SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO.: SC14-1639

L.T. No(s).: 3D13-2437; 132010CA04718000001

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, MIAMI LODGE NO. 20

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

CITY OF MIAMI

Respondent-Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF APPENDIX OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, MIAMI LODGE NO. 20

ROBERT D. KLAUSNER Florida Bar No. 244082 bob@robertdklausner.com PAUL A. DARAGJATI Florida Bar No. 713813 paul@robertdklausner.com ADAM P. LEVINSON Florida Bar No. 05534 ANNA R. KLAUSNER PARISH Florida Bar No. 124804 Klausner, Kaufman, Jensen & Levinson 7080 N.W. 4th St. Plantation, Florida 33317 Phone: (954) 916-1202 Fax: (954) 916-1232 Counsel for Petitioner-Appellant

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB

A-1. Order on Merits of Unfair Labor Practice Charge, dated October 18, 2017.

A-2. Notice of Appeal, dated November 15, 2017.

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been

filed with the Supreme Court via Florida E-Portal and furnished via e-mail, this

29th of November, 2017, to:

MARK A. TOUBY, ESQ. RICHARD A. SICKING, ESQ. TOUBY, CHAIT & SICKING, P.L. 2030 S. Douglas Rd., Ste. 217 Coral Gables, FL 33134 Email: ejcc@fortheworkers.com ejcc3@fortheworkers.com

VICTORIA MENDEZ, ESQ. JOHN A. GRECO, ESQ., KEVIN R. JONES, ESQ. OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY City of Miami 444 S.W. 2nd Avenue, Ste. 945 Miami, FL 33130 Email: vmendez@miamigov.com jgreco@miamigov.com Krjones@miamigov.com

MICHAEL MATTIMORE, ESQ. LUKE SAVAGE, ESQ. ALLEN, NORTON & BLUE, P.A. 906 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32303 Email: mmattimore@anblaw.com lsavage@anblaw.com

/s/ Robert D. KlausnerROBERT D. KLAUSNER

Fax Oct 10 2017 Od:11pm P002/016

STATE OF FLORIDA

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS COMMISSION

WALTER E. HEADLEY, JR., MIAMI LODGE #20, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, INC.,

Charging Party,

V.

CITY OF MIAMI,

Case No. CR-2017-001 (Relates to CA-2010-119)

ORDER ON MERITS OF UNFAfR LABOR PRACTICE

CHARGE Order Number: 1/U-269 Respondent. Date Issued: OCtober 18, 2017

Robert D. Klausner, Plantation; Paul A. Daragjati, Jacksonville; Ronald J. Cohen, Fort Lauderdale;·and Osnat K. Rind, Miami, attorneys for Charging Party.

Michael Mattimore, Tallahassee; Luke C. Savage, Coral Gables; and Victoria Mendez, Kevin R. Jones, and John A. Greco, Miami, attorneys for Respondent.

On September 21, 2010, the Walter E. Headley, Jr., Miami Lodge #20, Fraternal

Order of Police Inc. (FOP), filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging, in pertinent part,

that the City of Miami (City) violated Section 447.501(1)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes.

According to the charge, the City improperly invoked Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes,

financial urgency, and the City unlawfully failed to follow the procedures in the financial

urgency statute by unilaterally changing the contractual terms and conditions of

employment of ba.rgaining unit employees represented by the FOP before completing the

impasse resolution procedure set forth in Section 447.403, Florida Statutes.1 The City

denied the FOP's allegations. Both parties requested awards of attorney's fees and

litigation costs.

1The FOP also alleged that the City engaged in surface bsrgain!ng.

A-1

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CR-2017-001 (Relates to CA-2010-119)

After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer issued a recommended order

(HORO) in which he found that the City had a compelling interest in reopening its

contract with the FOP. In sum, he found that the City was experiencing a financial

urgency. The hearing officer also found, in pertinent part, that the City altered the terms

of the collective bargaining agreement relating to wages and pension benefits of

employees represented by the FOP. Additionally, the hearing officer found that Section

447.4095, Florida Statutes, did not require the City to complete the impasse process

prior to modifying the collective bargaining agreement.

Regarding an award of attorney's fees, the hearing officer found that the

resolution of the FOP's financial urgency charge was dependent on the validity of the

City's claim of financial urgency and it was novel, I.e., a case of first impression. He

concluded neither party was entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs of litigation.

A majority of the Commission agreed with the hearing officer's analysis of the

dispositive legal issues, his conclusions of law, and his recommendations. Walter E.

Headley, Jr., Miami Lodge #20, Fraternal Order of Police, /no. v. City of Miami, 38 FPER

iI 330 (2012). On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First District, concluded that the

Commission did not err in interpreting or applying Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes,

and affirmed the final order dismissing the FOP's unfair labor practice charge. Walter E.

Headley, Jr., Miami Lodge No. 20, Fraternal Order of Police, Im;_ v, City of M;ami,

118 So. 3d 885 1 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (First District Court). The FOP appealed to the

Florida Supreme Court.

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The Supreme Court concluded, in pertinent part, that Section 447.4095, Florida

Statutes, permits the unilateral implementation of changes to a collective bargaining

agreement only after parties have completed the impasse resolution proceedings found

in Section 447.403, Florida Statutes, and failed to ratify the agreement. Walter E.

Headley, Jr., Miami Lodge #20, Fraternal Order of Police, Inc,, et al. v. City of Miami,

215 So. 3d 1, 9 (Fla. 2017). The Supreme Court quashe~ the decision of the First

District Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The First District Court

remanded this case to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with the

Florida Supreme Court's opinion.

On May 18. 2017, upon consideration of the Florida Supreme Court's opinion and

the hearing officer's factual findings, we concluded that the City violated Section

447.501 (1 )(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, when it unilaterally changed wages, pensions,

health insurance, and other monetary items for the employees in the bargaining unit

represented by the FOP prior to completing the Section 447.403, Florida Statutes,

impasse resolution procedure. § 447.503(6)(a), Fla. Stat. We remanded this case to the

hearing officer and directed him to recommend an appropriate remedy and to make a

recomm_endation whether the FOP, as a prevailing charging party, was entltled to an

award of attorney's fees and costs.

