Supreme Court Amicus Brief American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock

7/31/2019 Supreme Court Amicus Brief American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock

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No. 11-1179================================================================

--------------------------------- --------------------------------- AMERICAN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP, INC., et al. ,

Petitioners,v.

STEVE BULLOCK, Attorney General of Montana, et al .,

Respondents.

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On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To TheSupreme Court Of The State Of Montana

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BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF AARP, CAMPAIGNLEGAL CENTER, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE

POLITICS, CHICAGO LAWYERS COMMITTEE FORCIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, CITIZENS FOR

RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON,COMMON CAUSE, ILLINOIS CAMPAIGN FORPOLITICAL REFORM, LEAGUE OF WOMEN

VOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, MICHIGANCAMPAIGN FINANCE NETWORK, NATIONALINSTITUTE ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS,

PROGRESSIVES UNITED, SUNLIGHTFOUNDATION, U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND AND WISCONSIN DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

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J UDD B. GROSSMAN STANLEY M. GROSSMAN SHAHEEN RUSHD GROSSMAN LLP590 Madison Avenue18th FloorNew York, NY 10022

(646) 770-7445

J. G ERALD H EBERTP AUL S. R YAN *T ARA M ALLOY MEGAN MC A LLEN THE C AMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER215 E Street, NEWashington, DC 20002

(202) [email protected]

*Counsel of Record

================================================================COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831


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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ........................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................ 1 ARGUMENT ........................................................... 4

I. Undisclosed Corporate Money In ElectionsGives Rise To Corruption And The Appear-ance Of Corruption ...................................... 4

A. Current Laws Accommodation Of CloseRelationships Between Candidates AndSo-Called Independent Spenders GivesRise To Corruption And The Appear-ance Of Corruption ................................ 5

B. The Absence Of Effective Disclosure Of Corporate Money In Elections GivesRise To Corruption And The Appear-ance Of Corruption ................................ 9

II. Corporations Spending Money In Candi-date Elections Deny Shareholders AndCitizens The Information Needed To HoldCorporations And Elected Officials Account-able And Make Informed Decisions OnElection Day ................................................ 12

A. Corporations Have Clear Incentives To Avoid Disclosure And Accountability Target As Exhibit A ............................ 13

B. Federal Tax Laws Accommodate Cor-porate Anonymity .................................. 15


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TABLE OF CONTENTS ContinuedPage

C. Federal Campaign Finance Laws Ac-commodate Corporate Anonymity ........ 18

D. States Campaign Finance Laws Ac-commodate Corporate Anonymity ........ 20

E. More Than $120 Million In AnonymousFunds Was Spent To Influence 2010Elections, With Far Greater SpendingPredicted For 2012 ................................ 24

III. Data That Is Disclosed Is Neither TimelyEnough, Nor Accessible Enough, To EnableThe Electorate To Make Informed Deci-sions On Election Day.................................. 29

CONCLUSION ....................................................... 31

APPENDIX

Description of Amici Curiae ................................ App. 1


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIESPage

C ASES :

Am. Tradition Pship v. Bullock , 132 S. Ct. 1307

(2012) ......................................................................... 4 Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .................... passim

Burroughs v. United States , 290 U.S. 534(1934) ....................................................................... 10

Citizens United v. FEC , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) ..... passim

Doe v. Reed , 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) ............................ 11

Grosjean v. American Press Co. , 297 U.S. 233(1936) ....................................................................... 10

McConnell v. FEC , 540 U.S. 93 (2003) ............... passim

SpeechNow.org v. FEC , 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.2010) ........................................................................ 12

Van Hollen v. FEC , ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012WL 1066717 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2012) ...................... 20

W. Tradition Pship, Inc. v. Atty Gen. , 271 P.3d1 (Mont. 2011) ......................................................... 28

STATUTES AND LEGISLATION :

2 U.S.C. 434(c)(2)(C) ................................................ 192 U.S.C. 434(f )(2) ..................................................... 19

26 U.S.C. 501(c)(4) ........................................... passim

26 U.S.C. 501(c)(5) ................................................... 17

26 U.S.C. 501(c)(6) ............................................. 17, 24

11 C.F.R. 104.20(c)(9) ............................................... 19


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ContinuedPage

11 C.F.R. 109.10(e)(1)(vi) ......................................... 19

11 C.F.R. 109.21(c) ..................................................... 6

11 C.F.R. 109.21(d) ..................................................... 611 C.F.R. 109.21(h) ..................................................... 6

26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(4)1(a)(2)(i) ................................ 16

26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(4)1(a)(2)(ii) ............................... 16

Iowa Code 68A.404(3)(a)(2) ..................................... 23

Mont. Code Ann. 13-1-101(c)(a)(i) ........................... 23

Mont. Code Ann. 13-1-101(22) ................................. 23

Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-227(3) ................................. 23

Mont. Code Ann. 13-37-225 ..................................... 23

Mont. Code Ann. 13-37-229 ..................................... 23

OTHER AUTHORITIES :

Anne Bauer, Best Practices for IndependentSpending: Part One , NIMSP, July 14, 2011,http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=453 ............................................................ 20

Brody Mullins and Ann Zimmerman, Target Dis-covers Downside to Political Contributions ,Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 2010, available at http:// online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703988304575413650676561696.html ........................... 13


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Brooks Jackson, American Crossroads / CrossroadsGPS , Factcheck.org, Sept. 18, 2011, http:// www.factcheck.org/2011/09/american-crossroadscrossroads-gps ......................................................... 27

Center for Responsive Politics, 2010 OutsideSpending, by Groups , May 16, 2012,http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=U ...................................................................... 15, 25

Chris Good, Karl Roves American CrossroadsGPS Rakes in $76M , ABC News, Apr. 17,2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/ 04/karl-roves-american-crossroads-gps-rakes-in-76m ........................................................................ 7

Comments of the Individual Members of the ABA Exempt Organizations CommitteesTask Force on Section 501(c)(4) and Politics (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/ tax/pubpolicy/2004/040525exo.pdf ......................... 16

Dan Eggen, Most independent ads for 2012 election are from groups that dont disclosedonors , Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 2012, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/most-independent-ads-for-2012-election-are-from-groups-that-dont-disclose-donors/2012/04/24/gIQACKkpfT_story.html .......................................................... 26, 27


