Support for Democracy in Malawi: Does Schooling Matter?

World Development Vol. 35, No. 5, pp. 904–919, 2007� 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

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www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddevdoi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.09.011

Support for Democracy in Malawi:

Does Schooling Matter?

GEOFFREY EVANSNuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK

and

PAULINE ROSE *

University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QQ, UK

Summary. — Education is assumed to be an important influence on citizens’ understanding andendorsement of democracy, but whether this occurs in newly democratic societies with relativelylow levels of educational provision is less clear. This paper explores the effect of education onunderstandings of and support for democratic government in Malawi—paying particular attentionto the consequences of primary schooling, which remains the modal experience of Malawian voters.Analysis of a national survey indicates that primary schooling promotes citizen endorsement ofdemocracy and rejection of non-democratic alternatives even when it has taken place underauthoritarian rule, without explicit civic education.
� 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words — sub-Saharan Africa, Malawi, democratic attitudes, education

*Final revision accepted: September 5, 2006.

1. INTRODUCTION: SCHOOLING ANDSUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE

DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Evidence on the positive relationship betweeneducation and support for democracy in devel-oped countries with considerable experience ofdemocracy is well established. In this literature,emphasis is placed in particular on ‘‘moderniza-tion’’ aspects of education, and its impact onindividuals’ political attitudes and participation(Bobo & Licari, 1989; Hyman & Wright, 1979;Lipset, 1959, 1994; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry,1996; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Evidence ofthis relationship has also emerged from transi-tion societies in Eastern Europe (Diamond,1999; Evans, 1995; Gibson, Duch, & Tedin,1992; Miller, Hesli, & Reisinger, 1994; Rei-singer, Miller, Hesli, & Hill Mayer, 1994; Rose,Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1999). In both of thesecontexts, universal secondary education hasbeen, or is close to being, achieved and the fo-cus of research tends to be on the influence of

904

intermediate and higher levels of education onpopular support for democratic transition.

Inferences derived from these studies are noteasily transferable to countries where not onlyis democracy a relatively recent phenomenon,but also many pupils do not proceed beyondprimary schooling. Nevertheless, arguments infavor of the importance of schooling for sup-port for democracy have been reiterated byinternational agencies in such contexts. Forexample, the World Bank argues that ‘‘Broadand equitable access to education is thus essen-tial for sustained progress toward democracy,civic participation, and better governance’’(World Bank, 2001, p. 8). However, as yet therehas been very little systematic research evidenceto support such claims in developing countrycontexts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa(Hannum & Buchmann, 2005). 1

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN MALAWI: DOES SCHOOLING MATTER? 905

One important exception is the work by Brat-ton and Mattes (2001a) and Bratton et al.(2005). Their research is broad in its focus, cov-ering 12 African countries, with education justone of the many factors considered. Moreover,their study covers many issues relating to polit-ical and economic reforms, with the nature ofinfluences on support for democracy being onlyone amongst these. This research highlights thecomplexity involved in understanding the rela-tionship between education and democracy inAfrican settings. In their earlier work, theauthors appear to be sceptical of the positive ef-fects of education on support for democracy:‘‘Unlike in the West. . .education does not buildsupport for democracy in Africa. . .Indeed, thevery highly educated in Africa seem to havequalms about democracy precisely because theyfear it endows illiterate citizens with politicalrights that may be exercised unreflectively orirresponsibly’’ (Bratton & Mattes, 2001a, p.117). More recently, however, Bratton, Mattes,and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) find that althougheducated Africans are more sceptical aboutthe quality of democracy that is delivered,‘‘education induces support for democracy,and it does so mainly at the expense of attach-ment to non-democratic alternatives’’ (p. 205).This relationship remains statistically signifi-cant in multi-variate analysis, but the authorsfind that ‘‘awareness of the meaning of democ-racy and knowledge of leaders have greater im-pact on democratic commitments than formaleducation’’ (p. 219), 2 and in their most com-prehensive set of analyses based on structuralequation models ‘‘education has no direct ef-fects on any reform attitude’’ though it doeshave ‘‘hefty indirect effects’’ (p. 291). Theauthors take this to indicate that ‘‘a person’sgeneral level of schooling is less immediatelyrelevant to learning deep democratic commit-ments than his or her specific awareness of pub-lic affairs.’’ (p. 291).

These findings are important and challeng-ing, indicating as they do the uncertaintysurrounding knowledge of the relationshipbetween education and democracy in Africansettings. Moreover, given the rather differentfocus of their work, Bratton et al. (2005) anal-ysis does not investigate in depth the impact ofdifferent levels of education on attitudes towarddemocracy. We therefore take a very differenttack and investigate the relationship betweeneducation and support for democracy via a nar-rower but deeper contextual analysis of the im-pact of stages of schooling in one country that

has yet to achieve even universal primary edu-cation, Malawi.

In countries such as Malawi where there havebeen long periods of one-party/man rule andwhere the introduction of democracy has inpart at least been externally driven, supportfor democracy is likely to have fragile founda-tions (Bratton & van der Walle, 1997).Although effective democracy is clearly not justa matter of obtaining popular legitimacy, suchbroad-based support is likely to be a necessarycondition for stable democratic consolidation.Education is also clearly an area where inter-ventions can and have been made and it isimportant therefore to clarify its putative rolein the process of mass endorsement of demo-cratic procedures. Furthermore, when consid-ered in conjunction with Stasavage’s (2005a,2005b) work demonstrating the positive effectsof democracy on primary education provisionand spending in general, 3 there is the possibil-ity of a virtuous circle, in which education pro-vides a pillar of support for democracy which inturn increases access to those levels of educa-tion which potentially reinforce and consolidatedemocratic practices.