On July 201 the hearing officer issued a supplemental order in which he

recommended directing the City to rescind its modifications to the wages, health care,

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and pension benefits of employees represented by the FOP beginning on September 30,

2010, as described in findings of fact thirty-seven through thirty-nine of his recommended

order. Headley, 38 FPER 1f 330. He recommended that the Commission direct the

parties to return to the status quo ante as of September 29, 201 O, the day prior to the

effective date of Its unlawful action. The hearing officer also recommended against an

award of attorney's fees and costs in favor of the FOP.

On August 3, the FOP filed one exception to the hearing officer's recommendation

against awarding its attorney's fees and costs. On August 14, after receiving an

extension of time, the City filed four exceptions to the recommended order, a response to

the FOP's exception, and a motion for oral argument. On August 25, the FOP filed a

response to the City's exceptions.

The City requested oral argument, which the FOP opposes as unnecessary. The

Commission does not believe oral argument would assist it in the resolution of this case

because the facts and legal arguments have been adequately presented in the briefs and

record. Accordingly, the City's motion for oral argument is denied. We now turn to the

exceptions.

The City's fourth exception is to the hearing officer's recommended remedy of

returning the parties to the status quo ante as of September 29, 2010, the day prior to

the effective date of the Clty's unlawful action. The City argues that any remedy should

be prospective only. The gravamen of the City's fourth exception is that its actions were

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validated by existing case law, including the Commission's General Counsel's interpreta-

tion of Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes, contained in a May 9, 2001, correspondence

letter. In support of this argument, the City relies on Communications Workers of

America v. Indian River School Boa.rd, 888 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004 );

J9cksonvifle Supervisors Association v. City of Jacksonville, 26 FPER 'fi 31140 at 255-

256 (2000), rev'd in part on other grounds 791 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001 ); and

Manatee Education Association, FEA, AFT (Local 3821 )1 AFL-CIO v. Schoof Board of

Manatee County, 62 So. 3d 1176, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011 ), affg in part and rev'g in

part, 35FPER1f 46 (2009). The City's reliance on these cases is misplaced.

The Communications Workers of America case involved the appeal of a trial

court's order vacating an arbitration award, which interpreted Section 447.4095, Florida

Statutes, in its favor, on the basis that the arbitrator exceeded his powers under Section

682.13(1 ), Florida Statutes. There, in an informal correspondence to the School Board,

the Commission's General Counsel stated that Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes, was

enacted by the Legislature in 1997 and that as of the date of his letter the Commission

had not interpreted its provisions in case law. He opined in that letter that in the event of

a financial urgency requiring modification of a collective bargaining agreement, an

employer is allowed to unilaterally change wages, hours, and terms and conditions of

employment after bargaining the impact of the change for a "reasonable period" not to

exceed fourteen days. Communications Workers of America, 888 So. 2d at 98.

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The Commission's General Counsel's correspondence highlights the factthat uto

date the Commission has not had an occasion to interpret" Section 447.4095, Florida

Statutes. Thus, contrary to the City's argument, there was no existing case law at the

time the City unilaterally modified the parties' collective bargaining agreement without

first completing the statutory Impasse resolution procedure. The General Counsel's

informal correspondence does not constitute existing Commission case law; it was

simply his opinion. More Importantly, the correspondence does not opine that an

employer is not obligated to first proceed through the Section 447.403, Florida Statutes,

impasse resolution procedure after Impasse is reached as required by Section 447.4095,

Florida. Statutes. In that case, the impasse resolution hearing was conducted pursuant to

Section 447.403, Florida Statutes. Id.

The Jacksonville Supervisors Association case Involved a reorganization of three

departments, which led management to abolish and create bargaining unit positions.

The case involved management rights pursuant to Section 447.209, Florida Statutes, not

financial urgency or the application or interpretation of Section 447 .4095, Florida

Statutes.

The Manatee Education Association case involved the employer invoking Section

447.4095, Florida Statutes, to modify salaries based on financial urgency. The union

sought to require the employer to prove the existence of a financial urgency before

proceeding under Section 447.4095. The court rejected the union's contention stating

that, "Requiring proof of financial urgency before resort io section 447.4095 could result

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(Relates to CA-2010-119)

in substantial delays, delays which could effectively eliminate the ability to address a

financial urgency, frustrating the obvious purpose of the statute. We affirm PERC's

determination that section 447.4095 does not place any temporal preconditions on the

initiation of the process section 447.4095 authorizes." Manatee Education Association,

62 So. 3d at 1181. However, the court rejected the Commission's determination that a

union must participate in Section 447.4095 negotiations in order to file (at some later

time) an unfair labor practice charge. Id.

The Manatee Education Association interpretations of Section 447.4095, Florida

Statutes, occurred in 2008 and 2009. However, until now neither the court nor the

Commission had interpreted Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes, as it applied to the

Section 447.403, Florida Statutes, Impasse resolution process. Moreover, until the

instant case neither the Commission nor the court had addressed the issue of an

employer bypassing the impasse resolution process pursuant to Section 447.4095,

Florida Statutes. Thus, the City's contention that its actions were validated by existing

case law is without merit.

Similarly, in support of its argument that the remedy should be prospective only,

the City relies on Dade County Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Miami Dade

County Board of County Commissioners, 160 So. 3d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), review

denied sub nom. Miami-Dade County Bd. of County Commissioners v. Dade County

Police Benevolent Association, 177 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. 2015) rev'g 40FPER11198 (2013);

7

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fntemational Union of Operating Engineers, Local 653 v. Board of County

Commissioners of Jackson County, 18 FPER ~ 23138 (1992), rev1d on other grounds,

620 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); and Allen v. Miami-Dade College Board of

Trustees, 43 FPER ~ 6 (PERC 2016), perouriam affd, 2017 WL 363130 (Fla. 3d DCA

January 25, 2017) {unpublished decision).

