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Supply Chain Dynamics and Coordination
DSC 335
Zhibin Yang, Assistant Professor
Decision Sciences
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Homecustomers
Homecustomers
Commercialcustomers
Commercialcustomers
Flowers-on-Demand floristFlowers-on-Demand florist
PackagingPackaging Flowers: Local/International
Flowers: Local/International
Arrangement materials
Arrangement materials
FedEx delivery service
FedEx delivery service
Local delivery service
Local delivery service
InternetserviceInternetservice
Maintenance services
Maintenance services
Supply Chain for a Florist
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East Coast West Coast East Europe West Europe Retail
USA Ireland Distribution centers
ManufacturerIreland Assembly
Germany Mexico USATier 1 Major subassemblies
Germany Mexico USA ChinaTier 2 Components
A Global Manufacturing Supply Chain
Poland USA Canada Australia MalaysiaTier 3 Raw materials
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Structure of Supply Chain
Multiple tiers of suppliers
Multiple tiers of customers
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Support Processes
Supplier relationship
process
New service/ product
development process
Order fulfillment process
Customer relationship
process
Service/Product Provider
Support Processes
Supplier relationship
process
New service/ product
development process
Order fulfillment process
Customer relationship
process
First-Tier Supplier
A Definition of Supply Chain (text pp 324)
A supply chain is the interrelated series of processes within a firm and across different firms that produces a service or product to the satisfaction of customers.
Ext
erna
l Sup
pli
ers
External C
onsumers
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Outline
Supply chain dynamics – bullwhip effect Causes of bullwhip effect Solutions to bullwhip effect
Supply chain coordination
Supply chain design
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Supply Chain Dynamics – Bullwhip Effect
What is the Bullwhip Effect? The variance of order quantity is greater than that of sales, and
the distortion increases as one moves upstream. Upstream members must react to the demand Slightest change in customer demand can ripple through the
entire chain
Hau L. LeeThoma Professor of Operations, Information, and Technology, Stanford Graduate School of BusinessDirector of the Stanford Global Supply Chain Management ForumDirector of the Strategies and Leadership in Supply Chains Executive Program
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Bullwhip Effect in a Diaper Supply Chain
Babies’ daily demand for diapers
Retailers’ daily orders to
distribution center
DC’s weekly orders to
Manufacturer
Manufacturer’s weekly production
quantity9,000
7,000
5,000
3,000
0
Ord
er q
uan
tity
Day 1 Day 30 Day 1 Day 30 Day 1 Day 30 Day 1 Day 30
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What Causes the Bullwhip Effect?
Demand Forecasting
Order Batching
Price Variations
Rationing Game
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Bullwhip Effect due to Demand Forecast
Stable demand with average 100 units;
Lead time: 4 weeks; At the beginning of each week, the retailer places an order before demand realizes
If demand drops by 10% (to 90 units) the order to the wholesaler drops by 60% (to 40 units)
Wholesaler Retailer
100 units
100 units
100 units
100 units 100
units
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(cont’d) Demand Forecasting
Contributing factors Lag in information flow Lack of information flow
Counter Measures Shorten lead time Better information
Current Practice / State-of-the-Art EDI and Cross docking Sharing sell-thru data
required by contracts (e.g., HP, Apple, IBM)
VMI (P&G and Wal-Mart)
Quick Response
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Bullwhip Effect due to Order Batching
Contributing factors Ordering costs Sales quotas Transportation discounts MRP systems
Counter Measures EDI & Computer
Assisted Ordering (CAO) Discounted on Assorted
Truckload, consolidated by 3rd party logistics
Regular delivery appointment
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Bullwhip Effect due to Price Variations
Contributing factors Promotions or quantity discounts cause retailers to place
larger orders to build up inventory Retailers order less in the following weeks, because
consumer demand is unaffected by promotion/discountCounter Measures
Everyday low price No discount to retailers Direct discounts to consumers through coupons
This is related to our case study #3
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Bullwhip Effect due to Rationing Game
How rationing causes bullwhip effect Limited production capacity during peak season Supplier / Manufacturer will ration the supply to satisfy
retailers’ orders; Retailers receive less than what they order Retailers inflate their orders, in anticipation of discounting in
their quantities Manufacturer observes very large volume and schedule
production to meet this inflated demand signal
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(cont’d) When Is Rationing Game Most Likely?