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Dan Eggen and Chris Cillizza, Romney backerslaunch super PAC to raise and spend unlim-ited amounts , Wash. Post, June 23, 2011,available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/romney-backers-launch-super-pac/2011/ 06/22/AGTkGchH_story.html ................................... 7

Dave Levinthal and Kenneth P. Vogel, Obama super PAC raises $2.5M , Politico, Apr. 20,2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 0412/75419.html ....................................................... 8

Electioneering Commcns, Supp. Explanationand Justification, 72 Fed. Reg. 72899 (Dec.26, 2007) .................................................................. 19

Eliza Newlin Carney, U.S. Chamber of Com-merce Faces Changing Times , Roll Call, Apr.24, 2012, available at http://www.rollcall.com/ issues/57_126/US-Chamber-of-Commerce-Faces-Changing-Times-214020-1.html?pos=hftxt ........... 17

Erika Lunder and L. Paige Whitaker, Cong.Research Serv., R40183, 501(c)(4) Organiza-tions and Campaign Activity: Analysis UnderTax and Campaign Finance Law (2009),available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/ R40183.pdf ............................................................... 16

FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11, 2010 WL 3184269(July 22, 2010) ......................................................... 12

FEC Advisory Op. 2011-12, 2011 WL 2662413(June 30, 2011) .......................................................... 8

http://www.americancrossroads.org ........................... 26


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http://www.crossroadsgps.org ..................................... 26

http://www.rove.com/bio ............................................. 26

Iowa Ethics & Campaign Disclosure Bd. Advi-sory Op. 2010-07, available at http://www.iowa.gov/ethics/legal/adv_opn/2010/10fao07.htm ........... 22

IRS Form 990, Sched. B, Sched. of Contribu-tors (OMB No. 1545-0047) ...................................... 17

Jonathan Martin, Ed Gillespie joins Team Romney , Politico, Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/74857.html ........ 8, 26

Keenan Steiner, Presidential Super PAC disclosures may leave voters in the dark , SunlightFoundation Reporting Group, Dec. 21, 2011,http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2011/ presidential-super-pac-disclosures-may-leave-voters-in-the-dark ................................................... 29

Kenneth P. Vogel and Abby Phillip, Primer: How super PACs rake it in , Politico, Feb. 8,2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 0212/72611.html ...................................................... 30

Kenneth P. Vogel, Rick Santorum speaks at super PAC fundraiser , Politico, Feb. 24, 2012,http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73262.html ........................................................................... 8

Kevin McNellis, Best Practices for IndependentSpending: Part Two , NIMSP, Mar. 15, 2012,http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=480 ...................................................... 22, 30


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Louis Brandeis, Other Peoples Money (NatlHome Library Found. ed. 1933) ............................... 9

Michael Isikoff, Firm gives $1 million to pro- Romney group, then dissolves , NBC News, Aug. 4, 2011, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 44011308/ns/politics-decision_2012 ........................ 18

Peter Stone, Democrats and Republicans alikeare exploiting new fundraising loophole ,iWatchNews, July 26, 2011, http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/07/27/5409/democrats-and-republicans-alike-are-exploiting-new-fundraising-loophole ...................................................................... 8

Pol. Comm. Status, Supp. Explanation andJustification, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595 (Feb. 7,2007) ........................................................................ 18

Rev. Rul. 68-45, 1968-1 C.B. 259 ................................ 16

Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Pro- foundly Affects Political Landscape , Open Se-crets Blog, May 5, 2011, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html .......... 25

Statement of Reasons of Chairman Matthew S.

Pettersen and Commrs Caroline C. Hunter andDonald F. McGahn, FEC Matter Under Review6002 (Aug. 2010), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/10044274536.pdf ...... 19, 20


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The Colbert Report (Comedy Central televisionbroadcast Apr. 3, 2012), available at http:// www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/ 411673/april-03-2012/colbert-super-pac-shh----501c4-disclosure ..........................................................


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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

This amici curiae brief is filed on behalf of 14nonprofit, nonpartisan organizations that supporteffective campaign finance disclosure laws to ensuretransparency and protect the integrity of govern-ment. 2

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In Citizens United v. FEC , this Court invalidateda longstanding federal law prohibition on corporateindependent expenditures, concluding that inde-pendent expenditures, including those made bycorporations, do not give rise to corruption or theappearance of corruption. 130 S. Ct. 876, 909, 913(2010). The Court seemingly based its conclusion onat least two faulty assumptions. First, the Courtassumed that so-called independent expendituresas defined in law require [t]he absence of prear-rangement and coordination and, therefore, do not

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel of record for all partiesreceived notice at least 10 days prior to the due date of the amicicuriae s intention to file this brief.

Letters consenting to the filing of this brief have been filedwith the Clerk. This brief was not authored in whole or in partby counsel for a party. No person or entity other than amici ortheir counsel made a monetary contribution to the brief spreparation or submission.

2 A description of amici curiae is attached as an Appendix.


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present the danger that expenditures will be givenas a quid pro quo for improper commitments from thecandidate. Id . at 908 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo , 424U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam)). Second, the Courtassumed that current disclosure laws would provide

citizens with the information needed to see wheth-er elected officials are in the pocket of so-calledmoneyed interests. Id . at 916 (quoting McConnell v.

FEC , 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.)).

These assumptions are contrary to experiencesince Citizens United . First, the law accommodatesclose relationships between so-called independentspenders and candidates and the resulting expendi-tures do give rise to corruption and the appearance of

corruption. Second, citizens do not have the infor-mation needed to see whether elected officials arein the pocket of so-called moneyed interests. Id . TheCourt has long recognized that disclosure require-ments deter actual corruption and avoid the appear-ance of corruption by exposing large contributionsand expenditures to the light of publicity. Buckley ,424 U.S. at 67. The inevitable corollary is that undis-closed money in politics gives rise to corruption andthe appearance of corruption.

Part I of amici s argument details how currentlaw accommodates close relationships between candi-dates and so-called independent spenders and how particularly in the absence of effective disclosure corporate funds used for so-called independent


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expenditures could lead to corruption and the ap-pearance of corruption.

Part II explains how more than $120 million inanonymous-source funds was spent to influence the2010 elections, with far greater spending of anony-mous funds projected for 2012. Specifically, Part IIdetails how tax and campaign finance laws facilitatecorporations predictable desire to deny citizens theinformation needed to hold corporations and electedofficials accountable and make informed decisions onElection Day.

Finally, Part III makes clear that even whencampaign finance data is disclosed, the data too oftenis neither timely enough, nor accessible enough, toenable the electorate to make informed decisions onElection Day.

