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Supporting standards comprise 35% of the U. S. History Test
10 (A)
Supporting Standard (10)The student understands the impact of
political, economic, & social factors in the U. S. role in the world from the 1970s through
1990.The Student is expected to:
(A) Describe Richard M. Nixon’s leadership in the normalization of relations with China
& the policy of détente
President Nixon’s 1972 visit to the People's Republic of China was an important step in formally normalizing relations between the
U. S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It marked the first time a U.S.
president had visited the PRC, which at that time considered the U.S. one of its foes, and the visit ended 25 years of separation (1947-
1972) between the two sides.
Nixon’s 1972 visit to China
President Nixon’s 1972 visit to the People's Republic of China was an important step in formally normalizing relations between the U. S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It marked the first time a U.S. president had visited the PRC, which at that time considered the U.S. one of its
foes, and the visit ended 25 years of separation (1947-1972) between the two sides.
U.S. did not maintain diplomatic relations as it
recognized the Republic of China or Taiwan as the
government of China. Early in his first term, Nixon and National Security Adviser
Henry Kissinger (right) began sending subtle overtures
hinting at warmer relations to the PRC government. After a series of these overtures by
both countries, Kissinger flew on secret diplomatic missions to Beijing, where he met with Premier Zhou Enlai. On July
15, 1971, the President announced that he would visit
the PRC the following year.
U.S. did not maintain diplomatic relations as it recognized the Republic
of China or Taiwan as the government of China. Early in his first term, Nixon and
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger (right) began sending subtle
overtures hinting at warmer relations to the PRC government. After a series of
these overtures by both countries, Kissinger flew on secret diplomatic
missions to Beijing, where he met with Premier Zhou Enlai. On July 15, 1971,
the President announced that he would visit the PRC the following year.
Occurring from February 21 to 28, 1972, the visit allowed the American public to view images of China for the first time in over two decades. Throughout the week
the President and his most senior advisers engaged in substantive
discussions with the PRC, including an hour-long meeting with Chairman Mao
Zedong, while First Lady Pat Nixon toured schools, factories and hospitals in
the cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Hangzhou with the large American press corps in tow. Nixon dubbed the visit “the
week that changed the world.”
Occurring from February 21 to 28, 1972, the visit allowed the American public to view images of China for the first time in over two decades. Throughout the week the President and his most senior advisers engaged in substantive discussions with the PRC, including an hour-long meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong, while First Lady Pat Nixon toured schools, factories
and hospitals in the cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Hangzhou with the large American press corps in tow. Nixon dubbed the visit “the week that changed the world.”
The repercussions of the Nixon visit were vast, and included a significant shift in
the Cold War balance, pitting the PRC with the U.S.
against the Soviets. “Nixon going to China” has since
become a metaphor for an unexpected or
uncharacteristic action by a politician.
The repercussions of the Nixon visit were vast, and included a significant shift in
the Cold War balance, pitting the PRC with the U.S.
against the Soviets. “Nixon going to China” has since
become a metaphor for an unexpected or
uncharacteristic action by a politician.
“By opening relations with China we would catch Russia’s attention and get more leverage on them through playing this
obvious, China card. The idea would be to improve relations with Moscow, hoping to
stir a little bit of its paranoia by dealing with China, never getting so engaged with China
that we would turn Russia into a hostile enemy but enough to get the attention of the
Russians. This effort, in fact, worked dramatically after Kissinger’s secret trip to
China.
“By opening relations with China we would catch Russia’s attention and get more leverage on them through playing this obvious, China card. The idea would be to improve relations with Moscow, hoping to stir a little bit of its paranoia by dealing with China, never getting so engaged with China that we would
turn Russia into a hostile enemy but enough to get the attention of the Russians. This effort, in fact, worked dramatically after Kissinger’s secret trip to China.
Kissinger and Nixon also wanted to get help in resolving the Vietnam War. By dealing with Russia and with China we
hoped to put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate seriously.
Kissinger and Nixon also wanted to get help in resolving the Vietnam War. By dealing with Russia and with China we hoped to put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate seriously.
Although Nixon was in China for a
week, this would be his sole meeting
with the top Chinese leader.