At supplier’s end Tight capacity (real or perceived)
At retailer’s end Anticipate demand peaks Competition with other retailers for same product
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Solutions for Battling Bullwhip Effect
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) Vendors take control of inventory management at the retailers
Quick Response (QR) Vendors receive POS data from retailers, and use this
information to synchronize their production and inventory activities.
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Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI)
How does it work? The vendor (supplier) receives inventory and point-of-sales
(POS) data from the retailers and calculates how much to ship to retailers.
The vendor places orders for supply.
VMI projects Dillard Department Stores, JCPenney and Wal-Mart Sales increases of 20 to 25% 30% inventory turnover improvements
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VMI Success at Wal-Mart
P&G collects demand and inventory information on a daily basis, from every Wal-Mart store
P&G automatically makes a shipment to Wal-Mart when inventory falls below the threshold
Because of the speed of this system, Wal-Mart pays P&G after the product passes over the scanners as the customer goes through the checkout lane
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VMI Failure at Spartan Stores
Spartan Stores, a grocery / drug store chain in Grand Rapids, MI (owned by an MSU alum?)
Spartan Stores shut down its VMI effort about one year after its inception.
Why?
Buyers didn’t trust the suppliers enough carefully monitor inventories intervene at slightest hint of trouble
Suppliers
didn’t do much to allay buyers’ fears didn’t do as effective a job as buyers
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Quick Response
The supplier receives POS data from retailers, and use this information to synchronize their production and inventory activities.
The retailer prepares individual orders, but the POS data is used by the supplier to improve forecasting and scheduling.
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Quick Response vs. VMI
Sales information passed back to the supplier.
Bullwhip effect is reduced.
What’s the difference? Who chooses the order quantity?
VMI: Supplier
QR: Retailer Who chooses when to order?
VMI: Supplier
QR: Retailer
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More on Battling the Bullwhip Effect
Lead time reduction Better information system
Better forecasting Better information system
Strategic partnering Information sharing Risk sharing
Product Transshipment Flexible delivery (3rd party logistics, truckload assortment
discounts)
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Outline
Supply chain dynamics – bullwhip effect
Supply chain coordination Coordinating self-interested members to improve the total
supply chain performance
Supply chain design
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Conflicting Objectives in Supply Chain
Decentralized supply chain: each member has his own interest and act independently
Self-interested decision makers: every member of the supply chain optimizes his own objective.
These self-interested members’ decisions may not align with the optimal decisions for the overall performance of the supply chain.
Inefficiencies across supply chain lead to decentralization cost
Solution: to coordinate the members to act as if they are a centralized supply chain (i.e., one decision-maker makes decisions in behalf of the whole supply chain)
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Conflicting Objectives – Prisoner’s Dilemma
A and B committed a crime together, and they were caught and interrogated separately by the police
What’s the best overall outcome for A and B? Both deny
What’s the likely outcome? Both confess
Can A and B coordinate to get away with the best outcome?
Prisoner B denies Prisoner B confesses
Prisoner A denies A & B: 6 months in jail A: 10 years in jailB: set free
Prisoner A confesses A: set freeB: 10 years in jail
A & B: 5 years in jail
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Supply Chain Coordination
Our goal: to attain performance of centralized supply chain with decentralized decision making
How do we do that?
1. A contract is agreed by and announced to all members before they make decisions
2. Each member independently decides and acts
3. The contract is executed
We say a decentralized SC is coordinated by a contract, if The total profit of decentralized SC equals the total profit of
centralized SC, and All members are better off under this contract, compared to
the case without such a contract (uncoordinated case)
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Coordination Issues in Operations
Can SC performance be improved by centralized decision making? – usually, yes!
Do all SC members improve their individual performance under centralized decision making? – may be NOT.
Can centralization be achieved without centralized control? That is, does there exists a coordinating contract that induces
all SC members to act as if they were in a centralized SC? May NOT. We need to design supply contract smartly.
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Example: Coordinating S.C. Inventory
Consider a simple demand driven supply chain: a buyer and a supplier
The buyer produces D = 10,000 units/year of a product at a constant rate. Each time the buyer places an order for a certain component, the ordering cost is Sb = $100. The buyer’s inventory holding cost is H = $10/yr and optimal ordering quantity:
BuyerSupplier Customers
2 2(10,000)(100)447
10b
b
DSEOQ
H= = =
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(cont’d)
The supplier produces an order whenever one is received from the buyer. Each time the seller sets up to produce a batch of components,
the production setup cost is Ss = $300.