In the rest of the paper, we first outline theMalawian context in terms of both its politicaland economic situation and the nature of theeducational system under which most contem-porary Malawian adults have received their for-mal training. We then present the empiricalanalysis of a national Afrobarometer survey.In our conclusion, we point to evidence of vari-ations in the impact of primary and higherlevels of education on different aspects of dem-ocratic reasoning and support. We note, impor-tantly, that these effects occur during a periodwhen Malawi was not a democracy and in theabsence of explicit civic education.

2. DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOLING INMALAWI

Following independence from British colo-nial rule in 1964, Malawi was faced with threedecades of one-party rule under the ‘‘life presi-dency’’ of Dr. Hastings Banda, representing theMalawi Congress Party (MCP). Banda’s rule isdescribed as being ‘‘marked by human rightsabuses and absence of freedoms’’ (Tsoka,2002, p. 2). Under Banda’s rule, unlike othersub-Saharan African countries post-indepen-dence, Malawi was generally characterized asa free market, capitalist economy (Acharya,

906 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

1981; Gulhati, 1989). However, intervention inthe economy was clearly evident with policiessupporting the estate agricultural sector and ahandful of non-agricultural private and ‘‘paras-tatals’’ (mainly owned by, or under the directinfluence of, President Banda) resulting in thedevelopment of a small, educated middle-classelite (Ellis, Kutengule, & Nyasulu, 2003; Harr-igan, 2001).

As with other countries in the region, Mala-wi’s economy suffered from economic recessionin the late 1970s, resulting in the acceptance ofIMF stabilization packages and World Bankstructural adjustment loans. Despite being seenas a relatively compliant reformer (Harrigan,1991), Malawi’s economy did not show signsof improvement and has remained stagnantover the past two decades. The majority(65%) of the population is identified as livingin poverty (National Economic Council,2000), with little change in real GDP per capitawhich remains at just US$170—amongst thelowest in the world (World Bank, 2005).

In the context of on-going poor economicconditions, internal and external pressure fordemocratic elections finally resulted in a refer-endum in June 1993, influenced in particularby the threat by international agencies to with-draw non-humanitarian aid (Kaspin, 1995; VanDonge, 1995). 4 Even though democracy waslargely motivated by external influences, theenthusiasm with which democracy was adoptedis evident through the overwhelming results ofthe 1993 referendum with 63% voting in favorof a multi-party system (Englund, 2002). Theresult was accepted by the Banda regime, andso was closely followed by multi-party parlia-mentary and presidential elections in 1994, witha high voter turnout. The eagerness for democ-racy was still evident in the subsequent generalelection held in May 1999, with both officialand self-reported figures for voter turnout over90%—higher than any other country in theAfrobarometer survey (Bratton et al., 2005).However, as is commonplace following found-ing elections, there appears to have been somewaning of this enthusiasm in the most recentelections, for which estimates indicate a voterturnout of around 60% (Dulani, 2004) andthe most recent waves of the Afrobarometersurvey indicate a concomitant decline in ex-pressed endorsement of democracy. 5

Neo-patrimonialism continues to be appar-ent, indicative of other African countries at asimilar stage of transition. Furthermore, partysupport during these early stages of democracy

has had a distinct regional basis with each ofthe three main parties representing the threeregions—United Democratic Front (UDF) inthe South, MCP in the Central Region, andAlliance for Democracy (AFORD) in theNorth. Little difference is evident between theparty manifestos, with each aligning themselvesto a market reform agenda similar to that of theprevious regime, couched within a poverty alle-viation strategy which would help guarantee do-nor funding (Harrigan, 2003; Tsoka, 2002). It istherefore not surprising that the party winningthe last three presidential elections is the onerepresenting the most populous region (i.e.,UDF with its support base in the South). Evenso, since the 1994 elections there has been someregional diversity in support for the various par-ties which has become more evident in the mostrecent elections (Khaila & Chimombo, 2005).

Education itself has played an important rolein the democratic process, with abolition of pri-mary school fees high on the agenda of politicalparties during the first democratic election cam-paigns in 1994. Previously, during Banda’sauthoritarian rule, emphasis was initially placedon improving quality rather than expanding ac-cess to schooling. With the introduction ofstructural adjustment reforms, inadequate hu-man capital was identified as one of the factorscontributing to the economic crisis at the end ofthe 1970s (Gulhati, 1989; Sahn & Arulpraga-sam, 1994). As a result, emphasis was shiftedto expanding access to primary schooling. How-ever, given limitations placed on governmentspending, World Bank proposals to financeexpansion through increasing primary schoolfees actually resulted in a decline in enrollment,with one-half of school-aged children remainingout of primary school by 1990 (Rose, 2003). Asa result, at the time of the transition to democ-racy, literacy rates remained low.

In 1994, the newly elected government ful-filled its pledge and immediately made primaryschooling fee-free for all children, resulting in amassive increase in primary enrollment.Although enrollment increased by approxi-mately 50%, slow progress has been made withrespect to completion of the eight-year primarycycle—approximately three-quarters of chil-dren drop out of primary school, many in theearly stages (Kadzamira & Rose, 2003).

