38005 3047

SUPPLEMENTTO

The London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the ist of JULY, 1947

published byRegistered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 3 JULY, 1947

FIRST AND SECOND BATTLES OFNARVIK ON loW AND 13$* APRIL1940 RESPECTIVELY.

The following Despatch was submitted on the25th April, 1940, to the Lords Commissionersof the Admiralty 'by Rear Admiral R. H. C.Hallifax, Rear Admiral (D1), Home Fleet.

Rear Admiral (Z>), Home Fleet,HM.S. Woolwich.

z$th April, 1940.

Be pleased to lay before the Board a narra-tive of the First Battle of Narvik, which hasbeen prepared by the Commanding Officer,H.M.S. HOTSPUR, the senior surviving officer,and the report of the C.O. H.M.S. HAVOCK.

(Sgd.) R. H. C. HALLIFAX,Rear Admiral.

H.M.S. HOTSPUR.

SIR,25th April, 1940.

I have the honour to forward herewith re-ports from H.M. Ships HOTSPUR andHOSTILE on the destroyer raid on Narvikon roth April, 1940. As senior survivingofficer of this raid, -I feel I should also attemptto give some co-ordinated account. In doingso, 1 am using information obtained fromH.M. Ships HOTSPUR, HOSTILE and sur-viving officers from H.M.S. HARDY. Noreport has yet been received from H.M.S.HAViOCK and of course, nothing is availablefrom H.M.S. HUNTER.

2. HARDY (Captain B. A. W. Warburton-Lee*), HUNTER (Lieutenant-Commander L.de Villiers), HOTSPUR (Commander H. F. H.

* Admiralty footnote: Captain (D), 2nd DestroyerFlotilla.

Layman) and HAVOCK (Lieutenant-Com-mander R. E. Courage), left Sullom Voef atdawn on 7th April, in company with theTwentieth Destroyer Flotilla and joinedRENOWN north of the Shetlands. The wholeforce proceeded in company towards Vest Fiord,destroyers being eventualy detached to lay theminefield off Eggdoysa at dawn, 8th April,1940.

3. After guarding the (minefield for a fewhours reports of 2 enemy destroyers were re-ceived from GLQWiWGRM and ships of theSecond Destroyer Flotilla joined RENOWNsouthwest of the Lofoten Islands before dark.

4. At daylight on 9th April, 1940, theRENOWN encountered SCHARNHORST andHIPPER. The Second Destroyer Flotilla,stationed astern of RENOWN carried out a divi-sional concentration on HIPPER but the rangewas probably too great. All destroyers weresoon left behind in the heavy seas, but notbefore both HARDY and HUNTER had nar-rowly escaped being hit.

5. The Second Destroyer Flotilla was thendetached to patrol east of the Lofoten Islands.After about two hours this patrol was brokenoff on receipt of orders to go to Narvik. Just'before leaving her patrol position HOTSPURmade visual contact with REPULSE.

6. (Available reports tended to show thatNarvik was only lightly held so the flotilla wasstopped off Tranoy at about 1600 to obtain in-formation and HOSTILE (Commander J. P.Wright) joined. It was then learnt that theenemy held the place in force.

7. The following " Most Immediate " mes-sage was sent by Captain (D), Second Destroyer

f Admiralty footnote: Sullom Voe—a harbour Jothe Shetland Isle.

3048 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947

Flotilla, to AdimiraHjy, Commander-in-Chief,Home Fleet and Vice Admiral CommandingBattle Cruiser Squadron.

" Norwegians report Germans holdingNarvik in force also 6 destroyers and i sub-marine are there and channel is possiblymined.

Intend attacking at dawn, high water."T.O.O.* 1751/9/4/40.

No permission to attack was asked or furtherinstructions sought. I submit that this message,made by the late Captain Warburton-Lee,should 'be given a place in our historical records.

8. The Admiralty replied as follows in mes-sage 0136/10 to Captain (D), Second DestroyerFlotilla, repeated Vice Admiral CommandingBattle Cruiser Squadron, and Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.

" Norwegian coast defence shipsEIDSVOLD and NORGE may foe in Germanhands. You alone can judge whether inthese circumstances attack should be made.We shall support whatever decision youtake."9. The plan for the attack was given by

Captain (D) Second Destroyer Flotilla in thefollowing messages to the flotilla: —

1430/9 as amended by 1955/9, with a finaladdition in message 2040/9. The gist ofthese messages was briefly as follows. Shipswere to be at action stations from 0030/10as enemy batteries were reported on bothsides of Ofot Fiord near Ramsundet. Onapproaching Narvik, HARDY, HUNTERand HAVOCK were to attack ships in theinner harbour. HOTSPUR and HAVOCKwere to engage batteries reported on Framne-sodden and any ships seen to the north west.These two ships were also to cover the re-tirement of those in the inner harbour, withsmoke. All ships were to be ready to senda small landing party in the event of opposi-tion proving light.

10. The 50 mile passage from Tranoy toNarvik was made in continuous snowstormswith visibility seldom greater than 2 cables.Ships were twice separated owing to merchantvessels passing through the line and on the oneoccasion that land was seen the whole flotillaalmost ran aground. The safe arrival of shipsoff Narvik at 0415 on loth April, 1940, is atribute to the skill of the navigating officer ofHARDY (Lieutenant-Commander R. C.Gordon-Smith) and to the handling of the shipsin rear.

11. HARDY immediately entered the har-bour at Narvik. After backing and filling amongthe merchant ships at anchor she fired torpe-does, 3 at a warship and 4 more into the north-eastern corner of the harbour. One torpedomust have hit the warship, as there was aviolent explosion and sparks came out of her.HARDY then used her guns on another warshipseen at anchor and then withdrew.

12. Surprise had been complete and theenemy had not yet opened fire. HUNTER andHAVOCK now entered the harbour. HUNTERfired 4 torpedoes at a destroyer and 4 more atsome other target but the result is not known.HAVOCK fired 5 torpedoes and secured hits ona destroyer with gunfire.

* Admiralty footnote: T.O.O.—Time of origin.

