Sustainable Governance in the BRICS Report Russia.pdf · Sustainable Governance in the BRICS...

Prof. Dr. Evgeny Gonthmaker, Institute for Contemporary DevelopmentProf. Dr. Boris Makarenko, Center for Political TechnologiesDr. Heiko Pleines (Coordinator), University of BremenProf. Dr. Hans-Henning Schröder, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)

Sustainable Governance in the BRICS

Country Report Russia

4 Assessment Overview

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite economic and political turbulence in global markets and in countries around it,

Russia has presented the appearance of stability – at least on the surface. Vladimir Putin,

who served two terms as president from 2000 until 2008, took on the role of prime minister

from 2008 until 2012 under hand-picked successor Dmitry Medvedev. Though some early

turbulence was noted, the Russian economy went through the global economic crisis largely

without major economic and political upheaval, cuts in social spending, the collapse of major

financial players, or other phenomena characteristic of many OECD countries.

In the broadest perspective, Russia’s most salient characteristic is perhaps that of being

“stuck in transition,” from both the socioeconomic and political points of view. It has failed to

complete the reinvention of its industrial and economic potential within a market environment

and the global division of labor, and has failed to build democratic institutions of scale and

quality corresponding to its economic potential and human capital.

The stability in the composition of the country’s top political personnel is partly due to

genuine popular support for the stability Putin brought after the chaotic transition period of

the 1990s, but partly also to severe manipulations of the democratic system. The quality of

elections was best summarized by the final report of the OSCE observation mission to the

December 2011 parliamentary elections: “The prior denial of registration to certain political

parties narrowed political competition. The contest was also slanted in favor of the ruling

party. This was evidenced by the lack of independence of the election administration, the

partiality of most media, and the undue interference of state authorities at different levels.”

The attention of the Russian political leadership is strongly focused on economic

development and security issues. Other policy fields related to domestic development are

accorded far less attention. The quality of policies ranges from modestly good in finance and

taxation to dangerously low in such areas as migration, research and innovation or

environmental issues.

However, even within the realm of the economy Russia seems to have undergone too few

structural reforms and adjustments, such as diversion of traditionally strong exports to

domestic markets or a reduction of the dependence on exports of raw materials and the

import of high-tech goods. Accordingly, a decline in Russia’s economic competitiveness (as

measured by the World Economic Forum) has been observed for several years, but seems

to have reached its bottom. Despite President Medvedev’s rhetorically strong promises to

engage in comprehensive modernization efforts, very few changes in any sphere have

materialized in fact.


A major reason for this is that Russia has managed to build governance mechanisms

capable of providing most public goods. Its executive agencies are good in terms of

“business-as-usual” routine, including interministerial coordination, but are largely isolated

from outside advice, and a two-thirds parliamentary majority has shielded the executive from

legislative scrutiny.

For its part, the state executive lacks the capacity for strategic planning. The political

leadership rarely focuses on strategic policy debates, but regularly interferes in the details of

policy (a process called “manual control by Putin”) and often focuses more on struggles

between narrow interests than on broader visions or the public interest. As a result, what

informal mechanisms are at work are more likely to promote patronage interests than enable

a focus on strategic policy debates. Moreover, many strategic visions, such as the fight

against corruption, the promotion of research and development, or national projects for

infrastructure development, health care or other public goods fail because of inefficient

implementation. Although, the ministries supervise executive agencies very tightly, this does

not imply that state agencies work efficiently. In many cases, bureaucratic procedures,

incompetence and corruption limit the implementation capacity of state agencies. State

agencies, particularly those related to taxation, environmental legislation or food and

sanitation, are sometimes used by the government to exert politically motivated pressure on

business. As a result, the government is only successful if policies are directly supported by

the president/prime minister, and can be implemented by a small technocratic team. This has

been true of oil funds, anti-monopoly regulation and central bank policy, for example.

The key obstacles to faster development are weak institutions, a servile court system,

insufficient protection of property rights, and rampant corruption. These factors affect the

economy and growth, but their nature is primarily political. Russia has constructed an “outer

shell” of democratic institutions, but has failed to fill it with substance, as the reality of political

pluralism and policy deliberation has deteriorated in recent years. The years under review in

this report were marked by growing controversy between the new market environment and

the growing middle class on one hand, and a rigid political system with a deficit of

competition and poor interest representation on the other; checks and balances have been

reduced to a minimum or a mere simulacrum.

When the “tandem” of President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin

announced in September 2011 that Putin would run for (and certainly win) a new term as

president, and when parliamentary elections the following December were widely perceived

as fraudulent, massive protests emerged in Moscow and other major Russian cities. The

origin of the protests lies in people’s declining confidence in the unchangeable government,

which cannot demonstrate efficient performance and the presence of social mobility. The


middle class is reacting with disappointment, demanding participation and representation in

politics. The protests were repeated when Putin was elected president in March 2012.

The immediate reaction of the government to the protests was conciliatory: It did not crack

down on the protests, and promised broad political reforms including liberalization of

legislation on parties and elections, and the symbolically important return of elections for

regional governors. Worthy of note is also a more pluralistic distribution of power in the Duma

that was newly elected in December 2011.

STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

The year 2012 in Russia marks the beginning of a new presidential term for veteran political

leader Vladimir Putin, who won the elections on March 4, returning from four years as prime

minister to the presidential office. The agenda for the new administration is clear: to enhance

the quality of governance, launch ambitious socioeconomic reforms and build stronger

institutions. The other unquestionable starting point for the country’s strategy is the need to

implement a series of political reforms able to open up avenues for more vigorous political

competition.

Russia enters this new phase of its development as a divided society, in which the majority

voted for “stability,” effectively meaning a carte blanche for the new Putin administration.

However, a minority strongly doubts the legitimacy of a political regime in which power

cannot change hands through elections. Every step taken by the incumbent government is

therefore met with disbelief. Genuine political reform and a demonstrated government

determination to improve its own efficiency will be crucial in regaining the trust of the skeptics

who constitute the middle class, a driving force behind any qualitative development of the

country’s economy, social and public life.

While Russia unquestionably has a high potential for development, serious impediments and

problems hamper the implementation of a seemingly clear agenda. Three broad factors will

shape Russia’s future development: economic growth rates, the quality of political reforms

and the country’s international relations.

Most Russian economists agree that the country’s growth rate will not – under any

reasonable scenario – exceed 4% per year in the next few years. Russia will be more

vulnerable in any new wave of economic crisis (even if generated outside of Russia); the

safety cushion provided by oil and gas revenues is much thinner than was the case four

years ago. “Uncancellable” government obligations in the social sphere, coupled with a

highly ambitious program of defense spending (which will presumably boost R&D and high-

tech industries) will put fiscal policy under serious pressure. Though Putin has assured the


public that he is ready to translate his electoral platform into a “business plan” and executive

decisions, there was at the time of writing still no comprehensive strategy with clearly defined

objectives and “road maps,” and there is therefore no objective information to evaluate or to

use in forecasting the outcomes of such reforms in general and their impact on the quality of

governance in particular.

The second factor relevant for Russia’s future overall development is the quality of political

reform. The reforms in the political domain announced in reaction to election protests include

a liberalization of the legal framework governing parties and elections, a return to popular

elections for governors and mayors, and a decentralization of center-periphery relations. The

determination on the part of Putin’s team to open up avenues for competition appears to be

genuine and based on the understanding that the old, “vertical” model of governance is both

inefficient and has aggravated the crisis of confidence within Russian society. However, the

reforms may well be crippled both by the government’s fear of risks imminent in the growth of

political competition (rise of populism and nationalism, growing costs of attaining decisions,

etc.), and by the potential for hidden resistance within the bureaucracy, which will attempt to

preserve its monopoly on power. The legislative process and amendments to these reforms

demonstrate that the Kremlin wishes to retain control over the political process (for example,

by introducing prohibitively high entry barriers for gubernatorial elections, hastily passing bills

that introduce repressive regulation of mass actions and equating NGOs with foreign sources

of finance to “foreign agents”) and lacks strategic vision (as demonstrated by the new bill on

Duma elections, which was heavily criticized for a lack of conceptual consistency). The

reforms will give new impetus to political participation and “open up” the political arena, but

their overall effects and plausible political development scenarios remain unclear. In any

case, even if successful, these reforms will take several years to produce tangible effects,

while the crisis of confidence persists and is having a destabilizing effect on the system in the

short term.

A third variable in Russia’s developmental equation is its relations with the outside world. To

modernize successfully, Russia needs massive inflows of foreign direct investment, access

to advanced technologies and the transfer of managerial practices. This in turn implies a

need for stable and constructive relations with both the European Union and the United

States. However, the anti-Western rhetoric typical of the recent electoral campaign indicates

that pragmatic cooperation is not always on the Russian foreign policy agenda. Rudiments of

a “security obsession” surviving from the Cold War hamper the ability of the Russian state to

make the best use of cooperation with the West.

With so diverse a set of variables, the strategic outlook for Russia’s future can only be

explicated by a forking path of scenarios. We will demonstrate the range of possible


outcomes with a best-case and a worst-case scenario. As in any scenario planning, we do

not anticipate that either of the two will materialize in full, but a trend leaning toward one or

the other will be evident within the next few years, and will help define future developments.

In the best-case scenario, the new administration starts assertively with a series of measures

addressing pressing issues (such as rampant corruption) and the concerns of the protesting

middle class, including implementation of the promised political reforms. As a result, the

current political tensions and frustrations within the population abate. In this scenario, the

government continues its efforts with a series of institutional and structural reforms, which

are basically consistent and serve the purpose of raising government efficiency and

introduce innovations in the economic and social spheres. If coupled with a favorable

international environment, this holds the potential of producing tangible effects in making

governance sustainable and ensuring Russia’s competitiveness with other BRIICS and “old

OECD” countries.

In the worst case, on the contrary, the government fails to tackle the present crisis of

confidence, and its structural reforms fail to bring about any qualitative changes in the

patterns of governance. The country stagnates, is dominated by bureaucratic routine and has

no strategic perspective. Such inertia would make it extremely vulnerable should another

external economic shock transpire, whether from repeated global financial turbulence, falling

oil prices or a deepened euro-area crisis.

The best-case scenario would not make Russia a world leader in economic development or

quality of governance, but would put it on par with the best of the BRICS in terms of

development patterns. As Russia’s standards are at present rather low in many spheres,

rising to the BRICS level would involve substantial catching up. But seen another way, this

means the Russian governance system would improve dramatically, which in turn would

provide a huge impetus for growth and modernization. On the contrary, the worst-case

scenario would probably allow Russia to muddle through, but both economic and political

risks would increase considerably and continuously.

9 Status Index: Quality of Democracy

Status Index

Quality of Democracy

S 1 Electoral Process

S 2 Access to Information

S 3 Civil Rights

S 4 Rule of Law



S 1.1 Candidacy Procedures

How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties? Everyone has equal opportunity to become a candidate for election. The registration of candidates and parties may be subject to restrictions only when in accordance with law and if deemed reasonably necessary in a democratic society. This includes protecting the interests of national security or public order, public health or morals, or protecting the rights and freedoms of others. Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; 10 candidates and parties are not discriminated against. 9 A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small 8 number of candidates and parties. 7

6

Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that 5 discriminate against many candidates and parties. 4

3

Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread 2 and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from 1 participating.

Explanation:

During the period under review, Russia had a fully proportional system for federal

parliamentary elections, combined with heavy and arbitrary regulations for registration of

political parties that effectively discriminate against registration of candidates and parties

undesirable for the government. Only seven parties were registered; since 2004 (when the

federal law on political parties was revised), not a single new party has been registered, and

only two new parties – both formed by the merger of several existing parties – have

appeared, both with almost explicit permission on the part of the Kremlin.

In 2011, the liberal People’s Freedom Party (Parnas), led by an ex-prime minister and

several other politicians prominent in the 1990s, was denied registration. The liberal Right

Cause party came into conflict with the Kremlin over inclusion of a controversial candidate,

and the Kremlin orchestrated a split in the party forcing its promising new leader Mikhail

Prokhorov to resign (the party subsequently scored less than 1% in the December 2011


federal parliamentary elections). Most experts retroactively agree that Parnas and/or Right

Cause under Prokhorov’s leadership would have captured a significant share of the urban

educated middle class protest vote, which otherwise was split between the traditionalist

Communist Party and the center-left A Just Russia party. Thus, it is reasonable to assume

that restrictions on the registration and control of internal party processes proved conducive

to a serious distortion of voters’ preferences.

In majoritarian elections (at the regional and local level), registration of candidates from

parliamentary parties is relatively easy. However, other candidates (independents and

members of nonparliamentary parties) have to undergo difficult bureaucratic procedures,

resulting in a significant number of candidates being denied registration.

After the scandals and protest rallies following the December 2011 elections, the government

promised reforms easing the entry barriers for parties and candidates, and although

registration of candidates for the March 2012 presidential elections seemed to be more open

and transparent, the candidate representing the liberal opposition Yabloko Party was denied

registration. However, these prospective changes have no impact on the assessment of the

period under review in this study.

In this context it is important to note that the questions in this section do not directly address

the overall quality of democracy or of electoral competition. For Russia, it is critical to

understand that such competition exists, but political pluralism is strictly limited to avoid

transfer of political power through elections. As a result, opposition parties are hugely

disadvantaged. In a nutshell, the quality of elections is best summarized in the following

paragraph extracted from the final report of the OSCE observation mission at the December

2011 parliamentary elections in (quoted here from a press release dated December 4, 2011):

“The prior denial of registration to certain political parties narrowed political competition. The

contest was also slanted in favor of the ruling party. This was evidenced by the lack of

independence of the election administration, the partiality of most media, and the undue

interference of state authorities at different levels.”



S 1.2 Media Access

To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication? Every candidate for election and every political party has equal opportunity of access to the media and other means of communication, which allows them to present their political views and to communicate with the voters. Access to the media may not be restricted or refused on grounds of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media 10 and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair 9 and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions. Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the 8 media and other means of communication. The major media outlets 7 provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions. 6 Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to 5 the media and other means of communication. While the major media 4 outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole 3 provides fair coverage of different political positions. Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media 2 and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased 1 in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.

Explanation:

Though equal access of all parties to major media outlets was declared to be one of the key

issues of recent (2009 – 2010) political reforms, access by opposition parties and candidates

to major national and regional media remains in reality limited.

National over-the-air TV channels and leading regional print media are publicly owned, and

severely restrict any criticism of the government (federal and regional), though allowing

infrequent appearances by parliamentary opposition figures. Numerous national TV

appearances by top government figures (including party conventions, meetings with voters,

etc.) are officially interpreted (including by the courts and by the Central Electoral

Commission) as “informing the public about the work of government,” rather than as

campaigning.

During electoral campaigns, public TV and AM radio channels are required to provide equal

air time to all participants, during political debates and for campaign ads. This requirement is


in general observed, but during the recent parliamentary campaign (fall 2011), opposition

parties such as the Yabloko Party complained that their campaign ads were censored, while

several TV clips created by A Just Russia were banned from airing on the basis of a

“recommendation” from the Central Electoral Commission (which lacks the legal competence

to issue such recommendations), under the pretext that such clips contained “traits of

extremism” though the clips were in fact focused on social injustice.