For these reasons, amici respectfully urge theCourt to deny certiorari and leave standing Mon-tanas law. If, however, the Court grants certiorari ,the Court should grant plenary review, reconsider itsholding in Citizens United that independent expendi-tures do not give rise to corruption or the appearanceof corruption, and affirm the judgment of the Su-

preme Court of Montana.--------------------------------- ---------------------------------


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ARGUMENT

I. Undisclosed Corporate Money In ElectionsGives Rise To Corruption And The Appear-ance Of Corruption.

In Citizens United , this Court concluded thatindependent expenditures, including those made bycorporations, do not give rise to corruption or theappearance of corruption. 130 S. Ct. at 909. In astatement accompanying the Courts order stayingthis case, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer,called into question this holding:

Montanas experience, and experience else-where since this Courts decision in CitizensUnited . . . make it exceedingly difficult to

maintain that independent expenditures bycorporations do not give rise to corruption orthe appearance of corruption.

Am. Tradition Pship v. Bullock , 132 S. Ct. 1307,1307-08 (2012) (order granting stay) (internal cita-tions omitted).

Amici respectfully submit that it is impossible tomaintain that independent expenditures can never becorruptive. Existing law accommodates close relation-

ships between so-called independent spenders andcandidates, which gives rise to corruption and theappearance of corruption. This threat of corruptionand the appearance of corruption is compounded bythe fact that citizens do not have the informationneeded to see whether elected officials are in the


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pocket of so-called moneyed interests. CitizensUnited , 130 S. Ct. at 916.

A. Current Laws Accommodation Of CloseRelationships Between Candidates AndSo-Called Independent Spenders GivesRise To Corruption And The Appear-ance Of Corruption.

Citizens United wrongly assumed that [t]he ab-sence of prearrangement and coordination . . . withthe candidate . . . alleviates the danger that expendi-tures will be given as a quid pro quo for impropercommitments from the candidate. Id . at 908 (quoting

Buckley , 424 U.S. at 47). In Buckley , this quote fol-

lows a dubious presumption that expenditures meet-ing the legal definition of independent expenditureare in fact made totally independently of the candi-date and his campaign. 424 U.S. at 47 (emphasisadded).

In McConnell , discussing the dividing linebetween coordinated and independent expendi-tures, the Court emphasized that the latter should beexpenditures that truly are independent and quotedthe Buckley Courts assertion that such expendituresshould be made totally independently of the candi-date and his campaign. 540 U.S. at 221 (quoting

Buckley , 424 U.S. at 47).

Perhaps it is this rhetoric regarding expendituresthat are truly independent and made totally inde-pendently of candidates that led the Citizens United


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Court to conclude that independent expenditures,including those made by corporations, do not give riseto corruption or the appearance of corruption. 130S. Ct. at 909.

However, federal campaign finance laws and thelaws of most states do not require true or totalindependence between candidates and so-called in-dependent spenders. Instead, coordination only oc-curs under federal law when an expenditure for aspecific communication (i.e., political ad) meets both prongs of the coordinated communication regula-tion: (1) the ad contains specified content 3 and (2) thecandidate suggests or requests the ad; is materiallyinvolved in the spenders decisions regarding the con-

tent of the ad, the intended audience, or the mediaoutlet used; or otherwise meets one of the rules nar-row conduct standards. 4 See 11 C.F.R. 109.21(c)(content standards) and 109.21(d) (conduct standards).

3 The coordination rules content standards vary depend-ing on the proximity of the ad to an election. If the ad is airedmore than 120 days before a Presidential primary election, ormore than 90 days before a House or Senate election, the ad only

meets the content standard if it expressly advocates a candi-dates election or defeat, or republishes a candidates campaignmaterials. See 11 C.F.R. 109.21(c).

4 The coordination rules conduct standards are also metby use of a common vendor absent a firewall, or involvement of a person or contractor who had been employed by the candidatein the previous 120 days, absent a firewall. See 11 C.F.R. 109.21(d)(1)-(5) and 109.21(h).


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Federal coordination rules are so narrow andlimited in scope that an independent spender can bemarried to a candidate and share the same homewithout running afoul of federal coordination limits,so long as the spouses refrain from discussing the

details of specific ad buys.Some of the most prominent independent expen-

diture organizations raising unlimited corporate,union and individual funds to finance their expendi-tures have been set up by close associates andformer employees of the candidates they support.

For example, the independent expenditure-onlypolitical committee (a.k.a. super PAC) Restore OurFuture, which is dedicated to the election of MittRomney as President of the United States, is run byseveral former Romney aides, including Charles R.Spies, who served as general counsel to Romneys2008 Presidential campaign. 5 Super PAC AmericanCrossroads was co-founded by Ed Gillespie, 6 whorecently became a Senior Advisor to Mitt Romneys

5 See Dan Eggen and Chris Cillizza, Romney backers launch

super PAC to raise and spend unlimited amounts , Wash. Post,June 23, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ romney-backers-launch-super-pac/2011/06/22/AGTkGchH_story.html.

6 See Chris Good, Karl Roves American Crossroads GPS Rakes in $76M , ABC News, Apr. 17, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/karl-roves-american-crossroads-gps-rakes-in-76m; see also http://www.crossroadsgps.org and http://www.americancrossroads.org.


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2012 presidential campaign. 7 The super PAC Priori-ties USA Action, which supports the reelection of President Obama, was co-founded by former ObamaWhite House aides Bill Burton and Sean Sweeney. 8

Not only does the law permit close associates andformer employees of candidates to set up independ-ent expenditure committees, but the FEC has alsointerpreted federal law to permit candidates to at-tend, speak at, and be featured guests at fundraisersfor the Committees at which unlimited individual,corporate, and labor organization contributions aresolicited, so long as they restrict any solicitation theymake to funds subject to the [Federal Election Cam-paign Acts] limitations, prohibitions and reporting

requirements. FEC Advisory Op. 2011-12, 2011 WL2662413, at *1 (June 30, 2011). Super PACs and thecandidates they support immediately capitalized on theFECs blessing of coordinated fundraising. 9 The abili-ty of candidates to be featured guests and speakers

7 See Jonathan Martin, Ed Gillespie joins Team Romney ,Politico, Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/ 74857.html.