13. By this time the enemy destroyers andshore batteries inside the harbour had openedfire. The shore guns all used tracer ammuni-tion, which appeared to be smaller than 4 in.and the shooting was not accurate.

14. HOTSPUR and HOSTILE saw nothingto the northward of Narvik though low visibilityprevented a proper examination of Rombaksand Herjangs Fiords. These two ships coveredthe retirement of the other three from the innerharbour by putting up a smoke screen, whichseemed very effective. HOTSPUR then fired 4torpedoes into the harbour and hit two merchantships, which sank. At least six torpedoes werefired by the enemy out of the harbour but allmissed or ran under without exploding.

15. All five ships then approached theharbour entrance again and engaged any suit-able targets they could see. This time a fairlyintense fire was encountered from shore batteriesand enemy destroyers but the flotilla was ableto withdraw, practically undamaged, to aposition off Skjomnes.

16. On board HARDY the position was thensummed up as follows. The Flotilla had beenoff an enemy harbour for over an hour andwere undamaged. A surprise attack had beenmade and 24 torpedoes had been fired into theharbour. HOSTILE still had her full outfit oftorpedoes whilst HOTSPUR had 4, HAVOCK 3and HARDY i torpedo remaining. There wasno sign of enemy warships outside the harbourand those inside must have been either sunk ordamaged. It was estimated that 3 or 4 enemywarships had been inside the harbour and thatprobably only 2 were somewhere outside andcould be dealt with if met. Captain (D),Second Destroyer Flotilla, therefore, decided tomake one more attack on the harbour.

17. At about 0520 HARDY led the Flotillainto the final attack on the harbour, shipsforming astern of her in the order HAVOCK,HUNTER, HOTSPUR and HOSTILE. A speedof 15 knots was not exceeded and the line wassnaked to keep guns bearing on the harbourentrance, now shrouded in mist. As each shipturned to port off the harbour entrance, shorebatteries or any other targets visible wereengaged. Whilst turning, HOSTILE .fired 4torpedoes into the harbour and one enemytorpedo passed harmlessly underneath her.She was also hit by a shell just abaft her star-board anchor but this did little damage.

18. Just after turning to port HARDY sightedenemy ships north of Narvik and Captain (D),Second Destroyer Flotilla, made an enemyreport " i enemy cruiser and 3 enemydestroyers off Narvik. Am withdrawing to thewestward." T.O.O. 0551/10. At the sametime he ordered the Flotilla to withdraw at30 knots.

19. Whilst turning to port and withdrawing tothe west, the Flotilla engaged these enemy shipsat ranges between 6,000 and 8,000 yards. Theenemy replied but did no damage.

20. When about half way along the OfotFiord HARDY sighted 2 more warships about3 miles ahead crossing from port to starboard.At first she hoped they might be our owncruisers and made the challenge; but it wasanswered by a salvo. Captain (D), SecondDestroyer Flotilla, soon identified the 2 shipsas large German destroyers (Leberecht MaasClass) and engaged them.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 3049

21. Captain (D), Second Destroyer Flotilla,then made to the Flotilla " Keep on engagingenemy." T.O.O. 0555/10. This was the lastsignal he made as shortly afterwards a shellburst on HARDY'S bridge and he was mortallywounded. Everyone on HARDY'S bridge andin the wheelhouse was now either killed orwounded. The ship, not under control and onfire forward, was making at high speed forthe south shore of the fiord. The Captain'sSecretary (Paymaster Lieutenant G. H.Stanning) was wounded, but struggled downfrom the bridge to find an empty wheelhouse.He took the wheel himself for a short time buton relief by an Able Seamen returned to thebridge. By this time the ship had practicallylost steam and the Captain's Secretary directedher to be beached. The torpedo officer(Lieutenant G. R. Heppel), thinking thatbridge steering was out of action, had gone aftto connect tiller flat steering but finding thebridge still controlling had returned there intime to agree to the beaching of the ship. Theaction taken at a critical time by PaymasterLieutenant Stanning may well have resulted insaving many lives. Whether it was right orwrong, he showed great initiative in anunaccustomed role.

22. Shortly after HARDY had been hit,HUNTER was seen to be on fire and her forwardtorpedo tubes were missing, indicating someexplosion. She was seen to -lose steam just aheadof HOTSPUR at the same moment the latter'ssteering and all bridge communications were putout of action. Whilst not under controlHOTSPUR collided with the damagedHUNTER and these two ships, locked togetherdrew all the enemy's fire. By means of verbalorders to engine room and tiller flat, given from" X " gun deck, HOTSPUR was able to extri-cate herself from this predicament but the com-bined effects of the collision and the damagedone by the enemy caused HUNTER to sink.

23. The enemy, however, must have receivedconsiderable punishment. One destroyerappeared to have been struck by a torpedo andseemed to be aground whilst others had beenhit by gunfire. HOTSPUR and HOSTILEhad fired torpedoes at the enemy who hadreplied with four, which passed close downHOTSPUR'S starboard side.

24. When withdrawing after her collisionHOTSPUR was still under fire from at least 4enemy ships. HOSTILE and HAVOCK had gotclear to the westward practically undamaged.Quickly taking in the situation, they immediatelyturned back into the Fiord and coveredHOTSPUR'S retirement. This was a bold move,skilfully executed in narrow waters and itprobably persuaded the enemy from followingup his advantage.

•25. As HOTSPUR was being conned from aftand had no signalling arrangements HOSTILEtook charge and escorted her to Skjel Fiord.When about 18 miles west of Narvik, theGerman ammunition ship RAUENFELS wasseen steaming up the fiord. Mistaking us forGerman destroyers she continued her course andwas then stopped and blown up by HAVOCK.

26. HARDY had last been seen aground andon fire with men clambering over the side.One gun was still firing and it seemed likelythat the enemy would close and finish her off.In the event, however, the enemy held off and

160 men got ashore. The epic story of howmost bf itbe'se men reached the village of!Ballangen and were rescued by IVANHOE 3days later, has been told elsewhere.