A recent exception to this rule has been the wide and reasonably objective coverage by all

national TV channels of the massive rallies protesting electoral fraud (December 2011).

The real counterweight to the ruling party’s domination of the mass media is the reasonably

free Internet and Internet-based social networks, which have rapidly grown in importance as

sources of political information and socialization during the past two or three years.



S 1.3 Voting and Registration Rights

To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections? To participate in national elections, every adult citizen must have the right to access an effective, impartial and non-discriminatory procedure for voting and voter registration. Voting rights also apply to convicts and citizens without a permanent residence in the country. No eligible citizen shall be denied the right to vote or disqualified from registration as a voter, otherwise than in accordance with objectively verifiable criteria prescribed by law, and provided that such measures are consistent with the State’s obligations under international law. Every individual who is denied the right to vote or to be registered as a voter shall be entitled to appeal to a jurisdiction competent to review such decisions and to correct errors promptly and effectively. Every voter has the right of equal and effective access to a polling station or alternative voting method, including a feasible absentee voting option. All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are 10 registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the 9 exercise of the right to vote. The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most 8 part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory, although occasional. 7 Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. 6 While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure 5 non-discriminatory, cases of discrimination occur regularly in practice. 4 3 The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic 2 discriminatory effects. Groups of adult citizens are de facto excluded 1 from national elections.

Explanation:

Russian citizens’ active voting rights are in almost perfect shape. Police registration at a

citizen’s place of residence automatically serves as registration to vote. Though mistakes do

occur in voters’ lists, a citizen residing in the area covered by a given polling station is

automatically included on the list if he or she shows up at the station. Russian laws forbid

any kind of census based on income, length of residence in the given area, or other such

details.

In federal elections, citizens who cannot come personally to the polling station associated

with their place of residence may obtain absentee ballot certificates entitling them to vote at


any polling station in Russia or abroad. Russian nationals living abroad can vote at the

polling stations nearest to their place of residence (consulates, etc.)

The Central Election Commission provides for the organization of voting in remote areas

(such as nomads in the tundra), on ships at sea, etc. The only two categories of Russian

citizens deprived of active (or passive) voting rights are convicted criminals during the course

of their prison terms (other forms of court punishment such as fines or mandatory labor do

not affect voting rights), and persons who have been declared mentally ill.



S 1.4 Party Financing

To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?

This question refers to the obligations of the receiving entity (parties and entities connected with political parties) to keep proper books and accounts, to specify the nature and value of donations received and to publish accounts regularly. Please note that this question also includes an assessment of how effectively funding of political parties and electoral campaigns is supervised (monitored by an independent body such as electoral or parliamentary commission, anti-corruption body, audit institution etc. with checking, investigative, sanction and regulatory powers) and infringements are sanctioned (taking into account administrative, civil and criminal liability). The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and 10 provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to 9 prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and 8 provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject 7 to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for 6 circumvention still exist. The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party 5 financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring 4 either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of 3 infringement do not follow. The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the 2 obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing 1 is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.

Explanation:

Formally, Russia has comprehensive legislation regulating campaign financing and

providing for the monitoring and supervision of campaign fund-raising and expenditure.

Most legal norms and monitoring mechanisms appear logical and impartial. Ceilings for

donations have been gradually raised since the 1990s, and today have reached what


might be described as reasonable amounts. Reports of funds raised and spent are

published regularly; irregularities exist, but are minimal.

However, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, the body tasked

with party financing oversight, is dominated by members close to the ruling party,

United Russia, and has often been accused of partiality.

Moreover, there are at least three reasons why Russia should not be accorded a high

score on this point:

1) The “shadow sector” of the Russian economy remains large (accounting for 16% of

GDP in 2010, according to Federal Statistical Authority estimates), and the share of

campaign financing it provides cannot be ascertained. This observation may apply to

any party or candidate.

2) The ruling party and its candidates have an advantage in access to mass media, as

they present de facto campaigning as “informing the public about the work of

government” (see “media access”). One of the main conclusions of the OSCE

observation mission to the December 2011 Duma elections was of a “convergence of

the state and governing party.” This implies that the ruling party has a significant

advantage in terms of financial resources that is not captured by this criterion’s

definitions. The convergence provides for extra assets and opportunities in the

campaign that are not captured in official figures of financial campaign resources. In

addition, the ruling party is often supported logistically and ideologically by various

state administrative organs, especially at the regional and local levels. In Russia this

support is referred to as the “administrative resources” of the ruling party.

3) The potential corporate sponsors of opposition parties and candidates are subject to

strong controls, though these are informal and difficult to document. This amounts to de

facto discrimination against the opposition in terms of access to campaign financing.



S 2.1 Media Freedom

To what extent are the media independent from government?

This question asks to what extent are the media subject to government influence and the influence of actors associated with the government. The question focuses both on media regulation and government intervention. The rules and practice of supervision should guarantee sufficient independence for publicly owned media. Privately owned media should be subject to licensing and regulatory regimes that ensure independence from government. Public and private media are independent from government influence; their 10 independence is institutionally protected and respected by the incumbent 9 government. The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media, but 8 the regulation of public and/or private media does not provide sufficient 7 protection against potential government influence. 6 The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly 5 by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial 4 resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for 3 private media. Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government 2 promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media 1 reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation.

Explanation:

Russia has a liberal mass media law, effectively banning censorship. The Internet remains

free from excessive regulation (despite numerous attempts to introduce restrictive

legislation). A significant share of the media market is privately owned and is de facto

independent of government influence and pressure. Segments free of government control

include both quality and “yellow” or tabloid print media, FM radio stations, the Internet, and all

hues of nonpolitical media (electronic and printed). Independent newspapers exist within

regional and local media markets.

However, the primary sources of political information (in terms of audience) are the national

TV channels, which are effectively owned and/or controlled by the federal government. In

opinion polls, about 80% of respondents name these as a primary source (or one of three

primary sources) of political information. The editorial (as well as personnel) policy of


government-controlled TV is openly centered on promoting pro-government political

objectives (see the quotation on the convergence of state and governing party and the

partiality of the media under “candidacy procedures”). Criticism of the government is severely

restricted, and access by opposition figures and opinions to federal TV channels is limited,

even during electoral campaigns when the law prescribes and sets clear rules for the equal

access of all participants to the mass media. The government in this way ensures an

advantage for its party, and discriminates against selected opposition figures (for more

details see “media access”).

Excessive government influence and pressure is also observed on public AM radio channels

(though restrictions there are less rigid), in regional branches of the government electronic

media holdings (VGTRC – effectively, the official regional channel for political news), and

many regional and local level print media that depend on their corresponding level of

government for subsidies, licensing, distribution, etc.

In contrast, “quality” newspapers are private and reasonably free, but the audience for these

publications rarely exceeds 15% of the population in big cities, and is much smaller in small

towns and rural areas.

The most important recent development in the dissemination of politically sensitive

information has been the growth of the Internet. With the number of regular Internet users in

Russia reaching 50 million, it has quickly become the second most important source of

political information (and number one for students and young people, a strong challenger to

federal TV in big cities among people with a college degree, and for those below 40 years of

age). The rise of the Internet has been a key factor explaining shifts in voting preferences

against the governing party and the massive post-election protest rallies.

Critical journalists and media organizations are often subjected to administrative harassment

by the state. According to the Glasnost Foundation, an NGO monitoring media freedom in

Russia, independent journalists have often become victims of violent attack (82 cases in

2011, following 58 in 2010). In 2011, 26 cases occurred in Moscow alone; many such attacks

remain unresolved and unpunished. Other forms of harassment include threats, extensive

fines for libel, intensive investigations, the firing of independent journalists and editors, and

so on.



S 2.2 Media Pluralism

To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions? This question does not assume that the predominance of either private or public ownership guarantees a pluralism of opinions. Rather, the underlying assumption is that a diversified ownership structure is likely to best represent the views and positions existing in society. Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print 10 media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective 9 anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions. Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media 8 market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media 7 reporting by representing a wider range of opinions. 6 Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the 5 print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or 4 only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain 5 opinions. Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print 2 media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, 1 and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.

Explanation:

As described under “media pluralism,” the mass media ownership structure and degree of

independence in Russia varies significantly from sector to sector. Privately owned media

(most print media, FM radio stations, cable and local TV channels, and Internet-based

media) are reasonably independent and are protected by a quite liberal mass media law.

They may be subjected to selective pressure from the various levels of government, and

practice moderate prudency and self-censorship in order to avoid acute conflicts with the

government, but with these reservations, such media can offer critical views and pluralistic

opinions.

However, the publicly owned media (federal TV channels, “main” regional and local TV

channels, AM radio, and selected federal and regional print media) are heavily biased and

offer pro-government propaganda rather than objective news and information.


At the end of 2011 (and under the obvious influence of public reaction to the election results),

President Medvedev announced plans to establish a public TV channel in Russia: “public” in

this sense referring not to the form of ownership (federal TV channels are already effectively

publicly owned), but to the impartiality of the governing bodies and editorial policies.

As described under “media access” and “media pluralism,” opposition figures and opinions

critical of and/or dissenting from the official position of the government have limited access to

public TV channels.



S 2.3 Access to Government Information

To what extent can citizens obtain official information? To assess the accessibility of government information, you should examine

(1) whether a freedom of information act exists or equivalent legal regulations exist,

(2) to what extent do the rules restrict access to information (e.g., exemptions, deadlines for responding to requests etc.) and justify these restrictions, and

(3) whether mechanisms for appeal and oversight exist to enforce citizens’ right to access information (e.g., administrative review, court review, ombudsman, commission etc.) You may consult www.freedominfo.org for information specific to your country. Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, 10 contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms 9 of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information. Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, 8 but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing 7 appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of 6 access. Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated 5 by bureaucratic procedures and some restrictions. Existing appeal and 4 oversight mechanisms are largely ineffective. 3 Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many 2 restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective 1 mechanisms of enforcement.

Explanation:

A more or less adequate framework law (#8-FZ, adopted on February 9, 2009, “On Provision

of Access to Information about the Work of Government Agencies and Local Government

Bodies”) regulating citizens’ access to information went into legal force two years ago. On the

basis of this new law, regional and local government acts were adopted during the 2010 –

2011 period.

The very fact of such a law’s adoption represents significant progress. For many years,

government agencies were stuck in controversies over its proposed substance (the draft of

the current law had reportedly already been finalized nearly a decade ago). The law provides


a framework and specific norms and procedures for the demand and provision of information,

timeframes for its presentation, mechanisms of appeal, incentives for the development of

electronic government, and other related elements.

However, critics of the law point out considerable weaknesses, as well as a lack of

consistency with the 2002 recommendations of the Council of Europe on access to official

documents and the Model Law on Freedom of Information. According to the critics, the law

does not assert a presumption of the openness of public information as a top-priority public

interest, and does not focus on access by the public to all information possessed by

government agencies (with reasonable restrictions). The law does not envisage the

establishment of the office of “information ombudsman” (or its equivalent), and is too vague

on appeal procedures; in many cases, the law does not specify procedures at all, but refers

to other pieces of legislation and the normative acts of executive agencies.

The development of regional and local legislation is often criticized for the mechanic

reproduction of federal law norms (unnecessary in any case, since the federal law has the

powers of direct action), rather than specifying procedures for obtaining information from the

relevant agencies of regional or local government.

The legislation was passed too recently to allow a full evaluation of its implementation;

however, Russian and international watchdogs have been critical of the way the law has

initially been applied, as well of the courts’ responses to the first appeals over the denial of

information.

One of the major challenges is the public’s low level of awareness of the opportunities

provided by the law. The law itself imposes no obligation on the state to promote public

awareness about the value of the freedom of information.


S 3 Civil Rights

S 3.1 Civil Rights

To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?

Civil rights contain and limit the exercise of state power by the rule of law. Independent courts guarantee legal protection of life, freedom and property as well as protection against illegitimate arrest, exile, terror, torture or unjustifiable intervention into personal life, both on behalf of the state and on behalf of private and individual actors. Equal access to the law and equal treatment by the law are both basic civil rights and also necessities to enforce civil rights. All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are 10 effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. 9 Infringements present an extreme exception. The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide 8 protection. 7 6 Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and 5 court protection often proves ineffective. 4 3 State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently 2 violated. Court protection is not effective. 1

Explanation:

As with many other aspects of Russia’s political environment, the picture with respect to civil

rights is mixed, with a basic tension between a sound constitutional and legal foundation on

one hand, and poor implementation on the other.

In most ordinary cases, civil rights are observed and protected by the courts. However, there

are certain areas where the situation deviates substantially from the norm.

In many cases, the national court system fails to provide speedy justice or implementation of

court decisions in favor of citizens against government agencies. Hence the record high

number of appeals of Russian citizens to the European Court of Human Rights: Russia holds

the first place in such appeals in terms of the absolute number of lawsuits (18th on a per

capita basis) – over 30,000 in 2010, which is an indication of limited protection of civil rights

by the Russian judiciary.


Of particular concern are cases against entrepreneurs; law enforcement agencies often open

investigations against businesspersons in order to provoke them into “bailing themselves out”

(i.e., bribing the officials to save their business and avoid a guilty verdict, justified or not).

Another example of the courts’ lack of sympathy to petitions made by citizens (or political

organizations) is offered by cases concerning the electoral process, from the denial of

opposition candidates’ or parties’ registrations to complaints about the falsification of election

results or other infringements at individual polling stations. Only a small share of such cases

is decided in favor of plaintiffs.

In summary, Russia’s political leadership often sacrifices adherence to civil and human rights

as well as to the rule of law in order to strengthen its own political power, which is seen in

turn as a precondition for the provision of stability. Lower courts are often biased in favor of

local politicians or are simply corrupt, and therefore fail to offer efficient protection of civil

rights.

The state prosecution has initiated biased and selective investigations against a considerable

number of businesspersons, independent journalists and NGOs. The second trial of former

Yukos Oil Company leaders Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev met with broad

criticism for its failure to observe due procedure and its evidently predetermined guilty

verdict.

In the case of the fight against terrorism and the situation in the Northern Caucasus, security

forces have decided at least implicitly that “stability” trumps the local population’s basic

human rights. This view is supported by the fact that human rights violations by Russian

security forces are rarely investigated and hardly ever punished. Amnesty International as

well as Russian human rights organizations regularly report cases of torture in state prisons

in the Northern Caucasus.


S 3 Civil Rights

S 3.2 Political Liberties

To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?

Political liberties constitute an independent sphere of democracy and are a prerequisite of political and civil society. They aim at the possibility of the formulation, the presentation and the equal consideration of citizens’ preferences and are embodied in the codification and unlimited validity of every individual’s right to speak, think, assemble, organize, worship, or petition without government (or even private) interference or restraints. All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties. 10 9

All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. 8 There are only few infringements. 7

6 State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly 5 in practice. 4 3 Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated. 2 1

Explanation:

From a formal perspective, political liberties are enshrined in the constitution and protected

by law, and state representatives voice support for these rights. In reality, the state treats any

opposition with suspicion. This suspicion is particularly directed toward so-called

nonsystemic opposition, that is, nonparliamentary political movements (left-wing and/or

liberal) that the state associates with “color revolutions” such as those in Ukraine or Georgia.