8 See Dave Levinthal and Kenneth P. Vogel, Obama super PAC raises $2.5M , Politico, Apr. 20, 2012, http://www.politico.

com/news/stories/0412/75419.html.9 See, e.g. , Peter Stone, Democrats and Republicans alikeare exploiting new fundraising loophole , iWatchNews, July 26,2011, http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/07/27/5409/democrats-and-republicans-alike-are-exploiting-new-fundraising-loophole; KennethP. Vogel, Rick Santorum Speaks at super PAC fundraiser ,Politico, Feb. 24, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/ 73262.html.


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at the fundraising events of so-called independentspenders obliterates any notion of true or totalindependence.

The simple fact that the spending of unlimitedcorporate, union and individual dollars meets thelegal definition of independent expenditure by nomeans alleviates the danger that expenditures willbe given as a quid pro quo for improper commitmentsfrom the candidate. Citizens United , 130 S. Ct. at908 (quoting Buckley , 424 U.S. at 47).

Experience since Citizens United has taught that with the laws ready accommodation of close relation-ships and coordinated fundraising activities betweencandidates and supposedly independent spenders independent expenditures do give rise to corruptionand the appearance of corruption.

B. The Absence Of Effective Disclosure Of Corporate Money In Elections GivesRise To Corruption And The Appear-ance Of Corruption.

Justice Brandeis famously wrote nearly a centu-ry ago: Sunlight is . . . the best . . . disinfectant, and

electric light the most efficient policeman. LouisBrandeis, Other Peoples Money 62 (Natl Home Li-brary Found. ed. 1933), quoted in Buckley , 424 U.S. at67.

This Court has long agreed with Justice Brandeis,recognizing the importance of disclosure to preventing


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political corruption. In Burroughs v. United States ,290 U.S. 534 (1934), the Court wrote that it cannotbe denied that disclosure would tend to prevent thecorrupt use of money to affect elections[.] Id . at 548.

Similarly, in Grosjean v. American Press Co. , 297U.S. 233 (1936), the Court made clear that informedpublic opinion is the most potent of all restraintsupon misgovernment. Id. at 250.

Decades later, the Buckley Court reiterated:

[D]isclosure requirements deter actual cor-ruption and avoid the appearance of corrup-tion by exposing large contributions andexpenditures to the light of publicity. Thisexposure may discourage those who woulduse money for improper purposes either be-fore or after the election. A public armedwith information about a candidates mostgenerous supporters is better able to detectany post-election special favors that may begiven in return.

424 U.S. at 67 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). As this passage from Buckley makes clear, the corrup-tion-preventing value of disclosure is inextricablylinked to the broader necessity for a well-informedelectorate a public armed with information in ademocracy such as ours. Id . Furthermore,

[D]isclosure provides the electorate with in-formation as to where political campaignmoney comes from and how it is spent by thecandidate in order to aid the voters in eval-uating those who seek federal office. . . . The


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sources of a candidates financial supportalso alert the voter to the interests to whicha candidate is most likely to be responsiveand thus facilitate predictions of future per-formance in office.

Id . at 66-67 (footnote omitted). Again in McConnell , the Court recognized disclo-

sures vital role in providing the electorate with in-formation, deterring actual corruption and avoidingany appearance thereof , and gathering the data neces-sary to enforce more substantive electioneering re-strictions. 540 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added).

McConnell recognized the importance of the First Amendment interests of individual citizens seeking to

make informed choices in the political marketplace. Id . at 197 (quoting McConnell v. FEC , 251 F. Supp. 2d176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003)).

The importance of effective disclosure to prevent-ing corruption is thus well established. Without ef-fective disclosure, corruption thrives and, in thewords of Justice Scalia, democracy is doomed. Doe v.

Reed , 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Scalia, J., concur-ring).

As amici explain in Section II, below, corpora-tions freed by Citizens United to make unlimitedpolitical expenditures and, by extension, unlimitedcontributions to other corporations making political


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expenditures, 10 are denying citizens the informationneeded to hold corporations and elected officialsaccountable and make informed decisions on ElectionDay. The close relationships between so-called inde-pendent spenders and candidates, combined with the

lack of disclosure, give rise to corruption and theappearance of corruption.

II. Corporations Spending Money In CandidateElections Deny Shareholders And CitizensThe Information Needed To Hold Corpora-tions And Elected Officials Accountable AndMake Informed Decisions On Election Day.

Notwithstanding this Courts assurance that

disclosure would provide shareholders and citizenswith the information needed to hold corporations andelected officials accountable for their positions andsupporters[,] Citizens United , 130 S. Ct. at 916,corporations spending money to influence candidateelections have predictably denied shareholders andcitizens such information. Corporations have clearincentives to avoid disclosure and accountability; fed-eral tax and campaign finance laws, as well as state

10 See SpeechNow.org v. FEC , 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010)(applying Citizens United s reasoning to invalidate limits oncontributions to political committees that make only independ-ent expenditures); see also FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11, 2010 WL3184269 (July 22, 2010) (concluding that independentexpenditure-only political committees may accept unlimitedcontributions from corporations and labor organizations).


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campaign finance laws, have accommodated theirdesire to do so. Consequently, non-disclosing corpora-tions spent more than $120 million to influence the2010 federal midterm elections and far greater spend-ing is predicted for 2012.

A. Corporations Have Clear Incentives To Avoid Disclosure And Accountability Target As Exhibit A.

Shortly after the Citizens United decision, theWall Street Journal reported:

Target Corp. sought to take advantage of new campaign-finance rules, but ended upputting a bulls eye on its back.

The Minneapolis retailer recently donated$150,000 to a political group, Minnesota For-ward, that backs pro-business candidates instatewide races, including a candidate for gov-ernor who opposes same-sex marriage. OnFriday, hundreds of gay-rights supportersdemonstrated outside Target stores in loca-tions nationwide, and a petition promising aboycott, signed by more than 240,000, wasdelivered to Target. 11

According to the report, the campaign against Targetwas orchestrated by MoveOn.org, whose director of

11 Brody Mullins and Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political Contributions , Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 2010,available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703988304575413650676561696.html.


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public advocacy said MoveOn and its members planto gin up bad publicity for any company venturinginto political campaigning. 12

This is seemingly the optimal scenario envisionedby the Citizens United Court:

[P]rompt disclosure of expenditures can pro-vide shareholders and citizens with the in-formation needed to hold corporations andelected officials accountable for their posi-tions and supporters. . . . The First Amend-ment protects political speech; and disclosurepermits citizens and shareholders to react tothe speech of corporate entities in a properway.