In Dade County Police Benevolent Associaf;on, Inc., the Mayor vetoed the County

Commission's resolution of the impasse pertaining to an increase in employee's health

insurance contributions and the County Commission did not override the veto. The

Commission dismissed the portion of the charge dealing with the mayor's veto but the

court reversed the Commission. On remand from the court, the issue before the

Commission was whether the remedy should be prospective or retroactive. Dade County

Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Miami Dade County Board of County

Commissioners, 43FPER1} 105 (2016). The Commission concluded that the remedy

should be prospective only because it was an issue of first impression and the County

had the benefit of the General Counsel's summary dismissal in the Dade County Police

Benevolent Association v. City of Hialeah, 24 FPER ,-i 29000 (G.C. Summary Dismissal

1997) case, which ratified the practice of having the legislative body reconvene to

address an issue still at impasse after a mayor's veto.

However, unlike the Dade County Police Benevolent Association, Inc., there is not

a General Counsel summary dismissal or Commission nase establishing existing case

law which created an ambiguity in the law, or upon which the City relied to bypass the

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impasse resolution procedure. Although this case involved an issue of first impression,

that factor goes to whether either party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees, not to

whether the re.medy of returning the parties to the status quo ante should be prospective.

ln Boa.rd of County Commissioners of Jackson County v. International Union of

Operating Engineers, 620 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), the court held that the

Commission could not declare Jackson County guilty of an unfair labor practice and

violating the law when its actions were consistent with prior case Jaw. In Allen, the

Commission stated that because it significantly clarified prior Commission and General

Counsel case law, and since the College may have relied on the prior decisions in

deciding how to implement the release time article, it is not appropriate under Jackson

County to conclude that the College has committed an unfair labor practice.

The Dade County Police Benevolent Association, Jackson County, and Allen

cases are distinguishable because these cases involved changes in the interpretation of

existing law upon which the respondents relied. In this case, there was no such change

in existing law for the City to rely upon.

In sum, we agree with the hearing officer and the FOP that the remedy in this

case should be the traditional remedy when an employer unlawfully changes the parties'

collective bargaining agreement; that is, a return to the status quo ante as it existed on

September 29, 201 O, the day prior to the effective date of the City's unlawful action.

Consequently, the City's fourth exception is denied.

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The City's first and second exceptions pertain to the City's assertion that the

hearing officer failed to consider its affirmative defense of exigent circumstances. In

these exceptions, the City argues that if a financial urgency existed then exigent

circumstances existed as well. The City claims that the hearing pfficer did not reach its

affirmative defense of exigency because he resolved the FOP's unfair labor practice

charge expressly on the merits under the then-existing and developing law as it applied

to Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes.

The affirmative defense of exigent circumstances is available in very limited and

temporal situations. Examples of exigent circumstances include weather conditions,

such as a hurricane or "a proposed sick-out by teachers in the context of ~n ongoing

labor dispute, which warranted the employer implementing a temporary change in the

personal reason and sick leave policy." See Pasco County School Board v. Public

Employees Relations Commission, 353 So. 2d 108, 125 (1977) (citing NLRB v. Minute

Maid Corp., 283 F. 2d 705 (5th Cir. 1960)); Broward Teachers Union v. Schoof Board of

Broward County, 30 FPER 'ii 304 (2004). It could also include a riot or civil disturbance.

This defense to a temporary unilateral change of the collective bargaining agreement

exists to provide relief to an employer who is forced by an emergency to quickly and

immediately suspend, not permanently alter, the contractual terms and conditions of

employment of its employees.

In emergency situations such as a hurricane or imminent strike an employer can

act Immediately to meet the emergency without prior consultation with or agreement by

10

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the certified union. See, e.g., Florida Classified Employees Association v. Taylor County

School Board, 7FPER~12100 at 263-264 (1981). Although an employer facing such

emergencies may take immediate action to suspend the contractual terms and

conditions, the City fails to cite any cases wherein an employer was authorized to

unilaterally alter the terms.of the collective bargaining agreement and then im.pose those

new terms on the bargaining unit.

According to the hearing officer's facts, the City knew since April 30, 2010, that it

was experiencing a financial urgency but it did not act until August 31. (HORO

findings 16, 28, and 32 through 36) This delay plus the fact that the City engaged in

negotiations with the FOP contradicts the City's contention that it was experiencing an

exigent circumstance such as a hurricane, imminent strike, or riot.

The City's contention that the hearing officer erred by not reaching its affirmative

defense of exigency is also without merit. We agree with the hearing officer that if the

City's contention is that he did not address its affirmative defense of exigent

circumstances, the City was required to timely file an exception and raise that issue with

the Commission in order to preserve that issue. The City filed no such exception; thus,

the City's first and second exceptions are denied. Likewise, the City's third exception,

which seeks to challenge the hearing officers finding that the FOP was not acting in bad

faith to perpetuate the status quo, is denied.

In the recommended order, the hearing officer concluded that although the City

was the prevailing party neither party was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. In the

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supplemental recommended order, the hearing officer found that the FOP is the

prevailing party.

A prevailing charging party is entitled to attorney's fees if the respondent knew or

should have known that its conduct was unlawful. See Leon County PBA v. City of

Tallahassee, 8FPER1'[ 13400 at 726 (1982), affd, 445 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984);

DeMarois v. Military Park Fire Control Tax District, 7 FPER ~ 12065 at 159 (1981), aff'd,

411 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); IBPA T, Local 1010 v. Anderson, 401 So_ 2d 824,

831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981 }. Pertinent to this inquiry is whether the law is well-settled in light

of prior Commission decisions. See Fort Walton Beach Fire Fighters Association v. City

of Fort Walton Beach, 11 FPER 1I 16240 at 660 (1985).

In its sole exception, the FOP excepts to the hearing officer's conclusion that this

case involved a novel issue. Relying on Chiles v. United Faculty of Florida, 615 So. 2d

671 (Fla. 1993), the FOP contends that neither the state of the case law nor the clarity of

the statute was in doubt. In essence, the FOP argues that the City knew or should have

known that it did not have the right to unilaterally modify the collective bargaining

agreement. The City, in its response, argues that well established case law governing

contractual modifications under Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes, did not exist at the

time it was required to act. See Collier Professional Firefighters and Paramed;cs,

f ntemational Association of Firefighters, Local 2396, AFL~C!O v. East Naples Fire Control

& Rescue District, 40 FPER il 176 (2013).