Smaller liberal and right-wing opposition parties have systematically been discriminated

against by the state administration and the media. NGOs critical of the national or regional

government have also repeatedly been subject to harassment by state agencies.

Accordingly, the freedom of assembly is (or at least was for most of the period under study)

in particular jeopardy. Though under the letter and spirit of the law, citizens have full rights of

assembly and collective action (with due notification of local government agencies), local


governments often de facto refuse to approve peaceful rallies under artificial pretexts (an

extreme example is the absolute denial of the right of assembly to sexual minorities).

Several demonstrations and public assemblies by oppositional parties and movements have

been banned or have been prevented under administrative pretexts. Unauthorized

demonstrations have on many occasions been dissolved by police forces using violence.

Leaders of protest actions (such as Boris Nemtsov, Alexei Navalny or Ilya Yashin) have been

arrested either “preemptively” (under artificial pretexts) or at the rallies, and are sentenced to

up to 15 days of administrative arrest, with courts in most cases accepting the version of

facts offered by the prosecution. Protests against specific state policies such as housing

demolition, the location of road projects in nature reserves, or special driving rights for

privileged people (“blue light driving”) have also been dissolved by the police. However, most

comparatively small demonstrations take place unhampered.

Government propaganda often accuses the liberal opposition of serving the interests of

foreign powers, implementing commands from abroad (no reliable evidence has ever been

presented by such propaganda), and/or being financed by foreign governments or

foundations.

The reaction of authorities to the collective actions protesting the December 2011 election

fraud was mixed. The first spontaneous protest rally was dispersed, and numerous insulting

remarks about these protests (including on the part of the prime minister and prospective

president) were made, but government statements later asserted the right of people to

engage in protests (supported by remarks by both the incumbent president and the same

prime minister). Later, the authorities granted permission to hold several protest rallies, each

expected to total thousands of individuals, and provided adequate security and police

protection for their participants.


S 3 Civil Rights

S 3.3 Non-Discrimination

How effectively does the state protect against discrimination based on gender, physical ability, ethnic origin, social status, political views or religion?

This question evaluates policies of state institutions aimed at preventing discrimination. Such an evaluation should refer to the measures taken by these institutions and their impact. The extent of observable discrimination may be used as an indicator for the efficacy of anti-discrimination policies. Please note that this question also includes an assessment of how effectively the state protects the rights of disadvantaged persons or persons belonging to minorities by positive discrimination measures, special representation rights or autonomy rights.

State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. 10 Cases of discrimination are extremely rare. 9 State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of 8 discrimination are observed. 7 6 State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of 5 discrimination can be observed. 4 3 The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. 2 Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society. 1

Explanation:

The nature and scale of discrimination varies between different spheres, and should be

analyzed on a case-by-case basis. In no sphere is the situation perfect, but in most cases it

is satisfactory; in some spheres the situation is improving, while in others the dynamics

remain negative.

With respect to gender, discrimination is mostly latent. Still, the share of women in top

positions in government or business is lower than in EU countries (though according to a

2010 study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, the situation is improving in the private sector),1

and salaries of women in comparable positions are lower (an average of 65% of men’s

salaries in 2010, according to the Federal Statistical Authority). Women in the North

1 Career Opportunities for Women in Business survey. PWC/ http://www.pwc.ru/en/hr-

consulting/publications/women-survey.jhtml


Caucasian regions of Russia are subjected to discrimination typical of Islamic societies.

However, the situation is improving; the emergence of private enterprise has given women

opportunities for careers less subject to the type of discrimination typical of the civil service or

other public sector spheres. With many reservations, the environment for gender equality is

becoming more meritocratic, even outside the private sector. Successful women with careers

in government, legislative institutions, and private business have served as positive models

for others. The role of the state in this process is limited, but in general facilitates it.

Lesbian and gay rights are not accepted in Russia. Support for these rights is increasingly

being undermined by legislation.

Until recently, government policy on protecting the rights of disabled people was relatively

ineffective. Though tax incentives for employers hiring disabled individuals have existed

since the 1990s, the effects were by and large counterproductive, as the provisions were

used for tax evasion. The biggest development in recent years has been the consistent, if

relatively slow effort to create an “accessible environment;” that is, to make streets, public

buildings and public transportation accessible for disabled people. Though limited to big

cities and still incomplete, this effort constitutes significant progress in protecting the rights of

the disabled, and has an important educational effect on the whole society. In addition, the

state continues to offer tax privileges for employers of disabled people, and maintains an

employment service helping invalids to find jobs.

With respect to ethnic and religious factors, particularly given the multiethnic and religiously

plural character of the Russian nation, the situation is reasonably good. No overt

discrimination is visible. The biggest problem and most basic inconsistency in the state’s

policy is its inability to tackle society’s growing phobias towards migrants of different ethnic

and religious origins. This primarily concerns Muslims, both from “within” Russia (the North

Caucasus) and the ex-Soviet states (Azerbaijan, Central Asia). There has been no consistent

policy encouraging the mass media or engaging civil society in efforts to promote tolerance

and discourage animosity, and this has led to growing interethnic tensions.

Discrimination by social origin is limited to unequal starting opportunities, which objectively

discriminate against the lower classes and the rural population.

Discrimination by political views is limited to leading opposition activists and journalists.


S 4 Rule of Law

S 4.1 Legal Certainty

To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?

This question assesses the extent to which executive actions are predictable (i.e., can be expected to be guided by law). Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in 10 accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and 9 transparent, ensuring legal certainty. Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. 8 Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion 7 to the government or administration. 6 Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions 5 that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal 4 regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory. 3 Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that 2 lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations 1 are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.

Explanation:

Bureaucratic discretion is very high, and can be identified in diverse spheres of interaction

between government agencies on one hand, and interactions with private individuals or

businesses on the other. The political system contains too few checks and balances to

ensure that legal norms and implementation practices contain sufficient safeguards against

corruption, red tape or excessive bureaucratic discretion. Coupled with insufficient

implementation of the freedom of information act (see “access to government information”),

appeal procedures weaknesses and a lack of parliamentary control over the executive, the

situation is alarming.

This excessive discretion allowed to the administration particularly affects government-

business relations. It is seen in high bureaucratic barriers, rampant corruption (see also

“corruption prevention”), excessive and nontransparent regulation, and inspections that

seriously hamper the business environment. Russia is ranked 120th out of 183 economies in

the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index for 2012. Protection of property rights,


institutional weakness and a lack of court independence are often cited as the main reasons

for the low rankings of the Russian business environment in most international assessments.

Though certain efforts are being undertaken to reduce bureaucratic discretion and introduce

anti-corruption measures, as well as to broaden the sphere of electronic government, no

critical breakthrough has taken place.

The Russian leadership, including Putin and Medvedev, consistently names corruption as

one of the main challenges ahead. However, most anti-corruption efforts have only a

symbolic nature. Official accusations of corruption are still perceived as public relations

campaigns resulting from political power struggles. For example, when Medvedev decided to

fire Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov in autumn 2010, the media was filled with obviously

orchestrated reports about his mismanagement and corruption. However, no court

proceedings have been initiated against him after his resignation.

Private citizens also encounter difficulties, as low-level corruption affects most interactions

with government agencies.


S 4 Rule of Law

S 4.2 Judicial Review

To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?

This question examines how well the courts can review actions taken and norms adopted by the executive. To provide effective control, courts need to pursue their own reasoning free from the influence of incumbent governments, powerful groups or individuals. This requires a differentiated organization of the legal system, including legal education, jurisprudence, regulated appointment of the judiciary, rational proceedings, professionalism, channels of appeal and court administration. Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the 10 government and administration act in conformity with the law. 9 Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and 8 administration act in conformity with the law. 7 6 Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance. 5 4 3 Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective 2 control. 1

Explanation:

The independence of courts is enshrined in the constitution and the legal system, but is

poorly observed in practice. The main manifestations of dependence include:

• excessive discretion allowed to the court bureaucracy (i.e., chairpersons of district courts) in

distribution of cases among judges, and in promotion and personnel affairs; a rank-and-file

judge is in many respects dependent on the chairperson of his or her court, and may be

vulnerable to pressure with regard to verdicts on individual cases;

• a “pro-prosecution bias,” in the sense that court bureaucracies are strongly linked to the

local (regional) executive and to law enforcement agencies (police, prosecutors’ offices,

etc). In most cases court verdicts automatically reproduce the arguments of the

prosecution. The clear case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev (the so-called

Yukos Affair) can be easily supplemented by the numerous guilty verdicts applied to


businesspeople who have fallen victim to obsolete and excessively repressive criminal

legislation on “economic crimes”;

• high levels of corruption, which also erodes the independence of courts.

In summary, it can be stated that there is a differentiated organization of the judiciary and a

formally adequate education and appointment system for judges. However, judicial

professionalism suffers from Soviet legacies, corruption and state interference. The political

leadership, most notably President Dmitri Medvedev himself, has repeatedly identified

corrupt and inefficient courts as a major obstacle to Russia’s progress towards a modern

society. The fact that more than a quarter of all cases pending at the European Court of

Human Rights are from Russia might also indicate that Russian citizens consider their

domestic courts to be biased. According to many surveys, in the case of inter-firm disputes

businesspeople evaluate court decisions as being quite fair. However, they regularly state

that court cases against state agencies are more likely to be unfair. The most prominent

example has been the Khodorkovsky case, where another court verdict announced in

December 2010 violated basic principles of the rule of law in order to keep a leading political

challenger imprisoned.


S 4 Rule of Law

S 4.3 Appointment of Justices

To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?

This question regards supreme or constitutional courts’ sufficient independence from political influence as a prerequisite of a functioning democratic system. The appointment process is a crucial factor which determines judiciary independence. The prospect of politically “neutral” justices increases accordingly with greater majority requirements and with the necessity of cooperation between involved bodies. A cooperative appointment process requires at least two involved democratically legitimized institutions. Their representative character gives them the legitimacy for autonomous nomination or elective powers. In an exclusive appointment process, a single body has the right to appoint justices irrespective of veto points; whereas in cooperative procedures with qualified majorities independence of the court is best secured. When answering the question take also into account whether the process is formally transparent and adequately covered by public media. If your country does not have a supreme or constitutional court, evaluate the appointment process of the appellate court that is responsible for citizens’ appeals against decisions of the government. Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special 10 majority requirements. 9 Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority 8 requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority 7 requirements. 6 Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority 5 requirements. 4 3 All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other 2 institutions. 1

Explanation:

Russia has three supreme court institutions: the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court (for

criminal and civil law cases) and the Supreme Court of Arbitration (for corporate law).

Uniform procedures for appointing justices of the three courts envisage that the Federation

Council (the upper house of the Federal Assembly) has to approve candidates nominated by


the president by a simple majority (more than 50% of the total members of the house).

Therefore, two institutions and two branches of power are formally involved.

However, in reality the upper house is absolutely loyal to the president, rendering voting

results a mere formality. In addition, the Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional

Court was amended in 2009 to give the president the right to appoint the chairman of the

Constitutional Court (instead of election through secret ballot elections by all court justices), a

move that was widely perceived as reducing the court’s independence from the executive.


S 4 Rule of Law

S 4.4 Corruption Prevention

To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?

This question addresses how the state and society prevent public servants and politicians from accepting bribes by applying mechanisms to guarantee the integrity of officeholders: auditing of state spending; regulation of party financing; citizen and media access to information; accountability of officeholders (asset declarations, conflict of interest rules, codes of conduct); transparent public procurement systems; effective prosecution of corruption. Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public 10 officeholders from abusing their positions. 9 Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives 8 for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions. 7 6 Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public 5 officeholders from abusing their positions. 4 3 Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see 2 fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity. 1

Explanation:

Corruption is widespread in Russia. This impression is shared not only by independent

experts (including international expert opinions as measured in various country rankings) and

polls of foreign and domestic businesspeople, but also by top state representatives within the

Russian government itself, including the president, who has regularly identified corruption as

a key problem.

This situation can be explained by the nearly complete lack of functioning integrity

mechanisms. State auditors are often competent, but auditors lack enforcement powers.

Rules to hold politicians or bureaucrats accountable are underdeveloped and are not

enforced in practice. The system of government procurement has been implemented, but

has drawn numerous criticisms and needs further improvement. Electronic government is

being gradually introduced, but thus far has not created a qualitatively different mode of

interaction between the government, economic actors and private citizens. Corruption is not

systematically prosecuted. Civil society is too weak to have a real impact on the situation and


NGOs are systematically discouraged from action on alleged corruption cases and public

integrity issues.

State spending is audited by the Audit Chamber. It has produced some important reports

focusing on misspending and corruption. However, it can only issue recommendations, which

can be ignored by political decision-makers and courts.

Mechanisms for the prevention of conflict of interest for civil servants, as well as codes of

ethics or behavior, are being introduced but in practice are poorly observed. A law introduced

in 2009 requires, civil servants to report their incomes and property assents, but the

procedure lacks transparency.

Russia still lacks legal procedures for control over expenses by politically exposed persons

(PEPs). The relevant Article 20 of the U.N. Convention on Tackling Corruption has not been

ratified by Russia, and pledges to do so were announced only as a part of a package of

political reform measures by outgoing President Medvedev at the very end of 2011.

Of 26 recommendations formulated for Russia in 2008 by the Council of Europe’s Group of

States against Corruption (GRECO), nine had been recognized by GRECO as “fulfilled” by

the end of 2010, 15 as “partially fulfilled,” and two as “not fulfilled.” The next round of

evaluation was due in mid-2012.

38 Status Index: Policy Performance

Status Index

Policy Performance Economy and Employment

S 5 Economy

S 6 Labor Market

S 7 Enterprises

S 8 Taxes

S 9 Budgets

Social Affairs

S 10 Health Care

S 11 Social Inclusion

S 12 Families

S 13 Pensions

S 14 Integration

Security

S 15 External Security

S 16 Internal Security

Resources

S 17 Environment

S 18 Research and Innovation

S 19 Education


S 5 Economy Category: Economy and Employment

S 5.1 Economic Policy How successful has economic policy been in providing a reliable economic framework and in fostering international competitiveness?

This question addresses the existence of a government’s general strategy to support the future-oriented development of its economy through regulatory policy. Sound economic policy is expected to adhere to the following principles: clear-cut assignment of tasks to institutions, refraining from unnecessary discretionary actions, frictionless interlinkage of different institutional spheres (labor market, enterprise policy, tax policy, budgetary policy) and the coherent set-up of different regimes (e.g. dismissal protection, co-determination rights, efficiency of anti-monopoly policies, income taxation). Countries following these principles are able to increase overall productivity, become more attractive for internationally mobile factors of production and thus raise their international competitiveness.

When answering the question, focus on the use and interplay of different regimes with regard to the aims of economic policy. Economic policy fully succeeds in providing a coherent set-up of different 10 institutional spheres and regimes, thus stabilizing the economic environment. 9 It largely contributes to the objectives of fostering a country’s competitive capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location. Economic policy largely provides a reliable economic environment and 8 supports the objectives of fostering a country’s competitive capabilities 7 and attractiveness as an economic location. 6

Economic policy somewhat contributes to providing a reliable economic 5 environment and helps to a certain degree in fostering a country’s competitive 4 capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location. 3 Economic policy mainly acts in discretionary ways essentially destabilizing 2 the economic environment.There is little coordination in the set-up of economic 1 policy institutions. Economic policy generally fails in fostering a country’s competitive capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location.