130 S. Ct. at 916.Corporate managers around the nation, however,

likely viewed this incident as a public relationsnightmare. To understand why corporations wishingto influence elections would seek anonymity withrespect to their political activities, Targets experienceis Exhibit A. Fortunately for corporate managers,evading disclosure laws is childs play. All a corpora-tion needs to do to avoid publicity for its politicalspending is to give its funds to a nonprofit that canmake political expenditures without disclosing itsdonors making the money untraceable.

12 Id.


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B. Federal Tax Laws Accommodate Corpo-rate Anonymity.

Following the Citizens United decision andTargets public relations nightmare, nonprofit corpo-rations organized as tax-exempt social welfareorganizations under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),26 U.S.C. 501(c)(4), have engaged in an unprece-dented amount of campaign spending to influencecandidate elections. According to amicus Center forResponsive Politics (CRP), spending by all section501(c) groups in the 2010 election is estimated tohave exceeded $120 million. 13 Virtually all of themoney used for these campaign expenditures camefrom sources kept secret from the American people.The 2010 campaign thus witnessed the return of hugeamounts of secret money to federal elections, to adegree not seen since Watergate. Candidate election-related spending by these nonprofit groups in thisyears elections is predicted to far exceed 2010 spend-ing.

Section 501(c)(4) of the IRC establishes tax-exempt status for [c]ivic leagues or organizations notorganized for profit but operated exclusively for thepromotion of social welfare. . . . 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(4).

IRS regulations make clear that spending to inter-vene or participate in candidate elections does not

13 CRP, 2010 Outside Spending, by Groups , May 16, 2012,http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=U.


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constitute promotion of social welfare. 26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(4)1(a)(2)(ii). Nevertheless, IRS regulationsauthorize section 501(c)(4) organizations to interveneand participate in candidate campaigns as long assuch campaign activities do not constitute the organi-

zations primary activity, which must be the promo-tion of social welfare. 26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(4)1(a)(2)(i).

The IRS has not further defined the regulationsprimary activity standard. Instead, a revenue rul-ing explains that all facts and circumstances aretaken into account in determining a 501(c)(4) organ-izations primary activity. 14 According to a Congres-sional Research Service report, some have suggestedthat primary simply means more than 50%. . . . The

report notes that others have called for a morestringent standard, but explains that even thismore stringent standard would still permit substan-tial campaign expenditures of up to 40% of totalprogram expenditures. 15

14 Rev. Rul. 68-45, 1968-1 C.B. 259.15

Erika Lunder and L. Paige Whitaker, Cong. ResearchServ., R40183, 501(c)(4) Organizations and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Law 2 (2009),available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/R40183.pdf; seealso Comments of the Individual Members of the ABA ExemptOrganizations Committees Task Force on Section 501(c)(4)and Politics 44 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/tax/ pubpolicy/2004/040525exo.pdf.


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Section 501(c)(5) labor unions and section 501(c)(6)trade associations are treated similarly under taxlaw, see 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(5), 501(c)(6), makingthese organizations additional appealing options tohide the sources of money. The U.S. Chamber of Com-

merce, a trade association exempt from federal in-come tax under section 501(c)(6), spent almost $33million in the 2010 midterm elections and is pre-dicted to spend more than $50 million in this yearselections funds raised over and above its normaldues. 16

Federal tax law permits section 501(c) tax-exempt organizations to raise unlimited sums fromany source and does not require such organizations

to disclose the sources of their funding to the public .17

Consequently, these nonprofit corporations presentattractive vehicles for business corporations andothers to influence candidate elections unhindered bythe transparency and accountability envisioned inCitizens United .

16

See Eliza Newlin Carney, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Faces Changing Times , Roll Call, Apr. 24, 2012, available at http:// www.rollcall.com/issues/57_126/US-Chamber-of-Commerce-Faces-Changing-Times-214020-1.html?pos=hftxt.

17 Section 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations must re-port to the IRS the names and addresses of significant donors,but this information is not publicly disclosed . See IRS Form 990,Sched. B, Sched. of Contributors (OMB No. 1545-0047).


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C. Federal Campaign Finance Laws Ac-commodate Corporate Anonymity.

Although federal campaign finance law requiresevery political committee to disclose the name of any person who contributes more than $200 to thecommittee, only groups with the major purpose of influencing elections qualify as political committees.See Buckley , 424 U.S. at 79; see also Pol. Comm.Status, Supp. Explanation and Justification, 72 Fed.Reg. 5595, 5597 (Feb. 7, 2007). Consequently, busi-ness corporations and 501(c) nonprofit corporationsgenerally are not regulated as political committeesand, instead, are subject to far less rigorous disclo-sure requirements. 18

When a business corporation or 501(c) nonprofitcorporation makes an independent expenditure inexcess of $250, such spender is only required to dis-close the name of a person who made a contributionin excess of $200 . . . for the purpose of furthering an

18 As registered political committees, super PACs are requiredto disclose contributors who give more than $200. However, superPACs may also receive contributions from corporations whichthemselves have been used to hide the true source of funds. Lastyear, for example, the super PAC Restore Our Future reported

its receipt of three $1 million contributions of questionablelegality from mysterious corporate donors W Spann LLC, F8LLC and Eli Publishing, L.C. These corporate donors had nodiscernible business activities and, therefore, appear to havebeen used specifically for the purpose of hiding the true donorsidentities. See Michael Isikoff, Firm gives $1 million to pro-

Romney group, then dissolves , NBC News, Aug. 4, 2011, http:// today.msnbc.msn.com/id/44011308/ns/politics-decision_2012.


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independent expenditure. 2 U.S.C. 434(c)(2)(C)(emphasis added). 19

Similarly, the FEC regulation implementing theelectioneering communication donor disclosure re-quirement of 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(2) provides that acorporation or labor union that spends more than$10,000 on electioneering communications needonly disclose the name of each person who made a do-nation of $1,000 or more for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications. 11 C.F.R. 104.20(c)(9)(emphasis added). For the purpose of furtheringmeans specifically designated for [electioneering com-munications] by the donor. Electioneering Commcns,Supp. Explanation and Justification, 72 Fed. Reg.