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The FOP's reliance on Chiles rs misplaced because Chiles did not involve the

interpretation or application of Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes. The Florida Supreme

Court issued Chiles in 1993 and Section 44 7.4095, Florida Statutes, was created by the

legislature in 1995. See Ch. 95-218, § 2, Laws of Fla. Moreover, in Chiles, the Supreme

Court held that before any unilateral modification could be made, the School Board had

to demonstrate a compelling state interest. CommunioaUons Workers of America v.

Indian River County School Board, 888 So. 2d 96, 101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Here, the

heariog officer found the City had a compelling interest in reopening its contract with the

FOP and altering provisions which related to wages and pension benefits of employees

represented by the FOP. In sum, he found that a financial urgency existed.

In the absence of a case interpreting and applying Section 447.4095, Florida

Statutes, which would have warned the City that it was acting unlawfully, the City would

not know or should not have known that its conduct was violative of Chapter 447, Part II,

Florida Statutes. We also note that the City prevailed before the hearing officer, the

Commission, the First District Court, and there was an unwritten dissenting opinion within

the Florida Supreme Court. We also note that although the City was a prevailing

respondent, the hearing officer concluded that neither party was entitled to attorney's

fees a.nd costs. Furthermore, we agree with the hearing officer that this case

encompassed a novel issue, involving statutory interprett3tion and application, as well as

constitutional issues; thus, neither party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. See,

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e.g., Fire Rescue Professionals of Alachua County, Local 3852, IAFF v. Alachua County,

28 FPER ~ 33158 (2002). Therefore, the FOP's sole exception is denied.

We agree with the hearing officer's analysis of the dispositive legal issues and

conclusions of law. Accordingly, the hearing officer's recommerided order is

incorporated herein.

The appropriate remedy in this case requires the City to rescind the changes in

wages and benefits that were legislatively imposed on September 30, reinstate the status

quo ante as of September 29, 2010, and make the employees whole.2 The Clerk of the

Commission is directed to open a back pay case and schedule a hearing before Hearing

Officer Joey D. Rix.

On September 25, seventy#two City police officers filed a motion to intervene.

They allege that their substantial interests may be affected by the outcome of the back

pay proceeding. The City and the FOP oppose the motion. The motion is denied as

premature with leave to refile in the back pay case.

This is not an appealable flnal order because the amount of back pay remains for

determination. See Department of Corrections v. Schwarz, et al, 134 So. 3d 1002 (Fla.

1st DCA 2012). When the amount of back pay is resolved, the Commission will issue a

final order that will allow either party to appeal the merits of this order or the amount of

back pay.

2The City's argument that the back pay award should be limited to a certain period of time is appropriately addressed by the hearing officer in the back pay ceise.

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It is so ordered. POOLE, Chair, BAX and KISER, Commissioners, concur.

I HER~~ERTIFY that this document was filed and a copy served on each party on 8{. ~ (J , 2017.

/bjk

cc: Attorneys representing the police officers who filed the motion to intervene:

Hoss Hernandez, Esquire 4551 Ponce Del Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33146-1832

Richard John Diaz, Esquire 3127 Ponce Del Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33134

H.K. "Skipn Pita, Esquire, and Randy M. Weber, Esquire 9~50 South Dixie Highway Suite 1200 Miami, Florida 33186

15

\

STATE OF FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS COMMISSION

WALTER E. HEADLEY, JR., MIAMI LODGE #20, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF MIAMI,

Respondent.

CASE NO.: CR-2017-001 (Relates to CA-2010-119)

I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

NOTICE OF APPEAL

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NOTICE IS GIVEN that the City of Miami, Respondent, appeals to the Third District

Court of Appeal, the Order of Public Employees Relations Commission dated October 18, 2017.

The Order is styled "Order on the Merits of Unfair Labor Practice Charge". A copy of the Order is

attached hereto.

Respectfully submitted:

VICTORIA MENDEZ, City Attorney JOHN A. GRECO, Deputy City Attorney KEVIN R. JONES, Assistant City Attorney Attorneys for City of Miami 444 S.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 945 Miami, FL 33130-1910 Tel.: (305) 416-1800 Fax: (305) 416-1801 Primary E-mail: jgreco@miamigov.com Secondary E-mail: kjones@miamigov.com

By: Isl John A. Greco John A. Greco, Deputy City Attorney Florida Bar No. 991236

A-2

l J

l

Michael Mattimore, Esq. Luke Savage, Esq. Allen Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32303 mmattimore@anblaw.com lsavage@anblaw.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Notice of Appeal Case No.: CR-2017-001

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to those

individuals listed below by e-mail generated by the PERC e-filing portal on this this 14th day of

November 2017.

Robert D. Klausner, Esq. Adam P. Levinson, Esq. Paul A. Daragjati, Esq. Stuart A. Kaufinan, Esq. Anna R. Klausner Parish, Esq. Klausner, Kaufinan, Jensen & Levinson 7080 NW 4th Street Plantation, FL 33317-2201 bob@robertdklausner.com adam@robertdklausner.com paul@robertdklausner.com stu@ro bertdklausner. com

Ronald J. Cohen, Esq. Rice Pugatch Robinson Storfer & Cohen, PLLC 101NE3rd Avenue Suite 1800 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Primary Email: rcohen@rprslaw.com

865749 2

Osnat K. Rind, Esq. Phillips & Richard, P.A. 9360 SW 72 Street Suite 283 Miami, FL 33173-3283 Tel: 305-412-8322 Fax: 305-412-8299 Primary Email: orind@phillipsrichard.com

865749

By: Isl John A. Greco

Notice of Appeal Case No.: CR-2017-001

John A. Greco, Deputy City Attorney Florida Bar No. 991236

3

Oct 1B 2017 04:03pm P002/016

STATE OF FLORIDA

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS COMMISSION

WALTER E. HEADLEY, JR., MIAMI LODGE #20 FRATERNAL ORDER ···-·---·· .. ··-·----····'--· .. ····-· ··- ···-·········--·-· ·-OF POLICE, INC.,

Charging Party,

v.