Given that democracy is still in its earlystages in Malawi, the vast majority of thosecurrently of voting age will have been ofschool-going age during the previous era ofauthoritarian rule. Even during this period in


Malawi, civic education was in principle taughtin primary school, although it is reported thatteachers were afraid to teach it as criticism ofthe regime could lead to imprisonment withouttrial (Dzimbiri, 1998 cited in Harber, 2002). 6

Not only has explicit teaching for democraticknowledge been weak, but also the style ofteaching has tended not to encourage criticalthinking or participation, in ways that mightbe considered necessary to promote valuesassociated with a democratic political culture(Harber, 2002). Authoritarian approaches toteaching and learning have continued sincethe introduction of democracy, and have beenreinforced under current conditions of school-ing in Malawi where the expansion of the sys-tem has resulted in over 100 pupils in lowergrades of primary school in many circum-stances with very few learning materials(Kadzamira & Rose, 2003). Under these condi-tions, support for democracy could occurdespite formal schooling, rather than becauseof it. Alternatively, ‘‘the spark of education’’could ‘‘induce people to think for themselvesat least in part as an unintended consequenceof the objectives of schooling’’ (Bratton et al.,2005, p. 204).

In the following analysis, we examine therelationship between each level of educationand citizens’ responses to questions concerningtheir endorsement and understanding ofdemocracy as a desirable practice in Malawi.To do this we use a survey conducted in 1999as part of the first wave of the Afrobarometerseries (www.afrobarometer.org).

3. DATA

The Afrobarometer surveys are the mostcomprehensive undertaken in the African con-text. The Malawi Afrobarometer survey usedhere is a nationally representative, multi-stagecluster, stratified random sample of householdsproducing interviews with 1,208 eligible voters,18 years and older. 7 The 1999 survey (under-taken six months after the second elections)has been chosen for two reasons. First, giventhat democracy had only been experienced overa period of five years by the time of the survey,it allows us to examine whether or not school-ing received by those of voting age underauthoritarian rule leads to greater support fordemocracy. Second, the survey includes a par-ticularly rich array of measures of understand-ing of and attitudes toward democracy. The

sets of questions about democracy included inthis wave of the Afrobarometer allow us toexamine support for democracy using not onlya question which establishes whether a personconsiders democracy always to be the best formof government but also further questions iden-tifying those who reject alternative regimes—including one-party ‘‘democracy,’’ militarycontrol, and presidential autocracy (see Bratton& Mattes, 2001b, p. 457). The meaning of suchstated support for democratic forms of govern-ment is further refined by questions probingrespondents’ understanding of these notions.

In Bratton et al.’s (2005) multi-variate analy-ses using the Afrobarometer survey, the effectsof education are estimated as a 4-point, scaledvariable (no formal, primary, secondary, andpost-secondary education). Inevitably this ob-scures non-linear effects and more importantlydoes not provide information on the effects ofdifferent schooling levels, the consequences ofthe provision of which is of particular concernto national governments and internationalagencies. For the purposes of our analysis,therefore, the effects of respondents’ educationare estimated by comparing the effects offive levels of attainment: No formal educa-tion (13% of the sample), incomplete primary(35%), completed primary (16%), secondary(32%), and post-secondary (4%). This enablesus to focus on the distinctive consequences ofthese different levels of educational experience.

4. RESULTS

(a) Preference for democracy

Figure 1 shows that although a sizableminority of Malawians considers that in somecircumstances a non-democratic governmentcan be preferable, or that it makes no differ-ence, there is substantial agreement with thestatement that democracy is preferable to anyother form of government. This is found acrossall levels of education. However, there is alsoa clear and substantial association betweeneducational level and preference for democracy.This is particularly evident at the lower level—between respondents with no schooling andthose with only some primary education—while there is no difference between primaryand secondary education in preferences. Thison its own suggests that primary schoolingis sufficient to promote endorsement of demo-cratic government. However, although the

http://www.afrobarometer.org

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Democracy is preferable to anyother form of government

In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be

preferable to a democraticgovernment

For someone like me, ademocratic or non-democraticregime makes no difference

% r

esp

on

den

ts

No formal Some primary Complete primary Secondary Post-secondary

Figure 1. Who prefers democracy? Question: ‘‘With which of the following statements are you in agreement?’’


answers to this question address a key issue,their interpretation relies on assumptions thatrespondents have some understanding of what‘‘democracy’’ means. If they had no grasp ofwhat such democracy involves, then it wouldbe unwise to take these responses at face value.We therefore next examine directly whether therespondents possess such understandings.

(b) Understandings of democracy

The newness of the concept of democracy inMalawi means that a local term for ‘‘democ-racy’’ is not available. To address this issuethe word demokolase has been adopted, other-wise the meaning itself is translated, for exam-ple as ‘‘government for the people by thepeople’’ (boma lobvomerezeka ndi anthu in thenational language, Chichewa), or as ‘‘freedom’’(ufulu). 8 For the purposes of the survey, theterm demokolase was used (Bratton et al.,2005), and respondents were probed for theirinterpretations of the term.

Bratton et al. (2005) note that there is a weakbut significant relationship between an addi-tional level of schooling and an individual’sability to attribute a meaning to democracyacross the Afrobarometer nations. In thesecountries, almost all respondents with post-sec-ondary schooling expressed an understandingof the concept, compared with approximatelytwo-thirds of those with no formal schooling.