27. About an hour after landing, HARDY'storpedo officer made his way back on board andwith a 9 Ib. T.N.T. charge" from the detonatortank blew up the steel chests in the Captain'sCabin. He was also able to rescue the Navigat-ing Officer, who had been too badly woundedto abandon ship. The action of LieutenantG. R. Heppel in returning to the ship, whichwas still on fire forward, is most creditable.

28. The results of the raid are difficult toassess and time alone will show the full effect.It is probable that 2 or 3 enemy destroyers wereput out of action and 7 or 8 merchant shipssunk. One ammunition ship was blown up.Some damage was done to wharves and jettiesby gunfire. On our side, HUNTER was sunk,HARDY put out of action and HOTSPURseverely damaged. The appearance of theflotilla in a snowstorm must have given a shockto the Germans on the day after their occupa-tion. Any plans which the enemy had forblocking the approaches must have been inter-fered with and the way was paved for our sub-sequent attacks. Some encouragement musthave been given to the Norwegians by theprompt appearance of our warships in theiroccupied waters.

29. Finally, on behalf of those who took partin the raid, I would like to pay a tribute tothe initiative and fine fighting spirit shown byour leader, Captain B. A. W. Warburton-Lee,whose conduct was an example to us all.

I have the honour to be,Sir,

Your obedient Servant,(Sgd.) H. F. LAYMAN,

Commander.The Rear Admiral Commanding

Home Fleet Destroyers.

H.M.S. HAVOCK,April, 1940.

H.M.S. HAVOCK was in company withCaptain D.2 in HARDY," HOTSPUR,HOSTILE and HUNTER during the night ofApril 9th-ioth and was the fourth ship in theline during the passage up the Otfiord.

2. The weather was overcast, with frequentsqualls of snow and the visibility varied between5 and 2 cables.

3. The passage up the fiord was without in-cident except that touch was lost once due to asudden alteration of course.

4. At 0426 the snowstorm cleared and thesouth side of the harbour of Narvik and somemerchant ships were disclosed.

5. Captain D. entered the harbour betweenthe British s.s. NORTH CORNWALL and theremainder of the merchant ships, and openedfire with guns and torpedoes. HUNTERfollowed and as soon as she was clear HAVOCKfollowed her. Fire was opened with the gunsat a destroyer alongside a merchant ship whosegun-flashes could be seen, and with torpedoesat merchant ships and a destroyer at anchor.Three torpedoes only were fired as HUNTERappeared to have hit all the merchant ships in

3050 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947

sight, and a second destroyer was not seen untilthe sights were past. All torpedoes were heardto hit ana the destroyer vanished. As the enemygun-fire was getting hot and they had the advan-tage of the light I increased speed and clearedout.

6. Just before entering the harbour twocolumns of water were seen ascending just in-shore of the HUNTER, and it is thought thatthey were caused by badly aimed torpedoes froman enemy destroyer.

7. While leaving the harbour 1 passed closeto NORTH CORNWALL, and one of theguards there fired on the bridge with a revolver.He was silenced by a Lewis gun.

8. Firing now increased from the harbourand HAVOCK was straddled but not hit. Firewas returned by the after group and an ex-plosion seen in an enemy ship, while the fore-most group bombarded the shore with H.E.shell, from which quarter a hot fire from riflesand machine guns was arriving.

9. Once clear of the harbour HAVOCKpassed backwards and forwards across the en-trance engaging ships inside with gunfire at3,000 to 4,000 yards. Spotting was almost im-possible owing to smoke but blind ladders wereused and success hoped for.

10. At 0507 a number of torpedoes were seenapproaching from the harbour and were avoidedby going full speed ahead or astern. One tor-pedo appeared to pass underneath the ship, andif it was fitted with a magnetic pistol the de-gaussing circuit undoubtedly saved the ship. Ithen withdrew out of torpedo range and as shipswere interfering with each others fire formedastern of Captain D. who made a signal" Follow Round " at 0514. By this time wewere 6,000 yards from the harbour.

11. At 0535 we passed the harbour for asecond time but were not fired at and thenHARDY led towards Rombaks Fjord.

12. At 0540 three German destroyers weresighted bearing 350 degrees apparently comingfrom Herjangs Fjord. Captain D. ordered 30knots and withdraw to the westwards atthe same time opening fire on the second ship.I turned to follow him and engaged the leadingship at 10,000 yards. HARDY made an enemyreport of a cruiser and two destroyers and inthe bad light this looked possible. The enemyhowever appeared to turn away under our fire.

13. At 0558 two more enemy destroyersappeared ahead and opened fire. HAVOCKwas slightly to port of HARDY and I engagedthe left hand ship but as soon as I saw thatthe leader was not fired at shifted to her. Therange was about 3,000 yards, and fire soon tookeffect, the third salvo hitting aft and caused aviolent explosion. She ceased fire with her mainarmament but continued to fire machine guns,an incendiary bullet from which set fire to aready-use cordite locker at A gun.

14. As we passed her I ordered the remainingtorpedoes to be fired but they unfortunatelypassed astern due to an underestimation of theenemy speed.

15. Just before HAVOCK fired! torpedoesenemy torpedoes were seen approaching on thesurface and easily avoided by combing thetracks. HARDY however who was steeringmore to port appeared to be hit by one as

there was a high column of smoke from herafter boiler room and much flame from thefunnel. Actually from accounts afterwards thiswas a salvo of shell, and she rapidly lost wayand passed astern.

16. As I was now at the head of the lineand no enemy appeared to be to the westwardof us, I turned to starboard 180 degrees andclosed the enemy astern, opening fire at 10,000yards.

17. During 'this run I passed HUNTER whowas on fire and losing speed and HOTSPURwhose steering gear seemed to be out of action.

18. Unfortunately the order to open firecould not be complied with as both foremostguns were out of action, and having no tor-pedoes I decided that it would be folly to closethe range any further, and turned to starboardpassing close astern of HOSTILE who wasmaking smoke.

•19. At this moment the two leading enemyappeared to be unhit and were firing wellplaced salvos, while two in rear were veryragged. HAVOCK was again straddled butnot hit except by splinters. -While withdrawingthe after group continued the engagement, untilthe enemy was lost in smoke.

20. .While .running to the west HOTSPURwas observed to collide with HUNTER whoappeared to be in a bad way, but the formergot clear.