CITY OF MIAMI, .. -

Case No. CR-2017-001 (Relates to CA-2010-119)

ORDER ON MERITS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

CHARGE - : . - orde.r . Nl:llliber·: - -IIU-269 :·

Dat©-Issued-: October: 18, 2017

Robert D. Klausner, Plantation; P~ul A. Daragjati, Jacksonville; Ronald J. Cohen, Fort Lauderdale; and Osnat K. Rind, Miami, attorneys for Charging Party.

Michael Mattlmore, Tallahassee; Luke C. Savage, Coral Gables; and Victoria Mendez, Kevin R. Jones, and John A. Greco, Miami, attorneys for Respondent.

On September 21, 2010, the Walter E. Headley, Jr_, Miami Lodge #20, Fraternal

Order of Police Inc. (FOP), filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging, In pertinent part,

that the City of Miami (City) violated Section 447.501 (1 )(a) and (c), Florida Statutes.

According to the charge, the City improperly invoked Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes,

financial urgency, and the City unlawfully failed to follow the procedures In the financial

urgency statute by unilaterally changing the contractual terms and conditions of

employment of bargaining unit employees represented by the FOP before completing the

Impasse resolution procedure set forth in Section 447.403, Florida Statutes.1 The City

denied the FOP's allegations. Both parties requested awards of attorney's fees and

litigation costs.

1The FOP also aHeged that the City engaged in surface barga.ining.

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(HORO) in which he found that the City had a compelllng Interest In reopening its

contract with the FOP. In sum, he found that the City was experiencing a financial

urgency. The hearing officer also found, in pertlnent part, that the City altered the terms

___ ---· -:: :::::.-- of1he co!lec!J.vf3- _p~~~injog!lme.~rn~nt relating to wages ~rid_ p_en~~on benefits of_

-employees re~iresentedoy the-.FOP . .Additionally, the hearing officer found that Section

447.4095, Florida Statutes, did not require the City to complete the impasse pmcess

prior to modifying the collective bargaining agreement.

Regarding an a.ward of attorney's fees, the hearing officer found that the

. resolution of the FOP's financial urgency charge was dependent on the valldity of the

City's claim of financial urgency and It was novel, i.e., a case of first impression. He

concluded neither party was entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs of litigation.

A majority of the Commission agreed with the hearing officer's analysis of the

dispositive legal issues, his conclusions of law, and his recommendations. Watter E,

Headley, Jr., Miami Lodge #20, Fraternal Order of Police; Inc. v. City of Mlam;, 38 FPER

1f ·330 (2012). On appeal, the District Court of Appeq), First District, concluded that the

Commission did not eJT in interpreting or applying Section 447.4095, Florida statutes,

and affirmed the final order dismissing the FOP's unfair labor practice charge. Walter E.

Headley, Jr. 1 Miami Lodge No. 20, Fraternal Order of Po/Ice, Inc. v. City of Miami,

118 So. 3d 885, 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (First District Court). The FOP appealed to the

Florida Supreme Court.

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The Supreme Court concluded, In pertinent part, that Section 447.4095, Florida

Statutes, permlts the unilateral implementation of changes to a collective bargaining

agreement only after parties have completed the impasse resolution proceedings found

in Section 447.403, Florida Statutes, and failad to ratify the agreement. Walter£.

_ ___ j1~~d~ey, _Jr., M_la!IJI Lc><:jg~ #~O,=-f~aternal Order of P~llqe, ~n22 ~._t.~I. v. _City of Mia!J1/,

· -- 215 So. 3d 1, 9 (Fla~ 2017). The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First

District Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The First District Court

remanded this case to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with the

Florida Supreme Court's opinion.

On May 18, 2017, upon consideration of the Florida Supreme Court's opinion and

the hearing officer's factual findings, we concluded that the City vlolated Section

447.501(1 )(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, when it unilaterally changed wages, pensions,

health Insurance, and other monetary Items for the employees in the bargalning unit

represented by the FOP prior to completing the Section 447._403, Florida Statutes,

impasse resolution procedure. § 447.503{6)(a), Fla. Stat. We remanded this case to the

hearing officer and directed him to recommend an appropriate remedy and to make a

recommendation whether the FOP, as a prevailing charging party, was entitled to an

award of attorney's fees and costs.

. On July 20, the hearing officer issued a supplemental order in which he

recommended directing the City to rescind its modifications to the wa.ges1 health care,

3

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and pension benefits of employees represented by the FOP beginning on September 30,

2010, as described in findings of fact thirty-seven through thirty-nine of his recommended

order. Headley, 38. FPER ~ 330. He recommended that the Commission direct the

parties to return to the status quo ante as of September 29, 2010, the day prior to the

effective date of its unlawful action. T~e hea~n_g office! ~lso _r~mm~nded ~g_?ln_st Cln_ - ·····-··---· -· - -.. -:.-_.=:.--.:: . . . ' _-.::::. .. :. - ··-=· . . - ... ·_- -- - . -·

· award of attorney's fees and costs· in favor of the FOP.

On August 3, ttle FOP filed one exception to the hearing officer's recommenda.tlon

against awarding its attorney's fees and costs. On August 14, after receiving an

extension of time, the City filed four exceptions to the recommended order, a response to

the FOP's exception, and a motion for oral argument. On August 25, the FOP filed a

response to the City's exceptions.

The City requested oral argument, which the ~OP opposes as unnecessary. The

Commission does not believe oral argument would assist it in the resolution of this case

because the facts and legal arguments have been adequately presented in the briefs and

record. Accordingly, the City's motion for oral argument is denied. We now turn to the

exceptions.

