+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Supplemental Slides

Supplemental Slides

Date post: 05-Jan-2016
Category:
Upload: auryon
View: 30 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend
Description:
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Preparedness for Biological Emergencies 27 April 2004. Jeffrey S. Duchin, M.D . Chief, Communicable Disease Control, Epidemiology and Immunization Section, Public Health - Seattle & King County Division of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Popular Tags:
13
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Preparedness for Biological Emergencies 27 April 2004 Jeffrey S. Duchin, M.D. Chief, Communicable Disease Control, Epidemiology and Immunization Section, Public Health - Seattle & King County Division of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, University of Washington
Transcript
Page 1: Supplemental Slides

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Preparedness for

Biological Emergencies 27 April 2004

Jeffrey S. Duchin, M.D. Chief, Communicable

Disease Control, Epidemiology and

Immunization Section, Public Health - Seattle &

King County Division of Allergy and Infectious Diseases,

University of Washington

Page 2: Supplemental Slides

Supplemental Slides

• The following slides contain supplemental information.

Page 3: Supplemental Slides

Fever or Respiratory Illness1 in Adults Who May Have Been Exposed to SARS

Begin SARS isolation precautions, initiate preliminary work-up; notify Health Department2

No Radiographic Evidence of Pneumonia

No Alternative Diagnosis

Continue SARS isolation and re-evaluate72 hours after initial evaluation

Persistent fever or unresolving respiratory symptoms

Perform SARS test; continue SARS isolation for additional 72 hr. At end of the 72 hrs, repeat clinical evaluation including CXR

No radiogrpahic evidence of pneumonia

Symptoms improve

or resolve

- CXR

Draft-Algorithm to Work Up and Isolate Symptomatic Persons who may have been Exposed to SARS

+ CXR

Alternative diagnosis confirmed3

Consider D/C SARS isolation precautions5

Consider D/CSARS isolation

precautions5 Use algorithm for CXR + cases

Page 4: Supplemental Slides

Draft- Algorithm to Work Up & Isolate Symptomatic Persons who may have been Exposed to SARS

Perform SARS testing

Laboratory evidence of SARS-CoV or

No alternative diagnosis

Alternative diagnosisconfirmed

Continue SARS isolation until 10 days following resolution offever given respiratory symptoms are absent or resolving

Consider D/CSARS isolation

precautionsUsing Alternative Diagnosis to Rule Out” SARS• Based on test with high positive predictive value• Clinical course consistent• No evidence of clustering• No strong epidemiologic lin

Fever or Respiratory Illness1 in Adults Who May Have Been Exposed to SARS

Begin SARS isolation precautions, initiate preliminary work-up; notify Health Department2

Radiographic Evidence of Pneumonia

Page 5: Supplemental Slides

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Symptoms and Signs

Symptom Range (%)Rales/Rhonchi 38-90Hypoxia 60-83

Sign Range (%)Fever 95-100Cough 57-100Dyspnea 20-100Chills/Rigor 73-90Myalgias 20-83Headache 20-70Diarrhea 10-67Nausea/Vomiting 10-24 (Rhinorrhea) 5-25(Sore Throat) 5-25

Page 6: Supplemental Slides

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Laboratory Findings

Range (%) Finding

17-34

70-95

30-50

40-60

20-30 (2-6X ULN)

70-94

30-40 (up to 3000 IU/L)

Leukopenia*

Lymphopenia

Thrombocytopenia*

Prolonged aPTT

Increased ALT

Increased LDH

Increased CPK

*Total WBC count normal or decreased; absolute lymphocyte count may be decreased early in course. At the peak of respiratory illness, approximately 50% of patients have leukopenia and thrombocytopenia or low-normal platelet counts.

Page 7: Supplemental Slides

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Chest Radiograph and CT

• Up to 30% normal at presentation• Infiltrates subsequently develop in nearly all laboratory

confirmed cases– 66% by day 3; 97% by day 7; 100% by day 10

• A “substantial proportion” of cases show early focal interstitial infiltrates progressing to more generalized, patchy interstitial infiltrates

• Focal consolidation• HRCT: Ground-glass opacification with or without thickening

of the intra-lobular or interlobular interstitium +/- consolidation

Wong. Radiology 2003;228:401-6; Wang. Proceedings of International Science Symposium on SARS. Beijing, China, 2003; Xue. Chin Med J 2003;116:819-822; Zhao. J Med Microbiol 2003;52:715-20. Rainer. BMJ 2003;326:1354-8.

Page 8: Supplemental Slides

SARS & Other Public Health Emergencies Diagnostic Testing: Key Concepts

• Be familiar with the appropriate diagnostic/laboratory tests

• Interpretation of results of new tests and implications for patient management

• Special procedures for obtaining and submitting specimens

• Biosafety considerations: precautions to protect laboratory workers

Page 9: Supplemental Slides

Severe Acute Respiratory SyndromeCDC Case Definition: Close Contact

• Close contact is defined as having cared for or lived with a person known to have SARS, or having a high likelihood of direct contact with respiratory secretions and/or body fluids of a patient known to have SARS during encounters with the patient or through contact with materials contaminated by the patient.

• Examples of close contact include kissing or embracing, sharing eating or drinking utensils, close conversation (<3 feet), physical examination, and any other direct physical contact between persons.

• Close contact does not include such activities such as walking by a person or sitting across a waiting room or office for a brief period of time.

Page 10: Supplemental Slides

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome What to Do Now: Absence of SARS Activity Worldwide

but in the presence of avian influenza H5N1• Identify all patients hospitalized with pneumonia and one of the

following risk factors:

• Travel to mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, or close contact with an ill person with a history of recent travel to one of these areas, OR

• Travel within 10 days of symptom onset to a country with H5N1 avian influenza in poultry or humans

• Employment in an occupation associated with a risk for SARS-CoV exposure (e.g., health care worker with direct patient contact; worker in a laboratory that contains live SARS-CoV), OR

• Part of a cluster of cases of atypical pneumonia without an alternative diagnosis. • Report to public health all cases answering yes to one of the above, and

clusters of unexplained pneumonia

Page 11: Supplemental Slides

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome What to Do Now: Absence of SARS Activity Worldwide

• For patients with pneumonia or ARDS who have recently traveled to Guangdong Province, China, diagnostic testing for SARS-CoV should be performed immediately.

• For others answering yes to one of the screening questions:

– Droplet precautions (Consider SARS isolation precautions if patient thought to be at high-risk after consultation with Public Health)

– Evaluate for alternative diagnosis

– Look for evidence of clustering

– Reassess after 72 hours and consider SARS testing if no alternative diagnosis and evidence of clustering or other reason to consider patient at high risk for SARS

Page 12: Supplemental Slides

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome When to Have a High Suspicion for SARS In the Absence

of SARS Activity Worldwide

• Situations in which a high suspicion for SARS is appropriate • The patient is part of a cluster of two or more healthcare

workers who 1) are hospitalized for CXR-confirmed pneumonia or ARDS 2) had direct patient contact, 3) have worked in the same facility, and 4) had illness onset within same 10-day period, OR

• The patient has 1) no alternate diagnosis that could explain the illness, 2) recently returned from a previously SARS affected area, and 3) either had close contact with someone hospitalized for a respiratory infection or visited a hospital while in the previously affected area and within 10 days of their illness onset.

Page 13: Supplemental Slides

Evaluation & management of patients requiring hospitalization for radiographically confirmed pneumonia, in the absence of person-to-

person transmission of SARS-CoV in the world


Recommended