In Malawi it can be seen that one-quarter ofthose with no formal schooling are unable toprovide a meaning for democracy (Table 1).Even so, Malawians are amongst those mostable to provide a definition (second only toNigerians). This, the authors suggest, indicatesthat low literacy levels and predominantly ruralpopulations do not necessarily act as a barrierto basic political consciousness.

In Malawi, the majority of those who do pro-vide a definition, associate democracy primarilywith either freedom in general or freedom ofexpression in particular—again, with a largerproportion of those with at least complete pri-mary schooling most likely to do so. These re-sults therefore indicate a positive relationshipbetween understanding of democracy andschooling, with primary school appearing tomake a difference in providing an understand-ing of democracy related to civil liberties. Theimportance of civil liberties is not surprising,given the severe restrictions on freedom ofspeech evident under the Banda regime (Tsoka,2002). As a result, the transition to democracywas often directly associated with giving peoplefreedoms—including a frequently held viewthat free primary schooling meant that parentswere free to decide whether or not to send chil-dren to school (Kadzamira & Rose, 2003).

Having established that most Malawians rec-ognize the term ‘‘democracy’’ and can attributemeaning to it, we also need to confirm whether

Table 1. What does democracy mean? Question: ‘‘What, if, anything, do you understand by the word ‘democracy’?What comes to mind when you hear the word?’’

No formal Some primary Primary Secondary Post-secondary Total

Don’t know 38 52 5 7 0 10223% 12% 3% 2% 0%

Freedom in general 17 46 25 50 6 14411% 11% 13% 13% 14%

Freedom of speech 23 64 47 81 10 22514% 15% 24% 21% 24%

Multi-party elections 17 73 23 40 3 15611% 17% 12% 11% 7%

Adverse consequences 11 18 9 22 4 547% 4% 5% 6% 10%

Other 56 172 88 179 19 51435% 41% 45% 47% 45%

N = 1,205.


respondents have an understanding of particu-lar aspects of the term, and how this is influ-enced by levels of education. Figure 2 displaysanswers to four questions enquiring as to themeanings respondents associate with the notionof democracy.

Responses to these questions illustrate that,in general, people do have a good understand-

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majority rule complete freedom foanyone to criticise

government

% r

esp

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g a

bso

lute

ly e

ssen

tial

/imp

ort

ant

No formal Some primary Com

Figure 2. Who understands ‘‘democracy?’’ Question: ‘‘Peopl

the ones I will mention now. In order for a society to be called

not very important, not impo

ing of the meaning of democracy when definedin specific ways. Very few failed to give a re-sponse and only a small number of people didnot consider these attributes important. Aswith preference for democracy, education influ-ences understandings—but in diverse ways.Differences in responses to general practicesassociated with democracy, including majority

r regular elections at least 2 partiescompeting

plete primary Secondary Post-secondary

e associate democracy with many diverse meanings such as

democratic is each of these absolutely essential, important,

rtant at all, don’t know?’’


rule and freedom to criticize the government,are again most noticeable at lower levels of edu-cation. Those who have experienced post-sec-ondary education were distinctive in havingan almost unanimous understanding of ques-tions relating to the mechanics of how democ-racies work in terms of regular elections andmulti-party competition, but even at other edu-cational levels around three-quarters answeredin the affirmative.

(c) Rejection of non-democratic alternatives

The evidence would thus suggest that respon-dents do understand what is involved in thedemocratic process and their expressed supportas shown in Figure 1 is meaningful. We canfollow up on this by examining responses toseveral questions that probe respondents ap-proval of decision-making procedures associ-ated with democracy. 9 As with the questionson the meaning of democracy, these go beyondsimple positive affirmation of democracy andassess whether respondents also endorse keyfeatures associated with a democratic systemand reject those inconsistent with such a sys-tem.

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if only one political party,or candidates from oneparty, were allowed tostand for elections and

hold office?

if the army came in govern the country%

res

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No formal Some primary Comp

Figure 3. Who rejects non-democratic alternatives? Question

and more than one political party is not the only one Malawi h

we had a different system of government. How much would yo

the following alternatives to our current system of governmen

Figure 3 presents the proportions who disap-prove of each proposition by educational level.Amongst the post-secondary group, there isunanimity or near unanimity of rejection ofall non-democratic options. The strongest rejec-tion amongst all education levels is expressed inrelation to Presidential autocracy, which isprobably influenced by experience under Ban-da’s regime. In general, levels of rejection ofanti-democratic alternatives are high evenamong those with no educational experience,but additional levels of education do make adifference, with higher proportions rejectingnon-democratic alternatives to democracy witheach increase in level of education. This can beseen most clearly when comparing educationalgroups with respect to respondents who rejectall three non-democratic options.

(d) Alternative explanations of support fordemocracy

So far we have presented evidence that sug-gests that educational level is consequentialfor meaningful support for democracy and therejection of alternatives to democracy. To beconfident that we have identified meaningful

to?

if parliament and politicalparties were abolished,

so that the Presidentcould decideeverything?

all 3

lete primary Secondary Post-secondary

: ‘‘Our current system of government with regular elections

as ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if

u disapprove, neither disapprove or approve, or approve of

t with at least two political parties and regular elections?’’


effects of education, rather than a spuriousassociation, we need also to examine alternativeinfluences on these democratic attitudes thatare likely to be associated with educationallevel and which may therefore account for therelationships observed between education andsupport for democracy and the rejection ofnon-democratic alternatives.