Unknown to Nixon and the rest of the
American diplomats at the time, Mao was in
poor health and he had been
hospitalized up to only nine days before Nixon’s
arrival.
Although Nixon was in China for a week,
this would be his sole meeting with the top Chinese
leader. Unknown to Nixon and the rest of
the American diplomats at the time, Mao was in
poor health and he had been
hospitalized up to only nine days before
Nixon’s arrival.
At the conclusion of his trip, the United States and the PRC governments issued the Shanghai Communiqué, a statement of their
foreign policy views and a document that has remained the basis of Sino-American
bilateral relations. Kissinger stated that the U.S. also intended to pull all its forces out
of the island of Taiwan. In the communiqué, both nations pledged to work toward the full normalization of diplomatic policy.
At the conclusion of his trip, the United States and the PRC governments issued the Shanghai Communiqué, a statement of their foreign policy views and a document that has remained the basis of Sino-American bilateral relations. Kissinger stated that the U.S. also intended to pull all its forces out
of the island of Taiwan. In the communiqué, both nations pledged to work toward the full normalization of diplomatic policy.
Nixon and his aides carefully planned
the trip to have the biggest possible
impact on television
audiences back in the U.S.
Nixon and his aides carefully planned
the trip to have the biggest possible
impact on television
audiences back in the U.S.
The Chinese themselves agreed to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
question. The statement enabled the U.S. and PRC to temporarily set aside the
“crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations” concerning
the political status of Taiwan and to open trade and other contacts. However, the
United States continued to maintain official relations with the government of
the Republic of China in Taiwan until 1979 when the U.S. broke off formal
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and established full diplomatic
relations with the PRC.
The Chinese themselves agreed to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. The statement enabled the U.S. and PRC to temporarily set aside the “crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations” concerning the political status of Taiwan and to open trade and other contacts. However, the United States continued to maintain
official relations with the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan until 1979 when the U.S. broke off formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and established full diplomatic relations with the PRC.
While in Shanghai, Nixon declared his
intention to “build a bridge across
16,000 miles and 22 years of hostilities which have divided us in the past. And what we have said today is that we shall build that
bridge.” Richard Nixon
meets with Mao Zedong in Beijing, February 21, 1972.
While in Shanghai, Nixon declared his
intention to “build a bridge across 16,000 miles and 22 years of
hostilities which have divided us in the past. And what
we have said today is that we shall build
that bridge.”
The three objectives for the Nixon trip were 1) to
embrace People’s Republic of China for peaceful
settlement of Taiwan.
The three objectives for the Nixon trip were 1) to embrace People’s Republic of China for peaceful settlement of
Taiwan.
2) Peaceful settlement of the
Vietnam War
2) Peaceful settlement of the Vietnam War
And 3) deter Soviet Union’s sphere of
Communist influence after the Sino-Soviet
Split.
And 3) deter Soviet Union’s sphere of Communist influence after the Sino-Soviet Split.
Some consider that Nixon’s diplomacy failed all three of them, as 1)
Taiwan is still facing military threat from People’s Republic of China after the Third
Taiwan Strait Crisis in 19962) Vietnam was soon captured by the PRC-
aided North Vietnam Communists as US withdrew troops from there soon after Nixon’s
trip to the PRC, and 3) The collapse of Soviet Union was mainly on the internal/domestic economic causes of its
unproductive centrally planned economic system. However, no one can dispute that
President Nixon’s visit opened the door to Sino-American foreign relations, and paved the way to the strong economic ties that bind the two
countries today.
Some consider that Nixon’s diplomacy failed all three of them, as 1)Taiwan is still facing military threat from People’s Republic of China after the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996
2) Vietnam was soon captured by the PRC-aided North Vietnam Communists as US withdrew troops from there soon after Nixon’s trip to the PRC, and
3) The collapse of Soviet Union was mainly on the internal/domestic economic causes of its unproductive centrally planned economic system. However, no one can dispute that President Nixon’s visit opened the door to Sino-American foreign relations, and paved the way to the strong
economic ties that bind the two countries today.
Improved relations with the Soviet Union and the
People’s Republic of China are often
cited as the most successful diplomatic
achievements of Nixon’s presidency.
The rationale for opening up China was for the U.S. to gain more leverage over relations with the Soviet Union.