Explanation:

The government has no real long-term program of economic development. Planning takes

the form of three-year federal budget projections and a set of “targeted” federal programs,

which are poorly coordinated with each other.

Regulatory policy (governing taxes and customs rules, for example) often changes in

mutually contradicting directions. This creates problems in attracting private capital (both

domestic and international) into investment projects.


There is no effective mechanism of control over the use of budgetary resources, a fact that

lends itself to massive corruption.

The need for long-term planning is being gradually recognized, but with little practical effect.

The first attempt to draft a long-term program of socioeconomic development (lasting until

the year 2020) took a very long time to develop; the program was ultimately adopted in the

fall of 2008, just as the global crisis began, rendering the program useless. Yet in the

following three years the program was neither officially cancelled nor reconsidered. The

government therefore has no real program of economic development at this time, although a

new version of the program is being developed.

State economic policy remains skewed in favor of politically influential large corporations,

especially state-owned ones. The state has increased its ownership stake in the economy,

and in a number of economic sectors deemed to be of strategic relevance has discriminated

against private (especially foreign) investors. Broad sectors of the economy defined as

significant to national security are shielded from competitive pressure. The “natural”

monopolies in the natural gas and transportation industries have not yet been substantially

reformed despite year-long debates. Red tape presents serious obstacles to running a small

or medium-sized business. According to the World Bank’s 2012 Ease of Doing Business

report, Russia ranks 120th in worldwide comparison. The comparatively unattractive

conditions for business have meant that investment levels are far from sufficient to satisfy the

Russian economy’s modernization needs.

Research and development has been declared a top priority of the Russian government, and

received the personal attention of President Dmitry Medvedev. However, government action

has to date focused on an isolated (though expensive) pet project (the creation of a Russian

“Silicon Valley” near Moscow), which is unlikely to have a broad impact on the innovation

potential of the Russian economy. Spending on R&D has hovered around 1% of GDP in

recent years.


S 6 Labor Market Category: Economy and Employment

S 6.1 Labor Market Policy How effectively does labor market policy in your country address unemployment?

This question addresses a government’s strategies to reconcile the following objectives: unemployment reduction and job security, and balancing supply and demand on the labor market by providing sufficient mobility of the labor force according to the needs of potential employers. To assess labor market policy comprehensively, special emphasis should be placed on the positive or detrimental effects resulting from labor market regulation (e.g., dismissal protection, minimum wages, collective agreements) and from the modus operandi of unemployment insurance.

Successful strategies ensure unemployment is not a serious threat. 10 9

Labor market policies have been more or less successful. 8

7 6

Strategies against unemployment have shown little or no significant success. 5

4 3

Labor market policies have been unsuccessful and unemployment has risen. 2

1

Explanation:

Russia has a relatively low rate of unemployment as compared to other middle-income

countries (between 6% and 8% in the period under study). This is partially attributable to

public service employment-promotion activities that provide information on vacancies, offer

professional retraining, organize public works and so on.

However, the relatively positive labor-market situation is mainly due to economic growth. The

economic boom that started in 1999 and led to a rise in GDP of more than 70% by 2008 was

accompanied by an eightfold rise in the average wage level (from $80 per month to $600).

Expansive state spending largely shielded the country’s socioeconomic development from

negative impacts associated with the global economic crisis (2008 – 2009).

However, the country’s negative investment climate, coupled with the lack of a long-term

socioeconomic development strategy and minimal encouragement of innovation means that


the creation of new, relatively modern jobs is minimal. This explains the low labor market

mobility and the preservation of significant numbers of inefficient jobs (which in turn produce

uncompetitive products and pay low salaries). Youth (or entry-level) unemployment is

developing into a serious problem.

The long-term strategy of socioeconomic development currently being elaborated envisages

the creation of 25 million “modern” and high-paying jobs; this figure was repeated in the

electoral platform of Vladimir Putin, the new president. However, this target figure has not

been explicated or justified in any reasonable manner.


S 7 Enterprises Category: Economy and Employment

S 7.1 Enterprise Policy How successful has enterprise policy been in fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and in stimulating private investment?

Private investment includes not only the acquisition of capital stock, but also entrepreneurial transactions aimed at investment, such as developing human capital, the restructuring of companies, establishing new companies, etc. Enterprise policy has been successful in achieving the objectives of fostering 10 innovation, entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and stimulating 9 private investment. Enterprise policy has largely achieved these four objectives. 8

7 6

Enterprise policy has partly achieved these four objectives. 5

4 3

Enterprise policy has not achieved the objectives of fostering innovation, 2 entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and stimulating private 1 investment.

Explanation:

Economic policy does not promote innovative processes for two principal reasons.

First among these are unfavorable political circumstances. The country’s general investment

climate is poor, due to the excessive presence of the state in the economy, the complicated

regulatory environment, administrative pressure and monopolization, and massive levels of

corruption.

The state has increased its ownership share in the economy, and has discriminated against

private (especially foreign) investors in a number of economic sectors deemed to be of

strategic relevance. Although the global economic crisis has led to an increase in state

support for individual enterprises, the bias in favor of well-connected enterprises has been

reduced, while support to innovative and export-oriented firms has been improved, according

to an independent study by the Higher School of Economics (Moscow) and the Levada-

Center.


Legal regulations on property rights are not consistently implemented and are not adequately

safeguarded by law, especially in the case of state intervention. In strategic sectors such as

the oil industry, the state seems to reduce the share of private owners systematically through

administrative pressures, a process which ultimately leads either to confiscation or to

negotiated sales. Some property rights, especially copyrights, are being ignored on a regular

basis.

A second reason for the lack of innovation is the limited management skills available within

most businesses, combined with the short-sighted prioritization of profit over strategic

development. Combined, these factors have cultivated an underdeveloped culture of

innovation.


S 8 Taxes Category: Economy and Employment

S 8.1 Tax Policy To what extent does taxation policy realize goals of equity, competitiveness and the generation of sufficient public revenues?

The objectives of justice and allocative efficiency suggest that taxation policies do not discriminate between different groups of economic actors with similar tax-paying abilities, such as corporate and personal income taxpayers (horizontal equity). Tax systems should also impose higher taxes on persons or companies with a greater ability to pay taxes (vertical equity). Tax rates and modalities should improve or at least not weaken a country’s competitive position. However, tax revenues should be sufficient to ensure the long-term financing of public services and infrastructure. “Sufficiency” does not assume any specific ideal level of public expenditure, but refers only to the relationship between public revenues and expenditures. Taxation policies are equitable, competitive and generate sufficient public 10 revenues. 9 Taxation policies fail to achieve one of the three principles. 8

7 6

Taxation policies fail to achieve two of the three principles. 5

4 3

Taxation policies fail to realize the following three principles: equity, 2 competitiveness and the generation of sufficient public revenues. 1

Explanation:

The taxation system in Russia as a whole is satisfactory. With correct application, the current

scope of taxes allows both for economic competitiveness and appropriate budgetary

revenues.

However, these positive effects are in many respects undermined by frequent changes to the

legislation in this sphere and by massive levels of corruption (which serves as an extra

punitive tax on business and citizens). In addition, the system of tax exemptions, privileges

and incentives for innovative development lacks both transparency and flexibility.


S 9 Budgets Category: Economy and Employment

S 9.1 Budgetary Policy

To what extent does budgetary policy realize the goal of fiscal sustainability? This question focuses on the aggregate of public budgets and does not assess whether budgets reflect government priorities or induce departments to manage efficiently. Sustainable budgeting should enable a government to pay its financial obligations (solvency), sustain economic growth, meet future obligations with existing tax burdens (stable taxes) and pay current obligations without shifting the cost to future generations (inter-generational fairness).

Budgetary policy is fiscally sustainable. 10 9

Budgetary policy achieves most standards of fiscal sustainability. 8

7 6

Budgetary policy achieves some standards of fiscal sustainability. 5 4 3 Budgetary policy is fiscally unsustainable. 2 1

Explanation:

Budgetary policy as a whole is fiscally sustainable. Over the last decade, Russia has

adhered to a consistent austerity policy that has regularly led to budget surpluses. This

allowed for a significant reduction in foreign debt (from over a third of GDP in 2000 to a mere

2% of GDP since 2008). Inflation has been constrained below 8% which is relatively low in

comparison to earlier years. A stability fund, later separated into a reserve fund and a welfare

fund, was introduced to save the state budget’s windfall profits from high oil prices for the

future. Saving windfall profits during Putin’s presidency offered the Russian government the

chance to react to the international financial and economic crisis of 2008 – 2009 with

extensive liquidity support and stabilization programs. The resulting budget deficits of 6% in

2009 and 4% in 2010 could be financed with the help of the stabilization funds. In 2011, there

was again a small budget surplus. The management of the oil funds offers the most

significant example of Russia’s ability to implement reforms efficiently if responsibility can be

assigned to a small team of technocrats.


The budgetary system is able to cover all expenses without delays or sequesters. However,

the budgetary policy does suffer from several deficiencies. First, tax revenue is excessively

centralized in the federal budget; and second, a smaller than necessary share of expenses is

distributed through targeted programs.

In the long run, the major challenge to maintaining sustainable budget practices is the

country’s dependence on oil revenues. A marked decline in world market prices for oil would

bring the state budget into deficit.


S 10 Health Care Category: Social Affairs

S 10.1 Health Policy How effective and efficient are health care policies in your country? Public health care policies should aim at providing high-quality health care for the largest possible share of the population and at the lowest possible costs. Of the three criteria – quality, inclusiveness and cost efficiency – efficiency should be given less weight if the first two criteria can be considered fulfilled.

Health care policies provide high-quality health care for a majority of the 10 population and services are efficiently organized. 9 Health care policies provide high-quality health care for a majority of the 8 population, but services are inefficiently organized. 7

6

Health care policies provide poor-quality health care for a majority of the 5 population and services are inefficiently organized. 4 3 Health care policies provide poor-quality health care for a majority of the 2 population. Health care services are underfinanced, overloaded, unreliable 1 and inefficiently organized.

Explanation:

Health care policy provides only minimal, decreasing and clearly insufficient guarantees of

availability and of high-quality medical services. The deterioration in the situation can be

explained first of all by the very low level of state financing for public health services (4% of

GDP). This has led to degradation in the system of free health care and its gradual

replacement by paid public health services. This trend has primarily affected the poor and

low-income population cohorts, which cannot afford to pay for medical services. The

organization of the public health care system is not focused on preventive maintenance of

diseases or on early treatment. This in turn shifts the balance of medical aid toward

hospitalization, and puts an excessive burden on the functioning of polyclinics (outpatients’

clinics) and ambulance stations.

As a result, the health care system as it exists today has little positive influence on life

expectancy; indeed, this indicator in Russia is extremely low (an average of 62 years for men

and 73 years for women).


S 11 Social Inclusion

Category: Social Affairs

S 11.1 Social Inclusion Policy To what extent does social policy in your country prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?

Reducing the various risks of social exclusion is a core task of social policy. The prevention of poverty and the provision of enabling conditions for equal opportunity in society are essential elements of such a policy. In addition to poverty, please take also into account additional dimensions of exclusion like the experience of marginalization and the desire to be appreciated when evaluating socioeconomic disparities. Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal 10 opportunities. 9 For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure 8 equal opportunities. 7 6 For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and 5 ensure equal opportunities. 4

3 Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society. 2

1

Explanation:

Risks of exclusion within Russian society are high. This situation is due to the ease with

which family incomes decline, or alternately fall into poverty following events such as the

birth of children, retirement or the contraction of a disease conducive to physical disability.

The size of the cash allowances and the volumes of public health and education services

provided are obviously insufficient to enable these groups to escape from the zone of

exclusion.

Substantial exclusion risks are also associated with one’s place of residence, particularly in

rural areas and small towns where low-paid jobs prevail.


S 12 Families Category: Social Affairs

S 12.1 Family Policy To what extent do family support policies in your country enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?

Traditional family patterns confine mothers to opt out of gainful employment and focus on household and child care work, a division of roles that has lost acceptance among an increasing number of women. This question is based on the assumption that an optimal system of family support should enable women to decide freely whether and when they want to remain full-time mothers or take up full- or part time employment. Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting 10 with employment. 9 Family support policies provide some support for women who want to 8 combine parenting and employment. 7

6 Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who 5 want to combine parenting and employment. 4 3 Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or 2 employment. 1

Explanation:

Russia has a relatively highly developed system of support for mothers with children. This

includes:

• maternity and birth benefits, which as a rule are similar to the mother’s average salary at

her previous job;

• monthly benefits payable to mothers until the child reaches 18 months of age;

• the protection of the mother’s job until the child reaches three years of age; and

• the so-called maternity capital (about €10,000 in 2012), a sum paid to mothers after the

birth of a second child that can be applied toward the acquisition of new housing or the

education of a child, or be invested in a pension plan for the mother.

However, a number of deficiencies in this system exist, including a shortage of places in

kindergartens and the low size of monthly child allowances for poor families.


S 13 Pensions


S 13.1 Pension Policy To what extent does pension policy in your country realize goals of poverty prevention, inter-generational equity and fiscal sustainability?

An optimal pension system should prevent poverty among the elderly due to retirement and should be based on distributional principles that do not erode the system’s fiscal stability. It should ensure equity among pensioners, the active labor force and the adolescent generation. These objectives may be achieved by different pension systems: exclusively public pension systems, a mixture of public and private pension schemes, or publicly subsidized private pension plans. Accumulating public and private implicit pension debt is undesirable.

The pension policy is fiscally sustainable, guarantees inter-generational 10 equity and effectively prevents poverty caused by old age. 9 The pension policy fails to realize one of these three principles. 8

7 6

The pension policy fails to realize two of these three principles. 5

4 3

The pension policy is fiscally unsustainable, does not effectively prevent 2 old-age poverty and fails to achieve inter-generational equity. 1

Explanation:

The pension system provides recipients with an income no less than that of the subsistence-

level payment officially established in the region where he or she resides.

The pension system is based on the principle of scaled intergenerational solidarity. Payments

into the pension system are made solely by employers (without any matching funds from the

employee or the government), and are quite high at 26% of the employee’s salary.

Nevertheless, the problem of the pension system’s fiscal self-sufficiency remains unresolved.

Its deficit has swelled in recent years, and has reached 5% of GDP. This deficit has thus far

been covered by transfers from the federal budget.

Retirement age in Russia remains low, at 55 years of age for women and 60 for men. Given

the country’s low life expectancies, any rise in the retirement age constitutes a prohibitively

difficult political task.


S 14 Integration


S 14.1 Integration Policy How effectively do policies in your country support the integration of migrants into society?

This question covers integration-related policies comprising a wide array of cultural, education and social policies insofar as they affect the status of migrants or migrant communities in society. The objective of integration precludes forced assimilation but favors integration by acquisition of nationality.

Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of 10 migrants into society. 9 Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, 8 but have failed to do so effectively. 7 6 Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants 5 4 3 Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from 2 the majority society. 1

Explanation:

Russia does not have a consistent migration policy; the problem of integrating migrants into

Russian society is therefore not a focus for the state. Indeed, it is considered to be the

problem of migrants themselves. This attitude is reinforced by the fact that a large share of

migrants within the country are living and working illegally.