21. Once clear of the smoke I drew up along-side HOSTILE and both foremost guns beingreported again in use, followed her back intothe action to relieve the pressure on 'HOTSPUR.Fire was opened at 10,000 yards and continueduntil HOTSPUR was out of range when allships withdrew. The leading enemy appearedto be still untouched and were straddling effec-tively while we were turning. They made noattempt however to close the range, after wehad slowed to HOTSPUR'S speed.

22. On the way down the fjord a merchantship was sighted which proved to be theGerman S.S. RAUENFELS, and HOSTILEstopped her with a shot and ordered me toexamine her. I fired another round into herbow and she stopped and her crew hurriedlyabandoned ship. I stopped and picked themup while the ship slowly drifted to the beach.I sent an armed boat over but she was burn-ing furiously and I was uncertain as to whethershe had used her W/T to call her friends, Idecided not to risk the loss of my party andordered their return. When the boat washoisted I fired two 'H.E. into her to hastenthe fire and went ahead. The result was cer-tainly startling, as the German literally eruptedand a column of flame and debris rose to over3,000 feet as testified both by HOSTILE andHARDY'S survivors to the west who saw itover the mountains that height. Fortunatelyno casualties were sustained in HAVOCK butsome damage to the hull was done. Judgingfrom the fragments picked up she containedall the reserve ammunition and torpedoes forthe destroyer flotilla, and also the Narvik mine-field.

23. HAVOCK then joined HOSTILE offTranoy Light.

24. From the evidence of the crew of theNORTH CORNWALL there were fourdestroyers in Narvik harbour when the attack

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 3051

commenced, two alongside the oiler, one along-side the ore pier and one at anchor. Two ofthese were hit by torpedoes from HARDY,HUNTER or HAVOCK and sank immediately.The other two were hit by gunfire and set onfire. They never left the harbour. One of thefive met outside was driven ashore and twomore damaged. The former were seen ashoreby HARDY survivors. The number of mer-chant ships sunk cannot be stated.

(Sgd.) R. E. COURAGE,Lieutenant-Commander.

The following Despatch by Vice-Admiral W. J.Whitworth, C.B., D.S.O., Vice-AdmiralCommanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron, wassubmitted on the 27th April, 1940, to theLords Commissioners of the Admiralty by theCommander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.

H.M.S. WARSPITE.April, 1940.

SIR,I have the honour -to forward the following

report of -the attack on the enemy Naval Forcesand Shore Defences at Narvik on Saturday,I3th April, 1940.

2. Force " B " which was placed under myorders for this operation, was composed of thefollowing of His Majesty's Ships: —

WARSPITE. _ Captain V. A. C.Crutchley, V.C., D.S.C. (Flying the flag ofVice-Adrairal Commanding, Battle CruiserSquadron).

BEDOUIN.— Commander J. A. McCoy.COSSACK. — Commander R. St.V.

Sherbrooke.ESKIMO. — Commander St.J. A.'

Micklethwait, D.S.O. ,PUNJABI.— Commander J. T. Lean.HERO.— Commander H. W. Biggs.ICARUS. — Lieutenant-Commander C. D.

Maud.KIMBERLEY. — Lieutenant-Commander

R. G. K. Knowling.FORESTER. — Lieutenant - Commander

E. B. Tancock, D.S.C.FOXHOUND. — Lieutenant-Commander

G. H. Peters.

3. The following instructions for the conductof the operation were received from you.

" Operation D.W. will take place SaturdayI3th April.

(i) Object destruction of German warships,Merchant ships and defences in Narvik area.

(ii) Ships of Force " B " are to rendez-vous- with WARSPITE flying the flag of theVice-Admiral Commanding, Battle CruiserSquadron, in position 67° 44' North 13° 22'East at 0730.

(iii) HOSTILE and HAVOCK to protectSkjel Fiord.

(iv) Remaining destroyers are to rendez-vous with Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet,in position 68° oo' North 11° 20' East at1030.

(v) After arrival of other Destroyers,HERO, FOXHOUND and FORESTER willbe detached to get out T.S.D.S. Destroyerof the aoth Destroyer Flotilla is to get out

A 2

Bow Protection gear* and is to form ahead ofleading T.S.D.S.* Destroyer when latter is instation on WARSPITE. The four destroyersworking their Asdics as far as practicable.Other destroyers form Anti-submarine screenas ordered by the Vice-Admiral Commanding,Battle Cruiser Squadron. The force will pro-ceed up Vest Fiord in this formation and itis suggested a destroyer should be detailed oneach side to throw a depth charge in anylikely inlet that could harbour a submarine.

(vi) On reaching Baroy Island which is thesuspected Minefield area, the A/S* screenshould as far as practicable swing into theswept waters until past the Island.

(vii) The force will proceed into Ofot Fiordengaging shore defences in passing, makingfull use of short range weapons as jvell asheavier guns. Non-T.S.D.S. destroyers andWARSPITE covering advance of sweepingde&troyers with gunfire. It is specially impor-tant that destroyers sighted should be engagedbefore they can fire torpedoes at WARSPI1E.

(viii) T.S.D.S. sweeping is to be continuedup to longitude 16° 55' East. Sweepingdestroyers are then to haul clear of WAR-SPITE recover or cut their sweeps and assistthe non-T.S.D.S. destroyers. Failing othertargets they fmay drop back and destroyshore defence guns on Baroy Island or else-where. WARSPITE will proceed to a posi-tion 5 miles from Narvik depending oncircumstances and from there cover theadvance of the destroyers into the harbourand adjacent waters where enemy ships may'be located.

(ix) Destroyers are normally to make smokeif required by Vice-Admiral Commanding,Battle Cruiser Squadron.

(x) The force will withdraw as ordered bythe Vice-Admiral Commanding, BattleCruiser Squadron.

(xi) FURIOUS is to arrange Air Attackson the following enemy positions. All forcesto synchronise with WARSPITE'S approach.

Attack (a] Baroy Island defences about1215.

(b) Romness Point, longitude16° 31' East and oppositeshore about 1300.