Improved relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic
of China are often cited as the most successful
diplomatic achievements of
Nixon’s presidency. The rationale for opening up China was for the
U.S. to gain more leverage over relations with the Soviet Union.
Nixon would push for détente with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev (left) & Richard Nixon (right) during Brezhnev’s June 1973 visit to Washington; this was a high-water mark in détente between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Détente The word is from the French & refers to archery—
when you arch the bow & suddenly release it—détente means a relaxation of tension or easing of strained relations, especially in a political context
Picture an archer who has his bowstring pulled back, his arrow aimed at another archer, who is in the same position; then,
perhaps because they both prefer not to fight if it can be avoided, they both slowly, let their hands move forward,
relaxing the tension on the bowstring, but not yet putting down the bow or removing the arrow from its place. That is the
meaning of détente.
Détente was all about relaxing the tension of
the bow
After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the two superpowers agreed to install a direct hotline between Washington D.C.
and Moscow (the so-called “red telephone”), enabling leaders of both
countries to quickly interact with each other in a time of urgency, and reduce the chances that future crises could
escalate into an all-out war.
After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the two superpowers agreed to install a direct hotline between Washington D.C. and Moscow (the so-called “red telephone”), enabling leaders of both countries to quickly interact with each other in a time of urgency, and
reduce the chances that future crises could escalate into an all-out war.
The most obvious manifestation of détente was the series of summits held
between the leaders of the two superpowers and the treaties that
resulted from these meetings. Early 1960s, before détente:
The Partial Test Ban Treaty had been signed on August 5, 1963.
Later in the decade, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
And Outer Space Treaty were two of the first building blocks of détente. These early treaties were signed all over the
globe.
The most obvious manifestation of détente was the series of summits held between the leaders of the two superpowers and the treaties that resulted from these meetings. Early 1960s, before détente:
The Partial Test Ban Treaty had been signed on August 5, 1963. Later in the decade, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
And Outer Space Treaty were two of the first building blocks of détente. These early treaties were signed all over the globe.
The term is often used in reference to the general easing of the geo-political tensions between the Soviet Union & the U. S. which began in 1969, as a foreign policy of U.S. presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford called détente; a “thawing out” or “un-freezing” at a period roughly in the middle of the Cold War. Détente was known in Russian as разрядка (“razryadka,” loosely
meaning “relaxation of tension”).
The term is often used in reference to the general easing of the geo-political tensions between the Soviet Union & the U. S. which began in 1969, as a foreign policy of U.S. presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford called détente; a “thawing out” or “un-freezing” at a period roughly in the middle of the Cold War. Détente was known in Russian as разрядка (“razryadka,” loosely
meaning “relaxation of tension”).
Based on his 1959 performance against Khruschev in the so-called
“Kitchen Debate,”as Eisenhower’s Vice-President, Nixon had earned a justifiable reputation as
a hard-liner on communism.
Nixon’s right-hand man was National Security Adviser & later
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger shown here with Anatoly Dobrynin, Andrei
Gromyko, & Leonid Brezhnev
The most important treaties were not developed until the Nixon Administration
came into office in 1969. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact
sent an offer to the West, urging them to hold a summit on “security and cooperation
in Europe.” The West agreed and talks began towards actual limits in the nuclear
capabilities of the two superpowers.
The most important treaties were not developed until the Nixon Administration came into office in 1969. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact sent an offer to the West, urging
them to hold a summit on “security and cooperation in Europe.” The West agreed and talks began towards actual limits in the nuclear capabilities of the two superpowers.
This ultimately led to the signing of the SALT I treaty in 1972. This treaty limited
each power’s nuclear arsenals, though it was quickly rendered out-of-date as a result of the development of Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRVs). In the
same year that SALT I was signed, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were also
concluded. Talks on SALT II also began in 1972.
This ultimately led to the signing of the SALT I treaty in 1972. This treaty limited each power’s nuclear arsenals, though it was quickly rendered out-of-date as a result of the development of
Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRVs). In the same year that SALT I was signed, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were also concluded. Talks
on SALT II also began in 1972.