The City's fourth exception is to the hearing officer's recommended remedy of

returning the parties to the status quo ante as of September 29, 201 o, the day prior to

the effective date of the City's unlawful action. The City argues that any remedy should

be prospective only. The gravamen of the City's fourth exception is that its actions were

4

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validqted by existing case law, including the Commission's General Counsel's interpreta-·--··--··- ··-··--- -·· -....... ---···--...-.-···- -- . --···----·--·------· ----· ··-··· ---· ·-·-·--···· .. . . .. ---·· . .. ·- ·-·--- --- ····-·· ·-·- -··

tlon of Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes, contained in a May 9, 2001, correspondence

letter. In support of this argument, tl1e City relies on Communications Workers of

Amerfce v. Indian Rivsr Sohool Board, 888 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004);

_ =--=- -=- -: -:..--.::__Jacksonville -5.'-f P~~~O(~ A~:;;ocietion v. CifY:.pf Je.r;f{spnvll/e, 26 FPER 1J 31140 at 255-

256 (2000), roi/d in pa.rt on other-grounds 791 So. 2d 508 -{Fla. 1st DCA 2001 ); and

Manatee Education Association, FEA, AFT (Local 3821 ), AFL-CfO v. School Board of

Manatee County, 62 So. 3d 1176, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011 ), aftg in part and rellg in

part, 35FPER1f 46 (2009). The City's reliance on these cases Is misplaced.

The Communications Workers of America case Involved the appeal of a tria.I

court's order vacating an arbitration award, which interpreted Section 447.4095, Florida

Statutes, in i1s favor, on the basis that the arbitrator exceeded his powers under Section

682_ 13(1 ), Florida Statutes. There, In an Informal correspondence to the School Board,

the Commission's General Counsel stated that Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes, was

enacted by the Legislature in 1997 and that as of the date of his letter the Commission

had not interpreted its provisions in case law. He opined in that letter that in the event of

a financial urgency requiring modification of a collective bargaining agreement, an

employer is allowed to unilaterally change wages, hours, and terms and conditions of

employment after bargaining the impact of the change for a Qreasonable period" not to

exceed fourteen days. Communications Workers of Amer/ca1 888. So. 2d at 98.

5

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. __ -.--I~e ~?.r:im~~~~~~s-.~~~er~I C?ouns~l's ~<?.r.~~~P?_~~E)~~~-~ighli~_hts the f~~~_!lla~ ~t~_

date the Commission has not had an occasion to Interpret" Section 447.4095, Florida

Statutes. Thus, contrary to the City's argument, there was no existing case law at the

time the City unilaterally modified the partles' collective bargaining agreement without

__ . _ ___ _ --· . fir~_t co~p~tln_~_ th~ ~tatutory lmpa§se re~olutlon proced\:ir~. -=-The_ Gener~! Couns~l's

··informal correspondence does not eonstitute existing Cominlssion case Jaw; it was

simply his opinion. More Importantly, the correspondence does not opine that an

employer Is not obligated to first proceed through the Section 447.403, Florida Statutes,

impasse resolution procedure after impasse is reached as required by Section 447.40951

Florida. Statutes. In that case, the Impasse resolution hea.ring was conducted pursuant to

Section 447.403, Florida Statutes. Id.

The Jacksonv/lle Supervisors Associal/on case involved a reorganization of three

departments, which led management to abolish and create bargaining unit positions.

The case involved management rights pursuant to Section 447.209i Florida Statutes, not

financial urgency or the application or [nterpretation of Section 447.4095, Florida

Statutes.

The Manatee Education AssociaUon case involved the employer Invoking Section

447.4095, Florida Sta.tutes, to modify salaries based on financlal urgency. The union

sought to require the employer to prove the existence of a financial urgency before

proceeding under Section 447.4095. The court rejected the union's contention stating

that, "Requiring proof of financial urgency before resort to section 447-4095 could result

6

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in substantial delays, delays which could effectively ~lilT)_Lf)ate the E1"1J.llty tp ad_(tr.~$.!:UL --·-· - ·--·-·---·-······ . ·-···· .. ---·-· ·-· --·-··-··· -·-·--·-····-·· ·-·--·- --· -- ·-·-···· ····-· ... --· -· .

financial urgency, frustrating the obvious purpose of the statute. We affirm PERC's

determination th~t section 447.4095 does not place any temporal preconditions on the

initiation of the process section 447.4095 authorizes.~ Manatee Education Association,

-·-· -·- ____ .. _ 62 So, 3d_fil.1.1QJ~-Howe~er, th~court rejected the Com~mission's.determination~that (;1- - -·-·--·· - --··- .

. -··union must participate Tn Section 447.4095 negotiations in order to file (at some later

time) an unfair labor practice charge. Id.

The Manatee Education Association interpretations of Section 447.4095, Florida

Statutes, occurred in 2008 and 2009_ However, until now neither the court nor the

Commission had Interpreted Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes, as it applied to the

Section 447.403, FJ"orida Statutes, lmpG1sse resolution process. Moreover, untll the ;

instant case neither the Commission nor _the court had addressed the Issue of an

employer bypassing the impasse resolution process pursuant to Section 447.4095,

Florida Statutes. Thus, the City's contention that its actions were validated by existing

case law is without merit.

Similarly, in support of its argument tha.t the remedy should be prospective only,

the City relies on Dade County Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Miami Dade

County Board of Counly Commissioners, 160 So. 3d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), review

denied sub nom. Miami-Dade County Bd, of County Commissioners v. Dade County

Po/ic~ Benevolent Association, 177 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. 2015) rev'g 40FPER11198 {2013);

7

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International Union of Operating_ Engineers, Loc~l 653 y'. __ f?q~rd__gf.9o.unfy_ __ ·-·--· _ .... •·r--· ''" •-··· • ··----··-···· .. -- .. ----· ··----·· --· ·---·- •• ... '

Commissioners ofJa.ckson County, 18 FPER CU 23138 (1992), rev'd on other grounds,

620 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); and Allen v, Miami-Dade College Board of

Trustees, 43FPER1J 6 (PERC 2016), per curla.m affd, 2017 WL 363130 (Fla. 3d DCA

.... -.-- ___ ·-::: = JanlJa~ 25.,:-291.7) (~np_t,JpJisbep .9ecision). :- .