(c) Warships an Ballangen, longi-tude 17° oo' East, and Narvikharbour and Herjangs andbatteries at Narvik about1345'.

Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle CruiserSquadron, will signal exact times at whichthese attacks are to commence.

(xii) FURIOUS is to provide Anti-sub-marine patrol for WARSPITE from 0830 videparagraph (ii).

Time of origin 1909/1201 April.

4. The following information in regard tothe Operation was contained in your signal1547/I2th April: —

(i) Minefield reported 68° 24' North15° 59' East.

(ii) U-Boat in Vest Fiord area.

* Admiralty footnotes: T.S.D.S.—Two SpeedDestroyer Sweep. Bow Protection Gear—Paravanes.A / S—Anti-Submarine.

3052 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947

(iii) Five or six LEBERECHT MA ASclass some damaged and six Merchantmensunk inside harbour.

(iv) HARDY beached 68° 23' North17° 06' East.

(v) Baroy Island 68° 21' North 16° 07'East has Military Defences including possiblymagnetic Torpedo tubes.

(vi) Three 12 or 18 pounder guns on hillNorth of Ore Quay, Chart Number 3753,facing North-west. Four inch calibre gunsboth sides of fiord near entrance to Ranchet68° 26' 30" North 16° 29' 30" East and68° 24' 30" North 16° 29' 30" East.

(vii) One or two unidentified aircraft weresighted in Vest Fiord on i2th April.

(viii) Two friendly Norwegian submarinesare in vicinity of Sommersoct 68° 27' North15° 29' East.5. At 0200 on I3th April, 1940, having with

considerable difficulty, owing to heavy swell,completed the transfer of my flag to H.M.S.WARSPITE at sea, I proceeded with H.M.Ships COSSACK, HERO, FOXHOUND andFORESTER to the rendezvous in position67° 44' North 13° 22' East, where H.M. ShipsBEDOUIN, PUNJABI, KIMBERLEY andICARUS joined my flag. H.M.S. ESKIMOwas at this time on patrol in the vicinity ofTranoy Light.

6. Force " B " proceeded up Vest Fiord.The weather was overcast, heavy melting snowclouds producing intermittent rain, windSouth-west Force 3-4*, visibility. 10 miles.Snow lay thickly on the mountains surroundingthe fiords, down to sea level.

7. At 0747 a signal was made orderingH.M.S. FURIOUS to commence air attack atthe times stated in the orders for the operation(vide paragraph 3 (xi)).

8. At 0915 I made the following signal toForce " B ".

" We are proceeding to attack the defencesof Narvik and any German war or merchantships met. I am sure that any resistance onthe part of the enemy will be dealt with inthe most resolute and determined manner. Iwish you all every success."9. At 1009 I made the following signal

amplifying the operation orders issued by you." Operation D.W. paragraph (vi). Any

sign of enemy activity on Baroy Island is tobe destroyed by gunfire. Paragraph (vii).

' If a guide to fire distribution is necessary oddnumbered destroyers take south side and evennumber take north side. Enemy warshipstake precedence over shore targets.

Paragraph (viii). On arrival east of 17°East destroyers may use high speed but shouldnot lose the support of WARSPITE'S fire.Any enemy warship in the fiord to the northof Narvik is to be provided for before theharbour to the south is entered.

Paragraph (x). If ordered to withdraw,the signal D.B.O. by V/S and W/T will beused."10. ICARUS, HERO and FOXHOUND in

that order sweeping directly ahead ofWARSPITE while the remaining five destroyers

* Admiralty footnotes: Refers to the Beaufort scaleof windforce. Force 3—Gentle breeze (7-10 m.p.h.at sea level). Force 4—Moderate breeze (11-15 m.p.h.at sea level).

(including FORESTER, her T.S.D.S. sweephaving failed) formed an A/S screen on her—one ahead and two on each bow.

11. At 1058 Force " B " was approachingESKIMO off Tranoy Light. .ESKIMOsignalled " Submarine bearing 240° from me."This submarine was on the surface and flashed" U " to ESKIMO presumably thinking she wasfriendly. On ESKIMO turning towards thesubmarine dived. Although contact was notobtained depth charges were dropped bydestroyers in the vicinity.

12. The aiea between Tranoy Light andBaroy Island had been reported dangerous dueto mines. As the Force approached this areascreening destroyers closed ready to formastern of the sweep.

13. At 1152 in position five miles westward ofBaroy Island WARSPITE'S aircraft was flownoff with instructions: —

(a) To carry but reconnaissance for Force" B " advancing up Ofot Fiord withparticular reference to the presence of Germanvessels in side fiords, the movements ofGerman forces and the position of shorebatteries.

(6) to bomb any suitable targets;(c) to return to Skjel Fiord.

14. On reaching Baroy Island the screeningdestroyers moved to .the van; BEDOUIN,PUNJABI, ESKIMO to starboard, COSSACK,KIMBERLEY and FORESTER to port.

15. A " Swordfish " aircraft from FURIOUSwas sighted approaching from the starboardquarter. It was believed to be that allocatedto Task A in the operation orders, namely,the bombing of Baroy Island defences. Inspec-tion of the Island however showed no sign ofenemy activity and a signal was made to theaircraft "I see nothing to bomb on BaroyIsland ", in which the observer concurred andreported that he was returning to his ship.

16. At 1203 WARSPITE'S aircraft reported" German destroyer in position one mile northof Hamnesholm (67° 25' North 16° 36' East),steering west." At 1229 BEDOUIN reportedsighting the enemy bearing 073°. Fire wasopened by destroyers in the van. The enemyretired at long range and fire was intermittentowing to the poor visibility and smoke.

The blackened bow of the ammunition shipRAUENFELS blown up by the 2nd DestroyerFlotilla during their retirement on loth April,was passed in position 68° 24^' North 16° 28'East.

17. At 1240 the aircraft reported that twoenemy destroyers were off Framsk (68° 24'North 16° 49' East) and at 1250 that thesedestroyers were hiding in a bay five miles aheadof the screen, and were in a position to firetorpedoes. The number was later corrected toone destroyer.

18. The action became more general. Enemydestroyers sighted in Ofot Fiord were engagedat long range and WARSPITE opened fire withmain armament.