As a result, at least selected groups of migrants are undergoing segregation and growing

isolation from the rest of the society. Anti-migrant sentiments, various xenophobic trends and

intolerance towards migrants among the native Russian population is increasing to a

dangerous extent.

A problem specific to Russia (at least in comparison with Europe, though some of the other

BRIICS countries may experience similar problems) is the phenomenon of “inner migrants.”

Numerous migrants who have come from the overpopulated and underdeveloped Russian

North Caucasus into areas of Central Russia find themselves at a great cultural (ethnic,


religious, etc.) distance from the indigenous population; this better resembles the situation of

migrants from developing countries into Europe, rather than the migration of a citizen from

one place to another in his or her own country. In these communities, segregation and

isolation are almost as acute as is the case for migrants from Central Asia. This aspect of the

problem requires a different policy approach, which is not in place today (see also “non-

discrimination”).


S 15 External Security Category: Security

S 15.1 External Security Policy How effectively does external security and defense policy in your country protect citizens against security risks and safeguard the national interest?

This question rests on the assumption that the aims of protecting citizens against security risks and safeguarding the national interest can be achieved by many different ways and combinations of security and defense policies. In addition a combination of various domestic and external policies can achieve an effective protection against new security risks arising from threats like terrorism. On the one hand the effectiveness of these policies depend on the relation between the aims and strategies of the defence policy and the way the military forces are financed, fitted with high-tech and state-of-the-art equipment and supported by a national consensus on the desired defense policy. On the other hand the membership in collective security alliances/organizations/treaties, the internal integration of domestic intelligence communities and their cooperation with regional/international counterparts, the promotion of neighbourhood stability, conflict prevention and assistance/risk containment for failed states are necessary pre-conditions to a successful security policy. Whereas military expenditures alone say little about the effectiveness of external security policy, they have to be taken into account in order to assess the cost/benefit-ratio of these policies.

External security policy protects citizens against security risks and safeguards 10 the national interest very effectively. 9 External security policy protects citizens against security risks and safeguard 8 the national interest more or less effectively. 7

6

External security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security 5 risks and safeguard the national interest. 4

3 External security policy exacerbates the security risks and does not safeguard 2 the national interest. 1

Explanation:

Russia’s status as a “great power” with nuclear weapons potential, a big army and sizable

military spending gives it relative security. Relations with the West (the United States and

NATO in particular) are not free from elements of confrontation, but are by far more

pragmatic and cooperative than in the Cold War era. Russia leads a collective security

organization embracing several of its post-Soviet neighbors (the Collective Security Treaty

Organization, ODKB), and participates in the Shanghai Treaty Organization, a security and


cooperation arrangement with China and Central Asian States. It has a standing agreement

on cooperation with NATO through the NATO-Russia Council.

Among neighboring states, the only “insecure” point is Georgia, with which Russia had a

military conflict in 2008. The conflict is far from being resolved, yet with international

monitoring in place, the threat of renewed hostilities is negligible. Of the 11 countries

bordering Russia, or the roughly 20 that qualify under a broader definition of “neighbors,”

only relations with Georgia can be interpreted as “bad,” and as potentially posing a security

danger.

Russia’s armed forces situation has often been criticized. However, the most serious attempt

to reform the services is presently underway; this will include downsizing the army, raising

the efficiency of command and management procedures, and providing more efficient and

more transparent expenditure mechanisms. After serious setbacks in 1990s, investments in

developing and appropriating state-of-the-art weaponry are growing, and will continue to

grow in the next two decades.


S 16 Internal Security Category: Security

S 16.1 Internal Security Policy How effectively does internal security policy in your country protect citizens against security risks?

This question rests on the assumption that the aims of protecting citizens against security risks like crime, terrorism and similar threats that are more and more internationally organized can be achieved by many different ways and combinations of internal security policies. For example, an effective policy includes objectives such as the internal integration of domestic intelligence and police communities and their regional cross-border cooperation with regional/international intelligence and police communities, the domestic strategy of intelligence and police communities and so on. Whereas expenditures on public order and safety alone say little about the effectiveness of internal security policy, they have to be taken into account in order to assess the cost/benefit-ratio of this policy.

Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively. 10 9

Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less 8 effectively. 7

6 Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security 5 risks. 4

3 Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks. 2

1

Explanation:

Russia’s internal security situation is a source of controversy. Internal security risks are by

and large contained, and Russian citizens are not exposed to high security risks in the

course of everyday life. However, the situation is far from normal in three respects:

• Though the war in Chechnya is over, some armed rebels are still at large in Chechnya and

Dagestan; the fundamentalist underground in these two and other regions of the North

Caucasus conducts terrorist acts in the region (mostly against government officials, police

officers and public figures), and occasionally plans terrorist acts in major Russian cities.

Police and security forces exert serious efforts toward preventing and addressing these

threats; official statements assert that hundreds of such acts are prevented each year, yet

the threat persists.


• Crime rates are high, including the incidence of homicide and other violent crime, with the

inmate population nearing a million people. However, the everyday life of an average

Russian is much more secure than in Brazil and South Africa (among the BRICS sample).

• The public prestige of the police is extremely low. The service is considered to be inefficient

and corrupt, and is deemed to fail in terms of “serving and protecting” the people. A 2009 –

2010 police reform is perceived as having been superficial, failing to address the core

problems of internal security. Data on the reliability of police services, such as that provided

by the World Economic Forum, must be considered carefully given the fact that it is based

on an expert survey of executives.


S 17 Environment Category: Resources

S 17.1 Environmental Policy How effectively does environmental policy in your country protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment?

This question covers a government’s activities aimed at safeguarding the environment and thereby securing the prerequisites for sustainable economic development. Environmental policy effectively protects, preserves and enhances the 10 sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment. 9 Environmental policy largely protects and preserves the sustainability of 8 natural resources and quality of the environment. 7

6 Environmental policy insufficiently protects and preserves the sustainability 5 of natural resources and quality of the environment. 4

3 Environmental policy has largely failed to protect and preserve the 2 sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment. 1

Explanation:

Russia has a generally sound and developing legislative foundation for environmental

protection. However, the implementation of this legislation is extremely inefficient, as it is

often neglected by the state, and because high levels of corruption allow business actors to

bypass the legal norms. As a result, the quality of environment in many regions is

unsatisfactory and deteriorating.

Ecological concerns are entirely subordinated to the promotion of economic growth, despite

a considerable legacy of environmental damage from the Soviet era. Accordingly, ecological

issues are on the political agenda only when they promise to deliver clear material short-term

advantages (e.g., because they can be used to put pressure on unwanted investors) or when

Russia is rewarded within the international arena (e.g., when the European Union agreed to

Russia’s WTO accession terms in return for Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol). A

long-term political effort to reduce economic dependence on raw material production would

also reduce negative environmental effects. But again, environmental concern is hardly ever

mentioned as a reason for this strategy, and it is not accompanied by relevant support for

renewable energies.


S 18 Research and Innovation Category: Resources

S 18.1 Research and Innovation Policy To what extent does research and innovation policy in your country support technological innovations that foster the creation and introduction of new products?

This question comprises subsidies and incentives for research institutions conducting basic and applied research, as well as subsidies and incentives for establishing start-up companies that transfer scientific output into products and enhanced productivity. Bureaucratic impediments to research and innovation should also be taken into account. Research and innovation policy effectively supports innovations that foster 10 the creation of new products and enhance productivity. 9 Research and innovation policy largely supports innovations that foster the 8 creation of new products and enhance productivity. 7

6 Research and innovation policy partly supports innovations that foster the 5 creation of new products and enhance productivity. 4

3 Research and innovation policy has largely failed to support innovations that 2 foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity. 1

Explanation:

Research and innovation policy as a whole is inefficient, for a variety of reasons. Tax

incentives and privileges are inefficient, and do not have a targeted character; this ensures

that private firms’ share of expenditure on research and innovations is very low. Fundamental

science financing (primarily by the Russian Academy of Science) is insufficient, and has

consistently declined over time. Credit for start-ups is difficult to obtain and expensive, and

the costs of office space and infrastructure are prohibitively high.

This said, Russia still has a solid and diversified foundation for both fundamental and applied

research and development, and the number of scientists and academic institutions is higher

than in any of the other BRIICS countries. Public R&D investment as a percentage of GDP is

higher than in all other BRIICS countries except Brazil. Therefore, the basic problem appears

to be inefficiency and inadequate management of the R&D sphere, as well as the generally

negative trend within the sector.


S 19 Education Category: Resources

S 19.1 Education Policy

To what extent does education policy in your country deliver high-quality, efficient and equitable education and training?

This question assesses the extent to which a government’s education policy facilitates high-quality learning that contributes to personal development, sustainable economic growth and social cohesion. Your response should focus on the following, irrespective of the education system’s organization: the contribution of education policy towards providing a skilled labor force, the graduate output of upper secondary and tertiary education, and (equitable) access to education. While the latter pertains to issues of fairness and distributive justice, it also has implications for a country’s international competitiveness as unequal education implies a waste of human potential.

Education policy effectively delivers efficient and equitable education and 10 training. 9 Education policy largely delivers high-quality, efficient and equitable education 8 and training. 7

6 Education policy partly delivers high-quality, efficient and equitable education 5 and training. 4

3 Education policy largely fails to deliver high-quality, efficient and equitable 2 education and training. 1

Explanation:

Russia has a relatively high level of school education that dates from the times of the Soviet

Union, and has been retained due to consistent state efforts in recent years. Spending on

education increased to about 5% of GDP during the period under study.

At the same time, the quality of college education, including in universities, is low (particularly

in comparison with the best world schools), and has tended toward further deterioration.

Though the number of college students rose significantly over the past decade, the quality of

higher education in most colleges remained low. Russia has joined the Bologna process,

which aims to create a common European academic education system. But only a few

academic institutions (mainly in Moscow and St. Petersburg) are able to teach on a

European level. Only several dozen Russian universities can provide competitive higher

education, especially in the science disciplines.


The system of vocational training, which used to be highly developed in Soviet times, has

degraded significantly, and does not produce a number of competent blue-collar workers

adequate to economic demand.

However, in comparison with other BRICS countries, the quality of education in Russia

remains high. General literacy, the participation of almost 100% % of children in primary and

secondary education, and the high number of students attending college are all positive

signs. However, this competitive advantage is declining from year into year. In the 2009 PISA

test, for example, Russian pupils’ performance was statistically significantly below the OECD

average in all three categories (reading, mathematics and science).

62 Management Index: Executive Capacity

Management Index

Executive Capacity

Steering Capability

M 1 Strategic Capacity

M 2 Inter-ministerial Coordination

M 3 Evidence-based Instruments

M 4 Societal Consultation

M 5 Policy Communication

Policy Implementation

M 6 Effective Implementation

Institutional Learning

M 7 Adaptability

M 8 Organizational Reform Capacity


M 1 Strategic Capacity Category: Steering Capability

M 1.1 Strategic Planning How much influence does strategic planning have on government decision-making?

Organizational forms of strategic planning include planning units at the center of government and personal advisory cabinets for ministers or the president/prime minister or extra-governmental bodies. An indicator of influence may be the frequency of meetings between strategic planning staff and the head of government. Please substantiate your assessment with empirical evidence.

Dominant influence. 10 9

Considerable influence. 8 7

6 Modest influence. 5

4 3

No influence. 2

1

Explanation:

Russia has a semi-presidential system of government, in which the state executive is headed

by the president, who is in turn supported by his presidential administration. However, the

president also nominates a prime minister who needs to be approved by parliament, and who

appoints his own government. As the government is appointed within the state executive

rather than being formed by parliament, it is dominated not by politicians but by civil servants

up to the ministerial ranks.

In the 1990s, the Russian state executive developed a dual structure under which the

presidential administration mirrors the structure of the government, with the corresponding

departments of the presidential administration doubling the work of the government

ministries. Accordingly, the answers to questions on executive capacity focus not solely on

the government in the narrow sense, but on the state executive in general.


However, during the period under investigation, the impact of the dual structure of

presidential administration and government was limited, as former president Vladimir Putin

had taken over the role of prime minister, while his hand-picked successor Dmitry Medvedev

had become president. The pair cooperated closely, and seemed to have agreed on a

general division of tasks.

The president and members of the government seldom meet experts, including those

working in the governmental analytical structures. No institutional mechanism for considering

expert opinions exists in the country.

Decisions prepared and made by the executive agencies and top leaders are as a rule

formulated within the executive bureaucracy, and are often predetermined by the lobbying of

separate groups inside the government machinery or by “crony” businesses connected with

it.


M 1 Strategic Capacity Category: Steering Capability

M 1.3 Scholarly Advice

How influential are non-governmental academic experts for government decision-making?

An indicator of influence may be the frequency of meetings between government and external academic experts. Please substantiate your assessment with empirical evidence. Dominant influence. 10

9 Considerable influence. 8 7

6 Modest influence. 5

4 3

No influence. 2

1

Explanation:

Non-governmental academic institutions have comparatively little influence within the

government itself. The character of interaction between government and academics often

takes the form of an imitation of dialogue or consultation rather than an institutionally binding

procedure.

For example, at the beginning of 2011, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin initiated the formation of

over 20 groups of academic and non-governmental experts to prepare a program of national

socioeconomic development looking forward to 2020. While the draft of such a program was

completed by the end of 2011, its basic ideas and proposals were for all practical purposes

ignored in the process of preparing the 2012 – 2014 federal budget. The experts’ attempts to

bring this point to the attention of top government figures were simply ignored. The future of

the expert materials prepared by the groups remains unclear.


M 2 Inter-ministerial Coordination Category: Steering Capability

M 2.1 GO Expertise

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills substantively?

This question examines whether the government office (referred to in some countries as the prime minister’s office, chancellery, etc.) has capacities to evaluate the policy content of line ministry proposals. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents. The GO / PMO has comprehensive sectoral policy expertise and provides 10 regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. 9 These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities. The GO / PMO has sectoral policy expertise and evaluates important draft 8 bills. 7

6 The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise, but does not 5 evaluate draft bills. 4

3 The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited 2 to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet 1 meetings.

Explanation:

The government office (the body of staff supporting the cabinet of ministers) plays a very

important role in the process of preparing government decisions. It has the power to evaluate

proposals prepared by the line ministries and to bring its conclusions to the notice of the

prime minister. These evaluations wield considerable influence within the government’s

decision-making process. The fact that the government office plays such a significant role

compensates in part for the lack of influence held by research organizations or academics.



M 2.2 GO Gatekeeping

Can the government office / prime minister’s office return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting on the basis of policy considerations?

Please assess whether the GO/PMO is de facto, not only legally, able to return materials on the basis of policy considerations. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents. The GO/PMO can return all/most items on policy grounds. 10

9 The GO/PMO can return some items on policy grounds. 8

7 6

The GO/PMO can return items on technical, formal grounds only. 5

4 3

The GO/PMO has no authority to return items. 2

1

Explanation:

The government office has the power to advise the prime minister and/or his deputies to

return line ministry proposals if they are deemed to be inadequate or poorly prepared. In

most cases, the prime minister (or his deputies) follows this advice, and the proposal is

returned to its initiators.