The period was characterized by the signing of treaties such as the Strategic
Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I and the Helsinki Accords. A second Arms-
Limitation Treaty, SALT II, was discussed but never ratified by the
United States. There is still ongoing debate amongst historians as to how successful the détente period was in
achieving peace.
The period was characterized by the signing of treaties such as the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I and the Helsinki Accords. A second Arms-Limitation Treaty,
SALT II, was discussed but never ratified by the United States. There is still ongoing debate amongst historians as to how successful the détente period was in achieving peace.
In 1975, the Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met and produced the Helsinki Accords, a wide
ranging series of agreements on economic, political, and human rights issues. The
CSCE was initiated by the USSR, involving 35 states throughout Europe. Among other
issues, one of the most prevalent and discussed after the conference was that of
human rights violations in the Soviet Union.
In 1975, the Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met and produced the Helsinki Accords, a wide ranging series of agreements on economic, political, and human rights issues. The
CSCE was initiated by the USSR, involving 35 states throughout Europe. Among other issues, one of the most prevalent and discussed after the conference was that of human rights violations in the Soviet
Union.
The U.S./U.S.S.R. détente was presented as an applied extension of that thinking. The
SALT II pact of the late 1970s continued the work off the SALT I talks, ensuring further reduction in arms by the Soviets and by the
US. The Helsinki Accords, in which the Soviets promised to grant free elections in Europe, has been called a major concession
to ensure peace by the Soviets.
The U.S./U.S.S.R. détente was presented as an applied extension of that thinking. The SALT II pact of the late 1970s continued the work off the SALT I talks, ensuring further reduction in
arms by the Soviets and by the US. The Helsinki Accords, in which the Soviets promised to grant free elections in Europe, has been called a major concession to ensure peace by the Soviets.
Détente ended after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (in which, rather ironically in light of subsequent world events, the U. S.
subsidized the anti-Soviet Mujahideen fighters in the region), which led to
America’s boycott of the 1980 summer Olympics in Moscow. President Reagan’s
election in 1980, based in large part on an anti-détente campaign (“Détente . . . isn’t that what a turkey has with his farmer—
until Thanksgiving Day?”), marked the close of détente and a return to Cold War
tensions. In his first press conference, President Reagan said “‘Détente’ has been a
one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its aims.”
Détente ended after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (in which, rather ironically in light of subsequent world events, the U. S. subsidized the anti-Soviet Mujahideen fighters in the region), which led to America’s boycott of the 1980 summer Olympics in Moscow. President Reagan’s election in 1980, based in large part on an anti-détente campaign (“Détente . . . isn’t that what a turkey has with his farmer—until Thanksgiving Day?”), marked the close of détente and a return to Cold
War tensions. In his first press conference, President Reagan said “‘Détente’ has been a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its aims.”
The Carter Administration had been supporting human rights groups inside the Soviet Union, and Leonid Brezhnev accused the administration of interference in other countries’ internal affairs. This prompted intense discussion of whether or not other nations may interfere if basic human rights
are being violated, such as freedom of speech and religion. The basic disagreement
in the philosophies of a democracy and a single-party state did not allow for
reconciliation of this issue.
The Carter Administration had been supporting human rights groups inside the Soviet Union, and Leonid Brezhnev accused the administration of interference in other countries’ internal affairs. This prompted
intense discussion of whether or not other nations may interfere if basic human rights are being violated, such as freedom of speech and religion. The basic disagreement in the philosophies of a democracy and a
single-party state did not allow for reconciliation of this issue.
Furthermore, the Soviets proceeded to defend their internal policies on human rights by attacking American support of
countries like South Africa and Chile, which were known to violate many of the same
human rights issues.
Furthermore, the Soviets proceeded to defend their internal policies on human rights by attacking American support of countries like South Africa and Chile,
which were known to violate many of the same human rights issues.
In July of the same year, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project became the first international
space mission, wherein three American astronauts and two Russian cosmonauts
docked their spacecraft and conducted joint experiments. This mission had been
preceded by five years of political negotiation and technical co-operation, including exchanges of US and Russian
engineers between the two countries’ space centers.
In July of the same year, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project became the first international space mission, wherein three American astronauts and two Russian cosmonauts docked their spacecraft and
conducted joint experiments. This mission had been preceded by five years of political negotiation and technical co-operation, including exchanges of US and Russian engineers between the two
countries’ space centers.