72899, 72911 (Dec. 26, 2007).20

This regulation was19 The FEC has further undermined this donor disclosure

requirement by promulgating a rule requiring disclosure onlywhen the person contributes for the purpose of furthering thereported independent expenditure. See 11 C.F.R. 109.10(e)(1)(vi)(emphasis added). Under the statute, a contribution for the pur-pose of furthering independent expenditures, generally, wouldtrigger disclosure, whereas triggering disclosure under the FECrule requires a person to contribute for the purpose of furtheringa specific ad .

20 Three members of the six-member FEC blocked an in-vestigation into whether the 501(c)(4) corporation FreedomsWatch violated the law by failing to disclose a major donor aftermaking electioneering communications. The three Commis-sioners interpreted the regulation even more narrowly than itsplain language requires, stating that donor disclosure is re-quired only if such donations are made for the purpose of fur-thering the electioneering communication that is the subject of the report . See Statement of Reasons of Chairman Matthew S.

(Continued on following page)


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recently invalidated by a D.C. district court, althoughan appeal is pending. See Van Hollen v. FEC , ___F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 1066717 (D.D.C. Mar. 30,2012), appeal docketed , No. 12-5117 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 18,2012).

Under these independent expenditure andelectioneering communication donor disclosure re-quirements, corporate and other donors to 501(c)organizations simply refrain from designating contri-butions specifically for the purpose of funding electionads and, by doing so, avoid federal campaign financelaw disclosure requirements.

D. States Campaign Finance Laws Accom-modate Corporate Anonymity.

Amicus National Institute on Money in StatePolitics (NIMSP) recently conducted a two-part studyof all 50 states disclosure requirements for inde-pendent spending (both independent expendituresand electioneering communications). 21 Unfortunately,NIMSPs report paints a bleak picture of disclosure inthe states; state disclosure requirements are, for the

Pettersen and Commrs Caroline C. Hunter and Donald F.McGahn, FEC Matter Under Review 6002, at 5 (Aug. 2010)(emphasis added), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/ 10044274536.pdf.

21 See Anne Bauer, Best Practices for Independent Spending: Part One , NIMSP, July 14, 2011, http://www.followthemoney.org/ press/ReportView.phtml?r=453.


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most part, even less robust than their ineffectivefederal counterparts.

In most states, disclosure of independentspending is either significantly flawed ornonexistent. 43 states require disclosure of independent spending to some degree, butonly 19 of them require the reporting of bothtypes of independent spending: electioneer-ing communications and independent ex-penditures. Not only is the disclosure of independent spending limited, many statesdo not require the disclosure of who fundedthese expenditures. Of the states studied, onlynine require the disclosure of contributions toindependent spenders, making it difficult to

know who is actually behind these independent political advertisements. The inadequate or nonexistent disclosure inthe states results in millions of dollars of po-litical spending going unreported. In Michi-gan, for example, at least $22.9 million of televised electioneering communications wentunreported in the 2010 elections, which farexceeds the $7.9 million of reported inde-pendent spending. Unfortunately, Michiganis not an outlier. Thirty other states fail to

require disclosure of the money spent onelectioneering communications, making it


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impossible to know the full extent of inde-pendent spending at the state level. 22

Just as federal laws readily accommodate corpo-rations wanting to spend millions to influence candi-date elections while maintaining anonymity, so too domost states laws. Because most states do not requireindependent spenders to disclose their contributors,corporations can indirectly fund election ads byrouting contributions through non-disclosing 501(c)organizations. NIMSPs report detailed one suchexample, in Iowa: [T]hree justices up for retention[as state supreme court justices] in 2010 had signeda unanimous decision in 2009 that legalized gaymarriage in Iowa. In response, several conservativeChristian organizations used independent expendi-tures to oppose the justices retention. 23 According toNIMSPs report, one of these organizations was the501(c)(4) American Family Association Action (AFA

Action), which created an Iowa state political com-mittee called Iowa for Freedom for the sole purpose of funding independent expenditures targeting the three

justices. 24 AFA Action routed more than $170,000 inexpenditures through Iowa for Freedom, but neither

22 Kevin McNellis, Best Practices for Independent Spending: Part Two , NIMSP, Mar. 15, 2012, http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=480 (emphasis added).

23 Id. 24 Id . See also Iowa Ethics & Campaign Disclosure Bd.

Advisory Op. 2010-07, available at http://www.iowa.gov/ethics/ legal/adv_opn/2010/10fao07.htm.


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entity disclosed the moneys origin because, like fed-eral law, Iowa law requires spenders to disclose onlythose donors who have provided funds for the pur-pose of furthering the independent expenditure. 25

Like most states, Montanas independent ex-penditure disclosure laws fail to provide citizens theinformation needed to hold corporations and electedofficials accountable and to make informed deci-sions on Election Day. Indeed, although Montanarequires groups making independent expenditures tofile disclosure reports and to disclose the sourcesof contributions exceeding $35, state law definescontribution as money given to influence an elec-tion, meaning funds given to such groups without a

stated purpose go undisclosed. See Mont. Code Ann. 13-1-101(c)(a)(i) (defining contribution), 13-1-101(22) (defining political committee), 13-37-225(establishing reporting requirements) and 13-37-229(requiring itemization for contributions of $35 ormore). By contrast, the segregated fund require-ment of the statute at issue in this case resolves thisdisclosure problem as to corporations by requiringcampaign funds (including any contributions so usedregardless of stated purpose) to be held separately

from every other source of income. See Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-227(3).

25 See Iowa Code 68A.404(3)(a)(2). See also Iowa Ethics &Campaign Disclosure Bd. Advisory Op. 2010-07, supra note 24.


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If this Court does not affirm the Montana Su-preme Courts decision upholding Montanas prohibi-tion on corporate political expenditures, corporationswill undoubtedly deny shareholders and citizens theinformation needed to hold corporations and elected

officials accountable and to make informed decisionson Election Day.

E. More Than $120 Million In AnonymousFunds Was Spent To Influence 2010Elections, With Far Greater SpendingPredicted For 2012.

Amicus CRPs analysis of publicly available datashows that section 501(c) groups spent more than

$120 million on candidate-election related ads dur-ing the 2010 midterm elections. The 501(c)(6) U.S.Chamber of Commerce spent nearly $33 million,raised above and beyond normal dues, without dis-closing the sources of its funding undoubtedlybusiness corporations denying shareholders andcitizens . . . the information needed to hold corpora-tions and elected officials accountable for their posi-tions and supporters. Citizens United , 130 S. Ct. at916. The 501(c)(4) group American Action Network

spent more than $26 million on election-related adsin 2010 without disclosing the sources of its funding.