19. The enemy destroyer reported by WAR-SPITE'S aircraft, believed to be one of theRoeder class, had manoeuvred into the smallbay in a position 68° 24^' North 16° 48' East,

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 3053

at the head of which lies Djupvik. Her bowspointed to the eastward, and her torpedo arma-ment bore across the fiord. She was hiddenfrom -the approaching destroyers.

20. The warning conveyed by the aircraftwas therefore invaluable. The leading destroyersturned their guns and torpedo armament onthe starboard tow, and before the enemy couldfire more than one salvo, she was heavilyengaged. Two torpedoes, one from BEDOUINand one from ESKIMO struck the ship and inthree minutes she was on fire forward and aft.A report was received, however, that a figurewas seen standing by the torpedo tubes and herdestruction was completed by salvos fromWARSPITE'S main armament. Torpedoesfired by the enemy .but passed clear of ourdestroyers.

21. Meanwhile more enemy destroyers hadappeared in Ofot Fiord. In ,the smoke andhaze the targets were not clear, but at leastfour ships were observed. The enemy steamedto and fro across the Fiord bringing guns andtorpedoes to bear and turning as the limit ofthe run was reached. Our destroyers, with theexception of those sweeping, adopted a looseformation from one to three miles ahead ofWARSPITE altering course as necessary ,tobring armament to bear and avoid shell fire.From this point Force " B " advanced up OfotFiord at a mean speed of 10 knots.

22. At 1318 WARSPITE'S aircraft sightedfive torpedo tracks approaching from ahead.These passed clear to port and subsequentlyan explosion was observed at the water's edgeon 'the port beam.

23. WARSPITE'S main armament engagedthe enemy when a target presented itself. Butowing to the smoke of the destroyer engagementfire was intermittent. Speed was adjusted tomaintain support of the destroyers but to keepWARSPITE dear of the torpedo danger as faras possible.

24. At 1341 FURIOUS'S aircraft were sightedon the port quarter approaching to the attack.

25. A further torpedo exploded on the fore-shore bearing Red 20°.*

26. At 1345 sweeping destroyers hauled theirsweeps and subsequently proceeded in supportof the Destroyers of the Striking Force.

27. At 1350 COSSACK reported yet anothertorpedo approaching. WARSPITE wasmanoeuvred to present the smallest target butthe track was not seen.

28. At 1352 WARSPITE'S aircraft reportedno destroyers in Skjomen Fiord.

29. Meanwhile the engagement with theenemy manoeuvring to the North of Narvikhad become closer and another destroyer wasseen leaving the harbour distant 12,000 yardsfrom WARSPITE. She was engaged bydestroyers on the starboard wing and by WAR-SPITE'S main armament and was soon severelydamaged. The enemy's fire was becomingragged and shots were falling round WAR-SPITE.

30. Gunfire was then observed in NarvikHarbour and was thought to be from a shorebattery. At 1402 I ordered the destroyers toengage enemy destroyers while WARSPITEengaged the shore battery.

* Admiralty footnote: Red 20° = 20° on the portbow.

31. At 1417 PUNJABI passed WARSPITEwithdrawing from the action owing to hits whichhad put the main steam pipe and all gunstemporarily out of action.

32. At the same time a heavy explosion shookWARSPITE: the cause was not ascertained.

33. At 1421 WARSPITE ceased fire on thetarget in Narvik .Bay owing -to our owndestroyers fouling the range. This target hadproved to be a destroyer alongside the quayand not a shore battery.

34. The situation then developed as follows: —One enemy destroyer badly on fire, ran

ashore at Herjangen (68° 33' North 17° 33 '̂East) and was struck by a torpedo fromESKIMO.

The destroyer, which had just left NarvikHarbour, broke out in flames forward andaft, and was abandoned iby her crew closeto 'the shore northwest of Narvik.

An unknown number of destroyers retiredup Rombaks Fiord, under cover of smokefrom funnels and floats and were followed byESKIMO, FORESTER, HERO, ICARUSand later BEDOUIN.

The destroyer alongside in Narvik Harbourcontinued to fire. COSSACK and FOX-HOUND entered the harbour supported byKIMBERLEY, and under their combinedattack the enemy caught fire. FOXHOUNDapproached to 'board but was received withMachine gun fire from the shore. Then thedestroyer blew up and resistance in-the har-bour ceased.

While carrying out this attack COSSACKdrifted on to a submerged wreck.35. Until defensive action in Narvik ceased

WARSPITE lay off the entrance 'and at 1450I signalled to the Commander-in-Chief: —

" Three enemy destroyers still up RombaksFiord. No enemy opposition in Narvik Bay.Four enemy destroyers destroyed. Aminvestigating possibility of occupying thetown."36. At 1500 I proceeded up Rombaks Fiord

to clear up -the situation there. Two enemydestroyers were reported at the head of theFiord by the aircraft and ESKIMO was leadingfive destroyers to the attack.

ESKIMO passed through the narrow neckin Rombaks Fiord followed closely byFORESTER and HERO and engaged -twoenemy ships in sight. The enemy replied withgun and torpedo fire and at 1450 ESKIMO' wasstruck by a torpedo which removed the bowof the ship. Of the two enemy ships, one,after firing torpedoes, ran aground at Sildvikawhere she was destroyed by gunfire and aban-doned. The other retired under cover of smoketo the top of the fiord.

37. Difficulty was then experienced owing tothe congestion in the narrow neck of this fiord.ESKIMO was trying to get clear stern firstassisted by FORESTER, the remainingdestroyers were endeavouring to enter and con-tinue the chase.