As dependent variables in these models, were-code variables included in the analysis aboveto form two indicators of attitudes to democ-racy—(i) preference for democratic governmentversus other responses (i.e., that sometimes anon-democratic government may be preferable,and that a democratic or non-democratic gov-ernment makes no difference) which, as we haveseen, was most strongly related to the distinc-tion between no education and some primaryeducation and (ii) the rejection of all threenon-democratic alternatives, which discrimi-nates effectively throughout the range of educa-tional levels.

The choice of independent variables is guidedby theoretical considerations and the findingsof previous research. Our aim is to identifythose socio-demographic attributes that could,independently of educational level, cause citi-zens to have a more or less supportive attitudetoward democracy. These attributes are in partthose identified in modernization accounts ofdemocratic development and also those thathave been proposed more specifically in theMalawian context. We do not in this analysisinclude respondent characteristics that arelikely to be highly dependent on some level ofeducation, such as literacy or media consump-tion, and which could be helpfully understoodas mediating education’s effects—that is, byproviding mechanisms through which educa-tion works—so that to include them in ourmodels would inappropriately obscure theinfluence of education per se.

Which socio-demographic attributes can beexpected to provide explanations of supportfor democracy and rejection of non-democraticalternatives in the Malawian context? Firstly,we might expect that there could be a genera-tional and gender influence on support fordemocracy. Younger people who have moreexperience of democracy and exposure to dem-ocratic propaganda, and have grown up in anera when democracy is more commonplace,are likely to be more supportive. For the pur-poses of the analysis, we divide the sample intothree age groups—those who were born ataround the time of independence or had experi-

ence of living under colonial rule (i.e., thoseaged 36 and above at the time of the survey),those who have lived mainly under Banda’sauthoritarian rule (26–35 year olds), and thosewho turned 18 during or after the transitionto democracy—some of whom might have beeneducated during post-democracy, particularlygiven the prevalence of over-age enrollment inprimary schools (18–25 year olds). In addition,given that women in Malawi continue to playtraditional roles while men have greater spatialand occupational mobility, it might be expectedthat males could benefit more from the mod-ernizing influences of democracy and thereforebe more supportive.

We can also expect there to be a relation-ship between age, sex, and educational level,which is indeed the case. For example, amongstrespondents aged above 35, only 28% have hadpost-primary education. However, amongstthose 25 and under, this figure rises to 45%.Conversely, amongst those 25 and under, only8% report no education at all, whereas this fig-ure is 14% for those aged over 35. It is also truethat males are considerably more likely to havereceived post-primary education (43% formales, compared with 28% for females).

However, as we can see from Table 2, age isunrelated to preference for democratic versusundemocratic government and thus cannot ac-count for education’s effect on support fordemocracy. 10 By contrast, there is a significantrelationship between sex and preference fordemocratic government and the rejection ofnon-democratic alternatives, which leaves openthe possibility that sex differences in part ac-count for the observed relationship betweeneducational level and these indicators of sup-port for democracy. 11

The presence of an urban population and amiddle class of professional and managerialwhite collar workers is a key component ofmodernization theories of democratic develop-ment. These attributes can again be expectedto correlate with education and therefore pro-vide possible alternative explanations for therelationship between education and supportfor democracy. In the sample, urban residenceand social class have a particularly strong rela-tionship with education, as would be expected:60% of those in urban areas have post-primaryschooling, compared with just 28% in ruralareas, while the figures for those with no educa-tion are 6% and 16%, respectively. The vastmajority of non-manual workers have post-primary education (83%), compared with

Table 2. Summary of associations between possible confounding factors, education, and support for democracy/rejectionof non-democratic alternatives

Education Preference for democracy Rejection of alternatives

Generation and genderAge + · ·Female � � �

ResidenceUrban + + +

Region (ref. = South)North + � �Center � � �

Party support (ref. = UDF)AFORD + � +MCP · � �

LanguageDominant Chichewa · · ·

Occupation (ref. = non-manual)Manual � � �Farmers � � �

HousingNon-traditional + · +

+ = Positive association @ p < 0.05.� = Negative association @ p < 0.05.· = Not significant.


38% of manual workers, and just 11.5% offarmers.

Given that in countries such as Malawi Wes-tern-based class distinctions do not necessarilyidentify inequalities in the distribution of re-sources, we also adopt an alternative wealthindicator, namely the type of housing in whichrespondents reside. Of those in formal hous-ing structures, 43% have post-primary school-ing, compared with 16% of those in moretraditional, lower-cost structures. Urban, non-manual, formally housed respondents are sub-stantially more likely to support democracyand oppose non-democratic alternatives thanare those in rural areas, manual workers/farm-ers, and respondents in informal housing. Theextent of the difference between farmers andmanual workers also points to a relationshipbetween the effects of rural residence and classposition.

For historical reasons, educational attain-ment also varies by region, with higher levelscontinuing to be evident in the North, wheremissionaries initially established formal school-ing in the late 19th century (Kadzamira &Rose, 2003; McCracken, 1977). This pattern isconfirmed in our sample, with 47% of those inthe North possessing post-primary education,compared with 38% in the South and 29% in

the Center. We might also expect that regionaldifferences in support for democracy resultfrom entrenched support for regionally basedpolitical parties. 12 Those in the South, associ-ated with the ruling party (UDF), are likelyto be more satisfied with their levels of politicalrepresentation and, therefore, more supportiveof democracy as a form of decision makingthan those who are excluded from government.Conversely, those in the Center who benefitedmost under an authoritarian regime are likelyto be relatively less positive about the currentdemocratic system.

