owner of the business and property of Automatic

Transmission Clinic.” Although Defendant argues that the business and the real property were

inextricably intertwined, it is undisputed that the business did not own the subject property but

that the subject property was owned by Defendant and Ricardo. Even where the letter mentions

property taxes, which would be commonly associated with real property, the letter states that

Plaintiff “will no longer be liable for …property taxes…associated with Automatic

Transmission Clinic.” (Italics added.)

Thus, it is not clear from the letter that the parties agreed that Plaintiff would convey

any interest in the subject property to Defendant. Accordingly, the court finds that Defendant

has not met his initial burden on summary judgment with respect to this argument.

ii. Adverse Possession

Defendant argues that he has met the requirements of adverse possession of the subject

property on a claim of right theory based on the 2011 agreement.2 He contends that he has

maintained exclusive open and notorious possession of the property from 2011 until the filing

of this action on November 14, 2019. Defendant also argues that he has paid all mortgage

payments, insurance, property taxes, and tax liens for the subject property since 2011. Plaintiff

does not dispute that Defendant has made such payments since August 19, 2011. Plaintiff

stated in her deposition that she had not set foot on the subject property since 2011.

(Deposition of Maria Morelos at pp. 42-43.)

Plaintiff’s argument on this point appears to be that Defendant did not sufficiently

convey his intent to oust her, as required to establish adverse possession against a cotenant.

“Cotenants have equal possessory rights in land. For one cotenant to establish adverse

possession against the other, more is required than to establish adverse possession against

strangers.” (Preciado v. Wilde (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 321, 323.) “ ‘ “[W]here, as here, a claim

of ownership by adverse possession is asserted against a cotenant additional principles become

operative. …” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “[E]ach tenant in common has a right to occupy the

whole of the property. The possession of one is deemed the possession of all; each may assume

that another in exclusive possession is possessing for all and not adversely to the others … .” ’

[Citation.] ‘ “ ‘Before title may be acquired by adverse possession as between cotenants, the

occupying tenant must bring home or impart notice to the tenant out of possession, by acts of

ownership of the most open, notorious and unequivocal character, that he intends to oust the

latter of his interest in the common property. [Citations.] Such evidence must be stronger than

that which would be required to establish a title by adverse possession in a stranger. [Citation.]’

… In short, one tenant in common cannot by mere exclusive possession acquire the title of his

cotenant. [Citation.]” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 325.)

“ ‘ “An ouster, in the law of tenancy in common, is the wrongful dispossession or

exclusion by one tenant of his cotenant or cotenants from the common property of which they

are entitled to possession.” [Citation.]’ (Estate of Hughes (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1612

(Hughes) [absent any evidence of actual exclusion from the property in dispute, the court could

not find an ouster].) ‘[O]uster must be proved by acts of an adverse character, such as claiming

the whole for himself, denying the title of his companion, or refusing to permit him to enter.’

(Zaslow v. Kroenert (1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 548 [denial of title, changing locks, posting ‘no

trespassing’ signs on the property, and denying admittance thereto constituted ouster].)

‘Whether there has been an ouster is a legal question.’ (Hughes, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p.

2 The elements of adverse possession are: “ ‘(1) Possession must be by actual

occupation under such circumstances as to constitute reasonable notice to the owner. (2) It

must be hostile to the owner’s title. (3) The holder must claim the property as his own, under

either color of title or claim of right. (4) Possession must be continuous and uninterrupted for

five years. (5) The holder must pay all the taxes levied and assessed upon the property during

the period. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Hacienda Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011)

198 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128.)

1612.)” (Hacienda Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128-

1129.)

Defendant contends that he adequately communicated to Plaintiff his intent to oust her

by telling her that he was the sole owner of the subject property. Courts have stated that

“claiming the whole [of the property]” may be sufficient to establish ouster of a cotenant.