M 2.3 Line Ministries To what extent do line ministries have to involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

Please assess whether line ministries involve the GO/PMO de facto, not only legally, in the preparation of policy proposals. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents. There are interrelated capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line 10 ministries. 9 The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the 8 preparation of policy proposals. 7

6 Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues. 5

4 3

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws. 2

1

Explanation:

As a rule, the government office (GO) does not participate in the preparation of government

proposals; rather, such proposals are generated by line ministries. The function of the GO

(apparat) is to evaluate proposals prepared by the ministries only after their official

submission to the government for consideration.



M 2.4 Cabinet Committees How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees prepare cabinet meetings?

This question studies whether cabinet committees (composed exclusively of cabinet members) or ministerial committees (composed of several ministers and individual non-cabinet members) effectively filter out or settle issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates.

Please assess whether ministerial or cabinet committees are de facto, not only legally, able to prepare cabinet meetings. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents. The large majority of issues are reviewed and scheduled first by/for the 10 committees. 9 Most of the issues are prepared by committees. Or: Issues of political or 8 strategic importance are reviewed and scheduled by/for the committees. 7

6 There is hardly any preparation of cabinet meetings by committees. 5

4 3

There is no preparation of cabinet meetings by committees. Or: There is 2 no ministerial or cabinet committee. 1

Explanation:

As a rule, questions brought for consideration at the government meeting are first prepared

by one of the line ministries, or by a group formed of several ministries. This usually involves

a formal coordination procedure in which this group’s positions are aligned. However, after

the ministerial proposal is submitted for government consideration, it is evaluated by the

government office. The opinion of this body is as significant as the ministries’ suggestions.



M 2.5 Senior Ministry Officials How effectively do senior ministry officials prepare cabinet meetings?

This question examines whether senior ministry officials (leading civil servants or political appointees including junior ministers below the cabinet level) effectively filter out or settle issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates.

Please assess whether senior ministry officials are de facto, not only legally, able to prepare cabinet meetings. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents.

Most issues arrive in time to be reviewed and scheduled first by/for the senior 10 ministry officials (i.e., more than 70 percent of cabinet agenda items are 9 prepared). Many of the issues are prepared by senior ministry officials (i.e., 50-70 percent 8 of cabinet agenda items are prepared). 7

6 There is some preparation of cabinet meetings by senior ministry officials (i.e., 5 less than 50 percent of cabinet agenda items are prepared). 4

3 There is no or hardly any preparation of cabinet meetings by senior ministry 2 officials. 1

Explanation:

Line ministers play the principal agenda-setting role for cabinet meetings. They prepare

materials and arrange for the key speakers at these meetings. Issues are ordinarily

introduced at cabinet meetings by a minister, or sometimes (for issues of lower importance)

by a deputy minister. Some issues are brought to the cabinet meeting agenda by the prime

minister himself; in such a case, one of his deputies acts as the speaker.



M 2.6 Line Ministry Civil Servants

How effectively do line ministry civil servants coordinate policy proposals? This question refers to administrative coordination and examines to what extent civil servants of individual ministries effectively coordinate the drafting of policy proposals with other ministries so that political coordination bodies and the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates.

In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents. Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by civil servants. 10

9 Many policy proposals are coordinated by civil servants. 8

7 6

There is some coordination of policy proposals by civil servants. 5

4 3

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by civil servants. 2

1

Explanation:

As a rule, the work of coordination as government decisions are prepared is carried out by

ranking ministry officials, usually at the deputy minister or departmental director level. This is

true both of intraministerial and interministerial activities.

However, the cabinet regularly interferes in the details of policy (a process called “manual

control” by Prime Minister Putin), and often focuses more on struggles between narrow

interests than on broader visions or the public interest. Moreover, many strategic–level policy

elements, such as the fight against corruption, the promotion of research and development,

or national projects for infrastructure and health care development, fail as a result of

inefficient implementation.



M 2.7 Informal Coordination Procedures

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms work?

This question examines whether there are informal coordination mechanisms (examples: coalition committees, informal meetings within government or with party groups, informal meetings across levels of government) which effectively filter out or settle issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates? Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by informal mechanisms. 10

9 Many policy proposals are coordinated by informal mechanisms. 8

7 6

There is some coordination of policy proposals by informal mechanisms. 5

4 3

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by informal 2 mechanisms. 1

Explanation:

Informal mechanisms enabling the coordination of decisions between ministries are not well

developed. Formal mechanisms (official correspondence, meetings followed by the

preparation of reports, etc.) are applied. It is only at the level of the prime minister that

informal coordination mechanisms are routinely applied.

The informal mechanisms that do function are more likely to promote patronage interests

than to reinforce any strategic policy focus.


M 3 Evidence-based Instruments Category: Steering Capability

M 3.1 RIA Application Does the government regularly assess the potential socioeconomic impact of the draft laws it prepares (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

If RIA activities are not centrally registered, please try to obtain exemplary information that is representative of the situation in your country. **Please Note: If RIA are not applied or do not exist, please give your country a score of “1” for this question AND for M3.2 and M3.3.

In case this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer. RIA are applied systematically to new or existing regulations, but are limited 10 to those matching defined criteria. 9 RIA are not applied systematically to study the impact of regulations. 8

7 6

RIA are applied randomly. 5

4 3

RIA are not applied or do not exist. 2

1

Explanation:

Regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) were introduced in Russia only recently. According to

most experts, they were introduced as part of the Russian government’s efforts to mitigate

the effects of the global financial crisis, which among other things revealed the need to

improve the efficiency of the government’s socioeconomic policy. The practice was

introduced by cabinet ordinance (postanovlenie) No. 336, adopted on May 15, 2010. The

mechanism created by this ordinance is based on preceding requirements to evaluate the

economic impacts of draft laws, but goes further than its predecessor. Thus, under the new

Russian RIA system, each legislative issue is required to be approved by the cabinet’s

Commission on Administrative Reform. In the first four months after its introduction, the RIA

mechanism produced negative verdicts on 140 out of 292 issues under consideration (48%)

(The Vedomosti, Nov. 2, 2011, No. 24 (2790)). Of sectors with more than 15 issues

considered, the highest rates of approval were achieved by the transportation and

communications sector (57 out of 70), health care and social services (14 out of 23) and


finance (14 out of 19); the lowest approval rates were seen in manufacturing (14 out of 41),

agriculture, forestry and fisheries (15 out of 40) and construction (14 out of 39).

Most experts assess the newly established RIA process as one of most useful mechanisms

currently aimed at bolstering the government’s efficiency.

Bolstering RIA’s claim to efficacy has been the addition of an additional mechanism, in this

case a type of retroactive RIA process (Cabinet Ordinance No. 633, adopted on July 29,

2011, “On Expertise of Normative Legal Acts of Federal Executive Agencies, to Reveal

Norms Creating Excessive Barriers to Entrepreneurial Activities”). This procedure requires

the government to engage in an RIA-style evaluation of acts adopted before the introduction

of RIA if the business community has complained that they impose excessive regulation.

The major problem with RIA is that it is applied not only to draft laws, but also to executive

regulations. Once a draft law initiated by the executive reaches the legislature, subsequent

amendments are not required to be subjected to RIA. Yet even with these weaknesses, the

very fact of RIA’s introduction and the proofs of its practical use constitute a significant

positive development in Russia’s management efficiency.



M 3.2 Needs Analysis To what extent do RIA analyze the purpose of and need for a regulation?

This question seeks to assess the analytical depth of RIA. Please try to obtain exemplary information that is representative of the situation in your country. In case this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer. RIA define the purpose of and need for a regulation in a clear, concise and 10 specific manner. 9 RIA mention the purpose of and need for a regulation, but the specification 8 is not sufficiently clear, concise and/or well-defined. 7

6 RIA mention the purpose of and the need for a regulation, but do not specify. 5

4 3

RIA do not analyze the purpose of and the need for a regulation. 2

1

Explanation:

As a part of the RIA procedure, evaluators are required to provide justification for any new

piece of legislation or regulatory norm. However, within today’s prevailing bureaucratic

culture, internal evaluation is not ever expected to find that the proposed government action

is not needed; rather, the evaluation is expected to start with justifying the proposal (even if

in a “ritualistic” manner). However, the statistics provided above in “RIA application” suggest

that RIA is a real rather than a formal evaluation mechanism.

It should be noted, however, that a negative RIA verdict does not kill the proposed new norm

outright, but rather returns it to the authors for improvement, a process also rooted in

Russian bureaucratic culture. No statistics are available detailing how many issues originally

rejected as a result of RIA were ultimately reintroduced with improvements for a second

assessment.



M 3.3 Alternative Options

To what extent do RIA analyze alternative options?

This question seeks to assess the scope of RIA. Please try to obtain exemplary information that is representative of the situation in your country. In case this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer. RIA analyze alternative options (including “do nothing”) and quantify the 10 costs and benefits of the different alternatives. 9 RIA highlight alternative options and consider the pros and cons of each 8 option. 7 6 RIA consider some alternative options. 5 4 3 RIA do not analyze alternative options. 2 1

Explanation:

RIA has not yet been applied for enough time to enable a general evaluation of its use.

Comparing and contrasting alternate options is not a part of Russia’s bureaucratic culture.

Rather, the basic approach is to evaluate existing drafts, not speculate about different

scenarios. However, the procedure of turning down a draft de facto presupposes an

alternative option. The RIA “verdict” ordinarily lists specific inconsistencies in the draft and

returns the proposal to the authors for correction, which implies that the possibility of

alternatives has been considered.


M 4 Social Consultation Category: Steering Capability

M 4.1 Negotiating Public Support To what extent does the government consult with trade unions, employers’ associations, leading business associations, religious communities, and social and environmental interest groups to support its policy?

This question assesses how successfully the government consults with economic and social actors in preparing its policy. Successful consultation is conceived here as an exchange of views and information that increases the quality of government policies and induces economic and social actors to support them. The government successfully motivates economic and social actors to support 10 its policy. 9 The government facilitates the acceptance of its policy among economic and 8 social actors. 7

6 The government consults with economic and social actors. 5

4 3

The government hardly consults with any economic and social actors. 2

1

Explanation:

Two different types and modes of government consultation with economic and social actors

can be identified in Russia.

First, the government does interact with “genuine” interest groups. This category includes

three national “umbrella-type” business associations (the Russian Union of Industrialists and

Entrepreneurs, Business Russia and OPORA, a group representing small and medium-sized

enterprises), as well as numerous sectoral business associations, a limited (for such a big

and populous country) number of professional unions, small independent labor unions and

environmental, human rights, and other organizations.

The primary problem with this type of consultation is that shared by many other interactions

between the government and interest groups or civil society: the government (or the majority

in a parliament loyal to the government) does not feel obliged to take expert opinions

formulated by these interest groups into account. As with expert opinions in parliamentary

hearings (see “summoning experts”), interest groups’ technical proposals may well be


accepted by the government, but on matters of conceptual importance the government tends

to stick to the original versions of its policy proposals. NGOs critical of the government have

been excluded from dialogue between the state executive and civil society, and have on

several occasions been harassed by state agencies.

The second type of interaction is with government-oriented NGOs, the so-called GONGOs.

In Russia, this category includes the biggest labor union association (the Federation of

Independent Trade Unions), as well as umbrella organizations for women, veterans and

other social groups. In addition, Russia has a national Public Chamber, a body comprising

142 public figures from various spheres of civil society who have been handpicked by the

government, and are mostly (though not entirely) loyal to the government. The chamber has

broad formal powers to evaluate bills, monitor the executive and engage in ombuds-type

activities. The presumed loyalty of the Public Chamber allows it to bring serious issues to the

attention of the institutions of power, but the degree of “permitted” criticism is strictly limited.

To a large extent, the Public Chamber and other GONGO-type organizations imitate

consultation, creating the impression that government policies enjoy broad public support.


M 5 Policy Communication Category: Steering Capability

M 5.1 Coherent Communication To what extent does the government implement a coherent communication policy? The government effectively coordinates the communication of ministries; 10 ministries closely align their communication with government strategy. 9 The government seeks to coordinate the communication of ministries 8 through consultation procedures. Contradictory statements are rare, but do 7 occur. 6 The ministries are responsible for informing the public within their own 5 particular areas of competence; their statements occasionally contradict each 4 other. 3 Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements 2 regularly contradict each other. 1

Explanation:

Ministries are responsible for informing the public on issues within their own particular areas

of competence; however, their statements occasionally contradict each other. The general

government information policy is poorly developed, and is structured primarily around the

prime minister’s public statements. The problem of “selling” policies to the public is often

poorly resolved; the government decision-making process often lacks any assessment of

prospective public reaction.

As a result, a number of government decisions have met with broad public protests as a

result of poor communication (e.g., the introduction of new high school education standards).


M 6 Effective Implementation Category: Policy Implementation

M 6.1 Government Efficiency To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

This question seeks to evaluate a government’s implementation performance against the performance benchmarks set by the government for its own work. The assessment should therefore focus on the major policy priorities identified by a government and examine whether declared objectives could be realized.

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives. 10

9 The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives 8 or can implement some of its policy objectives. 7

6 The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement 5 several policy objectives. 4

3 The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives. 2

1

Explanation:

The government’s ability to attain anticipated policy objectives is often undermined by its own

failure to implement decisions in full. This can be attributed to several factors, including:

• the poor quality or lack of strategic long- and middle-term planning. Even positive

government activities tend to have a “tactical” nature, and thus fail to produce lasting

improvements in governance quality;

• insufficient interministerial coordination (in a sense, a direct consequence of the previous

point);

• tendencies to prioritize departmental and ministerial interests over the interests of the

government as a whole; and

• rampant corruption throughout significant segments of the government machinery.

As a result of these factors, the government is only successful if policies are directly

supported by the president or prime minister, and can be implemented by a small

technocratic team. The oil funds, anti-monopoly regulation and central bank policies all show

that policy can be successfully implemented under such conditions.


M 6 Effective Implementation

Category: Policy Implementation

M 6.2a Ministerial Compliance To what extent does the organization of government ensure that ministers do not seek to realize their self-interest but face incentives to implement the government’s program?

Organizational devices providing incentives for ministers include prime ministerial powers over personnel, policies or structures, coalition committees, party summits, comprehensive government programs/coalition agreements and cabinet meetings. In case this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer. The organization of government successfully provides strong incentives for 10 ministers to implement the government’s program. 9 The organization of government provides weak incentives for ministers to 8 implement the government’s program. 7

6 The organization of government partly prevents ministers from realizing 5 departmental self-interests. 4

3 The organization of government fails to prevent ministers from realizing 2 departmental self-interests. 1

Explanation:

The role of the prime minister in the government is very strong. He relies on the powerful

government office (apparat), which serves the prime minister both in terms of analyzing

substantive issues and in an oversight role. Ministers’ independence is thus strongly limited

by government procedures and internal statutes, as well as the hierarchical system of formal

oversight.

This said, the poor quality of many government decisions and the absence of effective long-

term programs create ample loopholes enabling ministries and ministers to pursue their own

narrow departmental interests, to the detriment of the overall government interest.



M 6.2b Monitoring Line Ministries How effectively does the government office / prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities?