As expected, a greater proportion of respon-dents in the South (the base of the ruling party)do exhibit a preference for democracy. Peoplein the South and the North show a similar levelof disagreement with one-party rule, whilethose in the Center appear to be more accom-modating to this. This presumably reflects thecontinuing presence in that area of supportfor Banda’s authoritarian regime, given thatthe Center was the area of his hardcore sup-port. In general, these patterns of support byregion map closely on to the support bases ofthe main Malawian parties, both in termsof current party allegiances and the residuesof support for Banda’s one-party rule. Theruling UDF party is well entrenched in the


Southern region, thus helping to explain the rel-atively positive view toward democracy there.The somewhat less supportive attitudes in theNorth (despite its higher educational level)and the Center would seem to reflect the exclu-sion from power of many voters in those re-gions. Thus, the pattern observed hereindicates that the relationship between regionalresidence and support for democracy does notreflect education patterns across the regions. 13

(e) Does schooling matter?

The inter-relationship between some of thepotential explanations of attitudes to democ-racy and education requires that we estimatethe effect of education while controlling fortheir impact. The effects of different levels ofeducation are estimated using ‘‘no formalschooling’’ as the reference category. As bothour dependent variables—support for democ-

Table 3. Logit models of the effects of education on supp

Education (ref. = no formal)Some primaryPrimarySecondaryPost-secondary

Generation (ref. = over 35)18–2526–35

Gender (ref. = male)Female

Residence (ref. = rural)Urban

Region (ref. = South)NorthCenter

Party support (ref. = UDF ruling party)AFORD oppositionMCP oppositionOther oppositionNo party

Language group (ref. = minority languages)Chichewa

Occupation (ref. = non-manual)ManualFarmersOther

Housing (ref. = traditional)Non-traditional

N

* Significant at the 10% level.** Significant at the 5% level.

racy and rejection of non-democratic alterna-tives—are dichotomies we use logistic models.

Table 3 presents three models estimating theeffects on support for democracy. The firstmodel contains only education as an indepen-dent variable. The second model includessocio-demographic factors that might bethought either to have influenced the level ofeducation a respondent obtains, or at least tohave been present prior to the respondent’sattainment of educational qualifications. Giventhat education is temporally prior to respon-dent’s current class position and housing status,we exclude these variables from this model. Thethird model includes both class position andhousing status.

This estimation procedure provides a verydemanding test of the robustness of education’seffects, as it includes many factors that are asso-ciated with both education and attitudes towarddemocracy. All these provide different and

ort for democracy controlling for other characteristics

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

.592** .631** .640**

.825** .894** .917**

.769** .800** .734**

1.138** 1.046* .944**

�.287* �.276�.110 �.094

�.316* �.359**

.158 .237

�.102 �.146�.278* �.295*

�1.247** �1.241**

�1.870** �1.894**

�1.231** �1.270**

�1.423** �1.471**

�.072 �.088

�.559*

�.186�.210

.0231,205 1,137 1,135


competing socio-demographic bases of potentialsupport for, or opposition to, democracy. Someof these factors, such as urban residence and sex,will have influenced the levels of education ob-tained by the respondents while others, such asclass position and type of housing, are likely tohave resulted at least in part from having at-tained a certain level of education. The formerset of influences may well influence attitudes todemocracy in part through their influence uponthe level of education obtained. Similarly, thelatter set of influences will have in part been con-ditioned by prior education attainment, andmay also partly reflect that formative experi-ence. By controlling for the relationship betweenthese confounding factors and education, wemay therefore be under-estimating the contribu-tion of education to the explanation of attitudes.We can be confident, therefore, that should edu-cation survive these tests, the resulting estimatesof its effects are both conservative and highly ro-bust.

Turning first to column one of Table 3, whichdisplays the effect of education on preferencefor democracy without controlling for otherfactors, there is a highly significant differencebetween ‘‘no education’’ and all other levelsof educational experience, from ‘‘some primaryschooling’’ upwards. Further analysis indicatesthat no other differences are significant betweenlevels of education. This confirms what we sawin Figure 1.

Turning to model 2, which includes all possi-ble explanations of democratic support exceptoccupation and housing, education remainsclearly significant. It is worth considering, inaddition, the other significant influences ondemocratic support. By far the most substantialeffects are those of partisanship, specificallycontrasting people who support the govern-ing party (UDF) against all others: Perhapsunsurprisingly those who support the currentgoverning party are far more likely to supportdemocracy. 14 There are also significant posi-tive effects for being male, and coming fromthe South, although the latter effect is of mar-ginal significance and relates only to the com-parison with the Central region. In addition,there is a marginal negative effect of supportfor democracy on the youngest age cohort.However, as we can see in model 3, our fullyspecified model which includes all the possibleexplanations of democratic support, this age ef-fect is no longer significant. Instead, we see thatnon-manual workers are more supportive ofdemocracy than manual workers.

In both models 2 and 3 the education param-eters remain highly significant and, although insome instances reduced very slightly in magni-tude, are very little different from those inmodel 1. Education has a substantially moresignificant impact on support for democracythan do other socio-demographic characteris-tics, only party support is a stronger predictor.Education thus passes this extremely demand-ing test of the robustness of its effects withimpunity—though clearly, it is the differencebetween having no education at all and allother categories of educational experience thatis most important. If we consider these findingsin terms of the odds of supporting democracyrelative to the likelihood of doing so whenrespondents have no formal education, we findthat those with even some primary schoolingare 1.9 times more likely to support democracythan are respondents with no formal schooling.This increases to 2.5 for those who completeprimary education, but remains relatively un-changed among those with higher levels of edu-cation.