According to amicus CRP, more than twenty 501(c)nonprofit corporations spent more than a half-million


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dollars each on 2010 election ads without disclosingthe sources of their funding. 26

Not surprisingly, since this Court opened the doorto unlimited 501(c) spending by corporations with its2010 decision in Citizens United , the percentage of federal election-related spending by groups that donot disclose their donors rose from 1 percent to 47percent from the 2006 midterm elections to the 2010midterm elections. 27

Non-disclosing 501(c) groups are just gettingstarted in the 2012 elections, as most big spenderswait out the primary election season and prepare forthe general elections. On April 24, 2012, the Washing-ton Post reported:

Nearly all of the independent advertising be-ing aired for the 2012 general-election cam-paign has come from interest groups that donot disclose their donors, suggesting thatmuch of the political spending over the nextsix months will come from sources invisibleto the public.

Politically active nonprofit groups that donot reveal their funding sources have spent$28.5 million on advertising related to the

26 See CRP, supra note 13.27 Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly

Affects Political Landscape , Open Secrets Blog, May 5, 2011,http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html.


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November presidential matchup, or about 90percent of the total through Sunday, a Wash-ington Post analysis shows. 28

The American Crossroads/Crossroads GPS opera-tion perhaps best illustrates how dearly major fun-ders of election ads wish to avoid disclosure. Amer-ican Crossroads is a super PAC that discloses itsdonors to the FEC, while Crossroads GPS is a501(c)(4) corporation that does not disclose its donors.Both were co-founded in 2010 by Republican Partystrategists Ed Gillespie 29 and Karl Rove, 30 and bothare operated by Steven Law, who serves as the pres-ident of both organizations. 31 Supporters of thisoperation have a choice: contribute to the super PACand be disclosed or contribute to the 501(c)(4) andremain hidden from public view. According to Ameri-can Crossroads political director Carl Forti, the

28 Dan Eggen, Most independent ads for 2012 election are from groups that dont disclose donors , Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 2012,available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/most-independent-ads-for-2012-election-are-from-groups-that-dont-disclose-donors/2012/ 04/24/gIQACKkpfT_story.html.

29 Mr. Gillespie is former Chairman of the RepublicanNational Committee, former Counselor to President George W.Bush and recently became a Senior Advisor to Mitt Romneys2012 presidential campaign. See Jonathan Martin, Ed Gillespie

joins Team Romney , Politico, Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/74857.html.

30 Mr. Rove served as Senior Advisor and Deputy Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush. See http://www.rove.com/bio.

31 See Good, supra note 6; see also http://www.crossroadsgps.organd http://www.americancrossroads.org.


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501(c)(4) was formed precisely because some donorsdidnt want to be disclosed and were more comfort-able giving to an entity that keeps donors namessecret. 32 Indeed, Crossroads GPSs purpose as avehicle for donor anonymity is so blatant that it has

become folder for late night television, with StephenColbert, Comedy Centrals faux newsman, creatinghis own mock 501(c)(4) group, Colbert Super PACS.H.H. 33

The Washington Post reported that CrossroadsGPS raised nearly $40 million from unidentifieddonors in the first quarter of 2012, compared withless than $10 million taken in by its affiliated superPAC, American Crossroads. 34 In other words, the non-

disclosing 501(c)(4) Crossroads GPS out-fundraisedits disclosing super PAC counterpart American Cross-roads by a ratio of 4-to-1.

Similarly, Petitioner American Tradition Partner-ships (ATP) purpose, according to un-rebutted evi-dence submitted to the District Court by the State, isto solicit and anonymously spend the funds of othercorporations, individuals and entities to influence the

32 Brooks Jackson, American Crossroads / Crossroads GPS ,Factcheck.org, Sept. 18, 2011, http://www.factcheck.org/2011/09/ american-crossroadscrossroads-gps.

33 See The Colbert Report (Comedy Central televisionbroadcast Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/411673/april-03-2012/colbert-super-pac-shh----501c4-disclosure.

34 See Eggen, supra note 28.


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outcome of Montana elections. W. Tradition Pship, Inc. v. Atty Gen. , 271 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2011). ATPexplained to its prospective donors:

[W]ere not required to report the name orthe amount of any contribution that we re-ceive. So, if you decide to support this pro-gram, no politician, no bureaucrat, and noradical environmentalist will ever know youhelped make this program possible. The onlything we plan on reporting is our success tocontributors like you.

Id .

The American Crossroads/Crossroads GPS opera-tion, as well as petitioner ATP, make clear that, con-

trary to this Courts assurances in Citizens United ,there exists inadequate disclosure to provide share-holders and citizens with the information needed tohold corporations and elected officials accountable fortheir positions and supporters. 130 S. Ct. at 916.While Citizens United did indeed protect corporatepolitical speech, the disclosure expected to permit[]citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way never material-ized. Id.


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III. Data That Is Disclosed Is Neither TimelyEnough, Nor Accessible Enough, To EnableThe Electorate To Make Informed Deci-sions On Election Day.

The electorates ability to make informed deci-sions on Election Day is hindered not only by a lack of disclosure, but also by delayed disclosure and pooraccess to needed information.

For example, though super PACs must disclosethe identity of contributors who give them more than$200, numerous high-profile super PACs raising andspending unlimited funds to influence this years Jan-uary presidential caucuses and primaries did not filedisclosure reports with the FEC until after the cau-

cuses and primaries had taken place.35

Additionally, super PACs are permitted to accept

contributions from 501(c) corporations and, whenthey do so, need only disclose the fact that they re-ceived a contribution from the 501(c) corporation. Asexplained in Part II(B), supra , these 501(c) corpora-tions are not required to disclose to the public thesources of their funding. Consequently, even when asuper PAC discloses its receipt of a contribution from

35 See, e.g. , Keenan Steiner, Presidential Super PAC disclosures may leave voters in the dark , Sunlight Foundation Report-ing Group, Dec. 21, 2011, http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2011/presidential-super-pac-disclosures-may-leave-voters-in-the-dark.


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a 501(c) corporation, voters are nevertheless deniedinformation regarding the moneys true source. 36

Finally, much of the independent spending datathat is disclosed to campaign finance regulatoryagencies is inaccessible to or unusable by the public.Effective access requires comprehensive, Internet-based, easily searchable and downloadable databases.Despite this Courts assurances in Citizens United that modern technology makes disclosures rapid andinformative and that [w]ith the advent of the Inter-net, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provideshareholders and citizens with the information neededto hold corporations and elected officials accountablefor their positions and supporters[,] 130 S. Ct. at

916, such technology is not effectively employed inmany states. 37 Private organizations such as amici CRP and NIMSP spend millions of dollars annually toclean up, fill in the gaps and release to the publicuseful information gleaned from government data-bases.