The supplier’s total (setup) cost = Ss(D/EOQb).
Optimal ordering quantity for the centralized supply chain:
2 ( ) 2(10,000)(100 300)894
10b s
SC
D S SEOQ
H
+ += = =
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(cont’d)
If buyer orders Q=894, supply chain’s total cost is reduced
But, buyer incurs a higher cost, and will not order Q=894
The SC is NOT coordinated without a compensation for buyer
Buyer's optimal quantity
Centralized supply chain's optimal quantity Cost saving
Q=447 Q=894Supplier cost $6,711 $3,356 $3,356Buyer cost $4,472 $5,589 -$1,116Supply chain cost $11,184 $8,944 $2,239
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(cont’d) A Cost-sharing Contract
For any order quantity Q, the buyer always bears a fraction of of the total cost of the supply chain Supplier promises to pay buyer = (1–)(buy’s total holding
and setup cost) The buyer promises to pay the supplier = ()(supplier’s total
setup cost)
Buy’s optimal quantity = SC’s optimal quantity = centralized SC’s optimal quantity = 894
There exist a such that buyer and suppliers are both better off than ordering Q=447
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Factors that Affect Coordination of SC
Cooperation among self-interested agents require: extensive information sharing capabilities, trust among players, permission and coordination efforts by the controller, revealing truth about cost parameters.
Mechanisms such as pricing, auctions, contracts, or incentive rules are worth investigating.
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Outline
Supply chain dynamics – bullwhip effect
Supply chain coordination
Supply chain design Matching the type of product with the type of supply chain
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Outsourcing?VMI?
Quick Response?
Make to order?
…….
What Is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product ?
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Rule of Supply Chain Design
To match product characteristics with supply chain characteristics
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Campbell's Soup Fashion Apparel
Life cycle
Contribution margin
Variety
Forecast error
Stock-out rate
Forced markdowns
Make-to-order LT
Product Characteristics
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Product Life-Cycle: Soup
1969
1999
1989
1979
2009
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Product Life-Cycle: Fashion
Fall Winter
Spring
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Margins?
Retail Price: $139.50Retail Price: $1.39
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Variety? New Design?
Differed in color, size, style, etc., 95% new
Unchanged over years, only 5%
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Forecasting Error?
High forecast error, 40-100% errorHighly predictable, service level of 98%
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Stockout Rate?
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Markdowns?
Deep discount in the end of the seasonRare
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Functional Products
(Soup)
Innovative Products
(Fashion clothing)
Demand Uncertainty Low (forecast error) High (forecast error)
Life Cycle Long Short
Risk of Obsolescence Low High
Profit Margin Low High
Variety Low High
Demand volume High Low
Two Types of Products
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Tow Main Functions of Supply Chains
Physical function Transformation process – converting raw materials to finished
goods and moving them along SC
Market mediation Ensuring that the right variety of products are available at the
right place, at the right time, in the right quantities
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Two Types of Supply Chains
Factor Efficient Supply Chains Responsive Supply Chains
Operation strategy Make-to-stock or standardized services or products; emphasize high volumes
Make-to-order, or customized service or products; emphasize variety
Capacity cushion Low High
Inventory investment
Low; enable high inventory turns
If needed to enable fast delivery time
Lead time Shorten, but do not increase costs
Shorten aggressively
Supplier selection Emphasize low prices, consistent quality, on-time delivery
Emphasize fast delivery time, customization, variety, volume flexibility, top quality
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mismatchmatch
mismatch match
Source: “What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?”,by Marshall Fisher, HBR March-April 1997
Functional products Innovative products
Responsive SC
Efficient SC
Choose Supply Chain for Your Product
Common Mistake: Physically Efficient Supply Chain for an Innovative product
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Some Lessons of SC Design
Functional products: Don’t add complexity to a functional product, i.e. avoid trade
promotions SC players should cooperate to cut costs
Innovative products: Accept uncertainty Reduce uncertainty: new data, component commonality Avoid uncertainty: cut lead times, switch to make-to-order Hedge against uncertainty: inventory buffers, excess capacity