In o-ade Count}t Poliee Benevolent Association, Inc., the Mayor-vetoed the County

Commission's resolution of the impasse pertaining to an increase in employee's health

insurance contributions and the County Commission did not override the veto. The

Commission dismissed the portion of the charge dealing with the mayor's veto but the

court reversed the Commission. On remand from the court, the issue before the

Commission was whether the remedy should be prospective or retroactive. Dade County

Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Miami Dade County Board of County

Commissioners, 43 FPER 1f 105 (2016). The Commission concluded that the remedy

should be prospective only because it was an issue of first impression and the County

had the benefit of the General Counsel's summary dismissal in the Dede County Police

Benevolent Association v. City of Hialeah, 24 FPER ~ 29000 (G.C. Summary Dismissal

1997) case, which ratified the practice of having the legislative body reconvene to

address an issue still at Impasse after a mayor's veto.

However, unlike the Dade County Police Benevolent Association, Inc., there is not

a General Counsel summary dismissal or Commission case establishing existing case

law which created an ambiguity in the law, or upon which the City relied to bypass the

8

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.. ___ ----··· ____ lmp~se _r~s~!':'!X~~_p~~~ed~!~:._,l\ltl]~~~-~-thi~.gas.~Jnv9lv~.ci an issue qf firstJ.ri:mre~~!Qn,

that factor goes to whether either party ls entitled to an award of attorney's fees, not to

whether the remedy of returning the parties to the status quo ante should be prospective.

In Bo~rd of County Commissioners of Jackson County v. lntemational Un;on of

_ -·~::: ·:::- =-__ = (?peraftn_g f.ngfileers,~6?0 So'.-2d 1062(Fla._1st DCA.-1993),Jhe court held that the- -

Commission-could not deciare Jackson County guilty of an unfair labor practice and

vfolatlng the law when its actions were consistent with prior case law. In Allen, the

Commission stated that because i1 significantly cla.rified prior Commission and General

Counsel case law, and since the College may have relied on the prior decisions in

deciding how to implement the release time article, it is not appropriate under Jackson

County to conclude that the College has committed an unfair labor practice.

The Dade County Police Benevolent Assoo;ation, Jackson Count~ and Allen

cases are distinguishable because tfiese cases involved changes in the interpretation of

existing law upot1 which the respondents relied. In this case, there was no such change

in existing law for the City to rely upon.

In s_um, we agree with the hearing officer and the FOP that the remedy in this

case should be the traditional remedy when an employer unlawfully changes the parties'

collective bargaining agreement; that Is, a return to the status quo ante as it existed on

September 29, 2010, the day prior to the effective date of the City's unlawful action. ·

Consequently, the City's fourth exception is denied.

9

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· The City's first and second exceptions pertain to the City's ~s~~rtion t.b__?J; thSl ·-··-----·· ·-· :····-- ··---·· ·------··--~-·· . --· ·---··--·---·---- . ···-·· --· ' ··- . '

hearing officer failed to consider its affirmative defense of exigent circumstances. In

these exceptions, the City argues that If a financial urgency existed then exigent

clrcums~nces existed as well. The City claims that the hearing officer did not reach its

_ _ af[Lrrnativ~. g~fen~e of .~xige[lcy becausej}e res_o[yed the_fOP's u.nfair lab.or practl.ce -------·--·::-·--· -· . ·-·-·. - ·- ..

- charge expressly on the merlts under the then-existing and developing law as it applied

to Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes.

The affirmative defense of exigent circumstances is available in very limited and

temporal situations. Examples of exigent circumstances include weather conditions,

such as a hurricane or ua proposed sicl<-out by teachers in the context of an ongoing

labor dispute, which warranted the employer implementing a temporary change in the

personal reason and sick leave policy." See Pasco County School Boa.rd v .. Public

·Employees Re/atioos Commission, 353 So. 2d 108, 125 (1977) (citing NLRB v. M;nute

Maid.Corp., 283 F. 2d 705 (5th Cir. 1960)); Broward Teachers Union v. School Board of

Broward County, 30FPER1f 304 (2004)- It could also include a riot or civil disturbance.

This defense to a temporary unilateral change of the collective bargaining agreement

exists to provide relief to ~n employer who Is forced by an emergency to quickly and

immediately suspend, not pem1anently alter, the contractual terms and conditions of

employment of its employees.

In emergency situations such as a hurricane or imminent strike an employer can

act immedfately to meet the emergency without prior consultation with or agreement by

10

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_ . __ -·- .. the ?~r:t~~-~ .~nl~!J·.~~~! . .!:.~·-' f(~rida Cla_s~ifJ_e_cl_. Employees Ass<?_ciat;on v. TayJqr:__qou(Jty __ .

School Board, 7FPER1f 12100 at 263-264 (1981 ). Although an employer facing such

emergencies may take imrnedia.te action to suspend the contractual terms and

conditions, the City fails to cite any cases wherein an employer was authorized to

-. __ _ __ .. ·- :::-ynilat~Eajly __ @lter _!til:l t~r:ins.of tp.e_co~le9tive ba~~aining_agreem.ent ~nd then impose those _

new·terrnson the bargaining unit. ·

According to the hearing officer's facts, the City knew since April 30, 2010, that it

was experiencing a financial urgency but it did not act until August 31. (HORO

findings 16, 28, and 32 through 36) This delay plus the fact that the City engaged in

negotiations with the FOP contradicts the City's contention that it was experiencing an

exigent circumstance such as a hurricane, imminent strike, or riot.

The City's contention that tile hearing officer erred by not reaching its affirmative

defense of exigency is a.Isa without merit. We agree with the hearing officer that If the

City's contention is that he did not address its affirmative defense of exigent

circumstances, the City was required to timely file an exception and raise that issue with

the Commis$iOn in order to preserve that issue. The City filed no such exc..-eption; thus,

the City's first and sec9nd exceptions are denied. Likewise, the City's third exception,

which seeks to challenge the hearing officer's finding that the FOP was not acting in bad

faith to perpetuate the status quo, is denied.