In Table 4 we present a similar multi-variateanalysis of respondents’ rejection of plausiblenon-democratic alternatives to electoral democ-racy. As in Figure 3, we contrast respondentswho reject all three alternatives—army, presi-dent, and one-party—with other responses.The first model again presents the effects ofeducation alone. In this case, as in Figure 3,we see a different pattern to that observed forthe support for democracy measure. Each extralevel of completed education—primary, sec-ondary, post-secondary—is consequential forrespondents’ tendency to reject clearly alter-native non-democratic forms of governmentfor Malawi when compared with no formaleducation. Unlike the analysis of support fordemocracy presented in Table 3, however, theinclusion of background characteristics inmodels 2 and 3 does have a noticeable effecton the pattern of education’s effects in thatthere is a substantial (approximately one third)reduction in the size of the coefficients for pri-mary, secondary, and post-secondary educa-tion. Completed primary schooling remains asignificant positive influence on the rejectionof non-democratic alternative when comparedwith no formal schooling, but in the fully spec-ified analysis (model 3) the difference betweenthe coefficients for the effects of secondaryand primary schooling is effectively removed.The coefficient for secondary schooling is re-duced to less than half its original magnitude.

Table 4. Logit models of the effects of education on rejection of non-democratic alternatives controlling for othercharacteristics

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Education (ref. = no formal)Some primary .276 .245 .205Primary .658** .568** .438*

Secondary 1.088** .893** .517**

Post-secondary 2.627** 2.296** 1.751**

Generation (ref. = over 35)18–25 �.218 �.22326–35 �.239 �.251

Gender (ref. = male)Female �.370** �.429**

Residence (ref. = rural)Urban .814** .603**

Region (ref. = South)North �.131 �.088Center .069 .089

Party support (ref. = UDF ruling party)AFORD opposition �.135 �.249MCP opposition �.997** �1.053**

Other opposition �.873** �.941**

No party �.600* �.692**

Language group (ref. = minority languages)Chichewa �.039 �.049

Occupation (ref. = non-manual)Manual �.427Farmers �.841**

Other .288Housing (ref. = traditional)

Non-traditional .311**

N 1,202 1,135 1,133

* Significant at the 10% level.** Significant at the 5% level.


Post-secondary education retains its significantpositive effect compared with secondary,though it too is reduced in magnitude by onethird as a result of the inclusion of the socio-demographic controls. If, again, we considerthese findings in terms of the odds of rejectingnon-democratic alternatives relative to the like-lihood of doing so with no formal education,we find that those with completed primaryschooling are 1.6 times more likely to rejectnon-democratic alternatives than are respon-dents with no formal schooling. The increasein these odds for respondents with secondaryschooling is only slight—they are 1.7 timesmore likely to reject non-democratic alterna-tive—while for the small number of respon-dents with post-secondary education theincrease is estimated to be substantial (5.8times) but with a wide confidence interval.

As with the previous analysis there aresubstantial effects of party—supporters of thegoverning party are more likely to rejectnon-democratic alternatives than are thosewho support all other parties, other thanAFORD. Women are again more receptive tonon-democratic forms of government than aremen, and we also find a strong effect of urbanresidence—rural dwellers are less likely to rejectall non-democratic forms of government. Thosein more traditional forms of housing are morelikely to reject alternatives to democratic formsof government and, somewhat more strongly,farmers are significantly less likely to reject alter-natives than are non-manual workers. Clearly,education is not the only social structural factorto have relevance for this measure of democraticorientation, though crucially it is one in whichexternal intervention is most viable.


5. CONCLUSIONS

In Malawi, education strongly predictsmass endorsement of democratic proceduresand rejection of commonplace non-democraticalternatives. This is so even though it has beenundertaken in a non-democratic setting andwithout appropriate civic education. Moreover,the educated have a firmer grasp on meaning:Not only do they support democracy, but theyalso have a better understanding of why theyare supporting it. As a tool of intervention forthe promotion of democratic cultures, educa-tion per se would thus seem to represent a goodinvestment—especially as it is effective, in partat least, even when provided at only relativelyelementary levels: Primary schooling in particu-lar has a strong positive effect on general pref-erences for democracy and the rejection ofnon-democratic alternatives. In the case of theformer, this positive effect is found even if pri-mary schooling is only partly completed,though it is accompanied by lower levels ofcomprehension toward the meaning of democ-racy (with respect to an understanding ofdemocracy as a system of regular multi-partyelections) which suggests that this supportcould be somewhat shallow.

These findings are not to be taken as indicat-ing that other experiences—such as those ofthe democratic process itself—are irrelevant. Inparticular, the effect of being a government sup-porter or opponent has an even stronger effecton democratic attitudes. Nor should we dismissthe idea that these effects will not in part be med-iated via mechanisms such as increased literacyand media consumption, but it can be arguedthat on the basis of the analysis here the faithof external agencies such as the World Bank insupporting the expansion of primary educationis not in itself misplaced. This implication is fur-ther supported by the lack of any significant fur-ther increment in support for democracy fromhaving received a secondary education. Post-sec-ondary education is consequential for a more

nuanced rejection of non-democratic alterna-tives—that is, when democratic attitudes areexamined through a consideration of respon-dents’ consistent rejection of alternatives todemocracy, without explicit reference to democ-racy as a goal—though inevitably at the currenttime only a small proportion of the populationare able to receive this benefit. It could be sug-gested, therefore, that the greatest gains in sup-port for democracy are likely to be obtainedby increasing the proportion of the populationwho complete primary education, which cur-rently is still beyond the reach of the majorityof Malawian children.