38. At 1520 I ordered all available destroyersto concentrate in Rombaks Fiord.

At 1530 a report on the situation was receivedfrom BEDOUIN as follows: —

" One aground out of action (this was atSildvika). Two more round the corner out

3054 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947

of sight. If .they have torpedoes they arein a position of great advantage. HERO andBEDOUIN ammunition almost exhausted.BEDOUIN " A " mounting out of action.1520."I thereupon signalled BEDOUIN: —

" The torpedo menace must be accepted.Enemy moist be destroyed without delay.Take KIMBERLEY, FORESTER, HEROand PUNJABI under your orders andorganise attack sending most serviceabledestroyer first. Ram or board if necessary.1540."39. Meanwhile WARSPITE'S aircraft was

recalled and hoisted inboard and preparationswere made to carry out an indirect bombard-ment of the ships at the head of the fiord,should this be necessary. On its return WAR-SPITE'S aircraft reported sinking a submarineanchored off Bjerkvik, in Herjangs Fiord, bybombing. This sinking was accepted as afact.*

40. While I was in communication withBEDOUIN, HERO, ICARUS and KIM-BERLEY proceeded up Rombaks Fiord and,as soon as the targets could .be observed in thesmoke, opened fire on the destroyers at thehead of the Fiord. No reply was made, how-ever, and fire was checked. The enemy hadabandoned the ships, of which there provedto be three. One was already scuttled, onesank forthwith and HERO and ICARUS sentaway a iboarding party to the one remaining.BEDOUIN, on arrival, ordered boarding par-ties to return, and the enemy was sunk by atorpedo from HERO. HERO states the boardeddestroyer was .the HANS LUDEMANN.

41. As the destroyers had successfully dealtwith all enemy forces at the top of .the Fiord,indirect bombardment .by WARSPITE was notnecessary and it was decided to return to NarvikBay to investigate the state of affairs there.

42. COSSACK was still grounded on a wreckand had been under spasmodic fire from a shoregun of small calibre. Although not definitelylocated, the COSSACK silenced it by retalia-tory fire in its direction.

FOXHOUND, standing by, had sent herMedical Officer to COSSACK and was pickingup survivors from the German destroyerabandoned on fire off Narvik.

43. At 1742 I made the following report ofthe situation.

"WARSPITE, COSSACK and FOX-HOUND in Narvik Bay. Little opposition.All German destroyers sunk, three of themafter retiring up Rombaks Fiord. One sub-marine sunk by WARSPITE'S aircraft.Parties of men, possibly soldiers retreatingover hills. One field Howitzer silenced byCOSSACK. Enemy aircraft have beensighted. Damage to own ships so farreported:—ESKIMO bows blown off bytorpedo. COSSACK damaged and ashore inNarvik Bay. PUNJABI one boiler out ofaction. 1742."44. I thereupon considered the landing of a

party to occupy the town as the oppositionhad apparently been silenced.

* Admiralty footnote: It has since been confirmedthat this submarine was sunk by WARSPITE's air-craft.

With the force available only a small partycould be landed and to guard against the in-evitable counter-attack it would be necessaryto keep the force concentrated close to thewater-front and to provide strong covering gun-fire. In fact I considered it would be necessaryto keep WARSPITE off Narvik.

45. A signal was then received from FOX-HOUND that the Officer prisoners taken hadreported the presence of several German sub-marines in, the Fiord.

46. At 1800 twelve enemy aircraft weresighted approaching from the westward.

47. Apart from the above considerations Ifelt, that, to place, at the end of a long andstrenuous day, a party of less than 200 tiredseamen and marines in the midst of a force ofnot less than 2,000 professional Germansoldiers, would be to court disaster, even allow-ing for the moral effect -which the day'sengagement must have had on the enemy.

48.. The cumulative effect of the roar ofWARSPITE'S fifteen inch guns reverberatingdown and around the high mountains of theFiord, the bursts and splashes of these greatshells, the sight of their ships sinking and burn-ing around them must have been terrifying tothe enemy. But such an effect cannot be ofa lasting nature to the soldiers on shore, andI felt that to be taken full advantage of, itwould 'have required a trained, organisedmilitary force, ready to land directly the Navalengagement had ceased. If such a force hadbeen present, I believe that they would havesucceeded in establishing themselves so stronglyin Narvik that its eventual capture would onlybe a matter of time and reinforcements.

49. I thereupon decided against keepingWARSPITE stopped in the Fiord off Narvik,subject to submarine and air attack.

50. At 1832 I signalled: —" General from BC. One.* Am with-

drawinfg. KIMBERLEY is to guardCOSSACK withdrawing iher if possible fromNarvik harbour. PUNJABI to guardESKIMO."51. HOSTILE (Commander J. P. Wright)

and IVANHOE (Commander P. H. Hadow),based on Skjel Fiord, had been placed at mydisposal by your signal. I ordered thesedestroyers to proceed to Narvik and reinforcethose to be stationed there. IVANHOE hadbeen ordered to patrol the entrance to the Fiordand was therefore in the vicinity.

52. I proceeded down Ofot Fiord withFOXHOUND ahead. BEDOUIN, HERO andICARUS followed withdrawing from RombaksFiord. FORESTER was delayed embarkingthe majority of ESKIMO'S crew.

53. At 1840 when close to Hamnesholm Light(67° 25' North 16° 36' East) FOXHOUNDobtained a submarine contact and counter-attacked. This submarine was apparentlyescaping out of Ofot Fiord. A later reportreceived from the Hamnesholm Lighthousekeeper confirms this. I have since come tothe conclusion that a submarine navigating sub-merged in the narrow waters of a fiord wouldfind himself in a not very enviable positionwith Anti-submarine destroyers operating over-head and his desire to get out of it is there-fore understandable.

* Admiralty footnote: A signal to all ships presentfrom V.A.C, ist Battle Cruiser Squadron.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 3055

54. The four destroyers then formed an Anti-submarine screen and preparations were madeto repel the attack of the twelve aircraft whichwere still in sight to the northward. Thisattack did not develop although IVANHOEreported being bombed on passage up theFiord.

55. I ordered destroyers in company to beprepared to transfer wounded to WARSPITEunder cover of darkness at 2230. At 2027 Imade the following report: —

" Cornmander-in-Chief, Home Fleet(Repeated) Admiralty from Vice AdmiralCommanding Battle Cruiser Squadron.

My 1742. I am withdrawing with WAR-SPITE, PUNJABI, HERO, ICARUS, FOX-HOUND and FORESTER when woundedare collected.

BEDOUIN and KIMBERLEY remainingto assist ESKIMO and COSSACK. Haveordered HOSTILE and IVANHOE to sup-port them.