This question assumes that effective delegation from the core executive to ministries is reflected in the monitoring of line ministry activities by the administration of the core executive. While such monitoring is not sufficient to prevent line ministries from prioritizing sectoral over government interests, the presence or absence of monitoring is taken here as a proxy of effective delegation policies. In case this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer. The GO / PMO effectively monitors the activities of line ministries. 10

9 The GO / PMO monitors the activities of most line ministries. 8

7 6 The GO / PMO shadows the activities of some line ministries. 5

4 3

The GO / PMO does not monitor the activities of line ministries. 2

1

Explanation:

The government office engages in formal oversight procedures to monitor the activity of all

ministries. This enables the collection of a large amount of information on ministry work.

However, the mere availability of this information does not guarantee that the prime minister

and his deputies will make effective and coordinated administrative decisions.



M 6.2c Monotoring Agencies How effectively do ministries monitor the activities of executive agencies?

An effective implementation may be constrained by bureaucratic drift. To ensure that agencies act in accordance with government policies, this question assumes that ministries and their leading officials should monitor the activities of semi-autonomous executive agencies in their task area. In federal states with few executive agencies at the central level of government, the assessment should also consider regional-level decentralized agencies acting on behalf of the federal government. The ministries effectively monitor the activities of all executive agencies. 10

9 The ministries monitor the activities of most of the executive agencies. 8 7 6 The ministries monitor the activities of some executive agencies. 5

4 3

The ministries do not monitor the activities of executive agencies. 2

1

Explanation:

The ministries supervise the whole structure of government services and agencies very

tightly and rigidly. Moreover, no service or agency head can be appointed without the

consent of the supervising minister; deputy chiefs within all services and agencies are also

appointed directly by the minister.

However, this does not imply that state agencies work efficiently. In many cases,

bureaucratic procedures, incompetence and corruption limit the implementation capacity of

state agencies. State agencies, particularly those related to taxation, environmental

legislation, and food and sanitation, are sometimes used by the government to exert

politically motivated pressure on businesses.



M 6.3a Task Funding To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

A high or low degree of decentralization as such does not constitute a meaningful indicator of executive capacity. Rather, this question focuses on the delegation problem associated with decentralization. If the central government delegates a public task to lower levels of government (as a rule: regional self-government and in unitary states without regional self-government, local self-government), the central government needs to ensure that such tasks are adequately funded. The absence of corresponding funding sources (“unfunded mandates”) indicates a lack of responsibility and strategic design. Funding may be provided through grants (shares of centrally collected taxes) from the central budget or by endowing subnational self-governments with their own revenues.

Please note that subnational self-government refers to directly elected subnational administrative authorities with considerable discretion. The broad concept of “delegation” applied here is taken from principal-agent theory and includes independent powers of subnational self-government enshrined in the constitution. Thus, no difference is made between independent powers and those central government powers that have been delegated by laws or executive regulations to subnational self-government. The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all 10 their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing 9 adequate revenue-raising powers. The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of 8 their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing 7 adequate revenue-raising powers. 6 The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates 5 to subnational governments. 4 3 The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to 2 subnational self-governments. 1

Explanation:

Russia is a federal state; throughout this section and the following we will therefore discuss

both regional and local self-governing bodies (townships, villages, districts, etc.). The

situation for these two types of center-periphery relations are different in many important

respects.


Russian federalism is often criticized for an extreme centralization of both political and

economic powers within the central government, to the detriment of the regions. The share of

the center in the consolidated (federal and regional) budget has grown over the past decade,

to reach almost 60 percent; however, the problem of unfunded mandates has been minimal,

as regional government powers rely in most cases on appropriate locally generated

revenues, or on subventions from the federal budget.

At the same time, this situation leads to two types of problems:

• With excessive centralization, regional governments lose incentives to improve their local

business or investment climates, or to optimize their own expenses (because of their

dependence on subventions from the center);

• Following the economic crisis, the federal government has tended to delegate either tax-

raising (such as automobile transport tax) or tariff (e.g., for housing and utilities) powers to

the regions. This has partially served to resolve the previous problem, but has also forced

regional governments to choose between creating de facto unfunded mandates or making

unpopular decisions.

A new law law on local government (fully active since 2009) established a clear legal and

institutional base for this level of public authority, and more clearly defined its spheres of

competence. However, these spheres are not adequately matched by revenues generated at

or transferred to the local level. This thus implies an overall dependence by local government

on the regional government, and creates numerous unfunded mandates, particularly in

underdeveloped districts, townships and villages.



M 6.3b Constitutional Discretion

To what extent does central government ensure that substantial self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion? As a high or low degree of decentralization as such does not constitute a meaningful indicator of executive capacity, this question takes the constitutional scope of regional self-government or, in unitary states without regional self-government, local self-government autonomy, as a point of reference. Central government institutions are assumed to enable subnational self-governments to use this autonomy fully. Subnational autonomy may be curtailed by legal, administrative, fiscal or political measures of the central level. Such de facto centralizing policies may be deliberate or unintentional, unconstitutional or in accordance with the constitution. The central government enables subnational self-governments to use 10 their constitutional scope of discretion fully. 9 Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational 8 self-governments’ scope of discretion. 7 6 The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy 5 of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of 4 discretion. 3 The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments 2 from making use of their constitutionally provided autonomy. 1

Explanation:

As discussed under “task funding,” the considerable centralization of political and budgetary

powers in the center renders regional governments excessively dependent on the federal

government, and deprives them of incentives to increase efficiency and improve their

regional business climate.

In relations between regional governments and local authorities, the same problem is further

aggravated by an inadequate fiscal revenue base, which precludes less affluent localities

from fully acquitting their responsibilities.



M 6.3c National Standards To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national standards of public services?

This question seeks to assess how central government ensures that the decentralized provision of public services complies with standards (rules, performance figures, etc.) agreed upon and set on the national level. Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments 10 meet national standards of public services. 9 Central government ensures largely that subnational self-governments meet 8 national standards of public services. 7

6 Central government ensures that subnational self-governments meet 5 national minimum standards of public services. 4

3 Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments meet 2 national standards of public services. 1

Explanation:

With the reservation that national standards of public service are not fully developed, the

regional level of government has a civil service comparable in competence and

professionalism with the federal level. Levels of professional education and training,

remuneration, career practices and evaluation norms are compatible for federal and regional

government employees.

However, civil service competence at the local government level is very uneven. The new

law on self-government requires bigger and more competent civil service apparatuses at the

lower levels of public authority, but these standards are difficult to meet in rural areas and

small townships.


M 7 Adaptability Category: Institutional Learning

M 7.1 Domestic Adaptability To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

Government structures include the organization of ministries, the cooperation among ministries and in cabinet, the center of government and relations with subnational levels of government. This question asks whether these structures have been adapted to address inter / supranational developments and their effects for policy formulation and policy implementation. Please note that structural reforms are also studied in view of their role in institutional learning (question M 8.2). The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic 10 government structures to international and supranational developments. 9 The government has largely adapted domestic government structures 8 to international and supranational developments. 7

6 The government has partly adapted domestic government structures 5 to international and supranational developments. 4

3 The government has not adapted domestic government structures. 2

1

Explanation:

Russia is a member of the G-8, the G-20, and many other international economic and

financial organizations. The WTO accession process was nearly complete as of the time of

writing, and Russia will become a full member in 2012.

The government’s functional structure is thus close to what is common in international

practice. It allows quick adaptation of government structures to new trends and challenges,

at least in the sense that the government machinery can at any given point cooperate and

interact with inter- or supranational bodies.

However, this observation concerns the “external” dimension of such activity, and does not

automatically imply the growing efficiency of “domestic” governance (see “institutional

reform”).


M 7 Adaptability Category: Institutional Learning

M 7.2 International Coordination

To what extent does the government participate in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives?

This question evaluates whether the government actively collaborates in reform initiatives promoted by international fora or organizations. The underlying assumption is that – given the transnational integration of modern states – executive capacity increasingly depends on whether a government is able to actively participate in international institutions and in shaping international policies.

Joint reform initiatives concern challenges or problems that cannot be mastered unilaterally by an individual country and that aim to facilitate international cooperation in fields such as international security, economic development, social progress, human rights issues or environmental protection.

The government actively participates in the international coordination of joint 10 reform initiatives as often as possible. 9 The government often participates in the international coordination of joint 8 reform initiatives. 7

6 The government selectively and sporadically participates in the international 5 coordination of joint reform initiatives. 4

3

The government does not participate in the international coordination of joint 2 reform initiatives. 1

Explanation:

The government regularly participates in the international coordination of joint reform

initiatives. This takes the form of Russia’s active participation in the G-8, the G-20, the World

Bank, the United Nations and its various agencies (International Labor Organization, World

Health Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, etc.). Russia’s role differs from

area to area and from organization to organization, however; for instance, Russia is

comparatively less active on issues such as climate change and environmental protection,

but is very active in security matters. Its activity in global finance has been limited, but has

increased since the inception of the G-20. Russia’s role in setting the rules of world trade will

intensify following the completion of its WTO accession process.

Russia’s image as a spoiler of Western initiatives is mainly due to its role in the U.N. Security

Council and its objections to Western criticism of its own domestic human rights situation.

However, these highly visible cases generally have little impact on the pragmatic cooperation

taking place in other spheres.


M 8 Organizational Reform Capacity Category: Institutional Learning

M 8.1 Self Monitoring

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

Institutional arrangements include the rules of procedure and the work formats defined there, in particular the cabinet, the office of the head of government, the center of government, the portfolios of ministries, the advisory staffs of ministers and the head of government as well as the management of relations with parliament, governing parties, ministerial administration and public communication. The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and 10 effectively. 9 The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly. 8

7 6

The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and 5 sporadically monitored. 4

3 There is no monitoring. 2

1

Explanation:

The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.

Formal rules and procedures governing interaction between the various participants in the

political process are not well developed.

The situation is comparatively formalized and generally better arranged within the executive

branch of power; relations between the executive and other political institutions or non-

governmental actors are substantially less institutionalized, however.


M 8 Organizational Reform Capacity Category: Institutional Learning

M 8.2 Institutional Reform To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

For a list of institutional arrangements, see question M 8.1. Strategic capacity is the capacity to take and implement political decisions which take into account the externalities and interdependencies of policies, are based on scientific knowledge, promote common goods and represent a long-term orientation. The government improves considerably its strategic capacity by changing 10 its institutional arrangements. 9 The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional 8 arrangements. 7

6 The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its 5 institutional arrangements. 4

3 The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional 2 arrangements. 1

Explanation:

The ability of the government to improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional

arrangements is not high; nor have past efforts aimed at this goal been broadly successful.

The Russian government machinery underestimates the role of formal rules and institutes in

the functioning of all spheres of the political system. The Commission on Administrative

Reform is a standing executive body, but until recently (after the largely unsuccessful

attempted administrative reform of 2004), had limited scope of action

While the government certainly reacts to supranational changes and challenges (as

described in “domestic adaptability”), the government’s qualitative characteristics and overall

institutional arrangements tend to remain fixed.

However, some recent attempts to address this issue have been made. The most salient

example is the establishment of RIA procedures described in “RIA application.”

92 Management Index: Executive Accountability

Management Index

Executive Accountability

Citizens

M 9 Citizens’ Participatory Competence

Legislature

M 10 Structures and Resources of Parliamentary Actors

M 11 Parliamentary Accountability and Oversight

Intermediary Organizations

M 12 Media

M 13 Parties and Interest Associations


M 9 Citizens´ Participatory Competence Category: Citizens

M 9.1 Policy Knowledge To what extent are citizens informed of government policy-making?

This question assesses the extent to which citizens have information and knowledge enabling them to evaluate government policy-making adequately. The question focuses on policies, not the personnel or political composition of government or the power struggles that often dominate government. A high level of information about policies presupposes that citizens understand the motives, objectives, effects and implications of policies. Please rely on local opinion survey data to substantiate your evaluation. Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of government policies. 10

9 Many citizens are well-informed of individual government policies. 8 7

6 Few citizens are well-informed of government policies; most citizens have 5 only a rudimental knowledge of policies. 4 3

Most citizens are not aware of government policies. 2 1

Explanation:

Rates of political participation in Russia are not high. Voter turnout rates in national elections

are between 60% and 65%, and are significantly lower in regional and local elections.

Turnout linearly declines from the older to younger age cohorts. Between elections, less than

half of Russian citizens pledge their electoral support to any political party.

In general, Russian citizens do not closely follow the details of government decisions or

policy proposals. They certainly have a rational, if vague, set of opinions about politics,

policies and politicians, but rarely translate these into support for specific measures, a

rational understanding of quantitative indicators of taxes and tariffs, or other such analytical

activities.

Public opinion in general still lacks appreciation for or perhaps fails to comprehend the

realities and “rules of the game” of the market economy, which came to Russia only two

decades ago. Though the majority of the population (even in senior-citizen age cohorts) has


adjusted to market economy conditions, polls show overwhelming support for the

nationalization of mining and large-scale manufacturing industries, tight price controls as a

primary tool for curbing inflation (for example, according to the Levada-Center, 61% of

citizens in 2010 believed that the government should “set fixed prices for most goods,

irrespective of who produced them”).

This said, analyses of public opinion and its dynamics demonstrate that the Russian public

rationally evaluates the performance of the federal and regional governments, pays attention

to positive and negative shifts in the country’s socioeconomic situation, and has clear

opinions about the impact of policies that directly influence everyday life.

The country’s new middle class, with its higher levels of education than the population at

large, its better-developed market behavior and its active use of the Internet as a source of

political information, has a much stronger, more nuanced knowledge and understanding of

government policies.

As a conclusion, we would assert that in the terms of the civic culture conceptual approach

(Almond & Verba 1965), Russia has a developed “subject” culture, which allows its citizens

to rationally evaluate the “outputs” of government activities and performance, but not the

“inputs,” – that is, their own ability to influence these policies. The latter ability, which can be

seen as an element of a “participatory culture,” is limited to a minority of citizens.


M 10 Structures and Resources of Legislative Actors

Category: Legislature

M 10.1 Number of Committees

How many parliamentary committees are there?

The underlying assumption is that a parliament with a sufficient number of committees is better able to discuss bills, whereas too many committees may lead to fragmentation. Based on comparative studies, 12 – 18 committees are considered optimal. Please consider only regular parliamentary committees, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions. Total parliamentary committees:

M 10.2 Committee Size

How many members does a parliamentary (sub-)committee have on average?

It is assumed that parliamentary committees can best respond to their task of control if they have neither too many nor too few members. Based on comparative studies, 13-25 committee members are considered optimal.

Please consider only regular parliamentary committees, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Average number of committee members:

Where subcommittees exist, average number of subcommittee members:

4

14

32/ 27


M 10 Structures and Resources of Legislative Actors Category: Legislature

M 10.3 Pro-Government Committee Chairs

How many committee chairpersons nominated by the governing party (or parties) are appointed?

This question addresses the influence of governing parties in parliament. Please consider only regular parliamentary committees, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Total nominated / appointed committee chairpersons:

M 10.4 Deputy Expert Staff

How large, on average, is the deputy’s expert support staff?

This question seeks to measure the capacities of parliamentary deputies. Expert support staff size:

M 10.6 Legislature´s Expert Staff

How many expert support staff members work for the legislature (including legislature´s library)?