(Zaslow v. Kroenert (1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 548.) In Palin v. Sweitzer (1937) 8 Cal.2d 329, 330,

the California Supreme Court upheld the finding that the following evidence was sufficient to

establish adverse possession against cotenants: “as early as 1913 the respondent told Mrs. Ink

and his other cotenants that inasmuch as the property had been sold for delinquent taxes he had

elected to redeem it; that the other cotenants had ceased to pay any attention to the property,

and that he would thereafter claim it as his own; that since that time and until the

commencement of this action in November, 1930, he had full, complete, absolute and

independent control over the land.” Additionally, in Estate of Hughes (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th

1607, 1614, the Court of Appeal determined that the filing of two petitions asserting the

adverse possessor’s ownership rights and the denying the rights of the cotenants was sufficient

to oust the cotenants.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant told her that he was now the owner of the property as a

result of Ricardo’s death and that this constituted a misrepresentation that should bar

Defendant from a finding that he adversely possessed the subject property under the doctrine of

unclean hands. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant told her that he was the sole owner of the

property before they made the 2011 agreement. The parties have provided dueling declarations

with respect to when Defendant told Plaintiff that he owned the subject property as his sole

property and what exactly he told her. (Declaration of Reynaldo Morelos, ¶ 32; Declaration of

Maria M. Morelos, p.2, ¶ 9.)

Under the circumstances, where Plaintiff had given up all interest in the business and

Defendant presumably had Plaintiff’s permission to operate the business on the premises of the

subject property for nearly the entirety of the prescriptive period, the court finds that Defendant

has not shown that the statement to Plaintiff that Defendant was the sole owner of the property

is sufficient to constitute ouster as a matter of law. “Whether the various elements of adverse

possession have been established is a question of fact. [Citation.]” (Sevier v. Locher (1990) 222

Cal.App.3d 1082, 1087.) “Whether there is an ouster and consequent disseisin of a cotenant is

a question of fact. [Citation.]” (Weller v. Chavarria (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 234, 248.)

As mentioned above, Plaintiff and Defendant dispute the timing of Defendant’s

statement relative to the 2011 agreement. If the statement was made prior to the agreement, as

Plaintiff’s declaration indicates, it would appear that the statement would not assist Defendant

in establishing adverse possession under a claim of right based on the agreement, as Defendant

argues. If, on the other hand, the statement was made after the agreement was made, as

Defendant’s declaration indicates, Defendant’s argument that the statement constituted on

ouster is much stronger. Although Defendant’s declaration provides additional evidence that

may be consistent with adverse possession, such as putting up a fence and controlling the keys

to the property, these acts are of minimal assistance in establishing ouster where Defendant’s

business operated on the subject property. Both before and after Defendant’s statement was

made, Defendant was in possession and control of the subject property and had the authority to

make decisions regarding improving the property.

As there is conflicting evidence on this point, and the court may not weigh the evidence

on summary judgment, the court must conclude that Defendant has not met his burden of

showing that there is no triable issue of material fact with respect to whether he has acquired

title to the subject property by adverse possession.

III. Conclusion

The motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is DENIED.

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Case Name: Rajesh Raghani vs Samir Maharjan et al

Case No.: 20CV366946

BACKGROUND

Before the Court is the Motion of Plaintiff Rajesh Raghani (Plaintiff) to Compel

Defendant Classic Diamond and Jewelry LLC (CDJ) to Respond to Production of Documents

and Produce Documents in Response to Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of

CDJ's PMK Request for Sanctions.

This matter was previously on calendar September 30, 2021. The parties were ordered

to an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) with the Hon. Carol Overton. Engaging in good

faith efforts at the IDC and by meeting and conferring on their own, the parties resolved all but

one of their discovery disputes. The parties submitted a joint statement advising the Court that

its assistance was necessary to resolve the remaining disputed issue. This ruling will address

the remaining disputed issue.

Plaintiff seeks a response to the following request for production of documents:

REQUEST NO. 2

Any and all documents in Defendant’s possession or under his control which

reflect the manner in which other employees were paid.

Plaintiff maintains that he is entitled to wage and hour records for employees other

than Plaintiff. CDJ maintains that these records are per se irrelevant and protected by the third

party right of privacy.

DISCUSSION

I. Analysis

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for production of documents is vague,

ambiguous and overbroad. The Court also finds that third party employees have significant

privacy interests in their payroll records.

Applying the balancing approach of Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7

Cal.4th 1, as explained by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, the Court finds

that Plaintiff has not met its burden of proof for obtaining the discovery he seeks. The

intrusion into third party employees privacy weighed and balanced against Plaintiff’s right to

conduct this particular discovery, does not justify the production of the requested records.

Plaintiff’s motion as to the remaining issue is DENIED. The Court finds that each

party attempted in good faith to resolve this dispute. The Court will not award sanctions.

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