A further benefit of examining the Malawianexperience in detail has been to show that edu-cation has its effects even when it occurs in anon-democratic system, embodying hierarchicaland ostensibly illiberal values—such as was thecase in Malawi during the pre-democratic erawhen the respondents to our survey will, over-whelmingly, have received their education. Thissuggests that education’s impressive effects arederived from its impact on cognitive processesand values without regard to the specific contentof what is taught with respect to civic educationin schools. 15 The extra benefit that may attainfrom specific civic education cannot be evalu-ated here, but the necessity of such programsfor the promotion of democratic opinions viathe educational process at the expense of allow-ing more children to gain access to primary orhigher education is certainly questioned by ourfindings. They signal the possibility that, giventhe opportunity costs, investing in specific civiceducation-related subjects for schoolchildren incountries with already over-crowded curriculamight not be the most effective use of limitedavailable time and resources. Our results canthus be taken to suggest that the national gov-ernments and external agencies for whom dem-ocratic consolidation is a stated goal shouldfocus on providing more children with theopportunity to complete primary education insub-Saharan Africa.

NOTES

1. Previous analyses of development contexts have alsoaimed to assess institutional perspectives (i.e., Benavot,1996), which in contrast to modernization argumentsendorsing mass education’s role in consolidating democ-racy through its effects on individuals’ political orienta-

tions and participation emphasize the political impact ofhigher levels of education in the aggregate, anticipatingthat it will produce trained elites who will becomeresponsible for creating and running political institu-tions, and so strengthen democracy.


2. See also p. 273 which presents a range of otherexplanatory variables which have more powerful effectson commitment to democracy than formal education.

3. Stasavage argues that the reciprocal effects ofeducation on democratic attitudes are not substantial.However, given the possibility of intervention in educa-tion provision it is an effect that should not be dismissedand requires further investigation.

4. Several papers analyze the transition to democracyin Malawi, with accounts referring to the importance ofinternational factors as well as the role of the church inmobilizing domestic opposition to Banda’s regime. SeeBrown (2004) for a useful assessment of the role ofdifferent motivations behind the transition.

5. Although these changes are worthy of investigationin their own right, a decline in participation and initial‘‘honeymoon’’ optimism is generic in new democracies—post-communist societies demonstrate just this tendencywithout consequent problems for democratic stability—and our primary interest is in examining differencesbetween people with different levels of education regard-less of the mean level of endorsement of democracyobserved at any particular time.

6. Consistent with the assumption that the content ofeducation is consequential for commitment to demo-cratic practices and values, there has been considerableresearch into the promulgation of ‘‘civic education’’training (e.g., Finkel, 2003). The aim of this has been,more or less explicitly, to teach people how to supportdemocracy as a political practice to understand whatdemocracy is, and to participate in the democraticprocess. This can occur through schooling, or adulteducation programs (see, e.g., Bratton, Alderfer, Bow-ser, & Temba, 1999).

7. See Tsoka (2002) for further details with respect tocharacteristics of the sample.

8. Personal communications—Joseph Chimombo,Esme Kadzamira, and Stanley Khaila (University ofMalawi).

9. The phrasing of this question deliberately avoids useof the word ‘‘democracy,’’ given problems associatedwith the terminology—see above. We also find a strong

negative relationship between educational level and anoption for ‘‘decisions to be made by economic experts,’’but it is not clear that such expert decision making isnecessarily inconsistent with democratic practices, so wehave not used this question in the analysis reported here.

10. Bratton et al. (2005, p. 167) find that across Africancountries in the survey, those in the middle age group aremost supportive of democracy. They interpret this asindicating that younger people are more blase and olderpeople more likely to cling to past models of governance.

11. Such gender differences in political participationand support for democracy in Africa require detailedanalysis in their own right. These are being examined insubsequent work by the authors.

12. We have also examined the use of the dominantlanguage, Chichewa, given that it might be expected thatminority language speakers feel less well represented in ademocracy compared with majority language speakers.However, we found no relationship either with educa-tion levels, or with attitudes toward democracy.

13. A higher proportion of Malawians (81%) identifythemselves with a political party compared with otherAfrobarometer countries, suggesting that parties havesuccessfully mobilized support in their own region whichhas also resulted in respondents being more knowledge-able about their leaders (Bratton et al., 2005).

14. This is consistent with Bratton et al.’s analysis(2005, pp. 259–260) which also shows that ‘‘winners’’ aremore likely to approve of the performance of incum-bents, overlook corruption and support democracy.Moehler (2005) also finds that winners have higherlevels of institutional trust and more positive assess-ments of the fairness of elections. For a more general setof findings and discussion of these commonly foundpatterns, see Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, andListhaug (2005).

15. Afrobarometer datasets contain various measureswhich the authors are using to assess the role ofeducation in developing political cognition (includinginterest in politics, and knowledge of leaders) and,particularly, political values (including political toler-ance).

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Support for Democracy in Malawi: Does Schooling Matter?

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