Trade relations between the two blocs increased substantially during the era of détente. Most significant were the vast
shipments of grain that were sent from the West to the Soviet Union each year, which helped make up for the failure of kolkhoz,
Soviet collective agriculture.
Trade relations between the two blocs increased substantially during the era of détente. Most significant were the vast shipments of grain that were sent from the
West to the Soviet Union each year, which helped make up for the failure of kolkhoz, Soviet collective agriculture.
As direct relations thawed, increased tensions continued between the
superpowers through their surrogates, especially in the Third World. Conflicts in South Asia & the Middle East in 1973, saw
the Soviet and U.S. backing their respective surrogates with war material and diplomatic
posturing. In Latin America, the United States continued to block any leftward
electoral shifts in the region by supporting right-wing military coups. Neither side
trusted the other fully and the potential for nuclear war remained.
As direct relations thawed, increased tensions continued between the superpowers through their surrogates, especially in the Third World. Conflicts in South Asia & the Middle East in 1973, saw the
Soviet and U.S. backing their respective surrogates with war material and diplomatic posturing. In Latin America, the United States continued to block any leftward electoral shifts in the region by supporting
right-wing military coups. Neither side trusted the other fully and the potential for nuclear war remained.
Each side continued to aim thousands of nuclear warheads atop intercontinental ballistic missles (ICBMs) at each other’s
cities, maintain submarines with long-range nuclear weapon capability (Submarine-
launched ballistic missiles or SLBMs) in the world’s oceans, keep hundreds of nuclear-
armed aircraft on constant alert, and guard contentious borders in Korea and Europe
with large ground forces. Espionage efforts remained a high priority as defectors, reconnaissance satellites, and signal intercepts measured intentions and
attempted to gain strategic advantage.
Each side continued to aim thousands of nuclear warheads atop intercontinental ballistic missles (ICBMs) at each other’s cities, maintain submarines with long-range nuclear weapon capability (Submarine-launched ballistic missiles or SLBMs) in the world’s oceans, keep hundreds of nuclear-armed aircraft on constant alert, and guard contentious
borders in Korea and Europe with large ground forces. Espionage efforts remained a high priority as defectors, reconnaissance satellites, and signal intercepts measured intentions and attempted to gain strategic advantage.
The United States Air Force Rome Air Development Center (RADC), with the help of Raytheon, began
designing the system in 1975 and by 1980, the PAVE PAWS (in reference to PAVE, the Air Force program
name, and Phased Array Warning System), came online at both Otis AFB in Massachusetts and Beale AFB in California. Two more PAVE PAWS systems
were later installed in Robins AFB, Georgia, and Eldorado AFB, Texas, but they were decomissioned in
1995 at the end of the Cold War. The Robins AFB system was moved to Clear AFB, Alaska, and restarted in 2001 to provide full coverage defense to the whole of the western US. And combined with the BMEWS, all
but a small fraction of the South West is protected from attack.
The 1980 American presidential election saw Ronald Reagan elected on a platform
opposed to the concessions of détente. Negotiations on SALT II were abandoned.
The 1980 American presidential election saw Ronald Reagan elected on a platform opposed to the concessions of détente.
Negotiations on SALT II were abandoned.
APPEN-DIXToday’s Members of the
“Nuclear Club”
CountryWarheads active/total
Date of first test CTBT status
The five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT
United States 2,150 / 7,70016 July 1945 (“Trinity”)
Signatory
Russia 1,800 / 8,500[ 29 August 1949 (“RDS-1”)
Ratifier
United Kingdom 160 / 2253 October 1952 (“Hurricane”)
Ratifier
France 290 / 30013 February 1960 (Gerboise Bleue)
Ratifier
China n.a. / 25016 October 1964 (“596”)
Signatory
Non-NPT nuclear powers
India n.a. / 90–11018 May 1974 (“Smiling Buddha”)
Non-signatory
Pakistan n.a. / 100–12028 May 1998 (“Chagai-I”)
Non-signatory
North Korea n.a. / <10 9 October 2006 Non-signatory
Undeclared nuclear powers
Israel n.a. / 60-200Unknown (possibly 22 September 1979)
Signatory
Fini