This question seeks to measure the capacities of the parliament. Total parlimentary expert support staff:

26

5

450


M 11 Legislative Accountability Category: Legislature

M 11.2 Obtaining Documents

Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to obtain the documents they desire from government. Specify if you consider the rights of committees limited. This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions. Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; 10 they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame. 9 The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents 8 are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are 7 delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react 6 appropriately. The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are 5 considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered 4 incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately. 3 Parliamentary committees may not ask for government documents. 2 1

Explanation:

Most parliamentary powers scrutinized in this section are formally in place in Russia, with

well established and customary procedures. However, the Russian parliament’s supervisory

powers in relation to the state executive are generally weak. Moreover, with a solid majority

held by the governing party, the parliament is quite passive in its interaction with the

executive. An overwhelming share of bills (about 80%) is initiated either by the president or

the cabinet. The loyal Duma invariably approves such bills on a first reading, and introduces

amendments only between the first and the second readings. This mode of work is

interpreted by most independent experts and observers as “rubber-stamping” the

government’s initiatives. The quality of parliamentary deliberation and expertise has

deteriorated significantly. The Duma and its committees are empowered to ask for any

government documents and normally receive those requested.



M 11.3 Summoning Ministers

Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to summon ministers to committee meetings and to confront them with their questions. Please specify if you consider the rights of committees limited. This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly 10 follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions. 9 The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly 8 limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer 7 questions. 6 The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably 5 limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions. 4 3 Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers. 2 1

Explanation:

There are two different modes in which ministers are summoned by parliament. When a

committee considers a bill, it is customary to invite officials from the relevant executive

agencies (ministries, agencies, services). Normally such meetings are attended not by the

minister, but by the minister’s designated deputy; each ministry has a “state secretary” (a

deputy minister), whose responsibilities include interaction with the legislature.

Ministers are summoned to the Duma not by committees, but by the Duma’s steering body,

the Council of the Duma, to present reports on the ministry’s activities or on a particular

issue. Ministers normally appear as summoned. Similar practices also exist in the upper

house, the Federation Council.

According to a recent (2009) constitutional amendment, the government is required to

present annual reports on its activities to the Duma. These reports are presented in person

by the prime minister, who also answers questions and hears statements from all party

factions present in the Duma. This procedure is well established; however, the governing

party’s domination ensures that critical statements and difficult questions addressed to

executive officials are limited in time and scope.



M 11.4 Summoning Experts Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to invite experts to committee meetings. Please specify if you consider the rights of committees limited. This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions. Parliamentary committees may summon experts. 10 9 The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly 8 limited. 7 6 The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably 5 limited. 4 3 Parliamentary committees may not summon experts. 2 1

Explanation:

The practice of inviting experts to committee meetings and public hearings on legislative

issues is well established, and is regularly engaged in by all committees. Experts are free in

expressing their opinions. The problem is that the governing party’s predominance allows it

to accept or disregard experts’ opinions at will; the opposition is not strong enough to force

the majority into any serious deliberation, even if this would be based on reasonable experts’

opinions voiced at committee meetings or hearings.

Reasonable opinions on the details of legislation are often taken into account, but if members

of the governing party consider such opinions to be contrary to the conceptual thrust of their

bill, the opinions are turned down or ignored.

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Management Index: Executive Accountability


M 11.5 Task Area Coincidence

To what extent do the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries coincide?

If the task areas of parliamentary committees match the task areas of ministries, each parliamentary committee may focus on monitoring the activities of its corresponding ministry, thereby increasing the control capacity of the legislature. There are two possible ill-fitting constellations between committee and ministerial portfolios. If there are fewer committees than ministries, the committees may be overburdened with monitoring ministerial activities. If there are more committees than ministries, control responsibilities are split and the parliament may act non-cohesively.

This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions. The task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries fully coincide. 10 Parliamentary committees monitor ministries effectively. 9 The task areas of parliamentary committees do not fully correspond to the 8 task areas of ministries. Parliamentary committees are largely capable of 7 monitoring ministries. 6 The task areas of parliamentary committees do not correspond to the task 5 areas of ministries. Parliamentary committees fail to monitor ministries 4 effectively. 3 The task areas of parliamentary committees differ widely from the task 2 areas of ministries. Parliamentary committees frequently fail to monitor 1 ministries effectively.

Explanation:

With multiple changes in the structure of both the cabinet and the Duma committees over the

past 20 years, there has never been close semblance between the two structures. While

each Duma committee knows its counterparts in the executive branch of power, and does

work with these institutions, the disparities of structure do hamper the legislature’s monitoring

abilities.

Committee work does includes monitoring of ministry activities, but as stated above, the

powers of parliamentary supervision over the executive in Russia are limited, and the

preeminence of the governing party ensures that overall relations between executive and

legislature remain “friendly,” and that the Duma remains generally loyal to the executive.

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M 11.6 Audit Office

To what extent is the audit office accountable to the parliament?

This question assesses the extent to which the parliament can rely on its own auditing capacities. The audit office is accountable to the parliament exclusively. 10 9

The audit office is accountable primarily to the parliament. 8 7

6 The audit office is not accountable to the parliament, but has to report 5 regularly to the parliament. 4 3 The audit office is governed by the executive. 2 1

Explanation:

Two mutually exclusive assessments of audit office accountability can be given. Formally,

the auditors of the Chamber of Accounts (the official, though inaccurate, translation of the

federal audit office’s name) are appointed by parliament (six auditors by each of the two

houses of the Federal Assembly), and report to it as well as to the executive.

In reality, the Federal Assembly “voluntarily” amended the law on the Chamber of Accounts

in 2007, giving the president the right to nominate candidates for auditor positions, as well as

to nominate candidates for the chamber’s chairman and deputy chairman. Though the two

houses of parliament still have the formal right to approve the president’s nominees (as well

as, presumably, the right to turn them down), the strong pro-government majority in both

houses has turned this approval into a mere formality, and the parliament has thus lost the

right to nominate auditors of its own choice. This situation effectively makes the Chamber of

Accounts an arm of the executive, a kind of “internal audit office,” rather than a tool of

parliamentary control over the executive.

102



M 11.7 Ombuds Office

Does the parliament have an ombuds office?

This question asks whether parliaments have institutions that listen to the concerns of citizens, publicly advocate the issues raised by citizens and initiate governmental action to address them. The term “ombuds office” is used here as a label representing these functions and may be institutionalized in different organizational formats. Please also consider possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer. The parliament has an effective ombuds office. 10 9 The parliament has an ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited. 8 7

6 The parliament has an ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably 5 limited. 4 3 The parliament does not have an ombuds office. 2 1

Explanation:

The ombuds office in Russia is autonomous of all branches of power, but the ombudsman is

appointed by the Duma (the lower house of parliament). The appointment follows a

complicated procedure providing for the broadest support for the candidate: the

ombudsman’s nomination has to be supported by two-thirds of the parliamentary members,

after which an approval requiring a simple majority vote becomes a mere formality. However,

all three persons who have occupied this office since its inception have represented

opposition parties: first a liberal and human rights activist, second a moderate Communist,

and since 2004, a former parliamentarian from the Yabloko Party, the distinguished scholar,

diplomat and liberal parliamentarian Vladimir Lukin. Lukin’s nomination was supported by

then-President Putin and the ruling United Russia party – a deliberate move intended to

uphold the reputation of the ombudsman as an independent officeholder.

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The ombuds office performs the normal functions associated with such an institution;

however, the ability of the ombudsman to interfere and advocate on behalf of the interests of

those seeking help is limited.

According to the ombudsman’s 2010 annual report (published in May 2011), the institution

received over 57,000 appeals over the course of the year, over half of which concerned

violations of civil rights, primarily the right to court protection and fair trial. Another 25%

concerned violation of housing rights, while only 1.2% concerned the violation of political

rights. The ombuds office pursued 32% of these appeals, but on only 5% of the total number

were the rights of the applicant “fully restored.”

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M 12 Media Category: Intermediary Organizations

M 12.1 Media Reporting To what extent do the TV and radio stations in your country provide substantive indepth information on decisions taken by the government?

This question seeks to assess the extent to which the media provide contextualized information, analysis and background information that enables the broader public to evaluate the government’s decisions. For reasons of comparability and simplicity, the question focuses on:

(1) your country’s main TV and radio stations (excluding all other electronic and print media as well as pure news channels) and

(2) decisions taken by the government (and not political issues or the political process in general). A lack of in-depth information is not tantamount to a complete lack of information but to the dominance of “infotainment programs” framing government decisions as personalized power politics and diverting attention from the substance of decisions to entertaining events and stories. The main TV and radio stations every day produce high-quality information 10 programs analyzing government decisions. 9 The main TV and radio stations produce a mix of infotainment and quality 8 information programs. Programs with in-depth information on government 7 decisions comprise between five and seven hours a week. 6 The main TV and radio stations produce many superficial infotainment 5 programs. In-depth information on government decisions is limited to 4 programs lasting between three and five hours a week. 3 The main TV and radio stations are dominated by superficial infotainment 2 programs. In-depth information on government decisions is limited to 1 programs lasting between one and three hours a week.

Explanation:

The regular news programming on Russia’s main TV channels are not necessarily

“infotainment” per se, but are definitely superficial and strictly censored, so as to ensure that

the government’s decisions and activities are presented in the most favorable way. Criticism

is minimized or totally absent.

Even on analytic programs and political talk-shows, pro-government guests normally

dominate, while the presence of potential critics is carefully controlled. The anchorpersons of

such programs and shows often clearly lack impartiality, and allow the pro-government side

105


to make their point more forcefully (though the situation does differ from program to program

and from topic to topic). Therefore, we do not consider such talk shows to be serious or to

provide neutral in-depth coverage of government decisions and activities (though some are

better than others).

106


M 13 Parties and Interest Associations Category: Intermediary Organizations

M 13.1 Party Competence To what extent do the electoral programs of major parties in your country propose plausible and coherent policies?

This question seeks to assess the quality of parties’ policy proposals by analyzing the electoral programs of parties. It is assumed that programs document a party’s capacity to formulate policies and to engage in a programmatic competition with rival parties.

Two criteria of quality are given: a proposal is plausible if its underlying problem diagnosis, the suggested policy instruments/measures, policy objectives and expected policy impacts are reasonably linked with each other; a proposal is coherent if it does not contradict other proposed policies. Your evaluation will imply an assessment about whether proposed policies are likely to work, although the question is more focused on the plausibility of policy proposals. Please avoid an assessment of objectives pursued by individual parties, their appropriateness, desirability etc. “Major” parties are conceived here as parties supported by more than ten percent of the voters in the last national elections. Most electoral programs propose plausible and coherent policies. 10 9 Many electoral programs propose plausible and coherent policies. 8 7

6 Few electoral programs propose plausible and coherent policies. 5 4

3 Most electoral programs do not propose plausible or coherent policies. 2 1

Explanation:

Russia is a presidential republic with a weak parliament and no precedent for presidential

power changing hands through elections. Presidential elections constitute “defense of the

Kremlin” by the incumbent officeholder or his handpicked successor against (mostly) partisan

challengers, with a predetermined result (with the sole exception of the 1996 presidential

elections). In parliamentary elections, competition is real, but in the three most recent

electoral cycles the ultimate result was also predetermined; the governing United Russia

party was sure to win a clear majority.

107


Under these circumstances, the electoral programs of the opposition have never had a

chance to be implemented. Aware of this limitation, these parties use their programs to win

votes by addressing the concerns and desires of prospective voters (mostly paternalistic and

redistributive in nature), rather than by elaborating an alternate set of serious policy

proposals. Most such programs appear unrealistic, and are not in fact intended to be

implemented. Deliberation and debate between the pro-government and opposition parties

on the course of policy is therefore minimal.

Programs published by the ruling party or its presidential candidate tend to concentrate on

spotlighting successes achieved in various fields rather than on specific plans for the future.

Such plans are formulated in generalized slogan-type structures, with a minimum of specific

plans and figures. A culmination of such activity can be seen in United Russia’s 2011

parliamentary campaign. The party’s formal electoral program constituted a compilation of

short speeches by the incumbent president and prime minister. The announced “popular

program,” compiled by the party over the summer, was published late, received no formal

endorsement and was written in a vague and nonbinding language.

Only after the public scandal following the December 2011 elections did Vladimir Putin

promise to present a comprehensive political platform for his own presidential campaign.

However, the draft published on January 12, 2012 was just 13 pages long, with a minimum of

specific target figures or objectives.

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M 13 Parties and Interest Associations Category: Intermediary Organizations

M 13.2 Association Competence (Business)

To what extent do economic interest associations propose reasonable policies?

“Reasonable” policy proposals identify the causes of problems, rely on scholarly knowledge, are technically feasible, take into account long-term interests and anticipate policy effects. These criteria are more demanding than the criteria used to evaluate party programs as interest associations can be expected to represent a specialist, substantive policy know-how. The assessment should focus on the following interest associations: employers’ associations, leading business associations, trade unions. Most interest associations propose reasonable policies. 10 9 Many interest associations propose reasonable policies. 8 7

6 Few interest associations propose reasonable policies. 5 4 3

Most interest associations do not propose reasonable policies. 2 1

Explanation:

The number of serious economic interest associations in Russia is limited. However (see

“negotiating public support”), there are three national umbrella business associations which

do provide high-quality expert advice on business-government relations in general, as well as

on specific draft laws and regulatory documents. These umbrella associations are backed up

by sectoral business associations, some of which are more active and professional than

others.

The main problem (see “negotiating public support”) is that the government (or the majority in

parliament that is loyal to the government) does not feel obliged to take expert opinions

formulated by interest groups into account.

A recent example is offered by the Popular Program, a document drafted under the auspices

of the United Russia ruling party. The party formed a so-called All-Russia Popular Front, in

which all three umbrella business associations participated (as did trade unions).

Presumably, all submitted proposals for inclusion in the Popular Program, but there is no

publicly available information detailing the substance of such proposals, or whether or not

they were included in the program. In any case, the program has no official or binding status.

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M 13 Parties and Interest Associations

Category: Intermediary Organizations

M 13.3 Association Competence (Others) To what extent do non-economic interest associations propose reasonable policies?

“Reasonable” policy proposals identify the causes of problems, rely on scholarly knowledge, are technically feasible, take into account long-term interests and anticipate policy effects. These criteria are more demanding than the criteria used to evaluate party programs as interest associations can be expected to represent a specialist, substantive policy know-how. The assessment should focus on the following interest associations: social interest groups, environmental groups and religious communities. Most interest associations propose reasonable policies. 10 9 Many interest associations propose reasonable policies. 8 7

6 Few interest associations propose reasonable policies. 5 4

3 Most interest associations do not propose reasonable policies. 2 1

Explanation:

As discussed under “negotiating public support” and “association competence,” reasonable

policy proposals may come from a limited number of genuine noneconomic interest groups,

and to a certain degree, even from GONGO-type associations. In both cases, the impact of

such proposals is limited.

Bertelsmann Stiftung

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Bertelsmann Stiftung

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33311 Gütersloh

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Phone +49 5241 81-0

Fax +49 5241 81-681999

Dr. Daniel Schraad-Tischler

Program Evidence-based Policy Strategies

Phone +49 5241 81-81240

[email protected]

Najim Azahaf

Program Evidence-based Policy Strategies

Phone +49 5241 81-81411

[email protected]

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de

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