Seven enemy destroyers and one submarinehave been destroyed. There are now noenemy warships at Narvik. No shorebatteries were observed but a Howitzer on thehill behind Narvik and a field gun on theforeshore were reported to have been firing.Thirteen merchant ships in the harbour, halfappeared German. Our destroyers being inoccupation oif the harbour these were notsunk. Formationis of twelve enemy air-craft approached about 1830 but no attackhas as yet been made on WARSPITE,though IVANHOE was bombed while onpatrol off Tjel Sundet. Damage to ships andcasualties will be reported when received.Some German prisoners have been taken,details of which will be reported later."

56. Reports which were received, however,indicated that a number of wounded remainedin the destroyers at Narvik. Accordingly, at2050 I ordered course to be reversed andsignalled to COSSACK at Narvik: —

" All wounded are to be collected inPUNJABI to rendezvous with me in 17°East at midnight."

57. At 2210 I made the following signal: —" Commander - in - Chief, Home Fleet,

(Repeated) Admiraltyfrom B.C. One.

My impression ds that enemy forces inNarvik were thoroughly frightened as aresult of to-day's action and that the presenceof WARSPITE was the chief cause of this.

I recommend that the town be occupiedwithout delay by the main landing force.

I intend to visit Narvik again to-morrowSunday in order to maintain the moral effectof the presence of WARSPITE and to acceptthe air and submarine menace involved bythis course of action."In making this signal I knew that the troop

convoys making for Vaagsfiord were at sea andenvisaged them -being diverted direct to Narvik.

• 58. Meanwhile I proceeded to the Narvikarea. On arrival all destroyers in companyhaving wounded were brought alongside WAR-SPITE in turn to 'effect the transfer while theremainder carried out A/S patrol in the vicinity.

59. Transferring the wounded took a verylong time, and I was acutely aware of the pos-sibility of submarine and air attack. As regardsthe former I felt that Ofot Fiord had becometoo unhealthy an area for a submarine, witnessFOXHOUND'S attack and position of sub-marine. As regards air attack WARSPITE wasready to go ahead at any time and slipdestroyers alongside, and if air attack diddevelop it did not matter where it took place.In any event WARSPITE was there to supportthe destroyers who had done such grand work,and I was not disposed to abandon them intheir distress.

60. IVANHOE had, while proceeding up theFiord, been intercepted by a Norwegian vesselon board which were survivors of HARDY*and British Merchant ships. Tihe opportunitywas taken to distribute these survivors number-ing about 200 men to various destroyers.

61. Several large fires and explosions wereseen in Narvik nine miles to the Eastward.

62. I received a report from COSSACK thatthe condition of some wounded was so seriousas to make transfer by destroyer inadvisableand I therefore at 0250 closed Narvik to effectthe transfer by boat.-

63. During WARSPITE'S approach whiteVerey Lights were fired by a Merchant vesselin the harbour. This signal was presumed tobe a warning to whatever shore defences weremanned.

64. At 0326 COSSACK managed to drawclear of .the wreck and was berthed alongsideWARSPITE.

65. When all wounded were embarked Iordered withdrawal, the following dispositionsbeing made:—

KIMBERLEY and IVANHOE to remainat Narvik.

ESKIMO accompanied by BEDOUIN andCOSSACK by FORESTER to proceed toSkjel Fiord.

WARSPITE and remaining destroyers toproceed to the westward.66. At 1027 in reply to Admiralty message

timed 0913/14^1 April asking for an estimateof strength of enemy in Narvik area the follow-ing reply was sent: —

" Admiralty J(Repeated) Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, AURORA,

SOUTHAMPTON from B.C. One.Your 0913. Information from Norwegian

sources estimate 1,500 to 2,000 troops inNarvik. German Naval Officer prisonerstates that there are many more than this,but I think this statement was made withintent to deceive. He also states that gunson shore are being .positioned with the mainobject of opposing a landing but COSSACKaground in Narvik Bay for 12 hours yester-day was not seriously molested.

I am convinced that Narvik can be takenby direct assault, without fear of meetingserious opposition on landing. I consider thatthe main landing force need only be small•but that it must have the support of Force Bor one of similar composition. A specialrequirement being ships and destroyers withthe best available A.A. armaments."* Admiralty footnote: HARDY was lost in the first

engagement at Narvik three days previously.

3056 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947

General Remarks.67. The safe return of ESKIMO and

COSSACK to Skjel Fiord was a fitting conclu-sion to an operation which I consider was anunqualified success.

Seven or eight enemy destroyers and one sub-marine—the total German Naval Forces present—were sunk without the loss of a British ship.

(The enemy destroyer " already scuttled " inRombaks Fiord vide paragraph 40 may havebeen abandoned after -the attack by tyie andDestroyer Flotilla on loth April, 1940.)

68. Our casualties also were comparativelysmall—28 killed, 55 wounded, while the casual-ties amongst enemy destroyers with their com-plement of 280 each must have been veryheavy.

69. I cannot speak too highly of the vigourand determination with which our destroyerswent into the attack—they had to bear thebrunt of the enemy's defence, and it was onlyby •the skilful handling of their ships that theyavoided receiving heavy damage from gunfireand torpedo.

70. Our destroyers enjoyed a .tactical advan-tage in their ability to fire a heavy armamenton forward bearings.

71. The enemy reports made by WAR-SPITE'S aircraft were invaluable. I doubt ifever a ship-borne aircraft has been used to suchgood purpose as it was during this operation.In addition the aircraft bombed and sank anenemy submarine.

72. Apart from the effective fire developedby WARSPITE her presence undoubtedly gavegreat confidence to our own destroyers and putfear into the hearts of the enemy, who musthave realised that they were caught like rats ina trap.

73. The precision and coolness with whichWARSPITE was handled during the approach,and when both main 'and secondary armamentwere engaging the enemy was typical of theCommanding Officer — Captain V. A. C.Crutchley, V.C., D.S.C.

(Sgd.) W. J. WfflTWORTH,

Vice-Admiral Commanding,Battle Cruiser Squadron.

Commander-in-Ohief,Home Fleet.

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