In the recommended order, the hearing officer concluded that although the City

was the prevailing party neither party was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. In the

11

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supplemental recommended order, the hearing officer found that the FOP Is the ·-··· ·-·· -····· ···--·· - -·- .. ···---·- ·-···· -····· ···-·-··--·····----··-··-.-·- .. -··-····-·-·--··· . . ····- ···- - . ··-·--

prevailing party.

A prevailing charging party Is entitled to attorney's fees if the respondent knew or

should have known that its conduct was unlawful. See Leon County PBA v, City of

Tf!llB.hBSSf!~. ~ F::P.~8~13400at12e (1982), affd,_445 S_o..2cl 605 (Fla. 1stDCA_j984); - -

- DeMarols Ii. Military Paik Fire Control Tax District, 7 FPER if12065 at 159 (1981), affd,

411 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); IBPAT, Local 1010 v, Anderson, 401 So. 2d 824,

. 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Pertinent to this inquiry is whether the law is well·settled in light

of prior Commission decisions. See Fort Walton Besch Fire Fighters Association v. City

of Fort Walton Beach, 11 FPER 1f 16240 at 660 (1985).

In its sole exception, the FOP excepts .to the hearing officer's conclusion that this

case involved a novel issue. Relying on Chiles v. United Faculty of Flotida, 615 So. 2d

671 (Fla.· 1993), the FOP contends that neither the state of the case law nor the clarity of

the statute· was In doubt. In essence, 1he FOP argues that the City knew or should have

l~nown that it did not have the right to unilaterally modify the collective bargaining

agreement. The City, in its response, argues that well established case law governing

contractual modifications under Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes, did not exist at the

time it was required to act. See Collier Professional Firefighters and Paramedics,

International Association of Firefighters, Local 23961 AFL·CIO v. Ea.st Naples Fire Control

& Rescue District, 40 FPER i-J 176 (2013).

12

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The FOP's reliance on Ch;fes is misplaced because Chi/es did not involve the .. - ·- .. ' ··•.·-- .. ··--··· .. ._, ..... ·- ···-· --------·----· . - .. ·-·- ·-· .. . .. . ··--· ... -· .... -.-·· ·--- .. .. . . ·---· . . . . -··· --~---·-· . -·· .,.

Interpretation or application of Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes. The Florida Supreme

Court issued Chiles in 1993 and Section 447.4095, Florida Statutes, was created by the

legislature In 1995. See Ch. 95-218, § 2, Laws of Fla. Moreover, in Chiles, the Supreme

.:c..:. _ :::.--::..-:· · .. -=-Qou.r:t.he~d.tj:l§.t,~efQre ~nY,,!f.!}ilateral modifi~tion oould be made, the School BoaEd had. -

-to .. demonstrate a-compelllng state interest. Communications Workem of America v.

Indian River County School Board, 888 So. 2d 96, 101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Here, the

hearing officer found the City had a compelling interest in reopening its contract with the

FOP and altering provisions which related to wages and pension benefits of employees

represented by the FOP. In sum, he found that a financial urgency existed.

In the absence of a case interpreting and applying Section 447:4095, Florida

Statutes, which would have warned the City that it was acting unlawfully, the City would

not l<:now or should not have l<nown that its conduct was violative of Chapter 4477 Part II,

Florida Statutes. We also note that the City prevailed before the heG\ring officer, the

Commission, the First District Court, and there was an unwritten dissenting opinion within

the Florida Supreme Court We also note that although the City was a prevailing

respondent, the hearing officer concluded that neither party was entrtled to attorney's

fees and costs. Furthermore, we agree with the hearing officer that this case

encompassed a novel Issue, Involving s1atutory Interpretation and application, as well as

constitutional issues; thus, neither party Is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. See1

13

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.- . ~·fl:~ Fire __ ~~~?__~~.!:.'~'..~~5.lo~~!s__.~'. f!ilac~.~~--C?_~unty, Local 3852, IAFF v, (1.la~f1l!.~-Cou_nty,

28 FPER ~ 33158 (2002). Therefore, the FOP's sole exception is denied.

We agree with the hearing officer's analysls of the dispositive legal issues and

conclusions of law. Accordingly, the hearing officer's recomrnended order is

The appropriate··remedy in this case requires the City to rescind the changes in

wages and.benefits that were legislatively imposed on September 30, reinstate the status

quo ante as of September 29, 2010, and make the. employees whole.2 The Clerk of the

. Commission ls directed to open a back pay case and schedule a hearing before Hearing

Officer Joey D. Rix.

On September 25, seventy-two City police officers filed a motion to intervene.

They allege that their substantial Interests may be affected by the outcome of the back

pay proceeding. The City and the FOP oppose the motion. The motion is denied as

premature with leave to refile in the back pay case.

This is not an appealable final order because the amount of back pay remains for

determination. See Deparlment of Corrections v. Schwarz, et al, 134 So. 3d 1002 (Fla.

1st DCA 2012). When the amount of back pay is resolved, the Commission will issue a

final ord.er that will allow either party to appeal the merits of 1hls order or the amount of

back pay.

2The City's argument that the back pay award should be llmlted to a certain period of time is appropriately addressed by the hearing officer In the back pay case.

14

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It is so ordered . . . .. ·poor:E;··ct1afr; 61\X and KiSER, commfasioners, concur.

I HERJ;.~Y,,CERTlFY that this document was filed and a copy served on each party on ~~ (J , 2017.

-/bjk

BY~kU~

cc: Attorneys representinQ the police officers who filed the motion to lnteivene;

Hoss Hernandez, Esquire 4551 Ponce Del Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33146-1832

Richard John Diaz., Esquire 3127 Ponce Del Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33134

H.K. "Skip" Pita, ~squire, and Randy M. Weber, Esquire 9350 South Dixie Highway Suite 1200 Miami, Florida 33186

15

I

• Filings Pending

Date

m 11/14/2017

Public Employees Relations Commission

Case Remark CR-17-

Response 001

Schedule File Document

Note

Pending Filings

Notice of Appeal

http://perc.myflorida.com/ePerc/Filings.aspx?CaseID=36430

Page 1 of 1

11/14/2017