Just as undisclosed money in elections gives riseto corruption and the appearance of corruption, so too

36 See, e.g. , Kenneth P. Vogel and Abby Phillip, Primer: How super PACs rake it in , Politico, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72611.html (reporting that non-disclosing groups gave $8 million to super PACs during the 2010midterm elections).

37 See, e.g. , McNellis, supra note 22.


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App. 1

APPENDIX

The following groups constitute the amici curiae who submit the foregoing brief:

AARP is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organiza-

tion dedicated to assuring that older Amer-icans have independence, choice and controlin ways beneficial and affordable to themand to society as a whole. AARP engages inadvocacy to implement public policies of ben-efit to older Americans. AARP policy recog-nizes that the federal government shouldencourage disclosure by all who participatein supporting or opposing specific candidatesand that all campaign funding and financingentities should provide timely and full dis-

closure of contributions to enable the elec-torate to make informed decisions and giveproper weight to different speakers andmessages.

The Campaign Legal Center is anonprofit, nonpartisan organization createdto represent the public perspective in admin-istrative and legal proceedings interpretingand enforcing campaign finance and otherelection laws throughout the nation. Itparticipates in rulemaking and advisoryopinion proceedings at the FEC to ensurethat the agency is properly enforcing federalelection laws, and files complaints with theFEC requesting that enforcement actions betaken against individuals or organizationsthat violate the law.


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App. 2

The Center for Responsive Politics(CRP) is the nations premier research grouptracking money in U.S. politics and its effecton elections and public policy. Nonpartisan,independent and nonprofit, the organizationaims to create a more educated voter, aninvolved citizenry and a more transparentand responsive government. CRP pursues itsmission largely through its award-winningwebsite, OpenSecrets.org, which is the mostcomprehensive resource for federal campaigncontributions, lobbying data and analysisavailable anywhere.

The Chicago Lawyers Committee forCivil Rights Under Law, Inc. is the publicinterest law consortium of Chicagos leading

law firms. From nineteen firms in 1969, theChicago Lawyers Committee has grown tomore than fifty members today. Each year,almost 19,000 hours of donated professionallegal services, with a value of over $8.5million are directed to challenge discrim-ination and other violations of civil rights inboth public and private sectors.

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethicsin Washington (CREW) is a nonprofit,

nonpartisan corporation organized undersection 501(c)(3) of the Internal RevenueCode. Through a combined approach of research, advocacy, public education, andlitigation, CREW seeks to protect the rightsof citizens to be informed about theactivities of government officials and toensure the integrity of those officials. Among


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App. 3

its principal activities, CREW monitors theactivities of members of Congress and, whereappropriate, files ethics complaints withCongress. CREW also prepares written re-ports, including a yearly report it dis-seminates publicly about the most unethicalmembers of Congress.

Common Cause is a nonprofit, nonpartisanorganization with approximately 300,000members and supporters nationwide. Com-mon Cause has long supported efforts to re-form campaign finance laws to reduce thepotential for actual and apparent quid proquo corruption. Common Cause was a strongadvocate for congressional enactment of theBipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.

Illinois Campaign for Political Reform (ICPR) is a nonprofit and nonpartisanpublic interest group focused on state andlocal elections in Illinois that conducts re-search and advocates reforms to promotepublic participation and to encourage in-tegrity, accountability, and transparency inboth government and the election process.Founded in 1997 by the late U.S. SenatorPaul Simon and former Illinois Lieutenant

Governor Bob Kustra, ICPRs guidingprinciples seek to restore honest, open, andaccountable government and re-invigoratepublic confidence and civic involvement.

The League of Women Voters of theUnited States is a nonpartisan, community-based organization that encourages the


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App. 4

informed and active participation of citizensin government and influences public policythrough education and advocacy. Founded in1920 as an outgrowth of the struggle to winvoting rights for women, the League is or-ganized in 800 communities and in everystate, with more than 150,000 members andsupporters nationwide. One of the Leaguesprimary goals is to promote an open gov-ernmental system that is representative, ac-countable, and responsive and that assuresopportunities for citizen participation in gov-ernment decision making. To further thisgoal, the League has been a leader in seekingcampaign finance reform at the state, local,and federal levels for more than threedecades.

The Michigan Campaign Finance Net-work (MCFN) is a nonprofit, nonpartisanorganization that conducts research and pro-vides public education on money in Michiganpolitics. MCFN has a particular research em-phasis on undisclosed electioneering spend-ing in Michigan political campaigns that wassummarized in the 2011 report, $70 MillionHidden in Plain View.

The National Institute on Money inState Politics (NIMSP) is a nonprofit,nonpartisan organization created to providethe public accurate, comprehensive andhighly credentialed information about thecampaign finances of legislative and state-wide candidates in all 50 states, as well asparty committees and ballot measures, and


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App. 6

information available online about mem-bers of Congress, their staff, legislation, fed-eral spending, and lobbyists. The SunlightFoundation has a particular interest in pro-moting the electronic disclosure of politicalexpenditures at all levels of government.

U.S. PIRG Education Fund is a federationof independent, state-based, citizen-fundedorganizations that advocate for the publicinterest. Since 1970, state PIRGs have de-livered results-oriented citizen activism,stood up to powerful special interests, andused the time-tested tools of investigativeresearch, media exposs, grassroots organiz-ing, and litigation to win real results onissues that matter. Across the country, state

PIRGs employ close to 400 organizers, policyanalysts, scientists and attorneys, and areactive in 47 states, with a federal office inWashington, D.C. On national issues, theyalso coordinate their efforts, pool resources,and share expertise so that they can havethe biggest impact.

The Wisconsin Democracy Campaign (WDC) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan citizenorganization that specializes in tracking the

money in Wisconsin politics. WDC managesan extensive online database of contributorsto state campaigns and also monitors in-terest group electioneering. It has frequentlyfiled complaints with the state Government


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App. 7

Accountability Board to prompt enforcementaction, and is a regular participant in theGABs rulemaking process relating to cam-paign finance regulation.

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Supreme Court Amicus Brief American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock

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